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THE TRUE

INTELLECTUAL SYSTEM

OF THE

UNIVERSE:

WHEREIN

ALL THE REASON AND PHILOSOPHY OF ATHEISM IS CONFUTED,
AND ITS IMPOSSIBILITY DEMONSTRATED,

WITH A TREATISE CONCERNING

ETERNAL AND IMMUTABLE MORALITY.

BY

RALPH CUDWORTH, D.D.

59915

TO WHICH ARE ADDED,

THE NOTES AND DISSERTATIONS OF DR. J. L. MOSHEIM,

TRANSLATED BY

JOHN HARRISON, M.A.

WITH A COPIOUS GENERAL INDEX TO THE WHOLE WORK.

IN THREE VOLUMES.

VOL. I.

LONDON:
PRINTED FOR THOMAS TEGG,
73, CHEAPSIDE.
1845.

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LONDON:

J. HADDON, PRINTER, CASTLE STREET, FINSBURY.

ADVERTISEMENT

TO THE PRESENT EDITION.

AMONG the English divines who flourished during the seventeenth century, the name of CUDWORTH stands pre-eminently distinguished, as the powerful opponent of Hobbes, and the worst forms of philosophical infidelity which at that period disgraced the literature of our country. As connected with the most important subject of all religion—the existence of a Divine Being, the Creator and Moral Governor of the world—THE TRUE INTELLECTUAL SYSTEM OF THE UNIVERSE will always be considered a treasury of erudition and research; as containing the greatest mass of learning and argument that ever was brought to bear upon Atheism and Pantheism. The opinions of the ancient philosophers upon the existence of a God, and the consequent necessity of a Providence, together with numerous references to all heathen and sacred antiquity, demonstrate the fertility and laborious diligence of the Author. He has not only combated all the leading features of the atheistic creed, such as the casual and eternal formation

of the world; the materiality of a thinking substance; the mortality of the soul; the fortuitous organization of the body; and the motions and gravitation of matter; but he has wisely kept perpetually before the view of the reader the true nature and design of the Christian religion, pointing out those deviations from its divine revelations which have been too frequent among philosophers in all ages. And if any theological student wishes to obtain a knowledge of all that can be said respecting liberty and necessity, fate and free-will, eternal reason and justice,—of the existence of the soul after death in a state of separate consciousness—and of the doctrine of a future state of retribution, he has only patiently to digest the Intellectual System of Dr. Cudworth. Few writers, indeed, will bring within his reach such an inexhaustible fund of classical and patristic learning to bear upon the most fundamental article of the Christian faith.

Le Clerc expressed a wish that some man of learning would translate the Intellectual System into Latin; but this design, though resolved upon and attempted by several persons in Germany, was never executed till the year 1733, when the learned Dr. Mosheim published his translation of it, accompanied with such copious and elaborate notes and illustrations, as made it a valuable accession to the sacred literature of Europe. A translation of Dr. Mosheim's notes was commenced and partially announced by Robert Studley Vidal, Esq. in his version of Mosheim's Commentaries on the Affairs of the Christians, and subsequently in a letter which appeared in the Gentleman's Magazine of November, 1818; but from some cause or other Mr.

Vidal was prevented from completing his important undertaking.

Under these circumstances, and in conformity with the publisher's wish to omit nothing which might tend to enhance the value and utility of the work, the English public is now, for the first time, supplied with an edition enriched with this important supplement; "which," as the author himself informs us, "equals, if not exceeds, in bulk the volume upon which it comments, and was written with the design of correcting incidental errors and inaccuracies, of explaining the more obscure passages, of adding cognate matters either overlooked by Dr. Cudworth or broached since his time, and lastly, of professedly discussing and explaining various arguments in the several departments of philosophy, theology, and philosophical as well as ecclesiastical history."

The importance of the Treatise concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality, as an appendix to the Intellectual System, will be obvious to every one upon a perusal of the preface of its learned editor, Bishop Chandler. It may be reckoned, as he justly observes, to be a sequel in part of his first book against material fate; many points in relation to the theologic and Stoic hypotheses of fatalism, which are but slightly touched upon in his Intellectual System, having here received a more particular and a more ample consideration.

To render the work available for occasional reference by facilitating a ready access to the vast variety of subjects contained in it, a copious alphabetical Index has been added of the whole of the materials furnished both by

Cudworth and Mosheim. "It is to be regretted," says the elegant author of the Amenities of Literature, in speaking of the first edition, "that this valuable mass of curious erudition is not furnished with an ordinary Index. A singular clue to the labyrinth the author has offered by a running head on every single one of the thousand pages, and a minutely analytical table of contents is appended to the mighty tome. This indeed impresses us with a full conception of the sublimity of the work, but our intimacy with this multitude of matters is greatly interrupted by the want of a ready reference to particulars, which an ordinary index would have afforded."

AN

ACCOUNT OF THE LIFE AND WRITINGS

OF

RALPH CUDWORTH, D.D.

BY

THOMAS BIRCH, M.A., F.R.S.

DR. RALPH CUDWORTH was the son of Dr. Ralph Cudworth, at first Fellow of Emanuel College in the University of Cambridge, and afterwards minister of St. Andrew's Church in that town, and at last rector of Aller in Somersetshire, and chaplain to King James I.* He died in August or September, 1624.† Though he was a man of genius and learning, he published only a Supplement of to Mr. William Perkins's Commentary upon St. Paul's Epistle to the Galatians, of which, as well as several other works of that divine, he was editor.

Our author's mother was of the family of Machell, and had been nurse to Prince Henry, eldest son of King James I., and after Dr. Cudworth's death, married to Dr. Stoughton.‡ Our author himself was born at Aller in the year 1617, and educated with great care by his father-in-law Dr. Stoughton, and in 1630, was admitted pensioner in Emanuel College, the doctor giving him this testimony, that

* See Dr. John Laurence Mosheim's Preface to his Latin translation of Dr. Cudworth's Intellectual System. The pages of this preface are not numbered.

† Wood, Fasti Oxon, vol. 1. col. 187. 2nd edit. London, 1721.

‡ Mosheim, ubi supra.

he was as well grounded in school learning as any boy of his age that went to the University. July 5, 1632, he was matriculated as a student in the University, and applied himself to all parts of literature with such vigour, that in 1639 he was created Master of Arts with great applause. Soon after he was chosen Fellow of his college, and became an eminent tutor there, and had at one time eight and twenty pupils; an instance scarce ever known before, even in the largest colleges of the University. Among these was Mr. William Temple, afterwards famous for his embassies and writings. Not long after he was presented to the rectory of North Cadbury in Somersetshire, worth three hundred pounds per annum.

In 1642 he published a Discourse concerning the true Notion of the Lord's Supper. It was printed at London in quarto, with only the initial letters of his name. Bochart, Spencer, Selden, and other eminent writers quote this discourse with great commendations; and my most ingenious and learned friend Mr. Warburton, in a letter of excellent remarks upon our author, which he favoured me with, styles it "a master-piece in its kind;" and observes that "he has undoubtedly given the true nature and idea of the Sacrament, and supported it with all his learning." The same year likewise appeared his treatise entitled, The Union of Christ and the Church a Shadow, by R. C., printed at London in quarto.

He took the degree of Bachelor of Divinity in the year 1644, upon which occasion he maintained at the commencement in the University the two following Theses: I. Dantur boni et mali rationes æternæ et indispensabiles: II. Dantur substantiæ incorporeæ suâ naturâ immortales. Hence it appears, that even at that time he was examining and revolving in his mind those important subjects which he so long afterwards cleared up with such uncommon penetration in his Intellectual System, and other works still preserved in manuscript.

In the same year, 1644, he was appointed Master of Clare Hall in Cambridge, in the room of Dr. Paske, who had been ejected by the Parliamentary Visitors. In 1645, Dr. Metcalf having resigned the Regius professorship of the Hebrew tongues, Mr. Cudworth was unanimously nominated

on the 15th of October by the seven Electors to succeed him. From this time he abandoned all the functions of a minister, and applied himself only to his academical employments and studies, especially that of the Jewish antiquities. And we find the following passage in a manuscript letter of Mr. John Worthington, afterwards Master of Jesus College, dated May 12, 1646: "Our learned friend Mr. Cudworth reads every Wednesday in the schools. His subject is Templum Hierosolymitanum." When his affairs required his absence from the University, he substituted Mr. Worthington in his room. March 31, 1647, he preached before the House of Commons at Westminster, upon a day of public humiliation, a sermon upon 1 John ii. 3, 4, for which he had the thanks of that house returned him on the same day. This sermon was printed the same year at Cambridge in quarto, with the following motto in the title-page, Εὐσέβει, ὦ τέκνον· ὁ γὰρ εὐσεβῶν ἄκρως Χριστιανίζει, and with a Dedication to the House of Commons, which was omitted in the second and third editions. In 1651 he took the degree of Doctor of Divinity. Though the places which he held in the University were very honourable, yet he found the revenue of them not sufficient to support him; for which reason he had thoughts of leaving Cambridge entirely, and indeed actually retired from it, though but for a short time. This appears from two manuscript letters of Mr. Worthington; the former dated January 6, 1651, where he writes thus: "If through want of maintenance he (R. C.) should be forced to leave Cambridge, for which place he is so eminently accomplished with what is noble and exemplarily academical, it would be an ill omen." In the latter dated January 30, 1654, is this passage: "After many tossings Dr. Cudworth is, through God's providence, returned to Cambridge, and settled in Christ's College, and by his marriage more settled and fixed." For upon the decease of Dr. Samuel Bolton, Master of that college, in 1654, our author was chosen to succeed him, and married the same year. In this station he spent the rest of his life, proving highly serviceable to the University and the whole church of England. In January 1656-7, he was one of the persons nominated by a committee of the parliament to be consulted about the English translation of the

Bible; as appears from the following passage of Whitelocke.*

"January 16th. At the grand committee for religion, ordered, that it be referred to a sub-committee to send for and advise with Dr. Walton, Mr. Hughes, Mr. Castell, Mr. Clark, Mr. Poulk, Dr. Cudworth, and such others as they shall think fit; and to consider of the translations and impressions of the Bible, and to offer their opinions therein to this committee; and that it be especially commended to the Lord Commissioner Whitelocke to take care of this business."

"This committee," says Whitelocke, "often met at my house, and had the most learned men in the oriental tongues to consult with in this great business, and divers excellent and learned observations of some mistakes in the translations of the Bible in English; which yet was agreed to be the best of any translation in the world. I took pains in it; but it became fruitless by the parliament's dissolution."

Our author had a great share in the friendship and esteem of John Thurloe, Esq., Secretary of State to the Protectors Oliver and Richard Cromwell, who frequently corresponded with him, and consulted with him with regard to the characters of such persons in the University as were proper to be employed in political and civil affairs. For which purpose Dr. Cudworth wrote, among others, the following letter.†

"Honoured Sir,

"I must in the first place crave your pardon for the delay of this my second letter thus long (for I suppose you have receved my former in answere to yours), which, had not some unavoidable occasions hindered me, had come sooner to your hands. Sir, I think there are divers men in the University at this time, of singular parts and accomplishments for learning; some of which are so farre engaged in divinity that they cannot well divert themselves to other professions or employments; others perhaps so much addicted to a contemplative life, that they could not so well apply themselves to politicall and civill affairs. But for those, which I conceve to be more free and undetermined, I shall here present you with a catalogue of some of their names, such as I conceve best qualified for civill employments. First, Mr. Page, a Fellow of King's Colledge, an excellent Latinist, and one that hath

* Memorials of the English Affairs, p. 654. edit. London, 1732, in folio.

† Thurloe's Manuscript State Papers, vol. 38. p. 259.

travelled abroad for above ten yeares together. He is above forty yeares of age; but how he hath been or is affected to the Parliament or present government, I cannot tell. He is now absent from the University, and, I think, at present with the Earle of Devonshire. Secondly, Dr. Bagge, Fellow of Caius College, and Doctor of Physick, a singularly good and ready Latinist; and I beleeve there is none of his yeares in England equall to him in the profession of physick. He hath excellent parts, but I know not certainly, whether being so eminent in that way (though a very young doctour) he would put himselfe upon state-employment; neither do I fully know how he is affected. There are of Trinity Colledge severall that are very good Latinists, and well furnisht with all the politer learning; as Mr. Valentine (a sober discreet man) and Mr. Linne (well known for an excellent poet).

"Mr. Mildmay of Peter-house, one whose inclination seemes to be peculiarly carried out towards politicall and civill employments, a scholar and a discreet man.

"Mr. Croone, of Emanuell Colledge, a young master of arts, of excellent good parts, and a general scholar.

"Mr. Miles, fellow of Clare Hall, formerly my pupill, one that hath no mind to professe divinity, but a very good scholar, and also a junior master of arts.

"Lastly, of Christ Colledge, there is a young man, that is master of arts this yeare, one Mr. Leigh, that for his standing is very well accomplished, and I doubt not but in a very little time would be exceedinge fitte for any such employment as you would designe him for.

"Many more names I could set down; but these may suffice for your choice; and you may, if you thinke good, enquire further concerning any of them from some others, and, if you please, from this gentleman, whom I have for that purpose desired to present this to you, Mr. George Rust,* fellow of Christ Colledge, who can further enforme and satisfy you concerning them. He is an understanding, pious, discreet man, and himselfe I know to bee a man of exceeding good parts, and a generall scholar, but one that seemes not so willing to divert himselfe from preaching and divinity, which he hath of late intended; otherwise I know his parts are such, as would enable him for any employment.

"If you please to enquire further from him, and by him signify your further pleasure to me, I shall be ready in this or any thing else, that I am able, to expresse my selfe,

"Sir,

"Your affectionately devoted friend and servant,

"R. CUDWORTH."

Dr. Cudworth likewise recommended† to the Secretary, for the place of chaplain to the English merchants at Lisbon,

* Afterwards Dean of Dromore, in Ireland.

† Thurloe's Manuscript State Papers, vol. 43. p. 329, of the printed Papers, vol. 5. p. 522, 523.

Mr. Zachary Cradock, afterwards Provost of Eaton College, and famous for his uncommon genius and learning, and his abilities as a preacher.

In January, 1658-9, he wrote the following letter to Secretary Thurloe, upon his design of publishing some Latin discourses in defence of Christianity against Judaism.*

"Sir,—Having this opportunity offered by Doctour Sclater, who desires to waite upon you, upon your kind invitation, which I acquainted him with, I could do no lesse than accompany him with these few lines to present my service to you. I am perswaded, you will be well satisfied in his ingenuity, when you are acquainted with him. Now I have this opportunity I shall use the freedom to acquaint you with another busines. I am perswaded by friends to publish some Discourses which I have prepared in Latine, that will be of a polemicall nature in defense of Christianity against Judaisme, explaining some cheef places of Scripture controverted between the Jewes and us, (as Daniel's prophecy of the seventy Weekes, never yet sufficiently cleared and improved) and withall extricating many difficulties of chronologie. Which taske I the rather undertake, not onely because it is suitable to my Hebrew profession, and because I have lighted on some Jewish writings upon the argument, as have scarcely ever been seen by any Christians, which would the better inable me fully to confute them; but also because I conceive it a worke proper and suitable to this present age. However, though I should not be able myselfe to be any way instrumental to these great transactions of providence (not without cause, hoped for of many) amongst the Jews; yet I perswade myselfe my pains may not be alltogether unprofitable for the setling and establishing of Christians; or at least I shall give an account of my spending such vacant hours as I could redeeme from my preaching and other occasions, and the perpetual distractions of the bursarship, which the statutes of this Colledge impose upon me. It was my purpose to dedicate these fruits of my studies to his Highnes (to whose noble father I was much obliged,) if I may have leave, or presume so to doe; which I cannot better understand by any than yourselfe, if you shall think it convenient, when you have an opportunity to insinuate any such thing, which I permitte wholy to your prudence. I intend, God willing, to be in London some time in March; and then I shall waite upon you to receve your information. In the meantime, craving pardon for this prolixity of mine, and freedome, I subscribe myselfe,

Your really devoted Friend
and humble servant,
R. CUDWORTH.

Christ's Coll. Cambridge, Jan. 20, 1658.

The discourse concerning Daniel's Prophecy of the LXX

* Thurloe's Manuscript State Papers, vol. 63. p. 43.

Weeks, mentioned in this letter, and which is still extant in manuscript, is highly commended by Dr. Henry More, in his Preface, sect. 18. p. xvi. to his Explanation of the Grand Mystery of Godliness, printed at London, 1660, in folio, where he observes, that Dr. Cudworth in that discourse, which was read in the public schools of the university, had undeceived the world, which had been misled too long by the overgreat opinion they had of Joseph Scaliger; and that taking Funccius's Epocha, he had demonstrated the manifestation of the Messiah to have fallen out at the end of the sixty-ninth week, and his passion in the midst of the last, in the most natural and proper sense thereof; "which demonstration of his is of as much price and worth in theology, as either the circulation of the blood in physic, or the motion of the earth in natural philosophy."

Upon the Restoration of King Charles II. he wrote a copy of verses, published in Academiæ Cantabrigiensis ΣΩΣΤΡΑ, sive ad Carolum II. reducem de regnis ipsi, musis per ipsum restitutis, gratulatio, printed at Cambridge, 1660, in quarto. In 1662 he was presented by Dr. Gilbert Sheldon, Bishop of London, to the vicarage of Ashwell, in Hertfordshire,* to which he was admitted on the first of December that year.

In the beginning of the year 1665 he had a design to publish a discourse concerning Moral Good and Evil, as appears from the following extracts of letters written by him and by Dr. Henry More, Fellow of his college.†

Dr. Cudworth in a Letter to Dr. John Worthington, Jan. 1664-5.

"You know, I have had this designe concerning Good and Evil, or Natural Ethicks, a great while; which I begun above a year agoe (when I made the first sermon in the chapel about the argument), to study over anew, and dispatch a discourse about it. No man had so frequently exhorted me to it, and so earnestly, as this friend. But about three months since unexpectedly he told me on a suddain he had begun a discourse on the same argument. The next day in writing I imparted my mind more fully and plainly to him. Whereupon he came to me, and told me he would speak with me about it after a day or two. So he did; and then excused the business; that he could not tell whether I would dispatch and finish it or no, because I had

* Newcourt, Repertorium, vol. ii. p. 462.

† Communicated by my very learned friend, Mr. John Ward, F.R.S. and Professor of Rhetoric in Gresham College.

been so long about it; that Mr. Fullwood and Mr. Jenks had sollicited him to do this; and that you were very glad that he would undertake it. But now he understood I was resolved to go through with it, he was very glad of it; that he would desist, and throw his into a corner. All this I impart to you privately, because a common friend. I have not spoken to any body else but Mr. Standish, and something to Mr. Jenks and Fullwood."

Dr. H. More in a Letter to Dr. Worthington, Jan. 24, 1664-5.

"I understand by Mr. Standish's letter, that he unawares speaking to the master* of my Enchiridion Ethicum, he shewed again his disgust, &c.; that if I persisted in the resolution of publishing my book he would desist in his, though he had most of it then ready to send up to be licensed that week. I pray you spur him up to set his to the press. For my part, it is well known I have no designe at all but to serve the publick; and that I entered upon the task extreamly against my own will, and yet I have finished it all but a chapter. Whether, or when, I shall publish it, I shall have leisure enough to consider."

Dr. More in a Letter to Dr. Worthington, Feb. 7, 1664-5.

"Some few friends at Cambridge were exceedingly earnest with me to write a short ethicks, alledging no small reason for it. I did not only heartily reject them more than once, but with great zeal, if not rudeness, alledging several things, which were too long to write, indeed in a manner villifying the project, preferring experience of life before all such fine systems; alledging also, that Dr. Cudworth had a design for the greatest curiosity of that subject. But nothing would content them but my setting upon the work; that it was uncertain, when Dr. Cudworth's would come out; and besides, mine being a small treatise, running through the whole body of ethicks, they would interfere one with another. For my part, till I had by chance told Dr. Cudworth of my purpose (which I did simply, thinking nothing), and how many chapters I had finished, I knew nothing either of the time, or the scope of his writing, or if he intended a general ethicks. But the effect of those friends' earnestness (to tell you plainly how the case stood) was this: A day or two after their last importunity, I waking in the morning, and some of their weightiest allegations recurring to my mind; and also remembring, with what an excessive earnestness one of them sollicited me to this work (in which I thought there might be something more than ordinary, and that he was actuated in this business I knew not how), I began seriously to think with myself of the matter; and at last was so conscientiously illaqueated therein, that I could not absolutely free myself therefrom to this very day. Nor was this only an act of mere conscience, but of present self-denial. For it did very vehemently cross other great and innocent pleasures that I promised myself in a certain order of my studies, which I had

* Dr. Cudworth.

newly proposed to myself at that very time. But when I was once engaged, I proceeded not without some pleasure."

Dr. More, in a Letter to Dr. Worthington, May 10, 1665.

"I thank you for your freedom both to him and to me. It never came into my mind to print this Enchiridion, till his book was out, unless he would have professed his like of the project. I have new transcribed it all. Mr. Jenks and Mr. Fullwood are exceeding earnest to see it, and would transcribe it for their present satisfaction. But if they should do so, and it be known, it would, it may be, disgust Dr. Cudworth, whom I am very loth any way to grieve. But if yourself have a mind to see it, and could get a fair and true copy transcribed of it, I would willingly pay the transcriber, and the copy should be yours; for I am loth, that what I have writ on so edifying a subject, should be lost."

Irreligion began now to lift up its head; but the progress of it was opposed by no person with greater force and learning than by our author. For this purpose in 1678, he published at London, in folio, his "True Intellectual System of the Universe:" the first part, wherein all the reason and philosophy of atheism is confuted, and its impossibility demonstrated." The Imprimatur by Dr. Samuel Parker, Chaplain to Archbishop Sheldon, is dated May 29, 1671, seven years before the publication of this work; which met with great opposition from some of the courtiers of king Charles II., who endeavoured to destroy the reputation of it, when it was first published.* Nor has it escaped the censures of writers of different parties since that time.

The first piece which appeared against it, was from a Roman Catholic, in A Letter to Mr. R. Cudworth, D.D., printed at the end of a tract, entitled: Anti-Haman, or an Answer to Mr. G. Burnet's Mystery of Iniquity unvailed: wherein is showed the Conformity of the Doctrine, Worship, and Practice of the Roman Catholic Church with those of the purest times; the Idolatry of the Pagans is truly stated, and the Imputation of Pagan Idolatry clearly confuted; and the Reasons are given why Catholics avoid the the Communion of the Protestant Church. To which is annexed a Letter to R. Cudworth, D.D. by W. E., Student

* Vide Joannis Clerici Vitam, ad ann. 1711. p. 129. Edit. Amstelod. 1711. in octavo.

in Divinity. With leave of Superiors; 1679, in octavo. This writer attacks Dr Cudworth's assertion, that though very few of the ancient philosophers thought God to be corporeal, as Epicurus, Strato, &c., yet that the greatest part of them believed him to be a pure Spirit, and adored the only true God under the names of Jupiter, Minerva, Osiris, and Venus. In opposition to which his antagonist maintains,* "that although all Pagans (nay, all men) had naturally a knowledge of the true God, yet those they adored were men:" in support of which he urges four proofs taken, 1. From the diversity of their Sexes; 2. From their Generation; 3. From their Death; 4. From their Rites. He likewise attempts to confute what Dr. Cudworth has strenuously defended throughout his book, that the unity of God was a prime article of the Pagan creed.

But let us now see in how severe a manner he was treated even by a Protestant divine, Mr. John Turner, in his Discourse of the Messiah.† He tells us,‡ "we must conclude Dr. Cudworth to be himself a Tritheistic, a sect for which I believe he may have a kindness, because he loves hard words; or something else without either stick or trick, which I will not name, because his book pretends to be written against it." And again,§ that the most that charity itself can allow the Doctor, if it were to step forth and speak his most favourable character to the world, is, that he is an Arian, a Socinian, or a Deist."

Mr. Dryden likewise tells us,‖ that our author "has raised such strong objections against the being of a God and Providence, that many think he has not answered them." And the late Earl of Shaftesbury, in his Moralists, a Rhapsody,¶ has the following passage: "You know the common fate of those who dare to appear fair authors. What was that pious and learned man's case, who wrote the Intellectual System of the Universe? I confess it was pleasant enough to consider, that though the whole world were no less satisfied with his capacity and learning, than

* P. 335. &c. † See p. 16. 17. 19. 162. edit. London, 1685. in 8vo.
‡ P. 17. § P. 19.
‖ Dedication of his Translation of Virgil's Æneid, vol. 2. p. 378. edit. London, 1730, in octavo.
¶ Part 2. sect. 3. Characteristics, vol. 2. p. 262. edit. London, 1737. in octavo.

with his sincerity in the cause of the Deity, yet was he accused of giving the upper hand to the Atheists, for having only stated their reasons and those of their adversaries fairly together."

Such was the treatment which our great author received for his immortal volume; wherein, as Mr. Warburton says,* "with a boldness uncommon indeed, but very becoming a man conscious of his own integrity, and of the truth and evidence of his cause, he launched out into the immensity of the Intellectual System; and at his first essay penetrated the very darkest recesses of antiquity, to strip Atheism of all its disguises, and drag up the lurking monster to conviction. Where, though few readers could follow him, yet the very slowest were able to unravel his secret purpose—to tell the world—that he was an Atheist in his heart, and an Arian in his book. However, thus ran the popular clamour against this excellent person. Would the reader know the consequence? Why, the zealots inflamed the bigots:

'Twas the time's plague, when madmen led the blind:

The silly calumny was believed; the much injured author grew disgusted; his ardour slackened; and the rest and far greatest part of the defence never appeared."

The same gentleman, likewise, in his letter to me above cited, observes, that among the other excellencies of this work, "all his translations from the Greek writers are wonderfully exact, and a vast judgment and penetration shown in explaining their sense."

In 1706 there was published at London, in two volumes in quarto, an abridgment of the Intellectual System under this title: A Confutation of the Reason and Philosophy of Atheism: being in a great measure either an Abridgment, or an Improvement, of what Dr. Cudworth offered to that purpose in his True Intellectual System of the Universe. Together with an Introduction, in which, among accounts of other matters relating to this Treatise, there is an impartial examination of what that learned Person advanced touching the Christian doctrine of a Trinity in Unity, and

* Preface to the second volume of his Divine Legation of Moses, p. 10, 11, 12.

the Resurrection of the Body. By Thomas Wise, B.D., Fellow of Exeter College, in Oxford, and Chaplain to his Grace the Duke of Ormond.

In the Introduction, Mr. Wise styles Dr. Cudworth's book "the vastest magazine of reasoning and learning that ever singly appeared against Atheism;" and then examines his notions concerning the Trinity and the resurrection of the body. With regard to the former, he observes that Dr. Cudworth having laid down a general proposition, that the Heathens universally held but one unmade independent God, comes to show, that the Platonists in particular maintained an unity of the Godhead in their three divine hypostases, viz., mônad or good, mind, and soul, notwithstanding that they owned these three hypostases to be numerically distinct, or to have distinct singular essences of their own. To vindicate the Platonists in this point, he tells us, that "the ancient orthodox Fathers of the Christian church were generally of no other persuasion than this, that that essence or substance of the Godhead which all the three persons or hypostases agree in, as each of them is God, was not one singular or individual, but only one common or universal essence or substance."

"This," says Mr. Wise, "and other assertions of the like nature in Dr. Cudworth's Intellectual System, have made so much noise in the world, that there has hardly been a pamphlet or book written for some years about the blessed Trinity, especially in England, and in the heterodox way, which does not bring in Dr. Cudworth upon the stage, and vouch his name and quotations for its purpose. While on the other hand, the truly orthodox, (though often through a misunderstanding of his sense) do aim at his doctrine as a mark of their invectives; and others, who call themselves also by that name, entertaining no little veneration for the very words used by the ancient Fathers, especially when repeated and revived by so learned a person as Dr. Cudworth, and resolving whatever should come of it, to stand by them, have unhappily fallen into a kind of Tritheism." Mr. Wise therefore endeavours, as much as possible, to clear up and justify our author's doctrine. However, Mr. Robert Nelson, in his Life of Bishop Bull,* declares, that Dr.

* Sect. 61. p. 339, 340. edit. London, 1714. in octavo.

Cudworth's notion with regard to the Trinity was the same with Dr. Samuel Clarke's, and represents it in the following terms: "That the three Persons of the Trinity are three distinct spiritual substances, but that the Father alone is truly and properly God; that he alone in the proper sense is supreme; that absolute supreme honour is due to him only; and that he, absolutely speaking, is the only God of the universe, the Son and Spirit being God but only by the Father's concurrence with them, and their subordination and subjection to him." But to return to Mr. Wise; he next considers our author's opinion about the Resurrection, who, as appears from several passages of his Intellectual System, thought, that the resurrection body will not consist of the same substance with that which was buried; and that it will not be a body of flesh, but an ethereal one; and that the present body is only a seed of the resurrection. However, Mr. Wise shows from other passages in his works, that he has as plainly asserted the resurrection of the same numerical body, as in some places he has denied it.

In the year 1703, &c., Monsieur Le Clerc gave large extracts of the "Intellectual System" in his "Bibliotheque Choisie," tom. i. ii. iii. v. vii. viii. ix. which engaged him in a dispute with Monsieur Bayle, concerning Dr. Cudworth's notion of plastic natures. Monsieur Bayle, in his "Continuation des Pensées diverses sur les Cometes,* had observed, that "the Atheists are very much perplexed, how to account for the formation of animals, which they ascribed to a cause, which was not conscious of what it did, and yet followed a regular plan, without knowing according to what laws it went to work. But Dr. Cudworth's plastic nature, and Dr. Grew's vital principle† are exactly in the same case; and thus they take away the whole strength of this objection against the Atheists. For if God could communicate such a plastic power, it follows, that it is not inconsistent with the nature of things that there be such agents. They may therefore exist of themselves, will the adversary say; whence it would also follow, that the regularity which we observe in the universe may be the effect of a blind cause, which was not conscious of what it did." Mr. Bayle

* Tom. i. sect. 21.

† See Dr. Nehemiah Grew's Cosmologia Sacra, printed at London, 1701. in folio.

however owned, that Dr. Cudworth and Dr. Grew were not aware of the consequence, which according to him, followed from their system. Monsieur Le Clerc returned an answer in the fifth volume of his "Bibliotheque Choisie;"* wherein he observed, that the plastic or vital natures, which those two writers admit, cannot in the least favour the Atheists; because these natures are only instruments in the hand of God, and have no power nor efficacy but what they receive from him who rules and directs all their actions. That they are only instrumental causes produced and employed by the chief and first Cause; and that it cannot be said, that a palace has been built up without art, because not only hammers, rules, saws, &c., but even the arms of men, which made use of these intruments, are destitute of knowledge. It is sufficient, that the mind of the builder directed all these things, and employed them in the execution of his design. It is therefore plain, that the Atheists, who deny the being of an intelligent cause, cannot retort the argument of Dr. Cudworth and Dr. Grew upon them. Monsieur Bayle, in his answer,† endeavoured to show, that if these writers had considered the plastic natures only as instruments in the hand of God, this system would have been exposed to all the difficulties to which the Cartesian hypothesis is liable, and which they intend to avoid. That therefore we must suppose their opinion to have been, that these natures are active principles, which do not want to be continually set on and directed; but that it is sufficient, if God does but put them in a proper situation, and superintend their actions, to set them right, if it be necessary. This being the case, Monsieur Bayle pretends, that the argument may be retorted against those writers. For, says he, since when the order and regularity of this world are alleged as a proof of the being of a God, it is supposed, that a being cannot produce a regular work without having an idea of it; yet, according to Dr. Cudworth, the plastic natures which produce plants and animals have not the least idea of what they do. If it be answered, that they have been created with that faculty by a Being who knows all, and whose ideas they only put in execution; the Stra-

* Page 283. &c.

† Hist. des Ouvrages des Sçavans, Août 1704. art. 7. p. 380. &c.

tonician will reply, that if they do it only as efficient causes, this is as incomprehensible as that which is objected to him; since it is as difficult for any being to perform a scheme which it does not understand, but which another understands, as it is to perform a scheme which no being at all has any notion of. Since you acknowledge, will the Stratonician say, that God could endow some creatures with a power of producing excellent works, though without any knowledge, you most also confess, that there is no necessary connexion between the power of producing excellent works, and the idea and knowledge of their essence and of the manner of producing them: consequently you ought not to assert, that these things cannot subsist separately in nature, and that nature cannot have of itself what, according to you, the plastic beings received from God. In short, Monsieur Bayle asked, whether these writers maintained that the plastic and vital natures are only passive instruments in the hand of God, as Monsieur Le Clerc seemed to suppose by his comparison of an architect. Monsieur Le Clerc answered,* that, according to Dr. Cudworth, the plastic natures were not passive instruments; but that they are under God's direction, who conducts them, though we cannot explain after what manner. Nor can the Atheists, added he, retort the argument, because God is the author of the regularity and order with which the plastic natures act; whereas, according to the Atheists, matter moves of itself, without any cause to direct it, and to give it a power of moving regularly. This dispute was carried on still further, with some warmth, and a great many repetitions on both sides. But what has been said is sufficient to give the reader a notion of this controversy, for the progress of which he may consult the following books: "Histoire des Ouvrages des Scavans," Decemb. 1704. art. 12. "Bibliotheque Choisie," tom. vii. art. 7. "Répons. aux Questions d'un Provincial," tom. iii. chap. 179. "Bibliotheque Choisie," tom. ix. art. 10. "Réponse pour Mr. Bayle à Mr. Le Clerc," p. 31. annexed to the fourth volume of the "Répons. aux Quest. d'un Provincial." Upon the whole, Mr. Warburton, in his letter to me above cited, is of opinion, that our author's "'Plastic Life of Nature' is fully overthrown by

* Biblioth. Choisie, tom. vi. art. 7. p. 422.

Monsieur Bayle, whose superiority in that dispute with Monsieur Le Clerc is clear and indisputable."

Monsieur Le Clerc* expressed his wishes, that some man of learning would translate the "Intellectual System" into Latin; but this design, though resolved upon and attempted by several persons in Germany,† was never executed till the year 1733, when Dr. Mosheim published his translation of it under the following title: "Radulphi Cudworth Theologiæ Doctoris, et in Academiâ Cantabrigiensi Professoris, Systema Intellectuale hujus Universi, seu de veris Naturæ Rerum originibus Commentarii; quibus omnis eorum Philosophia, qui Deum esse negant, funditùs evertitur. Accedunt reliqua ejus Opuscula.. Joannes Laurentius Moshemius, Theologiæ Doctor, serenissimi Ducis Brunsvicensis â Consiliis Rerum sanctiorum, Abbas Cœnobiorum Vallis S. Mariæ et Lapidis S. Michaelis, omnia ex Anglico Latinè vertit, recensuit, variis Observationibus et Dissertationibus illustravit, et auxit." Jenæ, 2 volumes in folio. Dr. Mosheim, in his preface, represents the difficulties of translating this work to be very great; and observes some mistakes, which Monsieur Le Clerc has committed with regard to the sense of our author in his extracts in the "Bibliotheque Choisie." Monsieur Bourdelin, a member of the French Academy of Inscriptions and Belles Lettres, had begun a translation of the "Intellectual System" into French,‡ but was prevented from completing it by his death, which happened in May, 1717.

But to return to our author. In 1678 he was installed Prebendary of Gloucester.§ He died at Cambridge, June 26, 1688, and was interred in the Chapel of Christ's College, with the following inscription on his monument:

"Here lyeth the body of Dr. Ralph Cudworth, late Master of Christ's College, about thirty years Hebrew Professor, and Prebendary of Gloucester. He died the 26th of June, 1688, in the seventy-first year of his age."

He was a man of very extensive learning, excellently skilled in the learned languages and antiquity, a good ma-

* Biblioth. Choisie, tom. i. p. 65. † See Dr. Mosheim's preface.

‡ See his Eloge in Hist. de l'Academie des Inscriptions et Belles Lettres. tom. ii. p. 562. edit. Amsterdam.

§ Survey of the Cathedrals of York, &c., by Browne Willis, Esq., p. 743. edit. London, 1727. in quarto.

thematician, a subtile philosopher, and a profound metaphysician. He embraced the mechanical or corpuscular philosophy; but with regard to the Deity, intelligences, genii, ideas, and in short the principles of human knowledge, he followed Plato, and even the latter Platonists.* A great number of writers commend his piety and modesty; and Bishop Burnet† having observed "that Dr. Henry More studied to consider religion as a seed of a Deiform nature, and in order to this, set young students much on reading the ancient philosophers, chiefly Plato, Tully, and Plotin, and on considering the Christian religion as a doctrine sent from God both to elevate and sweeten human nature," tells us, "that Dr. Cudworth carried this on with a great strength of genius, and a vast compass of learning;" and that "he was a man of great conduct and prudence; upon which his enemies did very falsely accuse him of craft and dissimulation." The late Earl of Shaftesbury‡ styles him "an excellent and learned divine, of highest authority at home and fame abroad."

Besides his sermon on 1 John ii. 3, 4, above-mentioned, he published likewise another on 1 Cor. xv. 57, the third edition of both which was printed at London, 1676, in folio.

He left several posthumous works, most of which seem to be a continuation of his "Intellectual System," of which he had given the world only the first part. One of these was published by Dr. Edward Chandler, Bishop of Durham, at London, in 1731, under this title: "A Treatise concerning eternal and immutable Morality." In the preface§ to which, the bishop observes, that in this book our author "proves the falseness of the consequences with respect to natural justice and morality in God, which are deducible from the principles of those that maintain the second sort of fate, denominated by him theologic. And thus it may be reckoned to be a sequel in part of his first book against Material Fate. Had it come abroad as early as it was written, it had served for a proper antidote to the poison in some of Mr. Hobbes' and other writings, who revived in that age the exploded opinions of Protagoras and other ancient

* Mosheim, ubi supra. † History of his Own Time, vol. i. p. 187.
‡ Characteristics, vol. iii. chap. 2. p. 64. § P. 9. 10. 11.

Greeks, and took away the essential and eternal discriminations of moral good and evil, of just and unjust, and made them all arbitrary productions of divine or human will. Against the ancient and modern patrons of this doctrine, no one hath writ better than Dr. Cudworth. His book is indeed a demonstration of the truth of the contrary opinion, and is drawn up with that beauty, clearness, and strength, as must delight as well as convince the reader, if I may judge of the affection of others from the effect it had on me. It will certainly give a just idea of the writer's good sense, as well as vast learning. We are not certain that this treatise is quoted so perfect as the author designed it; but it appears from the manuscript, that he transcribed the best part of it with his own hand, as if it was speedily to have been sent to the press."

The titles and subjects of the rest of our author's manuscripts are as follow:

A Discourse of Moral Good and Evil in several folios, containing near 1000 pages.

Heads of the Chapters of one of those Books.

Chap. 1. The Opinions of the ancient Adversaries of natural Justice explained, p. 1.
2. Objections against Morality, p. 11.
3. Answers to the first objection, p. 29.
4. Answer to the second and third objections, p. 45.
5. Inconsistencies with a Commonwealth, p. 49.
6. Justice made by God's arbitrary Command, p. 79.
7. The sixth and seventh objections answered, p. 112.
8. Pleasure; wherein the ancient Hedonic Philosophy is explained, and it is largely debated, whether pleasure is the summum bonum, p. 117.
9. Answer to the ninth objection, p. 175.
10. Notion of Morality settled, p. 198.
11. Happiness; and the Philosophy of Epicurus concerning it examined and refuted, p. 253.
12. True Happiness in divine Life, p. 296.
13. Result of the former Discourse; incorporeal substance Deity, p. 303.
14. Controversy of Liberty stated. A new philosophical hypothesis, p. 336.
15. Objections against Liberty. Τὸ ἀγαθὸν φαινόμενον.
16. Argument from the phenomenon of Incontinency, p. 382.

Heads of another Book of Morality, wherein Hobbes's philosophy is explained.

Prolegomena; to show, that if nothing is naturally just or unjust, nothing can be made so. Chap. 2. Not by Laws. 3. Not by Laws of Nature. 4. Not by Covenants. 5. To explain his Doctrine, generally and particularly. 6. State of Nature. 7. Laws of Nature. 8. Common Representative. 9. To discover his Equivocations. 10. About Obligation. 11. According to him there can be no Ethics. 12. Judgment on his Politics, that no Politic can be built on these Principles.

A Discourse of Liberty and Necessity, in which the grounds of the atheistic philosophy are confuted, and morality vindicated and explained. This book contains 1000 pages in folio.

Heads of the Chapters of one of the Books.

Chap. 1. The Necessity of all human Actions asserted by three sorts of Men, and in different ways: first, some Christian Theologers of the latter age; secondly, the old Zenonian Stoics; thirdly, the Democritical Physiologers or atheistical Fatalists, p. 1.

2. Christian Fatalists pleading, p. 37.
3. The Stoical Fatalists pleading, p. 70.
4. Atheistical Fatalists pleading, p. 84.
5. Answer to the Phenomena objected, p. 119.
6. Of Motion and Sense, p. 167.
7. Of Intellection, p. 196.
8. Answer to Hobbes's Reflections, p. 305.
9. Morality, p. 317.

Heads of the chapters of another book De libero Arbitrio.

Chap. 1. Dreams. 2. Indifferences. 3. General Account. 4. Particular or full Account. 5. Definition and particular Account. 6. An Imperfection not formally in God. 7. Arguments to prove such a thing. 8. That that, which rules all, is not ἀνάγκη ἀπαραίτητος, but περίοια ἱλασμός. 9. Answer to the objection, μηδὲν ἀναίτιον. 10. Contingencies. 11. Argument for Necessity, taken from the Nature of God.

Upon Daniel's Prophecy of the LXX Weeks, wherein all the interpretations of the Jews are considered and confuted, with several of some learned Christians. In two volumes in folio.

Of the Verity of the Christian Religion against the Jews. Dr. Cudworth mentions this in his MSS. but it is not yet found.

A Discourse of the Creation of the World, and Immortality of the soul, in 8vo.

Hebrew Learning.

An Explanation of Hobbes's Notion of God, and of the Extension of Spirits.

Our author had several sons, who probably died young, but he left one daughter, Damaris, who was second wife to Sir Francis Masham, of Oates, in the county of Essex, Bart.,* by whom she had a son, the late Francis Cudworth Masham, Esq.† one of the Masters of the High Court of Chancery, and Accountant-General of the said Court, and Foreign Apposer in the Court of Exchequer. This lady had a great friendship with Mr. Locke, who died at her house at Oates, where he had resided for several years before. She was distinguished for her uncommon genius and learning; and in the year 1696 published at London, in 12mo. without her name, A Discourse concerning the Love of God.‡ She introduces this tract with observing, that "whatever reproaches have been made by the Romanists, on the one hand, of the want of books of devotion in the Church of England, or by the Dissenters, on the other, of a dead and lifeless way of preaching, it may be affirmed, that there cannot any where be found so good a collection of discourses on moral subjects, as might be made of English sermons, and other treatises of that nature, written by the divines of our church. Which books are certainly in themselves of the greatest and most general use of any; and do most conduce to that which is the chief aim of Christianity, a good life." She then animadverts upon those who undervalue morality,§ and others, who strain the duties of it to an impracticable pitch, and pretend to ascend by it to something beyond or above it;‖ and afterwards proceeds to consider the conduct of those who build their practical and devotional discourses upon principles, which will not bear the test, but which oblige them to lay

* He died at his seat at Oates, on Sunday the 3rd of March, 1702-3, in the 77th year of his age.

† He died May 17th, 1731.

‡ It contains 126 pages, besides the preface.

§ Pages 2. 3. ‖ Pages 3—6.

down such assertions of morality, as sober and well-disposed Christians cannot understand to be practicable.* And here she applies herself to the examination of Mr. John Norris's† scheme in his Practical Discourses and other treatises, wherein he maintains, that "mankind are obliged strictly, as their duty, to love, with desire, nothing but God only, every degree of desire of any creature whatsoever being sinful:" which assertion Mr. Norris defends upon this ground, that God, not the creature, is the immediate efficient cause of our sensations; for whatsoever gives us pleasure, has a right to our love: but God only gives us pleasure; therefore he only has a right to our love. This hypothesis is considered with great accuracy and ingenuity by Lady Masham, and the bad consequences of it represented in a strong light. Her Discourse was translated into French by Mr. Peter Coste, and printed at Amsterdam in 1705. She lies buried in the cathedral church of Bath, where a monument is erected to her memory with the following inscription:

"Near this place lies Dame DAMARIS MASHAM, daughter of Ralph Cudworth, D.D., and second wife of Sir Francis Masham, of Oates, in the county of Essex, Bart., who to the softness and elegancy of her own sex, added several of the noblest accomplishments and qualities to the other.

"She possessed these advantages in a degree unusual to either, and tempered them with an exactness peculiar to herself.

"Her learning, judgment, sagacity, and penetration, together with her candour and love of truth, were very observable to all that conversed with her, or were acquainted with those small treatises she published in her lifetime, though she industriously concealed her name.

"Being mother of an only son, she applied all her natural and acquired endowments to the care of his education.

"She was a strict observer of all the virtues belonging to every station of her life; and only wanted opportunities to make these talents shine in the world, which were the admiration of her friends.

"She was born on the 18th of January, 1658, and died on the 20th of April, 1708."

* Page 7.

† This Divine borrowed his hypothesis from father Mallebranche.

THE TRUE

INTELLECTUAL SYSTEM

OF THE

UNIVERSE.

Τιμιώτατον τῆς ψυχῆς Ἡ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΙΝΗ ΣΟΦΙΑ, Τέλος δὲ Ἡ ΘΕΙΑ.

ORIGENES.

TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

HENEAGE LORD FINCH,

BARON OF DAVENTRY, LORD HIGH CHANCELLOR OF ENGLAND, AND ONE OF HIS MAJESTY'S MOST HONOURABLE PRIVY COUNCIL.

My Lord,

The many favours I have formerly received from you, as they might justly challenge, whenever I had a fit opportunity, a public and thankful acknowledgment; so have they encouraged me at this time, to the presumption of this dedication to your lordship. Whom, as your perspicacious wit and solid judgment, together with your acquired learning, render every way a most accomplished and desirable patron; so did I persuade myself that your hearty affection to religion, and zeal for it, would make you not unwilling to take that into your protection which is written wholly in the defence thereof; so far forth, as its own defects or miscarriages should not render it uncapable of the same. Nor can I think it probable, that in an age of so much debauchery, scepticism, and infidelity, an undertaking of this kind should be judged by you useless or unseasonable. And now, having so fit an opportunity, I could most wil-

lingly expatiate in the large field of your Lordship's praises; both that I might do an act of justice to yourself, and provoke others to your imitation. But I am sensible, that as no eloquence less than that of your own could be fit for such a performance, so the nobleness and generosity of your spirit is such, that you take much more pleasure in doing praiseworthy things, than in hearing the repeated echoes of them. Wherefore, instead of pursuing encomiums, which would be the least pleasing to yourself, I shall offer up my prayers to Almighty God, for the continuation of your Lordship's life and health; that so his Majesty may long have such a loyal subject and wise counsellor; the Church of England such a worthy patron; the high Court of Chancery such an oracle of impartial justice; and the whole nation such a pattern of virtue and piety. Which shall ever be the hearty desire of,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's most humble, and

Most affectionate servant,

R. CUDWORTH.

PREFACE TO THE READER.

THOUGH, I confess, I have seldom taken any great pleasure in reading other men's apologies, yet must I at this time make some myself. First therefore, I acknowledge, that when I engaged the press, I intended only a discourse concerning liberty and necessity, or to speak out more plainly, against the fatal necessity of all actions and events; which, upon whatsoever grounds or principles maintained, will (as we conceive) serve the design of Atheism, and undermine Christianity, and all religion, as taking away all guilt and blame, punishments and rewards, and plainly rendering a day of judgment ridiculous; and it is evident, that some have pursued it of late in order to that end. But afterwards we considered that this, which is indeed a controversy concerning the "True Intellectual System of the Universe," does, in the full extent thereof, take in other things; the necessity of all actions and events being maintained by several persons upon very different grounds, according to that tripartite fatalism mentioned by us in the beginning of the first chapter. For first, the Democritic Fate is nothing but the material necessity of all things without a God, it supposing senseless matter, necessarily moved, to be the only original and principal of all things: which therefore is called by Epicurus, the physiological; by us, the atheistic fate. Besides which, the Divine Fate is also bipartite; some Theists supposing God both to decree and do all things in us (evil as well as good), or by his immediate influence to determinate all actions, and so make them alike necessary to us. From whence it follows, that his will is no way regulated or determined by any essential and immutable goodness and justice; or that he hath nothing of morality in his nature, he being only arbitrary will omnipotent. As also that all good and evil moral, to us creatures, are mere thetical or positive things; νόμῳ, and not φύσει, by "law" or "command" only, and not by nature. This therefore may be called the Divine Fate immoral

and violent. Again, there being other divine Fatalists, who acknowledge such a Deity as both suffers other things besides itself to act, and hath an essential goodness and justice in its nature, and consequently, that there are things just and unjust to us naturally, and not by law and arbitrary constitution only; and yet nevertheless take away from men all such liberty as might make them capable of praise and dispraise, rewards and punishments, and objects of distributive justice; they conceiving necessity to be intrinsical to the nature of every thing, in the actings of it, and nothing of contingency to be found any where: from whence it will follow, that nothing could possibly have been otherwise in the whole world than it is. And this may be called the Divine Fate moral (as the other immoral), and natural (as the other violent); it being a concatenation, or implexed series of causes, all in themselves necessary, depending upon a Deity moral (if we may so speak) that is, such as is essentially good, and naturally just, as the head thereof; the first contriver and orderer of all. Which kind of Divine Fate hath not only been formerly asserted by the Stoics, but also of late by divers modern writers. Wherefore of the three fatalisms, or false hypotheses of the universe, mentioned in the beginning of this book, one is absolute Atheism; another immoral Theism, or religion without any natural justice and morality (all just and unjust, according to this hypothesis, being mere thetical or factitious things, made by arbitrary will and command only): the third and last such a Theism as acknowledges not only a God, or omnipotent understanding Being, but also natural justice and morality, founded in him, and derived from him; nevertheless no liberty from necessity any where, and therefore no distributive or retributive justice in the world. Whereas these three things are (as we conceive) the fundamentals or essentials of true religion. First, that all things in the world do not float without a head and governor; but that there is a God, an omnipotent understanding Being, presiding over all. Secondly, that this God being essentially good and just, there is φύσει καλὸν καὶ δίκαιον, something in its own nature immutably and eternally just and unjust; and not by arbitrary will, law, and command only. And lastly, that there is something ἐφ' ἡμῖν, or, that we are so far forth principles or masters of our own actions, as to be accountable to justice for them, or to make us guilty and blameworthy for what we do amiss, and to deserve punishment accordingly. Which three fundamentals of religion are intimated by the author to the Hebrews in these words: "He that cometh to God must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of those who seek him out." For to seek out God here is nothing else but to seek a participation of his image, or the recovery of that nature and life of his which we have been alienated from. And

these three things, namely, that all things do not float without a head and governor, but there is an omnipotent understanding Being presiding over all; that this God hath an essential goodness and justice; and that the differences of good and evil moral, honest and dishonest, are not by mere will and law only, but by nature; and consequently, that the Deity cannot act, influence, and necessitate men to such things as are in their own nature evil; and lastly, that necessity is not intrinsical to the nature of every thing, but that men have such a liberty or power over their own actions as may render them accountable for the same, and blameworthy when they do amiss; and consequently, that there is a justice distributive of rewards and punishments running through the world: I say, these three (which are the most important things that the mind of man can employ itself upon), taken all together, make up the wholeness and entireness of that which is here called by us "The True Intellectual System of the Universe," in such a sense as Atheism may be called a false system thereof; the word "Intellectual" being added to distinguish it from the other, vulgarly so called, "Systems of the World" (that is, the visible and corporeal world), the Ptolemaic, Tychonic, and Copernican; the two former of which are now commonly accounted false, the latter true. And thus our prospect being now enlarged into a threefold fatalism, or spurious and false hypothesis of the intellectual system, making all things necessary upon several grounds, we accordingly designed the confutation of them all, in three several books. The first, against Atheism (which is the Democritic fate), wherein all the reason and philosophy thereof is refelled, and the existence of a God demonstrated; and so that ὑλικὴ ἀνάγκη, or "material necessity," of all things, overthrown. The second, for such a God, as is not mere arbitrary will omnipotent, decreeing, doing, and necessitating all actions, evil as well as good, but essentially moral, good, and just; and for a natural discrimen honestorum et turpium, whereby another ground of the necessity of all human actions will be removed. And the third and last, against necessity intrinsical and essential to all action, and for such a liberty, or sui-potestas, in rational creatures, as may render them accountable, capable of rewards and punishments, and so objects of distributive or retributive justice; by which the now only remaining ground of the fatal necessity of all actions and events, will be taken away. And all these three under that one general title of "The True Intellectual System of the Universe;" each book having, besides, its own particular title: as, against Atheism; for natural Justice and Morality, founded in the Deity; for Liberty from Necessity, and a distributive Justice of Rewards and Punishments in the world. And this we conceive may fully satisfy, concerning our

general title, all those who are not extremely critical or captious, at least as many of them as ever heard of the astronomical systems of the world; so that they will not think us hereby obliged to treat of the hierarchy of angels, and of all the several species of animals, vegetables, and minerals, &c. that is, to write de omni ente of whatsoever is contained within the complexion of the universe. Though the whole scale of entity is here also taken notice of; and the general ranks of substantial beings below the Deity (or Trinity of Divine hypostases) considered; which yet, according to our philosophy, are but two; souls of several degrees (angels themselves being included within that number) and body or matter; as also the immortality of those souls proved. Which notwithstanding is suggested by us only to satisfy some men's curiosity. Nevertheless, we confess that this general title might well have been spared by us, and this volume have been presented to the reader's view, not as a part or piece, but a whole complete and entire thing by itself, had it not been for two reasons; first, our beginning with those three fatalisms, or false hypotheses of the "Intellectual System," and promising a confutation of them all then, when we thought to have brought them within the compass of one volume; and secondly, every other page, throughout this whole volume, accordingly bearing the inscription of book the first upon the head thereof. This is therefore that which in the first place we here apologize for, our publishing one part or book alone by itself, we being surprised in the length thereof; whereas we had otherwise intended two more along with it. Notwithstanding which, there is no reason why this volume should be therefore thought imperfect and incomplete, because it hath not all the three things at first designed by us; it containing all that belongeth to its own particular title and subject, and being in that respect no piece, but a whole. This indeed must needs beget an expectation of the two following treatises (especially in such as shall have received any satisfaction from this first), concerning those two other fatalisms, or false hypotheses mentioned; to make up our whole Intellectual System complete: the one to prove that God is not mere arbitrary Will omnipotent (without any essential goodness and justice), decreeing and doing all things in the world, as well evil as good; and thereby making them alike necessary to us; from whence it would follow, that all good and evil moral are mere thetical, positive, and arbitrary things, that is, not nature, but will: which is the defence of natural, eternal, and immutable justice, or morality. The other, that necessity is not intrinsical to the nature of every thing, God and all creatures, or essential to all action; but, that there is something ἐφ' ἡμῖν, or, that we have some liberty, or power over our own actions: which is the defence of a distributive or retributive

justice, dispensing rewards and punishments throughout the whole world. Wherefore we think fit here to advertise the reader concerning these, that though they were, and still are, really intended by us; yet the complete finishing and publication of them will notwithstanding depend upon many contingencies; not only of our life and health, the latter of which, as well as the former, is to us very uncertain; but also of our leisure, or vacancy from other necessary employments.

In the next place, we must apologise also for the fourth chapter; inasmuch as, though, in regard of its length, it might rather be called a book than a chapter, yet it doth not answer all the contents prefixed to it. Here therefore must we again confess ourselves surprised; who, when we wrote those contents, did not suspect in the least but that we should have satisfied them all within a lesser compass. And our design then was, besides answering the objection against the naturality of the idea of God, from the Pagan polytheism (we having then so fit an occasion), to give such a further account of the idolatry and religion of the Gentiles as might prepare our way for a defence of Christianity to be subjoined in the close; it being not only agreeable to the sense of ancient doctors, but also expressly declared in the scripture, that one design of Christianity was to abolish and extirpate the Pagan polytheism and idolatry. And our reasons for this intended defence of Christianity were: first, because we had observed that some professed opposers of atheism had either incurred a suspicion, or at least suffered under the imputation, of being mere Theists, or natural religionists only, and no hearty believers of Christianity, or friends to revealed religion. From which either suspicion or imputation therefore we thought it justice to free ourselves, we having so unshaken a belief and firm assurance of the truth of the whole Christian doctrine. But, secondly and principally, because we had further observed it to have been the method of our modern Atheists to make their first assault against Christianity, as thinking that to be the most vulnerable, and that it would be an easy step for them, from thence, to demolish all religion and theism. However, since the satisfying the former part of those contents had already taken up so much room, that the pursuit of the remainder would have quite excluded our principally intended confutation of all the atheistic grounds; the forementioned objection being now sufficiently answered, there was a necessity that we should there break off, and leave the further account of the Pagan Idolatry and Religion, together with our Defence of Christianity, to some more convenient opportunity.

And now we shall exhibit to the reader's view a brief and general synopsis of the whole following work, together with some particular reflections upon several parts thereof, either for

his better information concerning them, or for their vindication; some of which therefore will be of greater use, after the book has been read, than before. The first chapter is an account of the atomic physiology, as made the foundation of the democritic fate. Where the reader is to understand that this democritic fate, which is one of the three false hypotheses of the Intellectual System there mentioned, is the very self-same thing with the atomic atheism, the only form of atheism that hath publicly appeared upon the stage as an entire philosophic system, or hath indeed been much taken notice of in the world for these two thousand years past. For, though it be true that Epicurus (who was also an atomic Atheist, as is afterwards declared, having, in all probability, therefore a mind to innovate something, that he might not seem to have borrowed all from Democritus) did by violence introduce liberty of will into his hypothesis; for the solving whereof he ridiculously devised that his third motion of atoms, called by Lucretius

Exiguum clinamen principiorum:

yet was this, as Cicero* long since observed, a most heterogeneous patch or assumentum of his, and altogether as contradictious to the tenor of his own principles as it was to the doctrine of Democritus himself. There can be nothing more absurd than for an Atheist to assert liberty of will; but it is most of all absurd for an atomic one. And therefore our modern Atheists do here plainly disclaim Epicurus (though otherwise so much admired by them), and declare open war against this liberty of will; they apprehending that it would unavoidably introduce incorporeal substance; as also well knowing that necessity, on the contrary, effectually overthrows all religion, it taking away guilt and blame, punishments and rewards; to which might be added also prayers and devotions.

And as there was a necessity for us here to give some account of that ancient atomic physiology, with which atheism now became thus blended and complicated, so do we, in this first chapter, chiefly insist upon two things concerning it. First, that it was no invention of Democritus nor Leucippus, but of much greater antiquity; not only from that tradition transmitted by Posidonius the Stoic, that it derived its original from one Moschus a Phœnician, who lived before the Trojan wars (which plainly makes it to have been Mosaical), but also from Aristotle's affirmation, that the greater part of the ancient philosophers entertained this hypothesis; and further because it is certain that divers of the Italics, and particularly Empedocles, before Democritus, physiologized atomically; which is the reason he

* De Nat. Deor. l. 1. cap. 25.

was so much applauded by Lucretius. Besides which, it is more than a presumption that Anaxagoras' Homœomery, or similar atomology, was but a degeneration from the true and genuine atomology of the ancient Italics, that was an anomœomery, or doctrine of dissimilar and unqualified atoms. Wherefore all that is true concerning Democritus and Leucippus, is only this, that these men were indeed the first atheizers of this ancient atomic physiology, or the inventors and broachers of the atomic atheism. Which is Laërtius' true meaning (though it be not commonly understood) when he recordeth of them that they were the first who made unqualified atoms the principles of all things in the universe without exception; that is, not only of inanimate bodies (as the other ancient religious atomists, the Italics, before had done), but also of soul and mind.

And whereas we conceive this atomic physiology, as to the essentials thereof, to be unquestionably true, viz., that the only principles of bodies are magnitude, figure, site, motion, and rest; and that the qualities and forms of inanimate bodies are really nothing but several combinations of these, causing several fancies in us (which excellent discovery therefore, so long ago made, is a notable instance of the wit and sagacity of the ancients); so do we in the next place make it manifest that this atomic physiology rightly understood is so far from being either the mother or nurse of atheism, or any ways favourable thereunto (as is vulgarly supposed), that it is indeed the most directly opposite to it of any, and the greatest defence against the same. For, first, we have discovered that the principle upon which this atomology is founded, and from whence it sprung, was no other than this, nothing out of nothing, in the true sense thereof; or, that nothing can be caused by nothing: from whence it was concluded, that in natural generations there was no new real entity produced which was not before: the genuine consequence whereof was twofold; that the qualities and forms of inanimate bodies are no entities really distinct from the magnitude, figure, site, and motion of parts; and that souls are substances incorporeal, not generated out of matter. Where we have showed that the Pythagoric doctrine of the pre-existence of souls, was founded upon the very same principles with the atomic physiology. And it is from this very principle rightly understood that ourselves afterwards undertake to demonstrate the absolute impossibility of all atheism. Moreover, we have made it undeniably evident that the intrinsic constitution of this atomic physiology also is such as that whosoever admits it, and rightly understands it, must needs acknowledge incorporeal substance; which is the absolute overthrow of atheism. And from hence alone it is certain to us, without any testimonies from antiquity, that Democritus and Leucippus could not possibly be the first

inventors of this philosophy, they either not rightly understanding it, or else wilfully depraving the same; and the atomic atheism being really nothing else but a rape committed upon the atomic physiology. For which reason we do by no means here applaud Plato, nor Aristotle, in their rejecting this most ancient atomic physiology, and introducing again that unintelligible first matter, and those exploded qualities and forms, into philosophy. For though this were probably done by Plato out of a disgust and prejudice against the atomic Atheists, which made him not so well consider nor understand that physiology; yet was he much disappointed of his expectation herein, that atomology, which he exploded (rightly understood) being really the greatest bulwark against atheism; and, on the contrary, those forms and qualities, which he espoused, the natural seed thereof, they, besides their unintelligible darkness, bringing something out of nothing, in the impossible sense; which we show to be the inlet of all atheism. And thus, in this first chapter, have we not only quite disarmed atheism of atomicism, or showed that the latter (rightly understood) affordeth no manner of shelter or protection to the former; but also made it manifest that it is the greatest bulwark and defence against the same. Which is a thing afterwards further insisted on.

As to the second chapter, we have no more to say, but only this: that here we took the liberty to reveal the arcane mysteries of atheism, and to discover all its pretended grounds of reason, that we could find any where suggested in writings, those only excepted that are peculiar to the Hylozoic form (which is directly contrary to the atomic); and that to their best advantage too; nevertheless to this end, that these being afterwards all baffled and confuted, theism might, by this means, obtain the greater and juster triumph over atheism.

In the third chapter we thought it necessary, in order to a fuller confutation of atheism, to consider all the other forms thereof, besides the atomic. And here do we, first of all, make a discovery of a certain form of atheism, never before taken notice of by any modern writers, which we call the Hylozoic; which notwithstanding, though it were long since started by Strato, in way of opposition to the Democritic and Epicurean hypothesis, yet because it afterwards slept in perfect silence and oblivion, should have been here by us passed by silently, had we not had certain knowledge of its being of late awakened and revived by some, who were so sagacious as plainly to perceive that the atomic form could never do their business, nor prove defensible, and therefore would attempt to carry on this cause of atheism, in quite a different way, by the life and perception of matter; and also that this, in all probability, would ere long publicly appear upon the stage, though not barefaced, but under

a disguise. Which atheistic hypothesis is partly confuted by us, in the close of this chapter, and partly in the fifth.

In the next place, it being certain that there had been other philosophic Atheists in the world before those atomics, Epicurus and Democritus, we declare out of Plato and Aristotle, what that most atheistic hypothesis was; namely, the eduction of all things, even life and understanding itself, out of matter, in the way of qualities, or as the passions and affections thereof, generable and corruptible. Which form of atheism is styled by us, not only Hylopathian, but also Anaximandrian; however, we grant some probability of that opinion, that Anaximander held an Homœomery of qualified atoms, as Anaxagoras afterwards did; the difference between them being only this, that the latter asserted an unmade mind, whereas the former generated all mind and understanding out of those qualified atoms, hot and cold, moist and dry, compounded together; because we judged this difference not to be a sufficient ground to multiply forms of atheism upon. And here do we give notice of that strange kind of religious atheism, or atheistic theogonism which asserted, not only other understanding beings, superior to men, called by them gods, but also, amongst those one supreme or Jupiter too; nevertheless native, and generated at first out of Night and Chaos (that is, senseless matter), as also mortal and corruptible again into the same.

Besides which, there is yet a fourth atheistic form taken notice of, out of the writings of the ancients (though perhaps junior to the rest, it seeming to be but the corruption and degeneration of Stoicism), which concluded the whole world, not to be an animal (as the pagan Theists then generally supposed), but only one huge plant or vegetable, having an artificial, plantal, and plastic nature, as its highest principle, orderly disposing the whole, without any mind or understanding. And here have we set down the agreement of all the atheistic forms (however differing so much from one another), in this one general principle, viz. that all animality, conscious life and understanding, is generated out of senseless matter, and corruptible again into it.

Wherefore in the close of this third chapter, we insist largely upon an artificial, regular, and plastic nature, devoid of express knowledge and understanding, as subordinate to the Deity; chiefly in way of confutation of those Cosmo-plastic and Hylozoic atheisms. Though we had a further design herein also, for the defence of theism; forasmuch as without such a nature, either God must be supposed to do all things in the world immediately, and to form every gnat and fly, as it were, with his own hands; which seemeth not so becoming of him, and would render his providence, to human apprehensions, laborious and distractious; or else the whole system of this corporeal universe

must result only from fortuitous mechanism, without the direction of any mind; which hypothesis once admitted, would unquestionably, by degrees, supplant and undermine all theism. And now, from what we have declared, it may plainly appear, that this digression of ours concerning an artificial, regular, and plastic nature (subordinate to the Deity), is no wen, or excrescency in the body of this book, but a natural and necessary member thereof.

In the fourth chapter, after the idea of God fully declared (where we could not omit his essential goodness and justice, or, if we may so call it, the morality of the Deity, though that be a thing properly belonging to the second book, the confutation of the divine fate immoral) there is a large account given of the pagan polytheism; to satisfy a very considerable objection, that lay in our way from thence, against the naturality of the idea of God, as including oneliness and singularity in it. For had that, upon inquiry, been found true, which is so commonly taken for granted, that the generality of the pagan nations had constantly scattered their devotions amongst a multitude of self-existent and independent deities, they acknowledging no sovereign Numen; this would much have stumbled the naturality of the divine idea. But now it being, on the contrary, clearly proved, that the pagan theologers all along acknowledged one sovereign and omnipotent Deity, from which all their other gods were generated or created; we have thereby not only removed the forementioned objection out of the way, but also evinced, that the generality of mankind have constantly had a certain prolepsis or anticipation in their minds, concerning the actual existence of a God, according to the true idea of him. And this was the rather done fully and carefully by us, because we had not met with it sufficiently performed before; A. Steuchus Eugubinus having laboured most in this subject, from whose profitable industry though we shall no way detract, yet whosoever will compare what he hath written, with ours, will find no just cause to think ours superfluous and unnecessary, much less a transcription out of his. In which, besides other things, there is no account at all given of the many pagan, poetical, and political gods, what they were; which is so great a part of our performance, to prove them really to have been but the polyonymy of one God. From whence it follows also, that the pagan religion, though sufficiently faulty, yet was not altogether so nonsensical as the Atheists would represent it, out of design, that they might from thence infer all religion to be nothing but a mere cheat and imposture; they worshipping only one supreme God, in the several manifestations of his goodness, power, and providence throughout the world, together with his inferior ministers. Nevertheless we cannot deny, that being once en-

gaged in this subject, we thought ourselves the more concerned to do the business thoroughly and effectually, because of that controversy lately agitated concerning idolatry (which cannot otherwise be decided, than by giving a true account of the pagan religion); and the so confident affirmations of some, that none could possibly be guilty of idolatry, in the Scripture sense, who believed one God the creator of the whole world; whereas it is most certain, on the contrary, that the pagan polytheism and idolatry consisted not in worshipping many creators, or uncreateds, but in giving religious worship to creatures besides the Creator; they directing their devotion (as Athanasius* plainly affirmeth of them), ἑνὶ ἀγενήτῳ, καὶ πολλοῖς γενητοῖς, to "one uncreated only; but, besides him, to many created gods." But as for the polemic management of this controversy, concerning idolatry, we leave it to other learned hands, that are already engaged in it.

Moreover, we have, in this fourth chapter, largely insisted also upon the Trinity. The reason whereof was, because it came in our way, and our contents engaged us thereunto, in order to the giving a full account of the pagan theology; it being certain, that the Platonics and Pythagoreans at least, if not other Pagans also, had their trinity as well as Christians. And we could not well avoid the comparing of these two together; upon which occasion we take notice of a double Platonic trinity; the one spurious and adulterated, of some latter Platonists; the other true and genuine, of Plato himself, Parmenides, and the ancients. The former of which, though it be opposed by us to the Christian Trinity, and confuted, yet betwixt the latter and that do we find a wonderful correspondence, which is largely pursued in the Platonic Christian apology. Wherein, notwithstanding, nothing must be looked upon as dogmatically asserted by us, but only offered, and submitted to the judgment of the learned in these matters; we confining ourselves, in this mysterious point of the Holy Trinity, within the compass of those its three essentials declared: First, that it is not a Trinity of mere names and words, or of logical notions only; but of persons or hypostases. Secondly, that none of those persons or hypostases are creatures, but all uncreated. And lastly, that they are all three, truly and really one God. Nevertheless we acknowledge, that we did therefore the more copiously insist upon this argument, because of our then designed defence of Christianity; we conceiving, that this parallelism, betwixt the ancient or genuine Platonic, and the Christian Trinity, might be of some use to satisfy those amongst us who boggle so much at the Trinity, and look upon it as the choke-

* Oratione iv. contra Arianos, tom. 1. opp. p. 469.

pear of Christianity; when they shall find, that the freest wits among the Pagans, and the best philosophers, who had nothing of superstition to determine them that way, were so far from being shy of such an hypothesis, as that they were even fond thereof. And that the Pagans had indeed such a cabala amongst them (which some perhaps will yet hardly believe, notwithstanding all that we have said), might be further convinced, from that memorable relation in Plutarch,* of Thespesius Solensis, who, after he had been looked upon as dead for three days, reviving, affirmed, amongst other things, which he thought he saw or heard in the mean time in his ecstasy, this of three gods in the form of a triangle, pouring in streams into one another; Orpheus' soul being said to have arrived so far; accordingly as from the testimonies of other Pagan writers we have proved, that a Trinity of divine hypostases was a part of the Orphic cabala. True indeed, our belief of the Holy Trinity is founded upon no pagan cabala, but only Scripture revelation; it being that, which Christians are, or should be, all baptized into. Nevertheless, these things are reasonably noted by us to this end, that that should not be made a prejudice against Christianity and revealed religion, nor looked upon as such an affrightful bugbear or mormo in it, which even pagan philosophers themselves, and those of the most accomplished intellectuals, and uncaptivated minds, though having neither councils, nor creeds, nor Scriptures, had so great a propensity and readiness to entertain, and such a veneration for.

In this fourth chapter, we were necessitated, by the matter itself, to run out into philology and antiquity; as also in the other parts of the book we do often give an account of the doctrine of the ancients: which, however, some over-severe philosophers may look upon fastidiously, or undervalue and depreciate, yet as we conceived it often necessary, so possibly may the variety thereof not be ungrateful to others; and this mixture of philology, throughout the whole, sweeten and allay the severity of philosophy to them; the main thing which the book pretends to, in the meantime, being the philosophy of religion. But for our parts, we neither call philology, nor yet philosophy, our mistress; but serve ourselves of either, as occasion requireth.

As for the last chapter; though it promise only a confutation of all the atheistic grounds, yet we do therein also demonstrate the absolute impossibility of all atheism, and the actual existence of a God. We say demonstrate, not à priori, which is impossible and contradictious; but by necessary inference from principles, altogether undeniable. For we can by no means grant to

* Libro de his, qui sero à Numine puniuntur, tom. 2. opp. p. 563. s.

the Atheists that there is no more than a probable persuasion, or opinion to be had of the existence of a God, without any certain knowledge or science. Nevertheless, it will not follow from hence, that whosoever shall read these demonstrations of ours, and understand all the words of them, must therefore of necessity be presently convinced whether he will or no, and put out of all manner of doubt or hesitancy concerning the existence of a God. For we believe that to be true, which some have affirmed, that were there any interest of life, any concernment of appetite and passion, against the truth of geometrical theorems themselves, as of a triangle having three angles equal to two right, whereby men's judgments might be clouded and bribed, notwithstanding all the demonstrations of them, many would remain at least sceptical about them. Wherefore, mere speculation and dry mathematical reason, in minds unpurified, and having a contrary interest of carnality, and a heavy load of infidelity and distrust sinking them down, cannot alone beget an unshaken confidence and assurance of so high a truth as this, the existence of one perfect understanding Being, the original of all things. As it is certain also, on the contrary, that minds cleansed and purged from vice may, without syllogistical reasonings and mathematical demonstrations, have an undoubted assurance of the existence of a God, according to that of the philosopher: Ἡ κάθαρσις ποιεῖ ἐν γνώσει τῶν ἀρίστων Εἶναι, "Purity possesses men with an assurance of the best things;" whether this assurance be called a vaticination or divine sagacity, (as it is by Plato and Aristotle,) or faith, as in the Scripture. For the Scripture faith is not a mere believing of historical things, and upon inartificial arguments or testimonies only; but a certain higher and diviner power in the soul, that peculiarly correspondeth with the Deity. Notwithstanding which, knowledge or science added to this faith, (according to the Scripture advice) will make it more firm and stedfast, and the better able to resist those assaults of sophistical reasonings that shall be made against it.

In this fifth chapter, as sometimes elsewhere, we thought ourselves concerned, in defence of the divine wisdom, goodness, and perfection against Atheists, to maintain, (with all the ancient philosophic Theists,) the perfection of the creation also; or that the whole system of things, taken altogether, could not have been better made and ordered than it is. And indeed, this divine goodness and perfection, as displaying and manifesting itself in the works of nature and providence, is supposed in Scripture to be the very foundation of our Christian faith; when that is defined to be the substance and evidence rerum sperandarum; that is, "of whatsoever is" (by a good man) "to be hoped for." Notwithstanding which, it was far from our

intention therefore to conclude, that nothing neither in nature nor providence could be otherwise than it is; or that there is nothing left to the free will and choice of the Deity. And though we do in the third section insist largely upon that ancient Pythagoric cabala, that souls are always united to some body or other, as also, that all rational and intellectual creatures consist of soul and body; and suggest several things from reason and Christian antiquity in favour of them both; yet would we not be understood to dogmatize in either of them, but to submit all to better judgments.

Again, we shall here advertise the reader, (though we have cautioned concerning it in the book itself) that in our defence of incorporeal substance against the Atheists, however we thought ourselves concerned to say the utmost that possibly we could in way of vindication of the ancients, who generally maintained it to be unextended, (which to some seems an absolute impossibility,) yet we would not be supposed ourselves dogmatically to assert any more in this point than what all incorporealists agree in, that there is a substance specifically distinct from body; namely such as consisteth not of parts separable from one another, and which can penetrate body, and lastly, is self-active, and hath an internal energy distinct from that of local motion. (And thus much is undeniably evinced by the arguments before proposed.) But whether this substance be altogether unextended, or extended otherwise than body, we shall leave every man to make his own judgment concerning it.

Furthermore, we think fit here to suggest, that whereas throughout this chapter and whole book, we constantly oppose the generation of souls, that is, the production of life, cogitation, and understanding out of dead and senseless matter: and assert all souls to be as substantial as matter itself; this is not done by us out of any fond addictedness to Pythagoric whimseys, nor indeed out of a mere partial regard to that cause of Theism neither which we were engaged in, (though we had great reason to be tender of that too;) but because we were enforced thereunto by dry mathematical reason; it being as certain to us, as any thing in all geometry, that cogitation and understanding can never possibly result out of magnitudes, figures, sites, and local motions (which is all that ourselves can allow to body) however compounded together. Nor indeed in that other way of qualities, is it better conceiveable, how they should emerge out of hot and cold, moist and dry, thick and thin; according to the Anaximandrian atheism. And they who can persuade themselves of the contrary, may believe that any thing may be caused by any thing; upon which supposition, we confess it impossible to us to prove the existence of a God from the phenomena.

In the close of this fifth chapter, because the Atheists do in the last place pretend theism and religion to be inconsistent with civil sovereignty, we were necessitated briefly to unravel and confute all the atheistic ethics and politics, (though this more properly belong to our second book intended:) Where we make it plainly to appear, that the Atheists' artificial and factitious justice is nothing but will and words; and that they give to civil sovereigns no right nor authority at all, but only belluine liberty and brutish force. But, on the contrary, as we assert justice and obligation, not made by law and commands, but in nature, and prove this, together with conscience and religion, to be the only basis of civil authority; so do we also maintain all the rights of civil sovereigns; giving both to Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and to God the things that are God's.

And now, having made all our apologies and reflections, we have no more to add, but only the retractation or retraction of one passage, vol. iii. p. 115; where mentioning that opinion of a modern atheistic writer, That cogitation is nothing else but local motion, we could not think Epicurus and Democritus to have sunk to such a degree, either of sottishness or impudence as this; whereas we found cause afterwards, upon further consideration, to change our opinion herein, page 418. Forasmuch as when Epicurus derived liberty of will in men, merely from that motion of senseless atoms declining uncertainly from the perpendicular; it is evident, that, according to him, volition itself must be really local motion. As indeed in the Democritic fate, and material necessity of all things, it is implied that human cogitations are but mechanism and motion. Notwithstanding which, both Democritus and Epicurus supposed that the world was made without cogitation, though by local motion. So that the meaning of these besotted Atheists, (if at least they had any meaning) seems to have been this, That all cogitation is really nothing else but local motion; nevertheless all motion not cogitation, but only in such and such circumstances, or in bodies so modified.

And now we are not ignorant that some will be ready to condemn this whole labour of ours, and of others in this kind, against atheism, as altogether useless and superfluous; upon this pretence, that an Atheist is a mere chimera, and there is no such thing any where to be found in the world. And indeed we could heartily wish upon that condition, that all this labour of ours were superfluous and useless. But as to Atheists, these so confident exploders of them are both unskilled in the monuments of antiquity, and unacquainted with the present age they live in; others having found too great an assurance, from their own personal converse, of the reality of them. Nevertheless, this labour of ours is not intended only for the conversion of

downright and professed Atheists, (of which there is but little hope, they being sunk into so great a degree of sottishness;) but for the confirmation of weak, staggering, and sceptical Theists. And unless these exploders of Atheism will affirm also, that all men have constantly an unshaken faith and belief of the existence of a God, without the least mixture of doubtful distrust and hesitancy, (which if it were so, the world could not possibly be so bad as now it is) they must needs grant such endeavours as these, for the confirming and establishing of men's minds in the belief of a God, by philosophic reasons, in an age so philosophical, not to be superfluous and useless.

THE TRUE INTELLECTUAL SYSTEM OF THE UNIVERSE.

BOOK I.

CHAP. I.

1. The fatal necessity of all human actions and events maintained upon three several grounds, which are so many false hypotheses of the intellectual system of the universe. 2. Concerning the mathematical or astrological fate. 3. Concerning the opinion of those, who suppose a fate superior to the highest Deity. 4. The moderation of this discourse. 5. The Atheistical hypothesis or Democritical fate being founded upon the atomical physiology: the necessity of giving an account of it, and that first briefly described. 6. The antiquity of this physiology, and the account which is given of it by Aristotle. 7. A clear and full record of the same physiology in Plato, that hath not been taken notice of. 8. That neither Democritus, nor Leucippus, nor Protagoras, nor any Atheists were the first inventors of this philosophy; and of the necessity of being thoroughly acquainted with it, in order to the confutation of Atheism. 9. The tradition of Posidonius the Stoic, that Moschus an ancient Phœnician was the first inventor of the atomical physiology. 10. That this Moschus, the inventor of atomical physiology, was probably the same with Mochus the physiologer in Jamblichus, with whose successors, priests and prophets, Pythagoras conversed at Sidon. 11. Other probabilities for this, that Pythagoras was acquainted with the atomical physiology. 12. That Pythagoras' monads were atoms. 13. Proved plainly, that Empedocles, who was a Pythagorean, physiologized atomically. 14. The same further convinced from Plato, Aristotle, Plutarch, and Stobæus. 15. That Anaxagoras was a spurious atomist, or unskilful imitator of that philosophy. 16. That Ecphantus the Pythagorean, Xenocrates, Heraclides, Diodorus, and Metrodorus Chius were all ancient assertors of the atomical physiology: together with Aristotle's testimony, that the ancient physiologers generally went that way. 17. How Aristotle is to be reconciled with himself, and the credit of other writers to be salved, who impute this philosophy to Leucippus and Democritus;

that they were the first atheizers of it; or the founders of that philosophy, which is atheistically atomical. 18. That the Atomists before Democritus were assertors of a Deity and substance incorporeal. 19. A confutation of those neoterics, who deny that incorporeal substance was ever asserted by any of the ancients, and the antiquity of that doctrine proved from Plato, who himself professedly maintained it. 20. That Aristotle likewise asserted incorporeal substance. 21. That Epicurus endeavoured to confute this opinion, as that which Plato and others of the ancients had maintained. 22. That all those philosophers, who held the immortality of the soul, and a Deity distinct from the world, held incorporeal substance; and that besides Thales, Pythagoras was a grand champion for the same, who also asserted a divine triad. 23. Parmenides an assertor of incorporeal substance, together with all those, who maintained that all things did not flow, but something stand. 24. Empedocles vindicated from being either an atheist or coporealist at large. 25. Anaxagoras a plain assertor of incorporeal substance. 26. Inferred that the ancient Atomists before Democritus were both theists and incoporealists. 27. That there is not only no inconsistency between atomology and theology, but also a natural cognation proved from the origin of the atomical physiology, and first a general account thereof. 28. A more particular account of the origin of this philosophy from that principle of reason, that in nature, nothing comes from nothing nor goes to nothing. 29. That the same principle, which made the ancients discard substantial forms and qualities, made them also to assert incorporeal substance. 30. That from the same ground of reason also they asserted the immortality of souls. 31. That the doctrine of pre-existence and transmigration of souls had its original from hence also. 32. That the ancients did not confine this to human souls only, but extend it to all souls and lives whatsoever. 33. All this proved from Empedocles, who asserted the pre-existence as well as the post-existence of all souls upon that ground. 34. A censure of this doctrine; that the reason of it is irrefragable for the post-eternity of all human souls; and that the hypothesis of the creation of human souls, which salves their immortality without pre-existence, is rational. 35. A new hypothesis to salve the incorporeity of the souls of brutes, without their post-existence and successive transmigrations. 36. That this will not prejudice the immortality of human souls. 37. That the Empedoclean hypothesis is more rational than the opinion of those, that would make the souls of brutes corporeal. 38. That the constitution of the atomical physiology is such, that whosoever entertains it, and thoroughly understands it, must needs hold incorporeal substance, in five particulars. 39. Two general advantages of the atomical or mechanical physiology; first, that it renders the corporeal world intelligible. 40. The second advantage of it, that it prepares an easy and clear way for the demonstration of incorporeal substance. 41. Concluded, that the ancient Moschical philosophy consisted of two parts, atomical physiology, and theology or pneumatology. 42. That this entire philosophy was afterwards mangled and dismembered, some taking one part of it alone, and some the other. 43. That Leucippus and Democritus, being atheistically inclined, took the atomical physiology, endeavouring to make it subservient to Atheism; and upon what occasion, they did it, and how unsuccessfully. 44. That Plato took the theology and pneumatology of the ancients, but rejected their atomical physiology, and upon what accounts. 45. That Aristotle followed Plato herein, with a commendation of Aristotle's philosophy.

THEY that hold the necessity of all human actions and events do it upon one or other of these two grounds; either because they suppose, that necessity is inwardly essential to all agents whatsoever, and that contingent liberty is πρᾶγμα ἀνυπόστατον, a thing impossible or contradictious, which can have no existence any where in nature; the sense of which was thus expressed by the Epicurean poet:[1]

——— Quod res quæque Necessum
Intestinum habeat cunctis in rebus agendis, &c.

"That every thing naturally labours under an intestine necessity:" or else, because though they admit contingent liberty not only as a thing possible, but also as that which is actually existent in the Deity, yet they conceive all things to be so determined by the will and decrees of this Deity, as that they are thereby made necessary to us. The former of these two opinions, that contingent liberty is πρᾶγμα ἀνυπόστατον, such a thing as can have no existence in nature, may be maintained upon two different grounds; either from such a hypothesis as this, That the universe is nothing else but body and local motion; and nothing moving itself, the action of every agent is determined by some other agent without it; and therefore that ὑλικὴ ἀνάγκη, material and mechanical necessity must needs reign over all things; or else, though cogitative beings be supposed to have a certain principle of activity within themselves, yet that there can be no contingency in their actions, because all volitions are determined by a necessary antecedent understanding.

Plotinus[2] makes another distribution of Fatalists, which yet in the conclusion will come to the same with the former: Διττοὺς ἄν τις θέμενος τούτους οὐκ ἂν τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἁποτυγχάνοι, οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀφ' ἑνός τινος τὰ πάντα ἀναρτῶσιν, οἱ δὲ οὐκ οὕτω, "A man (saith he) will not do amiss, that will divide all Fatalists first into these two general heads, namely, that they derive all things from one principle, or not;" the former of which may be called divine Fatalists, the latter atheistical. Which divine Fatalists he[3] again subdivides into such, as first make God by immediate

[1] Lucretius, who De Rerum Natura, lib. 2. v. 289, &c. has the following:

Sed ne mens ipsa necessum
Intestinum habeat cunctis in rebus agendis,
Et devicta quasi cogatur ferre patique.

Which Dr. Cudworth adapts to his purpose, by a slight alteration. The *necessum intestinum* is here evidently the same as what some Latin writers call *interior necessitas*. Donatus, on Teren. Eunuch. act 5. scene 5, observes that the ancients made use of this form of expression.

[2] De Fato, Ennead. lib. i. 3. cap. 2. p. 230.

[3] It would be very difficult to meet with this distribution in Plotinus. The learned author has elicited it from what is stated by Plotinus, a writer utterly regardless both of order and ornament, rather than found it expressly given by him. Dr. Cudworth,

influence to do all things in us; as in animals the members are not determined by themselves but by what is the hegemonic in every one: and secondly, such as make fate to be an implexed series or concatenation of causes, all in themselves necessary, whereof God is the chief. The former seems to be a description of that very fate, that is maintained by some neoteric Christians; the latter is the fate of the Stoics.

Wherefore Fatalists, that hold the necessity of all human actions and events, may be reduced to these three heads: First, such as asserting the Deity, suppose it irrespectively to decree and determine all things, and thereby make all actions necessary to us; which kind of fate, though philosophers and other ancient writers have not been altogether silent of it, yet it has been principally maintained by some neoteric Christians,[4] contrary to the sense of the ancient church. Secondly, such as suppose a Deity, that acting wisely, but necessarily, did contrive the general frame of things in the world; from whence by a series of causes doth unavoidably result whatsoever is now done in it. Which fate is a concatenation of causes, all in themselves necessary, and is that which was asserted by the ancient Stoics Zeno and Chrysippus, whom the Jewish Essenes[5] seemed to follow. And lastly, such as hold the material necessity of all things without a Deity; which fate Epicurus[6] calls τὴν τῶν φυσικῶν εἱμαρμένην, "the fate of the Naturalists," that is, indeed, the Atheists, the assertors whereof may be called also the Democritical Fatalists. Which three opinions concerning fate are so many several hypotheses of the intellectual system of the universe; all which we shall here propose, endeavouring to show the falseness of them, and then substitute the true mundane system in the room of them.

as we have elsewhere noticed, had a great regard for those who chose Plato for their leader in philosophizing, among whom Plotinus does not hold the lowest place. He, therefore, often sets forth their arguments, not as they were advanced and explained by those philosophers themselves, but as they ought to have been. This weakness in so excellent a man is to be pardoned in consideration of his other merits.

[4] The class meant must be obvious to all, except those who are ignorant of the history of every Christian state. The learned author evinces every where a violent antipathy to those Christians, who suppose all things to be decreed fatally by God, and considers that, were their opinion to prevail, it would be impossible to defend religion against the attacks of those who wish to overthrow it altogether. On the division which he here gives of those, who suppose all things to take place by fate, I make no remark, as a far different matter is now under consideration. Probably an opportunity will be afforded below of discussing some points respecting it.

[5] This is a conjecture: for what opinions the Essenes entertained of fate, is very doubtful and uncertain. See Jac. Basnage, Histoire des Juifs, tom. 2. lib. 2. cap. 20. p. 129.

[6] The learned author I doubt not had in his mind this passage of Epicurus, which occurs in the Epistle to Menœceus: Ἐπεὶ κρεῖττον ἦν τῷ περὶ θεῶν μύθῳ κατακολουθεῖν, ἢ τῇ τῶν φυσικῶν εἱμαρμένῃ δουλεύειν, Præstat enim fabulas de Diis amplecti, quam physicorum servire fato. Diogenes Laërtius, De Vitis Philosoph. lib. 10. segm. 134. p. 659. edit. Meibomii.

II. The mathematical[7] or astrological fate so much talked of, as is it is a thing no way considerable for the grounds of it, so whatsoever it be, it must needs fall under one or other of those two general heads in the Plotinical distribution last mentioned, so as either to derive all things from one principle or not. It seems[8] to have had its first emersion amongst the Chaldæans from a certain kind of blind Polytheism (which is but a better sort of disguised Atheism) but it was afterwards adopted and fondly nursed by the Stoics,[9] in a way of subordination to their divine fate; for Manilius, Firmicus, and other masters of that sect were great promoters of it. And there was too much attributed to astrology also by those, that were no Fatalists, both Heathen and Christian philosophers, such as were Plotinus, Origen, Simplicius, and others; who though they did not make the stars to necessitate all human actions here below, they supposed, that divine providence (fore-knowing all things) had contrived such a strange coincidence of the motions and configurations of the heavenly bodies with such actions here upon earth, as that the former might be prognostics of the latter. Thus Origen[10] determines that the stars do not make but signify; and that the heavens are a kind of divine volume, in whose characters they that are skilled, may read or spell out human events. To the same purpose Plotinus[1] Φέρεται μὲν ταῦτα ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ τῶν ὅλων, παρέχεσθαι δὲ καὶ ἀλλὴν χρείαν τὴν τοῦ εἰς αὐτὰ ὥσπερ γράμματα βλέποντος, τοῦς τοιαύτην γραμματικὴν εἰδότας ἀναγινώσκειν τὰ μέλλοντα ἐκ τῶν σχημάτων κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον μεθοδεύοντας τῷ σημαινόμενον· ὥσπερ εἴ τις λέγοι, ἐπειδὴ ὑψηλὸς ὄρνις σημαίνει ὑψηλάς τινας πράξεις, "The motion of the stars was intended

[7] For a detailed account of the authors who have treated of this fate, see Jo. Alb. Fabricius in his Delectus Argumentor. pro Veritate Religionis Christianæ, cap. 16. p. 400—403. Above all the discourse of Gerh. Jo Vossius, De Idololatria, lib. 2. cap. 48. p. 210. &c. ed. Amstelod. 1700 fol., will be of much assistance to those who do not at once understand all that is here discussed.

[8] On the origin of the fate, which Augustine, De Civit. Dei, lib. 5. cap. 9. has called sidereum, there is no reason for much to be said. The most ancient nations, it is certain, entertained a persuasion that demons or gods reside in the stars, regulating and directing their courses. This opinion had already reached the Italians in the age of Pythagoras, probably from the east. For, as Jamblichus informs us, there were some among them who believed Pythagoras to be one of those demons that inhabit the moon, Jamblichi Vita Pythagoræ, cap. 6. p. 23. ed. Kusteri. The same most ancient nations were firmly convinced that the gods take care of human affairs. Combine these two: Dii rebus humanis provident; and: Astra sedes sunt Deorum, and you will not, methinks, inquire further, how it happened that people of the earliest antiquity fell into the absurd opinion, that all events are regulated by the influence of the stars.

[9] See Jac. Thomasius, De Exustione Mundi Stoica, Diss. 15. p. 246.

[10] See Pet. Dan. Huetius, Origenianor. lib. 2. cap. 8. sect. 5. p. 129. This dogma like many others, he borrowed from the schools of the Platonists.

[1] The passage occurs in his book De Fato, Ennead. 3. lib. 1. cap. 6. p. 233. But this subject is discussed much more clearly and copiously by the same author, Ennead. 2. lib. 3. Utrum stellæ aliquid agant? cap. 1. p. 137. and cap. 7. p. 140, 141. This opinion of Plotinus, I observe, is expressed in Latin by Macrobius, In Somnium Scipionis. lib. 1. cap. 19. p. 97. ed. Gronovii.

for the physical good of the whole; but they afford also another use collaterally in order to prognostication, namely that they, who are skilled in the grammar of the heavens, may be able from the several configurations of the stars, as it were letters, to spell out future events, by making such analogical interpretations as they used to do in augury: as when a bird flies high, to interpret this of some high and noble exploit." And Simplicius [2] in like manner: Σύμφωνός ἐστιν ἡ εἱμαρμένη περιφορὰ τῇ προβολῇ τῶν ψυχῶν τῇ κατ' αὐτὴν ἐρχομένῃ εἰς τὴν γένεσιν, οὐκ ἀναγκάζουσα μὲν τὰς ψυχὰς τῶνδε ὀρέγεσθαι ἢ τῶνδε, σύμφωνος δὲ οὖσα ταῖς ὀρέξεσιν αὐτῶν, "The fatal conversion of the heavens is made to correspond with the production of souls into generation at such and such times, not necessitating them to will this or that, but conspiring agreeably with such appetites and volitions of theirs." And these philosophers were the rather inclinable to this persuasion from a superstitious conceit, which they had, that the stars being animated, were intellectual beings of a far higher

[2] Comm. in Epictetum, cap. 1. p. 26. ed. Salmasii. But unless I am much deceived, the opinion maintained at great length by Simplicius in this place concerning the influence of the stars, is totally at variance with that of Plotinus and Origen. For if all that he says be accurately examined, he holds this opinion of the stars: (I.) That they have no influence upon the soul of man, because it is without beginning and imperishable, ibid. p. 25. (II.) But that the soul's instrument or the body is affected by them. (III.) That such a body is always produced, as is suitable to the soul with which it is to be associated. (IV.) That as a conjecture can be formed of the artist from the instrument, so also astrologers, by an examination of the soul's instrument or body, can judge of the habit of that which is about to use the instrument. (V.) And that they are seldom mistaken, because the souls make use of their instruments the bodies mostly as parts, and accommodate their appetites to the nature of the bodies. (VI.) From which is evident that the conversion of the heavens does not effect those things which the souls undertake, but merely corresponds with the appetites of the souls, since these for the most part subject themselves to the dominion of the bodies. This last article is the substance of the words of Simplicius here adduced by Cudworth, the sense of which is wretchedly expressed in the Latin of Wolf. It is to be regretted indeed that most of those who translated the Greek philosophers into Latin, brought scarcely any qualification to the task, beyond a mere knowledge of the Greek language, being neither sufficiently acquainted with the philosophy of the ancients, nor possessing competent powers of reasoning. Hence it happens, that their versions are for the most part obscure, and very often altogether foreign to the meaning of their authors. To explain then what I have already said more clearly, Simplicius supposed as follows: That the human soul is not controlled by any thing, but is absolutely free; but that the body it is to be enclosed in is constructed agreeably to the state of the stars and of the heavens at the time of its formation. If, therefore, astrologers know the exact time when any one is conceived and born, that they are also able to tell how his body is affected, and what propensities it is endowed with. And as souls generally obey the instinct of the bodies, and do not make use of their own liberty, that therefore a judgment may generally be formed from the heavenly bodies of a man's whole nature, disposition, and appetites.—From this I think it will be obvious to every one, how far the opinion of Simplicius differs from that of Plotinus and Origen, and that Cudworth is wrong in ranking him among those, who attributed no other virtue to the stars besides that of signifying. I have thought it worth while to go to some length in this elucidation; partly because the opinion itself is of very great antiquity, as could easily be proved, and partly because it is manifest from thence, what doctrine the Platonists held concerning fate and liberty—a doctrine upon which so much absurd and perplexed comment has been written.

rank than men. And since God did not make them, nor any thing else in the world, singly for themselves alone, but also to contribute to the public good of the universe, their physical influence seeming inconsiderable, they knew not well what else could be worthy of them, unless it were to portend human events. This indeed is the best sense, that can be made of astrological prognostication; but it is a business that stands upon a very weak and tottering, if not impossible foundation.

III. There is another wild and extravagant conceit, which some of the Pagans had, who though they verbally acknowledged a Deity, yet supposed a certain fate superior to it, and not only to all their other petty gods, but also to Jupiter himself. To which purpose is that of the Greek poet, Latined by Cicero:[3] Quod fore paratum est, id summum exsuperat Jovem; and that of Herodotus:[4] Τὴν πεπρωμένην μοῖραν ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν ἀποφυγέειν καὶ τῷ Θεῷ· "It is impossible for God himself to avoid the destined fate;" and: Δοῦλος Θεὸς ἀνάγκης,[5] "God himself is a servant of necessity." According to which conceit, Jupiter in Homer[6] laments his condition, in that the fates having determined, that his beloved Sarpedon should be slain by the son of Menœtius, he was not able to withstand it. Though all these passages may not perhaps imply much more than what the stoical hypothesis[7] itself imported; for that did also in some sense make God himself a servant to the necessity of the matter, and to his own decrees, in that he could not have made the smallest thing in the world otherwise than now it is, much less was able to alter any thing: according to that of Seneca:[8] Eadem

[3] De Divinat. lib. 2. cap. 10. p. 3196. ed. Verburgii.

[4] These are not Herodotus' own words, but those of the oracle delivered by the Pythian priestess to the ambassadors of Crœsus, as quoted by him, Histor. lib. 1. cap. 91. p. 38. ed. Gronovii.

[5] He means, I have no doubt, the following passage of Philemon, which occurs among the other fragments of that author, collected by J. Le Clerc:

Δοῦλοι βασιλέων ἐσμὲν, οἱ βασιλεῖς Θεῶν,
Ὁ Θεὸς ἀνάγκης.
Nos Regibus, Reges Deis subserviunt,
Necessitati Deus.

See Menandri et Philemonis Reliquiæ, p. 307.

[6] This passage has already been noticed by Cicero, De Divinat. lib. 2. cap. 10. p. 3195. t. 9. opp. ed. Verburgii. It occurs Iliad. lib. M. In the margin Dr. Cudworth has cited Lactantius and Lucian as evidences of this hypothesis. The former, lib. 1. Divinar. Institut. cap. 11, p. 69. ed. Vener. Walchii, says: Illud vero, quale est? esse fata, quibus Dii omnes et ipse Jupiter pareat? Si Parcarum tanta vis est, ut plus possint, quam cœlestes universi, quamque ipse rector ac dominus: cur non illæ potius regnare dicantur? The latter in his Jupiter Confutatus, opp. t. 2. p. 124. ed. Grævii, ridicules the conceit at some length.

[7] So Pet. Gassendus supposed, who, Syntagm. Philos. par. 3. or Ethices lib. 3. cap. p. 532. tom. 2. opp. Lugd. 1658. fol. couples this hypothesis with the doctrine of the Stoics concerning fate.

[8] De Providentia, cap. 5. p. 195. ed. Joh. Frid. Gronovii. Similar passages may be found in Gassendus as above cited, and Jac. Thomasius, De Exustione Mundi Stoica, diss. 13. p. 170. and others.

necessitas et Deos alligat. Irrevocabilis divina pariter atque humana cursus vehit. Ille ipse omnium conditor ac rector scripsit quidem fata, sed sequitur. Semper paret, semel jussit. "One and the same chain of necessity ties God and men. The same irrevocable and unalterable course carries on divine and human things. The very maker and governor of all things, that writ the fates, follows them. He did but once command, but he always obeys." But if there were this further meaning[9]

[9] The doctrine, that the fates give laws to the gods themselves, or that the power of the gods cannot annul or alter any thing which has been decreed or ordained by the law of fate, is of the greatest antiquity. I shall adduce a striking passage of the most ancient poet Hesiod, Theogon. v. 463, &c. p. 81. ed. Clerici, in which it is clearly put forth, and which, I observe, has been overlooked by the learned men who have touched upon this subject. He is speaking of Saturn:

Πεύθετο γὰρ γαίης τε καὶ οὐρανοῦ ἀστερόεντος,
Οὕνεκά οἱ πέπρωτο ἐῷ ὑπὸ παιδὶ δαμῆναι,
Καὶ κρατερῷ περ ἐόντι, Διὸς μεγάλου διὰ βουλάς.
Audierat enim ex terra et cœlo stellis micante,
Quod sibi fatale esset, sui a filio domari,
Quamvis robusto, Jovis Magni per consilia.

We here see Saturn subject to the will of the fates. It is difficult to say from whence this opinion emanated, which formerly pervaded the whole of Greece and from thence spread also to the Latins. Those who feel inclined to put a favourable interpretation upon it will easily find reasons for doing so. I. They will say that μοῖρα or fate, to which the ancients made their gods subject, is divine providence, and that all those therefore who represented the gods as shackled by the fates, simply wished to testify thereby that the divinities which they worshipped, were either men or at least beings much inferior to the Supreme Deity, whose duty it was to obey his will and decrees, like all other creatures. Which explication, I confess, has much probability in it. II. Or they will affirm, as reason also suggests, that the most ancient nations held, this Supreme Deity, although he can do whatever he wills, to be nevertheless unable to undertake or ordain any thing contrary to his own divine virtues and perfections: but that this sound doctrine by degrees was mixed up with fables and strangely disfigured by the poets and others tinctured with superstition. With these, therefore, the fate by which the ancients supposed their god to be controlled, will be nothing else than God himself or the divine nature, which can decree nothing except what is agreeable to its own holiness and justice. But others, among whom we may rank our author, will perhaps contend that the whole of this doctrine sprung from a most impure source, and their conjecture is strengthened by the fact that it was handed down by the poets Homer and Hesiod, who, we know, clung to the most monstrous fictions respecting the generation of the gods, telling us forsooth that every thing divine was engendered of Chaos and Night by a certain eternal law. But if matter produced the gods themselves of necessity, what remains for us but to conclude that nothing can take place without fate, and that the gods themselves, generated by a certain fatal necessity, are also subject to fate and necessity. Each of these hypotheses, methinks, in the hands of any one, qualified by talent and a study of ancient authors, might be skilfully set forth and defended, but as to deciding positively which of them is nearest the truth, this I consider altogether unimportant. Perhaps all these causes together contributed towards the origin of this notion or, to explain what I think more clearly, perhaps all nations and individuals had not one and the same reason for adopting it. In considering and examining carefully all the concomitants of the doctrine, it appears to me most probable, that the priests had the chief share in propagating and instilling it into the minds of men. For scarcely any thing could so effectually excuse the crimes and atrocities of the gods, at which not a few were offended. If Jupiter was bound to obey the fates, who could feel indignant at his being so often caught in adultery? So forsooth it was willed by the fates. Indeed no act, however foul and unjust, is recorded of Mercury, Venus, and the other gods, which could not easily be palliated by those who were pleased to place fate and necessity over the gods themselves. In

in the passages before cited, that a necessity without God, that was invincible by him, did determine his will to all things; this was nothing but a certain confused and contradictious jumble of atheism and theism both together; or an odd kind of intimation, that however the name of God be used in compliance with vulgar speech and opinion, yet indeed it signifies nothing, but material necessity; and the blind motion of matter is really the highest Numen in the world. And here that of Balbus the Stoic in Cicero[10] is opportune: Non est natura Dei præpotens et excellens, siquidem ea subjecta est ei vel necessitati vel naturæ, quâ cœlum, maria, terræque reguntur. Nihil autem est præstantius Deo. Nulli igitur est naturæ obediens aut subjectus Deus. "God would not be the most powerful and excellent being, if he were subject to that either necessity or nature, by which the heavens, seas, and earth are governed. But the notion of a God implies the most excellent being. Therefore God is not obedient or subject to any nature."

IV. And now we think fit here to suggest, that however we shall oppose those three fatalisms before mentioned, as so many false hypotheses of the mundane system and economy, and endeavour to exclude that severe tyranness (as Epicurus calls it) of universal necessity reigning over all, and to leave some scope for contingent liberty to move up and down in, without which, neither rational creatures can be blame-worthy for any thing they do, nor God have any object to display his justice upon, nor indeed be justified in his providence; yet, as we vindicate to God the glory of all good, so we do not quite banish the notion of fate neither, nor take away all necessity; which is a

like manner, the complaints of those persons, at all times a numerous class, who bitterly repined at being neglected and despised by the gods, to whom notwithstanding they most devoutly sued for protection, might readily be silenced. For who could justly be angry with Esculapius for not expelling a fever, if he could be hindered from doing so by the fates? This I perceive did not escape the observation of Martial who has the following not inapt epigram:

Festinata sui gemeret cum fata Severi
Silius, Ausonio non semel ore potens:
Cum grege Pierio mœstus Phœboque querebar,
Ipse meum flevi, dixit Apollo, Linon.
* * * * *
Numina cum videas duris obnoxia fatis,
Invidia possis exonerare Deos.

Lib. 9. epigr. 88, p. 388. ed. Lud. Smids, Amstelod. 1701. 8. Some indeed, I am aware, will say that the priests by adopting this course, so far from advancing their own interests, would have gone the way to subvert religion altogether. But who is ignorant of the folly of most men, who never think of the immediate consequence of a thing, but at the same time assent to and believe what are in their whole nature incompatible? Almost all those who put faith in the gods were persuaded, as we have said, that fate held sway even over Jupiter, and yet they did not on that account cease to propitiate them. And further, those who held more closely than others to this opinion, surpassed the rest in superstition.

[10] De Natur. Deor. lib. 2. cap. 30. p. 3000.

thing the Clazomenian philosopher of old was taxed for, affirming, *μηδὲν τῶν γινομένων γίνεσθαι καθ' εἱμαρμένην, ἀλλὰ εἶναι κενὸν τοῦτο τοὔνομα*, "that nothing at all was done by fate, but that it was altogether a vain name." And the Sadduceans among the Jews have been noted for the same:[2] *Τὴν μὲν εἱμαρμένην ἀναιροῦσιν, οὐδὲν εἶναι ταύτην ἀξιοῦντες, οὔτε κατ' αὐτὴν τὰ ἀνθρώπινα τέλος λαμβάνειν, ἅπαντα δὲ ἐφ' ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς τιθέντες*, "They take away all fate, and will not allow it to be any thing at all, nor to have any power over human things, but put all things entirely into the hands of men's own free-will." And some of our own seem to have approached too near to this extreme, attributing, perhaps, more to the power of free-will, than either religion or nature will admit. But the hypothesis that we shall recommend, as most agreeable to truth, of a *πρόνοια ἱλάσμος*, "placable providence," of a Deity essentially good, presiding over all, will avoid all extremes, asserting to God the glory of good, and freeing him from the blame of evil; and leaving a certain proportionate contemperation and commixture of contingency and necessity both together in the world; as nature requires a mixture of motion and rest, without either of which there could be no generation. Which temper was observed by several of the ancients; as the Pharisaic sect amongst the Jews, who determined,[3] *τινὰ καὶ οὐ πάντα τῆς εἱμαρμένης εἶναι ἔργον, τινὰ δὲ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῖς ὑπάρχειν*, "that some things and not all, were the effects of fate, but some things were left in men's own power and liberty:" and also by Plato[4] amongst the philosophers: *Πλάτων ἔγκρινει μὲν εἱμαρμένην ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ψυχῶν καὶ βίων, συνεισάγει δὲ καὶ τὴν παρ' ἡμᾶς αἰτίαν*, "Plato inserts something of fate into human lives and actions, and he joins with it liberty of will also." He doth indeed suppose human souls to have within themselves the causes of their own changes to a better or worse state, and every where declares God to be blameless for their evils; and yet he[5] somewhere makes the

[1] Anaxagoras, who was censured for this opinion by Alexander Aphrodisiensis, De Fato, sect. 2. p. 11. ed. Lond. 1658. 12. But what opinion Anaxagoras really entertained concerning fate, has not yet been shown. See Gabr. Naudæus, De Fato et Vitæ Termino, p. 20.

[2] The words here quoted are from Josephus, Antiq. Judaicar. lib. 13. cap. 5. sect. 9. p. 649. t. 1. ed. Havercampi. But it is difficult to understand how men, who held the law of Moses to be divine, could reject all providence and fate.

[3] See Josephus, ibid.

[4] The testimony is from Plutarch, De Placitis Philosoph. lib. 10. cap. 27. p. 884. t. 2. opp. ed. Francof. 1599. fol. who also states the same thing, cap. 28. Heroto may be added among others, Alcinous, Introd. in Doctrinam Platonis, cap. 26. in Stanleii Historia Philosoph. t. 1. p. 348.

[5] Meaning, I presume, the fable concerning the fates which we read De Republica, lib. 10. p. 520, wherein Lachesis distributes certain lots to the souls about to be sent into bodies, which souls she among other things addresses with these words: *Ἀρετὴ δ' ἀδέσποτον, ἣν τιμῶν καὶ ἀτιμάζων, πλέον καὶ ἐλάττον αὐτῆς ἕξει. Αἰτία ἑλομένου. Θεὸς ἀναίτιος*, Virtus inviolabilis ac libera; quam prout honorabit quis aut negliget,

three fatal sisters notwithstanding, Clotho, Lachesis, and Atropos, to be busy about them also. For according to the sense of the ancients, fate is a servant of divine providence in the world, and takes place differently upon the different actings of free-willed beings. And how free a thing soever the will of man may seem to be to some, yet I conceive it to be out of question, that it may contract upon itself such necessities and fatalities, as it cannot upon a sudden rid itself of at pleasure. But whatsoever is said in the sequel of this discourse by way of opposition to that fatalism of the neoteric Christians, is intended only to vindicate what was the constant doctrine of the Christian church in its greatest purity, (as shall be made manifest,) and not to introduce any newfangled conceit of our own.

V. We must now proceed to give a more full and perfect account of these three several fates, or hypotheses of the mundane system before-mentioned, together with the grounds of them, beginning first with that, which we principally intend the confutation of, the Atheistical or Democritical fate: which as it is a thing of the most dangerous consequence of all, so it seems to be most spreading and infectious in these latter times.

Now this atheistical system of the world, that makes all things to be materially and mechanically necessary, without a God, is built upon a peculiar physiological hypothesis, different from what hath been generally received for many ages; which is called by some atomical or corpuscular, by others mechanical: of which we must therefore needs give a full and perfect account. And we shall do it first in general, briefly, not descending to those minute particularities of it, which are disputed amongst these Atomists themselves, in this manner.

The atomical physiology supposes, that body is nothing else but διαστατὸν ἀντίτυπον, that is, extended bulk; and resolves therefore, that nothing is to be attributed to it, but what is included in the nature and idea of it, viz. more or less magnitude, with divisibility into parts, figure, and position, together with motion or rest, but so as that no part of body can ever move it-

ita plus aut minus ex ea possidebit. Eligentis quidem culpa est omnis. Deus vero extra culpam. Plotinus, Ennead. 2. lib. 3. cap 15. p. 145. Utrum stellæ aliquid agant? wished to throw some light on this fable, but he pretty plainly shows himself to have been ignorant of its drift. Nor do I believe there is any one who can satisfactorily point out its full force and meaning. Indeed the whole doctrine of Plato concerning fate is incredibly open to questions and doubts; a subject we shall perhaps touch upon elsewhere. Suffice it for the present to observe, that so many discordant opinions of learned men upon the fate of Plato, seem to have arisen principally from this, that some followed what Plato expressly stated in words, while others looked more to what was agreeable and consistent with his other dogmas. If we examine solely what Plato has left on record concerning fate and liberty, we shall be able not to judge too unfavourably of his opinion, but if we consider what he ought to have taught consistently with his other opinions, I am afraid he will appear to have attributed more to fate and necessity than some suppose. For a copious discussion of this subject see Chalcidius, In Timæum Platonis, cap. 141. p. 332. &c.

self, but is always moved by something else. And consequently it supposes, that there is no need of any thing else besides the simple elements of magnitude, figure, site, and motion (which are all clearly intelligible as different modes of extended substance) to solve the corporeal phenomena by; and therefore, not of any substantial forms distinct from the matter; nor of any other qualities really existing in the bodies without, besides the results or aggregates of those simple elements, and the disposition of the insensible parts of bodies in respect of figure, site, and motion; nor of any intentional species or shows, propagated from the objects to our senses; nor, lastly, of any other kind of motion or action really distinct from local motion (such as generation and alteration) they being neither intelligible, as modes of extended substance, nor any ways necessary. Forasmuch as the forms and qualities of bodies may well be conceived to be nothing but the result of those simple elements of magnitude, figure, site, and motion, variously compounded together, in the same manner as syllables and words in great variety result from the different combinations and conjunctions of a few letters, or the simple elements of speech; and the corporeal part of sensation, and particularly that of vision, may be solved only by local motion of bodies, that is, either by corporeal effluvia[6] (called simulachra, membranæ, and exuviæ) streaming continually from the surface of the objects, or rather, as the later and more refined atomists[7] conceived, by pressure made from the object to the eye, by means of light in the medium. So that[8] ὡς δια βακτηρίας τοῦ τανθέντος ἀέρος τὸ βλεπόμενον ἀναγγέλλεται· the sense taking cognizance of the object by the subtle interposed medium, that is tense and stretched, (thrusting every way from it upon the optic nerves) doth by that as it were by a staff touch it. Again, generation and corruption may be sufficiently explained by concretion and secretion, or local motion, without substantial forms

[6] That this was the opinion of Democritus is stated almost by all: whether truly or not, I cannot say. For at this day it is impossible from the few passages extant in ancient authors touching his doctrine, to ascertain the views and opinions of this at all times acute man. That Epicurus, however, who is known to have followed in his footsteps, and Lucretius, the admirer of Epicurus, represented the nature of vision after this manner is unquestionable. See Pet. Gassendus, Physices sect. 3. lib. 7. cap. 5. p. 374. t. 2. opp. and Syntagm. Philos. Epicuri, sect. 3. cap. 12. p. 43. t. 3. opp.

[7] Renat. Cartesius, Dioptrices, cap. 1. sect. 2. p. 50. tom. 1. opp. ed. Amstelod. 1692. 4. illustrates this opinion by the same similitude of a staff. I suppose him therefore to be chiefly alluded to here by our author.

[8] It is incredible how much trouble and labour has been occasioned me by this habit of the learned doctor's of quoting passages of the ancients without pointing out either the author or the book. Days sometimes had to be consumed, before I could find what I wanted. For no man is gifted with so happy a memory as immediately to recollect all that he has at any time read. The Greek words here quoted are those of Apollodorus, by which he explained the nature of vision according to the Stoical opinion, and are preserved in Diog. Laërtius, De Vitis Philosophorum, lib. 7. segm. 157. p. 466. Plutarch, De Placitis Philosoph. lib. 4. cap. 15. t. 2. opp. p. 911. makes mention of the same opinion of the Stoics.

and qualities. And lastly, those sensible ideas of light and colours, heat and cold, sweet and bitter, as they are distinct things from the figure, site, and motion of the insensible parts of bodies, seem plainly to be nothing else but our own fancies, passions, and sensations, however they be vulgarly mistaken for qualities in the bodies without us.

VI. Thus much may suffice for a general account of the atomical physiology. We shall in the next place consider the antiquity thereof, as also what notice Aristotle hath taken of it, and what account he gives of the same. For though Epicurus went altogether this way, yet it is well known, that he was not the first inventor of it. But it is most commonly fathered on Democritus, who was senior both to Aristotle and Plato, being reported to have been born the year after Socrates;[9] from whose fountains Cicero[10] saith, that Epicurus watered his orchards, and of whom Sex. Empiricus[1] and Laertius testify that he did ἐκβάλλειν τὰς ποιότητας, "cashier qualities;" and Plutarch,[2] that he made the first principles of the wholé universe ἀτόμους ἀποίους καὶ ἀπαθεῖς, "atoms devoid of all qualities and passions." But Laertius[3] will have Leucippus, who was somewhat senior to Democritus, to be the first inventor of this philosophy, though he wrote not so many books concerning it as Democritus did. Aristotle, who often takes notice of this philosophy, and ascribes it commonly to Leucippus and Democritus jointly, gives us this description of it in his metaphysics:[4] Λεύκιππος

[9] On the age of Democritus, see especially the elaborate dissertation of Jo. Jonsius, De Scriptor. Histor. Philos. lib. 1. cap. 4. sect. 1. p. 26. ed. Dornii.

[10] De Natura Deorum, lib. 1. cap. 43. p. 2948. tom. 9. opp.

[1] The words of Laërtius here meant, I have no doubt, are those which occur in his Pyrrho, lib. 9. segm. 72. p. 586. Δημόκριτος δὲ τὰς ποιότητας ἐκβαλών. But what passage of Sextus he had in mind, I can only conjecture, not remembering to have read the phrase ἐκβάλλειν τὰς ποιότητας in that author. It is most probable, however, he intended the following: Ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν Δημόκριτος διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ὑπόκεῖσθαι φύσει αἰσθητὸν τῶν τὰ πάντα συγκρινουσῶν ἀτόμων, πάσης αἰσθητῆς ποιότητος ἔρημον ἐχουσῶν φύσιν, Sed Democritus quidem, propterea quod nihil occurrat nobis re vera sensibus subjectum, quum quæ omnia congregant et cogunt atomi, habeant naturam vacuam omni sensili qualitate; lib. 2. Adv. Logicos, p. 49. A similar passage occurs lib. 6. Contra Musicos p. 367, and lib. 1. Contra Logic. p. 399.

[2] Adv. Colotem, tom. 2. opp. p. 1110. Τί γὰρ λέγει Δημόκριτος; οὐσίας ἀπείρους τὸ πλῆθος, ἀτόμους τε καὶ ἀδιαφόρους ἔτι δὲ ἀποίους, καὶ ἀπαθεῖς ἐν τῷ κενῷ φέρεσθαι διεσπαρμένας, Quid enim dicit Democritus? Substantias multitudine infinita, divisionis et differentiæ, qualitatis quoque et affectionis expertes in vacuo ferri dispersas. None of these authors however, refer the origin of this doctrine of atoms to Democritus, as the learned Doctor seems to intimate, although they all testify that he was favourable to it. As to the matter itself, some learned men relying upon a certain passage of Augustine, think that Democritus did not take away all qualities from his atoms. See Jo. Alb. Fabricius, Ad Sextum Empiricum, p. 136. These I purpose answering elsewhere.

[3] De Placitis Philosoph. lib. 9. segm. 30. p. 567.

[4] Lib. 1. cap. 4. p. 268. tom. 4. opp. But Dr. Cudworth has here combined two statements, which in Aristotle are disconnected. For after the words; τὸ δὲ μὴ ὂν the philosopher interposes six or seven lines in which he somewhat more clearly explains

δὲ καὶ ὁ ἑταῖρος αὐτοῦ Δημόκριτος στοιχεῖα μὲν τὸ πλῆρες καὶ τὸ κενὸν εἶναί φασι, λέγοντες οἷον τὸ μὲν ὄν, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὄν, καὶ τὰς διαφορὰς αἰτίας τῶν ἄλλων φασὶ ταύτας μέντοι τρεῖς, σχῆμά τε καὶ τάξιν καὶ θέσιν, διαφέρειν γὰρ τὸ ὂν ῥυσμῷ καὶ διαθιγῇ καὶ τροπῇ, "Leucippus and his companion Democritus make the first principles of all things to be Plenum and Vacuum (body and space) whereof one is Ens, the other Non-ens, and the differences of the body, which are only figure, order, and position, to be the causes of all other things." Which differences they call by these names, Rysmus, Diathige, and Trope. And in his book De Anima,[6] having declared that Democritus made fire and the soul to consist of round atoms, he describes those atoms of his after this manner: Οἷον ἐν τῷ ἀέρι τὰ καλούμενα ξύσματα ἐν ταῖς διὰ τῶν θυρίδων ἀκτῖσι, ὧν τὴν πανσπερμίαν στοιχεῖα λέγει Δημόκριτος τῆς ὅλης φύσεως, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ Λεύκιππος, "They are (saith he) like those ramenta or dusty particles which appear in the sunbeams, an omnifarious seminary whereof Democritus makes to be the first elements of the whole universe, and so doth Leucippus likewise." Elsewhere[7] the same Aristotle tells us, that these two philosophers explained generation and alteration without forms and qualities by figures and local motion: Δημόκριτος καὶ Λεύκιππος ποιήσαντες τὰ σχήματα τὴν ἀλλοίωσιν καὶ τὴν γένεσιν ἐκ τούτων ποιοῦσι διακρίσει μὲν καὶ συγκρίσει γένεσιν καὶ φθοράν, τάξει δὲ καὶ θέσει ἀλλοίωσιν, "Democritus and Leucippus having made figures, (or variously figured atoms) the first principles, make generation and alteration out of these; namely, generation together with corruption from the concretion and secretion of them, but alteration from the change of their order and position." Again he elsewhere[8] takes notice of that opinion of the Atomists,

this philosophy, and then follow those which the learned Doctor has annexed immediately to the others, as if they had run on in one continued sentence.

[6] Lib. 1. cap. 2. p. 4. tom. 2. opp. But the worthy author is mistaken in supposing that Aristotle here explains generally, what atoms are according to the notion of Democritus. For this definition of atoms belongs to those only, which Democritus had asserted the soul to consist of, namely the σφαιροειδῆ: although, to confess the truth, the leader of the Peripatetics does not express himself very clearly in this passage.

[7] De Generatione et Corrupt. lib. 1. cap. 2. p. 700. tom. 1. opp. Here Aristotle is obscure, as usual, and his Latin interpreter not more intelligible. Who can understand: alterationem ordine et positu (fieri)? The sense is: mutationem situs et positus corpusculorum individuorum efficere, ut aliam res faciem et naturam adipiscantur.

[8] De Sensu et Sensibili, cap. 4. p. 70. tom. 2. opp. On this passage three things are to be observed. I. Dr. Cudworth again unites two different passages into one, and am I not certain whether correctly or not. For the words last quoted: καὶ εἰς σχήματα ἀνάγουσι τοὺς χυμούς, stand at some distance from the others in Aristotle. II. He joins these words with the rest in such a manner, as though Aristotle meant them to be understood not of Democritus only but also of the other ancient physiologers. But the fact is otherwise; for he says this of Democritus alone, as is at once evident from his own words: Εἰς δὲ τὰ σχήματα ἀνάγει τοὺς χυμούς. III. The translator Franc. Vatablus, ignorant, as it seems, of the ancient philosophy, has performed his office here most miserably. For what means: Sapores autem figuris tribuit? He

that all sense was a kind of touch, and that the sensible qualities of bodies were to be resolved into figures; imputing it not only to Democritus, but also to the generality of the old philosophers, but very much disliking the same: Δημόκριτος καὶ οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν φυσιολόγων ἀτοπώτατόν τι ποιοῦσι, πάντα γὰρ τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἁπτὰ ποιοῦσι καὶ εἰς σχήματα ἀνάγουσι τοὺς χυμούς, "Democritus and most of the physiologers here commit a very great absurdity, in that they make all sense to be touch, and resolve sensible qualities into the figures of insensible parts or atoms." And this opinion he endeavours to confute by these arguments. First because there is contrariety in qualities, as in black and white, hot and cold, bitter and sweet, but there is no contrariety in figures; for a circular figure is not contrary to a square or multangular; and therefore there must be real qualities in bodies distinct from the figure, site, and motion of parts. Again, the variety of figures and dispositions being infinite, it would follow from thence, that the species of colours, odours, and tastes should be infinite likewise, and reducible to no certain number. Which arguments I leave the professed Atomists to answer. Furthermore, Aristotle somewhere also censures that other fundamental principle of this atomical physiology, that the sensible ideas of colours and tastes, as red, green, bitter, and sweet, formally considered, are only passions and fancies in us, and not real qualities in the object without. For as in a rainbow there is really nothing without our sight, but a rorid cloud diversely refracting and reflecting the sun-beams, in such an angle; nor are there really such qualities in the diaphanous prism; when refracting the light, it exhibits to us the same colours of the rainbow; whence it was collected, that those things are properly the fantasms of the sentient, occasioned by different motions on the optic nerves: so they conceived the case to be the same in all other colours, and that both the colours of the prism and rainbow were as real as other colours, and all other colours as fantastical as they: and then by parity of reason they extended the business further to the other sensibles. But this opinion Aristotle condemns in these words:[9] Οἱ πρότερον φυσιολόγοι τοῦτο οὐ καλῶς ἔλεγον, λευκὸν οὔτε οὐδὲν οἰόμενοι οὔτε μέλαν ἄνευ ὄψεως, οὔτε χυμὸν ἄνευ γεύσεως, "The former physiologers were generally out in this, in that they thought there was no black or white without the sight, nor no bitter or sweet without the taste." There are

ought to have translated the passage thus: Saporum autem varietatem ex figurarum, quibus atomi sunt præditæ, varietate derivat. But the obscurity of Aristotle affords no slight excuse for the faults of his interpreters.

[9] But in a very different part from that before quoted by him, namely De Anima, lib. 2. cap. 1. p. 43. tom. 2. opp. On this point Pet. Gassendus, Physices sect. 3. lib. 6. cap. 2. p. 340. tom. 2. opp. defends the ancient physiologers against Aristotle.

other passages in Aristotle concerning this philosophy,[10] which I think superflous to insert here; and I shall have occasion to cite some of them afterward for other purposes.

VII. But in the next place it will not be amiss to show, that Plato also hath left a very full record of this mechanical or atomical physiology (that hath hardly been yet taken notice of) which notwithstanding he doth not impute either to Democritus (whose name Laertius[1] thinks he purposely declined to mention throughout all his writings) or to Leucippus, but to Protagoras. Wherefore in his Theætetus, having first declared in general,[2] that the Protagorean philosophy made all things to consist of a commixture of parts (or atoms) and local motion, he represents it, in particular concerning colours, after this manner:[3] Ὑπόλαβε τοίνυν οὑτωσὶ κατὰ τὰ ὄμματα πρῶτον, ὃ δὲ καλεῖς χρῶμα λευκὸν μὴ εἶναι αὐτὸ ἕτερόν τι ἔξω τῶν σῶν ὀμμάτων, μηδ' ἐν τοῖς ὄμμασι, ἀλλὰ μέλαν τε καὶ λευκὸν καὶ ὁτιοῦν ἄλλο χρῶμα ἐκ τῆς προσβολῆς τῶν ὀμμάτων πρὸς τὴν προσηκουσαν φορὰν φανεῖται γεγεννημένον, καὶ ὃ δὲ ἕκαστον εἶναί φαμεν χρῶμα, οὔτε τὸ προσβάλλον οὔτε τὸ προσβαλλόμενον ἀλλὰ μεταξύ τι ἑκάστῳ ἴδιον γεγονός, "First, as to that which belongs to the sight, you must conceive that which is called a white or a black colour not to be any thing absolutely existing either without your eyes or within your eyes; but black and white and every other colour is caused by different motions made upon the eye from objects differently modified; so that it is nothing either in the agent nor the patient absolutely, but something which arises from between them both." Where it follows immediately: Ἦ σὺ διισχυρίσαιο ἄν, ὡς οἷόν σοι φαίνεται ἕκαστον χρῶμα, τοιοῦτον καὶ κυνὶ καὶ ὁτῳοῦν ζώῳ, "Can you or any man else be confident, that as every colour appears to him, so it appears just the same to every other man and animal, any more than tastes and touches, heat and cold do?" From whence it is plain,[4] that Protagoras made sensible qualities not to be all

[10] Almost all the passages of Aristotle touching Democritus and his philosophy are collected together by Jo. Chrysostomus Magnenus in his Democritus Reviviscens, p. 34, &c. ed. Lugd. Bat. 1648. 12.

[1] De Dictis et Factis Philosoph. lib. 9. segm. 40. p. 571.

[2] I do not find it so written in the Theætetus, p. 118. For Plato affirms merely this: Ἐκ δὲ τῆς φορᾶς τε καὶ κινήσεως καὶ κράσεως πρὸς ἄλληλα γίγνεται πάντα, ἃ δή φαμεν εἶναι· οὐκ ὀρθῶς προσαγορεύοντες, and excepting Parmenides, adds that this doctrine was held by Protagoras, Heraclitus, Empedocles, Homer, and Epicharmus, but does not ascribe it to Protagoras alone.

[3] Theætetus, p. 119. Here, however, Dr. Cudworth as usual combines and condenses what in Plato are separated; for some words intervene after ἐν τοῖς ὄμμασι.

[4] With all deference to the learned author this is doubtful. I. For nowhere do I find Plato attributing this opinion to Protagoras; on the contrary, in what goes before, as I have just noticed, he names several philosophers. II. If such was the opinion of Protagoras, it is at least certain that he did not commit it to writing. For so Plato, before coming to this disputation, says expressly, p. 118: Πρωταγόρας τοῦτο ἡμῖν

absolute things existing in the bodies without, but to be relative to us, and passions in us; and so they are called presently after *τινὰ ἐν ἡμῖν φάσματα*, certain fancies, seemings, or appearances in us. But there is another passage,[5] in which a fuller account is given of the whole Protagorean doctrine, beginning thus: *Ἀρχὴ δὲ, ἐξ ἧς ἃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν πάντα ἥρτηται, ἥδε αὐτῶν, ὡς τὸ πᾶν κίνησις ἦν, καὶ ἄλλο παρὰ τοῦτο οὐδέν· τῆς δὲ κινήσεως δύο εἴδη. πλήθει μὲν ἄπειρον ἑκάτερον, δύναμιν δὲ τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν ἔχον, τὸ δὲ πάσχειν· ἐκ δὲ τῆς τούτων ὁμιλίας τε καὶ τρίψεως πρὸς ἄλληλα γίγνεται ἔκγονα, πλήθει μὲν ἄπειρα, δίδυμα δὲ· τὸ μὲν αἰσθητὸν, τὸ δὲ αἴσθησις ἀεὶ συνεκπίπτουσα καὶ γεννωμένη μετὰ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ*, &c., "The principle upon which all these things depend is this, that the whole universe is motion (of atoms) and nothing else besides; which motion is considered two ways, and accordingly called by two names, action and passion; from the mutual congress, and as it were attrition, together of both which, are begotten innumerable offsprings, which though infinite in number, yet may be reduced to two general heads, sensibles and sensations, that are both generated at the same time; the sensations are seeing, and hearing, and the like, and the correspondent sensibles, colours, sounds, &c. Wherefore when the eye and such a proportionate object meet together, both the *αἰσθητὸν* and the *αἴσθησις*, the sensible idea of white and black, and the sense of seeing, are generated together, neither of which would have been produced, if either of those two had not met with the other." *Καὶ τ' ἄλλα δὲ οὕτω ψυχρὸν καὶ θερμὸν καὶ πάντα τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ὑπολητπτέον, αὐτὸ μὲν καθ' αὑτὸ μηδὲν εἶναι, ἐν δὲ τῇ πρὸς ἄλληλα ὁμιλίᾳ, πάντα γίγνεσθαι, καὶ παντοῖα ἀπὸ τῆς κινήσεως*, "The like is to be con-

ᾐνίξατο τῷ πολλῷ συρφετῷ, τοῖς δὲ μαθηταῖς ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἔλεγε, "Hoc quidem nobis homunculis de plebe obscure significavit Protagoras, discipulis autem in arcano veritatem explicuit." Then follows the disputation, a part of which consists of the words quoted by Dr. Cudworth. III. This example from colours is adduced by Plato or Socrates, merely to illustrate the ancient dogma, that all things flow and are perpetually changing, or rather as a corollary from that dogma; but he does not tell us, whether Protagoras would recognize it as his own. On the contrary, it is probable, that he never professed what Socrates says; for a little afterwards Socrates declares, that he there says things which Protagoras himself, and those who thought with him, would, if living, consider ridiculous: *Γελοῖα ἀναγκαζόμεθα λέγειν, ὥς φαίη ἂν Πρωταγόρας τε καὶ πᾶς ὁ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐκείνῳ ἐπιχειρῶν λέγειν.*

[5] Theætetus, p. 120. Here again, unless I am altogether deceived, there is some misapprehension. For Plato is not descanting on the doctrine of Protagoras in these words, or explaining the same opinion as before concerning colours and bodies, but comes to the exposition of a totally different system from the former. See Socrates' own words, wherewith he introduces this passage, which sets forth, as Dr. Cudworth fancies, the opinions of Protagoras: *Εἰσὶ γὰρ, ὦ παῖ, μάλ' εὖ ἄμουσοι, ἄλλοι δὲ πολλοὶ κομψότεροι, ὧν μέλλω σοι τὰ μυστήρια λέγειν*, "Sunt hi quidem, O puer, a musis admodum alieni. Nec desunt alii quidam elegantiores, quorum tibi mysteria enarraturus sum." These words are immediately followed by the passage quoted. In what manner, however, these two opinions concerning the nature of qualities and colours differ, owing to the extreme brevity and obscurity of Plato, it will be scarcely possible to ascertain.

ceived of all other sensibles, as hot and cold, &c., that none of these are absolute things in themselves, or real qualities in the objects without, but they are begotten from the mutual congress of agent and patient with one another, and that by motion: so that neither the agent has any such thing in it before its congress with the patient, nor the patient before its congress with the agent." Ἐκ δὲ ἀμφοτέρων[6] τοῦ ποιοῦντος καὶ τοῦ πάσχοντος πρὸς τὰ ἄλληλα συγγιγνομένων καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἀποτικτόντων, τὰ μὲν ποῖα ἅττα γίγνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ αἰσθανόμενα, "But the agent and patient meeting together, and begetting sensation and sensibles, both the object and the sentient are forthwith made to be so and so qualified, as when honey is tasted, the sense of tasting and the quality of sweetness are begotten both together, though the sense be vulgarly attributed to the taster, and the quality of sweetness to the honey." The conclusion of all which is summed up thus: Οὐδὲν εἶναι αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτό, ἀλλά τινι αἰεὶ γίγνεσθαι, "That none of those sensible things is any thing absolutely in the objects without, but they are all generated or made relatively to the sentient." There is more in that dialogue to this purpose, which I here omit; but I have set down so much of it in the author's own language, because it seems to me to be an excellent monument of the wisdom and sagacity of the old philosophers; that which is the main curiosity in this whole business of the mechanical or atomical philosophy being here more fully and plainly expressed, than it is in Lucretius himself; viz., that sensible things, according to those ideas that we have of them, are not real qualities absolutely existing without us, but ἐν ἡμῖν φάσματα, fancies or fantasms in us: so that both the Latin interpreters Ficinus and Serranus,

[6] These Greek words are introduced by Dr. Cudworth, as if they occurred in the same part of Plato as the rest. What he adds also in English, in place of a version, comprises more than the Greek. But it would be in vain to look for either in the Theætetus. I suppose, therefore, that the learned author intended merely to state and express Plato's opinion in his own words, instead of repeating those of Plato himself. At any rate, what he here adduces on the authority of Plato, be it the doctrine of Protagoras or of others, borders very closely, it must be owned, upon the atomic philosophy, although whether it inculcates precisely the opinion of Democritus, who suffered no qualities to reside in his atoms, admits, I think, of much controversy. The opinions of the ancients on the nature of things are gleaned for the most part from a few words of others, and it is exceedingly doubtful, whether these possessed either the capacity to understand the meaning of those whose dogmas they repeat, or the impartiality not to wish purposely to mar or pervert any thing. To be more explicit: we should be cautious, I think, in believing Plato and Aristotle, when they are interpreting the dogmas of those who preceded them; because it is probable, that each of them, from a wish to be alone thought wise, not unfrequently did injustice to the ancients, and detracted from their virtues and fame. In like manner, I consider those not to act very wisely, who estimate the opinions of the ancient philosophers concerning God from what Cotta and Velleius say in Cicero. For if they had paid careful attention, they would have perceived, that both of them discuss many things for the sake of bringing odium upon those philosophers, and on that account have not recorded their opinions as faithfully as they ought.

though probably neither of them at all acquainted with this philosophy, as being not yet restored, could not but understand it after the same manner: the one expressing it thus: "Color ex aspectu motuque medium quiddam resultans est. Talis circa oculos passio;" and the other: "Ex varia aspicientis diathesi, variaque sensilis specie colores varios et videri et fieri, ita tamen ut sint *φανταστὰ*, nec nisi in animo subsistant." However, it appears by Plato's manner of telling the story, and the tenor of the whole dialogue, that himself was not a little prejudiced against this philosophy. In all probability the rather, because Protagoras had made it a foundation both for scepticism and atheism.

VIII. We have now learnt from Plato, that Democritus and Leucippus were not the sole proprietaries in this philosophy, but that Protagoras, though not vulgarly taken notice of for any such thing (being commonly represented as a sophist[7] only) was a sharer in it likewise: which Protagoras, indeed, Laërtius[8] and others affirm to have been an auditor of Democritus; and so he might be, notwithstanding what Plutarch tells us,[9] that Democritus wrote against his taking away the absolute natures of things. However, we are of opinion that neither Democritus, nor Protagoras, nor Leucippus, was the first inventor of this philosophy; and our reason is, because they were all three of them Atheists, (though Protagoras alone was banished for that crime by the Athenians) and we cannot think that any Atheists could be the inventors of it,[10] much less that it was the genuine spawn and brood of atheism itself, as some conceit; because, however these Atheists adopted it to themselves, endeavouring to

[7] This is rather too broad an assertion. The passages collected from ancient writers by the learned Jo. Alb. Fabricius, Biblioth. Græcæ, lib. 2. cap. 23. p. 780. and Ægid. Menagius, Comm. in Diogen. Laërtium, p. 418. concerning the life and actions of Protagoras, sufficiently prove, that his reputation stood as high for philosophy as for eloquence, if not higher.

[8] De Vitis Philos. lib. 9. segm. 50. p. 575, 576. See also Gellius, Noct. Att. lib. 5. cap. 3, and Suidas, under the word Πρωταγόρας.

[9] Plutarch states this, Adv. Colotem, tom. 2. opp. p. 1108, 1109. Ἀλλὰ τοσοῦτόν γε Δημόκριτος ἀποδεῖ τοῦ νομίζειν εἶναι τοῖον ἢ τοῖον τῶν πραγμάτων ἕκαστον, ὥστε Πρωταγόρᾳ τῷ σοφιστῇ τοῦτο εἰπόντι μεμαχῆσθαι καὶ γεγραφέναι πολλὰ καὶ πιθανὰ πρὸς αὐτόν, "Atque tantum abest, hoc ut senserit Democritus, unamquamque rem non magis talem, quam talem esse, ut etiam Protagoram sophistam hoc affirmantem impugnaverit, ac multa et probabilia contra eum scripserit." That the opinion of Protagoras, affirming those things to be true which appear so to a man, is glanced at in these words, I have no question; but even this dogma, censured as it everywhere is by the ancients, is a proof, that Democritus and Protagoras could not have entertained the same opinion concerning the elements of things.

[10] This argument, it must be obvious to any one, is wholly worthless; for who would tolerate reasoning of this sort:—This is ingenious—this is fine—this is excellent; therefore it cannot have been invented by an atheist? We know, indeed, that men entertaining the worst sentiments concerning things divine have often acquired great fame by the most useful inventions. I pass over much more that might be said on this subject.

serve their turns of it, yet if rightly understood, it is the most effectual engine against atheism that can be. And we shall make it appear afterwards, that never any of those Atheists, whether ancient or modern, (how great pretenders soever to it) did thoroughly understand it, but perpetually contradicted themselves in it. And this is the reason why we insist so much upon this philosophy here, not only because without the perfect knowledge of it, we cannot deal with the Atheists at their own weapon; but also because we doubt not but to make a sovereign antidote against atheism out of that very philosophy, which so many have used as a *vehiculum* to convey this poison of atheism by.

IX. But besides reason, we have also good historical probability for this opinion, that this philosophy was a thing of much greater antiquity than either Democritus or Leucippus. And first, because Posidonius, an ancient and learned philosopher, did (as both Empiricus and Strabo[1] tell us) avouch it for an old tradition, that the first inventor of this atomical philosophy was one Moschus a Phœnician, who, as Strabo also notes, lived before the Trojan wars.

X. Moreover, it seems not altogether improbable, but that this Moschus, a Phœnician philosopher, mentioned by Posidonius, might be the same with that Mochus, a Phœnician physiologer in Jamblichus, with whose successors, priests, and prophets, he affirms that Pythagoras, sometimes sojourning at Sidon (which was his native city), had conversed: which may be taken for an intimation, as if he had been by them instructed in that atomical physiology which Moschus or Mochus, the Phœnician, is said to have been the inventor of. Mochus or Moschus is plainly a Phœnician name, and there is one Mochus a Phœnician writer cited in Athenæus, whom the Latin translator calls Moschus; and Mr. Selden approves of the conjecture of Arcerius, the publisher of Jamblichus, that this Mochus was no other than the celebrated Moses of the Jews, with whose successors, the Jewish philosophers, priests, and prophets, Pythagoras conversed at Sidon. Some fantastic Atomists perhaps would here catch at

[1] The importance of the subject requires, that the passages of both the authors should be given. Strabo, Geographiæ lib. 16. p. 718. in commenting upon the learning of the Phœnicians, records of Moschus as follows: Εἰ δὲ δεῖ Ποσειδωνίῳ πιστεῦσαι, καὶ τὸ περὶ τῶν ἀτόμων δόγμα παλαιόν ἐστιν ἀνδρὸς Σιδονίου Μώσχου πρὸ τῶν Τρωϊκῶν χρόνων γεγονότος, "Si Posidonio credendum est, dogma de atomis antiquum est hominis Sidonii, Moschi, qui ante belli Trojani tempora fuit." And Sextus Empiricus, lib. 9. Adv. Mathemat. p. 621, after saying that Democritus and Epicurus invented atomism, subjoins these words: Εἰ μή τι ἀρχαιοτέραν ταύτην θετέον τὴν δόξαν, καὶ ὡς ἔλεγεν ὁ Στωϊκὸς Ποσειδώνιος, ἀπὸ Μώχου τινὸς ἀνδρὸς Φοίνικος καταγομένην, "Nisi hæc opinio statuenda sit antiquior, et ut Stoicus dixit Posidonius, deducta a Mocho quodam Phœnice." The learned Jo. Alb. Fabricius, observes on this passage, that Mochus treated of this in a physical work, the fifteenth book of which is quoted by Laërtius, lib. 8. segm. 140.

this,[2] to make their philosophy to stand by divine right, as owing its original to revelation; whereas philosophy being not a matter of faith but reason, men ought not to affect (as I conceive) to derive its pedigree from revelation, and by that very pretence seek to impose it tyrannically upon the minds of men, which God hath here purposely left free to the use of their own faculties, that so finding out truth by them, they might enjoy that pleasure and satisfaction, which arises from thence. But we aim here at nothing more than a confirmation of this truth, that the atomical physiology was both older than Democritus, and had no such atheistical original neither. And there wants not other good authority for this, that Pythagoras did borrow many things from the Jews, and translate them into his philosophy.

XI. But there are yet other considerable probabilities for this, that Pythagoras was not unacquainted with the atomical physi-

[2] I shall here comprise all that I have to say of Moschus. I. I can easily believe this Sidonian philosopher to be the same with him, whose disciples, according to the testimony of Jamblichus, In Vita Pithag. cap. 3, p. 10. ed. Kusteri, Pythagoras conversed with. Even the country proves it. But II. it is doubtful, whether his name was *Moschus* or *Mochus*. Learned men are at issue on this point, neither is the reading of ancient manuscripts uniform. The following give the name *Mochus*: Sam. Bochartus, Canaanis lib. 2. cap. 17. c. 777. ed. recent., who will have this name to be the same as Maacha; Thom. Reinesius, Append. ad Librum de Lingua Punica, sect. 4. p. 72, in Grævii Syntagm. Diss. Rarior., who surmises that the later Phœnicians formed *Mochus* from *Ogo* or *Ochus*, the more correct and ancient name; Gerh. Jo. Vossius, De Historicis Græcis lib. 3. p. 390; Ægid. Menagius, Ad Diogen. Laërtium p. 4; Jo. Alb. Fabricius, Ad Sextum Empir. p. 621. who observes that the more correct copies always read Μώχου and conjectures, that the name Μώσχου was foisted in by those, who wished to identify this physiologer with Moses, the divine writer; Ulr. Ohrectus in his translation of Jamblichus, and several others. Those who will have this philosopher to be the same with Moses, namely Arcerius, Jo. Selden, De Jure Nat. et Gentium secundum Disciplin. Ebræor. lib. 1. cap. 2. and Pet. Dan. Huetius, Demonstrat. Evangel. propos. 4. cap. 2. sect. 8. p. 88. prefer *Moschus*; although others also, who distinguish between Moses and Moschus, approve of this reading, as Is. Casaubonus, Animadvers. in Athenæum. lib. 3. cap. 36; Jo. Schefferus, De Philosophia Italica cap. 5. p. 20; and Ludolph. Kusterus, Ad Jamblichum p. 10. At this day I should think it is scarcely possible to settle this controversy, nor is the matter altogether of such importance as to warrant a copious disputation. Perhaps the whole difference between *Mochus* and *Moschus* lay in the different pronunciation; the name which the Phœnicians pronounced simply, being uttered in the mouth of the Greeks with a certain hissing sound. III. It is uncertain, whether or not this Mochus, the inventor of the atomic philosophy, is a different one from the Mochus, whom Athenæus, Deipnosoph. lib. 3. p. 126, Josephus and Tatianus, whose passages have been respectively collected by Fabricius, Ad Sextum as above, testify to have written τὰ Φοινικικὰ, or concerning the affairs of the Phœnicians. Men the most learned have taken it for granted, that this same Mochus, who referred the nature of things to minute corpuscles or atoms, composed also a history of his country. But I see no reason, why there may not have been two of this name among the Phœnicians, one a historian, and the other a natural philosopher. IV. Those are right, in my opinion, who consider this Phœnician physiologer to be a very different person from Moses, the divine writer, as Schefferus, Kusterus, Fabricius, in the passages noticed above, and especially Jo. Clericus, Biblioth. Choisie, tom. 1. p. 75. &c., whose arguments I shall not repeat. But the fact, that this Phœnician is said by ancient authors to have written a physical work consisting of many books and is therefore called by them φυσιολόγος, is, I conceive, a sufficient argument to refute those, who make Moschus to be the same with Moses.

ology. And first from Democritus himself, who as he was of the Italic row, or Pythagoric succession, so it is recorded of him in Laërtius,[3] that he was a great emulator of the Pythagoreans, and seemed to have taken all his philosophy from them; insomuch that if chronology had not contradicted it, it would have been concluded, that he had been an auditor of Pythagoras himself, of whom he testified his great admiration in a book entitled by his name. Moreover, some of his opinions had a plain correspondency with the Pythagoric doctrines, forasmuch as Democritus[4] did not only hold, *φέρεσθαι ἀτόμους ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ δινουμένας*, "that the atoms were carried round in a vortex;" but altogether with Leucippus, *τὴν γῆν ὀχεῖσθαι περὶ τὸ μέσον δινουμένην*, "that the earth was carried about the middle or centre of this vortex," which is the sun, "turning in the meantime round upon its own axis." And just so the Pythagoric opinion is expressed by Aristotle:[5] *τὴν γῆν ἓν τῶν ἄστρων οὖσαν κύκλῳ φερομένην περὶ τὸ μέσον νύκτα καὶ τὴν ἡμέραν ποιεῖν*, "That the earth, as one of the stars," that is a planet, "being carried round about the middle or centre" which is fire or the sun "did in the meantime by its circumgyration upon its own axis make day and night." Wherefore, it may be reasonably from hence concluded,[6] that as Democritus's philosophy was Pythagorical, so Pythagoras' philosophy was likewise Democritical or atomical.

XII. But that which is of more moment yet, we have the authority of Ecphantus, a famous Pythagorean, for this, that Pythagoras' monads, so much talked of, were nothing else but corporeal atoms. Thus we find it in Stobæus:[7] *Τὰς Πυθαγορικὰς μονάδας οὗτος πρῶτος ἀπεφήνατο σωματικάς*, "Ecphantus" who himself[8] asserted the doctrine of atoms "first declared that

[3] Laërtius relates all this, lib. 9. segm. 38. p. 570. on the faith of Thrasyllus, and adds on the same authority, that he was an auditor of Glaucus Rheginus, a Pythagorean.

[4] The same is ascribed to Democritus by Laërtius, lib. 9. segm. 44. p. 573. But as to what follows respecting the motion of the earth, though he states it to have been a dogma of Leucippus, yet he nowhere says, that Democritus held the like opinion. Indeed, I consider it by no means certain, that all that Leucippus approved of was regarded as true by Democritus also.

[5] De Cœlo, lib. 2. cap. 13. p. 658. tom. 1. opp.

[6] I consider neither of these reasons, however, of sufficient weight to prove, that Pythagoras favoured the doctrine of atoms. For I. the fact of Democritus' being a great admirer of Pythagoras, is no argument to show, that he held the same opinion with him in every thing. Many have a high esteem for the talents and capacity of Descartes, and yet do not assent to all his opinions. II. I am at a loss to understand, indeed, how it could be proved, that, because both Democritus and Pythagoras considered the earth to revolve round the sun, they were alike inclined to the atomic theory. For it does not necessarily follow that those, who agree in one thing, agree in all others. So also thought Nicetas: see Cicero Acad. Quæst. lib. 2. cap. 39. It is unnecessary to repeat what I have just noted, that it is uncertain, whether or not Democritus agreed to this opinion of Leucippus concerning the earth's motion.

[7] Eclog. Phys. lib. 1. cap. 13. p. 27. ed. Plantin. 1575, fol.

[8] That Ecphantus patronized the doctrine of atoms is evident from the same Stobæus, Eclog. Phys. lib. 1. cap. 25. p. 48. *Ἐκφαντος ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἀτόμων συνεσ-*

the Pythagoric monads were corporeal,"[8] i. e. atoms. And this is further confirmed from what Aristotle[9] himself writes of these Pythagoreans and their monads: Τάς μονάδας ὑπολαμβάνουσιν ἔχειν μέγεθος, "They suppose their monads to have magnitude." And from that he elsewhere[10] makes monads and atoms to signify the same thing: Οὐδὲν διαφέρει μονάδας λέγειν ἢ σωμάτια σμικρά, "It is all one to say monads or small corpuscula." And Gassendus[1] hath observed out of the Greek epigrammatist, that Epicurus' atoms were sometimes called monads too:

τάναι τὸν κόσμον, διοικεῖσθαι δὲ ἀπὸ προνοίας, "Ecphantus mundum ex atomis quidem compositum, providentia autem regi dicebat." But he does not add what Ecphantus thought was the nature of these atoms, which he considered the earth to be composed of, whether endowed with or destitute of qualities. This, however, we learn from Theodoret; for I make no doubt, that the Diophantus, who, as Theodoret tells us, De Curandis Græcor. Affection. serm. 4. p. 509. tom. 2. opp., held the principles of Democritus and Epicurus concerning atoms, is the same with this Ecphantus mentioned by Stobæus. Both were Syracusans, both Pythagoreans, and both champions of atoms. It is therefore probable that he deprived his atoms of qualities, as Democritus did.

[9] Metaphys. lib. 11. cap. 6. tom. 4. opp. p. 424. It must be remarked, that this book of Aristotle's Metaphysics is made the thirteenth in all the editions except Du Val's, in which it is the eleventh. The hint will be useful to those, who wish to refer to the passages, which Gassendus and others quote from Aristotle.

[10] De Anima, lib. 1. cap. 6. p. 13, tom. 2, opp.

[1] Physices sect. 1. lib. 3. cap. 4. p. 256. tom. 1. opp., and Not. ad lib. 10. Diogen. Laërtii, p. 70. tom. 5. opp. The epigram of which these are the concluding verses, occurs in the Anthologia Græcor. Epigrammat. lib. 1. cap. 15. p. 32. ed. Francof. 1600, and is Automedon's. As to the subject itself, Dr. Cudworth had Gassendus for his guide and master in the opinion he here espouses regarding Pythagoras; for the latter, in both the passages noted, spares no pains to show, that Pythagoras derived the elements of things from atoms. Cudworth, however, has not given all, but only some of the arguments made use of by Gassendus, probably those he considered more important than the rest. But if I am not much deceived, neither those adduced nor those omitted, are of such weight, as to induce any reasonable man to adopt this opinion, which Gassendus himself has pronounced to be paradoxical: and lest any one should be led away by the authority of these great men we will briefly prove this. In the first place, let me premise, that as far as I remember, there is no testimony extant in any ancient writer to show, that Pythagoras discoursed about a multiplicity of monads, but all affirm that he spoke only of one. Nevertheless, as it is clear from Aristotle, Metaphys. lib. 11. cap. 6. p. 423. &c., tom. 4. opp., and some others, that his disciples introduced monads or unities into their philosophy and reasoned profoundly concerning them, I shall not avail myself of this argument to show a difference between monad and atom, but shall inquire merely, whether those words of the ancients which are quoted by Cudworth and Gassendus, warrant the conclusion they come to, that the monads of Pythagoras and atoms are in reality identical. I. They allege out of Stobæus, that Ecphantus, a Pythagorean, first *made monads corporeal*; which passage, so far from showing that Pathagoras held with atoms, rather proves the contrary. For if Ecphantus first maintained that monads were corporeal, it is certain that neither Pythagoras himself, nor any one of the Pythagoreans before Ecphantus, was of that opinion. Therefore atoms had no place in the ancient doctrine of Pythagoras, but only in that remodelled by Ecphantus according to his own fancy; to say nothing of its being exceedingly doubtful, whether or not Ecphantus' corporeal monads were atoms or indivisible corpuscles. The entire words of Stobæus are these: Ἔκφαντος Συρακούσιος εἶτα Πυθαγορείων πάντων τὰ τέσσαρα σώματα καὶ τὸ κενόν· τὰς γὰρ Πυθαγορικὰς μονάδας οὗτος πρῶτος ἀπεφήνατο σωματικάς, "Ecphantus Syracusanus quatuor corpora et inane esse voluit: nam Pythagoricas monades primus hic corporeas fecit." Now, I leave it to any one possessing right reason to judge, whether these words appear to signify, that the corporeal monads of Ecphantus were those four elements, which he combines with the vacuum. If you say that these elements themselves were his atoms, you gain nothing

——Μάτην Ἐπίκουρον ἐάσον
Ποῦ τὸ κενὸν ζητεῖν καί τινες αἱ μονάδες.

XIII. But to pass from Pythagoras himself; that Empedocles,

thereby; for it would prove, that he was far removed from the genuine doctrine of Leucippus and Democritus and cannot be ranked among the true patrons of atomism. But II. they have the authority of Aristotle, that *the Pythagoreans ascribed magnitude to their monads.* Be it so, yet how it can be inferred from thence, that their monads were atoms, I am at a loss to conceive. For is it fair to reason thus: That which has magnitude is an atom? I say nothing of the obscurity of this passage of Aristotle, though I cannot let it pass without correcting a very gross error of the Latin interpreter, Bessarion. The words quoted here by Cudworth are preceded by these: Τὸν ὅλον οὐρανὸν κατασκευάζουσιν ἐξ ἀριθμῶν, πλὴν οὐ μοναδικῶν, which he, Bessarion, thus translates: "Totum cœlum ex numeris construunt, præter id, quod non ex monadicis;" most incorrectly, and without the slightest sense. The philosopher's meaning is: "Pythagoræi cœlum ex numeris construunt, verum non ex numeris simplicibus aut monadibus, sed ex numeris compositis." III. That Aristotle considered it *all one to say monads or small corpuscles* is not of much greater weight in this argument. For besides that he does not assert this positively, but merely says it might appear to be so (δόξειε), and that all small corpuscles, or σώματα σμικρά, are not necessarily atoms, we shall immediately see, if we refer only to the subject he is discussing in that passage, that nothing bearing upon the present question can be made of it. Aristotle is refuting those who make the soul to be number and self-moving, and is endeavouring to demonstrate the absurdity of this opinion. To do so, he assumes it to be all one, whether we call the soul a monad or simple number, or a small corpuscle; inasmuch as a monad cannot be conceived without magnitude: but, where there is magnitude, that there of necessity must be some mover, and therefore that, if the soul be a monad, it cannot move itself. Whoever considers it evident from this, that the monads of the Pythagoreans were atoms, ought, to say the least of it, to show first of all, that they held the soul to be an atom, and truly to do so would require wonderful ingenuity. Add moreover, what completely settles the matter, that in this very passage, and immediately after the words now in question, the Stagirite mentions the σφαιρία, or "spherical particles," of which it is well-known Democritus supposed the soul to consist, and distinguishes them from the monads he is speaking of. But if Democritus's σφαιρία, which he called atoms, are different from monads, how can monads be atoms? IV. Automedon's epigram, indeed, by coupling monads with the vacuum of Epicurus, seems to point out, that there were some who called atoms monads; nor do I consider this at all an inapt word to designate what is otherwise expressed by that name. But I do not see how this obliges us to believe, that what Pythagoras called monads are atoms; unless there should be any so foolish as to assent to reasoning like this: Atoms are sometimes called monads; therefore, the monads of Pythagoras are atoms. Having been speaking of Cudworth's arguments, I now come to those of Gassendus. V. In his Physice, as above quoted, p. 256. tom. 1. opp., he says: "Apud Aristotelem Pythagoræi introducere dicuntur, τὸ κενὸν, ὃ διορίζει τὰς φύσεις, inane, quod dirimit naturas: non autem aliud, quam inane interspersum heic commode intelligas, quo atomi discriminantur." The passage of Aristotle is in lib. 4. Physic. cap. 8. p. 507. tom. 1. opp. But for my part, I don't understand, what this avails towards showing, that the Pythagoreans recognized atoms in physics. For many philosophers believe in a certain vacuum, and yet do not maintain the nature of things to consist of corpuscles destitute of all quality. VI. He lays much stress upon the testimony of Vitruvius, who. lib. 2. cap. 2. after saying the Pythagoreans comprised the nature of things in four elements, according to his account, adds, that Democritus introduced the same elements, "sed resolubilia tamen in individua corpora, quæ distincta soliditatem retineant." Unquestionably, Gassendus had not Vitruvius before him, when he wrote this; for the passage runs differently, lib. 1. cap. 2. p. m. 25. ed. Flor. 1513—8. We give the very words: "Pythagorææorum disciplina adjecit ad aquam et ignem, aëra et terrenum. Ergo Democritus etsi res proprio non nominavit, sed tantum individua corpora proposuit, ideo ea ipsa dixisse videtur, quod ea, cum sint disjuncta, nec leguntur, ... nec sectionibus dividuntur, sed sempiterno ævo perpetuo infinitam retinent soliditatem." The passage, it must be confessed, is obscure; but looking at it altogether this appears evident, that Vitruvius considered

who was a Pythagorean also, did physiologize atomically, is a thing that could hardly be doubted of, though there were no more proof for it than that one passage of his in his philosophic poems:[2]

——— Φύσις οὐδενός ἐστιν ἑκάστου
Ἀλλὰ μόνον μίξις διάλλαξίς τε μιγέντων,

"Nature is nothing but the mixture and separation of things mingled;" or thus, "There is no production of any thing anew, but only mixture and separation of things mingled." Which is not only to be understood of animals, according to the Pythagoric doctrine of the transmigration of souls, but also, as himself expounds, universally of all bodies, that their generation and cor-

Democritus, although he held atoms generally to be the first principles of things, to have notwithstanding supposed, more elements, like the Pythagoreans. If this were true, then Democritus attributed qualities to his atoms, and for that reason could not be ranked in the number of those who may be truly called the patrons of the atomic doctrine. This therefore is very far from proving that the monads of Pythagoras were atoms. But if Vitruvius had said what Gassendus makes him say, the matter nevertheless could not be settled by his authority alone. For we must not take all for granted that this or the other writer of a later period surmised concerning Pythagoras or Democritus. VII. As to what Gassendus adds in the last place, that Democritus, Leucippus, and all the principal supporters of the atomic doctrine, were ranked among the Pythagoreans, this, I am indeed aware, has been done for the sake of system both by others and by Gassendus himself, De Philosophia, cap. 8. p. 23. s. tom. I. opp., where he establishes it on the authority of the biographer of Pythagoras met with in Photius, who, he says, makes Parmenides and Zeno belong to the Pythagoric school. But assuredly, the judgment of the acute man was never more at fault than here. For, because Gassendus and others have ranked the supporters of atoms as belonging to the Italic sect, and it is not yet clear what right they have had for doing so, yet it does not immediately follow, that the monads of Pythagoras were atoms. I say nothing of the fact, that this author of Pythagoras' life asserts only this in Photius, Cod. 259. p. 1318, that Zeno and Parmenides came from the school of Pythagoras. Other arguments are at hand to show, that Pythagoras, a man in my opinion remarkable neither for wisdom, nor for liberality and candour, never once thought of atoms: but prescribed limits forbid more being said. I wish readers however to learn from this example, how far even the greatest men can hoodwink themselves, when they come to the perusal of ancient authors, imbued with fixed opinions of their own. Cudworth and Gassendus, who were delighted with the atomic doctrine, fancied they found traces of it in every sect of antiquity.

[2] This passage, which Plutarch, De Placitis Philos. lib. i. cap. 30. p. 885. t. ii. opp., gives from the first book of Empedocles' Physics, is mutilated and otherwise inaccurately quoted by Dr. Cudworth. The verses are:

Ἄλλο δέ τοι ἐρέω, φύσις οὐδένος ἐστὶν ἁπάντων
Θνητῶν, οὐδέ τις οὐλομένου θανάτοιο τελευτή,
Ἀλλὰ μόνον μίξις τε διάλλαξίς τε μιγέντων
Ἐστι, φύσις δὲ βροτοῖς ὀνομάζεται ἀνθρώποισιν.

Jam quod naturam mortales nomine dicunt,
Hoc nihil est; neque enim mortem natura vel ortum
Humano præbet generi: nam mixtio tantum
Mixtorumque subest quædam secretio rebus,
Idque homines vulgo naturam dicere suerunt.

Here φύσις, as it is opposed to τελευτή, or *death*, seems to signify not nature generally, but *birth*, or *generation*.

ruption is nothing but mixture and separation; or, as Aristotle[3] expresses it, *σύγκρισις καὶ διάκρισις*, "concretion and secretion" of parts, together with change of figure and order. It may perhaps be objected, that Empedocles held four elements, out of which he would have all other bodies to be compounded; and that as Aristotle affirms,[4] he made those elements not to be transmutable into one another neither. To which we reply, that he did indeed make four elements, as the first general concretions of atoms, and therein he did no more than Democritus himself, who, as Laërtius writes,[5] did from atoms moving round in a vortex, *πάντα συγκρίματα γεννᾶν πῦρ, ὕδωρ, ἀέρα, γῆν, εἶναι γὰρ καὶ ταῦτα ἐξ ἀτόμων τινῶν συστήματα*, "generate all concretions, fire, water, air, and earth, these being systems made out of certain atoms." And Plato further confirms the same; for in his book De Legibus[6] he describes (as I suppose) that very atheistical hypothesis of Democritus, though without mentioning his name, representing it in this manner; that by the fortuitous motion of senseless matter were first made those four elements, and then out of them afterward sun, moon, stars, and earth. Now both Plutarch and Stobæus[7] testify, that Empedocles compounded the four elements themselves out of atoms: *Ἐμπεδοκλῆς δέ ἐκ μικροτέρων ὄγκων τὰ στοιχεῖα συγκρίνει, ἅπερ ἐστὶν ἐλάχιστα, καὶ οἱονεὶ*

[3] De Generat. et Corrupt. lib. 2. cap. 6. p. 739. t. 1. opp.

[4] *Ὥστε μὴ μεταβάλλειν εἰς ἄλληλα* are Aristotle's words on this opinion of Empedocles, which he confuted, ibid. p. 734. Add De Generat. lib. 1. cap. 3. p. 699.

[5] De Placitis Philos. lib. 9. segm. 44. p. 573.

[6] I wish the worthy author had pointed out the place: but he chooses to give his readers trouble rather than check the rapidity of his pen by referring them to the words of the ancients. I know not what passage of Plato he can have meant other than the following, from lib. 10. De Legibus. p. 666. opp., wherein he explains the opinion held of the origin of the world by those scoffers at religion and gods, who, he says, were numerous in that age. Certainly there is no passage in the whole book De Legibus more appropriate to what our author is here treating of. *Πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν καὶ ἀέρα φύσει πάντα εἶναι καὶ τύχῃ φασί, τέχνῃ δὲ οὐδὲν τούτων· καὶ τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα αὖ σώματα, γῆς τε καὶ ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης, ἄστρων τε περὶ, διὰ τούτων γεγονέναι, παντελῶς ὄντων ἀψύχων*, "Ignem, aquam, terram, aëra, omnia hæc non arte, sed natura et fortuna esse dicunt. Corpora etiam, quæ post hæc sunt, rerum terrenarum, solis, lunæ, stellarum omnium, ex istis anima prorsus carentibus facta esse, &c." Whether, as Dr. Cudworth supposes, he is expounding in these words the hypothesis of Democritus and his followers, is uncertain; for there is no reason for supposing, that there were not others also living at that period so grossly impious as to teach these things. See what we have noted below on ch. 2. § 22. Neither is it stated expressly in this passage, that the class whose impiety Plato is censuring held the elements to be compounded out of atoms.

[7] These words of Stobæus we read Eclog. lib. 1. cap. 20. p. 36. who says also, that Xenocrates held the same. Plutarch's passage occurs De Placitis Philos. lib. 1. cap. 17. p. 883. t. 2. opp. But our author has omitted another passage of Plutarch, in which he sets before us Empedocles' opinion more clearly, ibid. cap. 13. p. 883. *Ἐμπεδοκλῆς πρὸ τῶν τεσσάρων στοιχείων θραύσματα ἐλάχιστα, οἱονεί στοιχεῖα πρὶν στοιχείων, ὁμοιομερῆ, ἅπερ ἐστὶ στρογγύλα*, "Empedocles ante quatuor elementa ponit quædam minutissima fragmenta, tanquam elementa elementis priora, partium similarium, et formæ rotundæ." I shall say presently, why I think the learned Doctor was unwilling to bring forward this passage of Plutarch.

στοιχεῖα στοιχείων, "Empedocles makes the elements to be compounded of other small corpuscula, which are the least, and as it were the elements of the elements." And the same Stobæus again observes:[8] Ἐμπεδοκλῆς πρὸ τῶν τεσσάρων στοιχείων θραύσματα ἐλάχιστα, "Empedocles makes the smallest particles and fragments of body" that is, atoms "to be before the four elements." But whereas Aristotle affirms, that Empedocles denied the transmutation of those elements into one another, that must needs be either a slip in him, or else a fault in our copies; not only because Lucretius, who was better versed in that philosophy, and gives a particular account of Empedocles' doctrine (besides many others of the ancients) affirms the quite contrary; but also because himself, in those fragments of his still preserved, expressly acknowledges this transmutation:[9]

[8] I must produce the whole of this passage of Stobæus, to make the meaning of the philosopher more manifest. Stobæus says then, Eclog. 1, cap. 17. p. 33. Ἐμπεδοκλῆς περὶ ἐλαχίστου ἔφη πρὸ τῶν τεσσάρων θραύσματα ἐλάχιστα, οἱονεὶ στοιχεῖα πρὸ τῶν στοιχείων, ὁμοιομερῆ, "Empedocles ante elementa frusta ponebat minima, tanquam elementorum elementa, eaque similium partium." From this and the above passage of Plutarch it is clear, what sort of corpuscles Empedocles made the elements to be compounded of, namely those, which philosophers are wont to call *similar*, and of a round form. He could not, therefore, be of the same opinion as Democritus, who is acknowledged by almost every one to have taught, that all things consist of atoms that are *dissimilar* and of various shapes and forms. As Dr. Cudworth well knew this made against his own opinion concerning Empedocles, he seems on that account to have omitted the word ὁμοιομερῆ in Stobæus' passage, and to have passed over that of Plutarch altogether.

[9] Where the learned Doctor got this verse of Empedocles, I leave to others to find out, having in vain searched for it with great care in a number of books both ancient and modern. It is not among the fragments of Empedocles collected by Henr. Stephanus in his Poesis Philosophica, p. 17. &c., neither could I meet with it in a still more extensive collection of the remains of Empedocles' poems by Jo. Alb. Fabricius, which, through the courtesy of that illustrious scholar, I had the opportunity of consulting in manuscript. As respects the subject itself, Dr. Cudworth maintains, in opposition to Aristotle, that Empedocles believed in the μεταβολή, as the ancients call it, or the transmutation of the elements into each other. And so far he is right. In the first place, Lucretius, whose authority he cites expressly, ascribes this opinion to those who held four elements, among whom he numbers Empedocles, lib. 1. De Rerum Natura, v. 783. &c. p. 189.

> Et primum faciunt ignem se vertere in auras
> Aëris: hinc imbrem gigni, terramque creari
> Ex imbri, retroque a terra cuncta reverti,
> Humorem primum, post aëra, deinde calorem:
> Nec cessare hæc inter se mutare, meare
> De cœlo ad terram, de terra ad sidera mundi.

Again the same thing is evident from the testimony of Clemens Alexandrinus, who says Empedocles supposed, that all things would finally return to fire again, Stromatum lib. 5. cap. 14. p. 711. an opinion which no one can entertain, who does not believe it possible for the elements of things to change and put on as it were a new nature. Besides, without saying anything of a passage of Stobæus, which I purpose bringing forward by and by, or quoting other authors that testify to the same effect, Aristotle himself, in other places, clearly lays it down, that Empedocles τὴν περίοδον ποιεῖν τῶν στοιχείων, "circuitum elementorum inducere." See De Cœlo, lib. 3. cap. 7. p. 680, t. 1. opp., not to mention other passages of the kind at present. Is Aristotle at

Καὶ φθίνει εἰς ἄλληλα, καὶ αὔξεται ἐν μέρει αἴσης.

XIV. Besides all this, no less author than Plato affirms, that according to Empedocles, vision and other sensations were made by ἀπορρόαι σχημάτων, "the defluxions of figures," or effluvia of atoms, (for so Democritus' atoms are called in Aristotle σχήματα, because they were bodies which had only figure without qualities), he supposing, that some of these figures or particles corresponded with the organs of one sense, and some with the organs of another. [10] Οὐκοῦν λέγετε ἀπορρόας τινας τῶν ὄντων κατὰ Ἐμπεδοκλέα, καὶ πόρους, εἰς οὓς καὶ δι' ὧν αἱ ἀπορρόαι πορεύονται, καὶ τῶν ἀπορρόων τὰς μὲν ἁρμόττειν ἐνίοις τῶν πόρων, τὰς δὲ ἐλάττους ἢ μείζους εἶναι, "You say then, according to the doctrine of Empedocles, that there are certain corporeal effluvia from bodies of different magnitudes and figures, as also several pores and meatus's in us diversly corresponding with them: so that some of these corporeal effluvia agree with some pores, when they are either too big or too little for others." By which it is evident, that Empedocles did not suppose sensations to be made by intentional species or qualities, but as to the generality, in the atomical way; in which, notwithstanding, there are some differences among these Atomists themselves. But Empedocles went the same way here with Democritus, for Empedocles' ἀπορρόαι σχημάτων, "defluxions of figured bodies," are clearly the same thing with Democritus' εἰδώλων εἰσκρίσεις, "insinuations of simulacra, or exuvious images of bodies." And the same Plato adds further,[1] that according to Empedocles,

variance with himself, therefore, as well as with the rest of the ancients, when he elsewhere states that Empedocles denied the μεταβολὴ στοιχείων, or, as Dr. Cudworth suspects, have the transcribers been at fault? For my part I should say neither. When Aristotle lays it down, that Empedocles rejected the μεταβολὴ, he does not speak positively and absolutely, but comparatively, and of a certain kind of change. For although all those, that held the elements formerly to have been more, recognized also the conversions and changes of the elements, yet they did not all believe these changes to take place according to the same law or in the same manner, but went into different opinions on the matter. This is abundantly evident from Aristotle's book De Cœlo, lib. 3. cap. 7. p. 680. and elsewhere, from Stobæus, Eclog. Physic. lib. 1. cap. 24. p. 43. and from many others. Wherefore, because Empedocles rejected that manner of change of the elements, which Aristotle approved of, he is for that reason said by him to have denied the μεταβολὴ. Now if we inquire, what manner of change Empedocles thought preferable to the rest, ancient authors, it must be confessed, are at variance upon the point, as they usually are when expounding the opinions of the old physiologers. If we follow Lucretius and Clemens, it appears probable he held a certain ἀλλοίωσις, as they call it; if Aristotle, Stobæus, and others, he considered the whole change to take place by addition and detraction. The latter opinion, however, is unquestionably the truer one, and in accordance with what the ancients relate of the doctrines of Empedocles; as is shown by the passages brought forward by Dr. Cudworth soon after, and by what we shall adduce by and by.

[10] The words occur in his Meno, p. 14. but not in consecutive order as here, being interrupted by short questions from Socrates. Plutarch, De Placitis Philos. lib. 4 cap. 9. p. 909. states the same.

[1] Ibid. p. 14. Plutarch has the like, De Placitis Philos. lib. cap. 15. p. 883. tom. 2. opp. Ἐμπεδοκλῆς (χρῶμα εἶναι ἀπεφήνετο) τὸ τοῖς πόροις τῆς ὄψεως

the definition of colour was this: *Ἀπορρόη σχημάτων ὄψει σύμμετρος καὶ αἰσθητὸς*, "The defluxion of figures, or figured corpuscula" without qualities "commensurate to the sight and sensible." Moreover, that Empedocles' physiology was the very same with that of Democritus, is manifest also from this passage of Aristotle:[2] *Οἱ μὲν οὖν περὶ Ἐμπεδοκλέα καὶ Δημόκριτον λανθάνουσιν αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοὺς, οὐ γενέσιν ἐξ ἀλλήλων ποιοῦντες, ἀλλὰ φαινομένην γένεσιν· ἐνυπάρχον γὰρ ἕκαστον ἐκκρίνεσθαί φασιν ὥσπερ ἐξ ἀγγείου τῆς γενέσεως οὔσης*, "Empedocles and Democritus deceiving themselves, unawares destroy all generation of things out of one another, leaving a seeming generation only: for they say, that generation is not the production of any new entity, but only the secretion of what was before inexistent; as when divers kinds of things confounded together in a vessel are separated from one another." Lastly, we shall confirm all this by the clear testimony of Plutarch, or the writer

ἐναρμόττον, "Empedocles colorem id vocat, quod congruit meatibus visui inservientibus." So Stobæus, Eclog. Phys. lib. 1. cap. 19. p. 35. who adds however: *Τὰς δὲ διαφορὰς τῶν τροφῶν ποικιλίας*, "Differentias autem coloris e ciborum varietate duxit:" *Τέσσαρα τοῖς στοιχείοις ἰσάριθμα*, "Species quatuor, non secus ac elementorum posuit." But I. it is evident, that the *σχήματα* in these passages of Plato are not atoms or indivisible corpuscles, but the same as what Democritus calls *εἴδωλα* and Lucretius "simulacra, membranas summo de corpore rerum dereptas," lib. 4. v. 35, 36. "rerum effigies tenuesque figuras." II. It is true, Democritus' manner of explaining sensations and colours does not seem to differ much from that of Empedocles. Generally indeed they both adopted the same principles. But to say nothing of the atoms of Empedocles being very different from those of Democritus, as will presently be made appear, we have Plutarch's authority, that Empedocles did not make use of simulacra or images alone, like Democritus, in showing the nature of sensations, De Placitis Philos. lib. 4. cap. 13. p. 901. After having spoken of the opinions of Democritus and Epicurus, he says: *Ἐμπεδοκλῆς τοῖς εἰδώλοις τὰς ἀκτῖνας ἀνέμιξε, προσαγορεύσας τὸ γιγνόμενον ἀκτῖνας εἰδώλου συνθέτου*, "Empedocles imaginibus radios adjunxit, id, quod fit, appellans radios imaginis compositæ." I pass over other points of difference between the doctrines of Empedocles and Democritus on this head. III. As to Empedocles' having endeavoured to show the nature of colours and sensations, in the manner we have stated, it is no proof, that he believed the world to consist of atoms having nothing else but figure. For there is no reason why those who ascribe qualities to atoms, as it is evident many did, should not philosophize according to the same law concerning colours and sensations. IV. But I shall adduce one of the axioms of Empedocles, which clearly proves, that he held a far different opinion of colours and their nature, as also of the faculty of sensation, from that of Democritus and the other supporters of atomism. For he held the soul to be compounded of the four elements, and by that means to be sensible of and perceive all the elements; seeing that like is known by like, earth by earthy particles, fire by fiery, &c.

Γαῖᾳ μὲν γὰρ γαῖαν ὀπώπαμεν, ὕδατι δ' ὕδωρ,
Αἰθέρι δ' αἰθέρα δῖον, ἀτὰρ πυρὶ πῦρ ἀΐδηλον.

Terram terreno, atque unda conspeximus undam,
Æthere divinum nos æthera: vidimus igne
Claro ignem.

Sextus Empiricus, lib. 7. Contra Mathem. p. 396. Add Chalcidius, In Timæum Platonis, cap. 216. p. 356. Now suppose particles to be destitute of all quality, and you never can explain this dogma satisfactorily. For how, I ask, can that which has nothing but figure be sensible of and perceive what is like and kindred to it? Whereas by leaving qualities to Empedocles' atoms, you will find a ready way of clearing up the matter. But we are pursuing this to too great a length.

[2] De Cœlo, lib. 3. cap. 7. p. 680. tom. i. opp.

de Placitis Philosophorum:[3] Ἐμπεδοκλῆς καὶ Ἐπίκουρος καὶ πάντες, ὅσοι κατὰ συναθροισμὸν τῶν λεπτομερῶν σωμάτων κοσμοποιοῦσι, συγκρίσεις μὲν καὶ διακρίσεις εἰσάγουσι, γενέσεις δὲ καὶ φθορὰς οὐ κυρίως· οὐ γὰρ κατὰ ποῖον ἐξ ἀλλοιώσεως, κατὰ δὲ πόσον ἐκ συναθροισμοῦ ταύτας γίνεσθαι, "Empedocles and Epicurus, and all those that compound the world of small atoms, introduce concretions and secretions, but no generations or corruptions properly so called; neither would they have these to be made according to quality by alteration, but only according to quantity by aggregation." And the same writer sets down the order and method of the Cosmopœia according to Empedocles:[4] Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, τὸν μὲν αἰθέρα πρῶτον διακριθῆναι, δεύτερον δὲ τὸ πῦρ, ἐφ' ᾧ τὴν γῆν, ἐξ ἧς ἄγαν περισφιγγομένης τῇ ῥύμῃ τῆς περιφορᾶς ἀναβλύσαι τὸ ὕδωρ, ἐξ οὗ θυμιαθῆναι τὸν ἀέρα, καὶ γενέσθαι τὸν μὲν οὐρανὸν ἐκ τοῦ αἰθέρος, τὸν δὲ ἥλιον ἐκ πυρός, "Empedocles writes, that ether was first of all secreted out of the confused chaos of atoms, afterward the fire, and then the earth, which being constringed, and as it were squeezed by the force of agitation, sent forth water bubbling out of it; from the evaporation of which did proceed air; and from the ether was made the heavens, from fire the sun." We see therefore, that it was not without cause, that Lucretius did so highly extol Empedocles, since his physiology was really the same with that of Epicurus and Democritus; only that he differed from them[5] in some particularities, as in excluding a vacuum, and denying such physical minima as were indivisible.

[3] The very same words, except that the names of Democritus and Anaxagoras are added to those of Empedocles and Epicurus, occur in Stobæus, Eclog. Phys. lib. 1. cap. 24. p. 43.

[4] Lib. 2. cap. 6. p. 887.

[5] The learned Doctor concedes, that Empedocles dissented from Democritus in some particularities. He confesses, that he repudiated a vacuum, which Epicurus and Democritus above all things delighted in. This indeed is evident from Lucretius, De Rerum Natura, lib. 1, v. 744, 745. p. 183. Stobæus, Eclog. Phys. lib. 1. cap. 22. p. 38. and others. He grants also, that he denied the doctrine of indivisible corpuscles or, in other words, that he believed matter to be infinitely divisible. Whereas Democritus made his atoms indivisible. Besides Lucretius in the passage quoted, v. 747, 748. p. 184. and others, we have the testimony of Aristotle, De Cœlo, lib. 3. cap. 6. p. 679, tom. 1. opp., that Empedocles held that opinion. Although he affirms, indeed, that Empedocles, while he believed his atoms to be divisible seems to have thought nevertheless, that they never were in reality divided; and as regards the chief point in dispute, considers Empedocles to have held the same as Democritus, namely, that the world was compounded of atoms altogether destitute of qualities. Which view Mr. Creech, I observe, nearly coincides in. For in his notes to Lucretius, p. 189, he says: "Empedocles and Epicurus agree very well, except that that the opinion of the first of them is more abtruse and intricate, and that of the latter more plain and simple: For Empedocles composes his elements of the first principles, and of those elements constitutes all things. But Epicurus will have all things proceed immediately from the first principles." Would, indeed, that I could assent altogether to men of such acuteness and understanding, but although I readily believe Empedocles to have favoured the doctrine of atoms generally, I am almost convinced, notwithstanding, that his atoms possessed qualities, and therefore, that he cannot be classed among the genuine followers of Democritus and Epicurus. Passing over the words of Plutarch and Stobæus, quoted a little above, from which this is manifest, I shall here notice some

XV. As for Anaxagoras, though he philosophized by atoms, substituting concretion and secretion in the room of generation and corruption, insisting upon the same fundamental principle, that Empedocles, Democritus, and the other Atomists did; which was (as we shall declare more fully afterward) that nothing could be made out of nothing, nor reduced to nothing; and therefore that there were neither any new productions nor destructions of any substances or real entities; yet, as his Homœomeria[6] is represented by Aristotle, Lucretius, and other authors, that bone was made of bony atoms, and flesh of fleshy, red things of red atoms, and hot things of hot atoms; these atoms being supposed to be endued originally with so many several forms and qualities essential to them, and inseparable from them, there was indeed a wide difference betwixt his philosophy and the atomical. However, this seems to have had its rise from nothing else but this philosopher's not being able to understand the atomical hypothesis, which made him decline it, and substitute this spurious and counterfeit atomism of his own in the room of it.

XVI. Lastly, I might add here, that it is recorded by good authors concerning divers other ancient philosophers, that were not addicted to Democriticism or Atheism, that they followed this atomical way of physiologizing, and therefore in all probability did derive it from those religious Atomists before Democritus. As for example; Ecphantus[7] the Syracusian Pythagorist, who, as Stobæus writes, made τὰ ἀδιαίρετα σώματα καὶ τὸ κενὸν, "indivisible bodies and vacuum," the principles of physiology, and as Theodoret also testifies, taught ἐκ τῶν ἀτόμων συνεστάναι τὸν κόσμον, "that the corporeal world was

other points in proof of the same thing. In the first place, if we deprive the corpuscles of Empedocles of all qualities, I for my part am at a loss to know, how concord and discord, friendship and enmity, which he lays down as the efficient causes of all things, could arise in them. For whatever is destitute of all quality, can neither partake of friendship nor enmity. Therefore since Empedocles supposed, that friendship and enmity severed the elements, it is evident, I think, that he considered contrary qualities to have been mixed together in the first matter, which afterwards were in some way or other separated. Again, Aristotle, De Generat. lib. i. cap. 1. p. 698. tom. 1. opp. shows from Empedocles' own poems, that he maintained whiteness, warmth, coldness, and other qualities to have existed in the first elements, after the manner of differences. Lastly, that Lucretius, De Rerum Natura, lib. ii goes to so much length in refuting Empedocles, whom he states, v. 739, "in principiis rerum ruinas fecisse," is of itself indeed ample proof, that Empedocles and Epicurus were at issue on the main points of the question.

[6] On this doctrine of Anaxagoras see especially Bayle, Dictionaire Histor. et Critique, t. 1. artic. Anaxagoras, p. 206, &c. who has treated of all the difficulties of his dogma with great copiousness and accuracy. As to Anaxagoras' having taken up Homœomeria, as Dr. Cudworth supposes, from his not understanding the atomic hypothesis, few I think will assent to this, it being little in accordance with the many fine things said of that philosopher by the ancients. It is much more probable, that he was led into this opinion concerning the origin of things from very different reasons.

[7] Of him, however, the learned Doctor had already treated, sect. 12. which he seems here to have forgotten.

made up of atoms;" Xenocrates,[8] that made *μεγέθη ἀδιαίρετα*, "indivisible magnitudes" the first principles of bodies; Heraclides,[9] that resolved all corporeal things into *ψήγματα καὶ θραύσματά τινα ἐλάχιστα*, "certain smallest fragments of bodies;" Asclepiades, [10] who supposed all the corporeal world to be made *ἐξ ἀνομοίων καὶ ἀναρμων ὄγκων*, not of similar parts (as Anaxagoras) but "of dissimilar and inconcinn moleculæ," i. e. atoms of different magnitude and figures; and Diodorus,[1] that solved the material phenomena by *ἀμερῆ τὰ ἐλάχιστα*, "the smallest indivisibles" of body. And lastly, Metrodorus[2] (not Lampsacenus the

[8] None of the ancients who speak of Xenocrates have touched upon this opinion of his. But Georg. Pachymeres, a writer of the thirteenth century, and the author of a treatise, which occurs among the Opera Aristotelis, t. 2. and is erroneously attributed by many to Aristotle himself, says the following of Plato and Xenocrates: *Τοῖς τοιούτοις οὖν οἱ ἀμφὶ Ξενοκράτην καὶ Πλάτωνα ἀντιτείνοντες ἀδιαίρετα ἐποίουν μεγέθη, ὧν καὶ τὸ ὂν ἐκεῖνο ἐτίθουν, ὡστ' εἶναι καὶ ἓν καὶ ἀδιαίρετον*, thus freely translated by Jac. Schegkius: "His Plato et Xenocrates contradicentes, impartibiles quasdam magnitudines confinxerunt, quibus ut essentiæ ratio proprie tribueretur, ita cum essentia impartibilis unitas conjuncta foret, minime vero divisionem, quum essent *ἄτομοι*, admitterent." Pachymeres adds, that Aristotle had in some passages confuted this opinion. It appears indeed from these words, that both Xenocrates and Plato, if Pachymeres rightly understands them, believed matter not to be infinitely divisible, but atoms to be indivisible, and yet it does not follow that these atoms, which they considered indivisible, were held by them to be destitute of all qualities and endowed only with figure; which however is the chief point in dispute. For it is certain that many denied the infinite divisibility of matter, who nevertheless were strongly opposed to the opinions of Democritus.

[9] He means Heraclitus, the philosopher illustrious for the obscurity which he courted. For of him Plutarch, De Placitis Philos. lib. 1. cap. 13. p. 883. t. 2. opp. thus speaks: *Ἡράκλειτος ψήγματά τινα ἐλάχιστα καὶ ἀμερῆ εἰσάγει*, "Heraclitus ramenta quædam minima et divisionem non admittentia introducit." This part of Heraclitus' philosophy is copiously and learnedly discussed by Godofr. Olearius, Diss. De Principio Rerum Natural. ex Mente Heracliti, sect. 6. p. 846, &c., and De Rerum Γενέσει ex Mente Heracliti, sect. 3. p. 858. in Stanley's Historia Philos., who agrees in the opinion of our author, to which also Jo. Alb. Fabricius, Ad. Sextum Empiricum, p. 136, confesses himself not to be unfavourable. For my own part, indeed, I consider the remark made above concerning Xenocrates to be applicable also here; namely, that granting Heraclitus to have introduced these smallest corpuscles, still it is not made clear, that he deprived them of all qualities. But I purpose speaking more fully of Heraclitus in the preface.

[10] Sextus Empir. Hypotypos. Pyrrhon. lib. 3. cap. 4. p. 136. *Ἡρακλείδης δὲ ὁ Ποντικὸς καὶ Ἀσκληπιάδης ὁ Βιθυνὸς ἀνάρμους ὄγκους*, "Heraclides Ponticus et Asclepindes Bithynus incompositas moles (introduxerunt)." Several ancient authors, as noticed by Fabricius, in his annotations on this passage of Empiricus, have made mention of Asclepiades, who certainly of all others comes nearest to Democritus' doctrine of atoms. For so Cœlius Aurelianus expressly, lib. 1. De Acutis Passionibus, cap. 14. "Primordia corporis prima constituerat atomos, corpuscula intellectu sensa, sine ulla qualitate solita." Add Sextus, lib. 2. Adv. Logicos, sect. 220. p. 499, &c., where he terms the *ὄγκοι* of Asclepiades *νοητοί*, and lib. 1. Adv. Physicos, sect. 363. p. 621.

[1] In allusion doubtless to the following passage of Sextus concerning Diodorus, lib. 1. Adv. Physicos, sect. 363. p. 621. *Διόδωρος δὲ, ὁ ἐπικληθεὶς Κρόνος, ἐλάχιστα καὶ ἀμερῆ σώματα*, "Diodorus, cognomine Cronus, corpora minima et individua" (scilicet induxit). The same is stated lib. 3. Hypotypos. cap. 4. p. 136. Add Stobæus, Eclog. Physic. lib. 1. cap. 13. p. 28. But in these passages Sextus distinguishes Diodorus' opinion from that of Asclepiades. It will be worth while therefore to bear in mind what I have remarked a little above respecting Xenocrates and Heraclitus.

[2] He here had in mind, I suppose, the passage of Stobæus, Eclog. Physic. lib. 1.

Epicurean, but) Chius, who is reported also to have made indivisible particles and atoms the first principles of bodies. But what need we any more proof for this, that the atomical physiology was ancienter than Democritus and Leucippus, and not confined only to that sect, since Aristotle himself,[3] in the passages already cited doth expressly declare, that besides Democritus, the generality of all the other physiologers went that way: Δημόκριτος καὶ οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν φυσιολόγων, &c., "Democritus and the most of the physiologers make all sense to be touch, and resolve sensible qualities, as the tastes of bitter and sweet, &c. into figures." And again,[4] he imputes it generally to all the physiologers that went before him, οἱ πρότερον φυσιολόγοι, "the former physiologers" without any exception "said not well in this, that there was no black and white without the sight, nor bitter and sweet without the taste." Wherefore, I think, it cannot be reasonably doubted, but that the generality of the old physiologers before Aristotle and Democritus did pursue the atomical way, which is to resolve the corporeal phenomena, not into forms, qualities and species, but into figures, motions and fancies.

XVII. But then there will seem to be no small difficulty in reconciling Aristotle with himself, who doth in so many places plainly impute this philosophy to Democritus and Leucippus, as the first source and original of it; as also in salving the credit of Laërtius, and many other ancient writers, who do the like, Democritus having had for many ages almost the general cry and vogue for atoms. However, we doubt not but to give a very good account of this business, and reconcile the seemingly different testimonies of these ancient writers, so as to take away all contradiction and repugnancy between them. For although the atomical physiology was in use long before Democritus and Leucippus, so that they did not make it, but find it; yet these two, with their confederate Atheists (whereof Protagoras seems to have been one) were undoubtedly the first that ever made this physiology to be a complete and entire philosophy by itself, so as to derive the original of all things in the whole universe from senseless atoms, that had nothing but figure and motion,

cap. 13. p. 27. which says: Μητρόδωρος Θεοκρίτου Χῖος τὰ ἀδιαίρετα καὶ τὸ κενόν, "Metrodorus Theocriti Chius individua et inane (pro rerum principiis habuit)." But if even all these and many others were zealous atomists, which the learned Doctor does not in the least doubt, yet it cannot be proved thereby, that they did not derive the doctrine from Democritus but from the philosophers before him. For granting them to have been religious and worshippers of God, and Democritus impious and an enemy to all religion, still it is possible for a man to follow certain precepts of an atheist in matters of philosophy and at the same time hold his impiety in abhorrence. But of this elsewhere.

[3] De Sensu et Sensibili, cap. 4. p. 70. t. 2. opp. See what I have remarked above on sect. 6. respecting this passage.

[4] De Anima, lib. 2. cap. 1. p. 43. t. 2. opp.

together with vacuum, and made up such a system of it, as from whence it would follow, that there could not be any God, not so much as a corporeal one. These two things were both of them before singly and apart. For there is no doubt to be made, but that there hath been atheism lurking in the minds of some or other in all ages; and perhaps some of those ancient Atheists did endeavour to philosophize too, as well as they could, in some other way. And there was atomical physiology likewise before, without atheism. But these two thus complicated together, were never before atomical atheism, or atheistical atomism. And therefore Democritus and his comrade Leucippus need not be envied the glory of being reputed the first inventors or founders of the atomical philosophy atheized and adulterated.

XVIII. Before Leucippus and Democritus, the doctrine of atoms was not made a whole entire philosophy by itself, but looked upon only as a part or member of the whole philosophic system, and that the meanest and lowest part too, it being only used to explain that which was purely corporeal in the world; besides which they acknowledged something else, which was not mere bulk and mechanism, but life and self-activity, that is, immaterial or incorporeal substance; the head and summity whereof is the Deity distinct from the world. So that there have been two sorts of Atomists in the world, the one atheistical, the other religious. The first and most ancient Atomists holding incorporeal substance, used that physiology in a way of subordination to theology and metaphysics. The other, allowing no other substance but body, made senseless atoms and figures without any mind and understanding (i. e. without any God) to be the original of all things; which latter is that, that was vulgarly known by the name of atomical philosophy, of which Democritus and Leucippus were the source.[5]

XIX. It hath been indeed of late confidently asserted by

[1] This method of the learned Doctor's of coupling what the ancients say respecting Democritus and Leucippus with his own opinion of the antiquity of the atomic philosophy is, it must be confessed, ingenious. But, I am afraid, it will seem to be little in accordance with most part of the testimonies of ancient authors, which impute the invention of atoms positively and absolutely to Democritus and Leucippus. Nevertheless, that there were philosophers before Leucippus who spoke of atoms, is almost beyond controversy. And what then? Shall we insist that those, who derive the origin of this philosophy from Democritus and Leucippus, have been grossly in error? Few, I think, will admit this. To state my own impression, on a review of the whole matter, I am almost persuaded to believe, that those Greeks who discoursed of atoms before these philosophers attributed qualities, life, and other things to them, but that Democritus and Leucippus were the first who divested atoms of all qualities and left them nothing but figure. Hence it happened, that all the glory of having invented this philosophy was ascribed to them, though they had only in part deserved it. Should nothing prevent, I shall show in the preface, that this opinion is not far from the truth.

some,[6] that never any of the ancient philosophers dreamed of any such thing as incorporeal substance; and therefore they would bear men in hand, that it was nothing but an upstart and new-fangled invention of some bigotical religionists; the falsity whereof we shall here briefly make to appear. For though there have been doubtless in all ages such as have disbelieved the existence of any thing but what was sensible, whom Plato[7] describes after this manner: Οἱ *διατείνοιντ' ἂν πᾶν, ὃ μὴ δυνατοὶ ταῖς χερσὶ συμπιέζειν εἰσὶν, ὡς ἄρα τοῦτο οὐδὲν τὸ παράπαν ἐστί*, "That would contend, that whatsoever they could not feel or grasp with their hands, was altogether nothing;" yet this opinion was professedly opposed by the best of the ancient philosophers, and condemned for a piece of sottishness and stupidity. Wherefore the same Plato tells us, that there had been always, as well as then there was, a perpetual war and controversy in the world, and, as he calls it, a kind of gigantomachy betwixt these two parties or sects of men; the one, that held that there was no other substance in the world besides body; the other, that asserted incorporeal substance. The former of these parties or sects is thus described by the philosopher: Οἱ *μὲν εἰς γῆν ἐξ οὐρανοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀοράτου πάντα ἕλκουσι ταῖς χερσὶν ἀτεχνῶς πέτρας καὶ δρῦς περιλαμβάνοντες, τῶν γὰρ τοιούτων ἐφαπτόμενοι πάντων, δἄσχυρίζονται τοῦτο εἶναι μόνον, ὃ παρέχει προσβολὴν καὶ ἐπαφήν τινα, ταυτὸν σῶμα καὶ οὐσίαν ὁριζόμενοι· τῶν δὲ ἄλλων εἴτις φησὶ μὴ σῶμα ἔχον εἶναι, καταφρονοῦντες τὸ παράπαν, καὶ οὐδὲν ἐθέλοντες ἄλλο ἀκούειν*, "These," saith he, "pull all things down from heaven and the invisible region, with their hands to the earth, laying hold of rocks and oaks; and when they grasp all these hard and gross things, they confidently affirm, that that only is substance, which they can feel, and will resist their touch; and they conclude, that body and substance are one and the self-same thing; and if any one chance to speak to them of something which is not body, i. e. of incorporeal substance, they will altogether despise him, and not hear a word more from him." And many such the philosopher there says he had met withal. The other he represents in this manner: Οἱ *πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἀμφισβητοῦντες μάλα εὐλαβῶς ἄνωθεν ἐξ ἀοράτου τόπου ἀμύνονται νοητὰ ἄττα καὶ ἀσώματα εἴδη, βιαζόμενοι τὴν ἀληθινὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι· ἐν μέσῳ δὲ περὶ ταῦτα ἄπλετος ἀμφοτέρων μάχη τις ἀεὶ ξυνέστηκεν*, "The adversaries of

[6] No one can be at a loss to know who is aimed at in these words, that has read the Leviathan and other writings of Thomas Hobbes. For in comprising all things in bodies and denying the existence of any substance distinct from body, Hobbes endeavoured to back his opinion by all the best and wisest philosophers of antiquity. See his Leviathan, c. 12. p. 56, &c. Nevertheless, others also besides Hobbes have maintained, that the ancient philosophers had no notion of that which the learned have since understood by the term *spirit*.

[7] These and the following words of Plato occur in his Sophista, p. 160.

these corporealists do cautiously and piously assault them from the invisible region, fetching all things from above by way of descent, and by strength of reason convincing, that certain intelligible and incorporeal forms are the true or first substance, and not sensible things. But betwixt these two there hath always been," saith he, "a great war and contention." And yet in the sequel of his discourse he adds, that those Corporealists were then grown a little more modest and shame faced than formerly their great champions had been, such as Democritus and Protagoras; for however they still persisted in this, that the soul was a body, yet they had not, it seems, the impudence to affirm, that wisdom and virtue were corporeal things, or bodies, as others before and since too have done. We see here, that Plato[8] expressly asserts a substance distinct from body, which sometimes he calls οὐσίαν ἀσώματον, "incorporeal substance," and sometimes οὐσίαν νοητήν, "intelligible substance," in opposition to the other which he calls αἰσθητήν, "sensible." And it is plain to any one, that hath had the least acquaintance with Plato's philosophy, that the whole scope and drift of it is, to raise up men's minds from sense to a belief of incorporeal things as the most excellent: Τὰ γὰρ ἀσώματα κάλλιστα ὄντα καὶ μέγιστα λόγῳ μόνον, ἄλλῳ δὲ οὐδενὶ, σαφῶς δείκνυται, as he writes in another place;[9] "For incorporeal things, which are the greatest and most excellent things of all, are," saith he, "discoverable by reason only and nothing else." And his subterraneous cave, so famously known, and so elegantly described by him,[10] where he supposes men tied with their backs towards the light, placed at a great distance from them, so that they could not turn about their heads to it

[8] That Plato, besides τὰ αἰσθητὰ, which he said were perpetually flowing, firmly believed also in other things, called by him τὰ νοητὰ and τὰ ὄντα, admits of no doubt, being evident, not from these passages only, but from many others. See those collected by Jac. Thomasius, Schediasm. Philos. p. 10. Add Diogenes Laërtius in Platone, lib. 3. segm. 64. p. 202. But these ἀσώματα of Plato, whether we regard him as placing them out of or in the mind of God, are nothing but the models and forms, or ἰδέαι, of all things, which he supposed to be eternal and which, as all know, are very different from the substances called by us spirits and considered to be distinct from body. The passages here adduced refer evidently to the dispute at that time carried on among those, who denied or affirmed, that there were νοητὰ καὶ ἀσώματα εἴδη, "species aut ideæ rerum æternæ, solo ingenio patentes, et ab omni corpore remotas." Whether Plato believed in the existence of such incorporeal substances as we do, or not, I consider to be very doubtful. For arguments are not wanting to those, who hold that he supposed both God and souls to consist of subtile particles. It is certain, however, that he called God ἀσώματος. See Cicero, De Natura Deor. lib. 1. cap. 12. p. 2897. t. 9. opp. and Maximus Tyrius, Diss. 1. Quid sit Deus secundum Platonem, p. 15, &c.

[9] These words are from Plato's Politicus, p. 182. opp. More to the same effect may be found in different parts of his works. But it still remains to be shown whether his ἀσώματα are of the same kind, as those which are called so by later philosophers.

[10] This fable occurs lib. 7. De Republica near the beginning, p. 483. Its drift is certainly to remind men, that our days lie enveloped in darkness and therefore, that the mind must mount up to things more excellent than those, which are seen here, namely, to the contemplation of eternal forms and of God himself.

neither, and therefore could see nothing but the shadows (of certain substances behind them) projected from it, which shadows they concluded to be the only substances and realities, and when they heard the sounds made by those bodies that were betwixt the light and them, or their reverberated echoes, they imputed them to those shadows which they saw; I say, all this is a description of the state of those men, who take body to be the only real and substantial thing in the world, and to do all that is done in it; and therefore often impute sense, reason, and understanding, to nothing but blood and brains in us.

XX. I might also show in the next place, how Aristotle did not at all dissent from Plato herein, he plainly asserting,[1] ἄλλην οὐσίαν παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητὰ, "another substance besides sensibles," οὐσίαν χωριστὴν καὶ κεχωρισμένην τῶν αἰσθητῶν, "a substance separable and also actually separated from sensibles," ἀκίνητον οὐσίαν, "an immoveable nature or essence" (subject to no generation or corruption) adding, that the Deity was to be sought for here: nay, such a substance, ἣν μέγεθος οὐδὲν ἐνδέχεται ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ ἀμερὴς καὶ ἀδιαίρετός ἐστι, "as hath no magnitude at all, but is impartible and indivisible." He also blaming Zeno (not the Stoic, who was junior to Aristotle, but an ancienter philosopher of that name) for making God to be a body, in these words:[2] Αὐτὸς γὰρ σῶμα λέγει τὸν εἶναι Θεόν· εἴτε δὲ τόδε τὸ πᾶν, εἴτε ὅ τι δήποτε αὐτὸς λέγων· ἀσώματος γὰρ ὢν πῶς ἂν σφαιροειδὴς εἴη; ὅταν οὕτως οὔτ' ἂν κινοῖτο, οὔτ' ἂν ἠρεμοῖ, μηδαμοῦ τε ὤν· ἐπεὶ δὲ σῶμά ἐστι, τί ἂν αὐτὸ κωλύει κινεῖσθαι; "Zeno implicitly affirms God to be a body, whether he mean him to be the whole corporeal universe, or some particular body; for if God were incorporeal, how could he be spherical? nor

[1] There are various passages in Aristotle's Metaphysics, especially lib. 14., from which Dr. Cudworth might have extracted these words, as they are frequently made use of by the philosopher. For in this lib. 14. Aristotle takes great pains to show, that besides those things which fall under the senses. τὰ αἰσθητὰ, there is another substance immoveable and placed above all things sensible, the science of which he calls *Metaphysics* or *the first philosophy*. I think it evident, however, that the Doctor had in his eye the following passage in particular, Metaphys. lib. 14. cap. 7. p. 480. t. 4. opp. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐστιν οὐσία τις ἀΐδιος καὶ ἀκίνητος καὶ κεχωρισμένη τῶν αἰσθητῶν, φανερὸν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων· δέδεικται δὲ, καὶ ὅτι μέγεθος οὐδὲν ἐνδέχεται ἔχειν ταύτην τὴν οὐσίαν, ἀλλὰ ἀμερὴς καὶ ἀδιαίρετός ἐστι, "Quod itaque est quædam æterna immobilisque substantia, et a sensibilibus separata, constat ex dictis. Ostensum autem est, quod nec ullam magnitudinem possibile est hanc substantiam habere, verum impartibilis indivisibilisque est." Compare also the same philosopher, Physic. lib. 8. cap. 15. p. 660. t. 1. opp. where he strenuously contends, that the first mover is without parts and magnitude. But as to what Dr. Cudworth says of the agreement of Aristotle and Plato on this point, it is clear from what we have said of Plato, that this is to be taken only generally, each being considered to have admitted something ἀσώματον. For otherwise Aristotle, it is notorious, was strongly opposed to Plato's forms and the things which he called τὰ ὄντα.

[2] This Zeno is the one surnamed Eleates, of whom Diogenes Laërtius, lib. 9. and others. The passage of Aristotle occurs in his book De Zenone, Xenophane, et Gorgia, cap. 4. p. 844. tom. 2. opp.

could he then either move or rest, being not properly in any place: but if God be a body, then nothing hinders but that he may be moved." From which, and other places of Aristotle, it is plain enough also, that he did suppose incorporeal substance to be unextended, and as such, not to have relation to any place. But this is a thing to be disputed afterwards. Indeed some learned men conceive Aristotle to have reprehended Zeno without cause, and that Zeno made God to be a sphere, or spherical, in no other sense, than Parmenides did in that known verse of his:[3]

Πάντοθεν εὐκύκλου σφαίρας ἐναλιγκιον ὄγκῳ.

Wherein he is understood to describe the divine eternity. However, it plainly appears from hence, that according to Aristotle's sense God was ἀσώματος, an incorporeal substance distinct from the world.

XXI. Now this doctrine, which Plato especially was famous for asserting, that there was οὐσία ἀσώματος, "incorporeal substance," and that the souls of men were such, but principally the Deity; Epicurus taking notice of it, endeavoured with all his might to confute it, arguing sometimes after this manner:[4] "There can be no incorporeal God, (as Plato maintained) not only because no man can frame a conception of an incorporeal substance, but also because whatsoever is incorporeal must needs want sense, and prudence, and pleasure, all which things are included in the notion of God; and therefore an incorporeal Deity is a contradiction." And concerning the soul of man:[5] οἱ λέγοντες ἀσώματον εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν ματαιάζουσι, &c., "They who say, that the soul is incorporeal, in any other sense, than as that word may be used to signify a subtle body, talk vainly and foolishly; for then it could neither be able to do nor suffer any thing. It could not act upon any other thing, because it could touch nothing; neither could it suffer from any thing, because it could not be touched by any thing; but it would be just like to vacuum or empty space, which can neither do nor suffer any

[3] This verse is met with in Aristotle, as above quoted, cap. 4. p. 843. t. 2. opp., in Plato's Sophista, and in other ancient authors. Read the remarks upon it by Renat. Vallinus, Notæ in Boëthium de Consolat. Philos. p. 69.

[4] The words of Vellcius the Epicurean, or rather of Cicero, De Natura Deorum, cap. 12. p. 2897. t. 9. opp. The Doctor does not quote the passage itself, but states the argument it contains in a free English translation. Cicero's words are: "Quod vero sine corpore ullo vult esse (Plato,) ut Græci dicunt, ἀσώματον, id quale esse possit, intelligi non potest: careat enim sensu, necesse est, careat etiam prudentia, careat voluptate: quæ omnia una cum Deorum notione comprehendimus."

[5] As respects the sense, this is taken from Diogenes Laërtius, lib. 10. segm. 67, 68. p. 630. But Diogenes' words are different, the Doctor having preferred giving a paraphrastic exposition and interpretation of them. He says: Τὸ δὲ κενὸν οὔτε ποιῆσαι, οὔτε παθεῖν δύναται, ἀλλὰ κίνησιν μόνον δι' ἑαυτοῦ τοῖς σώμασι παρέχεται· ὥσθ' οἱ λέγοντες ἀσώματον εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν, ματαιάζουσιν· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν ἐδύνατο ποιεῖν, εἴτε πάσχειν, εἰ ἦν τοιαύτη.

thing, but only yield bodies a passage through it." From whence it is further evident, that this opinion was professedly maintained by some philosophers before Epicurus' time.

XXII. But Plato and Aristotle were not the first inventors of it; for it is certain, that all those philosophers, who held the immortality of the human soul, and a God distinct from this visible world, (and so properly the Creator of it and all its parts) did really assert incorporeal substance. For that a corporeal soul cannot be in its own nature immortal and incorruptible, is plain to every one's understanding, because of its parts being separable from one another; and whosoever denies God to be incorporeal,[6] if he make him any thing at all, he must needs make him to be either the whole corporeal world, or else a part of it. Wherefore if God be neither of these, he must then be an incorporeal substance. Now Plato was not the first, who asserted these two things, but they were both maintained by many philosophers before him. Pherecydes Syrus and Thales were two of the most ancient philosophers among the Greeks; and it is said of the former of them,[7] that by his lectures and disputes concerning the immortality of the soul, he first drew off Pythagoras from another course of life to the study of philosophy. "Pherecydes Syrus," saith Cicero,[8] "primus dixit animos hominum esse sempiternos." And Thales in an Epistle,[9] directed to him, congratulates his being the first, that had designed to write to the Greeks concerning divine things; which Thales also (who was the head of the Ionic succession of philosophers, as Pythagoras of the Italic) is joined with Pythagoras and Plato, by the writer De Placitis Philosophorum,[10] after this manner: Οὗτοι πάντες οἱ προτεταγμένοι ἀσώματον τὴν ψυχὴν ὑποτίθενται, φύσει λέγοντες αὐτοκίνητον καὶ οὐσίαν νοητὴν, "All these determined the soul to be incorporeal, making it to be naturally self-moving" or self-active "and an intelligible substance," that

[6] These words are evidently levelled against Hobbes, who declared himself to be at a loss to conceive a God without body. See his Leviathan, cap. 12. p. 56. cap. 34. p. 184. and the Appendix, p. 345, 346. The same writer is alluded to in the last words of this clause.

[7] That Pherecydes Syrus was the preceptor of Pythagoras, we are informed by Diogenes Laërtius, Cicero, Jamblichus, Porphyrius and other ancient authors. But I know of no one that has left on record what Dr. Cudworth here states, that Pythagoras was led to change his course of life by the disputations of Pherecydes concerning the immortality of the soul, except Augustine, cap. 137. p. 308. t. 2. opp.; but it is very doubtful, whether he is to be relied on.

[8] Tusculan. Quæst. lib. 1. cap. 16. p. 2586. t. 8. opp.

[9] This is preserved in Diogenes Laërtius, lib. 1. segm. 43. p. 25. Its commencement, which doubtless our author had in his mind, is as follows: Πυνθάνομαί δὲ πρῶτον Ἰώνων μέλλειν λόγους ἀμφὶ τῶν θείων χρημάτων εἰς τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἐκφαίνειν, "Audio vero, primum Ionum de divinis rebus apud Græcos quædam editurum." Learned men, however, are not wanting, who with Huëtius, Demonstrat. Evangel. prop. 4. sec. 5. p. 87. suspect this epistle to be spurious.

[10] Lib. 4. cap. 3. p. 908.

is, not sensible. Now he that determines the soul to be incorporeal, must needs hold the Deity to be incorporeal much more. "Aquam dixit Thales esse initium rerum," saith Cicero,[1] "Deum autem eam mentem, quæ ex aqua cuncta fingeret," "Thales said that water was the first principle of all corporeal things, but that God was that mind which formed all things out of water." For Thales was a Phœnician by extraction, and accordingly seemed to have received his two principles from thence, water, and the divine spirit moving upon the waters. The first whereof is thus expressed by Sanchoniathon,[2] in his description of the Phœnician theology, χάος ζοφερὸν, ἐρεβῶδες, "a turbid and dark chaos;" and the second is intimated in these words, ἠράσθη τὸ πνεῦμα τῶν ἰδίων ἀρχῶν, "the Spirit was affected with love towards its own principles;" perhaps expressing the force of the Hebrew word *Merachepheth*, and both of them implying an understanding prolifical goodness, forming and hatching the corporeal world into this perfection; or else a plastic power, subordinate to it. Zeno (who was also originally a Phœnician) tells us,[3] that Hesiod's chaos was water; and that the material heaven as well as earth was made out of water (according to the judgment of the best interpreters) is the genuine sense of Scripture, 2 Pet. iii. 5. by which water some perhaps would understand a Chaos of atoms confusedly moved.

[1] De Natura Deor. lib. 1. cap. 10. p. 2894. t. 9. opp. Concerning Thales' opinion of a God, see below, cap. 3. sec. 20.

[2] In Eusebius, De Preparat. Evangelica, lib. 2. cap. 9. p. 33. Provided only this Sanchoniathon be an ancient writer and of sufficient authority, which, it is certain, besides Henry Dodwell, many men of the greatest acuteness and learning, in the present day deny. Nor yet, if Sanchoniathon were all that our excellent author would have him to be, could his doctrine be easily made to agree with the opinion of Thales. For he considers, not water, as Thales, but ἀέρα ζοφώδη καὶ πνευματώδη, aërem tenebricosum ac spiritu fœtum, to be the first principle of all things according to the opinion of the Phœnicians. Indeed his πνεῦμα is undoubtedly nothing, but a certain efficient power destitute of knowledge, and diffused through the whole mass of rude matter. But it is plain from these words of Dr. Cudworth's, that he is following in the steps and propounding the opinions of Grotius, who in the notes to his book De Veritate Religionis Christ. lib. 1. sec. 16. p. 29, is wholly bent on proving, that Sanchoniathon, Pherecydes, Thales, and others of the ancients held the same opinion concerning the origin of the world and the first principles of things, as the divine writer Moses, and remarks the same of the word מרחפת, as our author does here. The doctrines however of Moses, Thales, and Sanchoniathon, I am persuaded, are so widely apart, that it is mere waste of time to attempt to show their agreement.

[3] If I be not altogether mistaken, Dr. Cudworth, when he wrote this, had in his eye the following words of Grotius in his notes on lib. 1. De Veritate Relig. Christ. sec. 16. p. 30, 31. "Apollonius Argonauticor. 4. (vs. 676, &c.) ἐξ ἰλύος ἐβλάστησε χθὼν αὐτὴ, edita limo terra fuit: ubi Scholiastes: Ζήνων τὸ παρ' Ἡσιόδῳ χάος ὕδωρ εἶναί φησιν.—Zeno chaos illud apud Hesiodum aquam esse dicebat.—Nota autem, Zenonem fuisse e Phœnicibus, quorum colonia Cittium, unde omnes transmarini כתים Hebræis." This Zeno wrote a commentary on Hesiod's Theogonia. See Jo. Alb. Fabricii Biblioth. Græcæ lib. 3. cap. 15. p. 413. In like manner on the passage of Peter, quoted soon after, Grotius' commentaries should be consulted. Some most learned men give a very different interpretation to it. But it is not to our purpose to touch upon these matters at present. See, however, what Jo. Alb. Fabricius says in his notes on Sextus Empiricus.

But whether Thales were acquainted with the Atomical physiology or no,[4] it is plain that he asserted, besides the soul's immortality, a Deity distinct from the corporeal world.

We pass to Pythagoras, whom we have proved already to have been an atomist; and it is well known also, that he was a professed incorporealist. That he asserted the immortality of the soul, and consequently its immateriality, is evident from his doctrine of pre-existence and transmigration: and that he likewise held an incorporeal Deity distinct from the world, is a thing not questioned by any.[5] But if there were any need of proving it (because there are no monuments of his extant), perhaps it might be done from hence, because he was the chief propagator of that doctrine amongst the Greeks, concerning three hypostases in the Deity.

For that Plato and his followers held[6] τρεῖς ἀρχικὰς ὑποστασεῖς, "three hypostases in the Deity; that were the first principles of all things," is a thing very well known to all; though we do not affirm, that these Platonic hypostases are exactly the same with those in the Christian trinity. Now Plato himself sufficiently intimates this not to have been his own invention; and Plotinus tells us, that it was παλαιὰ δόξα, "an ancient opinion," before Plato's time, which had been delivered down by some of the Pythagorics. Wherefore, I conceive, this must needs be one of those

[4] The worthy author in endeavouring to persuade us, that so many of the ancients inclined to the atomic philosophy, might also with some semblance of truth have ranked Thales among the number; for Plutarch De Placitis Philos. lib. 1. cap. 16. p. 883, says of his disciples: Οἱ ἀπὸ Θαλέω καὶ Πυθαγόρου παθητὰ σώματα καὶ τμητὰ εἰς ἄπειρον, ἢ τὰς ἀτόμους ἢ τὰ ἀμερῆ ἵστασθαι, καὶ μὴ εἰς ἄπειρον εἶναι τὴν τομήν, "Thaletis et Pythagoræ sectatores negant, in infinitum progredi sectionem eorum corporum, quæ motibus sunt obnoxia, seu subsistere in iis, quæ individua sunt et atomi vocantur."

[5] The learned Doctor forgot Cicero, who De Natura Deor. lib. 1. cap. 11. p. 2895. says: "Pythagoræ Deum (visum esse) animum per naturam rerum omnem intentum et commeantem;" which passage has led some later writers, and among them Jac. Basnage, Histoire des Juifs, lib. 3. cap. 20. p. 587. to charge Pythagoras with those crimes, that Spinoza is justly accused of. Nor did he call to mind Theophilus Antioch. who, lib. 3. Ad Autolycum, cap. 5. p. 290. ed. Wolfianæ, tells us, that Pythagoras asserted God and φύσις, or nature, to be one and the same. But Thom. Reinesius, Variar. Lection. lib. 3. p. 444. has endeavoured to clear the character of Pythagoras, to whose opinion Jo. Franc. Buddeus, Thesibus de Atheismo, cap. 1. pp. 57, 58. not to mention others, is not far from assenting. It is certainly much more probable, that Pythagoras believed in, than that he rejected, a God. But of this elsewhere.

[6] As we shall have to treat at considerable length below, cap. 4, on the Holy Trinity, which Dr. Cudworth supposes both Pythagoras and Plato to have taught their disciples, I think proper to leave untouched what is said here concerning it. The argument, however, advanced by him in vindication of Pythagoras, to show that he did not worship a corporeal god, does not appear to me to be very cogent; namely, *Pythagoras believed there are three persons in God, therefore he held the divine nature to be incorporeal.* For even among Christians themselves, who never in the least doubted of the three persons in God, sacred history informs us, there have been many notwithstanding, who held this triune God to be corporeal. The learned Doctor's memory, therefore, was at fault, when he wrote the last words of this clause, in which he asserts that no one ever thought so.

Pythagoric monstrosities, which Xenophon covertly taxes Plato for entertaining, and mingling with the Socratical philosophy, as if he had thereby corrupted the purity and simplicity of it. Though a corporealist may pretend to be a theist, yet I never heard that any of them did ever assert a trinity, respectively to the Deity, unless it were such an one, as I think not fit here to mention.

XXIII. That Parmenides, who was likewise a Pythagorean, acknowledged a Deity distinct from the corporeal world, is evident from Plato.[7] And Plotinus tells us also, that he was one of them that asserted the triad of divine hypostases. Moreover, whereas there was a great controversy amongst the ancient philosophers before Plato's time,[8] between such as held all things to flow (as namely Heraclitus and Cratylus); and others, who asserted that some things did stand, and that there was ἀκίνητος οὐσία, "a certain immutable nature," to wit, an eternal mind, together with eternal and immutable truths (amongst whom were Parmenides and Melissus); the former of these were all corporealists (this being the very reason why they made all things to flow, because they supposed all to be body) though these were not therefore all of them atheists. But the latter were all both incorporealists and theists; for whosoever holds incorporeal substance, must needs (according to reason) also assert a Deity.

And although we did not before particularly mention Parmenides amongst the atomical philosophers, yet we conceive it to be manifest from hence that he was one of that tribe, because he was an eminent asserter of that principle, οὐδὲν οὔτε γίνεσθαι οὔτε φθείρεσθαι τῶν ὄντων,[9] "that no real entity is either made or destroyed, generated or corrupted." Which we shall afterwards plainly show, to be the grand fundamental principle of the atomical philosophy.

XXIV. But whereas we did evidently prove before, that Empedocles was an atomical physiologer, it may notwithstanding with some colour of probability be doubted, whether he were not an Atheist, or at least a Corporealist, because Aristotle accuses him of these following things. First,[10] of making knowledge to

[7] He here alludes no doubt to the words put by Plato into the mouth of Parmenides in the dialogue of that name. As Parmenides will be brought before us again in the sequel, cap. 4. I shall pass over his opinions for the present.

[8] Plato nowhere treats more fully and copiously upon the whole of this controversy than in his Theætetus, pp. 130, 131. nor can Dr. Cudworth have meant to point to any other passage.

[9] If Parmenides did hold the doctrine he is here stated to have held, which, however, I do not know to be the case, still it cannot be proved thereby, that he believed in the same kind of corpuscles or atoms, as Democritus and Epicurus. For he also, who supposes atoms to possess qualities, may consistently entertain this opinion regarding generation.

[10] If Empedocles supposed the soul to be compounded of the four elements, and to understand external things solely by means of the particles it consists of, he must

be sense, which is indeed a plain sign of a Corporealist; and therefore in the next place also,[1] of compounding the soul out of the four elements, making it to understand every corporeal thing by something of the same within itself, as fire by fire, and earth by earth; and lastly,[2] of attributing much to fortune, and affirming that divers of the parts of animals were made such by chance, and that there were at first certain mongrel animals fortuitously produced, that were βουγενῆ καὶ ἀνδρόπρωρα, such as had "something of the shape of an ox, together with the face of a man" (though they could not long continue) which seems to give just cause of suspicion, that Empedocles atheized in the same manner that Democritus did.

To the first of these we reply, that some others, who had also

necessarily have believed, that the knowledge and understanding of souls is nothing but sense. Hence Aristotle, in ascribing that doctrine to him, which he does in more places than one, always charges him with the latter opinion also. Yet it is most probable the Doctor had in view this passage in particular, which occurs De Anima, lib. 3. cap. 3. p. 45. t. 2. opp.: Καὶ οἵ γε ἀρχαῖοι τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ταὐτὸν εἶναί φασιν, ὥσπερ καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς εἴρηκε·

Πρὸς παρέον γὰρ μῆτις ἀέξεται ἀνθρώποισι.

Καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις.

Ὗθεν σφίσιν αἰεὶ
Καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν ἀλλοῖα παρίσταται.

Ac veteres idem esse inquiunt cognoscere ac sentire: sicut et Empedocles ait:
Ad præsens enim sapientia augetur hominibus.
Et alibi:
Unde ipsis semper
Etiam prudentis munere fungi varia exhibet.

To Empedocles Aristotle adds Homer, whom he makes to be of the same opinion; with what justice we shall not stop to inquire. He then subjoins: Πάντες γὰρ οὗτοι τὸ νοεῖν σωματικὸν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι, ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαί τε καὶ φρονεῖν τῷ ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον, "Hi omnes enim existimant, intelligere esse corporeum, ut et sentire, ac quemque simile simili sentire et percipere." It is clear from these words, that Aristotle did not charge this upon Empedocles alone, but upon all the ancient physiologers put together.

[1] Aristotle censures him for this, adducing Empedocles' own verses, De Anima, lib. 1. cap. 2. p. 5. t. 2. opp., and speaks also of the same dogma in other passages.

[2] Aristotle De Partibus Animalium, lib. 1. cap. 1. p. 470. t. 2. opp. says: Ἐμπεδοκλῆς οὐκ ὀρθῶς εἴρηκε, λέγων ὑπάρχειν πολλὰ τοῖς ζώοις διὰ τὸ συμβῆναι οὕτως ἐν τῇ γενέσει, "Empedocles perperam docuit, pleraque in animalibus ita esse constituta, quoniam, quum gignerentur, casus ita id tulerit." The same author, Physicor. lib. 2. cap. 4. p. 470. t. 1. opp., finds fault with Empedocles for having attributed much to fortune, which he proves from this verse of his:

Ὡς οὕτω συνέκυρσε θέων τότε, πολλάκι δ' ἄλλως·

Sæpe alias aliter, sed tum sic forte cucurrit.

He makes mention also, in various passages, of the monstrous animals, which Empedocles believed to have been produced from the earth, but in a short time to have perished again. It will be sufficient to quote one from Physicor. lib. 2. cap. 8. p. 475: Ὅσα δὲ μὴ οὕτως, ἀπώλετο καὶ ἀπόλλυται, καθάπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς λέγει τὰ βουγενῆ καὶ ἀνδρόπρωρα, "Quæ vero non ita facta sunt, periere et pereunt, quemadmodum Empedocles perisse ait bovigena et androprora." Add p. 477 of the same.

read Empedocles' poems, were of a different judgment from Aristotle as to that, conceiving Empedocles not to make sense, but reason, the criterion of truth. Thus Empiricus informs us;[3] "Others say, that, according to Empedocles, the criterion of truth is not sense, but right reason; and also that right reason is of two sorts, the one θεῖος, or divine, the other ἀνθρώπινος, or human: of which the divine is inexpressible, but the human declarable." And there might be several passages cited out of those fragments of Empedocles' poems yet left to confirm this; but we shall produce only this one:

"Γυίων πίστιν ἔρυκε, νόει δ' ᾗ δῆλον ἕκαστον."

To this sense; "Suspend thy assent to the corporeal senses, and consider everything clearly with thy mind or reason."

[3] This passage occurs lib. 7. Contra. Mathem. sec. 122. p. 396. The verse of Empedocles, quoted a little after, we meet with in the same author, sec. 125. p. 347. together with others of the kind. But to speak the truth, they are of less efficacy towards vindicating Empedocles from the accusation of Aristotle, than Dr. Cudworth imagines. To say nothing of Chalcidius' having attributed the same thing to him, as Aristotle does, thus: "Plerique sola opinati sunt esse sensilia, ut Empedocles," Comm. in Timæum Platonis, cap. 348, p. 405. it must be borne in mind, that what he says of the manner in which the soul understands, places it beyond all doubt, that he held knowledge and understanding to be a kind of sense; and that he did entertain this opinion of the soul's understanding, which Aristotle imputes to him, will by and by be made manifest. Neither is the passage of Sextus of such weight with me, that I should seek for another interpretation of his meaning. For I. he says only, that there were some who stated this to have been the opinion of Empedocles: others, therefore, thought differently. II. Granting it to be the case, that Empedocles ascribed little to the testimony of the senses and made reason the criterion of truth, still I doubt whether it follows, that he considered knowledge and understanding to be different from sense. For if I possess the power of judging, there is nothing to prevent a man, who holds understanding and sense to be one and the same thing, from supposing a certain power to reside in the soul of understanding what is perceived and received into the mind. I shall give two instances: one of ancient, the other of more recent date. That Tertullian believed the same as what Aristotle ascribes to Empedocles is evident from these words of his: "Quid erit sensus, nisi ejus rei, quæ sentitur, intellectus? Quid erit intellectus, nisi ejus rei, quæ intelligitur, sensus?——Quis mihi exhibebit sensum non intelligentem, quod sentit, aut intellectum non sentientem, quod intelligit, ut probet alterum sine altero posse?" De Anima, cap. 18. p. 171. opp. ed. Venetæ, and yet he supposed the faculty of distinguishing truth from falsehood to be situated in reason. But could the learned doctor have forgotten Hobbes, whom he so often refutes? What was knowledge in his opinion? Certainly, sense. "Nulla," says he, "est animi conceptio, quæ non fuerat ante genita in aliquo sensuum," Leviathan, part 1. cap. 1. p. 3. for which reason he denies knowledge even to God. See especially Elementa de Cive, cap. 15. sec. 14. p. 117, 118. He decides, nevertheless, that reason must be resorted to, when a judgment is to be formed of truth, see Leviathan, c. 5. p. 20, 21. Are we to suppose, therefore, that Empedocles, because he thought thus of the soul's knowledge, rejected every thing simple and incorporeal? I think not. For his opinion, which, it is certain, was also entertained by many of the ancient philosophers, including Plato, appears to have been this; that the knowledge of corporeal things does not differ from sense, but that the forms or images τῶν νοητῶν, or of things which are understood by reason alone, are innate and treasured up in the soul itself, and therefore, to use the words of Tertullian in the passage quoted, that the mind, "per animum sive νοῦν incorporalia intelligere." Hence, there was no reason for Cudworth's considering it necessary to take up the cudgels against Aristotle, in defence of Empedocles.

And as to the second crimination, Aristotle[4] has much weakened his own testimony here, by accusing Plato also of the very same thing: Πλατὼν τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων ποιεῖ, γινώσκεται γάρ ὁμοίῳ ὅμοιον, τὰ δὲ πράγματα ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν εἶναι, "Plato compounds the soul out of the four elements, because like is known by like, and things are from their principles." Wherefore it is probable, that Empedocles might be no more guilty of this fault (of making the soul corporeal, and to consist of earth, water, air, and fire) than Plato was, who in all men's judgments was as free from it, as Aristotle himself, if not more. For Empedocles[5] did in the same manner, as Pythagoras before him, and Plato after him, hold the transmigration of souls, and consequently, both their future immortality and pre-existence; and therefore must needs assert their incorporeity; Plutarch[6] rightly declaring this to have been his opinion: Εἶναι καὶ τοὺς μηδέπω γεγονότας καὶ τοὺς ἤδη τεθνηκότας, "That as well those who are yet unborn, as those that are dead, have a being." He also asserted human souls to be here in a lapsed state;[7] μετανάστας, καὶ ξένους, καὶ φυγάδας, "wanderers, strangers, and fugitives from God;" declaring, as Plotinus[8] tells us, that it was a divine law, ἁμαρτανούσαις ταῖς ψυχαῖς πεσεῖν ἐνταυθα, "that souls sinning should fall down into these earthly bodies." But the fullest record of the Empedoclean philosophy concerning the soul is contained in this of Hierocles:[9] Κάτεισι καὶ ἀποπίπτει τῆς εὐδαίμονος χώρας ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ὡς Ἐμπεδοκλῆς φησιν ὁ Πυθα-

[4] The passage is in the De Anima, lib. 1. cap. 2. p. 5 tom. 2. opp. He has here omitted, however, the words ἐν Τιμαίῳ. For in this book, according to Aristotle, the opinion was advanced by Plato.

[5] That Empedocles held the doctrine of μετεμψύχωσις is manifest as well from other passages of the ancients, as from his well known verses, preserved by Diogenes Laërtius, lib. 8. segm. 78. p. 539, in which he declares himself to have been a boy, a girl, a plant, a fish, and a bird: also from his having forbidden animals to be put to death. See Plutarch, De Solert. Animal. tom. 2. p. 964.

[6] Adv. Colotem, p. 1113. tom. 2. opp.

[7] Plutarch, I find, makes use of these words in his book, De Exsilio, p. 607. after having quoted the verses of Empedocles, which we shall presently adduce.

[8] De Animæ Descensu in Corpora, Ennend, 4. lib. 8. cap. 1. p. 468.

[9] In Aurea Pythagoræ Carmina, p. 186. On this passage it will be worth while to consult the notes of the latest editor of Hierocles, Pet. Needham, p. 418, 419. who, among other things, has justly remarked that ἀμελθεῖς, the last word of this passage, should be read ἀμερθεῖς. But in my opinion it would have been better to quote the poem itself of Empedocles, referred to both by Plotinus and Hierocles in these passages, as it explains the philosopher's doctrine much more clearly than is done by either of them. These verses are preserved by Plutarch in his book, De Exsilio, tom. 2. opp. p. 607.

Ἔστι τὶ ἀνάγκης χρῆμα θεῶν ψήφισμα παλαιόν·
Εὔτέ τις ἁμπλακίῃσι φόνῳ φίλα γυῖα μιήνῃ,
Δαίμονες οἵτε μακραίωνος λελόγχασι βίοιο.
Τρὶς μιν μυρίας ὥρας ἀπὸ μακάρων ἀλάλησθαι.
Τὴν καὶ ἐγὼ νῦν εἰμι φυγὰς θεόθεν καὶ ἀλήτης.

γόρειος,—φυγὰς θεόθεν καὶ ἀλήτης, Νείκεϊ μαινομένῳ πίσυνος.——
Ἄνεισι δὲ καὶ τὴν ἀρχαίαν ἕξιν ἀπολαμβάνει,

Εἰ φεύξει τὰ περὶ γῆν καὶ τὸν ἀτερπέα χῶρον,
Ἔνθα φόνος τε κότος τε καὶ ἄλλων ἔθνεα κηρῶν.

Εἰς ὃν οἱ ἐκπεσόντες——Ἄτης

——Ἀνὰ λειμῶνά τε καὶ σκότος ἠλάσκουσιν.

Ἡ δὲ ἔφεσις τοῦ φεύγοντος τὸν τῆς Ἄτης λειμῶνα πρὸς τὸν τῆς ἀληθείας ἐπείγεται λειμῶνα, ὃν ἀπολιπὼν τῇ ὁρμῇ τῆς πτεροῤῥυήσεως εἰς γήϊνον ἔρχεται σῶμα, Ὀλβίου—αἰῶνος ἀμελθείς, "Man falleth from his happy state, as Empedocles, the Pythagorean, saith——By being a fugitive, apostate, and wanderer from God, acted with a certain mad and irrational strife or contention.—But he ascends again, and recovers his former state,——if he decline and avoid these earthly things, and despise this unpleasant and wretched place, where murder, and wrath, and a troop of all other mischiefs reign. Into which place they who fall, wander up and down through the field of Ate and darkness. But the desire of him, that flees from this field of Ate, carries him on towards the field of truth; which the soul at first relinquishing, and losing its wings, fell down into this earthly body, deprived of its happy life." From whence it appears that Plato's πτεροῤῥύησις was derived from Empedocles and the Pythagoreans.

Now, from what hath been already cited it is sufficiently manifest, that Empedocles was so far from being either an atheist or corporealist, that he was indeed a rank Pythagorist, as he is here called. And we might add hereunto, what Clemens Alexandrinus observes,[10] that according to Empedocles, ἦν ὁσίως καὶ δικαίως διαβιώσωμεν, μακάριοι μὲν ἐνταῦθα, μακαριώτεροι δὲ μετὰ τὴν ἐνθένδε ἀπαλλαγὴν· οὐ χρόνῳ τινὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἔχοντες, ἀλλὰ ἐν αἰῶνι ἀναπαύεσθαι δυνάμενοι, Ἀθανάτοις ἄλλοισιν ὁμέστιοι, ἐν δὲ τραπέζαις, &c. "If we live holily and justly, we shall be happy here, and more happy after our departure hence; having our happiness not necessarily confined to time, but being able to rest and fix in it to all eternity; feasting with the other immortal beings," &c. We might also take notice, how, besides the immortal souls of men, he acknowledged demons or angels;

Fata jubent, stant hæc decreta antiqua Deorum:
Si quid peccando longævi dæmones errant,
Quisque luit pœnas, cœloque extorris ab alto,
Triginta horarum per terras millia oberrat:
Sic et ego nunc ipse vagor, divinitus exsul.

[10] Stromatum, lib. 5. p. 722, where Clemens quotes also a passage from the poems of Empedocles, to prove what he has here stated.

declaring that some of these fell from heaven, and were since prosecuted by a divine Nemesis. For these in Plutarch[1] are called οἱ θεήλατοι καὶ οὐρανοπετεῖς ἐκεῖνοι τοῦ Ἐμπεδοκλέους δαίμονες, "those Empedoclean demons lapsed from heaven, and pursued with divine vengeance;" whose restless torment is there described in several verses of his.[2] And we might observe likewise, how he acknowledged a natural and immutable justice, which was not topical and confined to places and countries, and relative to particular laws, but catholic and universal, and every where the same, through infinite light and space; as he expresses it with poetic pomp and bravery:

> Ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν πάντων νόμιμον, διὰ τ' εὐρυμέδοντος
> Αἰθέρος ἠνεκέως τέταται, διὰ τ' ἀπλέτου αὐγῆς.[3]

And the asserting of natural morality is no small argument of a theist.[4]

[1] De Vitando Ære Alieno, tom. 2. opp. p. 830. Plutarch says, that those who are oppressed with debt wander up and down like οἱ θεήλατοι καὶ οὐρανοπετεῖς ἐκεῖνοι τοῦ Ἐμπεδοκλέους δαίμονες, "genii illi Empedoclis, Deorum ira impulsi, ac cœlo deturbati;" and takes the occasion to recite some verses of Empedocles, in which these demons are described as exposed to the greatest hardships both by land and sea.

[2] I have given these verses a little above from Plutarch, to which may be added those I have just spoken of, which are extant in the same author, De Vitando Ære Alieno, tom. 2. opp. p. 830. Mention is also made of this opinion of Empedocles concerning demons and souls in Stobæus, Eclog. Phys. lib. 1. p. 112.

[3] These verses are cited by Aristotle, Rhetoricor. lib. 1. cap. 13. p. 737. tom. 3. opp. But if the fact were not otherwise evident, it would be more than difficult to deduce from this passage, that Empedocles supposed the whole human race to be bound by a certain universal justice, which neither time, nor chance, nor anything else can change. For as is manifest from Aristotle, these verses do not treat of justice generally, but of that only which he makes Empedocles to hold as justice, that animals are not to be put to death. Aristotle lays it down, that there is a certain eternal law proceeding from nature itself, immutable and unwritten by men, of which that may be predicated which Empedocles formerly left on record respecting his precept of not taking away animal life: Καὶ ὡς Ἐμπεδοκλῆς λέγει περὶ τοῦ μὴ κτείνειν τὸ ἔμψυχον· τοῦτο γὰρ οὐ τισὶ μὲν δίκαιον, τισὶ δὲ οὐ δίκαιον, "Et ut Empedocles dicit de non interficiendo quod animatum est: id enim non quibusdam quidem justum est, quibusdam vero non justum." Then follow the verses here quoted by Cudworth. I would not assert, that Empedocles did not acknowledge a natural and eternal justice which all are bound to obey. This, I know, has been done by Gassendus, Comm. ad Librum 10. Diogenis Laërtii, tom. 5. opp. p. 158. who says: "Præterea Empedoclem justa et injusta νόμῳ, lege definientem;" but he cites no authority for his opinion. All I contend for is, that the fact cannot easily be proved from these verses.

[4] It remains for us to see, whether this defence of Empedocles against Aristotle stands upon firmer grounds than the one above. I. The learned doctor denies the statement of Aristotle, that Empedocles held the soul to be compounded of the four elements. But this I wonder at in a man, who had learnt all that remains to us of ancient records almost by heart. Can we suppose him to have overlooked Empedocles' own verses, in which this opinion is avowed and which are extant not only in Aristotle, De Anima, lib. 1. cap. 2. p. 5. tom. 2. opp. and Metaphys. lib. 2. cap. 4., p. 281. tom. 4. opp. but also in Sextus Empiricus, Chalcidius, and other ancient authors? II. He considers it evident, that Aristotle attributed this opinion to Empedocles without cause or reason, from his having included Plato in the same charge, who, he tells us, was notoriously free from it. But could any one who had studied Plato with as much zeal as Dr. Cudworth, be ignorant that Plato in his Timæus openly espouses the opinion of

But what then shall we say to those other things, which Empedocles is charged with by Aristotle, that seem to have so rank a smell of atheism? Certainly those mongrel and biform animals, that are said to have sprung up out of the earth by chance, look as if they were more akin to Democritus than Empedocles; and probably it is the fault of the copies, that it is read otherwise, there being no other philosopher that I know of, that could ever find any such thing in Empedocles' poems.[5] But

Timæus, De Anima Mundi, p. 506. edit. Galei. that the soul of the world, which he makes our souls to resemble, is compounded *of the same*, i. e., *of the divine essence*, and *of what is different*, i. e., as Simplicius rightly explains it, of the first elements of things, sec. 19. p. 242, and that he plainly asserts this to be the reason, why the soul knows and understands things falling under the senses, sec. 20. p. 244. Nor is that disowned by Simplicus, Chalcidius, and other interpreters of Plato, who cannot easily be accused of bearing him any ill will. "Plato," says Chalcidius on the Timæus Platon. sec. 51. p. 298. "animam ex omnibus initiis conflat, ut et ipsorum initiorum, et quæ initia sequuntur, et prorsus omnium rerum existentium scia esset ac de omnibus judicaret." What more, I ask, can be wanted? I shall not produce the passage of Simplicius testifying the same. It is cited by Ismaël Bullialdus, in his notes on Ptolemæus De Principatu Animæ, p. 115. The dogma quoted by Aristotle: ὅμοια ὁμοίοις γιγνώσκεσθαι, I do not indeed remember to have read in Plato; but if we find the thing itself there, why should we quarrel about words? Moreover there are others also besides Aristotle, who have attributed the same to him; among these Sextus Empiricus, lib. 1. contra Mathemat. cap. 13. sec. 303. p. 283. who, after stating this dogma of the physiologers: *similia similibus cognosci*, to be very ancient, adds, that it seems to have been derived from Pythagoras and is extant also in Plato's Timæus: Κεῖται μὲν καὶ παρὰ Πλάτωνι ἐν Τιμαίῳ. I pass over Chalcidius, who likewise calls it a Pythagoric dogma, In Timæum, sec. 50. p. 298, Simplicius, and others to the same effect. Simplicius, indeed, argues that Plato understood it differently from Empedocles, and his opinion is adopted by Bullialdus, on Ptolemæus, p. 115.; but if our limits would permit, it might easily be shown, that Pythagoras and Plato, and all the ancients who followed their precepts, cannot have thought otherwise of the faculties of the soul, than as, we are told, Empedocles thought. III. He observes, that according to Empedocles souls continually migrate into new bodies, that they are sent down into these bodies on account of sins, and that those who have lived a just and pious life will be admitted after death to the banquets of the gods; that there are also demons, and that these are persecuted by divine justice or Nemesis for crimes formerly committed; and lastly, that there is a certain universal justice granted to all mankind. None of these shall I call into question; for what can be certain, if we are allowed to set aside the testimony of so many of the ancients. I deny, however, the inference of the learned Doctor, that Aristotle was in error when he stated that Empedocles held the soul to be compounded of the elements. The dogma, as I shall presently show, is not of that nature, that no one could believe in these things who entertained it.

[5] Here again the learned Doctor oversteps the mark in his vindication of Empedocles. If no ancient author, except Aristotle, had stated that Empedocles held this absurd notion respecting the monstrous birth of animals, there might perhaps be some probability in his suspicion, that the copies of Aristotle are corrupted. But others record the same as Aristotle; among whom I instance Plutarch, Adv. Colotem, t. 2. opp. p. 1123. the more willingly, because he elsewhere in the very same book strenuously defends Empedocles; and to remove at once all ground for doubt, the philosopher's verses themselves are still extant, wherein he clearly puts forth this opinion. They are preserved by Ælian, De Natura Animalium, lib. 16. cap. 29. and are as follows:

Πολλὰ μὲν ἀμφιπρόσωπα καὶ ἀμφίστερνα φύεσθαι,
Βουγενῆ, ἀνδρόπρωρα, τὰ δὲ ἔμπαλιν ἐξανατέλλειν
Ἀνδροφυῆ, βούκρανα, μεμιγμένα τῇ μὲν ὑπ' ἀνδρῶν,
Τῇ δὲ γυναικοφυῆ σκιεροῖς ἠσκημένα γυίοις.

for the rest, if Aristotle do not misrepresent Empedocles, as he often doth Plato, then it must be granted, that he being a mechanical physiologer, as well as theologer, did something too much indulge to fortuitous mechanism; which seems to be an extravagancy, that mechanical philosophers and Atomists have been always more or less subject to. But Aristotle doth not charge Empedocles with resolving all things into fortuitous mechanism, as some philosophers have done of late, who yet pretend to be Theists and Incorporealists, but only that he would explain some things in that way. Nay, he clearly puts a difference between Empedocles and the Democritic Atheists in these words subjoined:[6] Εἰσὶ δὲ τινὲς, &c., which is as if he should have said, "Empedocles resolved some things in the fabric and structure of animals into fortuitous mechanism; but there are certain other philosophers, namely Leucippus and Democritus, who would have all things whatsoever in the whole world, heaven and earth and animals, to be made by chance and the fortuitous motion of atoms, without a Deity." It seems very plain, that Empedocles' Philia and Neikos,[7] his friendship and discord, which he makes to be the ἀρχὴ δραστήριος, "the active cause," and principle of motion in the universe, was a certain plastic power, superior to fortuitous mechanism; and Aristotle himself acknowledges somewhere as much. And Plutarch tells us,[8] that, according to Empedocles, the order and system of the world is not the result of material causes and fortuitous mechanism, but of a divine wisdom, assigning to every thing οὐκ ἣν ἡ φύσις δίδωσι χώραν, ἀλλ' ἣν ἡ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν ἔργον ποθεῖ σύνταξις, "not such a place as nature would give it, but such as is most convenient for the good of the whole." Simplicius,[9] who had read Empedocles, acquaints us, that he made

> Multa genus duplex referunt animalia membris
> Pectore vel capite aut alio, sic ut videatur
> Ante viri retroque boves forma aut vice versa.
> In pecore humanæ quondam vestigia formæ:
> Insunt et pecoris humano in corpore contra.

I feel grateful to the illustrious scholar Jo. Alb. Fabricius, for having pointed my attention to this passage.

[6] Aristotle, Physicor. lib. 2. cap. 4. p. 470. t. 1. opp. after stating, that Empedocles in his physiological system now and then ascribed something to chance and fortune, thus proceeds: Εἰσὶ δέ τινες, οἳ καὶ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ τοῦδε καὶ τῶν κοσμικῶν πάντων αἰτιῶνται τὸ αὐτόματον· ἀπὸ ταυτομάτου γὰρ γίγνεσθαί φασι τὴν δίνην καὶ τὴν κίνησιν. These words are translated by Dr. Cudworth, as if mention was made in them of atoms, as also of Leucippus and Democritus. But nothing of the kind is to be met with in this passage of Aristotle.

[7] On these, see what we have discussed, ch. 4. sect. 6.

[8] Plutarch's words, quoted a little after, occur in his Sympos. lib. 1. quæst. 2. p. 618, to which he subjoins some verses of Empedocles; but it would be difficult to establish from hence, that the opinion put forth in these words was held by Empedocles.

[9] Comm. ad. Arist. Libros Physicor. p. 74. b. ed. Græcæ Aldinæ. But it is the part of a wise man to be slow in giving credence to what the later Platonists have

two worlds, the one intellectual, the other sensible; and the former of these to be the exemplar and archetype of the latter. And so the writer De Placitis Philosophorum observes:[10] that Empedocles made δύο ἡλίους, τὸν μὲν ἀρχέτυπον, τὸν δὲ φαινόμενον, "two suns, the one archetypal and intelligible, the other apparent or sensible."

But I need take no more pains to purge Empedocles from those two imputations of corporealism and atheism, since he hath so fully confuted them himself in those fragments of his still extant. First, by expressing such a hearty resentment of the excellency of piety, and the wretchedness and sottishness of atheism in these verses:

Ὄλβιος ὃς θείων πραπίδων ἐκτήσατο πλοῦτον,
Δειλὸς δ' ᾧ σκοτόεσσα θεῶν πέρι δόξα μέμηλεν.[1]

To this sense: "He is happy who hath his mind richly fraught and stored with the treasures of divine knowledge; but he miserable whose mind is darkened as to the belief of a God." And secondly, by denying God to have any human form or members,

Οὐ μὲν γὰρ βροτεῇ κεφαλῇ κατὰ γυῖα κίκασται, &c.[2]

Or otherwise to be corporeal,

Οὐκ ἔστιν πελάσασθ' οὐδ' ὀφθαλμοῖσιν ἐφικτὸν
Ἡμετέροις, ἢ χερσὶ λαβεῖν.[3]

recorded of the ancient philosophers and their principles. For, as I shall probably show more at length elsewhere, they are accustomed frequently, in violation of all truth, to drag the whole body of them to their own side of the question.

[10] Lib. 2. cap. 20. p. 900. t. 2. opp. Here something might be said touching this opinion of Empedocles, which is widely different from that of Plato concerning the ἥλιος νοητός; but I fear I shall appear to many to have already exceeded due limits.

[1] These verses occur in Clemens Alexandrin. Stromat. lib. 5. cap. 14. p. 733. Our excellent author by his version would persuade his readers, that in them Empedocles is extolling piety towards God and reprobating the blindness of those who deny his existence. But it is evident, he is proclaiming the happiness of those who use the pure light of reason and deploring the misery of such as are loaded with superstition; which indeed is a very different interpretation. Nor did Clemens understand Empedocles otherwise.

[2] This verse is cited by Jo. Tzetzes Chiliad. 13. Hist. 464. v. 80. and Ammonius, Comm. in Aristot. Περὶ Ἑρμηνείας, fol. 107. edit. Aldinæ. In the same authors will be found those which follow a little after: Ἀλλὰ φρὴν ἱερὴ, κ. τ. λ.

[3] These are preserved in Clemens Alexandr. Stromat. lib. 5. p. 694. It is manifest therefore, that the learned Doctor has laboured to no purpose in repelling from Empedocles the opinions ascribed to him by Aristotle. It remains for us to see, whether these dogmas are of that character, that Empedocles cannot consequently be ranked among the number of those, who confess the existence of a God and deny souls to perish. I am aware, that Theophilus of Antioch, Ad Autolycum lib. 3. cap. 2. p. 272. long ago charged Empedocles with the grossest impiety towards God, and that men the most learned have followed his example. But on considering the whole matter, and carefully examining all that remains to us of that philosopher's poems, I am led to dissent from this judgment. Either we must reject the fragments of Empedocles altogether or we must own, that he held the existence of an eternal and transcendent substance, distinct and separate from the corporeal mass which we inhabit, from which

And then positively affirming what he is,

Ἀλλὰ φρὴν ἱερὴ καὶ ἀσθέσφατος ἔπλετο μοῦνον,
Φροντίσι κόσμον ἅπαντα καταΐσσουσα θοῇσιν.

"Only a holy and ineffable mind, that by swift thoughts agitates the whole world."

substance our souls are derived. I would not say, that there are not some points in his doctrines, from which inferences might be drawn highly injurious to the Deity. But I have for some time thought it hardly fair to charge upon these ancient philosophers all that we at this day consider to be mixed up with their opinions. If it were right to proceed in this way, no one either of the ancients or moderns will be accounted innocent, who has philosophized a little more freely than the generality are accustomed to do. But that Empedocles might have asserted all that Dr. Cudworth is so anxious to purge him from, and still not denied either a God or the eternity of souls notwithstanding, will be most clearly shown by giving a digest of his opinions on things divine and briefly explaining them in their order. I. He held two eternal principles of things, God or a substance most wise and most powerful, and matter. Whether he divested God of all concretion, I shall not now inquire. II. He divided matter into the most minute corpuscles, but endowed with contrary qualities, friendship and discord. III. Friendship and discord first caused the four elements to combine, from which all other things were afterwards formed. IV. Nevertheless nature and the virtue inherent in it were unable of themselves to produce animals altogether perfect and entire. Hence at first, monsters sprung up most foul and misshapen. V. But God aided the weak efforts of nature and by his power placed all things in their proper order, which before lay in confusion, and gave to men, plants, and animals the form they now have. VI. In every animal there is a two-fold soul, one sentient, the other intelligent and rational. VII. The sentient soul or ψυχὴ is composed of the four elements, with the addition of friendship and discord. Hence it comes to pass, that it can perceive external things. VIII. But the rational soul is sent from God himself into the body of man, to expiate sins which it has committed. IX. As having proceeded from God himself, it possesses conceptions of divine things and understands and contemplates of itself things cognizable to reason. X. The sentient soul, on the dissolution of the body, returns again into the elements it came from. XI. But the rational soul migrates into various bodies, until it is purged of every stain.—If we apply this rule in reading the verses of Empedocles and in examining the statements of the ancients respecting him, I am certain, we shall find less obscurity in both, than is done by most men, and shall not be always exclaiming against the inconsistency of the ancients in the accounts they give of his opinions. Above all, the dogma of man's double soul completely reconciles Empedocles with himself and puts an end at once to the difficulties, which the learned Doctor has been at such pains in endeavouring to remove by a different course. Undoubtedly, if we consider what the philosopher maintained concerning souls, he does appear to be inconsistent. He clearly held that souls are sent into these bodies from God, that they pass from time to time into new bodies, and finally, that they go from hence to the celestial abodes and the mansions of the blessed. Now these cannot be the principles of any man, who does not deny the annihilation of souls after death. But he also supposed the soul to be compounded of the four elements, considered knowledge to be a kind of sense, and lastly made the blood to be the seat of the mind; as is evident indeed from Stobæus, Eclog. Phys. p. 131. from Chalcidius, In Timæum Platonis cap. 226. p. 356. from Cicero and others. And what, I ask, does this prove, except that he held souls to be mortal? Hence it is, that ancient authors, who have touched upon Empedocles' opinion concerning the soul, are wonderfully at issue; some declaring him to have held souls to be mortal, others to be immortal. But all the discrepancy is cleared away, if we suppose him to have held a two-fold soul in man and animals; in which supposition there is nothing at variance with the principles and doctrines of the ancient philosophers, most of whom, it is well known, have distinguished between νοῦς and ψυχὴ and have given us more souls than one. It is probable, indeed, that Plato himself attributed to a man, not three parts of one soul, as many contend, but three souls altogether distinct in their nature. See Galen, De Decretis Platon. et Hippocr. lib. 6. cap. 2. t. 1. opp. f. 523. Can any one wonder, then, that Empedocles should have entertained this opinion, the philosophy of which is at least closely allied to that inculcated by Plato?

XXV. And now we shall speak something also of Anaxagoras, having showed before, that he was a spurious Atomist. For he likewise agreed with the other Atomists in this, that he asserted incorporeal substance in general as the active cause and principle of motion in the universe, and particularly an incorporeal Deity distinct from the world; affirming that there was, besides atoms, νοῦς ὁ διακοσμῶν τε καὶ πάντων αἴτιος, (as it is expressed in Plato[4]) "an ordering and disposing mind, that was the cause of all things." Which mind (as Aristotle tells us[5]) he made to be μόνον τῶν ὄντων ἁπλοῦν καὶ ἀμιγῆ καὶ καθαρόν, "the only simple, unmixed, and pure thing in the world." And he supposed this to be that, which brought the confused chaos of omnifarious atoms into that orderly compages of the world that now is.

XXVI. And by this time we have made it evident, that those atomical physiologers, that were before Democritus and Leucippus, were all of them Incorporealists; joining theology and pneumatology, the doctrine of incorporeal substance and a Deity, together with their atomical physiology. This is a thing expressly noted concerning Ecphantus the Pythagorean in Stobæus:[6] Ἐκφαντος ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἀτόμων συνεστάναι τὸν κόσμον, διοικεῖσθαι δὲ ἀπὸ προνοίας, "Ecphantus held the corporeal world to consist of atoms, but yet to be ordered and governed by a divine providence:" that is, he joined atomology and theology both together. And the same is also observed of Arcesilas, or perhaps Archelaus, by Sidonius Apollinaris:[7]*

[4] Phædo, p. 293. opp.

[5] De Anima, lib. 1. cap. 2. p. 6. t. 2. opp. Other passages of the ancients, stating the same thing of Anaxagoras, are collected together and elucidated by Bayle, Dictionnaire Histor. et Crit. t. 1. artic. Anaxagoras, not. d. p. 208.

[6] Eclog. Phys. lib. 1. cap. 25. p. 48.

[7] Carm, 15. In Epithalamio Polemi et Araneolæ v. 94. p. 152. ed. Savaronis. That Archelaus should be read in this passage for Arcesilaus had already been noticed by Gassendus, Physic. sect. 1. lib. 3. cap. 5. p. 257. t. 1. opp.; and that the passage will admit of no other reading is sufficiently shown by what follows:

——————— Socratica post hunc
Secta micat.

For Arcesilaus lived long after Socrates' time, whereas Archelaus is said to have been his preceptor; which if Bayle had borne in mind, he would not have accused Sidonius of a manifest error in his dates, Dictionnaire t. 1. artic. Archelaus, not. o. p. 286. These two names Archelaus and Arcesilaus are not unfrequently interchanged in the Latin versions of Greek authors.

* The copious and learned arguments of Dr. Cudworth in this place, to show that some of the ancient philosophers maintained the existence of simple and incorporeal substances, might, in many respects, be enlarged upon and made matter of discussion. I shall content myself with a few observations, which may clear the way for more elaborate comment by others. I. It is beyond all doubt, that not a few of the ancients made use of the words νοῦς and ἀσώματος and attributed a certain simplicity to God as well as to the souls of men. Many noted passages to that effect are extant in addition to the authorities given by the worthy Doctor. Ocellus Lucanus, a very ancient author, Περὶ τῆς τοῦ παντὸς φύσεως cap. 2. p. 519. ed. Galei, says: Αἱ δὲ δυνάμεις οὔτε φθείρονται, οὔτε γίνονται· λόγοι γὰρ ἈΣΩΜΑΤΟΙ τυγχάνουσι τούτων, "Facultates vero nec oriuntur, neque occidunt: siquidem

Post hos Arcesilaus divinâ mente paratam
Conjicit hanc molem, confectam partibus illis,
Quas atomos vocat ipse leves.

Now, I say, as Ecphantus and Archelaus asserted the corporeal world to be made of atoms, but yet notwithstanding held an incor-

ipsarum rationes corporis sunt expertes." Lucian ridiculing the controversies of philosophers says, that some gave God a body, others divested him of all body and form: Ἔτι δὲ οἱ μὲν ΑΣΩΜΑΤΟΝ καὶ ἀμορφον ἡγοῦντο εἶναι τὸ θεῖον, οἱ δὲ ὡς περὶ σώματος διενοοῦντο, in his Icaro-Menippus t. 2. opp. p. 122. Cato in Cicero De Senectute says of the soul: "Sic mihi persuasi, cum simplex animi sit natura, neque in se habeat quidquam admistum dispar sui atque dissimile, non posse eum dividi," cap. 21. p. 3754. t. 10. opp. II. But not to mention, that many who speak of things accessible only to reason and intellect, mean merely the notions or forms of things, which Plato calls ideas, and not certain self-existent substances, it appears very doubtful, whether that which the ancients termed *ἀσώματον* and incorporeal, was intended to be such as what we call *spiritual* and *spirit*. Certainly many things seem to show, that that very thing, which they supposed to be immaterial, was considered by them to consist of particles, although certainly the most subtile. Nor can it be unknown to any one, who has carefully sifted the opinions of the ancients, that they supposed a twofold kind of matter, one dissipable, the other incapable of change; the first of which, however, they alone strictly called ὕλη or matter. Our learned author indeed thinks, that those who denied souls to perish, ought necessarily to have divested them of all concretion: but although we reason thus now-a-days,—whatever has parts must necessarily be dissolved and perish; yet that the ancients argued differently and did not consider, that all things which have parts can also be divided and perish, many statements of theirs sufficiently prove. It is the custom with a great many, to believe the ancients to have attached the same ideas to words, that we do at this day, and to take for granted, that the old philosophers followed the same laws and principles in their reasoning as ourselves: hence they altogether remodel those philosophers and present them before us, not such as they really were, but such as they would have been, had they been educated in our schools. III. Lest any one should suppose this to be said without foundation, I shall adduce a passage from Cicero, wherein he clearly expounds the opinion of Plato and Aristotle concerning nature: "De natura autem ita dicebant, ut eam dividerent in res duas: ut altera esset efficiens, altera autem, quasi huic se præbens, ea quæ efficeretur aliquid. In eo, quod efficeret, vim esse censebant: in eo autem, quod efficeretur, materiam quamdam: *in utroque tamen utrumque:* neque enim materiam ipsam cohærere potuisse, si nulla vi contineretur, *neque vim sine aliqua materia. Nihil est enim, quod non alicubi cogatur,*" Academ. Quæst. lib. 1. cap. 6. p. 2231. t. 8. opp. We here see, that the ancient philosophers attributed matter to the efficient causes of all things, and thought, that nothing can exist without body. The reason of this opinion is supplied by Cicero: Whatever is, and exists, must necessarily be in some place; but nothing can be in place, except what is corporeal; therefore, if there are efficient causes, they must necessarily be corporeal; which is the substance of Cicero's words: "Nihil est enim, quod non alicubi esse cogatur." Is this then to deny, that there are not such substances as cannot be circumscribed in certain places? I shall add another passage of his, from which it is evident, that what the ancients call *simple* is very different from that which we call so or which we term without parts and *spiritual:* "Tenemusne, quid animus sit? tresne habeat partes, ut Platoni placuit,—an *simplex* unusque sit? si *simplex*, utrum sit ignis, an anima, an sanguis?" Academ. Quæst. lib. 4. cap. 30. p. 2321. t. 8. opp. Can the soul then be *simple*, and yet be either *fire or blood*, which no one denies to consist of particles? So certainly Cicero in this passage; who calls that simple which is compounded of homogeneous parts. Take a third quotation, which completely decides the matter. It is extracted from that passage, in which Cicero is censuring those who profess themselves unable to understand, what is meant by a soul without body. "Nequeunt," says he, "qualis animus sit vacans corpore, intelligere et cogitatione comprehendere. Quasi vero intelligant, qualis sit in ipso corpore, *quæ conformatio, quæ magnitudo, qui locus,*" Tusculan. Disp. lib. 1. cap. 22. p. 2594. t. 8. opp. Here Cicero finds fault with those, who deny the soul to be without body, and nevertheless attributes to the soul conformation, magnitude and place, which are affections of body and of concrete things. What can be plainer, therefore, than that those of the ancients, who

poreal Deity distinct from the same, as the first principle of activity in it: so in like manner did all the other ancient Atomists generally, before Democritus, join theology and incorporealism with their atomical physiology. They did atomize as well as he, but they did not atheize; but that atheistical atomology was a thing first set on foot afterward by Leucippus and Democritus.

XXVII. But because many seem to be so strongly possessed with this prejudice, as if atheism were a natural and necessary appendix to atomism,[8] and therefore will conclude, that the same persons could not possibly be Atomists and Incorporealists or Theists, we shall further make it evident, that there is not only no inconsistency betwixt the atomical physiology and theology, but also that there is, on the contrary, a most natural cognation between them.

term God and souls simple and incorporeal, do not for that reason necessarily deny parts of souls or divest God and mind of all matter, but leave to them a certain form, place, and magnitude. I could adduce more ample proof of what I have advanced from Plato, Aristotle, and the later Platonists, but my limits warn me to be brief. On this account also, I have preferred giving the elegant Latin words of Cicero, rather than Greek passages, to be followed by a Latin version. I should recommend, however, those who cannot assent to all this, to bear in mind the Platonic soul as consisting of parts, and to read Chalcidius, In Timæum Platonis, cap. 136. p. 331. Let me add what is noted below from Aristotle on ch. 4. sect. 24. not. 19. as also this passage of the same philosopher from lib. 1. De Anima, cap. 2. p. 7. t. 2. opp. Ὁρίζονται δὲ πάντες τὴν ψυχὴν τρίσιν, κινήσει, αἰσθήσει, ΤΩ ΑΣΩΜΑΤΩ, "Omnes tribus animam constare præcipiunt, motu, sensu, et corporis vacuitate." Here the Stagirite says, that all philosophers hold the soul to be incorporeal. Hence the ancients called God light, incorporeal and yet material: see Beausobre, Hist. des Manich. p. 469. Nevertheless, in this very chapter, in which he recounts the various opinions of philosophers concerning the soul, he tells us, that some held it to be fire, others air, others number, others a substance compounded of all the elements. Which two statements can never be reconciled, unless we suppose the ἀσώματος of the ancients to have been something widely different from that which is now called so by us. If our space permitted, this might be further confirmed from his books De Anima: see Beausobre as above p. 482. Meanwhile I would not be understood as supposing, that no one of the ancients ever lighted upon the notion, which at this day we have before us, when we employ the words *mind*, *spirit*, *simple*, and the like. I can easily persuade myself, that they were not all so hostile to sound reason, as to imagine souls to be immortal and yet not destitute of form and magnitude. All I mean is this, that those who read the works of ancient authors and meet with the words νοῦς, ἀσώματος, simplex, corpore vacans, ἁπλοῦς, καθαρὸς, &c., therein, should take care not necessarily to consider them as conveying the same idea as that which we attach to them in reference to God, souls, and things divine.

[8] In Dr. Cudworth's time, indeed, many of the learned men of Great Britain were apprehensive, lest those who endeavoured to refer all things to corpuscles or atoms should sap the very foundations of religion. In which opinion they were not a little strengthened by the example of Hobbes, who seemed to pervert this doctrine to the furtherance of impiety. Out of many I shall give the testimony of two, neither of whom can be suspected of superstition or weakness of mind in other respects. One is William Harvey, who in his book De Generatione Animal. Exerc. 10. p. 56. asserts, that those, "qui ex atomis omnia componant, divinum illud efficiens et Naturæ Numen non agnoscere, sed divino architecto honorem derogare:" the other Meric Casaubon, who, in his notes on Diogenes Laërtius, t. 1. p. 512. amongst other things indignantly objected against atomism, says: "Stent, per me licet, aut cadant atomi.—At Epicureorum tum veterum tum recentiorum (qui nimis multi) sententiam ridiculam, insanam, impiam—quis ferat, cui pietatis aliquis sensus aut sanioris vel mica judicii?" It is evident, therefore, what made Cudworth so anxious here to clear and defend those, who embraced the atomic physiology.

And this we shall do two manner of ways; first, by inquiring into the origin of this philosophy, and considering what grounds or principles of reason they were, which first led the ancients into this atomical or mechanical way of physiologizing. And secondly, by making it appear, that the intrinsical constitution of this physiology is such, that whosoever entertains it, if he do but thoroughly understand it, must of necessity acknowledge, that there is something else in the world besides body.

First, therefore, this atomical physiology seems to have had its rise and origin from the strength of reason, exerting its own inward active power and vigour, and thereby bearing itself up against the prejudices of sense, and at length prevailing over them, after this manner. The ancients considering and revolving the ideas of their own minds, found that they had a clear and distinct conception of two things, as the general heads and principles of whatsoever was in the universe; the one whereof was passive matter, and the other active power, vigour, and virtue. To the latter of which belongs both cogitation, and the power of moving matter, whether by express consciousness or no. Both which together may be called by one general name of life; so that they made these two general heads of being or entity, passive matter or bulk, and self-activity or life. The former of these was commonly called by the ancients the τὸ πάσχον, "that which suffers and receives," and the latter the τὸ ποιοῦν, "the active principle"; and the τὸ ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις, "that from whence motion springs." "In rerum natura," saith Cicero[9] according to the general sense of the ancients, "duo quærenda sunt; unum, quæ materia sit, ex qua quæque res efficiatur; alterum, quæ res sit quæ quicque efficiat: There are two things to be inquired after in nature; one, what is the matter out of which every thing is made; another, what is the active cause or efficient." To the same purpose Seneca;[1] "Esse debet aliquid unde fiat, deinde à quo fiat; hoc est causa, illud materia: There must be something out of which a thing is made, and then something by which it is made; the latter is properly the cause, and the former the matter." Which is to be understood of corporeal things and their differences, that there

[9] De Finibus Bonor. et Malorum, lib. 1. cap. 6. p. 2346. t. 8. opp. where the reading however is not, "quæ res sit," but, "quæ vis sit." The same is inculcated by Cicero in other passages more clearly than in this. See Quæst. Academ. lib. 1. cap. 2. p. 2221. where he says: "Nostra tu physica nosti, quæ contineantur ex effectione et ex materia ea, quam fingit et format effectio." Add cap. 6. p. 2231. which even surpasses the others in perspicuity. In these passages, however, Cicero does not so much put forth his own opinion as that of the ancient philosophers, which certainly gives not a little authority to what he says.

[10] The passage of Seneca, given only in part by Dr. Cudworth, deserves to be written out entire. "Dicunt," says he, "Stoici nostri, duo esse in rerum natura, ex quibus omnia fiant, causam et materiam. Materia jacet iners, res ad omnia parata, cessatura, si nemo moveat. Causa autem, id est, ratio, materiam format et, quocumque vult, versat, ex illa varia opera producit. Esse debet ergo," &c. Epistola 65. t. 2. opp. p. 160.

must be both matter, and an active power, for the production of them. And so also that of Aristotle:[1] Οὔσης αἰτίας μιᾶς μὲν, ὅθεν τὴν ἀρχὴν ἢ εἶναί φαμεν τῆς κινήσεως, μιᾶς δὲ τῆς ὕλης, "That, from whence the principle of motion is, is one cause, and the matter is another." Where Aristotle gives that name of cause to the matter also, though others did appropriate it to the active power. And the writer de Placitis Philosophorum[2] expresses this as the general sense of the ancients: Ἀδύνατον ἀρχὴν μίαν ὕλην τῶν ὄντων, ἐξ ἧς τὰ πάντα ὑποστῆναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν αἴτιον χρὴ ὑποτιθέναι, οἷον οὐκ ἄργυρος ἀρκεῖ πρὸς τὸ ἔκπωμα γενέσθαι, ἂν μὴ καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν ᾖ, τουτέστιν ὁ ἀργυροκόπος, ὁμοίως καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ χαλκοῦ, καὶ τοῦ ξύλου, καὶ τῆς ἄλλης ὕλης, "It is impossible, that matter alone should be the sole principle of all

[1] Physicor. lib. 2. cap. 3. p. 463. t. 1. opp. Aristotle, however, asserts the same in more passages than one and censures the ancient philosophers, who descanted upon matter alone and neglected an efficient cause. See Metaphys. lib. 1. cap. 3. p. 264. t. 4. opp.

[2] Lib. 1. cap. 3. p. 876. t. 1. opp. But I do not see, that this opinion is brought forward by the author of this book as being assented to by all the ancients. On the contrary, he remarks in this passage, that a different one was entertained by Anaximenes, whom he is refuting in the very words here quoted. As to the rest, the learned Doctor might have cited a much more ancient supporter of this doctrine than all those he has adduced, namely, Ocellus Lucanus, a noted Pythagorean, who commences cap. 2. of his book: Περὶ παντὸς φύσεως, p. 515, with these words: Ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐν τῷ παντὶ τὸ μέν τοι γένεσις, τὸ δὲ αἰτία γενέσεως· καὶ γένεσις μέν, ὅπου μεταβολὴ καὶ ἔκβασις τῶν ὑποκειμένων, αἰτία δὲ γενέσεως, ὅπου ταυτότης τοῦ ὑποκειμένου· φανερὸν, ὅτι περὶ μὲν τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς γενέσεως τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ κινεῖν ἐστι, περὶ δὲ τὸ δεχόμενον τὴν γένεσιν τὸ γε πάσχειν καὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι, "Verum quum in universo duæ existant res, quarum altera generatio, altera generationis habetur causa: ac generatio quidem ea esse videatur, in qua res ipsæ mutantur, et id, quod sunt, esse desinunt; generationis vero causa, ubi subjecta res eadem servatur et permanet: hanc sane efficiendi et movendi, illam vero accipiendi et patiendi vim habere, perspicuum est." But what need is there to show by testimonies and authorities the antiquity of an opinion, which is so commonly to be met with in the writings of those ancients, who impugned the arguments of Democritus and Epicurus? I should onsider it much more useful to know, that the ancients who spoke of an efficient cause did not all, as Cudworth seems to persuade himself, mean to point out a certain self-existent substance or a power endowed with reason and intelligence, much less to designate God by these words or a plastic nature obedient to the command of God. Even the passage of Cicero, quoted by us a little above from Academ. Quæst. lib. 1. cap. 6. p. 2231. shows, that the ancients thought far differently of their efficient cause from what we usually conceive of God and of essences proceeding by system and reason. Many of the ancients, it is manifest, imagined a certain power to be inherent in matter and necessarily connected with it, not acting of its own free will, but bound by the law of fate, and to this they referred the origin and causes of all things. But how widely this differs from what we understand by efficient causes, must be self-evident. That generative power so pompously held forth by Aristotle, which he is indignant at the older philosophers for having been too niggardly in extolling, is, after all things are considered, a most obscure and mysterious faculty, which he fancied, it would seem, to have been excited in matter by the influence of the stars. In short, if we interpret ancient authors, especially Aristotle, by our own notions, nothing sometimes is more sublime, more wise, or more consistent than they are: but if we explain the meanings of words from Aristotle himself, if we inquire what he called *distinct from body, without parts, efficient cause*, and *nature*, and finally, if we attentively examine the whole combination of his doctrine, we shall find reason for changing our opinion and for ranking him far below the level of truly wise men.

things, but there must of necessity be supposed also an agent or efficient cause: as silver alone is not sufficient to make a cup, unless there be an artificer to work upon it. And the same is to be said concerning brass, wood, and other natural bodies."

Now as they apprehended a necessity of these two principles, so they conceived them to be such, as could not be confounded together into one and the same thing or substance, they having such distinct ideas and essential characters from one another; the Stoics being the only persons who, offering violence to their own apprehensions, rudely and unskilfully attempted to make these two distinct things to be one and the same substance. Wherefore as the first of these, viz. matter, or passive extended bulk, is taken by all for substance, and commonly called by the name of body; so the other, which is far the more noble of the two, being that which acts upon the matter, and hath a commanding power over it, must needs be substance too, of a different kind from matter or body; and therefore immaterial or incorporeal substance. Neither did they find any other entity to be conceivable, besides these two, passive bulk or extension, which is corporeal substance, and internal self-activity or life, which is the essential character of substance incorporeal; to which latter belongs not only cogitation, but also the power of moving body.

Moreover, when they further considered the first of these, the material or corporeal principle, they being not able clearly to conceive any thing else in it, besides magnitude, figure, site, and motion or rest, which are all several modes of extended bulk, concluded therefore according to reason, that there was really nothing else existing in bodies without, besides the various complexions and conjugations of those simple elements, that is, nothing but mechanism. Whence it necessarily followed, that whatsoever else was supposed to be in bodies, was, indeed, nothing but our modes of sensation, or the fancies and passions in us begotten from them, mistaken for things really existing without us. And this is a thing so obvious, that some of those philosophers, who had taken little notice of the atomical physiology, had notwithstanding a suspicion of it; as for example, Plotinus,[3] who writing of the criterion of truth, and the power of reason, hath these words: Καὶ τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως, ἃ δὲ δοκεῖ πίστιν ἔχειν ἐναργεστάτην, ἀπιστεῖται, μήποτε οὐκ ἐν τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ἔχῃ τὴν δοκοῦσαν ὑπόστασιν, καὶ νοῦ δεῖ ἢ διανοίας τῶν κρινόντων, "Though the things of sense seem to have so clear a certainty, yet notwithstanding it is doubted concerning them, whether (the qualities of them) have any real

[3] In his book, Quod intelligibilia non sint extra intellectum, Ennead. 5. lib. 5. cap. 1. p. 520.

existence at all in the things without us, and not rather a seeming existence only, in our own passions; and there is need of mind or understanding to judge in this case, and to determine the controversy, which sense alone cannot decide." But the ancient physiologists concluded without any hesitancy, Οὐ τὸ αὐτό ἐστι τὸ μέλι τῷ γλυκάζεσθαί με, καὶ τὸ ἀψίνθιον τῷ πικράζεσθαι, "That the nature of honey in itself is not the same thing with my being sweetened, nor of wormwood with that sense of bitterness which I have from it;" Διαφέρειν δὲ τὸ πάθος τοῦ ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένου, καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις, τὰ μὲν ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενα οὐ καταλαμβάνειν, μόνα δὲ εἰ ἄρα τὰ ἑαυτῶν πάθη, "But that the passion of sense differed from the absolute nature of the thing itself without; the senses not comprehending the objects themselves, but only their own passions from them."*

I say therefore, that the ancients concluded the absolute nature of corporeal things in themselves to be nothing but a certain disposition of parts, in respect of magnitude, figure, site, and motion, which in tastes causes us to be differently affected with those senses of sweetness and bitterness, and in sight with those fancies of colours, and accordingly in the other senses with other fancies; and that the corporeal world was to be explained by these two things, whereof one is absolute in the bodies without us, the various mechanism of them; the other relative only to us, the different fancies in us, caused by the respective differences of them in themselves. Which fancies or fantastic ideas are no modes of the bodies without us, but of that only in ourselves, which is cogitative or self-active, that is, incorporeal. For the sensible ideas of hot and cold, red and green, &c., cannot be clearly conceived by us as modes of the bodies without us, but they may be easily apprehended as modes of cogitation, that is, of sensation, or sympathetical perception in us.

The result of all which was, that whatsoever is either in ourselves, or the whole world, was to be reduced to one or other of these two principles; passive matter, and extended bulk, or self-active power and virtue; corporeal or incorporeal substance; mechanism or life; or else to a complication of them both together.

XXVIII. From this general account, which we have now given of the origin of the atomical physiology, it appears, that the doctrine of incorporeal substance sprung up together with it. But this will be further manifest from that which follows. For we shall in the next place show, how this philosophy did, in

* What Greek author these words belong to, I have not been able to discover, although no pains have been spared in the search. They are certainly not extant in Plotinus; nor in Aristotle's books De Anima, and de Sensu et Sensili, wherein this argument is elaborately discussed; nor in those parts of Plato, in which he especially treats of the senses. Perhaps they are from Sextus.

especial manner, owe its original to the improvement of one particular principle of reason, over and besides all the rest; namely, that famous axiom, so much talked of amongst the ancients,

De nihilo nihil, in nihilum nil posse reverti ; [4]

That "nothing can come from nothing, nor go to nothing." For though Democritus, Epicurus, and Lucretius abused this theorem, endeavouring to carry it further than the intention of the first Atomists, to the disproving of a divine creation of any thing out of nothing by it; "Nullam rem à nihilo gigni divinitus unquam;"[5] and consequently of a Deity: yet as the meaning of it was at first confined and restrained, that "nothing of itself could come from nothing nor go to nothing," or that according to the ordinary course of nature (without an extraordinary divine power) nothing could be raised from nothing, nor reduced to nothing; it is not only an undoubted rule of reason in itself, but it was also the principal original of that atomical physiology, which, discarding forms and qualities, acknowledged really nothing else in body besides mechanism.[6]

Wherefore it was not in vain, or to no purpose, that Laërtius in the life of Democritus,[7] takes notice of this as one of his Dogmata, μηδὲν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος γίνεσθαι, μηδὲ εἰς τὸ μὴ ὂν φθείρεσθαι, "that nothing was made or generated out of nothing, nor corrupted into nothing;" this being a fundamental principle, not only of his atheism, but also of that very atomical physiology itself, which he pursued. And Epicurus, in his epistle to Herodotus,[8] plainly fetches the beginning of all his philosophy from hence: Πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι οὐδὲν γίνεται ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, καὶ οὐδὲν φθείρεται εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν. Εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐγίνετο τὸ ἐκφαινόμενον ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, πᾶν ἐκ παντὸς ἐγίνετ' ἂν, σπερμάτων γε οὐδὲν προσδεόμενον· καὶ εἰ ἐφθείρετο δὲ τὸ ἀφανιζόμενον εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν, πάντα ἂν ἀπολώλει τά πράγματα, οὐκ ὄντων τῶν εἰς ἃ διελύετο, "We fetch the beginning of our philosophy," saith he, "from hence, that nothing is made out of nothing or destroyed to nothing; for if things were made out of nothing, then every thing might be

[4] Persii Sat. 3. v. 84.

[5] Lucret. De Rerum Natura, lib. 1. v. 151.

[6] If the ancients so understood this celebrated axiom, it would be the same in sense with the well known: "Nihil fit sine causa." It is to be regretted, however, that the learned Doctor has not cited some ancient authors, who have given it this interpretation. For I must confess, I have not met with one, who has not attached a more extensive meaning to it.

[7] Lib. 9. segm. 44. p. 572.

[8] In Diogenes Laërtius, lib. 10. segm. 38, 39. p. 619. But at the beginning of this passage Dr. Cudworth has added something of his own, intending, I suppose, to make its sense more apparent. For the words: Καὶ οὐδὲν φθείρεται εἰς τὸ μὴ ὂν. Εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐγίνετο τὸ ἐκφαινόμενον ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, do not occur in Laërtius, who here speaks briefly and precisely, but are inserted by the learned Doctor for the sake, as I have said, of perspicuity.

made out of every thing, neither would there be any need of seeds. And if whatsoever is corrupted were destroyed to nothing, then all things would at length be brought to nothing." Lucretius in like manner, beginning here, insists more largely upon those grounds of reason hinted by Epicurus. And first, that nothing can be made out of nothing he proves thus:

Nam si de nihilo fierent, ex omnibus rebus
Omne genus nasci posset: nil semine egeret:
E mare primùm homines et terra posset oriri
Squamigerum genus, &c.
Nec fructus iidem arboribus constare solerent,
Sed mutarentur: ferre omnes omnia possent.
Præterea cur vere rosam, frumenta calore,
Vites autumno fundi suadente videmus? &c.
Quòd si de nihilo fierent, subitò exorerentur
Incerto spatio atque alienis partibus anni. [9]

In like manner he argues, to prove that nothing is corrupted into nothing:

Huc accedit, utì quicque in sua corpora rursum
Dissolvat natura, neque ad nihilum interimat res:
Nam si quid mortale à cunctis partibus esset,
Ex oculis res quæque repentè erepta periret.
Præterea quæcunque vetustate amovet ætas,
Si penitus perimit, consumens materiam omnem,
Unde animale genus generatim in lumina vitæ
Redducit Venus? aut redductum Dædala tellus
Unde alit atque auget? generatim pabula præbens, &c. [10]
Haud igitur penitus pereunt quæcunque videntur,
Quando aliud ex alio reficit natura; nec ullam
Rem gigni patitur, nisi morte adjutam alienâ. [1]

In which passages, though it be plain that Lucretius doth not immediately drive at atheism, and nothing else, but primarily at the establishing of a peculiar kind of atomical physiology, upon which indeed these Democritics afterward endeavoured to graft atheism; yet to take away that suspicion, we shall in the next place show, that generally the other ancient physiologers also, who were Theists, did likewise build the structure of their philosophy upon the same foundation, that "nothing can come from nothing, nor go to nothing:" as for example, Parmenides, Melissus, Zeno, Xenophanes, Anaxagoras, and Empedocles. Of Parmenides and Melissus Aristotle thus writes:[2] Οὐδὲν οὐδὲ γίνεσθαί φασιν οὐδὲ φθείρεσθαι τῶν ὄντων, "They say that no real entity is either generated or corrupted," that is, made anew out of nothing, or

[9] Lucret. lib. 1. v. 160, &c. p. 55. In the third verse for *et terra* we should read *e terra*, as it stands in the most approved copies. In the eighth, the word *suadente* seems harsh. Some read *sudante*, whether correctly or not I cannot say. These verses however, do not run on in continued order in Lucretius, but have several here and there intervening.

[10] Id. lib. v. 216. p. 67.

[1] Id. lib. 1. v. 263. p. 78.

[2] De Cœlo, lib. 3. cap. 1. p. 668. t. 1. opp.

destroyed to nothing. And Simplicius tells us,[3] that Parmenides gave a notable reason for the confirmation of this assertion, that nothing in nature could be made out of nothing: *Αἰτίαν τοῦ δεῖν πάντως ἐξ ὄντος γίνεσθαι τὸ γινόμενον, θαυμαστῶς ὁ Παρμενίδης προσέθηκεν. ὅλως γάρ φησιν, εἰ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, τίς ἡ ἀποκλήρωσις τοῦ τότε γενέσθαι, ὅτε ἐγένετο, ἀλλὰ μὴ πρότερον ἢ ὕστερον,* "Because if any thing be made out of nothing, then there could be no cause, why it should then be made, and neither sooner nor later." Again Aristotle[4] testifies of Xenophanes and Zeno, that they made this a main principle of their philosophy, *μὴ ἐνδεχέσθαι γίνεσθαι μηδὲν ἐκ μηδενός,* "that it cannot be, that any thing should be made out of nothing:" And of this Xenophanes, Sextus the philosopher tells us,[5] that he held *ὅτι εἷς καὶ ἀσώματος θεός,* "that there was but one God, and that he was incorporeal," speaking thus of him:

Εἷς θεὸς ἔν τε θεοῖσι καὶ ἀνθρώποισι μέγιστος,
Οὔτε δέμας θνητοῖσιν ὁμοίιος, οὔτε νόημα.

Aristotle[6] also writes in like manner concerning Empedocles: *Ἅπαντα ταῦτα κἀκεῖνος ὁμολογεῖ, ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἀμήχανόν ἐστι γενέσθαι, τό τε ὂν ἐξόλλυσθαι ἀνήυυτον καὶ ἄῤῥηκτον.* "Empedocles acknowledges the very same with other philosophers, that it is impossible any thing should be made out of nothing, or perish into nothing." And as for Anaxagoras, it is sufficiently known to all, that his Homœomeria, or doctrine of similar atoms, (which was a certain spurious kind of atomism) was nothing but a superstructure made upon this foundation. Besides all which, Aristotle[7] pronounces universally concerning the ancient physiologers without any exception, that they agreed in this one thing: *Περὶ ταύτης ὁμογνωμονοῦσι τῆς δόξης οἱ περὶ φύσεως, ὅτι τὸ γιγνόμενον ἐκ μὴ ὄντων γίγνεσθαι ἀδύνατον,* "The physiologers generally agree in this," laying it down for a grand foundation,

[3] Comm. in Libros Physic. Aristotel. f. 22. b. ed. Græcæ.

[4] De Xenophane, Gorgia et Zenone, cap. 1. p. 834. t. 2. opp. But Aristotle attributes this opinion to Xenophanes alone in this passage, and not to Parmenides likewise.

[5] Dr. Cudworth was here led into a mistake by Henry Stephens, who in his Poesis Philosophica, p. 36. where he states this opinion of Xenophanes concerning the Deity, and produces the verses which contain it, tells us, that he had borrowed them from Sextus the philosopher, by whom he undoubtedly means Sextus Empiricus. But though this latter writer in his Pyrrhon. Hypotypos. lib. 1. cap 33. p. 59. gives a large account of Xenophanes' opinion concerning God, yet we do not find in any part of his writings what is quoted from him by Stephens, who should have cited to that purpose Clemens Alexandrin. Stromat. lib. 5. cap. 14. p. 714. They are translated by Potter as follows:

Maximus idem hominum ac superum Deus unicus ille est,
Quem mortalis homo non mente aut corpore reddat.

[6] De Xenophane, Gorgia et Zenone, cap. 2. p. 836. t. 2. opp. The last words, however, are not Aristotle's, but those of Empedocles himself, two of whose verses Aristotle quotes.

[7] Physicor. lib. 1. cap. 5. p. 451. t. 1. opp.

"that it is impossible, that any thing should be made out of nothing." And again he calls this κοινὴν δόξαν τῶν φυσικῶν, "the common opinion of naturalists;" intimating also, that they concluded it the greatest absurdity that any physiologer could be guilty of, to lay down such principles, as from whence it would follow, that any real entity in nature did come from nothing, and go to nothing.[8]

Now it may well be supposed, that all these ancient physiologers (the most of which were also Theists) did not keep such a stir about this business for nothing; and therefore we are in the next place to show, what it was that they drove at in it. And we do affirm, that one thing, which they all aimed at, who insisted upon the forementioned principle, was the establishing some atomical physiology or other, but most of them at such as takes away all forms and qualities of bodies, (as entities really distinct from the matter and substance) and resolves all into mechanism and fancy. For it is plain, that if the forms and qualities of bodies be entities really distinct from the substance, and its various modifications, of figure, site, and motion, that then in all the changes and transmutations of nature, all the generations and alterations of body, (those forms and qualities being supposed to have no real existence any where before) something must of necessity be created or produced miraculously out of nothing; as likewise reduced into nothing in the corruptions of them, they having no being any where afterward. As for example; whenever a candle is but lighted or kindled into a flame, there must needs be a new form of fire, and new qualities of light and heat, really distinct from the matter and substance, produced of nothing, that is, created; and the same again reduced into nothing, or annihilated, when the flame is extinguished. Thus, when water is but congealed at any time into snow, hail, or ice, and when it is again dissolved; when wax is by liquefaction made soft and transparent, and changed to

[8] Not only those mentioned by Dr. Cudworth, but almost all the ancient physiologers, held nothing to be more true than this dogma: "Ex nihilo nihil fieri." Those who wish to see more passages of the ancient philosophers on this subject may consult Pet. Gassendus, Physices sect. 1. lib. 3. cap. 1. p. 232. t. 1. opp. Thom. Gatakerus, Ad Marci Antonini, lib. 4. sec. 4. p. 98, and the most learned Jac. Bruckerus in Joh. Georgii Schelhornii Amœnitat. litterar. t. 8. p. 304. Dr. Cudworth's principal aim here is to wipe off the stain of impiety from those, who maintained this axiom to be the foundation of all natural philosophy. He therefore produces those philosophers only, whose religion and piety he considered to be certain and unquestionable. Being wholly bent upon showing, that the supporters of atomism are not opposed to religion, and having laid it down that their doctrine is based upon the principle: "Ex nihilo nihil fit," he therefore thinks it necessary to undertake the defence of this also, and to prove by examples, that it was maintained by men who are free from all suspicion of being ill-affected towards the Deity. For my part, however, I am disposed to consider the whole of this vindication unnecessary; for there is no one, I am persuaded, so foolish as to assert, that the dogma could only have been held by those, who discarded God and all religion.

most of our senses; when the same kind of nourishment taken in by animals is turned into blood, milk, flesh, bones, nerves, and all the other similar parts; when that which was in the form of bright flame, appears in the form of dark smoke; and that which was in the form of vapour, in the form of rain or water, or the like: I say, that in all these mutations of bodies, there must needs be something made out of nothing. But that in all the Protean transformations of nature, which happen continually, there should be real entities thus perpetually produced out of nothing and reduced to nothing, seemed to be so great a paradox to the ancients, that they could by no means admit of it. Because, as we have already declared, first they concluded it clearly impossible by reason, that any real entity should of itself rise out of nothing; and secondly, they thought it very absurd to bring God upon the stage, with his miraculous extraordinary power, perpetually at every turn; as also, that every thing might be made out of every thing, and there would be no cause in nature for the production of one thing rather than another, and at this time rather than that, if they were miraculously made out of nothing. Wherefore they sagaciously apprehended, that there must needs be some other mystery or intrigue of nature in this business, than was commonly dreamed of, or suspected; which they concluded to be this, that in all these transformations there were no such real entities of forms and qualities distinct from the matter, and the various disposition of its parts, in respect of figure, site, and motion (as is vulgarly supposed) produced and destroyed; but that all these feats were done, either by the concretion and secretion of actually inexistent parts, or else by the different modifications of the same pre-existent matter, or the insensible parts thereof. This only being added hereunto, that from those different modifications of the small particles of bodies, (they being not so distinctly perceived by our senses) there are begotten in us certain confused phasmata or phantasmata, apparitions, fancies, and passions, as of light and colours, heat and cold, and the like, which are those things, that are vulgarly mistaken for real qualities existing in the bodies without us; whereas indeed there is nothing absolutely in the bodies themselves like to those fantastic ideas that we have of them; and yet they are wisely contrived by the author of nature for the adorning and embellishing of the corporeal world to us.

So that they conceived, bodies were to be considered two manner of ways, either as they are absolutely in themselves, or else as they are relatively to us: and as they are absolutely in themselves, that so there never was any entity, really distinct from the substance, produced in them out of nothing, nor corrupted or destroyed to nothing, but only the accidents and modifications altered. Which accidents and modifications are no

entities really distinct from their substance; forasmuch as the same body may be put into several shapes and figures, and the same man may successively stand, sit, kneel, and walk, without the production of any new entities really distinct from the substance of his body. So that the generations, corruptions, and alterations of inanimate bodies are not terminated in the production or destruction of any substantial forms, or real entities distinct from the substance, but only in different modifications of it. But secondly, as bodies are considered relatively to us, that so besides their different modifications and mechanical alterations, there are also different fancies, seemings, and apparitions begotten in us from them: which unwary and unskilful philosophers mistake for absolute forms and qualities in bodies themselves. And thus they concluded, that all the phenomena of inanimate bodies, and their various transformations, might be clearly resolved into these two things; partly something that is real and absolute in bodies themselves, which is nothing but their different mechanism, or disposition of parts in respect of figure, site, and motion; and partly something that is fantastical in the sentient.

That the atomical physiology did emerge after this manner from that principle of reason, that nothing comes from nothing, nor goes to nothing, might be further convinced from the testimony of Aristotle,[9] writing thus concerning it: Ἐκ τοῦ γίνεσθαι ἐξ ἀλλήλων τἀναντία ἐνυπῆρχεν ἄρα· εἰ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ γινόμενον ἀνάγκη γίνεσθαι, ἢ ἐξ ὄντων ἢ ἐξ μὴ ὄντων· τούτων δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐκ μὴ ὄντων γίνεσθαι ἀδύνατον, περὶ γὰρ ταύτης ὁμογνωμονοῦσι τῆς δόξης ἅπαντες οἱ περὶ φύσεως· τὸ λοιπὸν ἤδε συμβαίνειν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐνόμισαν· ἐξ ὄντων μὲν καὶ ἐνυπαρχόντων γίνεσθαι, διὰ δὲ σμικρότητα τῶν ὄγκων ἐξ ἀναισθήτων ἡμῖν, "The ancient physiologers concluded, that because contraries were made out of one another, that therefore they were before (one way or other) inexistent; arguing in this manner, that if whatsoever be made, must needs be made out of something or out of nothing, and this latter," that any thing should be made out of nothing "is impossible, according to the general consent of all the ancient physiologers; then it follows of necessity, that all corporeal things are made or generated out of things that were really before and inexistent, though by reason of the smallness of their bulks they were insensible to us." Where Aristotle plainly intimates, that all the ancient philosophers, whosoever insisted upon this principle, that nothing comes from, nor goes to nothing, were one

[9] These words are taken from Physicor. lib. 1. cap. 5. p. 451. The worthy Doctor, however, has made a mistake. He interprets the passage, as if Aristotle had shown therein, in what manner all the ancient physiologers arrived at the atomic form of philosophy. But those who examine Aristotle will understand the matter differently. For he speaks only of Anaxagoras and of the probable reasons, that led him to introduce the so-called *homœomeria.*

way or other atomical, and did resolve all corporeal things into ὄγκους τινὰς διὰ τὴν σμικρότητα ἀναισθήτους ἡμῖν, "certain moleculæ or corpuscula, which by reason of their smallness were insensible to us," that is, into atoms. But yet there was a difference between these atomists, forasmuch as Anaxagoras was such an atomist, as did notwithstanding hold forms and qualities really distinct from the mechanical modifications of bodies. For he not being able (as it seems) well to understand that other atomical physiology of the ancients, that, exploding qualities, solved all corporeal phenomena by mechanism and fancy; and yet acknowledging, that that principle of theirs, which they went upon, must needs be true, that nothing could of itself come from nothing nor go to nothing, framed a new kind of atomology of his own, in supposing the whole corporeal world or mass of matter to consist of similar atoms, that is, such as were originally endued with all those different forms and qualities that are vulgarly conceived to be in bodies, some bony, some fleshy, some fiery, some watery, some white, some black, some bitter, some sweet, and the like, so that all bodies whatsoever had some of all sorts of these atoms (which are in a manner infinite) specifically differing from one another in them: Πᾶν ἐν παντὶ μεμίχθαι, διότι πᾶν ἐκ παντὸς γίνεται, φαίνεσθαι δὲ διαφέροντα, καὶ προσαγορεύεσθαι ἕτερα ἀλλήλων ἐκ τοῦ μάλιστα ὑπερέχοντος διὰ τὸ πλῆθος ἐν τῇ μίξει τῶν ἀπείρων,[10] &c., "That all things were in every thing mingled together, because they saw, that every thing was made every thing; but that things seemed to differ from one another, and were denominated to be this or that, from those atoms, which are most predominant in the mixture, by reason of their multiplicity." Whence he concluded, that all the generations, corruptions, and alterations of bodies were made by nothing but the concretions and secretions of inexistent and pre-existent atoms, of different forms and qualities, without the production of any new form and quality out of nothing, or the reduction of any into nothing. This very account Aristotle gives of the Anaxagorean

[10] These also are from Physic. lib. 1. cap. 5. p. 451. as well as what follows a little after concerning Anaxagoras. Of this philosopher's opinion I shall say nothing, but shall notice two other points that occurred to me in reading this part. I. Few will be persuaded by the worthy author, that Anaxagoras framed a doctrine of his own, because his understanding was too weak to comprehend the atomic physiology. All that we are told of him proves, that he was by no means so dull of apprehension. It is most probable, rather, that this most acute man, having clearly seen that the theory of atoms could not account for all the phenomena of nature, devised a new system in order to remove the difficulties which lay in the way of that theory. II. To say that no other physiologer, either before or since Anaxagoras, attributed qualities to atoms, is perhaps too bold an assertion. I am not aware, indeed, whether many of the ancient physiologers approved of the whole of Anaxagoras' doctrine or not: but that any of those, that we know of as having devoted themselves to natural philosophy before Democritus and Leucippus, divested atoms of all qualities, is, it appears to me, exceedingly doubtful. Possibly those who read what we have remarked above concerning Empedocles and others will coincide in our view.

hypothesis: Ἔοικε Ἀναξαγόρας οὕτως ἄπειρα οἰηθῆναι τὰ στοιχεῖα, διὰ τὸ ὑπολαμβάνειν, τὴν κοινὴν δόξην τῶν φυσικῶν εἶναι ἀληθῆ, ὡς οὐ γινομένου οὐδενὸς ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, "Anaxagoras seemeth therefore to make infinite atoms endued with several forms and qualities to be the elements of bodies, because he supposed that common opinion of physiologers to be true, that nothing is made of nothing." But all the other ancient physiologers that were before Anaxagoras, and likewise those after him, who insisting upon the same principle of nothing coming from nothing did not Anaxagorize, as Empedocles, Democritus, and Protagoras, must needs make ὄγκους ἀνομοίους, dissimilar moleculæ, and ἀτόμους ἀποίους, atoms unformed and unqualified, otherwise than by magnitude, figure, and motion, to be the principles of bodies, and cashiering forms and qualities (as real entities distinct from the matter) resolve all corporeal phenomena into mechanism and fancy. Because, if no real entity can come from nothing, nor go to nothing, then one of these two things is absolutely necessary, that either these corporeal forms and qualities, being real entities distinct from the matter, should exist before generations and after corruptions, in certain insensible atoms originally such, according to the Anaxagorean doctrine; or else, that they should not be real entities distinct from the matter, but only the different modifications and mechanisms of it, together with different fancies. And thus we have made it evident, that the genuine atomical physiology did spring originally from this principle of reason, that no real entity does of itself come from nothing, nor go to nothing.[1]

XXIX. Now we shall in the next place show, how this very same principle of reason, which induced the ancients to reject substantial forms and qualities of bodies, and to physiologize atomically, led them also unavoidably to assert incorporeal substances; and that the souls of men and animals were such, neither generated nor corrupted. They had argued against substantial forms and qualities, as we have showed, in this manner, that since the forms and qualities of bodies are supposed by all

[1] Every one will admit the acuteness and intellectual vigour displayed in this exposition of the origin of the atomic philosophy. But, I. some, I imagine, will think, that the matter might have been set forth more briefly and in a manner better adapted to the understanding of readers, or will complain perhaps of occasional repetitions of what had already been stated. II. Others possibly will accuse the learned Doctor of inconsistency. He proposed to himself to show, that that well-known principle of reason: Ex nihilo nihil fit, led the ancients to resolve the whole nature of things into unqualified atoms; but he sometimes speaks, as though he thought, that they adopted and thus strenuously maintained this principle for the sake merely of being able thereby the more easily to defend the atomic doctrine. But if this were true, then atomism did not emanate from this dogma, but the dogma itself from atomism. But any one who fairly weighs and examines the whole will acknowledge, that this inconsistency is to be looked for in the style and modes of expression rather than in the thing itself. The worthy author is sufficiently consistent as regards the main question, although he appears to contradict himself in the manner of treating it.

to be generated and corrupted, made anew out of nothing and destroyed to nothing, that therefore they could not be real entities distinct from the substance of matter, but only different modifications of it in respect of figure, site, and motion, causing different sensations in us; and were all to be resolved into mechanism and fancy. For as for that conceit of Anaxagoras, of pre-existent and post-existent atoms, endued with all those several forms and qualities of bodies ingenerably and incorruptibly; it was nothing but an adulteration of the genuine atomical philosophy, and a mere dream of his, in which very few followed him. And now they argue contrariwise for the souls of men and animals, in this manner; because they are plainly real entities distinct from the substance of matter and its modification, and men and brutes are not mere machines, neither can life and cogitation, sense and consciousness, reason and understanding, appetite and will, ever result from magnitudes, figures, sites, and motions, that therefore they are not corporeally generated and corrupted, as the forms and qualities of bodies are. Ἀδύνατον γίνεσθαί τι ἐκ μηδενὸς προϋπάρχοντος, "It is impossible for a real entity to be made or generated from nothing pre-existing." Now there is nothing of soul and mind, reason and understanding, nor indeed of cogitation and life, contained in the modifications and mechanism of bodies; and therefore to make soul and mind to rise out of body whensoever a man is generated, would be plainly to make a real entity to come out of nothing, which is impossible. I say, because the forms and qualities of bodies are generated and corrupted, made and unmade, in the ordinary course of nature, therefore they concluded, that they were not real entities distinct from the substance of body and its various modifications: but because soul and mind is plainly a real entity distinct from the substance of body, its modification and mechanism; that therefore it was not a thing generated and corrupted, made and unmade, but such as had a being of its own, a substantial thing by itself. Real entities and substances are not generated and corrupted, but only modifications.

Wherefore these ancients apprehended, that there was a great difference betwixt the souls of men and animals and the forms and qualities of other inanimate bodies, and consequently betwixt their several productions: forasmuch as in the generation of inanimate bodies there is no real entity acquired distinct from the substance of the thing itself, but only a peculiar modification of it. The form of stone, or of timber, of blood, flesh, and bone, and such other natural bodies generated, is no more a distinct substance or entity from the matter, than the form of a house, stool, or table is: there is no more new entity acquired in the generation of natural bodies, than there is in the production of artificial ones. When water is turned into vapour, candle into

flame, flame into smoke, grass into milk, blood, and bones, there is no more miraculous production of something out of nothing, than when wool is made into cloth, or flax into linen; when a rude and unpolished stone is hewn into a beautiful statue; when brick, timber, and mortar, that lay together before disorderly, is brought into the form of a stately palace; there being nothing neither in one nor other of these, but only a different disposition and modification of pre-existent matter. Which matter of the universe is always substantially the same, and neither more nor less, but only Proteanly transformed into different shapes. Thus we see, that the generation of all inanimate bodies is nothing but the change of accidents and modifications, the substance being really the same both before and after. But in the generations of men and animals, besides the new disposition of the parts of matter and its organization, there is also the acquisition and conjunction of another real entity or substance distinct from the matter, which could not be generated out of it, but must needs come into it some other way. Though there be no substantial difference between a stately house or palace standing, and all the materials of the same ruinated and demolished, but only a difference of accidents and modifications; yet between a living man and a dead carcase, there is besides the accidental modification of the body, another substantial difference, there being a substantial soul and incorporeal inhabitant dwelling in the one and acting of it, which the other is now deserted of. And it is very observable, that Anaxagoras[2] himself, who made bony and fleshy atoms, hot and cold, red and green, and the like, which he supposed to exist before generations and after corruptions, always immutably the same (that so nothing might come from nothing and go to nothing), yet he did not make any animalish atoms sensitive and rational. The reason whereof could not be, because he did not think sense and understanding to be as real entities as hot and cold, red and green; but because they could not be supposed to be corporeal forms and qualities, but must needs belong to another substance that was incorporeal. And therefore Anaxagoras could not but acknowledge, that all souls and lives did preexist and post-exist by themselves, as well as those corporeal forms and qualities, in his similar atoms.

XXX. And now it is already manifest, that from the same principle of reason before-mentioned, that nothing of itself can come from nothing nor go to nothing, the ancient philosophers were induced likewise to assert the soul's immortality, together with its incorporeity or distinctness from the body. No sub-

[2] We have abundance of authority from Aristotle, De Anima lib. 1. cap. 2. p. 5. t. 2. and Metaphys. lib. 1. cap. 3. t. 4. p. 266. that Anaxagoras gave to animals a soul distinct from the atoms of which he supposed them to be compounded.

stantial entity ever vanisheth of itself into nothing; for if it did, then in length of time all might come to be nothing. But the soul is a substantial entity, really distinct from the body, and not the mere modification of it; and therefore, when a man dies, his soul must still remain and continue to have a being somewhere else in the universe. All the changes that are in nature are either accidental transformations and different modifications of the same substance, or else they are conjunctions and separations, or anagrammatical transpositions of things in the universe; the substance of the whole remaining always entirely the same. The generation and corruption of inanimate bodies is but like the making of a house, stool or table, and the unmaking or marring of them again; either different modifications of one and the same substance, or else divers mixtures and separations, concretions and secretions. And the generation and corruption of animals is likewise nothing but

————Μίξις τε διάλλαξίς τε μιγέντων,

"The conjunction of souls together with such particular bodies, and the separation of them again from one another," and so as it were the anagrammatical transposition of them in the universe. That soul and life that is now fled and gone from a lifeless carcase, is only a loss to that particular body or compages of matter, which by means thereof is now disanimated; but it is no loss to the whole, it being but transposed in the universe, and lodged somewhere else.[3]

[3] I. If Dr. Cudworth had affirmed merely, that some ancient atomic philosophers might possibly have reasoned as we do at this day: "In matter there is nothing but form, motion, and site; but sense, consciousness, reason, understanding, cannot result from form, site, and motion; therefore there is necessarily something in man altogether distinct from matter," no one could have found fault therewith; for the ancients had the use of the same faculty of reason as ourselves. But the broad assertion, that they did in fact so reason, few will admit without evidence. II. He assumes what is subject to controversy, that every one of the ancient physiologers held the nature of things to be compounded of atoms destitute of all form and quality. III. He contends, that all who formerly supposed souls to exist after death were led into this opinion from a belief in the atomic theory. But who is not aware, that many who held the immortality of souls were totally opposed to this doctrine? Dr. Cudworth does not think proper to rank Plato among the supporters of atomism; and yet he maintained that souls, are not annihilated, and must therefore have been drawn into this opinion from other reasons. IV. If the transition from the atomic physiology to the immortality of souls be so easy, how did it happen that none formerly were more adverse to this dogma, that those who acquired the greatest celebrity as atomists? Epicurus, Leucippus, Democritus, and the other supporters of atoms, we all know, made souls to perish. And how is this to be reconciled with the learned Doctor's position, that no man in his senses could be a supporter of atomism and yet deny the soul's immortality? V. Finally; I can very well understand indeed, how any one who leaves nothing to matter except motion, figure, and site, may by reasoning easily come to the conclusion, that there is something in man distinct from matter and body; but if I am not mistaken, a part of the process is still wanting before he can arrive at the immortality of souls. For the chain of connexion between the two does not appear to be very complete:

XXXI. It is also further evident, that this same principle, which thus led the ancients to hold the soul's immortality, or its future permanency after death, must needs determine them likewise to maintain its προϋπαρξις, or pre-existence, and consequently its μετενσωμάτωσις, or transmigration. For that which did pre-exist before the generation of any animal, and was then somewhere else, must needs transmigrate into the body of that animal where now it is. But as for that other transmigration of human souls into the bodies of brutes, though it cannot be denied but that many of these ancients admitted it also, yet Timæus Locrus,[4] and divers others of the Pythagoreans, rejected it, any otherwise than as it might be taken for an allegorical description of that beastly transformation that is made of men's souls by vice. Aristotle tells us again,[5] agreeably to what was declared before, ὅτι μάλιστα φοβούμενοι διετέλησαν οἱ παλαιοὶ τὸ ἐκ μηδενὸς γίνεσθαί τι προϋπάρχοντος, "That the ancient philosophers were afraid of nothing more, than this one thing, that any thing should be made out of nothing pre-existent:" and therefore, they must needs conclude, that the souls of all animals pre-existed before their generations. And indeed it is a thing very well known, that, according to the sense of philosophers, these two things were always included together in that one opinion of the soul's immortality, namely its pre-existence as well as its post-existence. Neither was there ever any of the ancients before Christianity, that held the soul's future permanency after death, who did not likewise assert its pre-existence; they clearly perceiving, that if it were once granted, that the soul was generated, it could never be proved but that it might be also corrupted. And therefore, the assertors of the soul's immortality commonly begun here; first, to prove its pre-existence, proceeding thence afterward to establish its permanency after death. This is the method used in Plato:[6] Ἦν που ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ πρὶν ἐν τῶδε τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ εἴδει γενέσθαι, ὥστε καὶ ταύτῃ ἀθάνατόν τι

"There is something in us distinct from body, therefore there is something in us immortal." What law, indeed, of reason or nature compels us to believe, that every thing which is apart from grosser matter or can be separated from body, is also immortal and eternal?

[4] See his treatise De Anima Mundi et Natura, in Thom. Galei Scriptores Mythologic. p. 566. Chalcidius, In Timæum Platonis, cap. 196. p. 349. 350. understands the same of Plato. I pass over several others, who, it is well known, have interpreted what is taught by Plato and Pythagoras concerning the transmigration of souls into brute animals in a moral sense, and have referred it to the imitation of the vices which are found in beasts.

[5] De Generat. et Corrupt. lib. 1. cap. 3. p. 704. tom. 1. opp.

[6] This is the reasoning of Socrates in Plato's Phædo. p. 382. He thus argues: "As our souls so readily comprehend and retain what is explained to them, it necessarily follows, that they possess innate notions of things. Therefore, undoubtedly, they were imbued with these notions in some other life before they descended into these bodies. Consequently, souls existed before they were united to bodies. If this be true, it is probable also that they are immortal."

ἔοικεν ἡ ψυχὴ εἶναι: "Our soul was somewhere, before it came to exist in this present human form, and from thence it appears to be immortal, and such as will subsist after death." And the chief demonstration of the soul's pre-existence to the ancients before Plato was this, because it is an entity really distinct from body or matter and the modifications of it; and no real substantial entity can either spring of itself out of nothing, or be made out of any other substance distinct from it, because nothing can be made ἐκ μηδενὸς ἐνυπάρχοντος ἢ προϋπάρχοντος: "from nothing either in-existing or pre-existing;" all natural generations being but the various dispositions and modifications of what was before existent in the universe. But there was nothing of soul and mind in-existing and pre-existing in body before, there being nothing of life and cogitation in magnitude, figure, site, and motion. Wherefore this must needs be, not a thing made or generated, as corporeal forms and qualities are, but such as hath a being in nature ingenerably and incorruptibly. The mechanism of human body was a thing made and generated, it being only a different modification of what was before existent, and having no new entity in it distinct from the substance: and the *totum* or *compositum* of a man or animal may be said to be generated and corrupted, in regard of the union and disunion, conjunction and separation of those two parts, the soul and body. But the soul itself, according to these principles, is neither a thing generable nor corruptible, but was as well before the generation, and will be after the deaths and corruptions of men, as the substance of their body, which is supposed by all to have been from the first creation, and no part of it to be annihilated or lost after death, but only scattered and dispersed in the universe. Thus the ancient atomists concluded, that souls and lives being substantial entities by themselves, were all of them as old as any other substance in the universe, and as the whole mass of matter, and every smallest atom of it is: that is, they who maintained the eternity of the world, did consequently assert also *æternitatem animorum* (as Cicero calls it) the eternity of souls and minds.[7]

[7] I scarcely know how this is to be understood. I. The learned Doctor lays down two classes of philosophers prior to the birth of Christ; one affirming, the other denying the world to be eternal. But if we except the Jews, I am not aware of any ancient philosopher who maintained the latter position. All seem to me to have acknowledged the eternity of the world; but they differed in this alone,—that some, as Aristotle, held both the form and matter of this globe to be eternal; others, with Plato at their head, only the matter to be eternal and the form to have been framed by God. II. But supposing his distinction of those who affirmed or denied the eternity of the world to be understood in this way, still all will not be made plain. What opinions those, who with Aristotle supposed the form as well as the matter to be eternal, entertained of souls and their nature, is very doubtful and obscure. Nor are arguments wanting to those who consider, that the Peripatetics did not hold souls to be self-existent and incorporeal substances. But as to such as conceived the matter only and not the form

But they, who conceived the world to have had a temporary beginning or creation, held the coevity of all souls with it, and would by no means be induced to think, that every atom of senseless matter and particle of dust had such a privilege and pre-eminency over the souls of men and animals, as to be the senior to them. Synesius, though a Christian, yet having been educated in this philosophy, could not be induced by the hopes of a bishopric to stifle or dissemble this sentiment of his mind:[8] Ἀμέλει τὴν ψυχὴν οὐκ ἀξιώσω ποτὲ σώματος ὑστερογενῆ νομίζειν, "I shall never be persuaded to think my soul to be younger than my body." But such, it seems, was the temper of those times, that he was not only dispensed withal as to this, but also as to another heterodoxy of his concerning the resurrection.[9]

also of the world to be eternal, it is notorious, that they derived souls from God himself and held them to be particles of the divine essence, which God had sent down into earthly bodies to atone for some sin heretofore committed. Hence, they did not believe souls to have then been born for the first time, when God gave form to rude and undigested matter, but to have existed like God himself from everlasting.

[8] So Synesius expresses himself, Epistola 105. p. 249. opp. But before the period of the controversy concerning Origen, Christians were at liberty to think as they liked respecting the origin of the soul. When once, however, these disputes were raised about Origen, who evidently held souls to have existed before the birth of bodies, this liberty was taken away and a stigma attached to those who professed such sentiments. It is unquestionable, however, that teachers of the greatest note, both before and since Origen, have favoured this doctrine. For an array of testimonies see Henr. Morus, Præfat. ad Opera Philosophica, sect. 18, &c. p. 20. and Leo Allatius, Notæ ad Methodii Symposion, p. 96. &c.

[9] I shall not repeat what I have remarked a little above, nor shall I advert to its being very uncertain, whether any of the ancients concluded as the learned Doctor here supposes; but I shall say a few words touching the whole matter in question. The Doctor supposes the atomic doctrine to have led the ancients into a belief in the pre-existence of souls before the birth of bodies and their transmigrations through many bodies. But I consider it to be beyond doubt, that many of them made the origin of the souls to be more ancient than the bodies and discoursed of their various migrations, who either were totally unacquainted with or like Plato repudiated the doctrine of Democritus. Besides, I confess myself altogether at a loss to discover, why he who refers all things to atoms should necessarily believe also, that souls existed before the bodies were born and that they pass from time to time into new bodies. For granting that an atomist may by a train of reasoning arrive at the conclusion, that the thinking power in us is a substance which has nothing in common with the matter and body it inhabits, yet what necessity does this doctrine impose on him of acknowledging this substance which he sees to be distinct from body, to be not only immortal but also antecedent to the body? I see no reason, indeed, why he may not consider the soul, although compounded of atoms, to be created by God at the time when the body is produced. But what should induce him to suppose, that this soul is always entering into new bodies? What necessary connexion is there in this: "There are atoms; therefore we must believe that souls, like Ulysses, are perpetually wandering, and on leaving one body pass into another?" Plato certainly in proving the existence of souls before the bodies drew his arguments, not from atoms, but from innate ideas. For in his Phædo, p. 382. opp. he makes Socrates reason thus: "The forms and species of things are innate in souls, therefore they must necessarily have lived in some other state, and that which we call to learn is nothing but remembering and recollecting." Others have come to the same opinion by a different road. On carefully weighing the opinions and dogmas of the ancients, among other things which I pass over for the present, the following appears to me to be the origin of the opinion respecting the existence of souls before the bodies. The ancient Chaldeans, Egyptians, and almost all the eastern nations believed,

XXXII. It is already plain also, that this doctrine of the ancient atomists concerning the immateriality and immortality, the pre-existence and post-existence of souls, was not confined by them to human souls only, but extended universally to all souls and lives whatsoever; it being a thing that was hardly ever called into doubt or question by any before Cartesius,[10] whether the souls of brutes had any sense, cogitation or consciousness in them or no. Now all life, sense, and cogitation was undoubtedly concluded by them to be an entity really distinct from the substance of body, and not the mere modification, motion, or mechanism of it; life and mechanism being two distinct ideas of the mind, which cannot be confounded together. Wherefore they resolved, that all lives and souls whatsoever, which now are in the world, ever were from the first beginning of it, and ever will be; that there will be no new ones produced, which are not already, and have not always

that the administration, care, and guidance of human affairs is entrusted by God to certain genii, the Deity himself having retired from the troublesome office; which opinion was adopted by Plato, see De Legibus, lib. 4. p. 597. and elsewhere, and, shall I say it? by those Christians also whose authority stood pre-eminently high. Consult Athenagoras, Apologiæ pro Christianis, cap. 29, p. 97, 98. and Justin M. Apologiæ 1. cap. 5. p. 44. Those, however, who supposed the soul to be immortal and distinct from body, justly considered the framing of so noble and excellent a substance to be far above the powers of the genii, and conceived therefore that a work of such magnitude was to be ascribed to God himself. But God, as they supposed, having resigned the superintendence of human affairs after creating the world, there was nothing left for them, therefore, but to assert that he produced all souls from himself anterior to the creation. It still remained to be explained, how God consistently with his own benignity and goodness, could have immured substances so noble and excellent in such wretched and miserable bodies. To meet this difficulty, it being necessary to show that this was done through the fault of the souls and not of God, they therefore inculcated, that the souls had sinned, and being deprived of their wings were consigned by him to the prison of the body, in order to suffer the punishment of crimes by which they had offended him. The transition from hence to the doctrine of transmigration was easy and straightforward. In the first place, it was past belief, that the number of souls contaminated with crimes against God should be equal to that of all the men who had lived since the creation, who were then living, and who were about to live hereafter; and this would necessarily seem so much the more unreasonable to the nations we are speaking of, inasmuch as the age they assigned to the world was almost incalculable; See Jac. Perizonius, Antiquitates Ægyptiacæ, cap. 2, p. 14, &c. Therefore, reason itself demanded, that a certain and definite number of souls should be fixed upon, as having sinned against the majesty of God, and as wandering to and fro on the earth. Secondly, they could not prevail upon themselves to consider it compatible with the divine goodness to condemn particles of its own nature to such miseries for an infinite period; hence, they were obliged to admit, that a return to God was open to souls duly purified; but as they saw, that most souls think of nothing less than of their own purgation, that, on the contrary, they are sunk in vice and continually contracting fresh pollution, they therefore decreed a longer banishment to them, and taught that souls, on being released from one body, immediately pass into another, until they have put off all deformity and wiped away the stains offensive to God. In short, in what manner soever the ancients may have arrived at these dogmas, this I consider certain, that few indeed, if any, were led into them from atomism. But compare sect. 34, where the learned Doctor states his own opinion more explicitly.

[10] This ought not to be taken without limitation. For it is agreed among the learned men of this day, that the main part of what Cartesius maintained concerning brute animals had already occurred to others before him. See Bayle, Diction. Histor. et Critique. tom. 3. artic. Pereira, p. 2231. &c.

been, nor any of those, which now are, destroyed, any more than the substance of any matter will be created or annihilated. So that the whole system of the created universe, consisting of body, and particular incorporeal substances or souls, in the successive generations and corruptions or deaths of men and other animals was, according to them, really nothing else, but one and the same thing perpetually anagrammatized, or but like many different syllables and words variously and successively composed out of the same pre-existent elements or letters.

XXXIII. We have now declared, how the same principle of reason, which made the ancient physiologers to become Atomists, must needs induce them also to be Incorporealists; how the same thing, which persuaded them, that corporeal forms were no real entities distinct from the substance of the body, but only the different modifications and mechanism of it, convinced them likewise, that all cogitative beings, all souls and lives whatsoever, were ingenerable and incorruptible, and as well pre-existent before the generations of particular animals, as post-existent after their deaths and corruptions. Nothing now remains but only to show more particularly, that it was *de facto* thus; that the same persons did from this principle (that nothing can come from nothing and go to nothing) both atomize in their physiology, taking away all substantial forms and qualities, and also theologize or incorporealize, asserting souls to be a substance really distinct from matter and immortal, as also to pre-exist. And this we shall do from Empedocles, and first from that passage of his cited before in part:

[1] Ἄλλο δέ σοι ἐρέω, φύσις οὐδενός ἐστιν ἑκάστῳ
Θνητῶν, οὐδέ τις οὐλομένη θανάτοιο γενέθλη, (*al. lect.* τελευτή)
Ἀλλὰ μόνον μίξις τε διάλλαξις τε μιγέντων
Ἔστι, φύσις δ' ἐπὶ τοῖς ὀνομάζεται ἀνθρώποισι.

Which I find Latinized thus;

"Ast aliud dico; nihil est mortalibus ortus,
Est nihil interitus, qui rebus morte paratur;
Mistio sed solum est, et conciliatio rerum
Mistilium; hæc dici solita est mortalibus ortus."

The full sense whereof is plainly this, that there is no φύσις, or

[1] These verses of Empedocles are extant in Plutarch, Adv. Colotem. par. 4. tom. 2. opp. and, in part, in Aristotle De Generat. et Corrupt. lib. 1. cap. 1. p. 698. tom. 1. opp. Dr. Cudworth, who gives a somewhat long interpretation of them a little after, fancies he sees many things in them, which, if I mistake not, will not be very clear to any one else. I understand Empedocles to be here speaking of generation, and of the secretion and concretion of things; but I find nothing at all concerning the eternity of souls or their origin of the same prior to bodies and matter. It was not difficult, however, for the learned Doctor, who was enamoured of the opinions he had adopted, to discover traces of these dogmas in this passage. Thus oftentimes even great men are hurried away by their zeal, so as to be much more keen-sighted than necessary in expounding the words of the ancients.

production of any thing, which was not before; no new substance made, which did not really pre-exist: and therefore that in the generations and corruptions of inanimate bodies, there is no form or quality really distinct from the substance produced and destroyed, but only a various composition and modification of matter. But in the generations and corruptions of men and animals, where the souls are substances really distinct from the matter, that there is nothing but the conjunction and separation of souls and particular bodies, existing both before and after, not the production of any new soul into being, which was not before, nor the absolute death and destruction of any into nothing. Which is further expressed in these following verses:

[2] Νήπιοι, οὐ γάρ σφιν δολιχόφρονές εἰσι μέριμναι,
Οἳ δὴ γίνεσθαι πάρος οὐκ ἐὸν ἐλπίζουσιν,
Ητοι καταθνήσκειν τε καὶ ἐξόλλυσθαι ἀπάντῃ.

To this sense; "that they are infants in understanding, and short-sighted, who think any thing to be made, which was nothing before, or any thing to die, so as to be destroyed to nothing." Upon which Plutarch glosses after this manner: Οὐκ ἀναιρεῖ γένεσιν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐκ μὴ ὄντος, οὐδὲ φθοράν, ἀλλὰ τὴν πάντῃ, τουτέστι, τὴν εἰς τὸ μὴ ὂν ἀπολύουσαν, "Empedocles does not here destroy generation, but only such as is out of nothing; nor corruption, but such as is into nothing." Which, as we have already intimated, is to be understood differently in respect to inanimate and animate things; for in things inanimate there is nothing produced or destroyed, because the forms and qualities of them are no entities really distinct from the substance, but only divers mixtures and modifications. But in animate things, where the souls are real entities really distinct from the substance of the body, there is nothing produced nor destroyed neither, because those souls do both exist before their generations, and after their corruptions; which business, as to men and souls, is again more fully expressed thus:

[3] Οὐκ ἂν ἀνὴρ τοιαῦτα σοφὸς φρεσὶ μαντεύσαιτο,
Ὥς ὄφρα μέν τε βιῶσι, τὸ δὴ βίοτον καλέουσι,
Τόφρα μὲν οὖν εἶσι, καί σφι πάρα δεινὰ καὶ ἐσθλά,
Πρὶν δὲ παγέντε βροτοὶ καὶ λυθέντες οὐδὲν ἄρ' εἰσί.

That good and ill did first us here attend,
And not from time before, the soul descend;
That here alone we live, and when
Hence we depart, we forthwith then
Turn to our old non-entity again;
Certes ought not to be believed by wise and learned men.

Wherefore, according to Empedocles, this is to be accounted one of the vulgar errors, that men then only have a being and

[2] Also preserved by Plutarch, Adv. Colotem, p. 1113. tom 2. opp.
[3] These we have from the same author, Adv. Colotem. The last verse, which

are capable of good and evil, when they live here that which is called life; but that both before they are born, and after they are dead, they are perfectly nothing.

And besides Empedocles, the same is represented by the Greek tragedian also,[4] as the sense of the ancient philosophers:

> Θνήσκει δ' οὐδὲν τῶν γινομένων,
> Διακρινόμενον δ' ἄλλο πρὸς ἄλλο
> Μορφὴν ἑτέραν ἀπέδειξεν.

That "nothing dies or utterly perisheth; but things being variously concreted and secreted, transposed and modified, change their form and shape only, and are put into a new dress."

Agreeably whereunto, Plato also tells us,[5] that it was παλαιὸς λόγος, an ancient tradition or doctrine before his time, τοὺς ζῶντας ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων γεγονέναι, οὐδὲν ἧττον ἢ τοὺς τεθνεῶτας ἐκ τῶν ζώντων, "that as well the living were made out of the dead, as the dead out of the living;" and that this was the constant circle of nature. Moreover the same philosopher acquaints us, that some of those ancients were not without suspicion, that what is now called death, was to men more properly a nativity or birth into life, and what is called generation into life, was comparatively rather to be accounted a sinking into death; the former being the soul's ascent out of these gross terrestrial bodies to a body more thin and subtle, and the latter its descent from a purer body to that which is more crass and terrestrial:[6] Τίς οἶδεν, εἰ τὸ ζῆν μέν ἐστι κατθανεῖν, τὸ κατθανεῖν δὲ

time appears to have corrupted, is thus emended by Le Clerc, Biblioth. Choisie, t. 1. p. 106.

> Γρὶν δὲ παγῆναι βροτοὶ, λυθέντες τ' οὐδὲν ἄρ' εἰσί.

[4] Euripides, from whose Chrysippus the verses are quoted by Clemens Alexandr. Stromat. lib. 6. p. 750. which Grotius in his Excerpta Veter. Tragicor, p. 417. arranges and translates as follows:

> ——————— Θνήσκει δ'οὐδὲν
> Τῶν γινομένων· διακριν ,μένον
> Δ' ἄλλο πρὸς ἄλλο
> Μορφὴν ἰδίαν ἀπέδειξε.
>
> Quæ sunt, horum
> Nihil emoritur, sed secretum
> Istud ab isto
> Propria sub imagine paret.

In substituting ἰδίαν in the last verse he follows the example of Philo, who reads it so De Mundo Corruptibili, p. 548.

[5] This doctrine is largely discoursed of by Socrates in Plato's Phædo, p. 381. and unquestionably was entertained by many of the ancients. Porphyry informs us, De Antro Nympharum, p. 256. ed. Cantabr. that Heraclitus held the opinion. Similar axioms of the old philosophers, and among others that of Empedocles also, are collected by Clemens Alexandr. Stromat. lib. 3. p. 516.

[6] The saying of Euripides, which is quoted by many of the ancients, as Plato, Clemens Alex., Cicero, and Sextus Empiricus, though not by all of them in the same words. See the remarks of Potter on Clementis Alexandr. Stromat. lib. 3. cap. 3. p. 517. and of Fabricius on Sexti Empirici Hypotyp. Pyrrh. lib. 3. cap. 24. p. 185.

ζῆν, "Who knows whether that which is called living be not indeed rather dying: and that which is called dying, living?"

Moreover, that this was the doctrine of Pythagoras himself, that no real entity perishes in corruptions, nor is produced in generations, but only new modifications and transpositions made; is fully expressed by the Latin poet,[7] both as to inanimate, and to animate things. Of the first thus:

> Nec perit in tanto quicquam (mihi credite) mundo,
> Sed variat, faciemque novat: nascique vocatur
> Incipere esse aliud, quàm quod fuit antè; morique
> Desinere illud idem. Cum sint huc forsitan illa,
> Hæc translata illuc: summâ tamen omnia constant.

Of the second, that the souls of animals are immortal, did preexist and do transmigrate, from the same ground, after this manner:

> Omnia mutantur; nihil interit: errat et illinc,
> Huc venit, hinc illuc, et quoslibet occupat artus
> Spiritus, éque feris humana in corpora transit,
> Inque feras noster, nec tempore deperit ullo.
> Utque novis facilis signatur cera figuris,
> Nec manet, ut fuerat, nec formas servat easdem
> Sed tamen ipsa eadem est; animam sic semper eandem
> Esse, sed in varias doceo migrare figuras.

Wherefore[8] though it be a thing, which hath not been commonly taken notice of, of late, yet we conceive it to be unquestionably true, that all those ancient philosophers, who insisted so much upon this principle, οὐδὲν οὐδὲ γίνεσθαι οὐδὲ φθείρεσθαι τῶν ὄντων, "that no real entity is either generated or corrupted," did therein at once drive at these two things: first, the establishing of the

[7] Ovid. Metam. lib. 15. v. 254, &c. and v. 165, &c.

[8] These testimonies of the ancients, to which others of the same kind might be added, I am willing to confess, make it evident that the generations and corruptions of animals and things were considered by many formerly to be a sort of secretion and concretion. Aristotle, it is well known, in his books De Generatione et Corruptione, and elsewhere, controverts this opinion, which he tells us was espoused by almost all the natural philosophers before him. Nor would I deny, that the old philosophers were led into this system by that principle of reason: Ex nihilo nihil fit. Finally I will acknowledge also, that those whose words are here adduced, believed souls to have existed before the birth of the bodies and not to perish on the dissolution of these. But I am not aware, I. whether it is also manifest from these testimonies, that those who held this opinion concerning generation were supporters of atomism and discarded both forms and qualities. Nor do I understand, why he who considers nothing to perish but to pass merely into a new form, cannot allow forms and qualities to matter. That Empedocles did so, we have shown above and shall demonstrate in the preface. II. It is speaking too freely to assert, that all who adopted this principle: Ex nihilo nihil fit, professed the immortality of souls. Who attributed more to it than Democritus, Epicurus, and Lucretius? and yet these held souls to be perishable. III. Least of all do these sayings prove, that these philosophers were led from atomism to a knowledge of incorporeal substances, from thence to the doctrine of souls existing before bodies, and finally from thence to the transmigrations of souls. I confess the force of this reasoning does not appear very clear to me: "There are atoms; therefore there are also incorporeal souls; therefore these are immortal; therefore they existed before the bodies; therefore they migrate from bodies to bodies."

immortality of all souls, their pre-existence and post-existence, forasmuch as being entities really distinct from the body they could neither be generated nor corrupted; and secondly, the making of corporeal forms and qualities to be no real entities distinct from the body and the mechanism thereof, because they are things generated and corrupted, and have no pre-existence and post-existence. Anaxagoras, in this latter, being the only dissenter; who supposing those forms and qualities to be real entities likewise, distinct from the substance of body, therefore attributed perpetuity of being to them also, pre-existence and post-existence, in similar atoms, as well as to the souls of animals.

And now we have made it sufficiently evident, that the doctrine of the incorporeity and immortality of souls, we might add also, of their pre-existence and transmigration, had the same original and stood upon the same basis with the atomical physiology; and therefore it ought not at all to be wondered at (what we affirmed before) that the same philosophers and Pythagoreans asserted both those doctrines, and that the ancient Atomists were both Theists and Incorporealists.

XXXIV. But now to declare our sense freely concerning this philosophy of the ancients, which seems so prodigiously paradoxical, in respect of that pre-existence and transmigration of souls; we conceive indeed, that this ratiocination of theirs from that principle, that nothing naturally, or of itself, comes from nothing, nor goes to nothing, was not only firmly conclusive against substantial forms and qualities of bodies, really distinct from their substance, but also for substantial incorporeal souls, and their ingenerability out of matter, and particularly for the future immortality or post-existence of all human souls. For since it is plain, that they are not a mere modification of body or matter, but an entity and substance really distinct from it, we have no more reason to think, that they can ever of themselves vanish into nothing, than that the substance of the corporeal world, or any part thereof, can do so. For that in the consumption of bodies by fire, or age, or the like, there is the destruction of any real substance into nothing, is now generally exploded as an idiotical conceit; and certainly it cannot be a jot less idiotical to suppose, that the rational soul in death is utterly extinguished.

Moreover,[9] we add also, that this ratiocination of the ancients would be altogether as firm and irrefragable likewise for the pre-

[9] The learned Doctor has omitted here the opinion of those who assert, that the whole man is generated by the parents, although they confess themselves ignorant of the way and manner; which opinion commonly called *propagatio per traducem* was formerly entertained indeed by many eminent Christians, as is shown by Herr. Norisius in the Vindiciæ Augustianæ appended to his Historiæ Pelagianæ, cap. 4. sec. 8. p. 101. I do not know the reason, why he would not touch upon this opinion, which was sufficiently noted at that period; perhaps, however, he considered it to differ but slightly from the one which makes souls to have existed before bodies.

existence and transmigration of souls, as it is for their post-existence and future immortality; did we not (as indeed we do) suppose souls to be created by God immediately, and infused in generations. For they being unquestionably a distinct substance from the body, and no substance, according to the ordinary course of nature, coming out of nothing, they must of necessity either pre-exist in the universe before generations, and transmigrate into their respective bodies; or else come from God immediately, who is the fountain of all, and who at first created all that substance that now is in the world besides himself. Now the latter of these was a thing, which those ancient philosophers would by no means admit of; they judging it altogether incongruous[10] to bring God upon the stage perpetually, and make him immediately interpose every where, in the generations of men and all other animals, by the miraculous production of souls out of nothing. Notwithstanding which, if we well consider it, we shall find, that there may be very good reason on the other side for the successive divine creation of souls; namely, that God did not do all at first, that ever he could or would do, and put forth all his creative vigour at once, in a moment, ever afterwards remaining a spectator only of the consequent results, and permitting nature to do all alone, without the least interposition of his at any time, just as if there were no God at all in the world. For this may be, and indeed often hath been, the effect of such an hypothesis as this, to make men think, that there is no other God in the world but blind and dark nature. God might also, for other good and wise ends unknown to us, reserve to himself the continual exercise of this his creative power, in the successive production of new souls. And yet these souls nevertheless, after they are once brought forth into being, will notwithstanding their juniority, continue as firmly in the same, without vanishing of themselves into nothing, as the substance of senseless matter, that was created many thousand years before, will do.

And thus our vulgar hypothesis of the new creation of souls, as it is rational in itself, so it doth sufficiently solve their incorporeity, their future immortality, or post-eternity, without introducing those offensive absurdities of their pre-existence and transmigration.

XXXV. But if there be any such, who, rather than they would allow a future immortality or post-existence to all souls, and therefore to those of brutes, which consequently must have their successive transmigrations, would conclude the souls of all brutes, as likewise the sensitive soul in man, to be corporeal, and

[10] As I have already noticed, most of those who believed in the permanent existence of souls, excluded God altogether from the charge and management of human affairs, conceiving the whole world to be left to certain genii.

only allow the rational soul to be distinct from matter; to these we have only thus much to say, that they, who will attribute life, sense, cogitation, consciousness and self-enjoyment, not without some footsteps of reason many times, to blood and brains, or mere organized bodies in brutes, will never be able clearly to defend the incorporeity and immortality of human souls, as most probably they do not intend any such thing. For either all conscious and cogitative beings are incorporeal, or else nothing can be proved to be incorporeal. From whence it would follow also, that there is no Deity distinct from the corporeal world. But though there seem to be no very great reason, why it should be thought absurd, to grant perpetuity of duration to the souls of brutes, any more than to every atom of matter, or particle of dust that is in the whole world; yet we shall endeavour to suggest something towards the easing the minds of those, who are so much burdened with this difficulty; viz. that they may, if they please, suppose the souls of brutes, being but so many particular eradiations or effluxes from that source of life above, whensoever and wheresoever there is any fitly prepared matter capable to receive them, and to be actuated by them, to have a sense and fruition of themselves in it so long as it continues such; but as soon as ever those organized bodies of theirs, by reason of their indisposition, become uncapable of being further acted upon by them, then to be resumed again and retracted back to their original head and fountain. Since it cannot be doubted, but what creates any thing out of nothing, or sends it forth from itself by free and voluntary emanation, may be able either to retract the same back again to its original source, or else to annihilate it at pleasure.

And I find, that there have not wanted some among the gentile philosophers themselves, who have entertained this opinion, whereof Porphyry[1] is one: Λύεται ἑκάστη δύναμις ἄλογος εἰς τὴν

[1] I suppose Porphyry to have written this somewhere, although after a careful search through almost the whole of his works I have found nothing of the kind in them. But I very much doubt, whether he meant it to be understood of the souls of brutes. For so far from ranking these among the ἄλογοι δυνάμεις, he is, on the contrary, at very great pains, in the whole of lib. 3. De Non Necandis Animantibus, to prove, that they partake of reason as well as those of men; also that they employ a peculiar kind of language, which some persons can understand, and that they draw conclusions, foresee the future, and the like. From which it is clear, that Porphyry could not have entertained the opinion here imputed to him concerning the souls of brutes and have believed them to be eradiations of the soul of the world, which, on the dissolution of the animal, return to their head and fountain; seeing that he supposes them to be like human souls; See Περὶ ἀποχῆς, lib. 3. sect. 16. p. 119. Hence as he attributes eternity and various migrations to our souls, to avoid inconsistency he ought to suppose the same of the souls of brutes. Indeed the Stoics of all others, I conceive, come nearest to this opinion of the learned Doctor's, whose leader Zeno, as is stated by Diogenes Laërtius lib. 7. segm. 157. p. 464. thought, τῆς τῶν ὅλων ψυχῆς μέρη εἶναι τὰς ἐν τοῖς ζώοις; although these concluded the same of men's souls as of those of brute animals, namely, that they are both mortal and return to the soul of the world.

ὅλην ζωὴν τοῦ παντός, "Every irrational power is resolved into the life of the whole."

XXXVI. Neither will this at all weaken the future immortality or post-eternity of human souls. For if we be indeed Theists, and do in very good earnest believe a Deity, according to the true notion of it, we must then needs acknowledge, that all created being whatsoever owes the continuation and perpetuity of its existence, not to any necessity of nature without God, and independently upon him, but to the divine will only. And therefore, though we had never so much rational and philosophical assurance, that our souls are immaterial substances, distinct from the body, yet we could not, for all that, have any absolute certainty of their post-eternity, any otherwise than as it may be derived to us from the immutability and perfection of the divine nature and will, which does always that which is best. For the essential goodness and wisdom of the Deity is the only stability of all things. And for aught we mortals know, there may be good reason, why that grace or favour of future immortality and post-eternity, that is indulged to human souls, endued with reason, morality, and liberty of will (by means whereof they are capable of commendation and blame, reward and punishment), that so they may be objects for divine justice to display itself upon after this life, in different retributions may notwithstanding be denied to those lower lives and more contemptible souls of brutes, alike devoid both of morality and liberty.[2]

[2] To speak the truth, this new opinion concerning the souls of brutes will be assented to by few who examine every thing for themselves. For, I. it labours under much greater difficulties than the opinion of those who supposed the souls of brutes to be permanent and independent substances, and has also less light and evidence with it. The souls of brutes, according to the Doctor, are eradiations and effluxes of the first cause, the source of all life. But what is the first cause? Is it the Deity? Then are the souls of brutes eradiations of God himself and those of men not so. This no one will believe. Or is there a certain soul of the world, distinct from God and diffused through the nature of things? If so, what is the nature of this? What sort of eradiations does it send forth into the souls of brutes? And what is meant by the bodies being prepared in a certain way to receive them? I desist from further questions, though I am sure many more will be asked by those who admit nothing except what is known for a certainty. II. This opinion leads us to conclude the same of the souls of men. For if the souls of brutes are eradiations of the soul of the world, which on the dissolution of the body return to the fountain from which they emanated, why cannot the same be supposed of our souls also? The Stoics certainly, who were not unfavourable to this opinion, placed all souls in the same rank, that is, they held that they all return after death to the head from which they came. This could not escape Dr. Cudworth, and he therefore labours to meet the difficulty. The immortality of human souls, says he, is known to us only from the divine perfections, and from this, that God wills them to be permanent. Whatever, therefore, may be thought of the souls of beasts, the immortality of human souls will, notwithstanding, always be safe on this argument: God wills the souls of men not to perish; therefore they do not perish. And all other arguments are without weight or force. But, I. if we are here to have recourse to the will of God only, why do we dispute so much about the nature of the souls of brutes? Why not thus briefly settle the matter? "The souls of brutes perish; for it pleases God that they should perish. The souls of men remain, for God wills it to be so." Why do we suppose eradiations from the soul of the world, why emanations

XXXVII. But if any, for all this, will still obstinately contend for that ancient Pythagoric and Empedoclean hypothesis, that all lives and souls whatsoever are as old as the first creation, and will continue to eternity, or as long as the world doth, as a thing more reasonable and probable than our continual creation of new souls, by means whereof they become juniors both to the matter of the world and of their own bodies, and whereby also (as they pretend) the divine creative power is made too cheap and prostituted a thing, as being famulative always to brutish, and many times to unlawful lusts and undue conjunctions;[3] but especially than the continual decreation and annihilation of the souls of

from God, why so many other things, to be enabled to answer those who deny the immortality of the souls of brutes? The worthy Doctor is not sufficiently consistent with himself through the whole of this disputation, again overthrowing what he had before declared to be irrefragable. He contends a little above, that nothing can be more sound or well founded than this dogma: "Whatever feels, understands, and reasons, is immortal," maintains it to be certain from this alone, that human souls do not perish, and with it repels those who believe the souls of brutes to be corporeal and mortal. But here he confesses, that there is no proof at all of the immortality of human souls, if we relinquish this one argument: "Souls are imperishable; for God wills it so, who always decrees what is best." Which of these two shall we consider true? If we admit the latter, then those were in the right, whom the Doctor opposes a little above, and who deny it to follow as a necessary consequence that, because brutes feel and in a certain manner reason, their souls are immortal. But what will become of all that he has said before of the dignity of the atomic philosophy, and of the right principles of those who formerly professed it? If no principle of reason is of itself sufficient to place the eternity of souls beyond a doubt, how can it be affirmed that the atomists are necessarily led to believe them to be eternal? If, on the other hand, we adopt the former of these positions, how can the latter be maintained? If it be true that: "Whatever feels and reasons is immortal;" and also that: "Brutes feel, perceive, and reason;" it follows as a necessary consequence, that their souls must be immortal. Nothing therefore is left him but either to abandon this new opinion concerning the souls of brutes, or to confess that all he has argued before is without weight or force. If it be true that: The souls of brutes are eradiations of the Deity which perish on the dissolution of the body, then it must be false that: Whatever feels, thinks, and reasons, is imperishable; which being the case, it necessarily follows that: Human souls may perish, although they feel, perceive, and reason. But if human souls do not perish, because they feel, think, and reason, as the learned Doctor contends, it is reasonable to deny, that the souls of brutes are eradiations of the Deity, or of the world's soul, and that when the body is destroyed they return to their fountain or head and so perish.

[3] The whole of this difficulty, however, is not got over upon the hypothesis even, that souls were created before all bodies and matter and are sent by God himself into the bodies now from time to time produced. For if adultery or incest be committed, does not the Deity minister to man's unlawful lust as much by immediately commanding a soul already created to enter into the body begotten through this crime as by creating a soul at the time of its perpetration. If we consider God and his infinite power, one is as difficult to him as the other. Indeed, to confess candidly my own opinion, the whole question concerning the origin of souls and the nature of the minds possessed by brutes, is so enveloped in darkness, that it would be wiser to pass it over altogether than to make it the theme of endless disputes. Our blessed Saviour taught the immortality of souls by arguments which nothing can be conceived to surpass in force, simplicity, or clearness. But with regard to whether they are immortal of their own nature or from the will of God, also respecting their origin, and the difference which separates them from the souls of brutes, he was wholly silent. May we not infer from this, that the controversies of the learned upon these topics are destined to last until the day, when the final dissolution of the world shall put a period to all contests?

brutes; we shall not be very unwilling to acknowledge thus much to them, that indeed of the two this opinion is more reasonable and tolerable than that other extravagancy of those, who will either make all souls to be generated, and consequently to be corporeal, or at least the sensitive soul, both in men and brutes. For besides the monstrosity of this latter opinion, in making two distinct souls and perceptive substances in every man, which is a thing sufficiently confuted by internal sense, it leaves us also in an absolute impossibility of proving the immortality of the rational soul,[4] the incorporeity of any substance, and by consequence, the existence of any Deity distinct from the corporeal world.

And as for that pretence of theirs, that senseless matter may as well become sensitive, and, as it were, kindled into life and cogitation, as a body, that was devoid of light and heat, may be kindled into fire and flame; this seems to argue too much ignorance of the doctrine of bodies in men otherwise learned and ingenious;[5] the best naturalists have already concluded, that fire and flame is nothing but such a motion of the insensible parts of a body, as whereby they are violently agitated, and many times dissipated and scattered from each other, begetting in the mean time those fancies of light and heat in animals. Now there is no difficulty at all in conceiving, that the insensible particles of a body, which were before quiescent, may be put into motion; this being nothing but a new modification of them, and no entity really distinct from the substance of body, as life, sense, and cogitation are. There is nothing in fire and flame, or a kindled body, different from other bodies, but only the motion or mechanism, and fancy of it. And therefore it is but a crude conceit, which the Atheists and Corporealists of former times have been always so fond of, that souls are nothing but fiery or flammeous bodies.[6] For though heat in the bodies of animals be a neces-

[4] Here, however, as well as elsewhere, the learned Doctor forgets what he advanced a little before, that if we relinquish the argument of the divine will and perfections, there is nothing which reason can supply of sufficient stability to place the immortality of souls beyond doubt.

[5] In this answer the learned Doctor appears to me to take for granted what is liable to controversy. For he reasons thus: "Sense is something distinct from matter; fire is not different from the matter in which it exists; therefore sense and fire are of a totally different nature." But perhaps his adversaries will deny, that sense is different from the matter itself, and allowing fire to be only a motion of particles, will argue, that sense also in like manner is nothing but a certain motion of the atoms which compose the sensitive soul.

[6] It must not be supposed, however, that all the old philosophers who held the soul to be fiery or flammeous denied its immortality. It is well known, that a great many believed God himself to be fire, and to dwell in fire, and yet did not deny his immortality. Hence they asserted that souls also, which they conceived to be parts of the Deity, are fiery or flammeous; and yet none of them supposed this to exclude their immortality. For, as I have already intimated, these old philosophers entertained very different notions of what can or cannot be annihilated from those which we entertain, nor did they consider every thing consisting of parts and matter to be perishable.

sary instrument for soul and life to act by in them, yet it is a t ing really distinct from life; and a red-hot iron hath not therefore any nearer approximation to life than it had before, nor the flame of a candle than the extinguished snuff or tallow of it; the difference between them being only in the agitation of the insensible parts. We might also add, that, according to this hypothesis, the souls of animals could not be numerically the same throughout the whole space of their lives; since that fire, that needs a pabulum to prey upon, doth not continue always one and the same numerical substance. The soul of a new-born animal could be no more the same with the soul of that animal several years after, than the flame of a new-lighted candle is the same with that flame that twinkles last in the socket; which indeed are no more the same, than a river or stream is the same at several distances of time. Which reason may be also extended further to prove the soul to be no body at all, since the bodies of all animals are in a perpetual flux.

XXXVIII. We have now sufficiently performed our first task, which was to show from the origin of the atomical physiology, that the doctrine of incorporeal substance must needs spring up together with it. We shall, in the next place, make it manifest, that the inward constitution of this philosophy is also such, that whosoever really entertains it, and rightly understands it, must of necessity admit incorporeal substance likewise. First, therefore, the atomical hypothesis, allowing nothing to body, but what is either included in the idea of a thing impenetrably extended, or can clearly be conceived to be a mode of it, as more or less magnitude, with divisibility, figure, site, motion and rest, together with the results of their several combinations, cannot possibly make life and cogitation to be qualities of body; since they are neither contained in those things before mentioned, nor can result from any συζυγίαι, or conjugations of them. Wherefore it must needs be granted, that life and cogitation are the attributes of another substance distinct from body, or incorporeal.

Again, since according to the tenor of this physiology, body

Boëthius, whom all know to have been a most strenuous defender of the immortality of souls, and a believer in the Christian doctrine, in his De Consolat. Philos. lib. 3. p. 69. thus addresses the Deity:

> " Tu causis animas paribus vitasque minores
> Provehis, et levibus sublimeis curribus aptans
> In cœlum terramque seris: quas lege benigna
> Ad te conversas *reduci* facis *igne* reverti."

What is meant here by *Redux Ignis*, but the human soul itself, returning to God from whom it emanated? See the remarks of Ren. Vallinus on this passage, p. 64. to which add what we have written above to show, that it does not follow, because the ancients held God and the soul to be incorporeal, that they supposed either one or the other to be separate and distinct from all matter.

hath no other action belonging to it but that of local motion, which local motion, as such, is essentially heterokinesy, that which never springs originally from the thing itself moving, but always from the action of some other agent upon it; that is, since no body could ever move itself, it follows undeniably, that there must be something else in the world besides body, or else there could never have been any motion in it. Of which we shall speak more afterwards.

Moreover, according to this philosophy, the corporeal phenomena themselves cannot be solved by mechanism alone without fancy. Now fancy is no mode of body, and therefore must needs be a mode of some other kind of being in ourselves, that is cogitative and incorporeal.

Furthermore, it is evident from the principles of this philosophy, that sense itself is not a mere corporeal passion from bodies without, in that it supposeth, that there is nothing really in bodies like to those fantastic ideas that we have of sensible things, as of hot and cold, red and green, bitter and sweet, and the like, which therefore must needs owe their being to some activity of the soul itself; and this is all one as to make it incorporeal.

Lastly, from this philosophy, it is also manifest, that sense is not the κριτήριον of truth concerning bodies themselves, it confidently pronouncing, that those supposed qualities of bodies, represented such by sense, are merely fantastical things; from whence it plainly follows, that there is something in us superior to sense, which judges of it, detects its fantastry, and condemns its imposture, and determines what really is and is not, in bodies without us, which must needs be a higher self-active vigour of the mind, that will plainly speak it to be incorporeal.

XXXIX. And now this atomical physiology of the ancients seems to have two advantages or pre-eminences belonging to it, the first whereof is this, that it renders the corporeal world intelligible to us; since mechanism is a thing that we can clearly understand, and we cannot clearly and distinctly conceive any thing in bodies else. To say that this or that is done by a form or quality, is nothing else but to say, that it is done we know not how; or, which is yet more absurd, to make our very ignorance of the cause, disguised under those terms of forms and qualities, to be itself the cause of the effect.

Moreover, hot and cold, red and green, bitter and sweet, &c. formally considered, may be clearly conceived by us as different fancies and vital passions in us, occasioned by different motions made from the objects without upon our nerves; but they can never be clearly understood as absolute qualities in the bodies themselves, really distinct from their mechanical dispositions;

nor is there indeed any more reason, why they should be thought such, than that, when a man is pricked with a pin, or wounded with a sword, the pain which he feels should be thought to be an absolute quality in the pin or sword. So long as our sensible ideas are taken either for substantial forms or qualities in bodies without us, really distinct from the substance of the matter, so long are they perfectly unintelligible by us. For which cause Timæus Locrus[7] philosophizing (as it seemeth) after this manner, did consentaneously thereunto determine, that corporeal things could not be apprehended by us, otherwise than αἰσθήσει καὶ νόθῳ λογισμῷ, "by sense and a kind of spurious or bastardly reason;" that is, that we could have no clear conceptions of them in our understanding. And for the same reason Plato[8] himself distinguisheth betwixt such

[7] Behold the passage itself from his book De Anima Mundi, in Gale's Scriptor. Myth. p. 545. Τρία δὲ ὄντα τρισὶ γνωρίζεσθαι, τὰν μὲν ἰδέαν, νόῳ καὶ κατ' ἐπιστάμαν, τὰν δὲ ὕλην, λογισμῷ νόθῳ, "Tria quum sint hæc, tribus ea quoque modis cognosci, formam quidem mente et scientia, materiam adulterina quadam ratiocinatione;" of which opinion he immediately subjoins the reason: Τῷ μήπω κατ' εὐθυωρίαν νοεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ κατ' ἀναλογίαν, "Quod videlicet non recta quadam et æqua rei animadversione, sed ex proportione quadam et collatione intelligatur;" and then proceeds thus: Τὰ δ' ἀπογεννήματα αἰσθήσει καὶ δόξᾳ, "Fœtus vero, qui ex illis nascuntur, sensu et opinione." Hence it is clear, that Timæus did not assert matter to be apprehended αἰσθήσει and λογισμῷ νόθῳ, but made αἰσθησις to refer to the ἀπογεννήματα and not to the ὕλη likewise.

[8] I am not aware, in what part of Plato's works these words occur in the same order as here quoted. Nevertheless, he often copiously enlarges upon the thing itself, and the distinction between what are apprehended γνώσει and δόξῃ. See especially the Theætetus, p. 139, &c. opp. Sophista, p. 166. 167. De Republica lib. 8. p. 384. &c. Plato in truth was distinguishing the forms, and eternal notions of things, which he termed ἰδέαι, from things corporeal and sensible; conceiving the former alone to be fixed and eternal, but the latter to be perpetually flowing. Hence he called the former οὐσία and νοητὰ, the latter γίνεσις and αἰσθητὰ; to the former he assigned ἐπιστήμη, γνῶσις, σοφία, νόησις, to the latter only δόξα. Nothing is better known than this in the writings of Plato and of those who philosophized after his manner. Alcinous, Introd. in Philos. Platonis, cap. 7. p. 472. appended to Heinsius' edition of Maximus Tyrius, says: Δόξαν μὲν τῶν σωμάτων φησὶν, ἐπιστήμην δὲ τῶν πρώτων, "Opinionem (Plato) ait ad corpora pertinere, scientiam vero ad priora illa sive τὰ νοητά." Nor ought the passage of Timæus above adduced to be understood differently. As to the thing itself, therefore, which is here attributed to Plato, I have no fault to find. But the learned Doctor, I consider, is wrong in supposing, that this distinction of Plato's is to be taken so extensively as to exclude all knowledge of corporeal things. For to show that those who repudiate atomism are altogether ignorant of the nature of bodies, he instances Timæus and Plato, who, he supposes, from their dislike to that doctrine were carried so far as to affirm, that bodies were totally unknown to them. But Plato meant merely that the science of things eternal is more certain and excellent than that of frail and perishable bodies, but he did not take away all knowledge of bodies or refer them to what the Greek philosophers call ἀκατάληπτα. Besides he wished to be understood of individual bodies, to which he attributed a mutable and uncertain existence, and not of the nature and affections of bodies generally, which he not only considered capable of being explained, but has himself expounded over and over again. We know that Aristotle made use of the same distinction as Plato and referred γνῶσις only to eternal and immutable things, although he differed from his master as to the nature of things called eternal. But what is more notorious than that this opinion did not prevent Aristotle from supposing, that the nature and relations of bodies could be shown.

things as are νοήσει μετὰ λόγου περιληπτά, "comprehensible by the understanding with reason," and those which are only δόξῃ μετ' αἰσθήσεως ἀλόγου, "which can only be apprehended by opinion, together with a certain irrational sense;" meaning plainly, by the latter, corporeal and sensible things. And accordingly the Platonists frequently take occasion from hence, to enlarge themselves much in the disparagement of corporeal things, as being, by reason of that smallness of entity that is in them, below the understanding, and not having so much οὐσίαν as γένεσιν[9] "essence" as "generation," which indeed is fine fancy. Wherefore we must either, with these philosophers, make sensible things to be ἀκατάληπτα or ἀπερίληπτα, altogether "incomprehensible" and "inconceivable" by our human understandings, (though they be able in the meantime clearly to conceive many things of a higher nature;) or else we must entertain some kind of favourable opinion concerning that which is the ancientest of all physiologies, the atomical or mechanical, which alone renders sensible things intelligible.

XL. The second advantage, which this atomical physiology seems to have, is this, that it prepares an easy and clear way for the demonstration of incorporeal substances, by settling a distinct notion of body. He that will undertake to prove, that there is something else in the world besides body, must first determine what body is, for otherwise he will go about to prove, that there is something besides he knows not what. But now if all body be made to consist of two substantial principles, whereof one is matter devoid of all form, (and therefore of quantity as well as qualities) from whence these philosophers* themselves conclude, that it is incorporeal; the other, form, which being devoid of all matter, must needs be incorporeal likewise. (And thus Stobæus[10] sets down the joint doctrine both of Plato and Aristotle; Ὃν τρόπον τὸ εἶδος τῆς ὕλης ἀφαιρεθὲν ἀσώματον, οὕτως καὶ τὴν ὕλην τοῦ εἴδους χωρισθέντος οὐ σῶμα εἶναι, δεῖν γὰρ ἀμφοῖν τῆς συνύδου, πρὸς τὴν τοῦ σώματος ὑπόστασιν, "That in the same manner, as form alone separated from matter is incorporeal, so neither is matter alone, the form being separated from it, body. But there is need of the joint concurrence of both these, matter and form together, to make up the substance of the body.") Moreover, if to forms qualities be likewise supperadded, of which it is consentaneously also resolved

* Ἀσώματος δὲ καὶ ἡ ὕλη "Matter is incorporeal." Plotin. p. 164.

[9] I do not remember it stated either by Plato or by any of his school, that bodies have neither οὐσία nor γένεσις. They denied οὐσία to them, I know, but not γένεσις also. Consult Plato himself De Republ. lib. 8. p. 484. opp. where he says: Δόξαν μὲν περὶ γένεσιν, νόησιν δὲ περὶ οὐσίαν.

[10] The passage occurs Eclog. Physicor. lib. 1. cap. 14. p. 29. The words of Plotinus given at the foot of the page are extant in his book περὶ ὕλης, Ennead. 2. lib. 4. cap. 10. p. 164.

by the Platonists, ὅτι αἱ ποιότητες ἀσώματοι, "that qualities are incorporeal," as if they were so many spirits possessing bodies; I say, in this way of philosophizing, the notions of body and spirit, corporeal and incorporeal, are so confounded, that it is impossible to prove any thing at all concerning them; body itself being made incorporeal (and therefore every thing incorporeal;) for whatsoever is wholly compounded and made up of incorporeals, must needs be itself also incorporeal.[1]

[1] I do not consider it incumbent upon me to defend the almost hopeless cause of those, who maintain that forms and qualities exist in bodies. But this, I think, I may with truth affirm, that the learned Doctor has done them injustice, and not fairly stated their opinions. If indeed they had entertained the conceits they are here said to have done, they might justly be ranked amongst the most foolish of mortals. But Plato was not so dull, nor Aristotle so stupid. The Doctor thus hampers the defenders of qualities: "You assert all body to be compounded of *form*, *matter* and *qualities*; but matter you make to be devoid of form and of all quality; therefore, as you yourselves acknowledge, your matter is not body, but a thing incorporeal. In like manner form, you say, is devoid of matter, and the same opinion you hold of qualities. Therefore, according to you, that which you call body consists of things devoid of all body. Matter is not body, nor form, nor quality. But what is more foolish, than to imagine a body which is made up of things immaterial and incorporeal? Therefore you shamefully confound the nature of body and spirit and inculcate absurdities too gross for the belief even of Arcadians or Thebans." We shall imagine the ancient assertors of qualities replying to Dr. Cudworth: "You are mistaken," say they "most learned Doctor, in supposing us to be so destitute of good sense as to believe that a body can be made up of that which is incorporeal. The notion which you yourself entertain of body, you unfairly attribute to us, though it never was ours, and you do not hesitate to make body and corporeal to be with us one and the same: but the case is altogether otherwise. There is a wide difference in our opinion between what we call *body* and a *thing corporeal*. We deny matter to be body, but not also anything corporeal; that is to say, we distinguish between ὕλη or *matter* and σῶμα or *body*. We assert matter to be a thing consisting of parts, solid, long, broad, thick, in a few respects corporeal, but devoid of qualities and forms. Body or σῶμα also, we hold to be the same matter, but with qualities and forms superadded, or matter either animate and endowed with life or possessing other affections and properties. With you, however, body and matter are one and the same; hence you persuade yourself, that we, in denying a thing to be body, concede also that it is apart from all matter. But the case is far otherwise. When we deny matter to be σῶμα or body, we assert merely, that it is not a body such as those of animals, beasts, plants, or other things which we see; but we by no means deny it to be body, if this word be taken in a wider sense and signify every thing which can be touched, felt, and moved. In this sense ought the words of Plotinus to be understood, wherein he affirmed that matter or ὕλη is ἀσώματος. That this is our opinion you may learn from Stobæus, who says, Eclog. Phys. lib. 1. cap. 14. Περὶ ὕλης p. 29. Οὐ σῶμα δὲ τὴν ὕλην φασὶν, οὐχ ὅτι οὐ μόνον ἐστερῆσθαι δοκεῖ τῶν περὶ σῶμα διαστάσεων, ἀλλ' ὅτι καὶ πολλῶν ἄλλων ἀπολείπεται κατὰ τὸν ἴδιον λόγον, ἃ τοῖς σώμασι ὑπάρχει, σχηματισμοῦ, χρώματος, βαρύτητος, κουφότητος, ὅλως πάσης ποιότητος καὶ ποσότητος· εἰ γὰρ τούτων μετεῖχεν, τὸ ποίων ἦν καὶ πόσων· οὐ μετειληφυῖα δὲ κατὰ τὸν λόγον, σῶμα μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη. σωματικὴ δὲ διὰ τὸ πάσαις, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐκμαγεῖον, ὑποκεῖσθαι τὴν ποιότησι. Negatur autem corpus esse materia, non tam quod intervallis corporis carent, quàm quod aliis quoque multis ad corpus pertinentibus destituatur per se, ut figura, colore, gravitate, levitate et omni denique qualitate et quantitate. Nam si hæc haberet, inter quanta et qualia referretur. Nunc his quum per se careat, ut corpus non est, ita corporea dicitur, quod omnibus corporibus tamquam speculum subjicitur. You may learn the same from Cicero, who Academ. Quæst. lib. 1. cap. 5. p. 2231 t. 8 opp. thus defines body conformably with our opinion: De natura autem ita dicebant, ut eam dividerent in res duas, ut altera esset efficiens, altera autem quasi huic se præbens. In eo, quod efficeret, vim esse censebant, in eo, quod efficeretur,

Furthermore, according to this doctrine of matter, forms, and qualities in body, life and understanding may be supposed to be certain forms or qualities of body. And then the souls of men may be nothing else but blood or brains, endued with the qualities of sense and understanding; or else some other more subtle, sensitive and rational matter, in us. And the like may be said of God himself also; that he is nothing but a certain rational, or intellectual, subtle and fiery body, pervading the whole universe; or else that he is the form of the whole corporeal world, together with the matter making up but one substance. Which conceits have been formerly entertained by the best of those ancients, who were captivated under that dark infirmity of mind, to think, that there could be no other substance besides body.

But the ancient atomical philosophy, settling a distinct notion of body, that it is διαστατὸν ἀντίτυπον, "a thing impenetrably extended," which hath nothing belonging to it, but magnitude, figure, site, rest, and motion, without any self-moving power, takes away all confusion; shows clearly how far body can go, where incorporeal substance begins; as also that there must of necessity be such a thing in the world.

Again, this discovering not only that the doctrine of qualities had its original from men's mistaking their own fancies for absolute realities in bodies themselves; but also that the doctrine of matter and form sprung from another fallacy or deception of the mind, in taking logical notions, and our modes of conceiving, for modes of being, and real entities in things without us; it showing likewise, that because there is nothing else clearly intelligible in body, besides magnitude, figure, site, and motion, and their various conjunctions, there can be no such entities of forms and qualities really distinct from the substance of body; makes it evident, that life, cogitation and understanding can be no corporeal things, but must needs be the attributes of another kind of substance distinct from body.

XLI. We have now clearly proved these two things; first, that the physiology of the ancients, before not only Aristotle and Plato, but also Democritus and Leucippus, was atomical or mechanical. Secondly, that as there is no inconsistency between the atomical physiology and theology, but indeed a natural cognation; so the ancient Atomists before Democritus were neither Atheists nor Corporealists, but held the incorporeity and im-

materiam quamdam; in utroque tamen utrumque.—*Sed quod ex utroque, id jam corpus et quasi qualitatem nominabant.* See, how carefully we distinguish matter from body; and how very different a meaning we attach to the word *body* from what you do."—I could wish this to be taken as an example, what great caution ought to be exercised by those who explore the systems and opinions of the ancients. For if we construe their words according to our own notions, we shall make those philosophers appear very different from what they really were.

mortality of souls, together with a Deity distinct from the corporeal world. Wherefore the first and most ancient Atomists did not make ἀτόμους ἀρχὰς τῶν ὅλων, they never endeavoured to make up an entire philosophy out of atomology; but the doctrine of atoms was to them only one part or member of the whole philosophic system, they joining thereunto the doctrine of incorporeal substance and theology, to make it up complete: accordingly as Aristotle hath declared in his Metaphysics,[2] that the ancient philosophy consisted of these two parts, φυσιολογία and θεολογία or ἡ πρώτη φιλοσοφία, physiology, and theology or metaphysics. Our ancient Atomists never went about, as the blundering Democritus afterwards did, to build up a world out of a mere passive bulk, and sluggish matter, without any ἀρχαὶ δραστήριοι, any active principles, or incorporeal powers; understanding well, that thus they could not have so much as motion, mechanism, or generation in it; the original of all that motion that is in bodies springing from something that is not body, that is, from incorporeal substance. And yet if local motion could have been supposed to have risen up, or sprung in upon this dead lump and mass of matter, nobody knows how, and without dependence upon any incorporeal being, to have actuated it fortuitously; these ancient Atomists would still have thought it impossible for the corporeal world itself to be made up, such as now it is, by fortuitous mechanism, without the guidance of any higher principle. But they would have concluded it the greatest impudence or madness, for men to assert, that animals also consisted of mere mechanism; or, that life and sense, reason and understanding, were really nothing else but local motion, and consequently, that themselves were but machines and automata. Wherefore they joined both active and passive principles together, the corporeal and incorporeal nature, mechanism and life, atomology and pneumatology; and from both these united, they made up one entire system of philosophy, correspondent with, and agreeable to, the true and real world without them. And this system of philosophy, thus consisting of the doctrine of incorporeal substance (whereof God is the head) together with the atomical and mechanical physiology, seems to have been the only genuine, perfect, and complete.[3]

[2] Aristotle himself, I am aware, has carefully distinguished between physiology and what he terms the first philosophy. Consult what he says thereupon, Metaphys, lib. 6. cap. 1. p. 346. t. 4. opp. where he treats elaborately of the speculative sciences. But I do not remember any passage, wherein he has stated, that the ancients made this division of the whole of philosophy. On the contrary he complains, I know, that the old philosophers prior to Anaxagoras were immersed as it were in matter, and did not give much consideration to efficient causes distinct from matter.

[3] If all this were as plain and clear as it is freely and broadly asserted, we certainly should have greater cause to be satisfied. But those who attentively examine our previous remarks will, I fear, come to this conclusion, that our worthy author has sometimes given a greater latitude than he ought to his own surmises and opinions.

XLII. But it did not long continue thus; for, after a while, this entire body of philosophy came to be mangled and dismembered, some taking one part of it alone, and some another; some snatching away the atomical physiology, without the pneumatology and theology; and others, on the contrary, taking the theology and doctrine of incorporeals, without the atomical or mechanical physiology. The former of these were Democritus, Leucippus, and Protagoras, who took only the dead carcass or skeleton of the old Moschical philosophy, namely, the atomical physiology; the latter, Plato and Aristotle,[4] who took indeed the better part, the soul, spirit, and quintessence of it, the theology and doctrine of incorporeals, but unbodied, and divested of its most proper and convenient vehicle, the atomical physiology, whereby it became exposed to sundry inconveniences.

XLIII. We begin with Leucippus and Democritus; who, being atheistically inclined, quickly perceived that they could not, in the ordinary way of physiologizing, sufficiently secure themselves against a Deity, nor effectually urge Atheism upon others; forasmuch as Heraclitus and other philosophers, who held that all substance was body, as well as themselves, did notwithstanding assert a corporeal Deity, maintaining that the form of the whole corporeal world was God, or else that he was ὕλη πῶς ἔχουσα, "a certain kind of body or matter," as (for example) a methodical and rational fire, pervading (as a soul) the whole universe; the particular souls of men and animals being but, as it were, so many pieces, cut and sliced out of the great mundane soul: so that, according to them, the whole corporeal universe, or mass of body, was one way or other a God, a most wise and understanding animal, that did frame all particularities within itself in the best manner possible, and providently govern the same. Wherefore those Atheists now apprehending, upon what ticklish and uncertain terms their atheistical philosophy then stood, and how that those very forms and qualities, and the self-moving power of body, which were commonly made a

[4] Some perhaps will ask, upon what authority this is stated. The learned Doctor speaks, as though Plato and Aristotle had devoted themselves exclusively to a knowledge of God and of those things that are incorporeal and cognizable only to reason. Both it must be owned repudiated atoms, but neither on that account disregarded bodies and neglected the contemplation of them. Plato, it is true, bestowed more pains upon the consideration of the forms and models of things, and of God and spirits, than of other subjects; but yet he did not deem bodies altogether unworthy of attention; on the contrary, in many places he inquires into their affections and nature, and that even in the Timæus itself. But how can Aristotle be said to have been wholly addicted to the investigation of incorporeals, who in several books inquired into the causes and relations of bodies, the nature of animals and plants, and such like subjects, and was considered by not a few to have paid less regard than became a philosopher to things removed from the senses. See, however, what is advanced by Dr. Cudworth a little below, where he states and sets forth his own opinion, so as to give it a greater show of probability and truth.

sanctuary for atheism, might notwithstanding chance to prove, contrariwise, the latibulum and asylum of a Deity, and that a corporeal God (do what they could) might lie lurking under them, assaulting men's minds with doubtful fears and jealousies; understanding moreover, that there was another kind of physiology set on foot, which banishing those forms and qualities of body, attributed nothing to it but magnitude, figure, site, and motion, without any self-moving power; they seemed presently to apprehend some great advantage to themselves and cause from it; and therefore greedily entertained this atomical or mechanical physiology, and violently cutting it off from that other part, the doctrine of incorporeals, which it was naturally and vitally united to, endeavoured to serve their turns of it. And now joining these two things together, the atomical physiology, which supposes that there is nothing in body, but magnitude, figure, site, and motion, and that prejudice or prepossession of their own minds, that there was no other substance in the world besides body; between them both they begat a certain mongrel and spurious philosophy, atheistically-atomical, or atomically-atheistical.

But though we have so well proved, that Leucippus and Democritus were not the first inventors, but only the depravers and adulterators of the atomical philosophy; yet if any will notwithstanding obstinately contend, that the first invention thereof ought to be imputed to them, the very principles of their atheism seeming to lead them naturally to this, to strip and divest body of all those forms and qualities, it being otherwise impossible for them, surely and safely, to exclude a corporeal Deity; yet so, as that the wit of these Atheists was also much to be admired, in the managing and carrying on those principles in such a manner, as to make up so entire a system of philosophy out of them, all whose parts should be so coherent and consistent together; we shall only say thus much: that if those Atheists were the first inventors of this philosophy, they were certainly very unhappy and unsuccessful in it, whilst endeavouring by it to secure themselves from the possibility and danger of a corporeal God, they unawares laid a foundation for the clear demonstration of an incorporeal one, and were indeed so far from making up any such coherent frame as is pretended, that they were forced every where to contradict their own principles. So that nonsense lies at the bottom of all, and is interwoven throughout their whole atheistical system; and that we ought to take notice of the invincible power and force of truth, prevailing irresistibly against all endeavours to oppress it; and how desperate the cause of atheism is, when that very atomical hypothesis of theirs, which, they would erect and build up for a strong castle to garrison themselves in, proves a most effectual engine against them-

selves, for the battering of all their atheistical structure down about their ears.*

XLIV. Plato's mutilation and interpolation of the old Moschical philosophy was a great deal more excusable, when he took the theology and metaphysics of it, the whole doctrine of incorporeals, and abandoned the atomical or mechanical way of physiologizing. Which in all probability he did, partly because those forementioned Atheists having so much abused that philosophy, adopting it as it were to themselves, he thereupon began to entertain a jealousy and suspicion of it; and partly, because he was not of himself so inclinable to physiology as theology, to the study of corporeal as of divine things; which some think to be the reason why he did not attend to the Pythagoric system of the corporeal world, till late in his old age. His genius was such, that he was naturally more addicted to ideas than to atoms, to formal and final than to material causes. To which may be added, that the way of physiologizing by matter, forms and qualities, is a more huffy and fanciful thing than the other; and lastly, that the atomical physiology is more remote from sense and vulgar apprehension, and therefore not so easily understood. For which cause many learned Greeks of later times, though they had read Epicurus' works, and perhaps Democritus' too, yet they were not able to conceive, how the corporeal and sensible phenomena could possibly be solved without real qualities; one instance whereof might be given in Plutarch, writing against Colotes the Epicurean. Wherefore Plato, that was a zealous asserter of an incorporeal Deity, distinct from the world, and of immortal souls, seriously physiologized only by matter, forms and qualities, generation, corruption, and alteration; and he did but play and toy sometimes a little with atoms and mechanism; as where he would compound the earth of cubical, and fire of

* Granting what the worthy Doctor assumes, that Democritus and his party rejected God and were opposed to all religion, although I am aware that there are men of the greatest learning who hold this to be altogether doubtful, yet how will it be proved, that before deciding upon the doctrine he professed and before embracing the atomic physiology, he was already atheistically inclined and adopted that doctrine for no other reason than because, after weighing and examining all other systems, he perceived it to be the best calculated to fortify and set off the impious opinions, which he entertained concerning God. In the first place if it were so, Democritus was unparalleled in wickedness and perverseness of mind. For he determined to be inclined to oppose and do away with a God, and that, before he knew by what means it could most effectually be accomplished. Then having compared the different systems of philosophy he had recourse to this in preference, because he found it better adapted than the others to his impious and wicked purpose. We here see a monster and not a man. But who has fathomed the recesses of his mind? In what manner and upon what authority is it shown, that Democritus proceeded by that course? Many I fear will hold this in the light of a fable and as not a whit more probable than the contrary supposition. For if we reverse the whole and say, that Democritus was first led to adopt the atomic doctrine upon mature deliberation and afterwards by an abuse of intellect degenerated into irreligion and atheism, this will be at least as probable as the account given of his motives by the learned author.

pyramidal atoms, and the like. For that he did therein imitate the atomical physiology, is plain from these words of his:[5] Πάντα οὖν δεῖ ταῦτα διανοεῖσθαι σμικρὰ οὕτως, ὡς καθ' ἓν ἕκαστον οὐδὲν ὁρώμενον ὑφ' ἡμῶν, συναθροισθέντων δὲ πολλῶν, τοὺς ὄγκους αὐτῶν ὁρᾶσθαι, "All these cubical and pyramidal corpuscula of the fire and earth are in themselves so small, that by reason of their parvitude none of them can be perceived singly and alone, but only the aggregations of many of them together.

XLV. And Aristotle here trod in Plato's footsteps, not only in the better part, in asserting an incorporeal Deity, and an immoveable first mover; but also in physiologizing by forms and qualities, and rejecting that mechanical way by atoms, which had been so generally received amongst the ancients. Wherefore though the genius of these two persons was very different, and Aristotle often contradicteth Plato, and really dissents from him in several particularities; yet so much I think may be granted to those reconcilers, (Porphyry, Simplicius, and others) that the main essentials of their two philosophies are the same.[6]

Now, I say, the whole Aristotelical system of philosophy is

[5] From the Timæus p. 537. opp. Gassendus was so struck with this passage, that he scrupled not on the strength of it to rank Plato among the number of those, who formerly supposed the world to be compounded of atoms, Physic. sect. 1. lib. 3. cap. 5. p. 257. t. 1. opp. But the words which precede and follow sufficiently show, that Plato is speaking of those particles, of which the four elements consist and which he certainly considered to be endowed with qualities. Nor is there any greater weight in what Gassendus, in support of his opinion, quotes from Pachymeres. See our remarks on this passage above on sect. 16. But another passage occurs in the Timæus, which might perhaps induce some to believe that Plato was not much opposed to atomism. Discoursing of the fabrication of the human body he says, that the inferior gods, to whom this office was assigned by the supreme Deity, compounded and cemented bodies together out of particles of all the four elements, with spirit superadded, οὐ τοῖς ἀλύτοις, οἷς αὐτοὶ συνείχοντο, δεσμοῖς, ἀλλὰ διὰ σμικρότητα ἀοράτοις, πυκνοῖς γόμφοις ξυντήκοντες, "Non iisdem, quibus ipsi erant colligati, vinculis, sed talibus, quæ cerni non possent propter parvitatem, crebris quasi cuneolis injectis," Timæus p. 531. opp. What Plato here calls γόμφοι Cicero renders *cuneoli* and Ficinus *clavi*, but Chalcidius in expounding the passage, In Timæum Platonis cap. 201. p. 351. fancies that atoms or smallest corpuscles are meant by them: "Quorum omnium," says he, "quemdam nodum concatenationemque dicit esse in minutis solidisque corpusculis, quæ γόμφους cognominat." Behold, therefore, a testimony sufficiently ancient to prove, that Plato had no antipathy to atoms! But nothing is more certain than that Chalcidius mistook Plato's meaning, for he is speaking of the joints or fastenings of the component particles of our bodies. If γόμφοι here were atoms, Plato would be made to say, that the inferior Gods made use of atoms for fastenings and joints, to connect together the various kinds of particles, out of which they had compounded human bodies. But who could understand this? Can an atom serve as a fastening to bind fiery and earthy particles together, and to prevent them from falling asunder? What the *cuneoli* are, I am unable to say, but am sure they are not atoms.

[6] Dr. Cudworth here concedes more than is necessary. The disagreement between Plato and Aristotle respecting the very first principles of physical science is remarkable. But the later Platonists, some of whom are here mentioned, strove hard to reconcile the one with the other, in order to stop the mouths of the Christians, who sneered at the contests and squabbles of philosophers. See our Diss. on the later Platonists, sect. 7. p. 12.

infinitely to be preferred before the whole Democritical; though the former hath been so much disparaged,[7] and the other cried up of late amongst us. Because, though it cannot be denied, but that the Democritic hypothesis doth much more handsomely and intelligibly solve the corporeal phenomena, yet in all those other things, which are of far the greatest moment, it is rather a madness than a philosophy. But the Aristotelic system is right and sound here, as to those greater things; it asserting incorporeal substance, a Deity distinct from the world, the naturality of morality, and liberty of will. Wherefore though a late writer of politics[8] do so exceedingly disparage Aristotle's Ethics, yet we shall do him this right here to declare, that his Ethics were truly such, and answered their title; but that new model of ethics, which hath been obtruded upon the world with so much fastuosity, and is indeed nothing but the old Democritic doctrine revived, is no ethics at all, but a mere cheat, the undermining and subversion of all morality, by substituting something like t in the room of it, that is a mere counterfeit and changeling; the design whereof could not be any other than to debauch the world.

We add further, that Aristotle's system of philosophy seems to be more consistent with piety, than the Cartesian hypothesis itself, which yet plainly supposeth incorporeal substance. For as much as this latter makes God to contribute nothing more to the fabric of the world, than the turning round of a vortex or whirlpool of matter; from the fortuitous motion of which, according to certain general laws of nature, must proceed all this frame of things that now is, the exact organization and successive generation of animals, without the guidance of any mind or wisdom. Whereas Aristotle's nature is no fortuitous principle, but such as doth nothing in vain, but all for ends, and in every thing pursues the best; and therefore can be no other than a subordinate instrument of the divine wisdom, and the manuary opificer or executioner of it.[9]

However, we cannot deny, but that Aristotle hath been taxed

[7] Gassendus on the publication of his Adversus Aristoteleos Exercitationes Peripateticæ, extant in tom. 3. of his works, had roused many of his contemporaries both in France and Britain, against the Aristotelian system of philosophy. In particular Hobbes was one of the first to enroll his name among the repudiators of Aristotle.

[8] Thomas Hobbes, who not only in other portions of his works frequently inveighs against Aristotle and the whole of his philosophy, but also in the Leviathan cap. 46. p. 322. does not hesitate to call his Ethics the source of all the evils in the commonwealth; "Unde nata sunt," says he, "de religione in Germania, Gallia et Anglia bella civilia, nisi a philosophia ethica et politica Aristotelis et eorum, qui Aristotelem sequuti sunt, Romanorum? Mensura boni et mali in omni civitate est lex. Aristoteles autem virtutem et vitium non legibus definivit, sed laude et vituperio apud cives. Regum omnium imperium tyrannidem vocat, in democratia sola libertatem esse dicit," &c.

[9] On Aristotle's nature as he calls it, and the Cartesian hypothesis concerning the origin of the world, we have spoken below in our Diss. on generative or plastic natures.

by sundry of the ancients, Christians and others, for not so explicitly asserting these two things, the immortality of human souls, and providence over men, as he ought to have done, and as his master Plato did.[10] Though to do him all the right we can, we shall observe here, that in his Nicomachian[1] Ethics, he speaks favourably for the latter: Εἰ γάρ τις ἐπιμέλεια τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ὑπὸ θεῶν γίνεται, ὥσπερ δοκεῖ, καὶ εὔλογον χαίρειν αὐτοὺς τῷ ἀρίστῳ καὶ τῷ συγγενεστάτῳ (τοῦτο γὰρ εἴη ὁ νοῦς) καὶ τοὺς ἀγαπῶντας μάλιστα καὶ τοὺς τιμῶντας ἀντευποιεῖν, ὡς τῶν φίλων αὐτοῖς ἐπιμελουμένους, ὀρθῶς τε καὶ καλῶς πράττοντας; "If God take any care of human things, as it seems he doth, then it is reasonable to think also, that he is delighted with that which is the best, and nearest akin to himself, (which is mind or right reason) and that he rewards those who most love and honour it (as taking care of such things as are most pleasing to him) in doing rightly and honestly." A very good sentence, were it not ushered in with too much of scepticism. And as for the point of the soul's immortality; it is true, that whereas other philosophers before Aristotle asserted the pre-existence, incorporeity, and immortality of all souls, not only the rational, but the sensitive also, (which in men they concluded to be one and the same substance) according to that of Plato's πᾶσα ψυχὴ ἀθάνατος; "every soul is immortal," they resolving that no life nor cogitation could be corporeal; Aristotle, on the contrary, doth expressly deny the pre-existence, that is, the separability, incorporeity and immortality of all sensitive souls, not in brutes only, but also every where, giving his reason for it in these words: Ὅτι μὲν οὐχ οἷόν τε πάσας προϋπάρχειν, φανερόν ἐστιν ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων· ὅσων γάρ ἐστιν ἀρχῶν ἡ ἐνέργεια σωματικὴ, δῆλον, ὅτι ταύτας ἄνευ σώματος ἀδύνατον ὑπάρχειν, οἷον βαδίζειν ἄνευ ποδῶν· ὥστε καὶ θύραθεν εἰσιέναι ἀδύνατον· οὔτε γὰρ αὐτὰς καθ' ἑαυτὰς εἰσιέναι οἷόν τε ἀχωρίστους οὔσας, οὐτ' ἐν σώματι εἰσιέναι,[2] "That all souls cannot pre-exist, is manifest from hence, because those principles, whose action is corporeal, cannot possibly exist

[10] It is the common opinion, that Aristotle made the moon to be the boundary of divine providence and consequently excluded the other parts of the world from its superintendence. See Atticus' disputation against him in Eusebius, Præparat. Evangel. lib. 15. cap. 5. &c., p. 798. and what the learned Worth, on Tatiani Orat. contra Græcos, p. 9. has noted out of Clemens and Theodoret.

[1] Lib. 10. cap. 9. p. 185. t. 3. opp. This passage however is of little avail towards refuting the accusation. For not to mention what Dr. Cudworth himself has observed, that he here lays down nothing for certainty, he does not refer the care of human affairs to that supreme deity, whom he is wont to call the *first mover*, but to the θεοὶ only, namely the inferior gods and spirits, whom he supposed to preside over the stars and heavenly bodies. Although Aristotle may have considered these to be in a certain way concerned in the care of human affairs, which I would not absolutely gainsay, still he denied that that Deity, whom he held to be supreme, took an interest in any thing beneath the moon.

[2] This passage and the one immediately following occur De Generat. Animalium, lib. 2. cap. 3. p. 618. t. 2. opp.

without the body, as the power of walking without the feet. Wherefore it is impossible, that these sensitive souls (pre-existing) should come into the body from without, since they can neither come alone by themselves naked and stript of all body, they being inseparable from it; neither can they come in with a body, that is, the seed." This is Aristotle's argument, why all sensitive souls must needs be corporeal, because there is no walking without feet, nor seeing without eyes. But at the same time, he declares, that the mind or intellect does pre-exist and come in from without, that is, is incorporeal, separable and immortal, giving his reason for it in like manner: Λείπεται δὲ τὸν νοῦν μόνον θύραθεν ἐπεισιέναι, καὶ θεῖον εἶναι μόνον· οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτοῦ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ κοινωνεῖ σωματικὴ ἐνέργεια. "It remains that the mind or intellect, and that alone (pre-existing), enter from without, and be only divine; since its energy is not blended with that of the body's, but it acts independently upon it." Notwithstanding which, Aristotle elsewhere[3] distinguishing concerning this mind or intellect, and making it to be twofold, agent and patient, concludes the former of them only to be immortal, but the latter corruptible: Τοῦτο μόνον ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀΐδιον, ὁ δὲ παθητικὸς νοῦς φθαρτὸς, "The agent intellect is only immortal and eternal, but the passive is corruptible;" where some interpreters, that would willingly excuse Aristotle, contend that by the passive intellect, is not meant the patient, but the fantasy only, because Aristotle should otherwise contradict himself, who had affirmed the intellect to be separable, unmixed and inorganical, which they conceive must needs be understood of the patient. But this salvo can hardly take place here, where the passive intellect is directly opposed to the agent. Now what Aristotle's agent understanding is, and whether it be any thing in us, any faculty of our human soul or no, seems to be a thing very questionable, and has therefore caused much dispute amongst his interpreters; it being resolved by many of them to be the divine intellect, and commonly by others, a foreign thing. Whence it must needs be left doubtful, whether he acknowledged any thing incorporeal and immortal at all in us. And the rather because, laying down this principle, that nothing is incorporeal, but what acts independently upon the body, he somewhere plainly determines, that there is no intellection without corporeal fantasms. That which led Aristotle to all this, positively to affirm the corporeity of sensitive souls, and to stagger so much concerning the incorporeity of the rational, seems to have been his doctrine of forms and qualities,

[3] De Anima, lib. 3. cap. 6. p. 50. t. 2. opp. Unless I am mistaken, however, this passage is not at all at variance with the former one. For what Aristotle calls passive intellect is nothing but the sensitive soul, which in perceiving external things is affected by them and suffers in a certain way.

whereby corporeal and incorporeal substance are confounded together, so that the limits of each could not be discerned by him. Wherefore we cannot applaud Aristotle for this;[4] but that

[4] That most both of the ancient Christians and philosophers never entertained a doubt of Aristotle's having supposed the soul to be subject to death and annihilation, is evident from their disputations against him, to be found in Eusebius, Præparat. Evangel. lib. 15. cap. 9. &c. p. 808. and this impression of theirs, not to speak at present of Aristotle's opinions themselves, receives no slight confirmation from the fact, that Dicæarchus, an intimate friend of his, made it a point to impugn the doctrine of the soul's immortality. See Cicero, Tusculan. Quæst. lib. 1. cap. 31. I say nothing of Alexander Aphrodisiensis, pre-eminent for the sagacity with which he is said to have explored the principles of Aristotle, who, Comm. ad. lib. 2. Topicor. Aristot. p. 72. 77. 81. and elsewhere, broadly maintains the annihilation of souls and contends, that this was Aristotle's opinion. Nevertheless they could not all prevail upon themselves to believe it. Thus the author of the life of Pythagoras, in Photius, Biblioth. cod. 259. p. 1317. says, that Aristotle and Plato were equally strenuous as champions of the immortality, and denies, that those comprehend the sublime conceptions of Aristotle, who think any otherwise of him and pronounce him to have held the soul to be mortal. But at the period especially, when the Peripatetic philosophy began to be so palatable to Christians, not a few set themselves vigorously to work to show, that the prince of philosophers had entertained better notions of the soul than men supposed. Hence arose a mighty controversy, which has not yet entirely ceased: whether Aristotle considered the soul to be mortal or immortal. Averroes, one of the most acute inquirers into the opinions of Aristotle, did not hesitate to declare for the mortality. See Bayle's Dictionnaire artic. Averroes, tom. 1. p. 384. Among others also those disciples of the Peripatetic school, who started up in Italy in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries,—Pomponatius, Cæsalpinus, Cremoninus,—did not scruple to assert that if Aristotle's dogmas were to be the criterion, the eternal life of souls must be abandoned: see Leibnitz, Discours de la Conformité de la Foi et de la Raison, sect. 11. p. 16. The same had been maintained before by those Platonists who, as is well known, contended so fiercely with the Peripatetics in Italy, concerning the excellence of their respective systems,—Bessarion, Georgius Trapezuntius and others; although among these Pletho was more moderate than the rest, and confessed that Aristotle appeared to him to have favoured the immortality. But others again stoutly defended Aristotle, and complained of the great injustice done to the philosopher by those, who asserted that he held souls to be mortal. The principal arguments to this point have been carefully collected by Boned. Pererius, among others, De Communibus Rerum Natural. Principiis et Affection. lib. 6. cap. 19. p. 388. &c. But Augustinus Oregius, a no mean philosopher, wrote a specific work, De Immortalitate Animæ, for the purpose of vindicating the cause of Aristotle. See Lib. Fromondus in his Philosoph. Christiana de Anima p. 761. and Bayle, Dictionnaire tom. 3. p. 2120. Among these some took an intermediate course, considering it to be one of those questions, upon which nothing certain can be established: so Franc. Patricius, Discuss. Peripatet. lib. 12. p. 152.; to which class Dr. Cudworth seems also to belong. For my own part, although Aristotle perhaps is designedly very obscure in speaking of this subject generally, yet I consider it almost certain, that he held souls to be mortal. I am led into this opinion chiefly from what he has stated sufficiently clearly concerning the origin of the soul De Generatione Animal. lib. 2. cap. 3. p. 617. &c. In this passage having first confessed it to be very difficult to explain, whence the soul comes or at what time men receive it, he adds, that he will try whether he can throw some light on a matter so abstruse. He then speaks of the soul which he calls *vegetative* and of the *sensitive* soul, and proceeds on to the νοῦς or *rational* soul, which alone, he says, comes to a man from without and is divine. He informs us, that there is a certain substance in the nature of things more divine than all the elements, which is not fire nor yet unlike fire, approaching more nearly to the nature of that region, in which the stars reside. Τοῦτο δὲ οὐ πῦρ, οὐδὲ τοιαύτη δύναμίς ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐμπεριλαμβανόμενον ἐν τῷ σπέρματι καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀφρώδει πνεῦμα, καὶ ἡ ἐν τῷ πνεύματι φύσις, ἀναλόγως οὖσα τῷ τῶν ἄστρων στοιχείῳ, "Itaque non ignis, non talis facultas aliqua est, sed spiritus, qui in semine spumosoque corpore continetur, et natura, quæ in eo

which we commend him for is chiefly these four things; first, for making a perfect incorporeal intellect to be the head of all; and secondly, for resolving that nature, as an instrument of this intellect, does not merely act according to the necessity of material motions, but for ends and purposes, though unknown to itself; thirdly, for maintaining the naturality of morality; and lastly, for asserting the τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, autexousy, or liberty from necessity.

spiritu est, proportione respondens elemento stellarum." From this substance he makes souls to be produced. Also De Generatione Animal. lib. 3. cap. 11. p. 664. he states the same more explicitly: Ἐν δὲ τῷ παντὶ θερμότης ψυχική, ὡς τρόπον τινὰ πάντα ψυχῆς εἶναι πλήρη· διὸ συνίσταται ταχέως, ὅποταν ἐμπεριληφθῇ. "In universa rerum natura calor quidam est animalis, ita ut quodammodo plena animæ sint omnia. Quamobrem consistunt celeriter, quum calor ille est exceptus." And this animal heat I conceive to be that "quintum genus, vacans nomine," from which Cicero says that Aristotle derived souls, Tuscul. Quæst. lib. 1. cap. 10. p. 2573. t. 8. opp. This therefore is Aristotle's opinion respecting the origin of the soul: That a certain animal heat, kindled up perhaps from the stars, is diffused through the whole nature of things, a substance most subtile and in an especial degree fiery and rapid. That some portion of this substance is caught up and absorbed by seed; and on this taking place, that a soul springs up and discharges its functions in the body.—If this be true, what hope is there left for poor souls, that they will survive after death? These souls are particles of an animal heat pervading the whole universe: moreover, this heat itself is something corporeal; not indeed such a body as the four elements, but far more rare and subtile, like those bodies which chemists call *spirits;* but still a body. Now I ask: what will become of such souls on the extinction of the bodies? Will they not return to that fountain from whence they came, to that "fifth fiery kind" which is everywhere? Will not the particle, which was pent up within the body, be again united to the substance from which it was taken? Therefore Aristotle's opinion was not a whit better than that of the Stoics, nor are those in error, who consider, that the prince of the Peripatetics augured ill of souls, and meant them to be perishable and mortal.

CHAPTER II.

In this Chapter are contained all the grounds of reason for the atheistic hypothesis. 1. That the Democritic philosophy, which is made up of these two principles, Corporealism and Atomism complicated together, is essentially atheistical. 2. Though Epicurus, who was an Atomical-Corporealist, pretended to assert a democracy of Gods, yet he was, for all that, an absolute Atheist: and that Atheists commonly equivocate and disguise themselves. 3. That the Democritical philosophy is nothing else but a system of atheology, or atheism swaggering under the glorious appearance of philosophy. And though there be another form of atheism, which we call Stratonical, yet the Democritic atheism is only considerable; all whose dark mysteries will be here revealed. 4. That we being to treat concerning the Deity, and to produce all that profane and unhallowed stuff of Atheists in order to a confutation, the divine assistance and direction ought to be implored. 5. That there are two things here to be performed: first, to show what are the Atheists' pretended grounds of reason against the Deity; and secondly, how they endeavour either to solve or confute the contrary phenomena. The first of those grounds, that no man can have an idea or conception of God, and that he is an incomprehensible nothing. 6. The second atheistic argument, that there can be no creation out of nothing, nor no omnipotence, because nothing can come from nothing; and therefore whatsoever substantially is, was from eternity self-existent, and uncreated by any Deity. 7. The third pretended reason against a Deity, that the strictest notion of a God implying him to be incorporeal, there can be no such incorporeal Deity, because there is no other substance but body. 8. The Atheists' pretence, that the doctrine of incorporeal substances sprung from a ridiculous mistaking of abstract names and notions for realities. They impudently make the Deity to be the chief of spectres, and an Oberon or prince of fairies and fancies. Their fourth argument against a Deity, that to suppose an incorporeal mind to be the original of all things is but to make a mere accident and abstract notion to be the first cause of all. 9. Their fifth argument; a confutation of a corporeal Deity from the principles of corporealism itself, that matter being the only substance, and all other differences of things nothing but accidents, generable and corruptible, no living understanding being can be essentially incorruptible. The Stoical God incorruptible, only by accident. 10. Their sixth ratiocination from a complication of atomicism; that the first principle of all things whatsoever in the universe is atoms or corpuscula devoid of all qualities, and consequently of sense and understanding, (which spring up afterwards from a certain composition of them) and therefore Mind or Deity was not the first original of all. 11. In the seventh place they disprove the world's animation, or its being governed by a living understanding animalish nature presiding over the whole; because sense and understanding are a peculiar appendix to flesh, blood, and brains, and reason is nowhere to be found but in human form. 12. The eighth atheistic ground, that God being taken by all for a most happy, eternal

and immortal animal, (or living being) there can be no such thing, because all living beings are concretions of atoms, that were at first generated, and are liable to death and corruption by the dissolution of their compages. And that life is no simple primitive nature, but an accidental modification of compounded bodies, which upon the disunion of their parts vanisheth into nothing. 13. The ninth pretended atheistic demonstration, that by God is meant a first cause or mover, which was not before moved by any thing else without it; but nothing can move itself, and therefore there can be no unmoved mover, nor any first in the order of causes, that is, a God. 14. Their further proof of this principle, that nothing can move itself, with an atheistic corollary from thence, that no thinking being could be a first cause, no cogitation arising of itself without a cause; which may be reckoned a tenth argument. 15. Another mystery of atheism, that all knowledge, and mental conception is the information of the things themselves known, existing without the knower, and a passion from them; and therefore the world must needs be before any knowledge or conception of it, and no knowledge or conception before the world, as its cause. 16. The twelfth argumentation, that things could not be made by a God, because they are so faulty and ill made, that they were not contrived for the good of man; and that the deluge of evils, that overflows all, shows that they did not proceed from any Deity. 17. The thirteenth instance of the Atheists against a Deity, from the defect of Providence, that in human affairs all is Tohu and Bohu, chaos and confusion. 18. The fourteenth atheistic ground, that it is not possible for any one being to animadvert and order all things in the distant places of the whole world at once: but if it were possible, that such infinite negotiosity would be absolutely inconsistent with happiness. 19. Several bold but slight queries of Atheists, why the world was not made sooner? and what God did before? why it was made at all, since it was so long unmade? and, how the architect of the world could rear up so huge a fabric? 20. The Atheists' pretence, that it is the great interest of mankind, that there should be no God; and that it was a noble and heroical exploit of the Democritics, to chase away that affrightful spectre out of the world, and to free men from the continual fear of a Deity and punishment after death, imbittering all the pleasures of life. 21. Another pretence of theirs, that Theism is inconsistent with civil sovereignty, it introducing a fear greater than the fear of the Leviathan; and that any other conscience allowed of besides the civil law (being private judgment) is, ipso facto, a dissolution of the body politic, and a return to the state of nature. 22. The Atheists' conclusion from the former premises, as set down in Plato and Lucretius, that all things sprung originally from nature and chance, without any Mind or God, that is, proceeded from the necessity of material motions, undirected for ends; that infinite atoms devoid of life and sense, moving in infinite space from eternity, by their fortuitous rencounters and entanglements, produced the system of the whole universe, and as well animate as inanimate things.

I. HAVING in the former chapter given an account of the genuine and primitive atomical philosophy, which may be called the Moschical; we are in the next place to consider the Democritical, that is, the atheized and adulterated atomology; which had its origin from nothing else but the joining of this heterogeneous and contradictious principle to the atomical physi-

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ology, that there is no other substance in the world besides body. Now we say, that that philosophy, which is thus compounded and made up of these two things, atomicism and corporealism complicated together, is essentially atheistical, though neither of them alone be such. For the atomical physiology, as we have declared already, is in its own nature sufficiently repugnant to atheism. And it is possible for one, who holds that there is nothing in the world besides body, to be persuaded notwithstanding of a corporeal Deity, and that the world was at first framed and is still governed by an understanding nature lodged in the matter. For thus some of these Corporealists have fancied the whole universe itself to be a God, that is, an understanding and wise animal, that ordered all things within itself, after the best manner possible, and providently governed the same. Indeed it cannot be denied, but that this is a very great infirmity of mind, that such persons lie under, who are not able to conceive any other substance besides body, by which is understood that which is impenetrably extended, or else, in Plato's language, which hath προσβολὴν καὶ ἐπαφὴν, "that thrusts against other bodies and resists their impulse;" or, as others express it, which is τόπου πληρωτικὸν, "that" so "fills up place," as to exclude any other body or substance from coexisting with it therein; and such must needs have not only very imperfect, but also spurious and false conceptions of the Deity, so long as they apprehend it to be thus corporeal; but yet it does not therefore follow,[1] that they must needs be

[1] For my part I should willingly concede that those, who consider God to be endowed with a certain sort of body, are not for that reason to be numbered among the disbelievers in a divine essence and nature altogether. For he who holds a certain eternal cause of all things, not only possessed of infinite power and wisdom, but also most free and wholly unshackled by any law of necessity, although he may think otherwise than as becomes an intelligent man of some properties and virtues of this essence, ought not nevertheless to be accounted an Atheist and foe to the Supreme Being. For such indeed is the frailty of the human mind, that it sometimes can comprehend the most essential portion of a truth, and still not grasp all its adjuncts and bearings. Take for example not a few of the early pastors of Christian flocks, men of the greatest eminence, Tertullian, Melito and others: not to speak of the ancient corruptors of the heavenly doctrine, who, although entertaining sublime and noble conceptions of a Deity, were nevertheless unable to abstract the mind from ocular experience, so as to believe in the existence of an incorporeal God. See what has been observed thereupon by Dion. Petavius, Dogm. Theol. t. 1. lib. 2. cap. 1. p. 86. &c. ed. recent. and by Jo. Bapt. Cotelerius on Clementinor. Homil. 17. t. 1. Patr. Apostol. p. 738. But as to what the worthy author wishes to persuade us also, that not even those are to be ranked with Atheists, who hold the whole universe itself to be a God or a consummately wise animal, this perhaps involves more difficulty and doubt than he supposes. In the first place, it is clear from the confession of all and from sense itself, that the matter of which this globe consists is bound by certain immutable laws. If this therefore, be God's body, what else will follow, but that the divine nature obeys necessity? Which being conceded, it would be unreasonable to require any one on the score of duty to worship God. Again, if the whole universe itself be God, we, certainly, and all animals will be parts of him, cast forth by that divine nature from his own bosom. But to exact from parts the worship of or piety towards the whole, appears to be very little short of madness. I shall not now touch upon the other bearings of this opinion,

accounted Atheists. But whosoever holds these two principles (before mentioned) together, that there is no other substance besides body, and that body hath nothing else belonging to it but magnitude, figure, site and motion, without qualities: I say, whosoever is that confounded thing of an Atomist and Corporealist jumbled together, he is essentially and unavoidably that, which is meant by an Atheist, though he should in words never so much disclaim it, because he must needs fetch the original of all things from senseless matter; whereas to assert a God is to maintain, that all things sprung originally from a knowing and understanding nature.

II. Epicurus, who was one of those mongrel things before mentioned, (an Atomical-Corporealist or Corporeal-Atomist) did notwithstanding profess to hold a multifarious rabble and democracy of Gods, such as though they were ἀνθρωπόμορφοι,[2] "of human form," yet were so thin and subtle, as that comparatively with our terrestrial bodies they might be called incorporeal; they having not so much carnem as quasi-carnem, nor sanguinem as quasi-sanguinem, a certain kind of aërial or etherial flesh and blood: which gods of his were not to be supposed to exist any where within the world, upon this pretence, that there was no place in it fit to receive them;

> Illud item non est, ut possis credere sedes
> Esse Deûm sanctas in mundi partibus ullis.[3]

And therefore they must be imagined to subsist in certain intermundane spaces, and Utopian regions without the world, the deliciousness whereof is thus elegantly described by the poet;

> Quas neque concutiunt venti, neque nubila nimbis
> Adspergunt, neque nix acri concreta pruinâ
> Cana cadens violat, semperque innubilus Æther
> Integit, et large diffuso lumine ridet.[4]

which, if estimated upon its own merits, will be evident as leading to all manner of wickedness and to a denial of the Supreme Being. Some, however, it must be owned, have been so blind to the perception of truth, as to discard God in their opinions, and still not only to venerate and most devoutly worship him themselves, but to hold forth also the necessity of his worship to all others. For so it comes to pass through the weakness of human nature, that many are Atheists in sentiments and opinions, but the friends of God in life and morals; and on the contrary, many deny God by their actions and course of life, who uphold him in their opinions and principles. I could wish this to be always borne in mind by learned men, who dispute about the religion and piety of others, especially of the ancient philosophers. We are most of us prone to accuse and excuse the ancients; but we should not be thus prone, if we kept constantly in view the disposition, corruptness and miseries of mankind, the recesses and inmost workings of our own minds, and lastly the ambiguity of words.

[2] This is chiefly borrowed from Cicero, who may be consulted with advantage, De Natura. Deor. lib. 1. cap. 18. p. 2907, t. 9. opp.

[3] The verses of Lucretius De Rerum Natura v. 147. 148. t. 2. ed. Havercamp. p. 245.

[4] Lucretius, lib. 3. v. 19, &c., t. 1. p. 476. On the rest that is here stated concerning the gods of Epicurus, see Lucretius and Cicero in the passages referred to.

Whereunto was added, that the chief happiness of these gods consisted in omnium vacatione munerum, "in freedom from all business and employment," and doing nothing at all, that so they might live a soft and delicate life. And lastly, it was pretended, that though they had neither any thing to do with us, nor we with them, yet they ought to be worshipped by us for their own excellent nature's sake, and happy state.

But whosoever had the least sagacity in him could not but perceive, that this theology of Epicurus was but romantical,[5] it being directly contrary to his avowed and professed principles, to admit of any other being, than what was concreted of atoms, and consequently corruptible; and that he did this upon a politic account, thereby to decline the common odium, and those dangers and inconveniences, which otherwise he might have incurred by a downright denial of a God, to which purpose it ac-

[5] I agree in opinion with those, who consider Epicurus to have been an Atheist and to have introduced gods solely for the sake of avoiding danger and inconvenience to himself, and I cordially assent to all that has been advanced by the venerable Buddeus, Thes. de Atheismo et Superstit. cap. 1. p. 66. &c., in answer to Rondellus, the champion of Epicurus, and others; nor am I induced to forego this opinion by the arguments brought forward in his defence by Bayle, Dictionnaire Hist. t. 1. artic. Epicurus, note g. p. 1077. Gassendus, De Vita et Moribus Epicuri, lib. 4. cap. 3. p. 201. t. 5. opp. and others mentioned by Jo. Alb. Fabricius in his Delect. Argum. pro Veritate Religionis Christianæ, cap. 14. p. 373. The main point insisted on by Gassendus and others in vindicating Epicurus is, that he was punctual and diligent in the worship of the gods and wrote copious commentaries on religion. But these learned men forget, that it was necessary for a man to do so, whose only maxim it was, to pass through life in comfort and tranquillity; which he could not by any means have done, if he had openly spurned the established religion. Nevertheless the reasoning of Dr. Cudworth in this place, to show that Epicurus was an Atheist, is, I consider, any thing but sound and conclusive. For the worthy Doctor argues thus: "Epicurus held all things to consist of atoms; therefore he could not possibly admit of immortal and eternal Gods; for that which is concreted of atoms cannot escape death and dissolution." But he must have known, that Gassendus had already denied the gods of Epicurus to be concreted of atoms, and had contended, that he placed the divine essence in the first principles of things, and held it to be eternal and immutable. Syntagm. de Philos. Epicuri, p. 2. cap. 3. p. 14. t. 3. opp. and in lib. 10. Laërtii. Which opinion is supported by the passages of the ancients brought forward by Bayle as above quoted, artic. Epicurus, note g. p. 1078, whereto may be added Lucretius De Rerum Natura, lib. 5. v. 149. &c. p. 245. &c. His assertion, therefore, that all things are concreted of atoms, notwithstanding that some of the ancient Christians think otherwise, seems to have reference only to this visible universe. We are not here inquiring into the mind and intention of Epicurus; for, as I have already acknowledged, he seems to me to have been in jest, when discoursing of gods, and to have left deities in words, which in reality he discarded. We are asking simply, what he openly professed and avowed in words; for if due regard be paid to them, he does not appear to have been inconsistent with himself, when he asserted all things to consist of atoms, and at the same time maintained the existence of gods. Although, to confess the truth, no passage either of Epicurus himself or of any other of the ancients can be adduced, in which it is expressly recorded, that he did not hold the gods to be concreted of atoms; it being inferred merely as a consequence from the passages which are cited on the subject. Wherefore some perhaps will consider him to have purposely abstained from an express avowal of his sentiments upon this matter, and to have had recourse to ambiguity as a protection against the malevolence of enemies. Compare the learned Doctor's observations below, cap. 4. sect. 20, on the same subject, where he seems to take a somewhat different view of the gods of Epicurus.

cordingly served his turn. Thus Posidonius[6] rightly pronounced: "Nullos esse deos Epicuro videri; quæque is de diis immortalibus dixerit, invidiæ detestandæ gratiâ dixisse." Though he was partly jocular in it also, it making no small sport to him, in this manner, to delude and mock the credulous vulgar:[7] "Deos jocandi causâ induxit Epicurus perlucidos et perflabiles, et habitantes, tanquam inter duos lucos, sic inter duos mundos propter metum ruinarum." However, if Epicurus had been never so much in earnest in all this, yet, by Gassendus' leave, we should pronounce him to have been not a jot the less an atheist, so long as he maintained, that the whole world was made[8] μηδενὸς διατάττοντος ἢ διατάξαντος, τὴν πᾶσαν μακαριότητα ἔχοντος μετὰ ἀφθαρσίας, "without the ordering and direction of any understanding being, that was perfectly happy and immortal;" and fetched the original of all things in the universe, even of soul and mind, ἀπὸ τῶν ἀτόμων σωμάτων ἀπρονόητον καὶ τυχαίαν ἐχόντων τὴν κίνησιν, "from senseless atoms fortuitously moved." He, together with Democritus, hereby making the world to be in the worst sense ὠὸν τῆς νυκτὸς, "an egg of the night," that is, not the off-spring of mind and understanding, but of dark senseless matter, of Tohu and Bohu, or confused chaos; and deriving the original of all the perfections in the universe from the most imperfect being, and the lowest of all entities, than which nothing can be more atheistical. And as for those romantic monogrammous Gods of Epicurus, had they been seriously believed by him, they could have been nothing else but a certain kind of aerial and spectrous men, living by themselves, nobody knows where, without the world:[9] Ἐπίκουρος ὡς μὲν πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς ἀπολείπει Θεὸν, ὡς δὲ πρὸς φύσιν πραγμάτων οὐδαμῶς, "Epicurus, according to vulgar opinion, leaves a God; but, according to the nature of things, none at all."

And as Epicurus, so other Atheists in like manner have commonly had their vizards and disguises; atheism for the most part prudently choosing to walk abroad in masquerade. And though some over-credulous persons have been so far imposed upon

[6] In Cicero, De Natura Deor. lib. 1. cap. 44. p. 2949. t. 9. opp.

[7] The words of Cicero, De Divinatione, lib. 2. cap. 17. p. 3702. t. 9. opp.

[8] These and the Greek words immediately following are extracted, I have no doubt, from some ancient writer; but who this may be, I have not thought it necessary to make minute enquiry. With respect to the thing itself there can be no question; inasmuch as it is to be found stated in nearly the same words in Laërtius, Plutarch, Lucretius and others.

[9] The custom of quoting the words of the ancients without naming the author, I have felt to be a bad one even from this passage alone, having had to search a long time, before I discovered that it is borrowed from Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Mathemat. lib. 9. p. 565. ed. Fabricii. But the passage of Sextus is not given entire, the words κατ' ἐνίους having been omitted, which indicate, that this opinion concerning Epicurus was not held by all, but by some only.

hereby, as to conclude, that there was hardly any such thing as an Atheist any where in the world, yet they, that are sagacious, may easily look through these thin veils and disguises, and perceive these Atheists oftentimes insinuating their atheism even then, when they most of all profess themselves Theists, by affirming, that it is impossible to have any idea or conception at all of God; and that as he is not finite, so he cannot be infinite, and that no knowledge or understanding is to be attributed to him; which is in effect to say, that there is no such thing. But whosoever entertains the Democritic principles,[10] that is, both rejects forms and qualities of body, and makes all things to be body, though he pretend never so much to hold a corporeal Deity, yet he is not at all to be believed in it, it being a thing plainly contradictious to those principles.

III. Wherefore this mongrel philosophy, which Leucippus, Democritus, and Protagoras were the founders of, and which was entertained afterwards by Epicurus, that makes (as Laërtius writes[1]) ἀρχὰς τῶν ὅλων ἀτόμους, senseless "atoms to be the first principles," not only of all bodies (for that was a thing admitted before by Empedocles and other Atomists that were Theists) but also of all things whatsoever in the whole universe, and therefore of soul and mind too; this I say, was really nothing else but a philosophical form of atheology, a gigantical and Titanical attempt to dethrone the Deity, not only by solving all the phenomena of the world without a God, but also by laying down such principles, from whence it must needs follow, that there could be neither an incorporeal nor corporeal Deity. It was atheism openly swaggering under the glorious appearance of wisdom and philosophy.

There is indeed another form of atheism, (which insisting on the vulgar way of philosophizing by forms and qualities) we for distinction sake shall call Stratonical; such as, being too modest and shamefaced to fetch all things from the fortuitous motion of atoms, would therefore allow to the several parts of matter a certain kind of natural (thongh not animal) perception, such as is devoid of reflexive consciousness, together with a plastic power, whereby they may be able artificially and methodically to form and frame themselves to the best advantage of their respective capabilities; something like to Aristotle's nature, but that it hath no dependence at all upon any higher Mind or Deity. And these Atheists may be also called hylozoic (as the other atomic,)

[10] Those who are even moderately acquainted with Hobbes cannot fail to perceive, that he is glanced at in these words. For he professed the principles of Democritus and at the same time maintained a corporeal God. See Leviathan, cap. 12. p. 56. cap. 24. p. 183. and Append. cap. 3. p. 360.

[1] Lib. 10. segm. 41. p. 620. and elsewhere. Add Lucretius, who especially, as is well known, has given a clear account of this doctrine of his master.

because they derive all things in the whole universe, not only sensitive, but also rational souls, together with the artificial frame of animals, from the life of matter. But this kind of atheism seems to be but an unshapen embryo of some dark and cloudy brains, that was never yet digested into an entire system, nor could be brought into any such tolerable form, as to have the confidence to show itself abroad in full and open view. But the Democritic and Atomic atheism, as it is the boldest and rankest of all atheisms, it not only undertaking to solve all phenomena by matter fortuitously moved, without a God, but also to demonstrate, that there cannot be so much as a corporeal Deity; so it is that alone, which, pretending to an entire and coherent system, hath publicly appeared upon the stage, and therefore doth, in a manner, only deserve our consideration.

And now we shall exhibit a full view and prospect of it, and discover all its dark mysteries and profundities; we being much of this persuasion, that a plain and naked representation of them will be a great part of a confutation at least: not doubting but it will be made to appear, that though this monster, big-swoln with a puffy show of wisdom, strut and stalk so gigantically, and march with such a kind of stately philosophic grandeur, yet it is indeed but like the giant Orgoglio in our English poet, a mere empty bladder, blown up with vain conceit, an Empusa, fantasm, or spectre, the offspring of night and darkness, nonsense and contradiction.

And yet for all that we shall not wrong it the least in our representation, but give it all possible advantages of strength and plausibility, that so the Atheists may have no cause to pretend (as they are wont to do, in such cases) that either we did not understand their mysteries, nor apprehend the full strength of their cause, or else did purposely smother and conceal it. Which indeed we have been so far from, that we must confess we were not altogether unwilling this business of theirs should look a little like something, that might deserve a confutation. And whether the Atheists ought not rather to give us thanks for mending and improving their arguments, than complain that we have any way impaired them, we shall leave it to the censure of impartial judgments.

IV. Plato[2] tells us, that even amongst those Pagans in his time there was generally such a religious humour, that πάντες, ὅσοι κατὰ βραχὺ σωφροσύνης μετέχουσι, ἐπὶ πάσῃ ὁρμῇ καὶ σμίκρου καὶ μεγάλου πράγματος, Θεὸν ἀεί που ἐπικαλοῦσι, "whosoever had but the least of seriousness and sobriety in them, whensoever they took in hand any enterprise, whether great or small, they would always invoke the Deity for assistance

[2] In the Timæus, p. 23δ.

and direction." Adding moreover, that himself should be very faulty, if in his Timæus, when he was to treat about so grand a point, concerning the whole world, εἰ γέγονεν ἢ καὶ ἀγενής ἐστι, "whether it were made or unmade," he should not make his entrance thereinto by a religious invocation of the Deity. Wherefore certainly it could not be less than a piece of impiety in a Christian, being to treat concerning the Deity itself, and to produce all that profane and unhallowed stuff of Atheists out of their dark corners, in order to a confutation, and the better confirmation of our faith in the truth of his existence, not to implore his direction and assistance. And I know no reason, but that we may well do it, in that same litany of Plato's, κατὰ νοῦν ἐκείνῳ μὲν μάλιστα, ἑπομένως δὲ ἡμῖν εἰπεῖν, "that we may first speak agreeably to his own mind, or becomingly of his nature, and then consentaneously with ourselves."

V. Now there are these two things here to be performed by us, first to discover and produce the chief heads of arguments, or grounds of reason, insisted on by the Atheists to disprove a Deity, evincing withal briefly the ineffectualness and falseness of them: and secondly, to show how they endeavour either to confute or solve, consistently with their own principles, all those phenomena which are commonly urged against them to prove a Deity and incorporeal substance; manifesting likewise the invalidity thereof.

The grounds of reason alleged for the atheistical hypothesis are chiefly these that follow. First, That we have no idea of God, and therefore can have no evidence of him; which argument is further flourished and descanted upon in this manner. That notion or conception of a Deity that is commonly entertained, is nothing but a bundle of incomprehensibles, unconceivables, and impossibles; it being only a compilement of all imaginable attributes of honour, courtship, and compliment, which the confounded fear and astonishment of men's minds made them huddle up together, without any sense or philosophic truth. This seems to be intimated by a modern writer[3] in these words; "The attri-

[3] Thomas Hobbes, who openly professed this opinion in more places than one. So Leviathan, par. 2. cap. 31. p. 171. ed Amstelod. he says: "De natura autem divina disputare, honori Deo debito contrarium est: supponitur enim, de regno Dei sciri nihil posse, nisi per rationem naturalem, id est, per principia physica, quæ, tantum abest, ut naturam divinam patefaciant, ut ne nostram quidem aut cujusquam rei minimam naturam nos docere possint. In attributis ergo divinis respiciendum non est ad definitiones vocabulorum, sed ad, quam significant, honoris intentionem." I pass over other passages of the same kind to be met with in his Elementa de Cive, cap. 15. sect. 14. p. 117. his book Of Human Nature, chap. 9. see Tripos Lond. 1684—8, and frequently elsewhere. The words, indeed, here adduced by Dr. Cudworth, I have not met with either in the Latin works of Hobbes, published together Amstelod. 1668—4. nor in his English minor works, nearly all of which I think I have read; but I am led to suppose, that they occur in the preface to a very rare collection of his treatises, De Fato et Necessitate, Lond. 1656—4. inasmuch as Leibnitz, Essais de Theodicée, tom. 2.

butes of God signify not true nor false, nor any opinion of our brain, but the reverence and devotion of our hearts; and therefore they are not sufficient premises to infer truth, or convince falsehood." And the same thing again is further set out, with no small pretence to wit, after this manner; "They that venture to dispute philosophically, or reason of God's nature, from these attributes of honour, losing their understanding in the very first attempt, fall from one inconvenience into another, without end and without number; in the same manner as when one, ignorant of the ceremonies of court, coming into the presence of a greater person than he is used to speak to, and stumbling at his entrance, to save himself from falling, lets slip his cloak, to recover his cloak lets

p. 12. finds this opinion advanced in that preface. Be that as it will, however, it may reasonably be doubted, whether we can infer from them, that Hobbes meant to deny a God. It is not for me to palliate or excuse the wicked and impious doctrines of this writer, or to put a different construction upon his words from what he himself intended; on the contrary, I hold him to have been a very bad man and do not deny his covert and insidious attacks upon the heavenly truth; nay, even this opinion in question I consider to be worthy of all reprobation. But still I confess my doubts, whether it is impossible for any one who is imbued with it to reverence a God. I. Hobbes in those very passages, wherein he maintains what we are speaking of, both lays down the existence of a God and decides, that that God is *omnipotent, one, infinite, eternal*, and incapable of all change. II. He expressly declares, that those who assert the world to be eternal and deny the providence of God over human affairs, do injustice to the Deity. III. But the other attributes of God, goodness, justice, holiness, mercy, he holds to be of such a nature, as to signify, *not what God is, but how much we admire and reverence him.* IV. Therefore he does not consider us to be destitute of all notion or conception of a Deity, but denies that we can form what the philosophers call a *positive* and *affirmative* notion of the divine virtues and perfections. V. But if he that holds these sentiments ought to be ranked amongst Atheists, I do not see why those termed *Supralapsarians* should not be referred to the same class. For many of these also, it is well known, decide, that the divine virtues, *justice, mercy, goodness*, do not correspond to the virtues which are designated by these words amongst men; which I consider to be the same with saying, that we lack a true notion of the divine perfections, and that the names made use of by us in this matter have no definite meaning. I shall add two points more. I. Hobbes contradicts himself. He denies, that the truth or falsehood of any thing can be proved from the divine perfections, inasmuch as we have no true notion of them; and yet in another passage, Leviathan, cap. 44. p. 300. he maintains it to be evident from our notion of the divine mercy, that the torments of the wicked after death will some time or other have an end. Thus frequently are those at variance with themselves, who wish to appear as instructors of the whole human race. II. In the latter period of his life Hobbes wrote an *Apology*, wherein he submitted all that he had formerly advanced in the Leviathan to the judgment of the wise, declaring, that in composing that book he had obeyed the impulse of an intemperate mind rather than reason, and that he had not afterwards defended the opinions contained in it. This is recorded by Anth. Wood, in the Athenæ Oxonienses. We may believe, that the man did nothing contrary to the sentiments of his own mind. For he was both prone by nature to cleave obstinately to any opinion which he had once adopted, and as the same author observes, was so infected with arrogance, that he could scarcely carry on a dispute without railing and abuse; nor at that time, indeed; had he any cause to fear, being in high estimation at court and enjoying the especial favour of King Charles the Second. I have thought proper to pursue this subject to greater length, partly because Dr. Cudworth very often censures and refutes Hobbes, whose impious and irreligious principles no good man can deny, and partly because in our time the piety and religion of this writer has been made subject of controversy by men of the greatest learning

fall his hat, and with one disorder after another discovers his astonishment and rusticity." The meaning of which, and other like passages of the same writer, seems to be this; that the attributes of God (by which his nature is supposed to be expressed) having no philosophic truth or reality in them, had their only original from a sort of rustic astonishment of mind, proceeding from excess of fear, raising up the fantasm of a Deity, as a bug-bear for an object to itself, and affrighting men into all manner of confounded nonsense and absurdity of expressions concerning it, such as have no signification, nor any conception of the mind answering to them. This is the first argument used especially by our modern Democritics against the Deity, that because they can have no phantastic idea of it, nor fully comprehend all that is concluded in the notion thereof, that therefore it is but an incomprehensible nothing.

VI. Secondly, another argument much insisted on by the old Democritic Atheists, is directed against the divine omnipotence and creative power, after this manner. By God is always understood a Creator of something or other out of nothing. For however the Theists be here divided amongst themselves, some of them believing that there was once nothing at all existing in this whole space, which is now occupied by the world, besides the Deity, and that he was then a solitary being, so that the substance of the whole corporeal universe had a temporary beginning and novity of existence, and the duration of it hath now continued but for so many years only. Others persuading themselves, that though the matter and substance at least, (if not the form also) of the corporeal world, did exist from eternity, yet nevertheless, they both alike proceeded from the Deity by way of emanation, and do continually depend upon it, in the same manner as light, though coeval with the sun, yet proceeded from the sun, and depends upon it, being always, as it were, made anew by it; wherefore, according to this hypothesis, though things had no antecedent non-entity in time, yet they were as little of themselves, and owed all their being as much to the Deity, as if they had been once actually nothing, they being, as it were, perpetually created out of nothing by it. Lastly, others of those Theists resolving, that the matter of the corporeal universe was not only from eternity, but also self-existent and uncreated, or independent upon any Deity as to its being; but yet the forms and qualities of all inanimate bodies, together with the souls of all animals in the successive generations of them, (being taken for entities distinct from the matter) were created by the Deity out of nothing. We say, though there be such difference among the Theists themselves, yet they all agree in this, that God is, in some sense or other, the creator of some real entity out of nothing, or the cause of that which otherwise would not have

been of itself, so that no creation out of nothing, (in that enlarged sense) no Deity. Now it is utterly impossible, that any substance or real entity should be created out of nothing (it being contradictious to that indubitable axiom of reason, de nihilo nihil, "from nothing nothing)." The argument is thus urged by Lucretius, according to the minds of Epicurus and Democritus:

> Principium hinc cujus nobis exordia sumet:
> Nullam rem e nihilo gigni divinitus unquam.
> Quippe ita formido mortales continet omnes,
> Quòd multa in terris fieri cæloque tuentur,
> Quorum operum causas nullâ ratione videre
> Possunt, ac fieri divino numine rentur:
> Quas ob res, ubi viderimus nil posse creari
> De nihilo, tum, quod sequimur, jam tutius inde
> Perspiciemus, et unde queat res quæque creari,
> Et quo quæque modo fiant operâ sine divûm.[4]

It is true indeed, that it seems to be chiefly levelled by the poet against that third and last sort of Theists before mentioned, such as Heraclitus and the Stoics, (which latter were contemporary with Epicurus) who held the matter of the whole world to have been from eternity of itself uncreated, but yet the forms of mundane things in the successive generations of them (as entities distinct from the matter) to be created or made by the Deity out of nothing. But the force of the argument must needs lie stronger against those other Theists, who would have the very substance and matter itself of the world, as well as the forms, to have been created by the Deity out of nothing. Since nothing can come out of nothing, it follows, that not so much as the forms and qualities of bodies (conceived as entities really distinct from the matter,) much less the lives and souls of animals, could ever have been created by any Deity, and therefore certainly not the substance and matter itself. But all substance and real entity, whatsoever is in the world, must needs have been from eternity, uncreated and self-existent. Nothing can be made or produced but only the different modifications of pre-existent matter. And this is done by motions, mixtures, and separations, concretions and secretions of atoms, without the creation of any real distinct entity out of nothing; so that there needs no Deity for the effecting of it, according to that of Epicurus:[5] Ἡ θεία φύσις πρὸς ταῦτα μηδαμῇ προσαγέσθω, "No divine power ought to be called in for the solving of these phenomena." To conclude

[4] De Rerum Nat. lib. 1. v. 150. &c. p. 53. &c. But in v. 157. instead of *tutius*, given by Dr. Cudworth, the vulgar editions read *rectius*, which I consider better. Also in v. 158. our author reads *et unde*, whereas Gifanius and others have *ut unde*, which I likewise prefer.

[5] I am ignorant, I confess, where this saying of Epicurus is to be found, having in vain consulted Laërtius and other ancients, and Gassendus among the moderns. But as the thing itself is stated in Lucretius De Rerum Nat. lib. 1. v. 1020. &c. and others, it would scarcely be worth while to seek for the words, which were no doubt quoted from memory.

therefore, if no substance nor real entity can be made, which was not before, but all, whatsoever is, will be, and can be, was from eternity self-existent; then creative power, but especially that attribute of omnipotence, can belong to nothing; and this is all one as to say there can be no Deity.

VII. Thirdly, the Atheists argue against the stricter and higher sort of Theists, who will have God to be the Creator of the whole corporeal universe and all its parts out of nothing, after this manner: that which created the whole mass of matter and body, cannot be itself body; wherefore, this notion of God plainly implies him to be incorporeal. But there can be no incorporeal Deity, because by that word must needs be understood, either that which hath no magnitude nor extension at all, or else that which is indeed extended, but otherwise than body. If the word be taken in the former sense, then nothing at all can be so incorporeal as to be altogether unextended and devoid of geometrical quantity, because extension is the very essence of all existent entity, and that which is altogether unextended is perfectly nothing. There can neither be any substance, nor mode or accident of any substance, no nature whatsoever unextended. But if the word incorporeal be taken in the latter sense, for that which is indeed extended, but otherwise than body, namely, so as to penetrate bodies and co-exist with them, this is also a thing next to nothing; since it can neither act upon any other thing, nor be acted upon by, or sensible of, any thing; it can neither do nor suffer anything.

Nam facere et fungi nisi corpus nulla potest res.[6]

Wherefore, to speak plainly, this can be nothing else but empty space or vacuum, which runs through all things, without laying hold on any thing, or being affected from any thing. This is the only incorporeal thing, that is or can be in nature, space or place; and therefore, to suppose an incorporeal Deity is to make empty space to be the creator of all things.

This argument is thus proposed by the Epicurean poet:

———Quodcunque erit esse aliquid, debebit id ipsum
Augmine vel grandi vel parvo———
Cui si tactus erit, quamvis levis exiguusque,
Corporum adaugebit numerum summamque sequetur:
Sin intactile erit, nulla de parte quod ullam
Rem prohibere queat per se transire meantem,
Scilicet hoc id erit vacuum, quod inane vocamus.[7]

"Whatsoever is, is extended or hath geometrical quantity and

[6] The verse of Lucretius, De Rerum Nat. lib. 1. v. 444. p. 123. but through forgetfulness cited a little differently from what it stands in the poet, whom all the copies make to write thus:

"Nam facere et fungi sine corpore nulla potest res."

[7] Id. lib. 1 v. 434, &c. p. 121.

mensurability in it; which if it be tangible, then it is body, and fills up a place in the world, being part of the whole mass; but if it be intangible, so that it cannot resist the passage of anything through it, then it is nothing else but empty space or vacuum." There is no third thing besides these two, and therefore whatsoever is not body, is space or nothing:

——— Præter inane et corpora tertia, per se
Nulla potest rerum in numero natura relinqui.[8]

Thus the ancient Epicureans and Democritics argued; there being nothing incorporeal but space, there can be no incorporeal Deity.

But because this seems to give advantage to the Theists, in making space something, or that which hath a real nature or entity without our conception, from whence it will follow, that it must needs be either itself a substance, or else a mode of some incorporeal substance; the modern Democritics[9] are here more cautious, and make space to be no nature really existing without us, but only the fantasm of a body, and as it were the ghost of it, which has no reality without our imagination. So that there are not two natures of body and space, which must needs infer two distinct substances, one whereof must be incorporeal, but only one nature of body. The consequence of which will be this, that an incorporeal substance is all one with an incorporeal body, and therefore nothing.[10]

[8] Lucret. De Rerum. Nat. lib. 1. v. 446. p. 123.

[9] That Hobbes, whom our worthy author every where makes a pass at, is meant here, must be evident from what he has written concerning space in his Elementa Philosophiæ, par. 2. cap. 7. sect. 2. p. 50. Among other things he says: "Spatii definitionem hanc esse dico: Spatium est phantasma rei exsistentis, *quatenus exsistentis*, id est, nullo alio ejus rei accidente considerato, præterquam quod apparet extra imaginantem." The English words of Dr. Cudworth nearly correspond to these Latin ones. But Descartes also explains the nature of space in the same manner, though in different words, Principiorum. philos. par. 2. sect. 10, 11, 12. p. 27, 28. who, as is well known, is followed by many of the modern philosophers, notwithstanding the different opinion held in England. See the most acute controversy "De Spatii Natura," carried on not long ago between the two illustrious men Gottf. Wil. Leibnitz and Samuel Clarke; the former assenting to the opinion of Hobbes and Descartes, and the latter maintaining space to be a *property*. Consult Recueil de diverses piéces sur la philosophie par Mr. Clarke, Neuton, Leibniz, t. 1. p. 31. &c. and p. 41. &c. Probably this disagreement is really less than many suppose, and consists chiefly in a dispute about words; let others however decide, who consider themselves more immediately concerned in these matters.

[10] I have here an observation or two to make. I. I am not aware that any one either of the ancients or moderns ever impugned the existence of God by this argument: "There is no God: for if there were a God, there would be something incorporeal: but there is nothing whatever incorporeal: neither therefore is there a God." The learned Doctor, indeed, here intimates that Epicurus and Lucretius argued in this manner; but, with all due deference to *him*, the fact is otherwise. For although they lay it down, that there is nothing in the nature of things, except *body* and *vacuum*, yet they do not thence deduce this conclusion: "Therefore there is no God," but only apply their dogma to explain the course and order of nature. Not to mention, that many, not without just cause, consider Epicurus to have separated

VIII. But because it is generally conceived, that an error cannot be sufficiently confuted, without discovering τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ ψεύδους, "the cause of the mistake;" therefore the Atheists will in the next place undertake to show likewise the original of this doctrine of incorporeal substances, and from what misapprehension it sprung; as also take occasion from thence, further to disprove a Deity.

Wherefore they say, that the original of this doctrine of incorporeal substances proceeded chiefly from the abuse of abstract names, both of substances (whereby the essences of singular bodies, as of a man or a horse, being abstracted from those bodies themselves, are considered universally); as also of accidents, when they are considered alone without their subjects or substances. The latter of which is a thing, that men have been necessitated to, in order to the computation or reckoning of the properties of bodies, the comparing of them with one another, the adding, subtracting, multiplying, and dividing of them; which could not be done, so long as they are taken concretely together with their subjects. But yet, as there is some use of those abstract names, so the abuse of them has been also very great; forasmuch as, though they be really the names of nothing, since the essence of this and that man is not any thing without the man, nor is an accident any thing without its substance, yet

the gods from body and space and to have supposed something interposed and intermediate as it were between them; which opinion is not at variance with what Lucretius asserts, that there is no third thing besides body and vacuum; for it is plain that this is to be understood of the visible universe and the nature of things only. Wherefore I almost suspect the worthy Doctor to have invented this argument rather than to have any where met with it. II. It does not necessarily follow, that those are to be accounted Atheists, who consider all things to consist of body coupled with space. For, as Dr. Cudworth himself confesses, there are many so obtuse in intellect as not to be able to conceive a God without body. Who, indeed, that is acquainted with the history of the Christians has not read of the Egyptian monks, who brought a capital charge against Origen for having written of God as divested of all body? III. When the learned Doctor here introduces Atheists reasoning thus: "He that wishes to form a notion of God in his mind, cannot but conceive him as incorporeal;" it appears to be little in accordance with the habits and arguments of that class, who are so far from advancing precepts on the true notion of Deity, that they rather consider it impossible for any one to form a conception of him at all: which is the very thing he himself had previously upbraided them with. IV. In asserting, that the followers of Democritus call space imaginary and a non-entity for the sake of being able more securely to combat with the Theists, he speaks, if I mistake not, somewhat too harshly. For to my knowledge many have taken up this doctrine concerning space from a fear that the vulgar opinion was injurious to the Deity. Hobbes, in the passage I have noted, tells us, that he adopted this opinion because he observed many to have been led by a false definition of space into the error of supposing the world to be without end; and we are informed by Leibnitz, as above quoted, p. 31, that a great many, who considered space to be something, had confounded it with God himself: to which number undoubtedly belonged some ancient Christian doctors, named by Jo. Alb. Fabricius on Sextus Empiricus, p. 639. I say nothing in behalf of those who, to defend their own wickedness and vain fancies, have perhaps abused this dogma; but I deny, that it is right to brand as Atheists generally those philosophers who have held the above-mentioned opinion concerning space.

men have been led into a gross mistake by them, to imagine them to be realities existing by themselves. Which infatuation hath chiefly proceeded from scholastics, who have been so intemperate in the use of these words, that they could not make a rational discourse of any thing, though never so small, but they must stuff it with their quiddities, entities, essences, hæcceities, and the like. Wherefore these are they, who being first deluded themselves, have also deluded the world, introducing an opinion into the minds of men, that the essence of every thing is something without that thing itself, and also eternal; and therefore when any thing is made or generated, that there is no new being produced, but only an antecedent and eternal essence clothed (as it were) with a new garment of existence: as also that the mere accidents of bodies may exist alone by themselves without their substances. As for example, that the life, sense, and understanding of animals, commonly called by the names of soul and mind, may exist without the bodies or substances of them by themselves, after the animals are dead; which plainly makes them to be incorporeal substances, as it were the separate and abstract essences of men. This hath been observed by a modern writer[1] in these words: "Est nominum abstractorum tum in omni vita, tum in philosophia, magnus et usus et abusus. Abusus in eo consistit, quòd, cùm videant aliqui, considerari posse, id est, inferri in rationes, accidentium incrementa et decrementa, sine consideratione corporum sive subjectorum suorum (id quod appellatur abstrahere), loquuntur de accidentibus, tanquam possent ab omni corpore separari: hinc enim originem trahunt quorundam metaphysicorum crassi errores. Nam ex eo, quod considerari potest cogitatio, sine consideratione corporis, inferre solent non esse opus corporis cogitantis. It is a great abuse, that some metaphysicians make of these abstract names, because cogitation can be considered alone without the consideration of body, therefore to conclude, that it is not the action or accident of that body that thinks, but a substance by itself." And the same writer elsewhere observes,[2] "that it is upon this ground, that when

[1] This passage is from Hobbes' Elementa Philosophiæ, par. 1. cap. 3. sect. 4. p. 19. with the omission, however, of some words not necessary towards understanding his meaning.

[2] These words I have not met with either in his English or Latin works, but that the thing itself was observed by him is most certain, as it may not be amiss to show by a very similar passage of his: "Aristoteles, qui non tam ad res respexit, quam ad voces, —— non dubitavit, quin nomen illud *Esse* alicujus *Rei* nomen fuerit: quasi esset in natura rerum aliquid, cujus nomen esset *Esse* vel *Essentia*. Ab hoc absurdo in aliud lapsus est adhuc pejus, nempe essentias quasdam esse ab entibus suis separatas, quas, cœli orbibus assistentes, circumagere illos affirmabat. Etiam animam humanam, ab homine separatum et dissitam, per se subsistere." And a little after: "Ab hac doctrina de essentiis et formis substantialibus separatis Dæmonologia Græcorum in ecclesia relicta est, et superstitio illa, quam δεισιδαιμονίαν vocant Græci, sive metum phantasmatum." Leviathan, cap. 46. p. m. 320. &c. Compare cap. 2. p. 7. cap. 44. p. 295.

a man is dead and buried, they say his soul (that is, his life) can walk, separated from his body, and is seen by night amongst the graves." By which means the vulgar are confirmed in their superstitious belief of ghosts, spirits, demons, devils, fairies, and hobgoblins, invisible powers and agents, called by several names, and that by those persons, whose work it ought to be rather to free men from such superstition. Which belief at first had another original, not altogether unlike the former; namely, from men's mistaking their own fancies for things really existing without them. For as in the sense of vision, men are commonly deceived in supposing the image behind the glass to be a real thing existing without themselves, whereas it is indeed nothing but their own fancy; in like manner, when the minds of men strongly possessed with fear, especially in the dark, raise up the fantasms of spectres, bugbears, or affrightful apparitions to them, they think them to be objects really existing without them, and call them ghosts and spirits, whilst they are indeed nothing but their own fancies; so the fantasm or fancy of a Deity (which is indeed the chief of all spectres) created by fear, has upon no other account been taken for a reality. To this purpose a modern writer,[3] "From the fear, that proceeds from the ignorance itself, of what it is that hath the power to do men good or harm, men are inclined to suppose and feign to themselves several kinds of powers invisible, and to stand in awe of their own imaginations, and in time of distress to invoke them, as also in the time of an unexpected good success to give them thanks, making the creatures of their own fancies their gods." Which though it be prudently spoken in the plural number, that so it might be perverted and put off to the heathen gods; yet he is very simple that does not perceive the reason of it to be the same concerning that one Deity, which is now commonly worshipped; and that therefore this also is but the creature of men's fear and fancy, the chief of all fantastic ghosts and spectres, as

[3] Again understand him to mean Hobbes, in whose Leviathan, cap. 11. p. 54, we have the passage here quoted in an English translation by the learned Doctor, who has made some omissions, however, and has expressed the meaning rather than the precise words. Hobbes advances the same in his book Of Human Nature, cap. 11. p. 72. But I would observe on this clause generally, that, strictly speaking, what is here cited cannot be taken for an argument on this question, nor was it asserted by Hobbes with a view to disprove a God, nor finally perhaps has any enemy of religion ever reckoned it among the grounds of Atheism. For he who considers men to have been so infatuated as to make gods and demons out of the names of abstract relations, fancies merely, that he is showing the way in which the notion of a God originated; but does not suppose, that he is bringing forward an argument against those who believe a God to exist. The learned Doctor, however, appears to have used the word *argument* somewhat vaguely in this chapter, and to have designated by it all the idle nonsense usually talked by Atheists in setting off and embellishing their own perverse theories; who, if really reasoning thus: "Men have taken occasion to feign to themselves a God from the names of abstract things; therefore there is no God," would be deserving of the ridicule of all sensible men, rather than of any serious confutation.

it were an Oberon or prince of fairies and fancies. This (we say) was the first original of that vulgar belief of invisible powers, ghosts, and gods; men's taking their own fancies for things really existing without them. And as for the matter and substance of these ghosts, they could not by their own natural cogitation fall into any other conceit, but that it was the same with that which appeareth in a dream to one that sleepeth, or in a looking glass to one that is awake, thin aerial bodies, which may appear and vanish when they please. But the opinion, that such spirits were incorporeal and immaterial could never enter into the minds of men by nature, unabused by doctrine; but it sprung up from those deceiving and deceived literati, scholastics, philosophers, and theologers enchanting men's understandings, and making them believe, that the abstract notions of accidents and essences could exist alone by themselves, without the bodies, as certain separate and incorporeal substances.

To conclude therefore, to make an incorporeal mind to be the cause of all things is to make our own fancy, an imaginary ghost of the world, to be a reality; and to suppose the mere abstract notion of an accident, and a separate essence, to be not only an absolute thing by itself, and a real substance incorporeal, but also the first original of all substances, and of whatsoever is in the universe. And this may be reckoned for a fourth atheistic ground.

IX. Fifthly, the Atheists pretend further to prove, that there is no other substance in the world besides body; as also from the principles of corporealism itself to evince, that there can be no corporeal Deity, after this manner.[4] No man can devise any other notion of substance, than that it is a thing extended, existing without the mind, not imaginary but real and solid magnitude; for whatsoever is not extended, is nowhere and nothing. So that "res extensa" is the only substance, the solid basis and substratum of all. Now this is the very self-same thing with body; for ἀντιτυπία, or "resistance," seems to be a necessary consequence and result from extension, and they that think otherwise, can show no reason, why bodies may not also penetrate one another, as some corporealists think they do; from whence it is inferred, that body or matter is the only substance of all things. And whatsoever else is in the world, that is, all the differences of bodies, are nothing but several accidents and modifications of this extended substance, body or matter. Which accidents, though they may be sometimes called by the names of real qualities, and forms, and though there be different

[4] Neither do I conceive this argument to have been so employed by any Atheist in disproof of a Deity, as Dr. Cudworth here states. I think, indeed, that he is secretly attacking Hobbes, and wishing to show the tendency of that philosopher's principles, who is known to have maintained God to be corporeal.

apprehensions concerning them amongst philosophers, yet generally they agree in this, that there are these two properties belonging to them; first, that none of them can subsist alone by themselves, without extended substance or matter, as the basis and support of them; and secondly, that they may be all destroyed without the destruction of any substance. Now as blackness and whiteness, heat and cold, so likewise life, sense, and understanding, are such accidents, modifications, or qualities of body, that can neither exist by themselves, and may be destroyed without the destruction of any substance or matter. For if the parts of the body of any living animal be disunited and separated from one another, or the organical disposition of the matter altered, those accidents, forms, or qualities, of life and understanding, will presently vanish away to nothing, all the substance of the matter still remaining one where or other in the universe entire, and nothing of it lost. Wherefore the substance of matter and body, as distinguished from the accidents, is the only thing in the world, that is uncorruptible and undestroyable. And of this it is to be understood, that nothing can be made out of nothing, and destroyed to nothing, i. e. that every entire thing, that is made or generated, must be made of some pre-existent matter; which matter was from eternity self-existent and unmade, and is also undestroyable, and can never be reduced to nothing. It is not to be understood of the accidents themselves, that are all makeable and destroyable, generable and corruptible. Whatsoever is in the world is but ὕλη πῶς ἔχουσα, "matter so and so modified" or "qualified," all which modifications and qualifications of matter are in their own nature destroyable, and the matter itself (as the basis of them, not necessarily determined to this or that accident) is the only ἀγέννητον καὶ ἀνώλεθρον, the only necessarily existent. The conclusion therefore is, that no animal, no living understanding body, can be absolutely and essentially incorruptible, this being an incommunicable property of the matter; and therefore there can be no corporeal Deity, the original of all things, essentially undestroyable.

Though the Stoics imagined the whole corporeal universe to be an animal or Deity, yet this corporeal god of theirs was only by accident incorruptible and immortal; because they supposed, that there was no other matter, which existing without this world, and making inroads upon it, could disunite the parts of it, or disorder its compages.[5] Which if there were, the life and

[5] This however may be questioned. I shall not dispute with those who consider the Stoics to have professed a corporeal God, namely, of fire; but I can scarcely believe that sect to have been so absurd as to suppose that this God could have been dissipated and disunited by the incursion of other matter, if such had existed: nay, I think I can show the contrary. The God of the Stoics resided in matter, and by his virtue agitated the whole mass, and regulated and swayed it according to his own will.

understanding of this Stoical god, or great mundane animal, as well as that of other animals in like cases, must needs vanish into nothing. Thus from the principles of corporealism itself, it plainly follows, that there can be no corporeal Deity, because the Deity is supposed to be ἀγέννητον καὶ ἀνώλεθρον, a thing that was never made, and is essentially undestroyable, which are the privileges and properties of nothing but senseless matter.

X. In the next place, the Atheists undertake more effectually to confute that corporeal god of the Stoics and others, from the principles of the atomical philosophy, in this manner.[6] All corporeal Theists, who assert that an understanding nature or mind, residing in the matter of the whole universe, was the first original of the mundane system, and did intellectually frame it, betray no small ignorance of philosophy and the nature of body, in supposing real qualities, besides magnitude, figure, site, and motion, as simple and primitive things, to belong to it; and that there was such a quality or faculty of understanding in the matter of the whole universe, co-eternal with the same, that was an original thing uncompounded and underived from any thing else. Now to suppose such original qualities and powers, which are really distinct from the substance of extended matter and its modifications, of divisibility, figure, site, and motion, is really to suppose so many distinct substances, which therefore must needs be incorporeal. So that these philosophers fall unawares into that very thing, which they are so abhorrent from. For this quality or faculty of understanding, in the matter of the universe, original and underived from any other thing, can be indeed nothing else but an incorporeal substance. Epicurus suggested a caution against this vulgar mistake, concerning qualities, to this purpose:[7] "Non sic cogitandæ sunt qualitates, quasi sint quædam per se existentes naturæ seu substantiæ, siquidem id mente assequi non licet; sed solummodo ut varii modi sese habendi corporis considerandæ sunt."

Wherefore, even if other matter had existed besides that which he inhabited, yet it is probable, that he would have subjected this also to himself and have bound it by certain laws. I say nothing of the phrase *by accident* being here employed not very appropriately. For the Stoics attributed nothing to chance or fortune, but taught, that all things are established in their present state by a necessary and eternal law. Therefore the god of the Stoics is immortal and incorruptible, not by accident, but of his own nature and by eternal necessity. But besides the Stoics many others also both of the ancients and moderns, whom I shall pass over in silence for the present, have supposed a two-fold kind of matter, the one subject to change, the other incapable of being changed by any force or art.

[6] But this argument, if indeed it be deserving the name, goes farther, and impugns not only the corporeal god of the Stoics, but all divine essence whatsoever. For if reason, understanding, and wisdom proceeded from a fortuitous concourse of atoms, all idea of a certain superlative and divine reason must at once be abandoned.

[7] I have not thought it worth while to inquire very minutely, to what author these words belong, inasmuch as no one that has read either Laërtius or Gassendus can have any doubt respecting the opinion itself of Epicurus. I believe, however, that they are somewhere put into his mouth by Gassendus.

Body, as such, hath nothing else belonging to the nature of it, but what is included in the idea of extended substance, divisibility, figure, site, motion or rest, and the results from the various compositions of them, causing different fancies. Wherefore, as vulgar philosophers make their first matter (which they cannot well tell what they mean by it) because it receives all qualities, to be itself devoid of all quality; so we conclude, that atoms (which are really the first principles of all things) have none of those qualities in them, which belong to compounded bodies; they are not absolutely of themselves black or white, hot or cold, moist or dry, bitter or sweet, all these things arising up afterwards from the various aggregations and contextures of them, together with different motions. Which Lucretius confirms by this reason, agreeable to the tenor of the atomical philosophy, that if there were any such real qualities in the first principles, then in the various corruptions of nature, things would at last be reduced to nothing:

> Immutabile enim quiddam superare necesse est,
> Ne res ad nihilum redigantur funditus omnes;
> Proinde colore cave contingas semina rerum,
> Ne tibi res redeant ad nilum funditus omnes.[8]

Wherefore he concludes, that it must not be thought, that white things are made out of white principles, nor black things out of black principles:

> Ne ex albis alba rearis
> Principiis esse, ———
> Aut ea quæ nigrant, nigro de semine nata:
> Neve alium quemvis, quæ sunt induta, colorem,
> Propterea gerere hunc credas, quod materiaï
> Corpora consimili sint ejus tincta colore;
> Nullus enim color est omnino materiaï
> Corporibus, neque par rebus, neque denique dispar.[9]

Adding, that the same is to be resolved likewise concerning all other sensible qualities as well as colours,

> Sed ne forte putes solo spoliata colore
> Corpora prima manere; etiam secreta teporis
> Sunt, ac frigoris omnino, calidique vaporis:
> Et sonitu sterila, et succo jejuna feruntur,
> Nec jaciunt ullum proprio de corpore odorem.[10]

Lastly, he tells us in like manner, that the same is to be understood also concerning life, sense and understanding; that there are no such simple qualities or natures in the first principles, out

[8] Lucretius De Rerum Nat. lib. 2. v. 750, 751. and 754, 755. p. 395, 396.

[9] Id. lib. 2. v. 730, &c. p. 392. These verses of Lucretius are here quoted in perverted order and perhaps it may safely be said, that the whole of this argument would have admitted of a somewhat more apt and neat arrangement.

[10] Id. lib. 2. v. 841, &c. p. 408.

of which animals are compounded, but that these are in themselves altogether devoid of life, sense and understanding:

Nunc ea, quæ sentire videmus cunque, necesse est
Ex insensilibus tamen omnia confiteare
Principiis constare: neque id manifesta refutant,
Sed magis ipsa manu ducunt et credere cogunt,
Ex insensilibus, quod dico, animalia gigni.
Quippe videre licet, vivos existere vermes
Stercore de tetro, putrorem cum sibi nacta est
Intempestivis ex imbribus humida tellus.[1]

"All sensitive and rational animals are made of irrational and senseless principles, which is proved by experience, in that we see worms are made out of putrified dung, moistened with immoderate showers."

Some indeed, who are no greater friends to a Deity than ourselves, will needs have that sense and understanding that is in animals and men, to be derived from an antecedent life and understanding in the matter. But this cannot be, because if matter as such had life and understanding in it, then every atom of matter must needs be a distinct percipient, animal, and intelligent person by itself; and it would be impossible for any such men and animals as now are to be compounded out of them, because every man would be "variorum animalculorum acervus," a heap of innumerable animals and percipients.

Wherefore as all the other qualities of bodies, so likewise life, sense, and understanding arise from the different contextures of atoms devoid of all those qualities, or from the composition of those simple elements of magnitudes, figures, sites and motions, in the same manner as from a few letters variously compounded all that infinite variety of syllables and words is made;

Quin etiam refert nostris in versibus ipsis,
Cum quibus, et quali positurâ contineantur;
Namque eadem cælum, mare, terras, flumina, solem
Significant, eadem fruges, arbusta, animantes;
Sic ipsis in rebus item jam materiai
Intervalla, viæ, connexus, pondera, plagæ,
Concursus, motus, ordo, positura, figuræ,
Cum permutantur, mutari res quoque debent.[2]

From the fortuitous concretions of senseless unknowing atoms

[1] Id. lib. 2. v. 864, &c. p. 412, 413. One verse, however, namely, v. 867, as not very suitable to our author's purpose, is here omitted.

[2] Id. lib. 2. v. 1012. p. 836. But the second verse seems to have been quoted, not from the book, but from memory, as all the copies read thus:

"Cum quibus, et quali sint ordine quæque locata."

Whereas the verse here given:

"Cum quibus, et quali positura contineantur."

occurs in lib. I. v. 818, in a similar argument. I may add, that between the fourth and fifth verses, as given here, two verses of Lucretius are omitted, the sense being plain and evident without them.

did rise up afterwards, in certain parts of the world called animals, soul and mind, sense and understanding, counsel and wisdom. But to think, that there was any animalish nature before all these animals, or that there was an antecedent mind and understanding, counsel and wisdom, by which all animals themselves, together with the whole world, were made and contrived, is either to run round in a senseless circle, making animals and animality to be before one another infinitely; or else to suppose an impossible beginning of an original understanding quality in the matter. Atoms in their first coalitions together, when the world was a making, were not then directed by any previous counsel or preventive understanding, which were things as yet unborn and unmade,

> Nam certe neque consilio primordia rerum
> Ordine se quæque atque sagaci mente locârunt,
> Nec, quos quæque darent motus, pepigere profecto.[3]

Mind and understanding, counsel and wisdom did not lay the foundations of the universe; they are no archical things, that is, they have not the nature of a principle in them; they are not simple, original, primitive and primordial, but as all other qualities of bodies, secondary, compounded and derivative, and therefore they could not be architectonical of the world. Mind and understanding is no God, but the creature of matter and motion.

The sense of this whole argument is briefly this; The first principle of all things in the whole universe is matter, or atoms devoid of all qualities, and consequently of all life, sense and understanding; and therefore the original of things is no understanding nature, or deity.

XI. Seventhly, The Democritic Atheists argue further after this manner:[4] They who assert a Deity, suppose ἔμψυχον εἶναι τὸν κόσμον, "the whole world to be animated," that is, to have a living, rational and understanding nature presiding over it. Now it is already evident from some of the premised arguments,

[3] Id. lib. 1. v. 1020. p. 239.

[4] But neither is this an argument of any weight, or it may hold the lowest place even among those which madmen advance against the existence of a Deity. "Sense, reason and understanding result from a fortuitous concourse of atoms; therefore the world cannot have sense, reason and understanding; therefore there is no God." He that approves of a sequence like this, should take care lest he provoke the just indignation of wise men. For in the first place it is clear, that that is assumed, which is a point of controversy, namely, that reason and understanding result from a certain combination of atoms. Secondly, if it were even certain, that we owe the power of reasoning and understanding to a certain contexture of atoms, yet it would not thence follow, that there is no God? Lastly, what means this reasoning: "There is no soul of the world; therefore there is no God." But, as I have before said, Dr. Cudworth was unwilling here to omit any thing, which could be advanced by men holding a Deity in abhorrence. Hence he has in this chapter reckoned in the place of arguments what all reasonable men will class among the ravings of a depraved and distempered mind.

that the world cannot be animated in the sense of Platonists, that is, with an incorporeal soul, which is in order of nature before body, it being proved already, that there can be no substance incorporeal; as likewise that it cannot be animated neither in the Stoical sense, so as to have an original quality of understanding or mind in the matter; but yet nevertheless some may possibly imagine, that as in ourselves and other animals, though compounded of senseless atoms, there is a soul and mind, resulting from the contexture of them, which being once made, domineers over the body, governing and ordering it at pleasure; so there may be likewise such a living soul and mind, not only in the stars, which many have supposed to be lesser deities, and in the sun, which has been reputed the principal deity; but also in the whole mundane system, made up of earth, seas, air, ether, sun, moon, and stars all together; one general soul and mind, which though resulting at first from the fortuitous motion of matter, yet being once produced, may rule, govern and sway the whole, understandingly, and in a more perfect manner than our souls do our bodies; and so long as it continues, exercise a principality and dominion over it. Which although it will not amount to the full notion of a God, according to the strict sense of Theists, yet it will approach very near unto it, and endanger the bringing in of all the same inconveniences along with it Wherefore they will now prove, that there is no such soul or mind as this, (resulting from the contexture of atoms) that presides over the corporeal universe, that so there may not be so much as the shadow of a Deity left.

It was observed before, that life, sense, reason and understanding are but qualities of concreted bodies, like those other qualities of heat, and cold, &c., arising from certain particular textures of atoms. Now as those first principles of bodies, namely single atoms, have none of those qualities in them, so neither hath the whole universe any (that it can be denominated from) but only the parts of it. The whole world is neither black nor white, hot nor cold, pellucid nor opaque, it containing all those qualities in its several parts. In like manner, the whole has no life, sense, nor understanding in it, but only the parts of it, which are called animals. That is, life and sense are qualities, that arise only from such a texture of atoms as produceth soft flesh, blood, and brains, in bodies organized, with head, heart, bowels, nerves, muscles, veins, arteries and the like:

> Sensus jungitur omnis
> Visceribus, nervis, venis, quæcunque videmus,
> Mollia mortali consistere corpore creta;[5]

And reason and understanding, properly so called, are peculiar

[5] Lucretius, lib. 2. v. 903. p. 418.

appendices to human shape;[6] "Ratio nusquam esse potest nisi in hominis figura." From whence it is concluded, that there is no life, soul nor understanding acting the whole world, because the world hath no blood nor brains, nor any animalish or human form.[7] "Qui mundum ipsum animantem sapientemque esse dixerunt, nullo modo viderunt animi naturam, in quam figuram cadere posset." Therefore the Epicurean poet concludes upon this ground, that there is no divine sense in the whole world:

Dispositum videtur, ubi esse et crescere possit
Seorsim anima atque animus; tanto magis inficiandum,
Totum posse extra corpus formamque animalem.
Putribus in glebis terrarum, aut solis in igni,
Aut in aqua durare, aut altis ætheris oris.
Haud igitur constant divino prædita sensu,
Quandoquidem nequeunt vitaliter esse animata.

Now if there be no life nor understanding above us, nor round about us, not any where else in the world, but only in ourselves and fellow animals, and we be the highest of all beings; if neither the whole corporeal system be animated, nor those greater parts of it, sun, moon nor stars, then there can be no danger of any Deity.

XII. Eighthly, the Democritic Atheists dispute further against a Deity in this manner:[9] the Deity is generally supposed to be ζῶον μακάριον καὶ ἄφθαρτον, "a perfectly happy animal, incorruptible and immortal." Now there is no living being incorruptible and immortal, and therefore none perfectly happy neither. For, according to that Democritic hypothesis of atoms in vacuity, the only incorruptible things will be these three: first of all, vacuum or empty space, which must needs be such, because it cannot suffer from any thing, since it is "plagarum expers,"

Et manet intactum, nec ab ictu fungitur hilum.[10]

Secondly, the single atoms, because by reason of their pawitude and solidity they are indivisible; and lastly, the "summa summarum" of all things, that is, the comprehension of all atoms dispersed every where throughout infinite space.

Quia nulla loci stat copia certum
Quo quasi res possint discedere dissoluique.[1]

But according to that other hypothesis of some modern

[6] So Velleius in Cicero De Nat. Deor. lib. 1. cap. 18. p. 2907.
[7] The words of Velleius the Epicurean in Cicero ibid. lib. 1. cap. 10. p. 2893. t. 9. opp.
[8] De Rerum Nat. lib. 5. v. 143. &c. p. 234. 244. t. 2. opp.
[9] This argument labours under the same faults as the foregoing. For its authors assume what is matter of controversy, namely, that there is no life except that which arises from the aggregation and contexture of atoms.
[10] Lucretius, lib. 5. v. 538. p. 272. Add lib. 3. v. 814. p. 600.
[1] Id. lib. 3. v. 815. p. 600. The editions, however, here read not *stat* but *sit*.

Atomists (which also was entertained of old by Empedocles) that supposes a plenity, there is nothing at all incorruptible, but the substance of matter itself. All systems and compages of it, all συγκρίματα and ἀθροίσματα, all concretions and coagmentations of matter divided by motion, together with the qualities resulting from them, are corruptible and destroyable: "quæ est coagmentatio rerum non dissolubilis?"[2] Death destroys not the substance of any matter; for as no matter came from nothing, but was self-eternal, so none of it can ever vanish into nothing; but it dissolves all the aggregations of it.

Non sic interimit mors res, ut materiaï
Corpora conficiat, sed cœtum dissupat ollis.[3]

Life is no substantial thing, nor any primitive or simple nature; it is only an accident or quality arising from the aggregation and contexture of atoms or corpuscula, which when the compages of them is disunited and dissolved, though all the substance still remain scattered and dispersed, yet the life utterly perishes and vanisheth into nothing. No life is immortal; there is no immortal soul; nor immortal animal, or Deity. Though this whole mundane system were itself an animal, yet being but an aggregation of matter, it would be both corruptible and mortal. Wherefore, since no living being can possibly have any security of its future permanency, there is none that can be perfectly happy. And it was rightly determined by our fellow-atheists, the Hedonics and Cyrenaics, εὐδαιμονία ἀνύπαρκτον, "perfect happiness is a mere notion," a romantic fiction, a thing which can have no existence any where. This is recorded to have been one of Democritus' chief arguments against a Deity, because there can be no living being immortal, and consequently, none perfectly happy. "Cum Democritus, quia nihil semper suo statu maneat, neget esse quicquam sempiternum, nonne Deum, ità tollit omnino, ut nullam opinionem ejus reliquam faciat?"[5]

XIII. A ninth pretended demonstration of the Democritic Atheists is as followeth. By God is understood a first cause or mover, which being not before acted upon by any thing else, but

[2] So exclaims Cicero, De Nat. Deor. lib. 1. cap. 8. p. 2891. t. 9. opp.

[3] Lucretius, lib. 2. v. 1001. p. 434.

[4] Laërtius informs us, that the Hegesiacs, whom he numbers among the sects of the Cyrenaics, held this opinion: Τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ὅλως ἀδύνατον εἶναι, "Esse impossibile, cumulate beatam vitam consequi," and ἀνύπαρκτον τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν εἶναι, "beatam vitam obtineri non posse," lib. 2. De Rebus Gestis Philos. segm. 94. p. 135.

[5] These are the words of Cicero, De Nat. Deor. lib. 1. cap. 12. p. 2897. But they by no means show, that Democritus employed this argument against a Deity, or that he considered it one of the strongest to disprove the existence of God. For Cicero says this only: that from the opinion of Democritus, who denies anything to be eternal, it follows by the law of consecution, that there is no God.

acting originally from itself, was the beginning of all things. Now, it is an indubitable axiom, and generally received among philosophers, that nothing can move itself, but "quicquid movetur, ab alio movetur; whatsoever is moved, is moved by something else;" nothing can act otherwise than it is made to act by something without it, acting upon it. The necessary consequence whereof is this, that there can be no such thing as any first mover, or first cause, that is, no God. This argument is thus urged by a modern writer,[6] agreeably to the sense of the ancient Democritics; "Ex eo quòd nihil potest movere seipsum, non inferetur id, quod inferri solet, nempe Æternum Immobile, sed contrà Æternum Motum; siquidem, ut verum est, nihil moveri à seipso, ita etiam verum est, nihil moveri nisi à moto, From hence, that nothing can move itself, it cannot be rightly inferred, as commonly it is, that there is an eternal immoveable mover (that is, a God) but only an eternal moved mover, or that one thing was moved by another from eternity, without any first mover. Because as it is true that nothing can be moved from itself; so it is likewise true, that nothing can be moved but from that which was itself also moved by something else before:" and so the progress upwards must needs be infinite, without any beginning or first mover. The plain drift and scope of this ratiocination is no other than this, to show that the argument commonly taken from motion, to prove a God, (that is, a first mover or cause) is not only ineffectual and inconclusive; but also that, on the contrary, it may be demonstrated from that very topic of motion, that there can be no absolutely first mover, no first in the order of causes, that is, no God.

XIV. Tenthly, because the Theists conceive that though no body can move itself, yet a perfect cogitative and thinking being

[6] This writer is Thomas Hobbes, in whose Element. Philosoph. par 4. or Physic. cap. 26. sect. 1. p. 204, the words here quoted occur. But some, I am afraid, will consider Hobbes not to have had justice done to him, if they read his entire words, which I subjoin: "Etsi," says he, "ex eo, quod nihil potest movere seipsum, satis recte infertur, primum aliquid esse movens, quod fuerit æternum; non tamen inferetur id, quod inferre solent, nempe æternum immobile, sed contra æternum motum: siquidem, ut verum est, nihil moveri a seipso, ita verum est, nihil moveri nisi a moto." For they will immediately perceive on attentively examining these words, that the atrocity of the opinion ascribed to their author by Dr. Cudworth, is somewhat diminished by them. For I. Hobbes did not deny the possibility of demonstrating from motion, that there is some first eternal mover, or God. Neither II. did he say, that that first mover was moved by some other external cause; for he expressly affirms it to be eternal. But III. he asserted merely, that this first mover is not immoveable, but moves itself, and in moving itself moves other bodies. The truth is, Hobbes maintained God to be corporeal; and conceding, that the being of a God could be proved from motion, he held, nevertheless, that this corporeal God, as he imagined him to be, must first move himself, if he wishes to impart motion to other bodies. The moving cause, however, by which God himself is moved, he considered to be, not without, but in, God himself. This doctrine I believe to be dishonourable and injurious to the Deity; but we are not now inquiring, how shamefully Hobbes erred, but whether he held the opinion here attributed to him.

might be the beginning of all, and the first cause of motion; the Atheists will endeavour to evince the contrary, in this manner. No man can conceive how any cogitation, which was not before, should rise up at any time, but that there was some cause for it, without the thinker. For else there can be no reason given why this thought rather than that, and at this time rather than another, should start up. Wherefore this is universally true of all motion and action whatsoever, as it was rightly urged by the Stoics, that there can be no κίνησις ἀναίτιος, "no motion without a cause," *i. e.*, no motion, which has not some cause without the subject of it, or, as the same thing is expressed by a modern writer:[7] "Nothing taketh beginning from itself, but from the action of some other immediate agent without it." Wherefore, no thinking being could be a first cause, any more than an automaton or machine could. To this purpose, it is further argued, that these two notions, the one of a knowing understanding being, the other of a perfectly happy being, are contradictions, because all knowledge essentially implies dependence upon something else as its cause;[8] "scientia et intellectus signum est potentiæ ab alio dependentis, id quod non est beatissimum." They conclude, that cogitation and all action whatsoever, is really nothing else but local motion, which is essentially heterokinesy, that which can never rise of itself, but is caused by some other agent without its subject.

XV. In the eleventh place, the Democritic Atheists reason thus: If the world were made by any antecedent mind or understanding, that is, by a Deity; then there must needs be an idea, platform, and exemplar of the whole world before it was made; and consequently actual knowledge, both in order of time and nature, before things. But all knowledge is the information of the things themselves known; all conception of the mind is a passion from the things conceived, and their activity upon it; and is therefore junior to them. Wherefore the world and things were before knowledge and the conception of any mind, and no knowledge, mind, or deity before the world as its cause. This argument is thus proposed by the atheistic poet:

> Exemplum porro gignundis rebus et ipsa
> Notities hominum Di vis unde insita primum,
> Quid vellent facere, ut scirent, animoque viderent?
> Quove modo est unquam vis cognita principiorum,
> Quidnam inter sese permutato ordine possent,
> Si non ipsa dedit specimen natura creandi?[9]

[7] Hobbes advances this opinion in various parts of his works. See Element. Philos. par. 2. cap. 9. p. 65. cap. 10. p. 68. and elsewhere. I cannot say, therefore, from what passage the words here quoted by Dr. Cudworth are taken.

[8] So Hobbes lays it down Element. de Cive, cap. 15. sect. 14. p. 118. and he brings forward these very words as an argument, why God cannot properly be said to know and understand. The same truly impious and flagitious opinion he inculcates in his Leviathan, cap. 31. p. 170.

[9] Lucretius, lib. 5. v. 182. &c. p. 249, &c.

"How could the supposed Deity have a pattern or platform in his mind, to frame the world by, and whence should he receive it? How could he have any knowledge of men before they were made, as also what himself should will to do, when there was nothing? How could he understand the force and possibility of the principles, what they would produce when variously combined together, before nature and things themselves, by creating, had given a specimen?"

XVI. A twelfth argumentation of the Democritic and Epicurean Atheists against a Deity is to this purpose: that things could not be made by a Deity, that is supposed to be a being every way perfect, because they are so faulty and so ill made: the argument is thus propounded by Lucretius:[10]

Quod si jam rerum ignorem primordia quæ sint,
Hoc tamen ex ipsis cœli rationibus ausim
Confirmare, aliisqe ex rebus reddere multis,
Nequaquam nobis divinitus esse paratam
Naturam rerum, tantâ stat prædita culpâ.

This argument, "à cœli rationibus," from astronomy or the constitution of the heavens, is this:[1] that the mundane sphere is so framed, in respect of the disposition of the equator and ecliptic, as renders the greatest part of the earth uninhabitable to men and most other animals; partly by that excess of heat in the torrid zone (containing all between the tropics) and partly from the extremity of cold in both the frigid zones, towards either pole. Again, whereas the Stoical Theists contemporary with Epicurus concluded, that the whole world was made by a Deity, only for the sake of men,

Horum omnîn causâ
Constituisse Deum fingunt———————[2]

it is urged on the contrary, that a great part of the habitable earth is taken up by seas, lakes and rocks, barren heaths and sands, and thereby made useless for mankind; and that the remainder of it yields no fruit to them, unless expugned by obstinate labour; after all which, men are often disappointed of the fruits of those labours by unseasonable weather, storms, and tempests. Again, that nature has not only produced many noxious and poisonous herbs, but also destructive and devouring animals, whose strength surpasseth that of men; and that the

[10] Lib. 2. v. 177, &c. p. 296. which verses are extant also lib. 5. v. 196, &c. p. 251.

[1] This is briefly expressed by Lucretius in these verses, lib. 5. v. 205, 206. p. 252.

"Inde duas porro prope partes fervidus ardor,
Assiduusque geli casus mortalibus aufert."

The whole subject here treated of is elegantly expounded by Cicero in his Somn. Scipionis, cap. 6. p. 3981. tom. 11. opp. although by no means with the intention of disproving a Deity.

[2] The words of Lucretius, lib. 2. v. 174. 175. p. 296.

condition of mankind is so much inferior to that of brutes, that nature seems to have been but a step-mother to the former, while she hath been an indulgent mother to the latter. And to this purpose, the manner of men's coming into the world is thus aggravated by the poet:

> Tum porro puer, ut sævis projectus ab undis
> Navita, nudus humi jacet, infans, indigus omni
> Vitai auxilio, cum primum in luminis oras
> Nixibus ex alvo matris natura profudit:
> Vagituque locum lugubri complet, ut æquum est,
> Quoi tantum in vita restet transire malorum.[3]

But on the contrary, the comparative advantages of brutes and their privileges which they have above men, are described after this manner:

> At variæ crescunt pecudes, armenta, feræque:
> Nec crepitacula eis opu[1] sunt nec quoiquam adhibenda est
> Almæ nutricis blanda atque infracta loquela;
> Nec varias quærunt vestes pro tempore cœli.
> Denique non armis opus est, non mœnibus altis,
> Queis sua tutentur, quando omnibus omnia large
> Tellus ipsa parit, naturaque Dædala rerum.

And lastly, the topic of evils in general is insisted upon by them, not those which are called *culpæ*, "evils of fault," (for that is a thing which the Democritic Atheists utterly explode in the genuine sense of it) but the evils of pain and trouble; which they dispute concerning, after this manner.[4] The supposed Deity and maker of the world was either willing to abolish all evils, but not able; or he was able, but not willing; or thirdly, he was neither willing nor able; or else lastly, he was both able and willing. This latter is the only thing that answers fully to the notion of a God. Now that the supposed creator of all things was not thus both able and willing to abolish all evils is plain, because then there would have been no evils at all left. Wherefore since there is such a deluge of evils overflowing all, it must needs be, that either he was willing and not able to remove them, and then he was impotent; or else he was able and not willing, and then he was envious; or lastly, he was neither able nor willing, and then he was both impotent and envious.

XVII. In the twelfth place, the Atheists further dispute in

[3] Lucretius, from whom all that is here advanced is chiefly borrowed. The verses quoted occur lib. 5. v. 223. p. 254. and are immediately followed by those given a little after.

[4] This argument is expressed as here given from the mouth of Epicurus by Lactantius, lib. De Ira Dei, cap. 13. p. 942. ed. Walchii; who adds, "plerosque philosophorum, qui providentiam defendunt, hoc argumento perturbari solere." In our own day, indeed, M. Bayle has spent all the force of his wit in setting off and arraying it against the reasoning of Lactantius, Diction. Hist. et Critique, artic. Pauliciens, not. e. tom. 3. p. 2204.

this manner. If the world were made by any Deity, then it would be governed by a providence; and if there were any providence, it must appear in human affairs. But here it is plain, that all is Tohu and Bohu, chaos and confusion; things happening alike to all, to the wise and foolish, religious and impious, virtuous and vicious. (For these names the Atheists cannot choose but make use of, though by taking away natural morality, they really destroy the things.) From whence it is concluded, that all things float up and down, as they are agitated and driven by the tumbling billows of careless fortune and chance. The impieties of Dionysius,[5] his scoffing abuses of religion, and whatsoever was then sacred, or worshipped under the notion of a God, were most notorious; and yet it is observed, that he fared never a jot the worse for it. "Hunc nec Olympius Jupiter fulmine percussit, nec Æsculapius misero diuturnoque morbo tabescentem interemit; verùm in suo lectulo mortuus, in Tympanidis rogum illatus est, eamque potestatem, quam ipse per scelus nactus erat, quasi justam et legitimam, hæreditatis loco tradidit, Neither did Jupiter Olympius strike him with a thunderbolt, nor Æsculapius inflict any languishing disease upon him; but he died in his bed, and was honourably interred, and that power, which he had wickedly acquired, he transmitted, as a just and lawful inheritance, to his posterity." And Diogenes the Cynic, though much a Theist, could not but acknowledge, that Harpalus, a famous robber or pirate in those times, who committing many villanous actions, notwithstanding lived prosperously, did thereby "testimonium dicere contra deos, bear testimony against the gods." Though it has been objected by the Theists, and thought to be a strong argument for providence, that there were so many tables hung up in temples, the monuments of such as having prayed to the gods in storms and tempests, had escaped shipwreck; yet as Diagoras observed, "Nusquam picti sunt, qui naufragium fecerunt, There are no tables extant of those of them, who were shipwrecked." Wherefore it was not considered by these Theists, how many of them that prayed as well to the gods, did notwithstanding suffer shipwreck; as also how many of those, who never made any devotional addresses at all to any deity, escaped equal dangers of storms and tempests.

Moreover, it is consentaneous to the opinion of a God, to think, that thunder rattling in the clouds with thunder-bolts

[5] The words of Velleius the Epicurean in Cicero De Nat. Deor. lib. 3. cap. 35. p. 3101. who also gives the example of Harpalus, which follows, cap. 34. p. 3099. In like manner what is soon after brought forward respecting the tablets of those, who having prayed to the Gods escaped the violence of storms and tempests, is related from the mouth of Diagoras, cap. 38. p. 3104. Add Diogenes Laërtius De Placitis Philos. lib. 6. segm. 59. p. 343.

should be the immediate significations of his wrath and displeasure: whereas it is plain that these are flung at random, and that the fury of them often lights upon the innocent, whilst the notoriously guilty escape untouched; and therefore we understand not how this can be answered by any Theists.

> Cur, quibus incautum scelus aversabile cumque est,
> Non faciunt, icti flammas ut fulguris halent,
> Pectore perfixo; documen mortalibus acre?
> Et potius nullæ sibi turpis conscius rei
> Volvitur in flammis innoxius, inque peditur
> Turbine cœlesti subito correptus et igni?[6]

Now the force of this argument appears to be very powerful, because it hath not only staggered and confounded Theists in all ages, but also hath effectually transformed many of them into Atheists. For Diagoras Melius[7] himself was once a superstitious religionist, insomuch that being a Dithyrambic poet, he began one of his poems with these words: Κατὰ δαίμονα καὶ τύχην πάντα τελεῖται, "All things are done by God and fortune." But being injured afterwards by a perjured person, that suffered no evil nor disaster thereupon, he therefore took up this contrary persuasion, that there was no Deity; and there have been innumerable others, who have been so far wrought upon by this consideration, as if not absolutely to disclaim and discard a Deity, yet utterly to deny providence, and all care of human affairs by any invisible powers. Amongst whom the poet was one, who thus expressed his sense:

> Sed cum res hominum tantâ caligine volvi
> Aspicerem, lætosque diu florere nocentes,
> Vexarique pios, rursus labefacta cadebat
> Religio, causæque viam non sponte sequebar
> Alterius, vacuo quæ currere semina motu
> Affirmat, magnumque novas per inane figuras
> Fortunâ, non arte regi; quæ numina sensu
> Ambiguo vel nulla putat, vel nescia nostri.[8]

XVIII. A thirteenth argumentation of the Democritic and Epicurean Atheists is to this purpose; that whereas the Deity is supposed to be such a being, as both knows all that is done every where in the most distant places of the world at once, and doth himself immediately order all things, this is, first, impossible for any one being thus to animadvert and order all things in the whole universe:

[6] Lucretius lib. 6. v. 389, &c. p. 480.

[7] This is stated almost in the same words by Sextus Empiricus lib. 9. Adv. Mathemat. sect. 53. p. 561. But what the injury was, that led Diagoras to renounce a Deity, we learn from Hesychius Milesius, De his qui erudit. fama claruere p. 17. ed. Hadr. Junii.

[8] Claudian, who has these verses lib. 1. In Rufinum v. 12. &c.

Quis regere immensi summam, quis habere profundi
Indu manu validas potis est moderanter habenas?
Quis pariter cœlos omneis convertere? et omneis
Ignibus ætheriis terras suffire feraceis?
Omnibus inque locis esse omni tempore præsto;
Nubibus ut tenebras faciat, cœlique serena
Concutiat sonitu? [9] &c.

And secondly, if it were supposed to be possible, yet such infinite negotiosity would be absolutely inconsistent with a happy state; nor could such a Deity ever have any quiet enjoyment of himself, being perpetually filled with tumult and hurlyburly:[10] Οὐ συμφωνοῦσι πραγματεῖαι καὶ φροντίδες καὶ ὀργαὶ καὶ χάριτες μακαριότητι, ἀλλ' ἀσθενείᾳ καὶ φόβῳ καὶ προσδεήσει τῶν πλησίον ταῦτα γίνεται, "Distraction of business and solicitous cares, displeasures and favours, do not at all agree with happiness, but they proceed from imbecility, indigency and fear:"[1] Το μακάριον καὶ ἄφθαρτον οὔτε αὐτὸ πράγματα ἔχει, οὔτε ἄλλῳ παρέχει, ὥστε οὔτε ὀργαῖς οὔτε χάρισι συνέχεται, ἐν ἀσθενείᾳ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον, "That which is happy and incorruptible, would neither have itself any business to do, nor create any to others; it would neither have displeasure nor favour towards any other persons, to engage it in action; all this proceeding from indigency." That is, favour and benevolence, as well as anger and displeasure, arise only from imbecility. That which is perfectly happy and wanteth nothing, ὅλον ὂν περὶ τὴν συνοχὴν τῆς ἰδίας εὐδαιμονίας, "being wholly possessed and taken up in the enjoyment of its own happiness," would be regardless of the concernments of any others; and mind nothing besides itself, either to do it good or harm. Wherefore, this "curiosus et plenus negotii deus,"[2] this "busy, restless, and pragmatical deity," that must needs intermeddle and have to do with every thing in the whole world, is a contradictious notion, since it cannot but be the most unhappy of all things.

XIX. In the next place, the Atheists dispute further by propounding several bold queries, which they conceive unanswerable, after this manner. If the world were made by a Deity, why was it not made by him sooner? or since it was so long unmade, why did he make it at all?[3] "Cur mundi ædificator repente extiterit, innumerabilia ante sæcula dormîerit? How came this builder and architect of the world to start up upon a sudden, after he had slept for infinite ages," and bethink himself of

[9] Lucretius, lib. 2. v. 1094, &c. p. 451.

[10] The words of Epicurus from the Epistle to Herodotus in Diogenes Laërtius lib. 10. segm. 77. p. 634.

[1] This, as is well known, is the first of the so called κύριαι δόξαι of Epicurus. It is extant in Diog. Laert. lib. 10. segm. 139. p. 661.

[2] The words of Velleius in Cicero De Nat. Deor. lib. 1. cap. 20. p. 2911.

[3] So Velleius disputes in Cicero De Nat. Deor. lib. 1. cap. 9. p. 2891. from whom is also borrowed the chief part of what the learned Doctor brings forward in this section.

making a world? For, certainly, if he had been awake all that while, he would either have made it sooner, or not at all; because there was either something wanting to his happiness before, or nothing: if there had been any thing wanting before, then the world could not have been so long unmade; but if he were completely happy in himself without it, then μηδὲν ἐλλείπων κεναῖς ἔμελλεν ἐπιχειρεῖν πράξεσι, "wanting nothing, he vainly went about to make superfluous things." All desire of change and novelty argues a fastidious satiety, proceeding from defect and indigency:

> Quidve novi potuit tanto post, ante quietos
> Inlicere, ut cuperent vitam mutare priorem?
> Nam gaudere novis rebus debere videtur,
> Quoi veteres obsunt; sed quoi nil accidit ægri
> Tempore in anteacto, cum pulchre degeret ævum,
> Quid potuit novitatis amorem accendere tali?[4]

Did this Deity therefore light up the stars, as so many lamps or torches, in that vast abyss of infinite darkness, that himself might thereby have a more comfortable and cheerful habitation? Why would he then content himself from eternity, to dwell in such a melancholic, horrid, and forlorn dungeon?

> An, credo, in tenebris vita et mœrore jacebat,
> Donec diluxit rerum genitalis origo?[5]

Was company and that variety of things, by which heaven and earth are distinguished, desirable to him? Why then would he continue solitary so long, wanting the pleasure of such a spectacle? Did he make the world and men in it to this end, that himself might be worshipped and adored, feared and honoured by them? But what could he be the better for that, who was sufficiently happy alone in himself before? Or did he do it for the sake of men, to gratify and oblige them?

> At quid immortalibus atque beatis
> Gratia nostra queat largirier emolumenti,
> Ut nostrâ quicquam causâ gerere aggrediantur?[6]

Again, if this were done for the sake of men, then it must be either for wise men or fools: if for wise men only, then all that pains was taken but for a very few; but if for fools, what reason could there be, why the Deity should seek to deserve so well at their hands? Besides this, what hurt would it have been to any of us, (whether wise or foolish) never to have been made?

[4] Lucretius, lib. 5. v. 169, &c. p. 248.
[5] Id. ibid. v. 175. 176. p. 249.
[6] Id. ibid. v. 166, &c. p. 248.

Quidve mali fuerat nobis non esse creatis ?
Natus enim debet, quicunque est, velle manere
In vitâ, donec retinebit blanda voluptas :
Qui nunquam vero vitæ gustavit amorem,
Nec fuit in numero, quid obest non esse creatum ?[7]

Lastly,[8] if this Deity must needs go about moliminously to make a world, ἐργάτου δίκην καὶ τέκτονος, "like an artificer and carpenter," what tools and instruments could he have to work withal? what ministers and subservient opificer? what engines and machines for the rearing up of so huge a fabric? How could he make the matter to understand his meaning, and obey his beck? how could he move it, and turn it up and down? for if incorporeal, he could neither touch nor be touched, but would run through all things, without fastening upon any thing; but if corporeal, then the same thing was both materials and architect, both timber and carpenter, and the stones must hew themselves, and bring themselves together, with discretion, into a structure.

XX. In the last place, the Atheists argue from interest (which proves many times the most effectual of all arguments) against a Deity; endeavouring to persuade, that it is, first, the interest of private persons, and of all mankind in general, and secondly, the particular interest of civil sovereigns, and commonwealths, that there should neither be a God, nor the belief of any such thing entertained by the minds of men; that is, no religion. First, they say therefore, that it is the interest of mankind in general; because so long as men are persuaded that there is an understanding being infinitely powerful, having no law but his own will, (because he has no superior) that may do whatever he pleases at any time to them, they can never securely enjoy themselves or any thing, nor be ever free from disquieting fear and solicitude. What the poets fable of Tantalus in hell, being always in fear of a huge stone hanging over his head, and ready every moment to tumble down upon him, is nothing to that true fear, which men have of a Deity, and religion, here in this life, which indeed was the very thing mythologized in it.

Nec miser impendens magnum timet aëre saxum
Tantalus, (ut fama est) cassâ formidine torpens :
Sed magis in vitâ divûm metus urget inanis
Mortales, casumque timent, quemcumque ferat fors.[9]

[7] Lucretius lib. 5. v. 177, &c. p. 249.

[8] The reasoning of Cicero against Plato, De Nat. Deor. lib. 1. cap. 8. p. 2890. On these queries themselves there is now no room for saying any thing. Any one may see, however, that they are not those of men, who are carrying on a rational and methodical disputation, but of such rather as are jumbling all things together in order to deceive the ignorant and unwary. If it once be established by valid arguments that there is a God, and that the world is governed by his providence, all questions of this kind fall to the ground of themselves: for they do not disprove a Deity, but show merely our own misery, ignorance and imbecility. Of this however elsewhere.

[9] Lucretius lib. 3. v. 993, &c. p. 634.

For besides men's insecurity from all manner of present evils, upon the supposition of a God, the immortality of souls can hardly be kept out, but it will crowd in after it; and then the fear of eternal punishments after death will unavoidably follow thereupon, perpetually embittering all the solaces of life, and never suffering men to have the least sincere enjoyment.

Si certum finem esse viderent
Ærumnarum homines, aliquâ ratione valerent
Religionibus atque minis obsistere vatum.
Nunc ratio nulla est restandi, nulla facultas:
Æternas quoniam pœnas in morte timendum.
Ignoratur enim, quæ sit natura animai,
Nata sit, an contra nascentibus insinuetur;
Et simul intereat nobiscum morte dirempta,
An tenebras Orci visat vastasque lacunas.[10]

Wherefore it is plain, that they, who first introduced the belief of a Deity and religion, whatever they might aim at in it, deserved very ill of all mankind, because they did thereby infinitely debase and depress men's spirits under a servile fear:

Efficiunt animos humiles, formidine divûm,
Depressosque premunt ad terram.[1]

As also cause the greatest griefs and calamities, that now disturb human life:

Quantos tum gemitus ipsi sibi, quantaque nobis
Volnera, quas lacrymas peperere minoribus nostris?[2]

There can be no comfortable and happy living, without banishing from our mind the belief of these two things, of a Deity, and the soul's immortality:

Et metus ille foras præceps Acheruntis agendus
Funditus, humanam qui vitam turbat ab imo,
Omnia suffundens mortis nigrore, neque ullam
Esse voluptatem liquidam puramque relinquit.[3]

It was therefore a noble and heroical exploit of Democritus and Epicurus, those two good-natured men, who seeing the world thus oppressed under the grievous yoke of religion, the fear of a Deity, and punishment after death, and taking pity of this sad condition of mankind, did manfully encounter that affrightful spectre, or empusa, of a providential deity; and by clear philosophic reasons, chase it away, and banish it quite out of the world; laying down such principles, as would solve all the phenomena of nature without a God:

[10] Lucretius, lib. 1. v. 108, &c. p. 41.
[1] Id. lib. 6. v. 51. p. 435.
[2] Id. lib. 5. v. 1195. p. 385.
[3] Id. lib. 3. v. 37. p. 480.

Quæ bene cognita si teneas, natura videtur
Libera continuo, dominis privata superbis,
Ipsa suâ per se sponte omnia dîs agere expers. [4]

So that Lucretius does not without just cause erect a triumphal arch or monument to Epicurus, for this conquest or victory of his obtained over the Deity and religion, in this manner:

Humana ante oculos fœde quum vita jaceret
In terris, oppressa gravi sub religione,
Quæ caput a cœli regionibus ostendebat,
Horribili super aspectu mortalibus instans;
Primum Graius homo mortales tendere contra
Est oculos ausus, primusque obsistere contra;
Quem nec fama deûm, nec fulmina, nec minitanti
Murmure compressit cœlum, &c. [5]

XXI. That it is also the interest of civil sovereigns and of all commonwealths, that there should neither be Deity nor religion, the Democritic Atheists would persuade in this manner:[6] A body politic or commonwealth is made up of parts, that are all naturally dissociated from one another, by reason of that principle of private self-love, who therefore can be no otherwise held together than by fear. Now if there be any greater fear

[4] Lucretius, lib. 2. v. 1089. p. 450.

[5] Id. lib. 1. v. 63. p. 26.

[6] The whole of what is adduced in this section is from Hobbes, who must be known to have held these opinions by every one who has even dipped into his works. Nevertheless his object in disputing on these matters was not, it would seem, to disprove a Deity and banish all religion, but to secure the peace and tranquillity of the state. The worthy Doctor, however, so expounds his opinions, as if Hobbes had positively denied, that piety or the knowledge of God could be tolerated in a well-regulated commonwealth; and although the fact is not so, yet I scarcely dare venture to set off the man's cause, which in this instance certainly, above all others, I confess to be most infamous. I shall give some of his words, that those who read them may be enabled more easily to judge of his opinion: "In corpore," says he, "civitatis, quando membra movet potestas spiritualis per terrorem pœnarum æternarum et spem præmiorum, aliter quam a potestate civili (quæ anima civitatis est,) moveri debent, verbisque novis et peregrinis intellectum suffocat, sequentur, quasi convulsiones, dissidia civium," Leviathan cap. 29. p. 155. In another passage he speaks more perniciously even: "Doctrinarum, quæ ad seditionem disponunt, una et prima hæc est; cognitionem de bono et malo pertinere ad singulos. In statu quidem naturali—veram eam esse, concedimus: sed in statu civili falsa est. Ostensum enim est, regulas boni et mali, justi et injusti, honesti et inhonesti esse leges civiles, ideoque, quod legislator præceperit, id pro bono, quod vetuerit, id pro malo habendum esse.—Privati autem homines, dum cognitionem boni et mali ad se trahunt, cupiunt esse sicut reges, quod salva civitate fieri non potest," Element. de Cive cap. 12. sec. 1. p. 82. I shall add a third passage, which in particular illustrates what is here said: "Doctrina alia, quæ obedientiæ civili repugnat, est, quidquid faciat civis quicumque contra conscientiam suam, peccatum esse: quæ doctrina ab eo nascitur, quod judices se faciunt homines boni et mali. Conscientia enim et judicium hominis eadem res est et erroribus obnoxia. Etsi ergo is, qui nulla lege civili obligatur, contra conscientiam agens peccet, propterea quod actionum suarum regulam aliam non habet, præter suam ipsius rationem; aliter tamen se res habet in iis, qui legibus civilibus se submiserunt, ubi non privata, sed publica lex unicuique civi pro conscientia habenda est. Alioqui in tanta conscientiarum, id est, opinionum privatarum varietate necessario civitas dividetur, nec summæ potestati obediet quisquam, nisi quatenus sibimet ipsi visum erit," Leviathan cap. 29. p. 152.

than the fear of the Leviathan, and civil representative, the whole structure and machine of this great coloss must needs fall a-pieces, and tumble down. The civil sovereign reigns only in fear; wherefore unless his fear be the king and sovereign of all fears, his empire and dominion ceases. But as the rod of Moses devoured the rods of the magicians, so certainly will the fear of an omnipotent Deity, that can punish with eternal torments after death, quite swallow up and devour that comparatively petty fear of civil sovereigns, and consequently destroy the being of commonwealths, which have no foundation in nature, but are mere artificial things, made by the enchantment and magical art of policy. Wherefore it is well observed by a modern writer,[7] "That men ought not to suffer themselves to be abused by the doctrine of separated essences and incorporeal substances," "such as God and the soul built upon the vain philosophy of Aristotle, that would fright men from obeying the laws of their country with empty names, (as of hell, damnation, fire and brimstone) as men fright birds from the corn with an empty hat, doublet, and a crooked stick." And again,[8] "if the fear of spirits" the chief of which is the Deity were taken away, men would be much more fitted than they are for civil obedience."

Moreover, the power of civil sovereigns is perfectly indivisible; it is either all or nothing; it must be absolute and infinite, or else it is none at all. Now it cannot be so, if there be any other power equal to it, to share with it, much less if there be any superior (as that of the Deity) to check it and control it. Wherefore the Deity must of necessity be removed and displaced, to make room for the Leviathan to spread himself in.

Lastly, it is perfectly inconsistent with the nature of a body politic, that there should be any private judgment of good or evil, lawful or unlawful, just or unjust allowed. But conscience (which theism and religion introduces) is private judgment concerning good and evil; and therefore the allowance of it, is contradictious to civil sovereignty and a commonwealth. There ought to be no other conscience (in a kingdom or commonwealth) besides the law of the country; the allowance of private conscience being, ipso facto, a dissolution of the body

[7] Our worthy author here expresses not the words indeed of Hobbes, but the opinion maintained by him in more places than one. See Leviathan, cap. 45. p. 305. cap. 46. p. 313. &c. &c.

[8] The Latin words of Hobbes, here no doubt referred to by our author, are somewhat different, and speak not of *the fear of spirits*, but of *the fear of spectres*, which indeed is more excusable, and gives another colour to the passage. "Si metus hic spectrorum," says Hobbes, "sublatus esset, simulque prognostica a somniis aliaque multa, quæ inde dependent, et quibus homines ambitiosi astutique populo simplici abutuntur, cives in omni civitate ad obedientiam multo magis eruditi essent, quam nunc sunt," Leviathan cap. 2. p. 8. ed. Amstelod.

politic, and a return to the state of nature. Upon all these accounts it must needs be acknowledged, that those philosophers, who undermine and weaken theism and religion, do highly deserve of all civil sovereigns and commonwealths.

XXII. Now from all the premised considerations, the Democritics confidently conclude against a Deity; that the system and compages of the universe had not its original from any understanding nature; but that mind and understanding itself, as well as all things else in the world, sprung up from senseless nature and chance, or from the unguided and undirected motion of matter. Which is therefore called by the name of nature, because whatsoever moves is moved by nature and necessity; and the mutual occursions and rencounters of atoms, their plagæ, their strokes and dashings against one another, their reflexions and repercussions, their cohesions, implexions and entanglements, as also their scattered dispersions and divulsions, are all natural and necessary; but it is called also by the name of chance and fortune, because it is all unguided by any mind, counsel or design.

Wherefore infinite atoms of different sizes and figures, devoid of all life and sense, moving fortuitously from eternity in infinite space, and making successively several encounters, and consequently various implexions and entanglements with one another, produced first a confused chaos of these omnifarious particles, jumbling together with infinite variety of motions, which afterward, by the tugging of their different and contrary forces, whereby they all hindered and abated each other, came, as it were by joint conspiracy, to be conglomerated into a vortex or vortices; where after many convolutions and evolutions, molitions and essays (in which all manner of tricks were tried, and all forms imaginable experimented) they chanced, in length of time, here to settle, into this form and system of things, which now is, of earth, water, air and fire; sun, moon and stars; plants, animals and men; so that senseless atoms, fortuitously moved, and material chaos, were the first original of all things.

This account of the cosmopœia, and first original of the mundane system is represented by Lucretius[9] according to the

[9] Lib. 5. v. 417. &c. p. 279. &c. But the editions give some of these verses a little differently. Thus the fifth verse is read in many copies:

"Ordine se suo quæque sagaci mente locarunt."

And the seventh verse in all of them:

"Sed quia multimodis multis premordia rerum."

I suspect our author, therefore, to have purposely emended this verse; and that not infelicitously. In like manner the fourteenth verse is expressed differently here from what it is in all the copies. The last edition reads:

"Tandem conveniant ea, quæ conventa repente."

mind of Epicurus, though without any mention of those vortices, which were yet an essential part of the old Democritic hypothesis.

Sed quibus ille modis conjectus materiaï
Fundarit cœlum, ac terram, pontique profunda,
Solis, lunaï cursus, ex ordine ponam.
Nam certe neque consilio primordia rerum
Ordine se quæque atque sagaci mente locarunt:
Nec quos quæque darent motus, pepigere profecto.
Sed quia multa modis multis primordia rerum,
Ex infinito jam tempore percita plagis,
Ponderibusque suis consuerunt concita ferri,
Omni-modisque coire, atque omnia pertentare,
Quæcunque inter se possent congressa creare:
Propterea fit, uti magnum volgata per ævum,
Omnigenos cœtus et motus experiundo,
Tandem ea conveniant, quæ ut convenere, repente
Magnarum rerum fiant exordia sæpe,
Terraï, maris, et cœli, generisque animantum.

But because some seem to think that Epicurus was the first founder and inventor of this doctrine, we shall here observe, that this same atheistic hypothesis was long before described by Plato, when Epicurus was as yet unborn; and therefore doubtless according to the doctrine of Leucippus, Democritus and Protagoras; though that Philosopher, in a kind of disdain (as it seems) refused to mention either of their names:[10] Πῦρ καὶ

[10] These words of Plato occur lib. 10. De Legibus, p. 666. opp. but the learned Doctor will neither persuade me nor perhaps others, that they embody the opinion professed by Lucretius concerning the origin of things. It is manifest indeed, that those whose dogmas Plato is here expounding supposed this world to have been formed fortuitously, and not by Divine reason or design, and consequently discarded a Deity; which on the whole was the doctrine also of Lucretius and of his master Epicurus. But it does not follow from thence, that they both held this same opinion concerning the first principles of things and derived the origin of the world from atoms destitute of all quality. Either I am altogether mistaken or the contrary is evident from Plato, who having stated, that those men whom he is assailing maintained all bodies to have been produced by chance, after these words, οἰκείως πως: adds: Θερμὰ ψυχροῖς, ἢ ξηρὰ πρὸς ὑγρά, ἢ μαλακὰ πρὸς σκληρὰ, καὶ πάντα, ὁπόσα τῇ τῶν ἐναντίων κράσει κατὰ τύχην ἐξ ἀνάγκης συνεκεράσθη, "Singula singulis, frigida calidis, sicca humidis, mollia duris, et omnino contraria contrariis adhæsisse, fortuna duce convenisse, ac necessitate contemperata esse." Now this widely differs from the opinions of Epicurus and the other supporters of atomism. For these will allow no atom to be of its own nature cold, hot, dry or moist, whereas the philosophers whom Plato introduces hold some particles to be moist, others cold, others hot, that is, to be endowed with qualities. The same affirm, that contraries adhered to contraries; which again is very different from the doctrine of Epicurus, according to whom it was not the nature itself of the corpuscles, but the figure and motion only, which produced those combinations we now see. Therefore whatever opinion these philosophers in Plato may have held concerning the nature of things, it is nevertheless clear that they did not hold the same as Epicurus. Hence he judges much more correctly and probably below, ch. 3. sect. 23. when he states this passage of Plato to contain a description of the doctrine of Anaximander usually called *Hylopathic*. But Dr. Cudworth, being so ardent an admirer of the atomic philosophy, fancied he saw atoms, whenever he found the ancients discoursing upon the fortuitous creation of things. On which account also, I suspect, he here omitted those words of Plato, well knowing them to be at variance with his own opinion.

ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν καὶ ἀέρα, φύσει πάντα εἶναι καὶ τύχῃ φασί· τέχνῃ δὲ οὐδὲν τούτων. Καὶ τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα αὖ σώματα, γῆς τε καὶ ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης, ἄστρων τε πέρι, διὰ τούτων γεγονέναι, παντελῶς ὄντων ἀψύχων. Τύχῃ δὲ φερόμενα τῇ τῆς δυνάμεως ἕκαστα ἑκάστων, ᾗ ξυμπέπτωκεν, ἁρμόττοντα οἰκείως πως, &c. ταύτῃ καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα οὕτω γεγεννηκέναι τὸν τε οὐρανὸν ἅλον καὶ πάντα ὁπόσα κατ' οὐρανόν· καὶ ζῶα αὖ καὶ φυτὰ ξύμπαντα, ὡρῶν πασῶν ἐκ τούτων γενομένων· οὐ διὰ νοῦν (φασὶν) οὐδὲ διά τινα θεὸν, οὐδὲ διὰ τέχνην, ἀλλὰ, ὃ λέγομεν, φύσει καὶ τύχῃ, τέχνην δὲ ὕστερον ἐκ τούτων ὑστέραν γενομένην, &c. "The Atheists say, that fire, water, air and earth" *i. e.* the four elements "were all made by nature and chance; and none of them by art or mind" that is, they were made by the fortuitous motion of atoms, and not by any Deity "and that those other bodies, of the terrestrial globe, of the sun, the moon, and the stars" which by all, except these Atheists, were, in those times, generally supposed to be animated, and a kind of inferior Deities "were afterwards made out of the aforesaid elements, being altogether inanimate. For they being moved fortuitously, or as it happened, and so making various commixtures together, did, by that means, at length produce the whole heavens and all things in them, as likewise plants and animals here upon earth; all which were not made by mind, nor by art, nor by any God; but, as we said before, by nature and chance; art, and mind itself, rising up afterwards from the same senseless principles in animals."

CHAPTER III.

An introduction to the confutation of the atheistic grounds, in which is contained a particular account of all the several forms of Atheism. 1. That the grounds of the hylozoic Atheism could not be insisted on in the former chapter, together with those of the atomic, they being directly contrary each to other; with a further account of this hylozoic Atheism. 2. A suggestion, by way of caution, for the preventing of all mistakes, that every Hylozoist must not therefore be condemned for an Atheist, or a mere counterfeit histrionical Theist. 3. That nevertheless, such Hylozoists as are also Corporealists can by no means be excused from the imputation of atheism, for two reasons. 4. That Strato Lampsacenus, commonly called Physicus, seems to have been the first asserter of the hylozoic atheism, he holding no other god but the life of nature in matter. 5. Further proved, that Strato was an Atheist, and that of a different form from Democritus, he attributing an energetic nature, but without sense and animality, to all matter. 6. That Strato not deriving all things from a mere fortuitous principle, as the Democritic Atheists did, nor yet acknowledging any one plastic nature to preside over the whole, but deducing the original of things from a mixture of chance and plastic nature both together in the several parts of matter, must therefore needs be an hylozoic Atheist. 7. That the famous Hippocrates was neither an hylozoic nor Democritic Atheist, but rather an Heraclitic corporeal Theist. 8. That Plato took no notice of the hylozoic atheism, nor of any other than what derives the original of all things from a mere fortuitous nature; and therefore, either the Democritical, or the Anaximandrian atheism, which latter will be next declared. 9. That it is hardly imaginable, there should have been no philosophic Atheists in the world before Democritus and Leucippus, there being in all ages, as Plato observes, some or other sick of the atheistic disease. That Aristotle affirms many of the first philosophers to have assigned only a material cause of the mundane system, without either efficient or intending cause; they supposing matter to be the only substance, and all things else nothing but the passions and accidents of it, generable and corruptible. 10. That the doctrine of these materialists will be more fully understood from the exceptions which Aristotle makes against them: his first exception, That they assigned no cause of motion, but introduced it into the world unaccountably. 11. Aristotle's second exception, That these materialists did assign no cause τοῦ εὖ καὶ καλῶς, of well and fit, and give no account of the orderly regularity of things. That Anaxagoras was the first Ionic philosopher who made mind and good a principle of the universe. 12. Concluded, That Aristotle's materialists were downright Atheists, not merely because they held all substance to be body, since Heraclitus and Zeno did the like, and yet are not accounted Atheists (they supposing their fiery matter to be originally intellectual, and the whole world to be an animal); but because these made stupid matter, devoid of all understanding and life, to be the only principle. 13. As also, because they supposed every thing besides the substance of matter, life, and un-

derstanding, and all particular beings, to be generable, and corruptible, and consequently, that there could be no other God than such as was native and mortal. That those ancient theologers, who were Theogonists, and generated all the gods out of night and chaos, were only verbal Theists, but real Atheists; senseless matter being to them the highest Numen. 14. The great difference observed betwixt Aristotle's atheistical materialists and the Italic philosophers, the former determining all things, besides the substance of matter, to be made or generated, the latter that no real entity was either generated or corrupted; thereupon both destroying qualities and forms of body, and asserting the ingenerability and incorporeity of souls. 15. How Aristotle's atheistic materialists endeavoured to baffle and elude that axiom of the Italic philosophers, That nothing can come from nothing nor go to nothing; and that Anaxagoras was the first amongst the Ionics, who yielded so far to that principle, as from thence to assert incorporeal substance, and the pre-existence of qualities and forms in similar atoms, forasmuch as he conceived them to be things really distinct from the substance of matter. 16. The error of some writers, who because Aristotle affirms, that the ancient philosophers did generally conclude the world to have been made, from thence infer, that they were all Theists, and that Aristotle contradicts himself in representing many of them as Atheists. That the ancient Atheists did generally κοσμοποιεῖν, assert the world to have been made, or have had a beginning; as also some Theists did maintain its eternity, but in a way of dependency upon the Deity. That we ought here to distinguish betwixt the system of the world, and the substance of the matter, all Atheists asserting the matter to have been, not only eternal, but also such independently upon any other being. 17. That Plato and others concluded this materialism, or hylopathian atheism, to have been at least as old as Homer, who made the ocean (or fluid matter) the father of all the gods. And that this was indeed the ancientest of all atheisms, which verbally acknowledging gods, yet derived the original of them all from night and chaos. The description of this atheistic hypothesis in Aristophanes, That night and chaos first laid an egg, out of which sprung forth love, which afterwards mingling with chaos, begat heaven and earth, and all the gods. 18. That notwithstanding this, in Aristotle's judgment, Parmenides, Hesiod, and others, who made love, in like manner, senior to all the gods, were to be exempted out of the number of Atheists; they understanding this love to be an active principle, or cause of motion in the universe, which therefore could not rise from an egg of the night, nor be the offspring of chaos, but must be something in order of nature before matter. Simmias Rhodius' Wings, a poem in honour of this heavenly love. This not that love, which was the offspring of Penia and Porus in Plato. In what rectified sense it may pass for true theology, that love is the supreme Deity and original of all things. 19. That though Democritus and Leucippus be elsewhere taxed by Aristotle for this very thing, that they assigned only a material cause of the universe; yet they were not the persons intended by him in the fore-cited accusation, but certain ancienter philosophers, who also were not atomists, but hylopathians. 20. That Aristotle's atheistic materialists were all the first Ionic philosophers before Anaxagoras, Thales being the head of them. But that Thales is acquitted from this imputation of atheism by several good authors (with an account how he came to be thus differently represented), and therefore that his next successor Anaximander is rather to be accounted the prince of this atheistic philosophy. 21. A passage out of Aristotle objected, which, at first sight, seems to make Anaximander

a divine philosopher, and therefore hath led both modern and ancient writers into that mistake. That this place well considered proves the contrary, That Anaximander was the chief of the old atheistic philosophers. 22. That it is no wonder, if Anaximander called senseless matter the τὸ Θεῖον, or God, since to all Atheists that must needs be the highest Numen; also how this is said to be immortal, and to govern all; with the concurrent judgment of the Greek scholiasts upon this place. 23. A further account of the Anaximandrian philosophy, manifesting it to have been purely atheistical. 24. What ill judges the vulgar have been of Theists and Atheists; as also that learned men have commonly supposed fewer Atheists than indeed there were. Anaximander and Democritus Atheists both alike, though philosophizing different ways. That some passages in Plato respect the Anaximandrian form of atheism, rather than the Democritical. 25. Why Democritus and Leucippus new-modelled atheism into the atomic form. 26. That besides the three forms of atheism already mentioned, we sometimes meet with a fourth, which supposes the universe, though not to be an animal, yet a kind of plant or vegetable, having one plastic nature in it, devoid of understanding and sense, which disposes and orders the whole. 27. That this form of atheism, which makes one plastic life to preside over the whole, is different from the hylozoic, in that it takes away all fortuitousness, and subjects all to the fate of one plastic methodical nature. 28. Though it be possible, that some in all ages might have entertained this atheistical conceit, that things are dispensed by one regular and methodical, but unknowing senseless nature; yet it seems to have been chiefly asserted by certain spurious Heraclitics and Stoics. And therefore this form of atheism, which supposes one cosmoplastic nature, may be called Pseudo-Zenonian. 29. That, besides the philosophic Atheists, there have been always enthusiastic and fanatical Atheists, though in some sense all Atheists may be said also to be both enthusiasts and fanatics, they being led by an ὁρμὴ ἄλογος, or irrational impetus. 30. That there cannot easily be any other form of atheism, besides those four already mentioned, because all Atheists are corporealists, and yet all corporealists not Atheists, but only such as make the first principle of all things not to be intellectual. 31. A distribution of atheisms producing the former quaternio, and showing the difference between them. 32. That they are but bunglers at atheism, who talk of sensitive and rational matter; and that the canting astrological Atheists are not at all considerable, because not understanding themselves. 33. Another distribution of atheisms; That they either derive the original of things from a merely fortuitous principle, the unguided motion of matter, or else from a plastic and methodical, but senseless nature. What Atheists denied the eternity of the world, and what asserted it. 34. That of these four forms of atheism, the Atomic or Democritical, and the Hylozoic or Stratonical are the chief; and that these two being once confuted, all atheism will be confuted. 35. These two forms of atheism being contrary to one another, how we ought in all reason to insist rather upon the atomic; but that afterwards we shall confute the hylozoic also, and prove against all corporealists, that no cogitation nor life belongs to matter. 36. That in the meantime we shall not neglect any form of atheism, but confute them altogether, as agreeing in one principle; as also show, how the old atomic Atheists did sufficiently overthrow the foundation of the Hylozoists. 37. Observed here, that the Hylozoists are not condemned merely for asserting a plastic life, distinct from the animal (which, with most other philosophers, we judge highly probable, if taken in a right sense);

but for grossly misunderstanding it, and attributing the same to matter. The plastic life of nature largely explained. 38. That though the confutation of the atheistic grounds, according to the laws of method, ought to have been reserved for the last part of this discourse; yet we having reasons to violate those laws, crave the reader's pardon for this preposterousness. A considerable observation of Plato's, that it is not only moral vitiosity, which inclines men to atheize, but also an affectation of seeming wiser than the generality of mankind; as likewise, that the Atheists, making such pretence to wit, it is a seasonable undertaking to evince, that they fumble in all their ratiocinations. That we hope to make it appear, that the Atheists are no conjurers; and that all forms of atheism are nonsense and impossibility.

I. We have now represented the grand mysteries of atheism, which may be also called the mysteries of the kingdom of darkness; though indeed some of them are but briefly hinted here, they being again more fully to be insisted on afterward, where we are to give an account of the Atheists' endeavours to solve the phenomenon of cogitation. We have represented the chief grounds of atheisms in general, as also of that most notorious form of atheism in particular, that is called atomical. But whereas there hath been already mentioned another form of atheism, called by us hylozoical; the principles hereof could not possibly be insisted on in this place, where we were to make the most plausible plea for atheism, they being directly contrary to those of the atomical, so that they would have mutually destroyed each other. For, whereas the atomic atheism supposes the notion or idea of body to be nothing but extended resisting bulk, and consequently to include no manner of life and cogitation in it; hylozoism, on the contrary, makes all body, as such, and therefore every smallest atom of it, to have life essentially belonging to it (natural perception, and appetite), though without any animal sense or reflexive knowledge, as if life, and matter or extended bulk, were but two incomplete and inadequate conceptions of one and the same substance, called body. By reason of which life (not animal, but only plastical) all parts of matter being supposed able to form themselves artificially and methodically (though without any deliberation or attentive consideration) to the greatest advantage of their present respective capabilities, and therefore also sometimes by organization to improve themselves further into sense and self-enjoyment in all animals, as also to universal reason and reflexive knowledge in men; it is plain, that there is no necessity at all left, either of any incorporeal soul in men to make them rational, or of any Deity in the whole universe to solve the regularity thereof. One main difference betwixt these two forms of atheism is this, that the atomical supposes all life whatsoever to be accidental, generable, and corruptible; but the hylozoic admits of a certain

natural or plastic life, essential and substantial, ingenerable and incorruptible, though attributing the same only to matter; as supposing no other substance in the world besides it.

II. Now to prevent all mistakes, we think fit here by way of caution to suggest, that as every Atomist is not therefore necessarily an Atheist, so neither must every Hylozoist needs be accounted such. For whoever so holds the life of matter, as notwithstanding to assert another kind of substance also, that is immaterial and incorporeal, is no ways obnoxious to that foul imputation. However, we ought not to dissemble, but that there is a great difference here betwixt these two, atomism and hylozoism, in this regard; that the former of them, namely atomism, (as hath been already declared) hath in itself a natural cognation and conjunction with incorporealism, though violently cut off from it by the Democritic Atheists; whereas the latter of them, hylozoism, seems to have altogether as close and intimate a correspondence with corporealism; because, as hath been already signified, if all matter, as such, have not only such a life, perception and self-active power in it, as whereby it can form itself to the best advantage, making this a sun, and that an earth or planet, and fabricating the bodies of animals most artificially, but also can improve itself into sense and self-enjoyment; it may as well be thought able to advance itself higher, into all the acts of reason and understanding in men; so that there will be no need either of an incorporeal immortal soul in men, or a deity in the universe. Nor indeed is it easily conceivable, how any should be induced to admit such a monstrous paradox as this is, That every atom of dust or other senseless matter is wiser than the greatest politician and the most acute philosopher that ever was, as having an infallible omniscience of all its own capabilities and congruities; were it not by reason of some strong prepossession, against incorporeal substance and a Deity: there being nothing so extravagant and outrageously wild, which a mind once infected with atheistical sottishness and disbelief will not rather greedily swallow down, than admit a Deity, which to such is the highest of all paradoxes imaginable, and the most affrightful bug-bear. Notwithstanding all which, it may not be denied, but that it is possible for one, who really entertains the belief of a Deity and a rational soul immortal, to be persuaded, first, that the sensitive soul in men as well as brutes is merely corporeal; and then that there is a material plastic life in the seeds of all plants and animals, whereby they do artificially form themselves; and from thence afterward to descend also further to hylozoism, that all matter, as such, hath a kind of natural, though not animal life in it;[1] in consideration

[1] This is very justly and wisely said. For certainly it may happen that some may believe that there is a God and that nature is incorporeal, and yet they may at the

whereof, we ought not to censure every Hylozoist, professing to hold a Deity and a rational soul immortal, for a mere disguised Atheist, or counterfeit histrionical Theist.

III. But though every Hylozoist be not therefore necessarily an Atheist, yet whosoever is a Hylozoist and Corporealist both together, he that both holds the life of matter in the sense

same time think that God has concealed a kind of plastic power within particles of matter. I may confirm this, not by bringing forward those who think that there is a God, and that the world is endowed with one soul or even with many, nor those of the ancient or more recent philosophers, whose opinions are not very different, but I will cite only that sect of Arabian philosophers whom Maimonides denominates Loquentes. They taught that there is a God, and divided the universe into atoms—still they by no means affirmed life of every atom. The opinion of these philosophers cannot be more fitly set forth than as Cudworth expresses it. Lest however I should seem to speak hastily, I will quote the very words of Maimonides as I find them in Buxtorf's translation. "Existimant, totum hunc mundum, hoc est, omnia illius corpora conflata esse ex perexiguis quibusdam particulis, quæ ob summam exiguitatem nullam neque divisionem admittant, (atomos vocant) neque quantitatem habeant: sed quum illarum multæ in unum coëunt, et invicem congregantur, tum illud compositum fieri quantum, et ipsum (*ἄτομον* scilicet) corpus; ita ut, si duo tantum ejusmodi atomi conjungantur, unumquodque illorum (post conjunctionem) fiat corpus, ac per consequens duo sint corpora, juxta quosdam ipsorum. Præterea omnes istas atomos statuunt esse similes et æquales, nullamque inter illas esse differentiam. Dicunt itaque, omnia in universum corpora ex istis particulis individuis esse composita compositione conjunctionis; (non per mutationem vel mixtionem, sed conjunctionem et copulationem, ut formas suas retineant:) et proinde generatio illis nihil aliud est, quam congregatio, et corruptio idem, quod separatio: unde etiam non utuntur vocibus generationis et corruptionis, sed pro iis dicunt congregationem et separationem, motum et quietem. Tandem non statuunt particulas istas ab æterno existere, quemadmodum Epicurus voluit, et alii, qui sententiam de atomis sunt amplexi, sed Deum illas semper de novo creare, quando ipsi lubet; ac proinde iterum quoque posse entitate sua privari, et in nihilum redigi." "They think that this whole universe, that is all the bodies of which it is composed, is formed of very small particles of matter without dimensions, and indivisible on account of their minuteness, (they call them atoms); but when many of these come together and join, that then these joined particles become a body (*ἄτομον* scilicet), so that if two atoms of the same kind come together each of them after conjunction is a body, and by consequence, according to some, there are two bodies. Moreover, they maintain that these atoms are alike, equal in all respects, having no difference one from the other. They say therefore, that out of these separate particles all bodies are formed into the universe of beings, not by a change of nature or by mingling with each other, but by a composition of conjunction, *(compositia compositione conjunctionis)* that they are so conjoined as that each retains its own form. With these philosophers, moreover, production is nothing more than conjunction, and destruction is only separation. They do not even use the terms production and destruction, but instead of them they use the terms conjunction and separation—motion and rest. Still they do not say that these particles have always existed, as Epicurus and other advocates of the atomic doctrine said, but that they were all created by God as it pleased him, and that in like manner he could deprive them of being and reduce them to nothing." More Nevochim, part 1. cap. 83. p. 149. Here God and atoms may both be traced. It remains that I say something concerning the life of atoms. Maimonides a little lower, p. 152. adds "Vita, ex ipsorum sententia, exsistit in unaquaque particula corporis viventis. Ita dicunt, quamvis particulam animantis sensu præditi sensilem quoque esse. Nam vita, sensus, intellectus et sapientia ipsis sunt accidentia non minus quam nigredo et albedo." "Life according to the opinion of these philosophers exists in every particle of the living body. Thus they say that each particle of a body, living and feeling, is itself capable of feeling. Life, sense, intellect, and knowledge in their judgment are as much accidents in these bodies as are a black or a white colour." Maimonides however entirely refutes this opinion.

before declared, and also that there is no other substance in the world besides body and matter, cannot be excused from the imputation of atheism, for two reasons; first, because though he derive the original of all things, not from what is perfectly dead and stupid, as the atomic Atheist doth, but from that which hath a kind of life or perception in it, nay an infallible omniscience, of whatsoever itself can do or suffer, or of all its own capabilities and congruities, which seems to bear some semblance of a Deity; yet all this being only in the way of natural, and not animal perception, is indeed nothing but a dull and drowsy, plastic and spermatic life, devoid of all consciousness and self-enjoyment. The Hylozoists' nature is a piece of very mysterious nonsense, a thing perfectly wise, without any knowledge or consciousness of itself; whereas a Deity, according to the true notion of it, is such a perfect understanding being, as with full consciousness and self-enjoyment is completely happy. Secondly, because the hylozoic Corporealist, supposing all matter, as such, to have life in it, must needs make infinite of those lives (forasmuch as every atom of matter has a life of its own) coordinate and independent on one another, and consequently, as many independent first principles, no one common life or mind ruling over the whole. Whereas, to assert a God, is to derive all things ἀφ' ἑνός τινος, "from some one principle," or to suppose one perfect living and understanding being to be the original of all things, and the architect of the whole universe.

Thus we see, that the hylozoic Corporealist is really an Atheist,[2] though carrying more the semblance and disguise of a Theist, than other Atheists, in that he attributes a kind of life

[2] This I confess is perfectly true. Nevertheless why though life be attributed to matter, and though all matter be confined to bodies, should this be charged with making Deity corporeal? Is every one who may be of this opinion to be accused of this high impiety? I think not. This rule of the author I judge may be taken thus: Whoever thinks that there is life in matter, and that there exists nothing but what is corporeal, may justly be denominated an Atheist, unless perhaps he frame to himself a corporeal deity. But what mortal man ever so absurdly judged? Certainly there was one who was of this opinion, not an unlearned man—a Christian—a writer of the third century who wrote the Clementina. That he was of the opinion that to every particle of matter a kind of life or soul was united, no one will doubt who shall read his book. It will be enough for me to quote one passage where he maintains that all things are governed by fear or apprehension. "Does not the earth itself," he says, "remain under fear of the command? what do its tremblings and earthquakes indicate? The sea observes its appointed bounds, the stars their order, and the rivers their course." Lib. 9. sect. 15. p. 581. T. I. P. P. Apostol. • If all things are restrained by fear lest they should violate God's commands, who can deny that there is life and soul in all things? Let him who desires it seek other passages. Vid. lib. 6. sect. 8. p. 556. Lib. 8. p. 573. Lib. 9. sect. 24. p. 704. &c. The same man thinks that there is no nature without body, and is utterly ignorant of what spirit apart from body can be. But among these bodies he provides a place even for Deity whom he is not ashamed openly to declare to be corporeal. Vide Clementina Homil. xvii. p. 738. I do not doubt that besides him many, both among Jews and Christians, were of a similar sentiment.

to matter. For indeed every Atheist must of necessity cast some of the incommunicable properties of the Deity, more or less, upon that which is not God, namely matter; and they who do not attribute life to it, yet must needs bestow upon it necessary self-existence, and make it the first principle of all things, which are the peculiarities of the Deity. The Numen, which the hylozoic Corporealist pays all his devotions to, is a certain blind she-god or goddêss, called nature, or the life of matter; which is a very great mystery, a thing that is perfectly wise, and infallibly omniscient, without any knowledge or consciousness at all; something like to that τῶν παίδων αἴνιγμα (in Plato[3]) περὶ τοῦ εὐνούχου βολῆς τῆς νυκτερίδος, that "vulgar enigma or riddle of boys concerning an eunuch striking a bat; a man and not a man, seeing and not seeing, did strike and did not strike, with a stone and not a stone, a bird and not a bird, &c." the difference being only this, that this was a thing intelligible, but humorsomely expressed; whereas the other seems to be perfect nonsense, being nothing but a misunderstanding of the plastic power, as shall be showed afterwards.

IV. Now the first and chief asserter of this hylozoic atheism was, as we conceive, Strato Lampsacenus,[4] commonly called also Physicus, that had been once an auditor of Theophrastus, and a famous Peripatetic, but afterwards degenerated from a genuine Peripatetic into a new-formed kind of Atheist. For Velleius, an Epicurean Atheist in Cicero, reckoning up all the several sorts of Theists, which had been in former times, gives such a character of this Strato, as whereby he makes him to be a strange kind of atheistical Theist, or divine Atheist, if we may use such a contradictious expression; his words are these,[5] Nec audiendus Strato, qui Physicus appellatur, qui omnem vim divinam in natura sitam esse censet, quæ causas gignendi, augendi, minuendíve habeat, sed careat omni sensu. "Neither is Strato, commonly called the Naturalist or Physiologist, to be heard, who places all divinity in nature, as having within itself the causes of all generations, corruptions and augmentations, but without any manner of sense." Strato's deity therefore was a certain living and active, but senseless nature. He did not fetch the original of all things, as the Democritic and Epicurean Atheists, from a mere fortuitous motion of atoms, by means whereof he bore some slight semblance of a Theist; but

[3] De Rep. lib. 5. p. 468. Plato has not the fable itself; he only refers to it generally.

[4] Vide Diogen. Laert. segm. 58. p. 298. Concerning Strato and others whom we shall name, read in addition to Diogenes Laert. as referred to, S. Jo. Alb. Fabricium Bibliothec. Græc. lib. 3. c. 11. p. 311. and especially concerning Strato, read the dissertation of that most learned man Fred. Philip Schlosser. Wittem. 1728 edition.

[5] De Nat. Deor. lib. 1. cap. 13. p. 2902.

yet he was a downright Atheist for all that, his God being no other than such a life of nature in matter, as was both devoid of sense and consciousness, and also multiplied together with the several parts of it. He is also in like manner described by Seneca in St. Augustine[6] as a kind of mongrel thing, betwixt an Atheist and a Theist: Ego feram aut Platonem, aut Peripateticum Stratonem, quorum alter deum sine corpore fecit, alter sine animo? "Shall I endure either Plato, or the Peripatetic Strato, whereof the one made God to be without a body, the other without a mind?" In which words Seneca taxes these two philosophers, as guilty of two contrary extremes; Plato, because he made God to be a pure mind or a perfectly incorporeal being; and Strato, because he made him to be a body without a mind, he acknowledging no other deity than a certain stupid and plastic life, in all the several parts of matter, without sense. Wherefore this seems to be the only reason why Strato was thus sometimes reckoned amongst the Theists, though he were indeed an Atheist, because he dissented from that only form of Atheism, then so vulgarly received, the Democritic and Epicurean, attributing a kind of life to nature and matter.

V. And that Strato was thus an Atheist, but of a different kind from Democritus, may further appear from this passage of Cicero's:[7] Strato Lampsacenus negat operâ deorum se uti ad fabricandum mundum; quæcunque sint docet omnia esse effecta natura, nec ut ille, qui asperis, et lævibus, et hamatis uncinatisque corporibus concreta hæc esse dicat, interjecto inani; somnia censet hæc esse Democriti, non docentis, sed optantis, "Strato denies, that he makes any use of a God, for the fabricating of the world, or the solving the phenomena thereof; teaching all things to have been made by nature; but yet not in such a manner, as he who affirmed them to be all concreted out of certain rough and smooth, hookey and crooked atoms, he judging these things to be nothing but the mere dreams and dotages of Democritus, not teaching but wishing." Here we see, that Strato denied the world to be made by a Deity or perfect understanding nature, as well as Democritus; and yet that he dissented from Democritus notwithstanding, holding another kind of nature, as the original of things, than he did, who gave no account of any active principle and cause of motion, nor of the regularity that is in things. Democritus' nature was nothing but the fortuitous motion of matter; but Strato's nature was an inward plastic life in the several parts of matter, whereby they could artificially frame themselves to the best

[6] De Civ. Dei. lib. 6. cap. 10. sect. 1. p. 122. tom. 7. opp. Ed. Benedict.
[7] Acad. Quæst. lib. 4. cap. 38. p. 2318. tom. 8. opp.

advantage, according to their several capabilities, without any conscious or reflexive knowledge. Quicquid aut sit aut fiat (says the same author[8]) naturalibus fieri, aut factum esse docet ponderibus et motibus. "Strato teaches whatsoever is, or is made, to be made by certain inward natural forces and activities."

VI. Furthermore, it is to be observed, that though Strato thus attributed a certain kind of life to matter, yet he did by no means allow of any one common life, whether sentient and rational, or plastic and spermatic only, as ruling over the whole mass of matter and corporeal universe; which is a thing in part affirmed by Plutarch,[9] and may in part be gathered from these

[8] Cicero as above.

[9] Advers. Colotem. p. 1115. tom. 2. opp. Different persons, according as they are affected towards Strato, take different views of this passage from Dr. Cudworth. Lescalopierius, Comm. ad lib. Ciceronis De Nat. Deor. p. 58. thus translates it into Latin: "Denique mundum ipsum animal esse negat Strato, vultque, naturam sequi temerarios fortunæ impetus; initium enim rebus dare spontaneam quamdam naturæ vim; et sic deinceps ab eadem natura physicis motibus imponi finem," "Strato denies that the world is an animal, and thinks that nature follows the accidental impulses of chance, for that things have their commencement from a certain spontaneous plastic power in nature, and that thus again by the same nature, an end is forced upon physical motion." This version Bayle and Buddeus both approve, Pet. Bayle's Dict. vol. 3. Voce Spinosa, note A. p. 2631. Bud. Diss. de Spinozismo ante Spinosam, sect. 6. in Analect. Histor. Philos. p. 318. Still, it somewhat offends Bayle that Strato should be considered to have here taught that nature follows the accidental impulses of chance. He thinks that this is inconsistent with his other doctrines; for if there be any dependence upon the testimony of ancient writers, Strato attributed nothing to fortune and accident, but all things to necessity; nor had he anything in common with the Epicureans, with whom chance was the sole director and governor. And I confess that Lescalopierius would have given a better rendering had he translated the word τυχην simply "fortune," and not introduced the expression "temerarios fortunæ impetus" into the words of Plutarch. But that there was no foundation for what Bayle supposes, that inasmuch as Strato believed that all things were borne on by a sort of necessity he could give no opportunity for fortuitous chance, will I think presently appear. Xylander translates the words of Plutarch obscurely, "Negat mundum esse animal et naturalia comitari fortunæ casu initium motus naturæ prebente itaque hos porro absolvi." The man who would express the sense of this version ought truly to be able to see farther than other men. The very learned Schlosser, Diss. de Strat. Lampsaceno, sect. 24. p. 24. adds another version, "Tandem mundum esse non esse animal, dicit, naturalia vero sequi fortuita. Initium enim indere automaton seu spontaneam quamdam naturæ vim, tum vero ita continuare affectiones rerum naturalium singulas." "At length, he says, that the world is not an animal, but that natural things follow a fortuitous course. For the commencement of things conferred a self-moving or spontaneous power upon nature, and then, in this manner, all the properties of natural things are maintained." In whatever way the passage is translated it is exceedingly obscure, which is occasioned by Plutarch's not having defined and fixed the force and meaning of the words φυσις, τυχη, αυτοματον. I for my own part judge that what in the passage is clear and perspicuous may be separated from what is ambiguous. It is evident, 1. That Strato denies that the world is an animal, or that through universal nature a sort of common life is diffused. 2. That he thought what he calls φυσις and τυχη were both necessary to the production of things. So Plato, not now to adduce other ancient testimonies; lib. 10. De Legibus, p. 665. 666. et al. teaches that the Atheists of his time always joined φυσις and τυχη, in explaining the principles of the nature of things. 3. That τυχη or fortune set in motion the innate plastic power which belonged to matter, but, 4. That this power afterwards perfects all things by its own energy, and, as Cicero says, effects by its activity and force as much as nature can

words of his: Τὸν κόσμον αὐτὸν οὐ ζῶον εἶναί φησι, τόδε κατὰ φύσιν ἔπεσθαι τῷ κατὰ τύχην, ἀρχὴν γὰρ ἐνδιδόναι τὸ αὐτόματον, εἶτα οὕτω περαίνεσθαι τῶν φυσικῶν παθῶν ἕκαστον, "Strato affirmeth that the world is no animal (or god), but that what is natural in every thing, follows something fortuitous antecedent, chance first beginning, and nature acting consequently thereupon." The full sense whereof seems to be this, that though Strato did not derive the original of all mundane things from mere fortuitous mechanism, as Democritus before him had done, but supposed a life and natural perception in the matter, that was directive of it; yet not acknowledging any one common life, whether animal or plastic, as governing and swaying the whole, but only supposing the several parts of matter to have so many plastic lives of their own, he must needs attribute something to fortune, and make the mundane system to depend upon a certain mixture of chance and plastic or orderly nature both together, and consequently must be an Hylozoist. [1] Thus we see, that

do. But had Plutarch added what Strato's φυσις and τυχη were, he would have saved us considerable trouble. In the meantime, if we will carefully consider these four things it will appear that from them this sentiment follows, which agrees with what others of the ancients said respecting Strato:—that those persons are mistaken who think that any soul, power, or reason is concealed in the universe, which may govern and direct its motions; all things which exist are rather produced and formed by a certain law of nature. Whatever part of matter has this minute plastic power, this power is quiescent till some other exterior force, as it were, awakens and excites it. If, therefore, any thing that shall be fit and adapted to excite this plastic power should perchance operate upon it so as to induce efficient action, then that thing accomplishes whatever it can, and without any foreign aid effects whatever nature itself is able to effect. It will be seen, I hope, clearly what Strato thought. You see what his τυχη and what his φυσις are; the one, φυσις, is that power of affecting and producing which matter has as it were laid up and concealed within itself; the other, τυχη, is that external action whose aid is required that this plastic power may be excited. It will be seen finally that according to Strato, τυχη was very properly joined with φυσις, and that there was not an opposition between them, as Bayle supposed. Strato's τυχη is the daughter of necessity. He would have been foolish indeed had he taught that any one thing acted to excite these motions of nature without a cause. I wish that what has been brought forward from Cicero, sect. 8. declaring this sentiment of Strato, should be examined. Such I incline to think learned men regard as the doctrine of Strato. It is quite as correspondent with his views as what Cudworth has here given.

[1] So almost all learned men have thought, as Bayle, Buddeus, Lescalopierius, Leibnitz, Clark, Thomasius, whom Schlosser, loc. laud. and that very learned man, Jac. Fred. Reimmann, in Hist. Atheism, sect. 2. cap. 27. sect. 3. p. 186. have mentioned, reckoning Strato among those who have declared war against God and religion. But the very celebrated Reimmann himself, l. c. sect. 4. p. 188., judges that the things preserved from the ancients concerning Strato are too few and too obscure to determine what he taught. The very learned Schlosser, whom I have so often mentioned, proceeded further, nor did he hesitate to plead for Strato. He thinks the passage from Plutarch, sect. 32. p. 30. since it is so exceedingly obscure, exhibits nothing certain. The sayings of Cicero and of Seneca he thinks may be understood so as that Strato shall not be thought to have excluded God from the creation of the world, but that he only wished to indicate that all the causes of what occurs in nature are not to be immediately attributed to God, second causes are not to be entirely neglected, or as a learned man speaks, God is not to be entirely, but only to a certain point, excluded from the creation of the world. He brings forward other things also to lessen the force of these passages, which, since they are but conjectures, I do not think it needful here to describe. But although I think that they who endeavour to wipe off the imputation of impiety from the innocent, deserve well of mankind, I do not envy the ingenious

these are two schemes of atheism, very different from one another;[2] that which fetches the original of all things from the mere fortuitous and unguided motion of matter, without any

patron of Strato; nevertheless, if the dispute is to be estimated according to the decision of the ancients, how far Strato may be cleared, I confess I cannot tell. As to the passage from Plutarch, I apprehend I have somewhat dispelled its obscurity, and I think it will be sufficiently clear from what I have said, that Strato has left to God little or no part in the construction of the universe. Other passages, moreover, of Cicero and Seneca may be explained by acute conjectures, still I think they cannot be so softened and mitigated in force, as to allow the idea that Strato was a devout and religious man. What Cicero and Seneca intimate, Lactantius confirms in his book, De Ira Dei, cap. 10. p. 918, where he says, "Naturam ait Straton habere in se vim gignendi et minuendi: sed eam nec sensum habere ullum, nec figuram; ut intelligamus, omnia quasi sua sponte esse generata, nullo artifice, nec auctore." "That Strato declares nature to have the power of producing and of destroying; but that it has not either sense or figure; so that we are to understand that all things are produced as it were spontaneously, without a contriver and without an author." Lactantius afterwards repeats the same thing, and refutes it, l. c. p. 926: "Qui se negat opera Deorum uti ad mundum fabricandum, qui Deum sine mente fingit, qui omnem divinam vim in natura sitam putat, qui naturam sensu et figura carentem, nullo artifice, nec auctore." "That man denies creation to be the work of Deity who feigns a God without mind, who thinks that all divine power resides in nature, who judges that nature destitute of sense and figure, without a contriver and without an author, has brought together all things which we behold." How such a man can be a worshipper of any God, I cannot by any effort of thought conceive. Now, if any one inquire of me whether I think that Strato taught all that Cudworth assigns to him; whether I suppose that he believed that entire and perfect life resides in every particle of matter, I must answer that I have nothing from the things which have been said that would make this appear. These are the conclusions which a distinguished man draws from what the ancients have left in writing respecting the philosophy of Strato. But there is much to oppose our attributing to every writer what may seem to follow from what he has said. It appears, if any confidence can be reposed in the statements of ancient writers, that Strato thought that a plastic power is hidden in matter which needs some external influence to excite it. But how he explained this, and fitted it to all things which have been produced, had we his works we might understand. These being lost, it is better, as I conceive, to confess ignorance than to indulge in uncertain conjectures, especially since they who are competent to judge clearly enough see that this opinion cannot be sustained by even a single argument. Nevertheless, I think there is not much force in what the learned Schlosser intimates, l. c. sect. 31. p. 29. 30. as contradicting Cudworth. For he thinks that Strato could not attribute life to every particle of matter, since, as Cicero testifies, he dissented from Democritus; nor did he with him divide nature into minute particles or atoms. I readily grant, as Cicero is the authority for it, that Strato laughed at the atoms of Democritus, as rough and smooth, as hooked and barbed; but must he be regarded, even though this be true, as denying that matter can be and ought to be separated into particles? I think not. How many soever investigators of nature there are, they cannot but divide it into parts by their acuteness, and separate it into minute particles, though all do not assent to the atomic system of Epicurus and Democritus. Strato, perhaps, did deny that all things which we behold could be formed by the fortuitous conjunction of particles destitute of every quality. But this did not hinder his assigning such a power to these particles, endued with the necessary qualities, with life and feeling. Who is ignorant that Anaxagoras, who contemned the atomic system, yet divided the universe into corpuscles, which he called similaria. What! as the very learned Bayle has sought to show, shall the defenders of the atomic system be more to be tolerated because they attribute life and feeling to every atom? Dict. vol. 2. vide Leucipp. note 2. p. 1701. There are learned men, with whom, however, I do not agree, who imagined that all the atoms of Democritus were considered as endued with life. This dispute, which I have so far gone into, has been undertaken not simply to controvert the opinions of others, but that I may offer an example of how much caution ought to be used in investigating the opinions of ancient philosophers.

[2] Thus had Lactantius divided those who exclude God from the creation and government of the world: "Qui nolunt divina providentia factum esse mundum, aut princi-

vital or directive principle: and that which derives it from a certain mixture of chance and the life of matter both together, it supposing a plastic life, not in the whole universe, as one thing, but in all the several parts of matter by themselves; the first of which is the Atomic and Democritic atheism, the second the Hylozoic and Stratonic.

VII. It may perhaps be suspected by some, that the famous Hippocrates, who lived long before Strato, was an assertor of the Hylozoic atheism, because of such passages in him as these: Ἀπαίδευτος ἡ φύσις ἐκ τοῦ σάου μαθοῦσα τὰ δέοντα ποιεῖν, "Nature is unlearned or untaught, but it learneth from itself what things it ought to do:" and again, Ἀνευρίσκει ἡ φύσις αὐτὴ ἑαυτῇ τὰς ἐφόδους, οὐκ ἐκ διανοίας, "Nature finds out ways to itself, not by ratiocination."[3] But there is nothing more

piis inter se temere coëuntibus dicunt esse concretum, aut repente natura exstitisse." "They who deny that the world was created by Divine Providence, must maintain either that it was formed by principles or particles fortuitously mixing together, or that it suddenly sprung into existence." De Ira Dei. cap. 10. p. 918.

[3] Epidem. lib. 6. sect. 5. sect. 2. tom. 2. opp. p. 1184. others read, καὶ οὐ μαθοῦσα, τὰ δέοντα ποιέει. Each of these passages is extant in the works of Hippocrates, but if there are no others from which atheism can be at all argued, certainly his works contain nothing by which his followers in the medical art may demonstrate his piety. In these words, perhaps, he declares only, what physicians are every day in the habit of declaring, that the principal means whether of preventing or of healing diseases, is in nature itself, or as Cicero, Tuscul. Quæs. lib. 3. cap. 3. p. 2696. tom. 8. opp. has left on record, "That to the healing of the body, both its own constitution and nature very considerably contribute." If this be atheistic, I see no reason why what Hippocrates says elsewhere should not be regarded as equally impious and injurious. In leg. tom. 1. p. 2. Πρῶτον οὖν μεν πάντων δεῖ φύσιος· φύσιος γὰρ ἀντιπραττούσης, κενὲα πάντα, "Nature is first and chiefly necessary to him who would obtain a knowledge of the art of healing, since if it be against him, all his efforts will be vain." Other things, moreover, may be found in Hippocrates, from which learned men have suffered themselves to place the prince of physicians among Atheists, and the passages from which Cudworth thought he was to be rescued from this imputation, has been adduced in support of it. Among the chief of these learned men the illustrious Mich. Hieron. Gudlingius not long ago employed the whole force of his talents to show that Hippocrates, in Otiis, tom. 2. cap. 3. denied the existence of Deity, Gudling. Part. 23, 24. On the other hand, others fiercely contend for his piety, as Joh. Stephanus, some time since a Venetian physician, in Hipp. Theolog. Venet. 1638—4. published by Joh. Alb. Fabricius, with the addition of many notes by which Stephen's opinion was strengthened, Biblioth. Græc. vol. 3. p. 192, also Andr. Ottom. Goelicke Orat. published at Duisberg, and Dan. Wilh. Triller. a man of great learning, and in this matter very far surpassing all others, in his Hippoc. Falso Atheismi. accusat. Rudolstadt, 1719 in 8. Every one, moreover, who approves of the opinion Cudworth expresses, ought to consult on the subject Jean le Clerc. Bibl. anc. et mod. tom. 15. p. 428. vide p. 436. Joh. Alb. Fabricius Bibl. Græc. vol. 13. p. 191. embraced the opinion of Triller, from which it is evident that Joh. Franc. Buddæus, Thes. de Atheism. and Superstit., cap. 1. 83, 84. does not greatly differ. I pass over others. When such men contend I scarcely dare interpose my judgment, which I acknowledge to be small; yet I may give utterance to a few things which have come into my mind while I have been considering the subject. Since Hippocrates has given no definition of the word φυσις, and of other words which he uses in writing on subjects more sublime than ordinary, either side of a dispute concerning his piety and religion may be maintained. If any one would discuss the law of consequence with Hippocrates, I fear that the argument would fail, inasmuch as passages continually occur in his writings from which any, even the most horrible doctrines may be drawn. In like manner, I have long been quite persuaded that no one of the ancient inquirers after knowledge, not to mention the more modern, will be accounted innocent and pious if it be lawful to say that

affirmed here concerning nature by Hippocrates, than what might be affirmed likewise of the Aristotelic and Platonic nature, which is supposed to act for ends, though without consultation and ratiocination. And I must confess it seems to me no way misbecoming of a Theist, to acknowledge such a nature or principle in the universe, as may act according to rule and method for the sake of ends, and in order to the best, though itself do not understand the reason of what it doth; this being still supposed to act dependently upon a higher intellectual principle, and to have been first set a work and employed by it, it being otherwise nonsense. But to assert any such plastic nature as is independent upon any higher intellectual principle, and so itself the first and highest principle of activity in the universe, this indeed must needs be either that Hylozoic atheism already spoken of, or else another different form of atheism, which shall afterwards be described. But though Hippocrates were a corporealist, yet we conceive he ought not to lie under the suspicion of either of those two atheisms; forasmuch as himself plainly asserts a higher intellectual system, than such a plastic nature, in the universe, namely an Heraclitic corporeal God, or understanding fire, immortal, pervading the whole world, in these words: Δοκέει δέ μοι ὃ καλέομεν θερμὸν, ἀθάνατόν τε εἶναι, καὶ νοεῖν πάντα, καὶ ὁρῆν, καὶ ἀκούειν, καὶ εἰδέναι πάντα τὰ ὄντα καὶ τὰ μέλλοντα ἔσεσθαι,[4] "It seems to me, that that

they held all those sentiments to which what they have written may seem to lead. On which account this mode of interpretation will not do. Of the sayings of Hippocrates which he has left concerning the nature and origin of things, some are of such a kind as very easily to lead to the opinion which has been propounded from his writings, that there is nothing more than a sort of θερμὸς, or warmth or plastic power generating all things. And I confess that when I have read his book, De Carnibus, this seems to me most probable. For the passage which is here quoted by Cudworth is only the beginning of a longer sentence concerning the nature of this warmth; what follows teaches that this plastic power or warmth, which Hippocrates pronounces immortal and intelligent, is nature necessarily conjoined with matter. There are, moreover, passages of his in which he mentions τῆς θείας ἀνάγκης and τοῦ θείου, "divine fate," lib. 1. De Diæt. t. 1. p. 182.; De Mulieb. Natura. t. 2. p. 358. ed. Linden. There is also a passage where he says that the gods have wisely and well ordained all things, lib. 1. De Diæt. t. 1. p. 190. ed. Linden. It may then be concluded that Hippocrates worshipped a more excellent and dignified kind of nature, which directed the motions of his θέρμος, and which was itself acted upon in order to the production of the universe. But what his θεια ἀναγκη and θειον is, I have never been able from any thing he says to discover. Still, a few will suspect that when he speaks of the gods he merely adopts current and popular language after the manner of prudent men. Since things are thus, I cannot tell but that it may be wisest perhaps to acknowledge at this distance of time that it can scarcely be determined what Hippocrates thought concerning a Deity, nor does it clearly appear whether he were a religious man or an atheist. In the meantime, if this judgment be rejected, I will willingly concede to any one who shall deliver a better.

[4] De Princip. aut Carnibus. sect. 1. p. 249. tom. 1. opp. But Cudworth quotes only the commencement of the sentence. Had he added what follows it would have appeared, as I think, that Hippocrates attributes such properties to his heat or fire, as that if he did not believe it to be the more dignified or excellent nature, he may, not unjustly, be reckoned with atheists. And this chiefly is the point in controversy among those who contend concerning the religion of Hippocrates, whether or not he thought this θέρμος to be some kind of divine essence.

which is called heat or fire, is immortal and omniscient, and that it sees, hears, and knows all things, not only such as are present, but also future." Wherefore we conclude that Hippocrates was neither a Hylozoic nor Democritic Atheist, but a Heraclitic corporeal Theist.[5]

VIII. Possibly it may be thought also, that Plato in his Sophist intends this hylozoic atheism, where he declares it as the opinion of many,[6] *τὴν φύσιν πάντα γεννᾶν, ἀπό τινος αἰτίας αὐτομάτης, καὶ ἄνευ διανοίας φυούσης*, "that nature generates all things from a certain spontaneous principle, without any reason and understanding." But here the word *αὐτομάτης* may be as well rendered fortuitous, as spontaneous; however, there is no necessity that this should be understood of an artificial or methodical unknowing nature. It is true indeed, that Plato himself seems to acknowledge a certain plastic or methodical nature in the universe, subordinate to the Deity, or that perfect mind which is the supreme governor of all things; as may be gathered from these words of his: *Τὴν φύσιν μετὰ λόγου καὶ σὺν λόγῳ καὶ νῷ τὰ πάντα διακοσμεῖν*, "that nature does rationally (or orderly) together with reason and mind, govern the whole universe."[7] Where he supposes a certain regular nature to be a partial and subordinate cause of things under the divine intellect. And it is very probable that Aristotle derived that whole doctrine of his concerning a regular and artificial nature, which acts for ends, from the Platonic school. But as for any such form of atheism as should suppose a plastic or regular but senseless nature either in the whole world, or the several parts of

[5] That Hippocrates approved of the views of Heraclitus, Daniel Clark, in his History of Medicine, p. 109 of the first edition, Gudlingius, in the passages referred to, and others, think. But Triller, in Hippoc. Atheis. fals. accus. spares no pains to show that this is an unsupported affirmation, in which Jean le Clerc, Bibl. ac. et mod. tom. 15. p. 358. agrees with him. It is difficult to say which of these is right, nor will space permit that I should prosecute the inquiry further. On the agreement in many points of Heraclitus and Hippocrates read Gesnerus tom. 1. Comment. Acad. Scient. Gott. in Diss. de Animis Hippocrates.

[6] In Sophista, p. 168. opp.

[7] Where these words are to be found, though I have examined Plato with great care, I cannot tell. I have read and re-read Plato's Sophist, which Cudworth quotes, but certainly this little book has no words of the kind; I suspect, therefore, that this sentence as here recited was not quoted from Plato, but that Cudworth framed it from several scattered passages of the philosopher. I am the more easily induced to believe this on two accounts. First, when further on he treats concerning nature as the universal producer, sect. 6, he quotes the same passage, but with some difference. Secondly, I find that the learned Doctor, in quoting the sentiments of Plato is sometimes not very exact, nor are all the opinions attributed to that philosopher proved from his writings, of which what we have observed at sect. 6. of the Dissertation concerning plastic nature, is a remarkable example. The study of Plato had occupied the truly learned Doctor so much that he seldom recedes far from his sentiments, though he does in reality depart from them; on which account he often quotes in one sense what the author wrote in another. Add to this that I have read in Plato, *passim*, sentiments not very dissimilar from that quoted. Thus in Phileb. p. 79, "mind is the ornament of all things," not to mention other passages.

matter by themselves, to be the highest principle of all things, we do not conceive that there is any intimation of it to be found any where in Plato. For in his De Legibus, lib. 10. p. 665, 666. where he professedly disputes against atheism, he states the doctrine of it after this manner, *τὰ μὲν μέγιστα καὶ κάλλιστα ἀπεργάζεσθαι φύσιν καὶ τύχην, τὰ δὲ σμικρότερα τέχνην*, "that nature and chance produced all the first, greatest, and most excellent things, but that the smaller things were produced by human art." The plain meaning whereof is this, that the first original of things, and the frame of the whole universe, proceeded from a mere fortuitous nature, or the motion of matter unguided by any art or method. And thus it is further explained in the following words: *Πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν καὶ ἀέρα φύσει πάντα εἶναι καὶ τύχῃ φασί· τέχνῃ δὲ οὐδὲν τούτων*, &c., "That the first elements, fire, water, air, and earth, were all made by nature and chance, without any art or method;" and then, "that the bodies of the sun, moon, and stars, and the whole heavens, were afterwards made out of those elements, as devoid of all manner of life," and only fortuitously moved and mingled together; and lastly, that the whole mundane system, together with the orderly seasons of the year, as also plants, animals, and men, did arise after the same manner, from the mere fortuitous motion of senseless and stupid matter. In the very same manner does Plato state this controversy again betwixt Theists and Atheists in his Philebus, p. 28. Ed. Ser.: *Πότερον, ὦ Πρώταρχε, τὰ ξύμπαντα, καὶ τόδε τὸ καλούμενον ὅλον, ἐπιτροπεύειν φῶμεν τὴν τοῦ ἀλόγου καὶ εἰκῇ δύναμιν, καὶ τὰ ὅπῃ ἔτυχεν; ἢ τἀναντία, καθάπερ οἱ πρόσθεν ἡμῶν ἔλεγον, νοῦν καὶ φρόνησίν τινα θαυμαστὴν συντάττουσαν διακυβερνᾶν*, "Whether shall we say, O Protarchus, that this whole universe is dispensed and ordered, by a mere irrational, temerarious and fortuitous principle, and so as it happens; or contrariwise, (as our forefathers have instructed us) that mind, and a certain wonderful wisdom, did at first frame, and does still govern all things?"

[8]Wherefore we conclude, that Plato took no notice of any

[8] What the reason could be why Cudworth says that Plato took no notice of any other form of atheism than that which derives all things from a fortuitous principle, I cannot tell. The passages which he brings forward in support of his assertion will not, I am convinced, bear the sense he puts on them. I. He thinks that the passage from Plato's Sophist must be understood of such a plastic power as he himself had imagined. But he will not easily persuade those of this who have read for themselves what Plato wrote. For those of whom Plato speaks as teaching that nature herself produced all things by a kind of spontaneous power, are opposed by him to those who think that all things have been brought together or have proceeded from God with design and divine knowledge. From which must be understood that there had been impious men and contemners of God, who cherished the former of the opinions he mentions, nor on account of what they attributed to the plastic power of nature could they think of it as forming all things according to the will of God, especially if the word *αὐτομάτης* as Cudworth thinks, be translated spontaneous, from thence it does not follow, as will presently appear, that Plato refused in this passage, to designate as Atheists those who judged matter to be endued with a plastic power II. He says

other form of atheism, as then set on foot, than such as derives all things from a mere fortuitous principle, from nature and chance, that is, the unguided motion of matter, without any plastic artificialness or methodicalness, either in the whole universe, or the parts of it. But because this kind of atheism, which derives all things from a mere fortuitous nature, had been managed two manner of ways, by Democritus in the way of atoms, and by Anaximander and others in the way of forms and qualities; (of which we are to speak in the next place;) therefore the atheism, which Plato opposes, was either the Democritic or the Anaximandrian atheism; or else (which is most probable) both of them together.

IX. It is hardly imaginable, that there should be no philosophic Atheists in the world before Democritus and Leucippus. Plato[9] long since concluded, that there have been Atheists, more or less, in every age, when he bespeaks his young Atheist after this manner; Οὐ σὺ μόνος οὐδὲ σοὶ φίλοι πρῶτοι καὶ πρῶτον ταύτην δόξαν περὶ θεῶν ἔσχετε, γίγνονται δὲ ἀεὶ πλείους ἢ ἐλάττους ταύτην τὴν νόσον ἔχοντες· the full sense whereof seems to be this; "Neither you, my son, nor your friends (Democritus, Leucippus and Protagoras) are the first who have entertained this opinion concerning the gods, but there have been always some more or less sick of this atheistic disease." Wherefore we shall now make a diligent search and enquiry, to see if we can find any other philosophers, who atheized before Democritus and Leucippus, as also what form of atheism they entertained.

that in those passages in which Plato inveighs against the atheists of his own age in Lib. de Legibus and Phileb. he exhibits their doctrine so as to make it appear that they sought the origin of things from fortune, from chance, and from accident. And he thinks it is clear from hence that they did not attribute to matter the power of creating and producing. But I do not understand why when a plastic power is thought to be concealed in matter, there should be hesitation in attributing much to accident, to fortune, and to chance. We have seen on a previous page that Strato embraced both chance and the life of matter at the same time. Here I may quote the words of Cicero as the most fit to set forth this matter from De Natur. Deor. lib. 2. cap. 32. p. 3001. "Seminis (aiunt) vim esse tantam, ut id, quamquam sit perexiguum, tamen, si inciderit in concipientem comprehendentemque naturam, nactumque sit (casu) materiam, qua ali augerique possit, ita fingat et efficiat in suo quidque genere." "They say that the power of a seed, though it be very small, is so great that if it fall," (observe here, I pray you, accident and fortune conjoined with the life of the seed or of the substance) "upon nature receiving and retaining it, and if it obtain by accident matter by which it may be nourished and increased, it creates and produces what is of its own species." Compare what we have said at section 5. It may be added, that Plato intimates in those passages from his book De Legibus which the learned Doctor has adduced, that these men referred the origin of things to φύσις and τύχη. They did not, therefore, refer all things to τύχη, or fortune, but betook themselves also to φύσις, or nature, which seems to be an argument that they did not greatly differ from the opinion of Strato. To confess the truth, what Plato says, both in these and in other passages, concerning the atheists of his day, is both too brief and too obscure to give us a complete or clear view of what their sentiments concerning the nature of things were.

[9] De Legibus, lib. 10. p. 665. Ed. Ser. p. 888.

Aristotle in his Metaphysics, speaking of the quaternio of causes, affirms, that many of those, who first philosophized, assigned only a material cause of the whole mundane system, without either intending or efficient cause. The reason whereof he intimates to have been this, because they asserted matter to be the only substance; and that whatsoever else was in the world, besides the substance or bulk of matter, were all nothing else but πάθη, different passions and affections, accidents and qualities of matter, that were all generated out of it, and corruptible again into it; the substance of matter always remaining the same, neither generated nor corrupted, but from eternity unmade; Aristotle's words are these:[10] Τῶν πρώτων φιλοσοφησάντων οἱ πλεῖστοι τὰς ἐν ὕλης εἴδει μόνον ᾠήθησαν ἀρχὰς εἶναι πάντων, ἐξ οὗ γὰρ ἐστιν ἅπαντα τὰ ὄντα, καὶ ἐξ οὗ γίγνεται πρώτου, καὶ εἰς ὃ φθείρεται τελευταῖον, τῆς μὲν οὐσίας ὑπομενούσης, τοῖς δὲ πάθεσι μεταβαλλούσης τοῦτο στοιχεῖον, καὶ ταύτην τῶν ὄντων τὴν ἀρχήν φασιν εἶναι, "Most of those, who first philosophized, took notice of no other principle of things in the universe, than what is to be referred to the material cause; for that, out of which all things are, and out of which all things are first made, and into which they are all at last corrupted and resolved, the substance always remaining the same, and being changed only in its passions and qualities; this they concluded to be the first original and principle of all things."

X. But the meaning of these old Material philosophers will be better understood by those exceptions, which Aristotle makes against them, which are two: first, that because they acknowledged no other substance besides matter, that might be an active principle in the universe, it was not possible for them to give any account of the original of motion and action.[1] Εἰ γὰρ ὅτι μάλιστα πᾶσα φθορὰ καὶ γένεσις ἔκ τινος, ὡς ἑνὸς ἢ καὶ πλειόνων ἐστὶν, διὰ τί τοῦτο συμβαίνει, καὶ τί τὸ αἴτιον; οὐ γὰρ δὴ τό γε ὑποκείμενον αὐτὸ ποεῖ μεταβάλλειν ἑαυτό· λέγω δὲ οἷον, οὔτε τὸ ξύλον, οὔτε τὸ χαλκὸς αἴτιον τοῦ μεταβάλλειν ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν· οὐδὲ ποιεῖ τὸ μὲν ξύλον κλίνην, ὁ δὲ χαλκὸς ἀνδριάντα ἀλλ' ἕτερόν τι τῆς μεταβολῆς αἴτιον· τό δὲ τοῦτο ζητεῖν ἐστι τὸ τὴν ἑτέραν ζητεῖν ἀρχὴν, ὡς ἂν ἡμεῖς φαίημεν, ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως, "Though all generation be made never so much out of something as the matter, yet the question still is, by what means this cometh to pass, and what is the active cause which produceth it? because the subject-

[10] Lib. 1. c. 3. tom. 4. opp. p. 264. It ought not to be omitted that a little after, p. 265, Aristotle adds that there were those who thought that the ancients thus philosophized concerning the nature of things. He himself regards it as uncertain whether it were really so.

[1] Arist. Met. lib. 1. c. 3. p. 265. To this ought to be added what the same philosopher eloquently says, cap. 7. p. 274. that they who entertain this opinion take away all cause of motion, τὸ της κινήσεως αἴτιον ἀναιρεῖν.

matter cannot change itself; as for example, neither timber, nor brass, is the cause, that either of them are changed; for timber alone does not make a bed, nor brass a statue, but there must be something else as the cause of the change; and to inquire after this is to enquire after another principle besides matter, which we would call that, from whence motion springs." In which words Aristotle intimates, that these old Material philosophers shuffled in motion and action into the world unaccountably, or without a cause; forasmuch as they acknowledged no other principle of things besides passive matter, which could never move, change or alter itself.

XI. And Aristotle's second exception against these old Material philosophers is this; that since there could be no intending casuality in senseless and stupid matter, which they made to be the only principle of all things, they were not able to assign τοῦ εὖ καὶ καλῶς αἰτίαν, "any cause of well and fit," and so could give no account of the regular and orderly frame of this mundane system:[2] Τοῦ εὖ καὶ καλῶς τὰ μὲν ἔχειν, τὰ δὲ γέγνεσθαι τῶν ὄντων, ἴσως οὔτε γῆν, οὔτ' ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων οὐδὲν εἰκὸς αἴτιον εἶναι· οὐδ' αὐτῷ αὐτομάτῳ, καὶ τύχῃ τοσοῦτον ἐπιτρέψαι πρᾶγμα καλῶς ἔχει,[2] "That things partly are so well in the world, and partly are made so well, cannot be imputed either to earth or water, or any other senseless body; much less is it reasonable to attribute so noble and excellent an effect as this to mere chance or fortune." Where Aristotle again intimates, that as these Material philosophers shuffled in motion into the world without a cause, so likewise they must needs suppose this motion to be altogether fortuitous and unguided; and thereby in a manner make fortune, which is nothing but the absence or defect of an intending cause, to supply the room both of the active and intending cause, that is, efficient and final. Whereupon Aristotle subjoins a commendation of Anaxagoras, as the first of the Ionic philosophers, who introduced mind or intellect for a principle in the universe; that in this respect he alone seemed to be sober and in his wits, comparatively with those others that went before him, who talked so idly and atheistically. For Anaxagoras' principle was such, saith Aristotle, as was ἅμα τοῦ καλῶς αἰτία, καὶ τοιαύτη ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις ὑπάρχει, "at once a

[2] Met. lib. 1. c. 3 p. 266. There will be those perhaps who will say that this passage is not correctly quoted, for after the words αἴτιον εἶναι, the words οὔτ' ἐκείνους οἰηθῆναι are omitted. Aristotle says that it is neither likely nor probable that the philosophers whom he opposes, thought the earth or any thing else of that kind to be the cause of the excellence with which nature shines. In this manner does he clear those ancient philosophers, while he says it is utterly incredibile that they thought so absurdly as to seek the origin of things from matter only. Cudworth knew that this was in opposition to the sentiments of those ancient philosophers whom he reckons among Atheists; and therefore he seems designedly to have omitted these words.

cause of motion and also of well and fit;" of all the regularity, aptitude, pulchritude and order that is in the whole universe. And thus it seems Anaxagoras himself had determined: Ἀναξαγόρας τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ καλῶς καὶ ὀρθῶς νοῦν λέγει, "Anaxagoras saith, that mind is the only cause of right and well;"[3] this being proper to mind to aim at ends and good, and to order one thing fitly for the sake of another. Whence it was, that Anaxagoras concluded good also, as well as mind, to have been a principle of the universe, Ἀναξαγόρας ὡς κινοῦν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀρχήν, ὁ γὰρ νοῦς κινεῖ, ἀλλὰ κινεί ἕνεκά τινος, ὥστε ἕτερον, "Anaxagoras makes good a principle, as that which moves; for though mind move matter, yet it moves it for the sake of something,[4] and being itself, as it were, first moved by good: so that good is also a principle." And we note this the rather, to show how well these three philosophers, Aristotle, Plato and Anaxagoras, agreed all together in this excellent truth, that mind and good are the first principle of all things in the universe.

XII. And now we think it is sufficiently evident, that these old Materialists in Aristotle, whoever they were, were downright Atheists;[5] not so much because they made all substance to be

[3] Arist. de An. lib. 1. c. 2. p. 5. tom. 2. opp.

[4] Arist. Met. lib. 14. c. 10. p. 485. tom. 4. opp. These words, and those which follow are given by Cudworth, as if they were Aristotle's, and as if they immediately followed in the sentence. But nothing of the kind is to be found in Aristotle. Cudworth intends them as a consequence of the words employed by that philosopher.

[5] Besides Cudworth there are others also who think that in this passage Aristotle charges atheism upon the Ionic sect of philosophers. Among these is Samuel Parker who in his disputation concerning God, lib. 1. sect. 5. p. 11. on this account censures Aristotle and defends the Ionics. To me it seems very doubtful whether Aristotle thought so badly concerning these philosophers as Cudworth especially supposes. The following I reckon as arguments in support of my opinion. I. Aristotle numbers Anaxagoras and Thales among the philosophers of whom he treats. But Cudworth himself takes both these distinguished men out from the number of Atheists, and that as will presently appear with good reason. II. Aristotle twice clearly affirms that these philosophers, very well understanding that the origin of all things could not possibly be explained from the laws and constitution of matter, were compelled by necessity to seek some other principle besides matter. Προϊοντων δὲ οὕτως ἀυτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα ὠδοποίησεν αὐτοῖς καὶ συνηνάγκασε ζητεῖν. "When they had proceeded so far, the thing itself led them on, and they were compelled to search further." Lib. 1. Metaphys. cap. 3. p. 265. The same sentiment he repeats a little afterwards even more clearly, ὑπ' αὐτῆς τῆς ἀληθείας ὥσπερ εἴποιμεν, ἀναγκαζθμενοι, τὴν ἑπομένην ἐζήτησαν ἀρχήν, "compelled, as we have said, by the force of truth, they sought that principle which follows." So far is Aristotle from saying, that this referred the origin of things to matter alone, that he rather affirms the very contrary. III. The arguments brought forward from Aristotle are urged by him not for the sake of dispute, but only to show that necessity impelled those philosophers to search for some other origin of things than matter. Wherefore also, as we have before said, sect. 5. he himself thought it incredible, that those philosophers entertained so absurd a notion. IV. Aristotle intimates that he thought Anaxagoras wiser than the rest of that class; but he shows that this was not on account of his attributing mind to matter which others did not do. On the contrary he affirms that he regarded Anaxagoras as wiser than others, because that immediately and without any circumlocution, he professed it as his belief, that nature is a partaker of sense and

body or matter, for Heraclitus first, and after him Zeno, did the like, deriving the original of all things from fire, as well as Anaximenes did from air, and Thales is supposed by Aristotle[6] to have done from water, and that with some little more seeming plausibility, since fire being a more subtle and moveable body than any other, was therefore thought by some ancients to be ἀσωματώτατον, the most incorporeal of all bodies, as earth was for that cause rejected by all those corporeal philosophers from being a principle,[7] by reason of the grossness of its parts. But Heraclitus and Zeno, notwithstanding this, are not accounted Atheists, because they supposed their fiery matter to have not only life, but also a perfect understanding originally belonging to it, as also the whole world to be an animal: whereas those Materialists of Aristotle made senseless and stupid matter, devoid of all understanding and life, to be the first principle and root of all things. For when they supposed life and understanding, as well as all other differences of things, to be nothing but mere passions and accidents of matter, generable out of it, and corruptible again into it, and indeed to be produced, but in a secondary way, from the fortuitous commixture of those first elementary qualities, heat and cold, moist and dry, thick and thin, they plainly implied the substance of matter in itself to be devoid of life and understanding. Now if this be not atheism, to derive the original of all things, even of life and mind itself, from dead and stupid matter fortuitously moved, then there can be no such thing at all.

XIII. Moreover, Aristotle's Materialists concluded every thing besides the substance of matter, (which is in itself indif-

reason; whence all things have proceeded; while others after considerable wandering and various shifts came at length to the same point, so as on their own acknowledgment to seek, under the impulse of necessity, for some other cause of things than mere matter. V. I do not see that Aristotle has intimated in this passage, that those philosophers taught, that there is nothing in the universe which has not been produced, and which may not again be produced, and which may not again be destroyed. Nor yet if even they did teach this, which I do not entirely deny, that they were on that account to be immediately reckoned Atheists, since the same notion was entertained by not a few of the ancients, whose piety and belief in a God no one will readily question. Since all these things are so, what ground the learned Doctor could have for contending that Aristotle reckoned these philosophers as Atheists, and for himself approving of such a decision, I cannot at all understand. I do not here inquire whether the philosophers of the Ionic School were Atheists or not. There are very learned men on both sides of this question—my only object at present is to ascertain what Aristotle judged concerning them.

[6] Metaphysic. Lib. 1. c. 3. p. 265. tom. 4. opp.

[7] I perceive that Aristotle has made this observation, Metaph. lib. 1. cap. 7. p. 275. also De Anima, lib. 1. cap. 2. p. 6. tom. 2. opp. Still he does not say this generally of all philosophers, but only of the more recent who reduced all things to one element. In Physic. Auscult. lib. 2. cap. 1. p. 463. he intimates very clearly, that there were among the ancient philosophers those who regarded the earth as the principle of all things. Vide Gassend. tom. 1. opp. p. 235. 236. who gives examples of philosophers of this opinion.

ferent to all things,) and consequently all particular and determinate beings, to be generable and corruptible. Which is a thing that Plato takes notice of[8] as an atheistic principle, expressing it in these words; Ἔστι μὲν γὰρ οὐδέποτ' οὐδὲν, ἀεὶ δὲ γίγνεται, that "nothing ever is, but every thing is made and generated."[9] Forasmuch as it plainly follows from hence, that not only all animals and the souls of men, but also if there were any gods, which some of those Materialists would not stick, at least verbally, to acknowledge, (meaning thereby certain understanding beings superior to men) these likewise must needs have been all generated, and consequently be corruptible. Now to say, that there is no other God, than such as was made and generated, and which may be again unmade, corrupted and die, or that there was once no God at all till he was made out of the matter, and that there may be none again, this is all one as to deny the thing itself. For a native and mortal God is a pure contradiction. Therefore whereas Aristotle, in his Metaphysics,[10] tells us of certain Theologers, οἱ ἐκ νυκτὸς πάντα γεννῶντες, such as did generate all things (even the gods themselves) "out of Night and Chaos," we must needs pronounce of such Theologers as these, who were Theogonists, and generated all the gods (without exception) out of senseless and stupid matter, that they were but a kind of atheistical Theologers, or theological Atheists. For though they did admit of certain beings, to which they attributed the name of gods, yet according to the true notion of God, they really acknowledged none at all, (*i. e.* no understanding nature as the original of things) but Night and Chaos, senseless and stupid matter, fortuitously moved, was to them the highest of all Numens. So that this theology of theirs was a thing wholly founded in atheistical nonsense.

XIV. And now we think it seasonable here to observe, how vast a difference there was betwixt these old Materialists in Aristotle, and those other philosophers, mentioned before in the first chapter, who determined, οὐδὲν οὐδὲ γίγνεσθαι οὐδὲ φθείρεσθαι τῶν ὄντων, "That no real entity at all was generated or corrupted," for this reason, because nothing could be made out of nothing. These were chiefly the philosophers of the Italic or Pythagoric succession; and their design in it was not, as Aris-

[8] This dogma is read in Plato just as here quoted. Still it has been erroneously added, that it is considered by Plato to be among the first principles of Atheists. On the other hand he maintains that all learned and wise men, Parmenides only excepted, were of this opinion; among whom he mentions Protagoras, Empedocles, Heraclitus, Epicharmus and Homer. Now who will say that Plato considers all such men as Atheists? Indeed, so far as appears, I do not deny that no one can be an Atheist unless at the same time he holds the sentiment, that all things are generable and corruptible. Still I do deny that the crime of Atheism is to be imputed to all those who do hold this sentiment.

[9] In Theat.

[10] Lib. 14. c. 6. p. 477.

totle was pleased somewhere to affirm, ἀνελεῖν πᾶσαν τὴν γένεσιν, to contradict common sense and experience, in denying all natural generations and alterations; but only to interpret nature rightly in them, and that in way of oppposition to those atheistic Materialists, after this manner; that in all the mutations of nature, generations and alterations, there was neither any new substance made, which was not before, nor any entity really distinct from the pre-existing substances, but only that substance which was before, diversely modified; and so nothing produced in generations, but new modifications, mixtures, and separations of pre-existent substances.

Now this doctrine of theirs drove at these two things; first, the taking away of such qualities and forms of body, as were vulgarly conceived to be things really distinct from the substance of extended bulk, and all its modifications of more or less magnitude, figure, site, motion or rest. Because, if there were any such things as these, produced in the natural generations and alterations of bodies, there would then be some real entity made ἐκ μηδενὸς ἐνυπάρχοντος ἢ προϋπαρχοντος, "out of nothing inexistent or pre-existent." Wherefore they concluded, that these supposed forms and qualities of bodies were really nothing else, but only the different modifications of pre-existent matter, in respect of magnitude, figure, site, and motion, or rest; or different concretions and secretions, which are no entities really distinct from the substance, but only cause different phasmata, fancies and apparitions in us.

The second thing, which this doctrine aimed at, was the establishing the incorporeity and ingenerability of all souls. For since life, cogitation, sense and understanding, could not be resolved into those modifications of matter, magnitude, figure, site and motion, or into mechanism and fancy, but must needs be entities really distinct from extended bulk, or dead and stupid matter; they concluded that therefore souls could not be generated out of matter, because this would be the production of some real entity out of nothing inexisting or pre-existing; but that they must needs be another kind of substance incorporeal, which could no more be generated or corrupted, than the substance of matter itself; and therefore must either pre-exist in nature, before generations, or else be divinely created and infused in them.

It hath been already proved in the first chapter, that the upshot of that Pythagoric doctrine, that nothing could be generated out of nothing pre-existing, amounted to those two things mentioned, viz. the asserting of the incorporeity and ingenerability of souls, and the rejecting of those fantastic entities of forms and real qualities of bodies, and resolving all corporeal phenomena into figures or atoms, and the different apparitions or fancies caused by them. But the latter of these may be further con-

firmed from this passage of Aristotle's,[1] where, after he had declared, that Democritus and Leucippus made the soul and fire to consist of round atoms or figures, like those ἐν τῷ ἀέρι ξύσματα, "those ramenta that appear in the air" when the sun-beams are transmitted through crannies; he adds: Ἔοικε δὲ καὶ τὸ παρὰ τῶν Πυθαγορείων λεγόμενον, τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχειν διάνοιαν, ἔφασαν γάρ τινες αὐτῶν, ψυχὴν εἶναι τὰ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι ξύσματα, οἱ δὲ, τὸ ταῦτα κινοῦν,[2] "And that which is said amongst the Pythagoreans seems to have the same sense, for some of them affirm, that the soul is those very ξύσματα, ramenta or atoms; but others of them, that it is that which moves them;" which latter doubtless were the genuine Pythagoreans. However, it is plain from hence, that the old Pythagoreans physiologized by ξύσματα, as well as Democritus; that is, figures and atoms, and not qualities and forms.

But Aristotle's Materialists, on the contrary, taking it for granted, that matter, or extended bulk, is the only substance, and that the qualities and forms of bodies are entities really distinct from those modifications of magnitude, figure, site, motion or rest; and finding also by experience, that these were continually generated and corrupted, as likewise that life, sense and understanding were produced in the bodies of such animals, where it had not been before, and again extinguished at the death or corruption of them, concluded, that the souls of all animals, as well as those other qualities and forms of bodies, were generated out of the matter, and corrupted again into it; and consequently, that every thing that is in the whole world, besides the substance of matter, was made or generated, and might be again corrupted.

Of this atheistic doctrine, Aristotle speaks elsewhere, as in his book "De Cœlo:"[3] Εἰσι γάρ τινες οἳ φασιν, οὐθὲν ἀγέννετον εἶναι

[1] But this passage is not to be found in the place whence, from memory, Cudworth, incorrectly supposes he obtained it, but De Anima, lib. 1. cap. 2. p. 4. tom. 2. opp. The learned Doctor thinks it clearly shows that the followers of Pythagoras traced the origin of things to corpuscles and atoms. But, to speak no stronger, it is very doubtful whether Aristotle has correctly expounded the opinion of this class of philosophers. It will scarcely be right however, for us to pronounce any thing on the subject, since for a long time it must be unknown how they defined the ψυχὴ and the ξύσματα from which they maintained that all things proceeded. "I pass over other points with which we ought to be acquainted, ere we pronounce a judgment on this subject.

[2] Nat. Ausc. lib. 1. c. 2. This reference is a mistake, for the passage is De Anima, Lib. 1. cap. 2. p. 4. t. 2. opp.

[3] Lib. 3. c. 1. p. 668. t. 1. opp. The learned Doctor in quoting and translating this passage took more liberty than I should have taken. For first he united two sentences which in Aristotle are separate, that he might the more easily obtain the sentiment he wished to obtain. And next he omits some words which he perceived would conduce but little to his purpose. Aristotle mentions two kinds of physical doctrine—the first, that which mantains that there is nothing which is not generated, and teaches that nothing has come into existence of itself; that some things moreover will remain stable, that others will be destroyed, γενόμενα δὲ τὰ μεν ἄφθαρτα διαμένειν, τα δε πάλιν φθείρεσθαι. Cudworth thinks proper to pass over these words, which show that the

τῶν πραγμάτων, ἀλλὰ πάντα γίγνεσθαι· μάλιστα μεν οἱ περὶ τόν Ἡσίοδον, εἶτα δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, οἱ πρῶτοι φυσιολογήσαντες· οἱ δὲ, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πάντα γίνεσθαί τε φασὶ, καὶ ῥεῖν, εἶναι δὲ παγίως οὐθέν. ἓν δὲ τι μόνον ὑπομένειν, ἐξ οὗ ταῦτα πάντα μετασχηματίζεσθαι πέφυκεν, "There are some, who affirm, that nothing is ingenerable, but that all things are made; as Hesiod especially, and also among the rest they who first physiologized, whose meaning was, that all other things are made (or generated) and did flow, none of them having any stability; only that there was one thing (namely matter) which always remained, out of which all those other things were transformed and metamorphized." Though as to Hesiod, Aristotle afterwards speaks differently. So likewise in his Physics, after he had declared, that some of the ancients made air, some water, and some other matter, the principle of all things; he adds:[4] Τοῦτο καὶ τοσαύτην φασὶν εἶναι τὴν ἅπασαν οὐσίαν· τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα πάθη τούτων, καὶ ἕξεις, καὶ διαθέσεις· καί τούτων μὲν ὁτιοῦν εἶναι ἀίδιον· τὰ

doctrine of the ancient physiologists or Ionic sect of philosophers was very different from what he represents it. Aristotle says, that Hesiod and other physiologists were of this opinion. He further says, that another sect think that all things flow and are borne onwards in a continual course, but that one thing only remained out of which other things are formed. To this opinion, he adds that many and especially Heraclitus were pledged. But Cudworth unites what is said of the latter class with what is said of the former, and in this manner quotes the passage of Aristotle as if they who said that all things were generated, and those who said that all things flowed, were with one exception only of the same opinion, which moreover greatly differed from the sentiment held by Aristotle. But the excellent author was not just to the memory of those philosophers who are commonly called Ionics, and whom he wished to regard as condemned by the judgment of Aristotle; two sentences, which ought to have been separate, he unites, so that they appear so much the worse. Moreover, should we be inquired of in what the difference lies between those two sects of materialists whom Aristotle brings forward: I confess that this is not in every particular clear. In enumerating and explaining the different opinions of ancient philosophers, Aristotle's brevity makes him obscure, from which it happens that out of what he says none can learn the entire sentiments of any philosopher, unless he take as true a good many uncertain guesses. I have often thought in reading Aristotle, that sometimes he has perverted the sentiments of the ancient philosophers, and that he has reported them with greater brevity than necessary; that he might the more speedily refute them, and the more easily acquire to himself honour out of the refutation. And I think the evidence of this is that he frequently differs even from himself, nor does he always report in the same manner the opinions he controverts. As for example even this passage shows, that those learned men are in too great haste who determine concerning the opinions of the Ionics, as if they had their whole sentiments before them; too much at this distance of time has been lost for us to determine accurately, how they who belonged to this class were affected in respect of God. Aristotle testifies that they believed that all things were generated, but that some would remain, some would be destroyed. Why, I ask, did they thus believe, or from what principles could such an opinion arise? If they thought that all things were formed of matter, what would they adduce in support of the permanence and eternity of things so formed. Did they seek the cause of this permanence in matter itself or in some other principle separate from matter? Let those persons who think they are more shrewd than other people, exercise themselves with this inquiry, or let them ingenuously confess that where there is so much of obscurity, it is the part of true wisdom to be cautious and not to determine rashly.

[4] Lib. 2. c. 1. p. 463. opp.

δὲ ἄλλα γίγνεσθαι καὶ φθείρεσθαι ἀπειράκις, "This they affirmed to be all the substance or essence that was; but all other things, the passions, affections and dispositions of it; and that this therefore was eternal, as being capable of no change, but all other things infinitely generated and corrupted.[5]

XV. But these Materialists being sometimes assaulted by the other Italic philosophers, in the manner before declared, that no real entities, distinct from the modifications of any substance, could be generated or corrupted, because nothing could come from nothing nor go to nothing; they would not seem plainly to contradict that theorem, but only endeavoured to interpret it into a compliance with their own hypothesis, and distinguish concerning the sense of it in this manner; that it ought to be understood only of the substance of matter and nothing else, viz. that no matter could be made or corrupted, but that all other things whatsoever, not only forms and qualities of bodies, but also souls; life, sense and understanding, though really different from magnitude, figure, site and motion, yet ought to be accounted only the πάθη, the passions and accidents of this matter, and therefore might be generated out of it, and corrupted again into it, and that without the production or destruction of any real entity, matter being the only thing that is accounted such. All this we learn from these words of Aristotle:[6] Καὶ διὰ τοῦτο

[5] This passage does not help the learned Doctor any more than the last. He thinks that it contains and exhibits the opinion of certain ancient physiologists who shut out Deity entirely from the creation and government of this world, deriving all things from matter. But I imagine no one who has read Aristotle for himself will think this; for the philosopher says here, not that some, but that all philosophers have taken one thing or more as the principle of things, from whence they have derived every thing else. Therefore if it were true, as Cudworth has it, Aristotle says here that all philosophers are to be regarded as Atheists, which is very far even from probability. To put one thing or more as the principle of things, to hold that principle to be eternal and unchangeable, to teach that all other things arise out of this principle, may prove a man to know but little either of matter or of the origin of the world, but will not prove him forthwith to be destitute of all religion, an enemy of God, and an Atheist, As to the rest, all that Cudworth maintains in this section would be well enough, if it were thoroughly known, both what the ancient Italic philosophers and what the physiologists of Aristotle taught, concerning the several matters here brought forward. I can clearly enough understand how the ancient Pythagoreans might think as the excellent Doctor will have it they did think; but whether they did really think so, I acknowledge myself ignorant till it is explained by the testimony of ancient writers. That very likely there were among the ancient physiologists those who, despising the notion of a Supreme God, referred all things to matter, and whose sentiments were as here related I will not entirely deny. But that those physiologists of whom Aristotle makes mention were altogether of these opinions, I doubt whether any arguments can decide.

[6] Metaph. lib. 1. cap. 3. p. 264. t. 4. Opp. That man must have a clearer vision than other men who can perceive in this passage all that Cudworth thinks it contains. I. I cannot see in it any mention of the dispute between the Pythagorean and Ionic philosophers, nor do I understand that Aristotle asserts, that the Pythagoreans applied the common maxim "Ex nihilo nihil fit" to confute the Ionics, and that they replied in the same manner. The learned Doctor was full of love of the Pythagorean and Platonic philosophy, and at the same time of hatred against Hobbes, who at that time

οὔτε γίνεσθαι οὐθὲν οἴονται, οὔτε ἀπόλλυσθαι, ὡς τῆς τοιαύτης φύσεως ἀεὶ σωζομένης· ὥσπερ δὲ τὸν Σωκράτη φαμὲν οὔτε γίγνεσθαι ἁπλῶς, ὅταν γίγνεται καλὸς ἢ μουσικὸς, οὔτε ἀπόλλυσθαι, ὅταν ἀποβάλλῃ ταύτας τὰς ἕξεις, διὰ τὸ ὑπομένειν τὸ ὑποκείμενον, τὸν Σωκράτη αὐτὸν, οὕτως οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδέν· δεῖ γὰρ εἶναί τινα φύσιν, ἢ μίαν, ἢ πλείους μιᾶς, ἐξ ὧν γιγνεται τὰ ἄλλα, σωζομένης ἐκείνης. The sense whereof is this; "And therefore as to that axiom of some philosophers, that nothing is either generated or destroyed, these Materialists admit it to be true in respect of the substance of matter only, which is always preserved the same: As," say they, "we do not say, that Socrates is simply or absolutely made, when he is made either handsome or musical, or that he is destroyed, when he loseth those dispositions, because the subject Socrates still remains the same; so neither are we to say that any thing else is absolutely either generated or corrupted, because the substance or matter of every thing always continues. For there must needs be some certain nature, from which all other things are generated, that still remaining one and the same.

We have noted this passage of Aristotle's, the rather because this is just the very doctrine of Atheists at this day; that the substance of matter or extended bulk is the only real entity, and therefore the only unmade thing, that is neither generable nor creatable, but necessarily existent from eternity; but whatever else is in the world, as life and animality, soul and mind, being all but accidents and affections of this matter (as if therefore they had no real entity at all in them) are generable out of nothing, and corruptible into nothing, so long as the matter, in which they are, still remains the same. The result of which is no less than this, that there can be no other gods or god, than such as was at first made or generated out of senseless matter,

was teaching in Britain that all things originate with matter, and who had obtained many followers. He was therefore easily led to the opinion, that they long since maintained the opinions which he himself approved, and the arguments which he employed in opposing Hobbes, they had formerly employed in opposing the Ionica. When in this state of mind he read ancient writers, he thought he could observe many things in them which it is very difficult for us to observe. II. What, as I think, Aristotle here affirms is that the ancient physiologists were of opinion that there was one principle, or more than one, in nature from which all things were made and produced; which if they wished it to be understood of corporeal things cannot any how be tolerated. Still I do not find it affirmed in the writings of Aristotle, that they included among the things which spring from matter, life, sense and mind, nay even Deity itself. This dictum of the learned doctor, therefore will not obtain with righteous judges such a power as to forthwith condemn the Ionic philosophers and place them among Atheists. Let it be added moreover, that Aristotle, in what follows, reckons Thales and Anaxagoras among those who entertained these opinions concerning the origin of things; but that lib. 1. De Anima, cap. 3. p. 6. 7. t. 2. he shows that they taught a better sentiment concerning the nature of the soul, as easily appears, yet that it was that sentiment which Cudworth attributes to the Ionic philosophers. Concerning Anaxagoras I shall say something by and bye.

and may be corrupted again into it. And here indeed lies the grand mystery of atheism, that every thing besides the substance of matter is made or generated, and may be again unmade or corrupted.

However Anaxagoras, though an Ionic philosopher, and therefore, as shall be declared afterward, successor to those atheistic Materialists, was at length so far convinced by that Pythagoric doctrine, that no entity could be naturally generated out of nothing, as that he departed from his predecessors herein, and did for this reason acknowledge mind and soul, that is, all cogitative being, to be a substance really distinct from matter, neither generable out of it, nor corruptible into it; as also that the forms and qualities of bodies (which he could not yet otherwise conceive of than as things really distinct from those modifications of magnitude, figure, site and motion) must for the same cause pre-exist before generations in certain similar atoms, and remain after corruptions, being only secreted and concreted in them. By means whereof he introduced a certain spurious atomism of his own; for whereas the genuine Atomists before his time had supposed ὄγκους ἀνομοίους, "dissimilar atoms," devoid of all forms and qualities, to be the principles of all bodies, Anaxagoras substituted in the room of them his ὁμοιομέρεια, his "similar atoms," endowed from eternity with all manner of forms and qualities incorruptibly.

XVI. We have made it manifest, that those material philosophers, described by Aristotle, were absolute Atheists, not merely because they made body to be the only substance, though that be a thing which Aristotle himself justly reprehends them for also in these words of his: "Οσοι μὲν οὖν ἕν τε τὸ πᾶν καὶ μίαν εἶναί τινα φύσιν, ὡς ὕλην τιθέασι, καὶ ταύτην σωματικὴν, καὶ μέγεθος ἔχουσαν, δῆλον ὅτι πολλαχῶς ἁμαρτάνουσι, τῶν γὰρ σωμάτων τὰ στοιχεῖα τιθέασι μόνον, τῶνδε ἀσωμάτων οὔ, ὄντων καὶ ἀσωμάτων,[7] "They who suppose the world to be one uniform thing, and acknowledge only one nature as the matter, and this corporeal or indued with magnitude, it is evident, that they err many ways, and particularly in this, that they set down only the elements of bodies, and not of incorporeal things, though there be also things incorporeal." I say, we have not concluded them Atheists, merely for this reason, because they denied incorporeal substance,

[7] Metaph. lib. 1. c. 7 p. 274. tom. 4. opp. From this passage it seems that these philosophers did not altogether deny that nature was incorporeal. For Aristotle does not remark on this as a fault in them that they affirmed the incorporeity of nature, but he blames them for not marking the origin and causes of these natural things. If these philosophers had believed that there were no simple natures, Aristotle would have disputed the point with them but with little wisdom. For how I ask can it be for a matter of blame to a man who denies that there are minds, that he does not inquire into the nature and origin of minds. Certainly a wise man is not wont to be very solicitous about things the very existence of which he denies.

but because they deduced all things whatsoever from dead and stupid matter, and made every thing in the world, besides the bare substance of matter, devoid of all quality, generable and corruptible.

Now we shall take notice of an objection, made by some late writers,[8] against this Aristotelic accusation of the old philosophers, founded upon a passage of Aristotle's own, who elsewhere in his book De Cœlo, [9] speaking of the heaven or world, plainly affirms, γενόμενον μὲν οὖν ἅπαντες εἶναί φασιν, that "all the philosophers before himself did assert the world to have been made, or have had a beginning." From whence these writers infer, that therefore they must needs be all Theists, and hold the divine creation of the world; and consequently, that Aristotle contradicts himself, in representing many of them as Atheists, acknowledging only one material principle of the whole universe, without any intending or efficient cause. But we cannot but pronounce this to be a great error in these writers, to conclude all those, who held the world to have been made, therefore to have been Theists; whereas it is certain on the contrary, that all the first and most ancient Atheists did (in Aristotle's language) κοσμοποιεῖν ἢ γεννᾷν τὸν κόσμον, "make or generate to the world," that is, suppose it not to have been from eternity, but to have had a temporary beginning; as likewise that it was corruptible, and would some time or other, have an end again. The sense of which atheistic philosophers is represented by Lucretius in this manner:[10]

> Et quoniam docui, mundi mortalia templa
> Esse, et nativo consistere corpore cœlum,
> Et quæcunque in eo fiunt, fientque, necesse
> Esse ea dissolvi.

And there seems to be indeed a necessity in reason, that they, who derive all things from a fortuitous principle, and hold every thing besides the substance of matter to have been generated, should suppose the world to have been generated likewise, as also to be corruptible. Wherefore it may well be reckoned for one of the vulgar errors, that all Atheists held the eternity of the world.

Moreover, when Aristotle subjoins immediately after, ἀλλά γενόμενον, οἱ μὲν ἀΐδιον οἱ δὲ φθαρτὸν, that though the ancient

[8] Who these writers may be I have not deemed it important to inquire. In the age in which Cudworth lived there were many in England who wrote publicly against those who denied the existence of God, and on that account the opinions of ancient philosophers concerning God were inquired into. Among these writers, some, and doubtless Parker, endeavoured to show against Aristotle that the philosophers of the Ionic sect did not judge ill concerning God.

[9] Lib. 1. c. 10. p. 632. tom. 1. opp.

[10] Lib. 6. ver. 43. adde lib. 5. ver. 236.

philosophers all held the world to have been made, yet notwithstanding they were divided in this, that some of them supposed for all that, that it would continue to eternity such as it is, others, that it would be corrupted again; the former of these, who conceived the world to be γενόμενον, but ἀΐδιον, "made," but "eternal," were none of them Atheists, but all Theists. Such as Plato, whom Aristotle seems particularly to perstringe for this, who in his Timæus[1] introduceth the supreme Deity bespeaking those inferior gods, the sun, moon and stars (supposed by that philosopher to be animated) after this manner; "Α δὲ ἐμοῦ γενόμενα, ἄλυτα, ἐμοῦγε θέλοντος, τὸ μὲν οὖν δεθὲν πᾶν λυτὸν· τόγε μὴν καλῶς ἁρμοσθὲν καὶ ἔχον εὖ, λύειν ἐθέλειν, κακοῦ· δὶ ἃ καὶ ἐπείπερ γεγένησθε, ἀθάνατοι μὲν οὐκ ἐστὲ, οὐδ' ἄλυτοι τὸ πάμπαν· οὔτι. μὲν δὴ λυθήσεσθέ γε, οὐδὲ τεύξεσθε θανάτου μοίρας· τῆς ἐμῆς βουλήσεως μείζονος ἔτι δεσμοῦ καὶ κυριωτέρου λαχόντες,[2] "Those things, which are made by me, are indissoluble by my will; and though every thing which is compacted, be in its own nature disolvable, yet it is not the part of one that is good, to will the dissolution or destruction of any thing that was once well made. Wherefore though you are not absolutely immortal, nor altogether indissolvable, yet notwithstanding you shall not be dissolved, nor ever die; my will being a stronger band to hold you together, than any thing else can be to loosen you." Philo and other Theists followed Plato in this, asserting, that though the world was made, yet it would never be corrupted, but have a post-eternity. Whereas all the ancient Atheists, namely those who derived the original of things from nature and fortune, did at once deny both eternities to the world, past and future. Though we cannot say, that none but Atheists did this; for Empedocles and Heraclitus, and afterward the Stoics, did not only suppose the world likewise generated, and to be again corrupted, but also that this had been, and would be done over and over again, in infinite vicissitudes.

Furthermore, as the world's eternity was generally opposed by all the ancient Atheists, so it was maintained also by some Theists, and that not only Aristotle,[3] but also before him, by

[1] Cap. 27. p. 250. Ed. Fabricii. This dogma of Plato is further exhibited by several writers, Jac. Thomasius De Exust. Mundi Stoic. Diss. 3. p. 37. and Chalcidius in Timæum Plat. cap. 23. p. 284.

[2] Timæum p. 41. Ser.

[3] Physic. Auscultat. lib. 8. Respecting this sentence of Aristotle we should also consult the book of Ocel. Lucan. περὶ πάντον φύσιως, extant in opusculis mythol. vel. edited by Thomas Gale, p. 501. What were the opinions of the more recent Platonic philosophers, Zach. Mitylenæus, Dial. De Opif. Mund. p. 207. 213. has very fully and well explained. But whether they all thus taught seems to me a little more uncertain than the learned author imagines. As however he has only touched the point in passing, I do not think it right to occupy much time in dwelling upon it.

Ocellus Lucanus[4] at least, though Aristotle thought not fit to take any notice of him; as likewise the latter Platonists universally went that way, yet so, as that they always supposed the world to have as much depended upon the Deity, as if it had been once created out of nothing by it.

To conclude therefore; neither they, who asserted the world's generation and temporary beginning, were all Theists; nor they, who maintained its eternity, all Atheists; but before Aristotle's time, the Atheists universally, and most of the Theists, did both alike conclude the world to have been made; the difference between them lying in this, that the one affirmed the world to have been made by God, the other by the fortuitous motion of matter.

Wherefore if we would put another difference betwixt the Theists and Atheists here, as to this particular, we must distinguish betwixt the system of the world and the substance of the matter. For the ancient Atheists, though they generally denied the eternity of the world, yet they supposed the substance of the matter, not only to have been eternal, but also self-existent and independent upon any other being; they making it the first principle and the original of all things, and consequently the only Numen. Whereas the genuine Theists, though many of them maintained the world's eternity, yet they all concluded both the form and substance of it to have always depended upon the Deity, as the light doth upon the sun; the Stoics with some others being here excepted.

XVII. Aristotle tells us,[5] some were of opinion, that this atheistic philosophy, which derives all things from senseless and stupid matter in the way of forms and qualities, was of great antiquity, and as old as any records of time amongst the Greeks; and not only so, but also that the ancient Theologers themselves entertained it: Εἰσὶ δέ τινες, οἱ καὶ τοὺς παμπαλαίους, καὶ πολὺ πρὸ τῆς νῦν γενέσεως, καὶ πρώτους θεολογήσαντας, οὕτως οἴονται περὶ τῆς φύσεως διαλαβεῖν. Ὠκεανόν τε γὰρ καὶ Τήθυν ἐποίησαν τῆς γενέσεως πατέρας, καὶ τὸν ὅρκον τῶν θεῶν ὕδωρ, τὴν καλουμένην ὑπ' αὐτῶν Στύγα τῶν ποιητῶν, τιμιώτατον μὲν γὰρ τὸ πρεσβύτατον· ὅρκος δὲ τὸ τιμιώτατόν ἐστιν,[6] "There are some who conceive, that even the most ancient of all, and the most remote from this present generation, and they also who first theologized, did physiologize after this manner; forasmuch as

[4] Περὶ πάντων φύσεως, inter Scriptor. Mythol. à Tho. Gale editos, p. 501.

[5] Met. lib. 1. c. 3. tom. 4. p. 265. opp.

[6] The last words of this passage are exceedingly obscure. The meaning is: It was right to swear by that which was deemed the most excellent and the best of all things. But that which is the most ancient is at the same time the best. Since the gods, therefore, swore by the Styx, it may from thence be perceived that there is nothing more ancient than water.

they made the Ocean and Tethys to have been the original of generation: and for this cause the oath of the gods is said to be by water (called by the poets Styx) as being that, from which they all derived their original. For an oath ought to be by that, which is most honourable: and that which is most ancient, is most honourable." In which words it is very probable, that Aristotle aimed at Plato; however it is certain that Plato, in his Theætetus,[7] affirms this atheistic doctrine to have been very ancient, ὅτι πάντα ἔκγονα ροῆς τε καὶ κινήσεως, "that all things were the offspring of flux and motion," that is, that all things were made and generated out of matter; and that he chargeth Homer with it, in deriving the original of the gods themselves in like manner from the ocean (or floating matter) in this verse of his,

[7] It is so. Plato reports that all wise men, with the single exception of Parmenides, thought that all things proceeded from water, and that generation was a sort of flowing motion. I will give his words: Καὶ περὶ τούτου πάντες ἐξῆς οἱ σοφοι, πλην Παρμενίδου, ξυμφέρεστον, Πρωταγόρας τε καὶ Ἡράκλειτος καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς καὶ τῶν ποιητῶν οι ἄκροι τῆς ποιήσεως ἑκατέρας, κωμῳδίας μέν Ἐπίχαρμος, τραγωδίας δὲ Ὅμηρος, εἰπών· Ὠκεανόν τε Θεῶν γένεσιν καὶ μητέρα Τηθὺν, πάντα εἰρηκεν ἔκγονα ροῆς τε καὶ κινήσεως, "And in this opinion all wise men of respective classes agree, Parmenides only excepted, Protagoras, Heraclitus, Empedocles, and the best poets of every kind; in comedy, Epicharmus; in tragedy, Homer; for since he called Oceanus the father of the gods and Tethys their mother, he declared that all things were produced from a flowing and motion." But it is not true that Plato regarded this as an atheistic sentiment, since it is incredible that he should have ranked all ancient wise men, and among them Empedocles and Homer, among Atheists. Plato shows that he could quote the most ancient writers as referring the origin of the universe to motion and flowing; this, however, any one may do, in such a manner as not to deny the existence of a Deity. Cudworth mixes two sentiments which ought to be kept separate; one the opinion of those who imagine all things to have been generated from Chaos and Night without a God, the other that of those who seek the origin of all things from water, and on that account explain production as a flowing and motion. Still his error was so much the less, as it is evident that Plato himself confounded these two different things. I can scarcely bring myself to say any thing concerning the sentiment of Homer, convinced as I am that many, both of the ancient and of the more modern philosophers regarded him as of the same judgment concerning the principles of things with Thales the Milesian. Vid. Heraclides de Allegoriis Homer. p. 438. 439. among the writers whom Thomas Gale published, and Plutarch in his life of Homer. But I am also convinced, that in some passages the same poet makes mention of two principles, water and earth; for instance, Iliad H. v. 99. where he introduces Menelaus as wishing that the Greeks might return to water and to earth, or to the elements out of which they sprung, i. e. that they might die.

Ἀλλ' ὑμεῖς μεν πάντες, ὕδωρ καὶ γαῖα γένοισθε.

So that I have almost come to the notion that it is exceedingly difficult to determine what Homer thought concerning the gods, their origin, and the production of the universe. The good Doctor perhaps would not have been able to give an answer had any one asked him what the sentiments of Homer were. The poet seems to me to have been at no certainty, but to have rashly, and with but little judgment, interwoven with his verses the dogmas that were prevalent among the Greeks. I do not therefore wonder that the ancients, Heraclides, Plutarch, and in fact all, whether wise or unwise, were able to corroborate as they pleased their opinions and dogmas by the authority of Homer. Moreover the verse which Plato quotes is Iliad. Ξ v. 258. with which may be compared v. 303. 304. 343. of the same book, not now to mention others.

Ὠκεανόν τε θεῶν γένεσιν, καὶ μητέρα Τηθύν.

The father of all gods the ocean is,
Tethys their mother.

Wherefore these indeed seem to have been the ancientest of all Atheists,[8] who though they acknowledged certain beings superior to men, which they called by the name of gods, did notwithstanding really deny a God, according to the true notion of him, deriving the original of all things whatsoever in the universe

[8] I have determined, if nothing hinder, to comment somewhat largely in the preface concerning the opinion in divine matters, and the religion of those among the ancients who wrote Theogonies. Here I only observe a few things as space will allow. I. If they who wrote concerning the generation of the gods were Atheists, to the same class, certainly, we must refer all those who represented a certain power of producing and creating as concealed in matter. For what that amor, or love, is which they say is the parent of the gods, I know not, unless it be a producing power which at some time issued from matter. II. Nor is it very far from the truth, that there formerly were some so insane as to think that from very chaos, or from the bosom of a rude unformed mass, a certain plastic power broke forth, by whose aid what before was confused was put in order and fitly adjusted, nay even that all things were generated. However insane this notion may appear, so great is the misery and blindness of men that we must not consider it wonderful that some minds have been fascinated even by such dreams. Among the learned philosophers of the people of the East, even down to this day, there are those who regard things like these as abstruse and recondite truths. Thus Engebrecht Kæmpfer, in his history of Japan, book 3. c. 2. p. 207. vol. 1. London, 1727. fol. mentions, that in a book called Odaiki, which the Sintoists, as they are called among the Japanese, the most ancient sect of that country, esteem very highly, the following doctrine is taught concerning the origin of the universe: "In the beginning of the opening of all things, a chaos floated, as fishes swim in the water for pleasure. Out of this chaos arose a thing like a prickle, moveable and transformable. This thing became a soul, or spirit, and this spirit is called KUNITOKO DATSNO MIKOTTO." You see that God, the parent of all things, or that which Hesiod and others call Amor, sprung from this unformed and rude mass. This sect say that they have nothing greater, more secret, and more admirable than this dogma. Who does not wonder at the ignorance of men who do not use the light God gives. This is not very unlike what the same author quotes concerning other philosophers of the race which they call Sinto. Book 3. c. 7. p. 250. "Some among them whom I conversed withal admitted an intellectual or incorporeal being, but only as governor and director, not as the author of nature; nay, they pretended that it is an effect of nature, produced by In and Jo, heaven and earth, one active the other passive, one the principle of generation the other of corruption. After the same manner also they explained some other active powers of nature to be spiritual beings." These things very nearly come up to those which the ancients said concerning the generation of the gods; and certainly they show this, that even now the insanity which Cudworth attributes to Theogonists is not without a parallel. III. Nevertheless, among learned men there are not wanting those who attribute to these ancient Theogonists sounder and better sentiments concerning God, and who fancy that, although chaos was placed by them first in order in the universe, they were not Atheists, but they conceived that this chaos itself was produced by some efficient cause or created by God. Philo Judæus, in his book De Mund. Incorrupt. p. 941. observes, that some, among whom was himself, believed that the chaos of Hesiod or the world was created by God. Nor does the writer of the Clementines greatly differ from this opinion. Homil. 6. sect. 3. p. 671: t. 1. Patr. Apostol. The celebrated Simplicius, a more recent Platonic philosopher, Comm. in lib. 4. Physicor. Aristotelis, was of the same opinion; relying on whose authority chiefly the very learned Petrus Petitus, Observation. Miscellan. c. 12. p. 52. pleads for the piety of Hesiod and of the other ancient Theogonists. The same sentiment the illustrious Gudlingius, not long since, maintained with great ingenuity, in Gudlingianis, p. 32. Observ. 5. p. 193. who nevertheless admits that Hesiod considered chaos to have emanated from God rather than to have been created by him, Vid. Zimmerman de Relig. Hesiodi Musei Helvet. tom. 7. p. 359.

from the ocean, that is, fluid matter, or, which is all one, from night and chaos; and supposing all their gods to have been made and generated, and consequently to be mortal and corruptible. Of which atheistic theology Aristophanes gives us the description in his Aves,[9] after this manner: That at first was nothing but Night and Chaos, which laying an egg, from thence was produced love, that mingling again with Chaos, begot heaven, and earth, and animals, and all the gods.

Χάος ἦν, καὶ νύξ, ἔρεβός τε μέλαν πρῶτον, καὶ Τάρταρος εὐρύς.
Γῆ δ', οὐδ' ἀὴρ, οὐδ' οὐρανὸς ἦν· ἐρέβους δ' ἐν ἀπείροσι κόλποις
Τίκτει πρώτιστον ὑπηνέμιον νὺξ ἡ μελανόπτερος ὠόν.
Ἐξ οὗ περιτελλομέναις ὥραις ἔβλαστεν Ἔρως ὁ ποθεινός.
Στίλβων νῶτον πτερύγοιν χρυσαῖν· εἰκὼς ἀνεμώκεσι δίναις.
Οὗτος δὲ χάει πτερόεντι μιγεὶς νυχίῳ, κατὰ Τάρταρον εὐρὺν,
Ἐνεόττευσε γένος ἡμέτερον, καὶ πρῶτον ἀνήγαγεν ἐς φῶς,
Πρότερον δ' οὐκ ἦν γένος ἀθανάτων, πρὶν Ἔρως συνέμιξεν ἅπαντα.

First all was Chaos, one confused heap;
Darkness enwrapt the disagreeing deep;
In a mixt crowd the jumbling elements were,
Nor earth, nor air, nor heaven did appear;
Till on this horrid vast abyss of things,
Teeming Night spreading o'er her coal-black wings,
Laid the first egg; whence, after time's due course,
Issued forth Love (the world's prolific source)
Glistering with golden wings; which fluttering o'er
Dark Chaos, gendered all the numerous store
Of animals and gods, &c.

And whereas the poet there makes the birds to have been begotten between Love and Chaos before all the gods; though one might think this to have been done jocularly by him, merely to humour his plot; yet Salmasius[10] conceives, and not without

[9] Ver. 694. p. 404. Edit. Kusteri. To this point also belongs what the author says in another passage of the same comedy, that the birds were more ancient than Jupiter, and that the Titans existed before Saturn, v. 468. Also that the Κορυδος, or crested lark, was the first of all birds, and previous to the earth, v. 471. 472. p. 397. What Thomas Burnet, in his Sacred Theory of the Earth, book 2. c. 7. p. 130. 131. and what Hugo Grotius de Veritat. Relig. Christ. lib. 1. p. 39. ed. Cl. Kæcher. have said on the former of these passages, is not unworthy of being read; neither of whom, however, think that it gives the views of Atheists.

[10] Exercitat. Plinian. in Solinum, t. 1. p. 309. What was Salmasius's opinion may be best of all learned from his own words. After he had said that the Egyptians taught that the heavens and the stars were created previously to the earth, he thus proceeds: "Eadem antiquissimorum Græcorum sententia fuit, ab Ægyptiis sumpta. Nam avium genus prius editum, quam terra esset condita, crediderunt, ut ex his Aristophanis versibus patet. Hæc fabulosa quidem, sed eam opinionem adstruunt. Nam si galerita fuit in rerum natura, quum terra nondum esset, cœlum et aërem jam tum fuisse oportuit." "This was the opinion of the most ancient Greeks, taken from the Egyptians; for they believed that a kind of birds were produced before the earth was formed, as appears from these verses of Aristophanes." Here he quotes the verses of that poet, 472. 473. and proceeds: "This might be fabulous, yet it sustains the opinion which has been mentioned, for if the crested lark was in the universe while as yet the earth was not, heaven and air must have already existed." The same sentiment concerning the production of birds previously to the earth and all other creatures, Salmasius conceives to be propounded in Notis ad Simiam, p. 270. Ed. Crenii. But this seems to me somewhat more obscure than I

some reason, that it was really a piece of the old atheistic cabala, which therefore seems to have run thus: That chaos or matter confusedly moved being the first original of all, things did from thence rise up gradually from lesser to greater perfection. First inanimate things, as the elements, heaven, earth, and seas; then brute animals; afterwards men, and last of all the gods. As if not only the substance of matter, and those inanimate bodies of the elements, fire, water, air, and earth, were, as Aristotle somewhere speaks, according to the sense of those atheistic Theologers, φύσει πρότερα τοῦ θεοῦ, θεοὶ δὲ καὶ ταῦτα,[1] "first in order of nature before God, as being themselves also gods," but also brute animals at least, if not men too. And this is the atheistic creation of the world, gods and all, out of senseless and stupid matter, or dark chaos, as the only original Numen; the perfectly inverted order of the universe.

XVIII. But though this hypothesis be purely atheistical, that

like, though I am not willing to contend stiffly with those who deem it wrong to desert Salmasius. Moreover, to confess the truth, I can scarcely bring myself to think that any opinion of the ancients concerning the origin of the world may be learned from the jests of Aristophanes. For though I readily grant that the poet says many things according to the views of the ancient physiologists, yet is it abundantly evident that the things he says are in a very confused and mutilated shape. I. He plainly says nothing concerning the origin of the human race and of beasts. He speaks of the generation first of heaven, then of water, next of the earth, and lastly of the gods, from amor or love. There is no mention of fire, nor of men, nor of animals. II. He does not reckon birds with animals, but places them among the gods, which all will at once see could not have been in earnest. III. As to what he says of birds, they are represented as defending their own theory respecting their origin by arguments very witty, and calculated to excite laughter. For they prove that they were produced from amor or love, because, like love, they are furnished with wings and are present with lovers. I pass over other jests. Wherefore I am almost ready to think, that in what Aristophanes wrote concerning the production of birds before the gods, he did not intend to utter the opinion of any physiologist or any philosopher, but that he feigned it all for the sake of fun and joke.

[1] De Gen. et Cor. lib. 2. cap. 6. p. 735. t. 1. opp. I. This passage, which Cudworth thinks favourable to his cause, is exceedingly obscure. Aristotle is disputing against Empedocles, who it is well known joined concord and discord with his four elements. Among other things, he denies that this can be tolerated, for that it referred the generation of all things to this mixing of the elements. Ὁ δὲ τὴν μῖξιν μονὴν ἐπαινεῖ. Which being affirmed he thus proceeds: Καὶ τοί γε τὰ στοιχεῖα διακρίνει οὐ τὸ νεῖκος ἀλλ' ἡ φιλία, τὰ φύσει πρότερα τοῦ θεοῦ. "It is not, however, discord, but its opposite, that distinguishes those elements which by nature are anterior to the Deity." What this passage means neither my present space nor the subject permits me to inquire. I do not doubt there will be many who will judge that the Stagyrite here utters enigmas. This, however, is plain, that he discusses not the opinion of the ancient physiologists, as Cudworth supposes, but rather that of Empedocles, whom the learned Doctor himself does not reckon among Atheists. II. Nor can I agree with Cudworth concerning the subject spoken of. He thinks it evident from the passage of Aristophanes, that those ancient physiologists whom he mentions among Atheists believed that animals proceeded from the bosom of rude matter even before the gods, because birds declare themselves to have been anterior to the gods. But, not to repeat what I have already said, the excellent Doctor does not observe that the birds of Aristophanes separate themselves from animals, and wish to be regarded as gods, even as the most ancient of the gods. Wherefore this passage seems rather to teach that those philosophers whose opinions Aristophanes followed thought that animals were posterior to the gods.

makes Love, which is supposed to be the original Deity, to have itself sprung at first from an egg of the night; and consequently that all Deity was the creature or offspring of matter and chaos, or dark fortuitous nature; yet Aristotle somewhere conceives, that not only Parmenides, but also Hesiod, and some others, who did in like manner make Love the supreme Deity, and derive all things from Love and Chaos, were to be exempted out of the number of those atheistic materialists before described; forasmuch as they seemed to understand by love, an active principle and cause of motion in the universe; which therefore could not spring from an egg of the night, nor be the creature of matter, but must needs be something independent on it, and in order of nature before it: Ὑποπτεύσειε δ' ἄν τις, Ἡσίοδον πρῶτον ζητῆσαι τὸ τοιοῦτον, κἂν εἴ τις ἄλλος, Ἔρωτα ἢ Ἐπιθυμίαν, ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ἔθηκεν ὡς ἀρχὴν, οἷον καὶ Παρμενίδης. Καὶ γὰρ οὗτος κατασκευάζων τὴν τοῦ παντὸς γίνεσιν,

Πρώτιστον μὲν (φησιν) ἔρωτα θεῶν μητίσατο πάντων.

Ἡσίοδος δὲ,

Πάντων μὲν πρώτιστα χάος γένετ' αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα
Γαῖ εὐρύστερνος, ———
Ἠδ' ἔρος, ὃς πάντεσσι μεταπρέπει ἀθανάτοισιν·

ὡς δέον ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ὑπάρχειν τινὰ αἰτίαν, ἥτις κινήσει καὶ συνέξει τὰ πράγματα. τούτους μὲν οὖν πῶς χρὴ διανεῖμαι περὶ τοῦ τις πρῶτος, ἐξέστω κρίνειν ὕστερον.[2] "One would suspect that Hesiod, and if there be any other who made love or desire a principle of things in the universe, aimed at this very thing (namely, the settling of another active principle besides matter:) for Parmenides, describing the generation of the universe, makes Love to be the senior of all the gods; and Hesiod, after he had mentioned Chaos, introduced Love as the supreme Deity. As intimating herein, that besides matter, there ought to be another cause or principle, that should be the original of motion and activity, and also hold and conjoin all things together. But how these two principles are to be ordered, and which of them was to be placed first, whether Love or Chaos, may be judged of afterwards." In which latter words Aristotle seems to intimate, that Love, as taken for an active principle, was not to be supposed to spring from Chaos, but rather to be in order of nature before it; and therefore by this Love of theirs must needs be meant the Deity.[3]

[2] Aristot. Metaphys. lib. 1. cap. 4. p. 267.

[3] But Aristotle here neither excuses nor accuses Hesiod; he leaves the matter without determining any thing: nor, though I have applied all my powers, have I been able to detect, in the latter words of this passage, what Cudworth persuades himself is concealed in them. The philosopher says, that a little lower down he would discuss whether chaos ought to be regarded as more ancient than love, or love than chaos. If these words can be made to signify that Hesiod's love was itself a god, and more ancient than chaos, I certainly do not know what interpretation

And indeed Simmias Rhodius in his Wings, a hymn made in honour of this Love, that is senior to all the gods, and a principle in the universe, tells us plainly, that it is not Cupid, Venus's soft and effeminate son, but another kind of love,

Οὔτί γε Κύπριδος παῖς·
Ὠκυπέτας δ' αὐτὸς Ἔρως καλεῦμαι·
Οὔτι γὰρ ἔκρινα βιάζειν, παράγω δὲ πειθοῖ.
Γαῖα, θαλάσσας τε μυχοὶ, οὐρανίων πᾶς τε θεός μοι ἵκει.
Τῶν δ' ἐγὼν ἐκνοσφισάμην ὠγύγιον σκᾶπτρον, ἐκράνά τέ σφιν θέμιστας.[4]

I'm not that wanton boy,
The sea-froth goddess' only joy.
Pure heavenly Love I hight, and my
Soft magic charms, not iron bands, fast tie
Heaven, earth, and seas. The gods themselves do readily
Stoop to my laws. The whole world dances to my harmony.

Moreover, this cannot be that Love neither, which is described in Plato's Symposium,[5] (as some learned men have conceived)

may not be given to them; nor can I blame those persons who fancy they find without labour, both in Aristotle and Plato, what they themselves only last night dreamed. Thus great men are often troubled with the same infirmity with those whose abilities are more moderate; all are wont to torture the opinions of ancient writers into agreement with theirs, to avoid the charge of not agreeing with them. Moreover, Jean le Clerc, a most learned man, did not doubt that the thing was as Cudworth says, and that Hesiod was justified by Aristotle. Wherefore, when he comes to this passage he deems it necessary to contend against Aristotle, and shows that Hesiod can scarcely, if at all, be taken out from the class of Atheists. Biblioth. Chois. t. 2. p. 46. We will refer to the subject again lower down, if God permit.

[4] This poem of Simmias, Claud. Salmasius published with critical notes; and so greatly has he altered this passage, that it seems but little like what we here read. Thomas Crenius in Museo Philologico et Historico, t. 2. p. 259. was at pains again to repeat the comment of Salmasius. But since the sentence in both copies is nearly the same, I have judged it no business of mine to transfer to this page the conjectures and corrections of the learned editor. The poem, in embellishing which so much labour is expended, is, after all, scarcely worthy of a writer of moderate abilities. Moreover, my translation of it differs not at all from Cudworth's.

[5] This the learned Doctor rightly says, although it seems different from many, both ancients and moderns. Even Plato himself confirms this opinion, for he acknowledges that the things which Parmenides and Hesiod sang concerning love do not correspond with what he calls love, Τὰ δὲ, he says, παλαιὰ πράγματα περὶ Θεοὺς, ἃ Ἡσίοδος καὶ Παρμενίδης λέγουσιν, ἀνάγκῃ, καὶ οὐκ ἔρωτι γεγονέναι, εἰ ἐκεῖνοι ἀληθῆ ἔλεγον, "The ancient doings of the gods which Hesiod and Parmenides describe, if indeed they have reported the truth, are to be attributed rather to necessity than to love." But whether the learned Doctor has rightly expounded the nature of that love which Plato commends in his Symposium, I leave to the judgment of those persons who examine the dicta of Plato from what he himself has written. I will rather mention what has occurred to me when I have meditated on the subject, as most likely to have been the opinions of the ancients. I. There is no doubt, in the first place, that the ancient Greeks had certain dogmas among them concerning the nature and origin of the universe; and these, as I suspect, were brought to them from the religions prevalent in the East. Certainly, any one who shall consider only what Hugo Grotius, in lib. 1. De Verit. Relig. Christ., and Thomas Burnet, in his Sacred Theory of the Earth, have written on the opinions of the Phœnicians, Egyptians, Syrians, and others, concerning the universe, though not approving of all the opinions of these learned men, will nevertheless be brought to acknowledge that there is a very great similarity in these opinions with what the ancient Greeks have handed down on the same subjects in their Theogonies. II. They who among the Greeks wrote poems concerning

that was begotten between Penia and Porus, this being not a divine but a demoniac thing (as the philosopher there declares), no God, but demon only, or of a middle nature. For it is nothing but φιλοκαλία, or the love of pulchritude as such, which, though rightly used, may perhaps wing and inspire the mind to noble and generous attempts, and beget a scornful disdain in it of mean, dirty, and sordid things; yet it is capable of being abused also, and then it will strike downward into brutishness and sensuality. But at best it is an affection belonging only to imperfect and parturient beings; and therefore could not be the first principle of all things. Wherefore we see no very great reason, but that in a rectified and qualified sense this may pass for true theology;[6] that Love is the supreme Deity and original

the generation of the gods, or Theogonies, had only this object, that they should harmonize and adapt the fables of the Greeks concerning the gods and their exploits, to their systems of physics. I think that of this no one can be doubtful who has attentively read Hesiod; although Hesiod is not the writer who, in the best manner and with most success, has done this. III. Since this was what they undertook, it was natural that they should give the names of the Greek deities to the elements, and to the laws of nature which they supposed, and in this manner convert things and attributes, as it were, into persons. No one will deny this who examines ancient writers with care. IV. Among the doctrines of the ancients, moreover, this seems to have been one that there was I know not what plastic creative power concealed in rude and unformed matter; and that this power, when the creation of all things approached, sprang forth from the bosom of matter, and by degrees produced the universe. This plastic power, therefore, after the manner of those ancient poets, was invested with the name and attributes of a Deity, whom the Greeks, worshipped. V. But among the deities of the Greeks there was no one fit and suited to this except Amor, or the deity set over love, whom they wished to regard as the producer of all things. They therefore called this plastic power of nature by the name of Love, and on that account spoke of Love as the most ancient of their gods. This is evident from the fact, that we see many rashly attributing the fables of the Greeks respecting Cupid to this Amor or love, or the efficient cause of the universe. For example, we saw a little while ago that Aristophanes attributed to that Amor by which the universe was produced, the golden wings which the Greeks were wont to give to the son of Venus. VI. But the more recent writers were wont to attribute to the son of Venus absurdities which could in no way befit a nature such as that which originated all things. They supposed therefore afterwards a double Amor, one the son of Venus or terrestrial, the other the parent of the universe or celestial, concerning which Hesiod, Parmenides, and others sang. But Ovid Fast lib. 1. v. 1. calls Venus the mother of both loves. Time truly had effaced from the mind and memory of men the purpose of those who had first discussed the origin of the gods. Wherefore something was to be devised lest they should seem to have entertained opinions altogether foolishly and absurdly. I believe that those persons who have diligently consulted the remains of antiquity, and who are most skilled in both the manners of mankind and the institutes of the Greeks, will readily confess that this comes very near to the truth. Nevertheless, let every one use his own judgment.

[6] The reference here is to some in England at that time very highly esteeming Plato, who said that Love was the supreme Deity, and that the Holy Spirit chiefly was Divine Love. See Henry More's Defence of the Cabbala, cap. 1. p. 75. &c. Some, however, censure this, mindful of what the tragic poet sung, whose words Augustine also commends:

> Deum esse amorem, turpis et vitio favens
> Finxit libido
>
> Base lust, to favour vice, fancied love to be God.

Lib. 20. contra. Faustum, cap. 9. p. 240. t. 8. opp. On behalf of these, therefore, Cudworth deemed it right to plead.

of all things; namely, if by it be meant eternal, self-originated, intellectual Love, or essential and substantial goodness, that having an infinite overflowing fulness and fecundity dispenses itself uninvidiously, according to the best wisdom, sweetly governs all, without any force or violence (all things being naturally subject to its authority, and readily obeying its laws), and reconciles the whole world into harmony. For the Scripture telling us that God is love, seems to warrant thus much to us, that love in some rightly qualified sense is God.

XIX. But we are to omit the fabulous age, and to descend to the philosophical, to inquire there who they were among the professed philosophers, who atheized in that manner before described. It is true indeed, that Aristotle in other places accuses Democritus and Leucippus of the very same thing, that is, of assigning only a material cause of the universe, and giving no account of the original of motion; but yet it is certain, that these were not the persons intended by him here; those which he speaks of being τινὲς τῶν πρώτων φιλοσοφησάντων, "some of the first and most ancient philosophers of all." Moreover, it appears by the description of them that they were such as did not philosophize in the way of atoms, but resolved all things whatsoever in the universe into ὕλη and πάθη τῆς ὕλης, matter, and the passions or affections, qualities and forms of matter; so that they were not atomical, but hylopathian philosophers. These two, the old Materialists and the Democritics, did both alike derive things from dead and stupid matter, fortuitously moved; and the difference between them was only this, that the Democritics managed this business in the way of atoms, the other in that more vulgar way of qualities and forms: so that indeed this is really but one and the same atheistic hypothesis, in two several schemes. And as one of them is called the atomic atheism, so the other, for distinction's sake, may be called the hylopathian.[7]

XX. Now, Aristotle tells us plainly, that these hylopathian Atheists of his were all the first philosophers of the Ionic order, and succession, before Anaxagoras. Whereof Thales being the head, he is consentaneously thereunto by Aristotle made to be ἄρχηγος τῆς τοιαύτης φιλοσοφίας, "the prince and leader of this kind of atheistical philosophy," he deriving all things whatsoever, as Homer had done before him, from water, and acknowledging no other principle but the fluid matter.

Notwithstanding which accusation of Aristotle's, Thales is far

[7] Still, if the Ionic sect taught all that Cudworth states, they did not differ much from those whom he has called Hylozoics. For they could not so reckon this vital and plastic power among the properties of matter, as to teach in what way all other things were produced. But if we must say how the matter stands, the ancients have left us so little concerning these different sects that we cannot always determine what was, and what was not to be considered as part of their doctrines.

otherwise represented by good authors; Cicero[8] telling us that besides water, which he made to be the original of all corporeal things, he asserted also mind for another principle, which formed all things out of the water; and Laertius[9] and Plutarch[10] recording, that he was thought to be the first of all philosophers who determined souls to be immortal. He is said also to have affirmed,[1] that God was πρεσβύτατον πάντων, "the oldest of all things," and that the world was ποιήμα θεοῦ, "the workmanship of God." Clemens[2] likewise tells us, that being asked, εἰ λανθάνει τὸ θεῖον πράσσων τί ὁ ἄνθρωπος; καὶ πῶς, εἶπεν, ὅσγε οὐδὲ διανοούμενος: "Whether any of a man's actions could be concealed from the Deity? he replied, not so much as any thought." Moreover, Laertius[3] further writes of him, that he held τὸν κόσμον ἔμψυχον καὶ δαιμόνων πλήρη, "that the world was animated and full of demons." Lastly, Aristotle[4] himself elsewhere speaks of him as a Theist: Καὶ ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ δέ τινες ψυχὴν μεμίχθαι φασίν· ὅθεν ἴσως καὶ Θαλῆς ὠήθη πάντα πλήρη θεῶν εἶναι, "Some think (saith he) that soul and life is mingled with the whole universe; and thence, perhaps, was that of Thales, that all things are full of gods." Wherefore we conceive that there is very good reason why Thales should be acquitted from this accusation of atheism. Only we shall observe the occasion of his being thus differently represented, which seems to have been this; because, as Laertius[5] and Themistius[6] intimate, he left no philosophic

[8] De Nat. Deor. lib. 1. cap. 10. p. 2894. tom. 9. opp.

[9] Ibid. Lib. 1. segm. 24. p. 16.

[10] De Placit. Philos. lib. 4. cap. 2. p. 908. tom. 2. opp. Laertius has left it on record that there were those who taught this doctrine, and amongst them Choerilus, a poet. On which passage, Œgid. Menagius in Comm. p. 14. has remarked that Nemesius, in his book, De Natura Hominis, cap. 2. gives the same view. But Plutarch has not said this plainly, but very obscurely, from which I fancy it has happened that learned men who have touched on this argument have omitted the passage of his writings. Θαλῆς, he says, ἀπεφήνατο πρῶτος τὴν ψυχὴν φύσιν ἀεικίνητον ἢ αὐτοκίνητον. "Thales was the first to say that the soul is nature, which, since it moved of its own accord, always moved." This, indeed, is the same thing as Laertius records only in different words.

[1] Diog. Laert. lib. 1. segm. 35. p. 21. and Plutarch in Convivio Septem Sapientum, p. 153. tom. 2. opp. The passage referred to in Laertius does not read as here quoted, τῶν πάντων, but τῶν ὄντων.

[2] Clemens Alex. Stromat. lib. 5. p. 704. ed. Potteri. Diogenes Laertius, lib. 1. segm. 36. p. 22. and Valerius Maximus, lib. 7. cap. 2. sect. 8. p. 602. tell us the same thing.

[3] Ibid. Lib. 1. segm. 27. p. 18. But neither does this passage, nor that of Aristotle which follows, clear the memory of Thales, if it shall appear from any thing else that he was an Atheist. For it cannot be gathered an made out from the fact that any one supposes mind to be inherent to matter, and regards the universe as full of Deity, that he thinks aright concerning God. Spinoza himself would not reject this opinion, yet no one ever more skilfully controverted the being of a God than he.

[4] De Anima, lib. 1. cap. 5. p. 17. tom. 2. opp.

[5] Ibid. Lib. 1. segm. 23. p. 15.

[6] Orat. 26. p. 317. ed. Harduin. Laertius intimates that there were those who say that nothing of this kind is to be found in the writings of Thales, with whom however, he does not entirely agree, but Themistius clearly records concerning Thales and

writings or monuments of his own behind him, (Anaximander being the first of all the philosophic writers:) whence probably it came to pass,[7] that in after-times some did interpret his philosophy one way, some another; and that he is sometimes represented as a Theist, and sometimes again as a downright Atheist.

But though Thales be thus by good authority acquitted,[8] yet

Anaximander what Cudworth here mentions. Compare Jo. Alb. Fabricii. Biblioth. Græc. lib. 1. cap. 35. sect. 3. p. 238. 239.

[7] Jean le Clerc Biblioth. Choisie, tom. 2. p. 50. adds another reason why Aristotle thought but little favourably of the religion and piety of Thales. He suspects that the philosopher judged of the opinions of Thales from those of his followers, and since he saw that they were not well affected towards the belief of a God, he fancied that he was guilty of the same crime, at which, nevertheless, he would have entirely shuddered. There is, moreover, no necessity for this conjecture, for we have already shown that Aristotle did not cherish so unjust an opinion as Cudworth and others suppose, either concerning Thales or the rest of the philosophers of the Ionic school.

[8] Very many of the greatest learning have so acquitted him, among whom I name, Thom. Stanley, Histor. Philos. p. 1. cap. 6. p. 9. 10. Jo. Potter, ad Clementis Alexandr. Protreptic. p. 56. Jo. Franc. Buddeus, Thesibus de Atheismo et Superstit. cap. 1. sect. 10. p. 21. Samuel Parcker, de Deo et Provid. Diss. 1. sect. 5. p. 14. Jac. Frid. Reimmann, Historia Atheismi, cap. 19. sect. 2. p. 142. Jo. Christ. Wolf. Diss. de Atheismi Falso Suspectis, p. 31. But others cannot be induced by even so many authorities to acquit Thales, among whom are the author of Observat. 21. tom. 2. Observat. Halens. p. 447. scripsit, et Peter Bayle, Diction. Histor. et Critique, tom. 1. voce Anaxagoras not. D. p. 200. et tom. 4. voce Thales not. C. p. 2714. The arguments commonly adduced by these writers to overturn so many testimonies of the ancients as to the piety of Thales are chiefly the following. 1. That almost all the ancients, and principally Aristotle, affirm that Anaxagoras was the first to assign mind or efficient causation to matter, wherefore they judge that Thales, who was more ancient than Anaxagoras, was not of this opinion, but that he attributed the origin of the universe to matter solely. Nevertheless Aristotle, who is brought forward as the author of this charge, will easily clear Thales. For what he affirms, is not that no philosopher before Anaxagoras affirmed mind of matter, but that Anaxagoras was the first who did it φανερῶς, openly and avowedly, Metaphys. lib. 1. cap. 3. p. 364. tom. 4. opp. from which is to be understood not that others entirely omitted to do so, but that they did it more obscurely. If these things be considered, it will be easily perceived whence that common report arose which even Cicero somewhere follows: "Anaxagoram primum omnium mentis infinitæ vi rerum omnium descriptionem et modum confici voluisse." "That Anaxagoras was the first all who maintained that the arrangement and form of the universe was effected by the power of an infinite mind." Because no one had so fully and openly discussed the doctrine of universal mind as Anaxagoras, this philosopher is accounted by many the first of those who ranked mind among the principles of things. Compare the notes on sect. 12. 2. They say that Augustine, lib. de Cic. Dei. 8. cap. 2. p. 146. 147. tom. 7. opp. clearly ranks Thales among Atheists. Certainly, Augustine denies that Thales taught that any part of the universe proceeded from a divine mind. I wonder that Clemens Alexandrinus has been omitted by learned men, who plainly says that all the physiologists who lived previously to Anaxagoras are to be reckoned among Atheists. See Stromat. lib. 1. cap. 2. p. 347. and lib. 2. cap. 4. p. 435. Also, Eusebius, who says the same thing, Præpar. Evang. lib. 1. cap. 7. p. 21. 22. But, inasmuch as the more ancient testimonies that we have are in favour of the piety of Thales, the authority of those who have just been referred to ought not to be so highly accounted of, as that their single opinion should weigh down so many other opinions, by which Thales is pronounced free from atheism, especially as we may believe that Augustine maintained the sentiments which in his time were commonly received. In the meantime, I readily concede, that with so much uncertainty among ancient authors, and with so little testimony, none can easily determine concerning the religion of the most ancient philosophers. That sentiment should be regarded as the better, the probability of which is stronger than that of its opposite. Very lately, the

his next successor, Anaximander, can by no means be excused from this imputation; and therefore we think it more reasonable to fasten that title upon him, which Aristotle bestows on Thales, that he was ἄρχηγος τῆς τοιαύτης φιλοσοφίας, "the prince and founder of this atheistic philosophy;" who derived all things from matter, in the way of forms and qualities; he supposing a certain infinite *materia prima*, which was neither air, nor water, nor fire, but indifferent to every thing, or a mixture of all, to be the only principle of the universe, and leading a train of many other Atheists after him, such as Hippo, surnamed Ἄθεος by Simplicius and others, Anaximenes, and Diogenes Appolloniates,[9] and many more; who, though they had some petty differences amongst themselves, yet all agreed in this one thing, that matter, devoid of understanding and life, was the first principle of all things; till at length Anaxagoras stopped this atheistic current amongst these Ionic philosophers, introducing mind as a principle of the universe.

XXI. But there is a passage in Aristotle's Physics[10] which seems at first sight to contradict this again; and to make Anaximander also not to have been an Atheist, but a divine philosopher. Where having declared that several of the ancient physiologers made ἄπειρον, or Infinite, to be the principle of all things, he subjoins these words: Διὸ καθάπερ λέγομεν, οὐ ταύτης ἀρχὴ, ἀλλ' αὕτη τῶν ἄλλων εἶναι δοκεῖ. Καὶ περιέχειν ἅπαντα καὶ πάντα κυβερνᾶν, ὡς φασιν ὅσοι μὴ ποιοῦσι παρὰ τὸ ἄπειρον ἄλλας αἰτίας, οἷον νοῦν, ἢ φιλίαν. Καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ θεῖον, ἀθάνατον γὰρ καὶ ἀνώλεθρον, ὥσπερ φησὶν ὁ Ἀναξίμανδρος καί οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν φυσιολόγων, "Therefore, there seems to be no principle of this infinite, but this to be the principle of other things, and to contain all things and govern all things, as they all say who do not make, besides infinite, any other causes, such as mind or friendship; and that this is the only real Numen or God in the world, it being immortal and incorruptible, as Anaximander affirms, and most of the physiologers." From which place some late writers have confidently concluded, that Anaximander, with those other physiologers there mentioned,

learned James Brücker has endeavoured with great ingenuity to show that Thales leaned to the doctrine of those who imagined Deity to be mind extended throughout the universe. Otio Vindelico. Exercit. 2. sect. 2. p. 129. but neither is this opinion entirely free from question and doubt.

[9] Concerning Hippo, see Fabricius Biblioth. Græc. lib. 2. cap. 23. sect. 20. p. 777. Anaximenes is reckoned among Atheists also by Augustine, De Civit. Dei. lib. 8. cap. 2. p. 147. tom. 7. opp. and among the more recent authors, by Eric. Hier. Gudlingius in Otiis, p. 2. cap. 3. sect. 8. p. 108. and in Observ. Halenib. tom. 2. Observ. 21. p. 450. Concerning Diogenes of Appollonia, Peter Bayle in Diction. tom. 1. p. 1005. 1006. has treated with great care. He spares no labour to show that he was polluted with the same fearful sentiments as Spinoza in our own age. Vid. Nouv. Dict. Hist. Crit. tom. 1. voce Anaximenes, p. 328.

[10] Physicar. Auscult. lib. 3. cap. 4. p. 485. tom. 1. opp.

did by Infinite understand God, according to the true notion of him, or an Infinite mind, the efficient cause of the universe, and not senseless and stupid matter; since this could not be said to be immortal, and to govern all things; and consequently, that Aristotle grossly contradicts himself, in making all those Ionic philosophers before Anaxagoras to have been mere Materialists or Atheists. And it is possible, that Clemens Alexandrinus[1] also might from this very passage of Aristotle, not sufficiently considered, have been induced to rank Anaximander amongst the divine philosophers, as he doth in his Protreptrick to the Greeks; where, after he had condemned certain of the old philosophers as atheistic corporealists, he subjoins these words: Τῶν δὲ ἄλλων φιλοσόφων, ὅσοι τὰ στοιχεῖα ὑπερβάντες, ἐπολυπραγμόνησάν τι ὑψηλότερον καὶ περιττότερον, οἱ μὲν αὐτῶν τὸ ἄπειρον καθύμνησαν, ὧν Ἀναξίμανδρος ὁ Μιλήσιος ἦν, καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας ὁ Κλαζομένιος, καὶ ὁ Ἀθηναῖος Ἀρχέλαος,[2] "But of the other philosophers, who transcending all the elements, searched after some higher and more excellent thing, some of them praised Infinite, amongst whom was Anaximander the Milesian, Anaxagoras, the Clazomenian, and the Athenian Archelaus." As if these three had all alike acknowledged an incorporeal Deity, and made an infinite mind, distinct from matter, the first original of all things.

But that forecited passage of Aristotle alone, well considered, will itself afford a sufficient confutation of this opinion; where Anaximander, with those other physiologers, is plainly opposed to Anaxagoras, who besides infinite senseless matter, or similar atoms, made mind to be a principle of the universe, as also to Empedocles, who made a plastic life and nature, called friendship, another principle of the corporeal world; from whence it plainly follows that Anaximander and the rest supposed not infinite mind, but infinite matter, without either mind or plastic matter, to have been the only original of all things, and therefore, the only Deity or Numen.

Moreover, Democritus being linked in the context with Anaximander,[3] as making both of them alike, τὸ ἄπειρον, or Infinite, to be the first principle of all; it might as well be inferred from this place, that Democritus was a genuine Theist, as Anaximander. But as Democritus' only principle was infinite

[1] In Protreptic. cap. 5. p. 57. tom. 1. opp. But it ought not to be omitted that Clemens did not entertain the same opinion of each of these three philosophers; for he adds, that Archelaus and Anaxagoras placed mind over the infinite. He, therefore, in effect, denies that Anaximander did this.

[2] Clem. Prot. p. 43. cap. 5. p. 57. tom. 1. opp.

[3] Aristotle, in the last words of this passage, shows that most of the physiologists had the same notion as Anaximander, therefore Cudworth supposes that he reckoned Democritus among the number. Hence he contends that if Anaximander be freed from Atheism, Democritus would also be free. What the force of this argument is, any one who uses his reason will, I suppose, at once perceive.

atoms, without any thing of mind or plastic nature; so likewise was Anaximander's an infinity of senseless and stupid matter; and therefore they were both of them Atheists alike, though Anaximander, in the cited words, had the honour (if it may be so called) to be only named, as being the most ancient of all those atheistical physiologers, and the ringleader of them.

XXII. Neither ought it at all to seem strange, that Anaximander and those other atheistical Materialists should call infinite matter, devoid of all understanding and life, the τὸ θεῖον "the Deity" or "Numen," since to all those who deny a God, (according to the true notion of him) whatsoever else they substitute in his room, by making it the first principle of all things, though it be senseless and stupid matter, yet this must needs be accounted the only Numen, and divinest thing of all.

Nor is it to be wondered at neither, that this infinite, being understood of matter, should be said to be not only incorruptible, but also immortal, these two being often used as synonymous and equivalent expressions. For thus in Lucretius,[4] the corruption of all inanimate bodies is called death.

——————Mors ejus quod fuit ante;

And again,

Quando aliud ex alio reficit natura, nec ullam
Rem gigni patitur, nisi morte adjutam alienâ.[5]

In like manner mortal is used by him for corruptible,

Nam siquid mortale à cunctis partibus esset,
Ex oculis res quæque repentè erepta periret.[6]

And this kind of language was very familiar with Heraclitus,[7] as appears from these passages of his: Πυρὸς θάνατος, ἀέρι

[4] Lucretius, lib. 1. v. 672. [5] Lib. 1. v. 264, 265. [6] Lib. 1. v. 219.

[7] Vide Henr. Stephan. in Poesi Philosophic. p. 137. Henry Stephen, from whom unquestionably our author quoted, brings forward the first of these two passages, under the name of Plutarch, but learned men have not mentioned it as extant in Plutarch, although he clearly mentions this opinion of Heraclitus concerning this change of principles, De Placit. Philos. lib. 1. cap. 3. p. 877. tom. 2. opp. They have commended Stephen only as the author, when they should have taken the credit to themselves. The very learned Joh. Potter on Clemens Alex. p. 746. and Godof. Olearius, Diss. 2. De Genes. Rerum Natural. ex Mente Heracliti. sec. 7. may be taken as examples. I think it worth while, therefore, to intimate that this is not attributed by Plutarch to Heraclitus, although it may be read in different parts of his book. The passage is lib. de Primo Frigido, p. 948. 949. Σκοπῶμεν εἴ καλῶς εἴρηται τὸ πυρὸς θάνατος ἀέρος γένεσις, "Let us see whether it is rightly said, that the death of fire is generation to air." A little after, Plutarch utters from the other part of this sentence what is said in it as to water arising out of air, p. 950. 951. Ἀὴρ μεταβάλλει εἰς ὕδωρ συνιστάμενος, "Air thickened becomes water." Stephen, therefore, inasmuch as he had known a similar dictum of Heraclitus commended by some, did not hesitate to refer to Heraclitus the opinion which Plutarch quotes without the name of the author, wherein he seems to have assumed more than was right. The other dogma of Heraclitus, that the world is indestructible, Clemens Alexan. quotes in the very words of Heraclitus, Stromat. lib. 6. cap. 2. p. 476. as well as Philo, in his book, p. 958.

γένεσις. καὶ ἀέρος θάνατος ὕδατι γένεσις, "The death of fire is generation to air; and the death of air is generation to water;" that is, the corruption of them. And again: Ψυχῇσιν θάνατος, ὕδωρ γενέσθαι· ὕδατι δὲ θάνατος, γῆν γενέσθαι, "It is death to vapour or air to be made water; and death to water, to be made earth." In which Heraclitus did but imitate Orpheus, as appears from this verse of his, cited by Clemens Alexandrinus,[8]

Ἔστιν ὕδωρ ψυχῇ, θάνατος δ' ὑδάτεσσιν ἀμοιβή.

Besides which, there are many examples of this use of the word ἀθάνατος, in other Greek writers, and some in Aristotle[9] himself, who, speaking of the heavens, attributes ἀθανασία and ἀϊδιότης to them, as one and the same thing; as also affirms, that the ancients made heaven to be the seat of the Deity, ὡς ὄντα μόνον ἀθάνατον, "as being only immortal," that is, "incorruptible."

Indeed that other expression, at first sight, would stagger one more, where it is said of this ἄπειρον, or "infinite," that it doth

[8] Stromat. lib. 6. cap. 2. p. 476.

[9] De Cœlo, lib. 1. cap. 3. p. 614. 615. tom. 1. opp. Aristotle quotes the sentiment; not in the same words, however, as we find here. It will be of advantage to give the words of the philosopher: Πάντες γὰρ ἄνθρωποι περὶ Θεῶν ἔχουσιν ὑπόληψιν, καὶ πάντες τὸν ἀνώτατον τῷ θείῳ τόπον ἀνποδιδόασι,——ὡς τῷ ἀθανάτῳ τὸ ἀθάνατον συνηρτημένον, "All men have the gods in high esteem, and all assign to Deity the highest place; on this account, that to what is incorruptible, the immortal seat most properly belongs. Lucretius uses the word *immortalis*, as signifying what cannot in any way be destroyed, what is incorruptible.

E quibus hæc rerum consistet summa refecta
Immortali sunt natura prædita certe.

He speaks of atoms, lib. 1. v. 236. 237. p. 72. which, he says, are endued with an incorruptible nature. What Cudworth here argues, since it is set forth with but little perspicuity, I will explain briefly. His opinion is this. Because that Anaximander called his infinite, "immortale" or incorruptible, it does not necessarily follow that he attributed soul or mind to this infinite. For that in both Greek and Latin writers, the words death, mortal, and immortal, are used respecting things wanting in life and sense, and they call that mortal which is liable to change, destruction, and death, and that immortal which plainly cannot be either changed or destroyed. Nothing is more correct than this observation, especially in reference to poets. Out of many passages, I may quote one from Virgil, Georgic. lib. 4. v. 225.

Scilicet huc reddi deinde ac resoluta referri
Omnia nec morti esse locum.

"Hence take the forms his prescience did ordain,
And into him at length resolve again,
No room is left for death." DRYDEN.

On which passage, Servius very properly remarks, "Locum morti id est perditioni. Nihil enim est quod perire funditus possit." "By locum morti is meant entire destruction: for there is nothing that can be entirely destroyed." Moreover, examples of the same use of the word may be found in other writers; Cicero especially, who, speaking of the four elements of Empedocles, De Natur. Deor. lib. 1. cap. 12. p. 2896. tom. 9. opp. says, "Has quatuor naturas et *nasci* et *extingui* perspicuum est et sensu omni carere." "It is clear that these natures are both produced and destroyed, and that they are destitute of all feeling."

not only contain, but also govern all things: but Simplicius[10] tells us, that this is to be understood likewise of matter, and that no more was meant by it, than that all things were derived from it, and depended on it, as the first principle: Ὁ δὲ λόγος τοῖς τοιούτοις περὶ τῶν φυσικῶν ἀρχῶν, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ περὶ τῶν ὑπερ φύσιν, εἰ δὲ καὶ περιέχειν ἔλεγον καὶ κυβερνᾶν οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ περιέχειν ὑπάρχει τῷ ὑλικῷ, αἰτιῷ ὡς διὰ πάντων χωροῦντι, τὸ δὲ κυβερνᾶν ὡς κατὰ τὴν ἐπιτηδειότητα αὐτοῦ, τῶν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ γενομένων, "These philosophers spake only of natural principles, and not of supernatural; and though they say, that this infinite of theirs doth both contain and govern all things, yet this is not at all to be wondered at; forasmuch as containing belongs to the material cause, as that which goes through all things, and likewise governing, as that from which all things, according to a certain aptitude of it, are made." Philoponus (who was a Christian) represents Aristotle's sense in this whole place more fully, after this manner: "Those of the ancient physiologers, who had no respect to any active efficient cause, as Anaxagoras had to mind, and Empedocles to friendship and contention, supposed matter to be the only cause of all things; and that it was infinite in magnitude, ingenerable and incorruptible, esteeming it to be a certain divine thing, which did govern all, or preside over the compages of the universe, and to be immortal, that is, undestroyable.[1] This Anaximenes said to be air, Thales to be water, but Anaximander, a certain middle thing; some one thing, and some another." Καὶ οὐδέν γε θαυμαστόν φησιν, ἐν τῇ καθ' ἡμᾶς περιόδῳ τοὺς πρώτους μὴ ἐπιστήσαντας τῇ ἐφεστηκυίᾳ τῶν ὅλων δυνάμει, ἕν τῶν στοιχείων, ὅπερ ἄν ὑπόπτευεν ἕκαστος, αἴτιον τοῖς ἄλλοις τε εἶναι, τοῦτο εὐθὺς καὶ Θεὸν ὑπονοῆσας, "And Aristotle in this passage tells us, that it is no wonder, if they, who did not attend to the active cause, that presides over the universe, did look upon some one of the elements (that which each of them thought to be the cause of all other things) as God. But as they considering only the material principle, conceived that to be the cause of all things; so Anaxagoras supposed mind to be the principle of all things, and Empedocles friendship and contention."

[10] Commentar. in octo Libros Physic. Auscultat. Aristot. Lib. 1. cap. 3. p. 32. edit. Aldin.

[1] Comment. in IV. primos Libros Physicor. Lib. 1. cap. 3. a. 10. Adde cap. 1. edit. Græcæ Venet. 1535. fol. The author of the Philosophumena, commonly attributed to Origen, greatly confirms and illustrates this interpretation of the words of Aristotle, who pleading for Anaximander's infinite nature thus expounds the opinions of that philosopher. Ταύτην δε ἀίδιον εἶναι καὶ ἀγήρω, ἣν καὶ πάντας περιέχειν τοὺς κόσμους. "This" infinite nature, he says, "is eternal; it is not subject to the infirmities of old age, and it embraces all worlds." Philosoph. cap. 6. p. 57. It may almost be said that this author sought to explain more fully what Aristotle had obscurely spoken.

XXIII. But to make it further appear, that Anaximander's philosophy was purely atheistical, we think it convenient to show what account is given of it by other writers. Plutarch, in his Placita Philosophorum, does at once briefly represent the Anaximandrian philosophy, and censure it after this manner: Ἀναξίμανδρός φησι, τῶν ὄντων τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶναι τὸ ἄπειρον, ἐκ γὰρ τούτου πάντα γίνεσθαι, καὶ εἰς τοῦτο πάντα φθείρεσθαι, διὸ καὶ γεννᾶσθαι ἀπείρους κόσμους, καὶ πάλιν φθείρεσθαι· λέγει οὖν διὰ τί ἄπειρόν ἐστιν, ἵνα μὴ ἐλλείπῃ ἡ γένεσις ἡ ὑφισταμένη· ἁμαρτάνει δὲ οὗτος, τὴν μὲν ὕλην ἀποφαινόμενος, τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν αἴτιον ἀναιρῶν, τὸ δὲ ἄπειρον οὐδὲν ἄλλο, ἢ ὕλη ἐστίν· οὐ δύναται δὲ ἡ ὕλη εἶναι ἐνέργεια, ἐὰν μὴ τὸ ποιοῦν ὑποκέηται,[2] "Anaximander the Milesian affirms infinite to be the first principle; and that all things are generated out of it, and corrupted again into it; and therefore that infinite worlds are successively thus generated and corrupted. And he gives the reason why it is infinite, that so there might be never any fail of generations. But he erreth in this, that assigning only a material cause, he takes away the active principle of things." For Anaximander's infinite is nothing else but matter; but matter can produce nothing, unless there be also an active cause. Where he shows also, how Anaximenes followed Anaximander herein, in assigning only a material cause of the universe, without any efficient; though he differed from him, in making the first matter to be air, and deriving all things from thence by rarefaction and condensation. Thus we see, it is plain that Anaximander's infinite was no infinite mind, which is the true Deity, but only infinite matter, devoid of any life or active power. Eusebius is more particular in giving an account of Anaximander's Cosmopœia: Τὸ ἄπειρον φάναι τὴν πᾶσαν αἰτίαν ἔχειν τῆς τοῦ παντος γενέσεώς τε καὶ φθορᾶς, ἐξ οὗ δή φησι τούς τε οὐρανοὺς ἀποκεκρίσθαι, καὶ καθόλου τοὺς ἅπαντας ἀπείρους ὄντας κόσμους· φησὶ δὲ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ ἀϊδίου γόνιμον θερμοῦ τε καὶ ψυχροῦ, κατὰ τὴν γένεσιν τοῦδε τοῦ κόσμου ἀποκριθῆναι, καὶ τινα ἐκ τούτου φλογὸς σφαῖραν περιφυῆναι τῷ περὶ τὴν γῆν ἀέρι, ὡς τῷ δένδρῳ φλοιόν· ἧς τινος ἀπορραγείσης, καὶ εἰς τινας ἀποκλεισθείσης κύκλους, ὑποστῆναι τὸν ἥλιον, καὶ τὴν σελήνην, καὶ τοὺς ἀστέρας,[3] "Anaximander affirms infinite" matter "to be the only cause of the generation and corruption of all things; and that the heavens, and infinite worlds, were made out of it, by way of secretion or segregation. Also that those generative principles of heat and cold, that were contained in it from eternity, being segregated, when this

[2] Lib. 1. cap. 3. p. 875. tom. 2. opp. Cudworth has abridged the words of Plutarch, and omitted what did not seem pertinent to his design.

[3] Evang. Præp. lib. 1. p. 15. ed. Steph. Eusebius nevertheless intimates that he transcribed these words as to the dogmas of the ancient philosophers from the Stromata of Plutarch, which have been lost.

world was made, a certain sphere of flame or fire did first arise and encompass the air, which surrounds this earth," as a bark doth a tree "which being afterwards broken, and divided into smaller spherical bodies, constituted the sun and moon and all the stars." Which Anaximandrian Cosmopœia was briefly hinted at by Aristotle[4] in these words: Οἱ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ ἑνὸς, ἐνούσας τὰς ἐναντιότητας, ἐκκρίνουσιν, ὥσπερ Ἀναξίμανδρός φησι, "Some philosophers generate the world by the secretion and segregation of inexistent contrarieties, as Anaximander speaks." And elsewhere in his metaphysics[5] he takes notice of Ἀναξιμάνδρου τὸ μίγμα, "Anaximander's mixture of things." Whence we conclude, that Anaximander's infinite was nothing else but an infinite chaos of matter, in which were either actually or potentially, contained all manner of qualities; by the fortuitous secretion and segregation of which, he supposed infinite worlds to be successfully generated and corrupted. So that we may now easily guess, whence Leucippus and Democritus had their infinite worlds, and perceive how near akin these two atheistic hypotheses were. But it will not be amiss to take notice also of that particular conceit, which Anaximander had, concerning the first original of brute animals and mankind. Of the former, Plutarch gives us this account: Ἀναξίμανδρος ἐν ὑγρῷ γεννηθῆναι τὰ πρῶτα ζῶα, φλοιοῖς περιεχόμενα ἀκανθώδεσι, προβαινούσης δὲ τῆς ἡλικίας, ἀποβαίνειν ἐπὶ τὸ ξηρότερον, καὶ περιῤῥηγνυμένου τοῦ φλοιοῦ, ἐπὶ ὀλίγον χρόνον μεταβιῶναι,[6] "That the first animals were generated in moisture, and encompassed about with certain thorny barks, by which they were guarded and defended; which after further growth, coming to be more dry and cracking, they issued forth, but lived only for a short time after." And as for the first original of men, Eusebius represents his sense thus: Ἐξ ἀλλοειδῶν ζώων ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐγεννήθη, ἐκ τοῦ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα δι' ἑαυτῶν ταχὺ νέμεσθαι, μόνον δὲ τὸν ἄνθρωπον πολυχρονίου δεῖσθαι τιθηνήσεως, διὸ καὶ κατ' ἀρχὰς οὐκ ἄν ποτε τοιοῦτον ὄντα διασωθῆναι,[7] "Men were at first generated in the bellies of other animals, forasmuch as all other animals, after they are brought forth, are quickly able to feed and nourish themselves, but man alone needs to be nursed up a long time; and therefore could not be preserved at first in any other way." But Plutarch expresseth this something more particularly: Ἀναξίμανδρος ἐν ἰχθύσιν ἐγγενέσθαι τὸ πρῶτον ἀνθρώπους ἀποφαίνεται, καὶ τραφέντας καὶ γενομένους ἱκανοὺς ἑαυτοῖς βοηθεῖν, ἐκβληθῆναι

[4] Physicar. Auscult. lib. 1. cap. 5. p. 451. tom. 1. opp.

[5] Metaphysicor. lib 14. cap. 2. p. 473. tom. 4. opp. Καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ Ἀναξαγόρου ἓν· Βέλτιον γὰρ ἦν ὁμοῦ πάντα, καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλέους τὸ μῖγμα καὶ Ἀναξιμάνδρου. "And this is the one thing of Anaxagoras: preferable to the all things together, and the mixture of Empedocles and Anaximander." Vid. Nouv. Dict. Hist. Crit. tom. 1. voce Anaximander, p. 327.

[6] Pla. Ph. lib. 5. cap. 19. p. 908 tom 2. opp.

[7] E. P. lib 1.

τηνικαῦτα καὶ γῆς λαβέσθαι,[8] "Anaximander concludes, that men were at first generated in the bellies of fishes, and being there nourished till they grew strong, and were able to shift for themselves, they were afterwards cast out upon dry land." Lastly, Anaximander's theology is thus both represented to us, and censured by Velleius the Epicurean philosopher in Cicero: "Anaximandri opinio est nativos esse deos, longis intervallis orientes occidentesque, eosque innumerabiles esse mundos; sed nos deum nisi sempiternum intelligere quî possumus?"[9] "Anaximander's opinion is, that the gods are native, rising and vanishing again, in long periods of times; and that these gods are innumerable worlds: but how can we conceive that to be a God, which is not eternal?" We learn from hence, that Anaximander did indeed so far comply with vulgar opinion, as that he retained the name of gods, but however that he really denied the existence of the thing itself, even according to the judgment of this Epicurean philosopher. Forasmuch as all his gods were native and mortal, and indeed nothing else but those innumerable worlds, which he supposed in certain periods of time to be successively generated and destroyed. Wherefore it is plain that Anaximander's only real Numen, that is, his first principle, that was ingenerable and incorruptible, was nothing but infinite matter, devoid of all understanding and life, by the fortuitous secretion of whose inexistent qualities and parts, he supposed, first, the elements of earth, water, air, and fire, and then, the bodies of the sun, moon and stars, and both bodies and souls of men and other animals, and lastly, innumerable or infinite such world as these, as so many secondary and native gods, (that were also mortal) to have been generated, according to that atheistical hypothesis described in Plato.[10]

[8] Symp. lib. 8. Q. 8. p. 730. tom. 2. opp.

[9] De Nat. Deor. lib. 1. cap. 10. p. 2894. tom. 9. opp.

[10] De Legibus lib. 10. p. 666. But in chap. 1. sect. 13. and in chap. 2. sect. 22. our author gives a different view of this passage of Plato. For he there represents the opinion of Democritus, Leucippus, and Epicurus as censured by Plato. This indeed in note 10. p. 138. on cap. 2. sect. 22. we showed to be very far from likely. Certainly the cause of Anaximander seems to be in the worst possible condition, if the authorities have any weight on which Cudworth relied in condemning him. Only those, therefore, have ventured to plead his cause who, on other accounts, wish well for the fame of the ancient philosophers, among whom may be mentioned, as of chief reputation, Jo. Franc. Buddeus, Thesibus de Atheismo et Superstit. cap. 1. sect. 10. p. 22. and Jo. Christ. Wolfius, Diss. de Atheismi Falso Suspectis sect. 9. p. 33. second to none in prudence and justice. Nevertheless, attempts have been made to restore the lost reputation of this philosopher by, among Englishmen, Samuel Parker, in his dissertation concerning God. cap. 1. sect. 6. p. 15. and by Jac. Hasæus, among Germans, in his Dissert. de vetr. Philosoph. Atheismo. cap. 5. sect. 1. p. 19. Whose arguments, which I acknowledge to be ingenious, I would readily trust, if I could bring myself to believe that these learned men were themselves satisfied with what they did. But they looked at only a part of the doctrine of Anaximander as it was expounded by the ancients; they did not look at the whole in its connexions, nor did they even touch upon those things concerning the origin of men and animals, which are here

XXIV. It is certain that the vulgar in all ages have been very ill judges of Theists and Atheists, they having condemned many hearty Theists, as guilty of atheism, merely because they dissented from them in some of their superstitious rites and opinions. As for example: Anaxagoras the Clazomenian,[1] though he was the first of all the Ionic philosophers (unless Thales ought to be excepted) who made an infinite mind to be a principle, that is, asserted a Deity, according to the true notion of it; yet he was, notwithstanding, generally cried down for an *Atheist, merely because he affirmed the sun to be μύδρον διάπυρον*, "a mass of fire," or a "fiery globe," and "the moon to be an earth;" that is, because he denied them to be animated and endued with understanding souls, and consequently to be gods. So likewise Socrates was both accused, and condemned, for atheistical impiety, as denying all gods, though nothing was

referred to from Eusebius and Plutarch, atheistic certainly, and unworthy on every account of a man concerned for piety and religion. Still three things have occurred to me, examining these matters as accurately, and with as much moderation as was right, which seem somewhat to sustain the arguments for Anaximander. I. Aristotle Metaphysic lib. 1. cap. 3. as has been intimated already at sect. 12. says that all philosophers of the Ionic school were compelled to investigate some higher and greater principle than mere matter. Since, therefore, Anaximander was of this school, he also seems to have contended for something greater than matter, and to have inquired after a parent and creator of the universe. II. Anaximander studied under Thales, for whose piety and religion Cudworth contended a few pages back. If the scholar be wont to be not unlike the master, it seems to be evident that the excellent author should have here pronounced more favourably concerning Anaximander. III. Hermias, an ancient writer in Irrisione Gentil. Philos. sect. 10. p. 221. ed. Worth. shows that Anaximander taught that motion is eternal,—more ancient than the water or ὑγρόν of Thales. Ἀναξίμανδρος τοῦ ὑγροῦ πρεσβυτέραν ἀρχὴν εἶναι λέγει τὴν αἴδιον κίνησιν, καὶ ταύτῃ τὰ μὲν γεννᾶσθαι, τὰ δὲ φθείρεσθαι. "Anaximander teaches that there is some principle more ancient than moisture, that motion is eternal, and that some things arise from it, others perish;" which may perhaps be understood thus: that there was some cause more ancient than matter, which he called eternal motion, or rather an eternal mover. But how much weight ought to be assigned to these things learned men will see. To my mind they seem scarcely sufficient to overturn the considerations which have led to the reckoning of Anaximander among Atheists. Yet neither do I imagine all that Cudworth attributes to Anaximander to be sufficiently certain. For what have come down to us do not so clearly expound the doctrine of the ancients, as to enable us to exhibit fitly, and in order, the whole genius and nature of this philosopher. In the first place, I can scarcely grant to the learned Doctor what he urges in opposition, that Anaximander regarded infinite matter, and that void of all life and sense, as the principle of the universe. It seems to me that the philosopher placed in matter itself something of life and of plastic power, to which something he attributed infinity. Though in so great an obscurity as to ancient matters, what wise man is there, I ask, who has so good an opinion of himself as to resolve that what he conjectures and supposes concerning the dogmas of ancient philosophers, should be regarded as of absolute authority. I cannot omit saying that it is clear from what he taught concerning the origin of living beings, as Plutarch reports it, that though he might not altogether follow in the track of his instructor, yet he did not entirely repudiate his doctrines. He denied that moisture was the principle of the universe, as Thales had maintained; still he thought that this moisture was the principal and chiefest part of his eternal matter, since men and animals, than whom he held that material nature contained nothing more excellent, sprang from it.

[1] Let those who desire to see this matter more fully explained, consult Bayle's Dictionary, voce Anaxagoras note K. vol. 1. p. 213.

pretended to be proved against him, but only this, that he did θεοὺς διδάσκειν μὴ νομίζειν, οὕς ἡ πόλις νομίζει, ἕτερα δὲ δαιμόνια καινὰ εἰσφέρειν,[2] "teach that those were not true gods, which the city worshipped, and in the room thereof introduce other new gods." And lastly, the Christians in the primitive times, for the same reason, were vulgarly traduced for Atheists by the Pagans, as Justin Martyr declares in his apology:[3] Ἄθεοι κεκλήμεθα, καὶ ὁμολογοῦμεν τῶν τοιούτων νομιζομένων θεῶν ἄθεοι εἶναι, "We are called Atheists; and we confess ourselves such, in respect of those gods which they worship, but not of the true God." And as the vulgar have unjustly condemned many Theists for Atheists, so have they also acquitted many rank Atheists from the guilt of that crime, merely because they externally complied with them in their religious worship and forms of speech. Neither is it only the vulgar, that have been imposed upon herein, but also the generality of learned men, who have been commonly so superficial in this business, as that they have hardly taken notice of above three or four Atheists, that ever were in former times, as namely, Diagoras, Theodorus, Euemerus, and Protagoras; whereas Democritus and Anaximander were as rank Atheists as any of them all, though they had the wit to carry themselves externally with more cautiousness. And indeed it was really one and the self-same form of atheism, which both these entertained, they deriving all things alike, from dead and stupid matter fortuitously moved, the difference between them being only this, that they managed it two different ways; Anaximander in the way of qualities and forms, which is the more vulgar and obvious kind of atheism; but Democritus in the way of atoms and figures, which seems to be a more learned kind of atheism.

And though we do not doubt at all, but that Plato, in his tenth de Legibus[4] where he attacks atheism, did intend the confutation as well of the Democritic as the Anaximandrian atheism; yet whether it were, because he had no mind to take any notice at all of Democritus, who is not so much as once mentioned by him any where, or else because he was not so perfectly acquainted with that atomic way of physiologizing, certain it is, that he there subscribes the atheistic hypothesis more according to the Anaximandrian than the Democritic form. For when he represents the atheistic generation of heaven and earth, and all things in them, as resulting from the fortuitous commixture of hot and

[2] Read Plato's Apology for Socrates, p. 362. whence these words have been quoted.

[3] Apol. 2. pro Christ. p. 56. opp. Almost all apologies for the ancient Christians refute this calumny. Adamus Rechenbergius, Diss. peculiari in Syntagm. Diss. ad N. T. et Hist. Eccl. pertinentium p. 257. and Christ. Kortholtus in Pagano obtrectatore.

[4] The words were quoted, sec. 8, 9.

cold, hard and soft, moist and dry corpuscula, this is clearly more agreeable with the Anaximandrian generation of the world, by the secretion of inexistent contrarieties in the matter, than the Democritic Cosmopœia, by the fortuitous concourse of atoms, devoid of all manner of qualities and forms.

Some indeed seem to call that scheme of atheism, that deduces all things from matter, in the way of qualities and forms, by the name of Peripatetic or Aristotelic atheism; we suppose for this reason, because Aristotle physiologized in that way of forms and qualities, educing them out of the power of the matter. But since Aristotle himself cannot be justly taxed for an Atheist, this form of theism ought rather, as we conceive, to be denominated from Anaximander, and called the Anaximandrian atheism.

XXV. Now the reasons, why Democritus and Leucippus new-modelled atheism, from the Anaximandrian and Hylopathian into the atomic form, seem to have been chiefly these; first, because they being well instructed in that atomic way of physiologizing, were really convinced, that it was not only more ingenious, but also more agreeable to truth; the other, by real qualities and forms, seeming a thing unintelligible. Secondly, because they foresaw, as Lucretius intimates,[5] that the production of forms and qualities out of nothing, and the corruption of them again into nothing, would prepare an easy way for men's belief of a divine creation and annihilation. And lastly, because, as we have already suggested, they plainly perceived, that these forms and qualities of matter were of a doubtful nature; and therefore, as they were sometimes made a shelter for atheism, so they might also prove, on the contrary, an asylum for corporeal theism; in that it might possibly be supposed, that either the matter of the whole world, or else the more subtle and fiery part of it, was originally endued with an understanding form or

[5] But where? I am certain that Lucretius has nowhere written, that Democritus and his followers rejected forms and qualities, and avowed the atomic doctrine, because they felt that it was easy to pass from forms and qualities to an acknowledgment of God and to religion. I suspect therefore that the learned Doctor had in mind those verses of Lucretius in which he intimates that men, if they only hold fast this one doctrine, that out of nothing nothing can proceed, would see without difficulty that whatever exists was created by the power of the gods. Lib. 1. v. 156—159. p. 55. For while he affirms this, he at the same time concedes what he had previously indicated somewhat obscurely, that those persons must confess a God who hold the opposite dogma, that out of nothing, something may proceed. What the learned author here writes as to the reasons by which Democritus was induced, rejecting qualities and forms, to adopt the atomic doctrine, ought if I am not much deceived, to be regarded as a not very probable conjecture. The excellent Doctor appears to assume, that it was atheism in Democritus that led him to avow the atomic doctrine, and that he chose this theory simply that he might so much the more successfully oppose the idea of a God. But who I ask will regard this as proved? If, as indeed I am not at all disposed to question, Democritus did deny the existence of a Deity, it will nevertheless always remain doubtful whether the philosophic scheme he followed led him to this denial, or whether his denial of God induced him to adopt that scheme. I do not touch on other matters lest I should seem too ready to censure.

quality, and consequently the whole an animal or god. Wherefore they took another more effectual course, to secure their atheism, and exclude all possibility of a corporeal God, by deriving the original of all things from atoms, devoid of all forms and qualities, and having nothing in them, but magnitude, figure, site and motion, as the first principles; it following unavoidably from thence, that life and understanding, as well as those other qualities, could be only accidental and secondary results from certain fortuitous concretions and contextures of atoms; so that the world could be made by no previous counsel or understanding, and therefore by no Deity.

XXVI. We have here represented three several forms of atheism, the Anaximandrian, the Democritical and the Stratonical. But there is yet another form of atheism, different from them all, to be taken notice of, which is such as supposes one kind of plastic and spermatic, methodical and artificial nature, but without any sense or conscious understanding, to preside over the whole world, and dispose and conserve all things, in that regular frame in which they are. Such a form of atheism as this is hinted to us in that doubtful passage of Seneca's;[6] "Sive animal est mundus," for so it ought be read, and not anima "sive corpus naturâ gubernante, ut arbores, et sata;" "whether the whole world be an animal, (*i. e.* endued with one sentient and rational life) or whether it be only a body governed by (a certain plastic and methodical, but senseless) nature, as trees, and other plants or vegetables." In which words are two several hypotheses of the mundane system, sceptically proposed by one who was a Corporealist, and took it for granted that all was body. First, that the whole world, though having nothing but body in it, yet was notwithstanding an animal, as our human bodies are, endued with one sentient or rational life and nature, one soul or mind, governing and ordering the whole. Which corporeal cosmo-zoism we do not reckon amongst the forms of

[6] Nat. Quæst. lib. 3. sec. 29. All that the learned author says in explanation of this passage of Seneca is ingenious. Still two things have occurred to me in reading the passage. I. It seems to be more suitable that the received reading should be retained, and not that the word *animal* should be thrust into the text instead of *anima* which all copies have. For all understand that the soul and the body are elegantly set in opposition to each other, which elegance is lost if *animal* and *corpus* be read. Nor in this way does the sentence lose any of the meaning which Cudworth considered as lying hid within it. The words have the same force whether *animal* or *anima* be read. No one who remembers that a thing is often denominated according to its nobler part, will wonder that *anima* should be used, or that the world should be said to be endued with rational life. II. Though any one should imagine the world to be like a plant or a tree, I do not on that account determine that he is forthwith to be classed among Atheists; for the two things, to account the world like a plant, and to avow the existence of a God, the producer and former of that plant, are not in opposition to each other. I do not mention these things to bring aid to those philosophers whom Seneca refers to, but to meet the fears of some who might conceive that by this observation they should be led to accuse innocent men.

atheism, but rather account it for a kind of spurious theism, or theism disguised in a paganic dress, and not without a complication of many false apprehensions, concerning the Deity in it. The second is, that the whole world is no animal, but, as it were, one huge plant or vegetable, a body endued with one plastic or spermatic nature, branching out the whole, orderly and methodically, but without any understanding or sense. And this must needs be accounted a form of atheism, because it does not derive the original of things in the universe from any clearly intellectual principle or conscious nature.

XXVII. Now this form of atheism, which supposes the whole world (there being nothing but one body in it) not to be an animal, but only a great plant or vegetable, having one spermatic form, or plastic nature, which without any conscious reason or understanding orders the whole, though it have some nearer correspondence with that hylozoic form of atheism before described, in that it does not suppose nature to be a mere fortuitous, but a kind of artificial thing; yet it differs from it in this, that the hylozoic supposing all matter, as such, to have life essentially belonging to it, must therefore needs attribute to every part of matter (or at least every particular totum, that is one by continuity) a distinct plastic life of its own, but acknowledge no one common life, as ruling over the whole corporeal universe; and consequently impute the original of all things (as hath been already observed) to a certain mixture of chance, and plastic or methodical nature, both together. Whereas the cosmo-plastic atheism quite excludes fortune or chance, subjecting all things to the regular and orderly fate of one plastic or plantal nature, ruling over the whole. Thus that philosopher before mentioned concludes, that whether the world were an animal (in the Stoical sense) or whether it were a mere plant or vegetable,[7] Ab initio ejus usque ad exitum, quicquid facere, quicquid pati debeat, inclusum est. Ut in semine, omnis futuri ratio hominis comprehensa est. Et legem barbæ et canorum nondum natus infans habet; totius enim corporis, et sequentis ætatis, in parvo occultoque lineamenta sunt. Sic origo mundi non magis solem et lunam, et vices siderum, et animalium ortus, quàm quibus mutarentur terranea, continuit. In his fuit inundatio, quæ non secus quàm hyems, quàm æstas, lege mundi venit. "Whatsoever, from the beginning to the end of it, it can either do or suffer, it was all at first included in the nature of the whole; as in the seed is contained the whole delineation of the future man, and the embryo or unborn infant hath already in it the law of a beard and grey hairs; the lineaments of the whole body, and of its following age, being there described as it were in a little and

[7] Nat. Quæst. lib. 3, c 29.

obscure compendium. In like manner, the original and first rudiments of the world contained in them not only the sun and moon, the courses of the stars, and the generation of animals, but also the vicissitudes of all terrestrial things; and every deluge or inundation of water comes to pass no less by the law of the world (its spermatic or plastic nature) than winter and summer doth."

XXVIII. We do not deny it to be possible, but that some in all ages might have entertained such an atheistical conceit as this, that the original of this whole mundane system was from one artificial, orderly and methodical, but senseless nature, lodged in the matter; but we cannot trace the footsteps of this doctrine any where so much as among the Stoics, to which sect Seneca, who speaks so waveringly and uncertainly in this point, (whether the world were an animal or a plant) belonged. And indeed divers learned men have suspected, that even the Zenonian and Heraclitic Deity itself was no other than such a plastic nature or spermatic principle in the universe, as in the seeds of vegetables and animals doth frame their respective bodies orderly and artificially. Nor can it be denied, but that there hath been just cause given for such a suspicion; forasmuch as the best of Stoics, sometimes confounding God with nature, seemed to make him nothing but an artificial fire, orderly and methodically proceeding to generation. And it was familiar with them, as Laërtius[8] tells us, to call God σπερματικὸν λόγον τοῦ κόσμου, "the spermatic reason, or form of the world." Nevertheless, because Zeno[9] and others of the chief Stoical doctors did also many

[8] Lib. 7. segm. 136. p. 450. The learned author is wrong in saying that some of the Stoics were of this opinion, but that Zeno the founder of the sect was not. When Diogenes had quoted this sentence he immediately added: Λέγει δὲ περὶ αὐτων Ζήνων τε ἐν τῷ περὶ τῦν ὕλου, "Zeno discusses these things in his book De Universo."

[9] Zeno thus defined nature Ἐστι δὲ φύσις ἕξις ἐξ αὐτῆς κινουμένη κατὰ σπερματικοὺς λόγους, ἀποτελοῦσά τε καὶ συνέχουσα τὰ ἐξ αὐτῆς ἐν ὡρισμένοις χρόνοις, καὶ τοιαῦτα δρῶσα, ἀφ' οἵων ἀπεκρίθη, "Nature is a habit deriving motion from itself, according to spermatic reasons; effecting and containing those things that proceed from her, at certain fixed times, and performing what she was ordained for." Diog. Laërt. lib. 7. segm. 148. p. 459. From this definition both in this passage and somewhat more clearly below in the dissertation on plastic nature, Sect. 6. Cudworth labours to make out that the Stoics believed that there were two principles concealed in the universe, from which all things were created and formed, the first a sort of rational mind or God, the second a certain plastic nature, obeying the laws of God, and forming all things which are formed, according to his will. But unless I am entirely mistaken, the learned Doctor gives more weight than was right to the opinion which he had adopted concerning plastic nature, and divides things which the Stoics considered as indissolubly united. For every one who is skilled in knowledge of this kind will know very well, that reason and plastic power were not regarded by them as two distinct things, but as powers and perfections of one and the same God, or of that nature which they thought to be extended throughout the universe. This indeed is plain from the very passage of Laërtius which I have but just now quoted, if it be rightly considered, nor is it at all in opposition to this opinion that they always call this producing thing, which excites all necessary motions in the universe, φύσις and *nature*, but not God. For although

times assert, that there was φύσις νοερὰ καὶ λογικὴ, "a rational and intellectual nature" (and therefore not a plastic principle only) in the matter of the universe; as likewise that the whole world was an animal, and not a mere plant: therefore we incline rather to excuse the generality of the first and most ancient Stoics from the imputation of atheism, and to account this form of atheism, which we now speak of, to be but a certain degeneracy from the right Heraclitic and Zenonian Cabala, which seemed to contain these two things in it; first, that there was an animalish, sentient and intellectual nature, or a conscious soul and mind, that presided over the whole world, though lodged immediately in the fiery matter of it: secondly, that this sentient and intellectual nature, or corporeal soul and mind of the universe, did contain also under it, or within it, as the inferior part of it, a certain plastic nature, or spermatic principle which was properly the fate of all things. For thus Heraclitus[10] defined Fate: Λόγον τὸν διὰ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ παντὸς διήκοντα, ἢ αἰθέριον σῶμα, σπέρμα τῆς τοῦ παντὸς γενέσεως, "A certain reason passing through the substance of the whole world, or an ethereal body, that was the seed of the generation of the universe." And Zeno's[1] first principle, as it is said to be an intel-

the word nature, among the Stoics especially, is a flexible and ambiguous word, still it appears that they designated by this name even God himself, whom they called by different names, sometimes Jove, sometimes fate, sometimes mind, sometimes nature; according to the testimony, among others, of Diogenes Laërtius, lib. 7. segm. 137. p. 451. Moreover of the proofs that the Stoics so used the word nature as to intend by it chiefly God, Justus Lipsius has lately exhibited many in his Physiologia Stoica lib. 1. Diss. 5. fol. 106. I will quote only one passage of Lactantius which very clearly sets the thing forth: "Stoici, naturam dividunt in duas partes: unam, quæ efficiat, alteram, quæ se ad faciendum tractabilem præstet. In illa prima esse vim faciendi, in hac materiam, nec alterum sine altero esse posse. Ita isti uno naturæ nomine res diversissimas comprehenderunt, Deum et mundum, artificem et opus, dicuntque, alterum sine altero nihil posse, tamquam natura sit Deus mundo permistus. Nam interdum sic confundunt, ut sit Deus ipsa mens mundi, et mundus corpus Dei," Divinar. Instit. lib. 7. cap. 3. p. 781. "The Stoics divide nature into two parts, one that which works, the other that which offers itself to be wrought upon. In the former is power of acting, in the latter is simply matter, nor is one of them able to do any thing without the other. Thus under this one name of nature, they comprehend two things very diverse: God and the world, the artificer and the work, and they say that one can do nothing without the other; as if nature were God mixed up with the world. For sometimes they so confound things that God becomes the very soul of the world, and the world the body of God." Instit. lib. 7. cap. 3. p. 781. There was no reason therefore, why the learned Doctor should suppose that what the Stoics call "natura," from which all motion proceeds, was a power separate from mind or God, or to use his own expression a plastic nature. I can easily enough bear to be censured in this place by those who think that the God of the Stoics was nature without intelligence and destitute of mind, for it is not easy for me to concede that this sentiment is proved. But I cannot bear that Cudworth should add to the God of the Stoics a certain producing or plastic energy, which obeyed the divine commands; a sentiment which certainly formed no part of the creed of Stoics.

[10] This definition of fate is supplied from Plutarch. de Placitis Philosophor. lib. 1. cap. 28. p. 885. tom. 2. opp.

[1] Vide Plutarch. de Placitis Philos. lib. 1. cap. 7. p. 881. Οἱ Στωϊκοὶ κοινότερον θεὸν ἀποφαίνονται πῦρ τεχνικὸν ὁδῷ βαδίζον ἐπὶ γενέσει κόσμου, ἐμπεριλη-

lectual nature, so it is also said to have contained in it *πάντας τοὺς σπερματικοὺς λόγους, καθ' οὓς ἕκαστα καθ' εἱμαρμένην γίγνεται*, "all the spermatic reasons and forms, by which every thing is done according to fate." However, though this seem to have been the genuine doctrine, both of Heraclitus and Zeno;[2] yet others of their followers afterwards divided these two things

φόρος πάντας τοὺς σπερματικοὺς λόγους, καθ' οὓς ἕκαστα κατ' εἱμαρμένην γίγνεται, "The Stoics commonly maintain that God is a kind of fiery agency methodically acting to the production of a world, containing within itself all those seminal forms according to which by fate every thing is produced." Stobæus has nearly the same thing Eclog. Physic. lib. I. cap. 3. p. 5. Οἱ Στωϊκοὶ νοερὸν Θεὸν ἀποφαίνονται πῦρ τεχνικὸν, &c. "The Stoics represent God as an intellectual, fiery agency."

[2] I do not in the least deny the close affinity between that system of philosophy which Heraclitus professed, and the system of the Stoics. Even Cicero is authority for this opinion, De Natura Deor. lib. 3. cap. 14. p. 3067. tom. 9. opp. "Omnia vestri solent ad igneam vim referre, Heraclitum, ut opinor, sequentes." "Your followers are wont as Heraclitus did, to refer all things to a fiery agency." But concerning this matter I do not know whether as to Heraclitus it be sufficiently ascertained and known, 1. whether he believed in the existence of a God or eternal mind, and, 2. whether he associated with this Deity plastic nature forming all bodies according to the will of God. That Cudworth assigned to Heraclitus both the notions here mentioned will be more evident when we come to the dissertation on plastic nature, sect. 6. where he does not at all hesitate to reckon Heraclitus among the supporters of this doctrine. I. Whether Heraclitus were an atheist or not has been disputed for the first time in our own age. Godof. Olearius ingeniously and with great learning and beauty maintained the cause of the philosopher, in his two dissertations, De Rerum Genesi ex Mente Heracliti. sec. 3. &c. and De Igne Rerum Omnium Principio ex Mente Heraclili. sec. 13. &c. which are extant in Stanley's History of Philosophy. He chiefly maintained that the *εἱμαρμένη* or fate of Heraclitus was no other than God; who he shows from many passages of ancient writers, was designated by this title both by Stoics and others. Still what the excellent author says does not satisfy every body. I mention only two, illustrious for both learning and talent: Pet. Bayle, who in the Continuat. Cogitat. de Cometis, tom. 2. p. 495. &c. labours to brand the system of Heraclitus with the basest imputations, and Joh. Franc. Buddeus, Thes. de Atheismo et Superstitione, cap. 1. p. 82. Indeed all things considered I am disposed to state the matter thus. I. If the doctrine of Heraclitus is to be gathered from his followers, the testimony to his religion and piety is unanimous; for from them it is plain, that he maintained that God is a very subtle fire, and what indeed necessarily followed, restrained in some way by fate. If moreover from his own writings we examine such of his opinions and doctrines as have come down to us, it will be impossible without injustice, to thrust him out from the number of those who professed their belief in a God of some sort, though very mutilated and having but little perfection. It seems clear indeed that he believed in the existence of a something distinct from these grosser bodies, which subsists by itself, which lives, which is intelligent, which cannot perish: to which also he refers our own souls. Some things on this matter occur below in the Dissertation on plastic nature, sect. 6. and Cudworth has added more in chap. 4. sect. 14. II. I think, however, that we must differently adjudge the question whether he asserted that nature was a plastic power. Indeed I do not see from what appears that he separated the production of things from God, and referred it to some other nature subject to God. On the contrary as the Stoics believed that the Deity whom they acknowledged, produced and created all things, so also Heraclitus thought that all things which are generated came forth from God. Indeed below at sec. 6. of the dissertation concerning plastic nature, Cudworth maintains that the *εἱμαρμένη* or fate of Heraclitus was that very thing, the idea of which he had formed in his own mind, his plastic nature. But it is clear from the definition of the fate of Heraclitus, which is found in Plutarch and Stobæus, lib. 1. cap. 1. p. 2. that this fate is no other than what Heraclitus calls λόγος or mind diffused through the whole universe; in one word his God; not nature producing according to the command of God. See the longer discussion of this subject in Olearius as above quoted p. 853. and 860. &c.

from one another, and taking only the latter of them, made the plastic or spermatic nature, devoid of all animality or conscious intellectuality, to be the highest principle in the universe. Thus Laertius tells us,[3] that Boethus, an eminent and famous Stoical doctor, did plainly deny the world to be an animal, that is, to have any sentient, conscious, or intellectual nature presiding over it; and consequently must needs make it to be but corpus naturâ gubernante, ut arbores, et sata, "a body governed by a plastic or vegetative nature, as trees, plants and herbs." And as it is possible, that other Stoics and Heraclitics might have done the like before Boethus, so it is very probable, that he had after him many followers; amongst which, as Plinius Secundus may be reckoned for one,[4] so Seneca himself was not without a doubtful tincture of this atheism, as hath been already showed. Wherefore this form of atheism, which supposes one plastic or spermatic nature, one plantal or vegetative life in the whole world, as the highest principle, may, for distinction sake, be called the Pseudo-Stoical, or Stoical atheism.

XXIX. Besides these philosophic Atheists, whose several forms we have now described, it cannot be doubted, but that there have been in all ages many other Atheists that have not at all philosophized, nor pretended to maintain any particular atheistic system or hypothesis, in a way of reason, but were only led by a certain dull and sottish, though confident disbelief of whatsoever they could not either see or feel: which kind of Atheists may therefore well be accounted enthusiastical or fanatical Atheists. Though it be true in the meantime, that even all manner of Atheists whatsoever, and those of them who most of all pretend to reason and philosophy, may, in some sense, be justly styled also both enthusiasts and fanatics. Forasmuch as they are not led or carried on into this way of atheizing, by any clear dictates of their reason or understanding, but only by an

[3] Vide Plutarch, lib. 7. segm. 143. p. 455. Βοηθὸς δέ φησιν οὐκ εἶναι ζῶον τὸν κόσμον. "Boethus denied that the world is an animal." Gilies Menage Comm. in Diog. Laertium. p. 316. has treated concerning Boethus. Whether Cudworth in this place rightly expounds the opinion of that eminent Stoic I scarcely know. Because Boethus denied that the world is an animal, he concludes that he entirely denied a God or an eternal nature partaking of a rational soul, and that to the world he left nothing but a life of that kind which is seen in plants and trees. But that Boethus was not of this opinion appears from what Laertius says, segm. 148. p. 459. Βοηθὸς δέ ἐν τῷ περὶ φύσεως οὐσίαν θεοῦ τὴν τῶν ἀπλανῶν σφαῖραν. "Boethus has said in his book on nature, that the substance of God is the globe of fixed stars." Therefore he did not entirely deny that there is a Deity, although he said that his power resides, not as other Stoics had it, diffused through all nature, but in the region of the stars. From whence also is to be understood here, how that dogma of his may be taken, in which he denies that the world is an animal. By this he meant not that God is extended through the whole universe, but that from the stars is sent forth a plastic energy over the other parts of the universe.

[4] There are many learned men who do not hesitate to reckon Pliny among Atheists; among whom are Joh. Franc. Buddeus, Thes. de Atheism. and Superstit. cap. 1. p. 102. and Jac. Fred. Reimman Hist. Atheism. lib. 1. cap. 39. sect. 2. p. 283.

ὁρμὴ ἄλογος, "a certain blind and irrational impetus;" they being, as it were, inspired to it by that lower earthly life and nature,[5] which is called in the Scripture oracles, τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ κόσμου, "the spirit of the world, or a mundane spirit," and is opposed to the τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ, "the Spirit that is of God." For when the apostle speaks after this manner, "We have not received the spirit of the world, but the Spirit that is of God," he seems to intimate thus much to us, that as some men were led and inspired by a divine Spirit, so others again are inspired by a mundane spirit, by which is meant the earthly life. Now the former of these two are not to be accounted enthusiasts, as the word is now commonly taken in a bad sense; because the Spirit of God is no irrational thing, but either the very self-same thing with reason, or else such a thing as Aristotle (as it were vaticinating concerning it) somewhere calls λόγου τι κρεῖττον, "a certain better and diviner thing than reason," and Plotinus ῥίζαν λόγου, "the root of reason." But on the contrary, the mundane spirit, or earthly life, is irrational sottishness; and they who are atheistically inspired by it (how abhorrent soever they may otherwise seem to be from enthusiasm and revelations) are notwithstanding really no better than a kind of bewitched enthusiasts and blind spiritati, that are wholly ridden and acted by a dark, narrow, and captivated principle of life, and, to use their own language, in-blown by it, and by it bereft, even in speculative things, of all free reason and understanding. Nay, they are fanatics too, however that word seems to have a more peculiar respect to something of a Deity; all Atheists being that blind goddess Nature's fanatics.

XXX. We have described four several forms of atheism; first, the Hylopathian or Anaximandrian, that derives all things from dead and stupid matter, in the way of qualities and forms,

[5] This lower and earthly life, with which the learned Doctor supposes Atheists to be inspired, is doubtless the lower faculty of our mind. He seems to be of the same way of thinking as the Platonics, who appear to have considerably separated the animal spirit from the rational. Others will judge of this opinion. To me it will be enough to have intimated that the words of Paul, 1 Cor. ii. 12. "Now we have received not the spirit of the world, but the Spirit which is of God," are brought forward in support of this view with but little propriety. The spirit of the world, which is here opposed to the Spirit which is of God, least of all denotes any faculty of the mind, or lower earthly life and nature. For the apostle affirms that he had not *received* this spirit, from which it is evident that he speaks not of some implanted power of the understanding, but concerning some life altogether different in its origin. Cudworth's lower earthly life and nature is some implanted faculty of the mind. In my judgment, "the spirit of the world" is that power of discussing, of speaking, of reasoning, which the world supplies; in a word, it is the man's wisdom—the wisdom of this world, which the apostle repeatedly mentions in this epistle, and by which he declares the ministers of Christ are not actuated. Vide ver. 4, 5, 6, 13, &c. This wisdom of the world is, as it were, a spirit which rendered the philosophers, and wise men of that age, apt and skilful in disputing and discussing more correctly and more subtlely than other persons. The apostle denies that he and his associates were governed by this spirit; a far more divine Spirit actuated them, as their writings abundantly show.

generable and corruptible: secondly, the atomical or Democritical, which doth the same thing in the way of atoms and figures: thirdly, the cosmoplastic or Stoical atheism, which supposes one plastic and methodical but senseless nature, to preside over the whole corporeal universe: and lastly, the hylozoic or Stratonical, that attributes to all matter, as such, a certain living and energetic nature, but devoid of all animality, sense and consciousness. And as we do not meet with any other forms or schemes of atheism besides these four, so we conceive, that there cannot easily be any other excogitated or devised; and that upon these two following considerations. First, because all Atheists are mere corporealists, that is, acknowledge no other substance besides body or matter. For as there was never any yet known, who asserting incorporeal substance, did deny a Deity, so neither can there be any reason, why he that admits the former should exclude the latter. Again, the same dull and earthly disbelief or confounded sottishness of mind, which makes men deny a God, must needs incline them to deny all incorporeal substance also. Wherefore, as the physicians speak of a certain disease or madness, called hydrophobia, the symptom of those that have been bitten by a mad dog, which makes them have a monstrous antipathy to water; so all Atheists are possessed with a certain kind of madness, that may be called pneumatophobia, that makes them have an irrational but desperate abhorrence from spirits or incorporeal substances, they being acted also, at the same time, with an hylomania, whereby they madly dote upon matter, and devoutly worship it as the only Numen.

The second consideration is this, because as there are no Atheists but such as are mere corporealists, so all corporealists are not to be accounted Atheists neither: those of them, who notwithstanding they make all things to be matter, yet suppose an intellectual nature in that matter to preside over the corporeal universe, being in reason and charity to be exempted out of that number. And there have been always some, who, though so strongly captivated under the power of gross imagination, as that an incorporeal God seemed to them to be nothing but a god of words,[6] (as some of them call it) a mere empty sound or contradictious expression, something and nothing put together; yet notwithstanding, they have been possessed with a firm belief and persuasion of a Deity, or that the system of the universe depends

[6] So at that time Hobbes was maintaining, who affirmed, that he could not understand what an incorporeal God could be. See the Appendix to his Leviathan, chap. 1. p. 346. and chap 3. p. 361. where, among other things, he says, "Those indeed who attribute purity to God are right, for that is honourable; but to attribute to him immateriality, which is one step towards nothingness, is dangerous." Reference may here be made to what we have written, chap. 2. sect. 1. See also what Tobias Pfannerus has collected from those who maintained that Deity among Christians is corporeal. System. Theol. Gentilis. cap. 2. sect. 19. p. 77.

upon one perfect understanding being as the head of it; and thereupon have concluded that ὕλη πῶς ἔχουσα, a certain "kind of body or matter is God." The grossest and most sottish of all which corporeal Theists seem to be those who contend, that God is only one particular piece of organized matter, of human form and bigness, which endued with perfect reason and understanding exerciseth an universal dominion over all the rest. Which hypothesis, however it hath been entertained by some of the Christian profession, both in former and later times, yet it hath seemed very ridiculous, even to many of those heathen philosophers themselves, who were mere corporealists, such as the Stoics, who exploded it with a kind of indignation, contending earnestly μὴ εἶναι θεὸν ἀνθρωπόμορφον,[7] that God (though corporeal) yet must not be conceived to be of any human shape. And Xenophanes,[8] an ancient philosophic poet, expresseth the childishness of this conceit after this manner:

Ἀλλ' εἴτοι χεῖράς γ' εἶχον βόες ἠὲ λέοντες,
Ἦ γράψαι χείρεσσι, καὶ ἔργα τελεῖν, ἅπερ ἄνδρες,
Καί κε θεῶν ἰδίας ἔγραφον, καὶ σώματ' ἐποίουν
Τοιαῦθ', οἷόν περ καὶ αὐτοὶ δέμας εἶχον ὁμοῖον.

"If oxen, lions, asses, and horses had all of them a sense of a Deity, and were able to limn and paint, there is no question to

[7] These are the words of Clemens Alexandrinus concerning Xenophanes, Stromat. lib. 5. p. 715.

[8] Clemens Alexandrinus has preserved these verses in his Stromat. lib. 5. p. 714. Cudworth, however, does not quote them in their most correct form, nor even entire. He omits the third verse.

Ἵπποι μὲν δὲ' ἵπποισι, βόες δέ τε βουσὶν ὅμοιοι,

"Horses like horses, and oxen like oxen."

In the fourth verse also, ἰδέας should be read instead of ἰδίας. I omit other matters. Cotta, in Cicero De Natura Deorum, lib. 1. cap. 27. p. 2919. t. 9. opp. utters sentiments very similar to this of Xenophanes, in opposition to the Epicureans, who contended that Deity was of human form and shape: "Accessit ista opinio fortasse, quod homini homine nil pulchrius videatur. Sed tu hoc, physice, non vides, quam blanda concilintrix et quasi sui sit lenis natura? An putas, ullam esse terra marique belluam, quæ non sui generis bellua maxime delectetur? —— An tu aquilam, aut leonem, aut delphinum ullam anteferre censes figuram suæ? Quid igitur mirum, si hoc eodem modo homini natura præscripsit, ut nihil pulchrius putaret, quam hominem, eam esse caussam, cur Deos hominum similes putaremus? Quid censes, si ratio esset in belluis? non suo quasque generi plurimum tributuras fuisse?" "You advance, forsooth, the argument, that to man nothing seems more beautiful than man. But do you not see, Doctor, how bland a flatterer, and how kind nature is, as it were, to herself? Do you imagine that there is any beast of earth or sea that is not supremely enamoured of creatures of its own kind? Do you suppose that an eagle, or a lion, or a dolphin prefers any shape and form to its own? What wonder is it then, inasmuch as nature has in like manner taught man to imagine nothing more beautiful than man, that this should be made by us a reason for thinking the gods like ourselves? What think you, if there were reason in beasts, would not each claim the highest honour for its own shape?"

be made, but that each of these several animals would paint God according to their respective form and likeness, and contend that he was of that shape and no other." But that other corporeal Theism seems to be of the two rather more generous and genteel, which supposes the whole world to be one animal, and God to be a certain subtle and ethereal, but intellectual matter, pervading it as a soul: which was the doctrine of others before the Stoics: Τὸ πῦρ θεὸν ὑπειλήφασιν Ἵππασός τε ὁ Μεταποντῖνος καὶ ὁ Ἐφέσιος Ἡράκλειτος,[9] "Hippasus of Metopontus and Heraclitus the Ephesian supposed the fiery and etherial matter of the world to be God." However, neither these Heraclitics and Stoics, nor yet the other anthropomorphites, are by us condemned for downright Atheists, but rather looked upon as a sort of ignorant, childish, and unskilful Theists.[10]

Wherefore we see, that Atheists are now reduced into a narrow compass, since none are concluded to be Atheists, but such as are mere corporealists; and all corporealists must not be condemned for Atheists neither, but only those of them who assert, that there is no conscious intellectual nature, presiding over the whole universe. For this is that which the adepti in atheism, of what form soever, all agree in, that the first principle of the universe is no animalish, sentient, and conscious nature, but that all animality, sense and consciousness, is a secondary,

[9] Idem in Protreptico, cap. 5. p. 55. Many of the ancients have handed down the tradition that both these philosophers regarded fire as the principle of the universe. But I remember none except Clemens and Stobæus Eclog. Phys. lib. 1. cap. 1. p. 2. who distinctly report that the ancients regarded fire as God. Nevertheless, not these philosophers only, but almost all ancient philosophers who avowed their belief that there is a God, Pythagoras, Plato, Hippocrates, were of opinion that Deity is a very pure fire, or something fiery, although they said he was incorporeal. It would be easy to evince this by many testimonies. But, not to multiply words, I will intimate in this place that souls were thought to be something fiery by almost all who assigned immortality to them, and at the same time they considered them to be derived from a celestial ethereal fire, or God, to which, when the body was dissolved, they would again return. Cicero attributes this sentiment to Aristotle, De Natur. Deor. lib. 1. cap. 13. p. 2899. "Cœli ardorem Deum dicit esse, non intelligens, cœlum mundi esse partem," "He speaks of the fire of heaven as God, not understanding that heaven is part of this world."

[10] I shall not object, if any one desire to entertain a kindlier sentiment respecting those philosophers who imagine God to be nature endued with understanding, and extended through the universe, although consequences follow from this doctrine such as entirely set aside a divinity. Nevertheless, I think we ought to observe with special care, when we are examining these matters, whether freedom of action is attributed to the Deity they imagine, or whether he is bound by the laws of fate and necessity. If this be done, and it be determined that God acts necessarily, whatever may be said concerning the wisdom and power of God, I judge that such philosophers must nevertheless be ranked among Atheists; for if liberty of action be denied to God, we must, truly and properly speaking, deny all piety and religion, all difference between justice and injustice, nay, even Deity itself. Before, therefore, any judgment be pronounced concerning Heraclitus and the Stoics, I conceive it to be especially important to inquire whether these philosophers gave fate a power over Deity, or whether they attribute to God liberty of action.

derivative and accidental thing, generable and corruptible, arising out of particular concretions of matter organized and dissolved together with them.

XXXI. Now if the first principle and original of all things in the universe be thus supposed to be body or matter, devoid of all animality, sense, and consciousness, then it must of necessity be either perfectly dead and stupid, and without all manner of life; or else endued with such a kind of life only, as is by some called plastic, spermatical and vegetative, by others the life of nature, or natural perception. And those Atheists, who derive all things from dead and stupid matter, must also needs do this, either in the way of qualities and forms, and these are the Anaximandrian Atheists; or else in the way of atoms and figures, which are the Democritical. But those who make matter endued with a plastic life to be the first original of all things, must needs suppose either one such plastic and spermatic life only in the whole mass of matter or corporeal universe, which are the Stoical Atheists; or else all matter as such to have life and an energetic nature belonging to it (though without any animal sense or self-perception), and consequently all the particular parts of matter, and every totum by continuity, to have a distinct plastic life of its own, which are the Stratonic Atheists. Wherefore there does not seem to be any room now left for any other form of atheism, besides these four, to thrust in.

And we think fit here again to inculcate what hath been already intimated, that one grand difference amongst these several forms of atheism is this, that some of them attributing no life at all to matter, as such, nor indeed acknowledging any plastic life of nature, distinct from the animal, and supposing every thing whatsoever is in the world, besides ὕλη ἄποιος, the bare substance of matter considered as devoid of all qualities, (that is, mere extended bulk,) to be generated and corrupted; consequently resolve, that all manner of life whatsoever is generable and corruptible, or educible out of nothing, and reducible to nothing again; and these are the Anaximandrian and Democritic atheisms. But the other, which are the Stoical and Stratonical, do on the contrary suppose some life to be fundamental and original, essential and substantial, ingenerable and incorruptible, as being a first principle of things; nevertheless, this not to be any animal, conscious and self-perceptive life, but a plastic life of nature only; all Atheists still agreeing in those two forementioned things; first, that there is no other substance in the world besides body; secondly, that all animal life, sense, and self-perception, conscious understanding and personality, are generated and corrupted, successively educed out of nothing and reduced into nothing again.

XXXII. Indeed, we are not ignorant that some, who seem

to be well wishers to Atheism, have talked sometimes of sensitive and rational matter,[1] as having a mind to suppose three several sorts of matter in the universe, specifically different from one another, that were originally such, and self-existent from eternity; namely, senseless, sensitive and rational: as if the mundane system might be conceived to arise from a certain jumble of these several sorts of matter, as it were scuffling together in the dark, without a God, and so producing brute animals and men. But as this is a mere precarious hypothesis, there being no imaginable account to be given how there should come to be such an essential difference betwixt matters, or why this piece of matter should be sensitive, and that rational, when another is altogether senseless; so the suggestors of it are but mere novices in Atheism, and a kind of bungling well-wishers to it. First, because, according to this hypothesis, no life would be produced or destroyed in the successive generations and corruptions of animals, but only concreted and secreted in them; and consequently, all human personalities must be eternal and incorruptible: which is all one as to assert the pre and post-existence of all souls from eternity to eternity, a thing that all genuine and thorough-paced Atheists are in a manner as abhorrent from, as they are from the Deity itself. And, secondly, because there can be no imaginable reason given by them why there might not be as well, a certain divine matter perfectly intellectual and self-existent from eternity, as a sensitive and rational matter. And therefore, such an hypothesis as this can never serve the turn of Atheists. But all those that are masters of the craft of Atheism, and thoroughly catechized or initiated in the dark mysteries thereof, (as hath been already incul-

[1] This, if I am not deceived, is said by Robert Fludd, a physician and chemist, and by the brethren of the Rosicrucian order, whose philosophy was much talked of for a time, and commended itself, not as at present to but few, as the only divine philosophy. Any one who has read Peter Gassendi's examination of Fludd's philosophy, tom. 3. opp. will easily feel how great was the ignorance of this race of philosophers in explaining the principles of the universe; nor can he fail to know how correctly Cudworth writes that they imagined in their dreams that matter was endued with intelligence and feeling. Is it possible more correctly to speak of any one who is known to have taught that light and darkness are the two principles of the universe, the former of animate nature, the latter of inanimate, and to have declared in so many words that soul and life are every day shed from the sun upon all lower objects? The reason why Cudworth did not mention the name of such a man and of his companions doubtless was, because there were then living at Cambridge university those who were well affected towards Fludd, and especially, he had no wish to offend Henry More, with whom he enjoyed acquaintance and intimate friendship. Still, I must add, 1. That some things are attributed by Cudworth to this class of philosophers, which appear to be no more than consequences from their dogmas. 2. That it does not seem at all likely, as the learned Doctor intimates in passing, that Fludd and his associates were desirous of rendering aid to the cause of atheism. Nevertheless, not Cudworth only but other philosophers also, of greatest repute, Gassendi, Marin, Mersenne, Franc. Lanovius, have left it on record that the opinions of Fludd directly tended to confirm the worst forms of Atheism.

cated) do perfectly agree in this, that all animal, sentient, and conscious life, all souls and minds, and consequently, all human personalities, are generated out of matter, and corrupted again into it, or rather educed out of nothing and reduced into nothing again.

We understand also, that there are certain canting astrological Atheists,[2] who would deduce all things from the occult qualities and influences of the stars, according to their different conjunction, oppositions and aspects, in a certain blind and unaccountable manner. But these being persons devoid of all manner of sense, who neither so much as pretend to give an account of these stars, whether they be animals or not, as also whence they derive their original, (which, if they did undertake to do atheistically, they must needs resolve themselves at length into one or other of those hypotheses already proposed) therefore, as we conceive, they deserve not the least consideration. But we think fit here to observe, that such devotees to the heavenly bodies as look upon all the other stars as petty deities, but the sun as the supreme deity and monarch of the universe, in the meantime conceiving it also to be perfectly intellectual, (which is in a manner, the same with the Cleanthean hypothesis) are not so much to be accounted Atheists, as spurious, paganical and idolatrous Theists. And upon all these considerations we conclude again, that there is no other philosophic form of Atheism that can easily be devised, besides these four mentioned, the Anaximandrian, the Democritical, the Stoical and the Stratonical.

XXXIII. Amongst which forms of Atheism there is yet

[2] That among philosophers now regarded as the more ancient there were men of the same kind who, though they denied the existence of God, nevertheless attributed to the stars a wonderful power over men and over the whole universe, a remarkable example is shown in the case of that old man whom the ancient writer of the Recognit. Clementis, lib. 8. cap. 2. p. 566. tom. 1. Patr. Apostol. brings forward. He thus addresses Peter. "Neque Deus est, neque cultus hic aliquis est, neque providentia in mundo; sed fortuitus casus et Genesis agunt omnia: sicut ego ex me ipso manifestissime comperi, in disciplina Matheseos præ ceteris eruditus." "Neither is there any God, nor is this any kind of worship, nor is there any providence over the world, but accident and GENESIS direct all things; as I have most clearly ascertained, being instructed beyond others in the mathematics." Not incredible, therefore, should be the example of Cosmus Reggerius, a most desperate man, who chiefly devoted himself to predictions and astrology, and who in so many words denied the existence both of God and of devils. See Bayle's Dict. tom. 3. p. 2499. note D. This sentiment does not seem very different from that of those who ascribed the rise and fall of religions to the stars alone. In the fifteenth century there was a certain Didaco Gornez in Spain, who rejecting all religion, decreed with equal impiety and folly that Jesus Christ had the spirit of Mercury, Mahomet the spirit of Mars, and Abraham the spirit of Saturn. See Alph. de Spina Fortalitium Fidei, lib. 2. Consid. 6. fol. 30. Concerning Cardan, Vanin, and others, who more recently have contaminated themselves with follies and crimes of the same kind, I say nothing. Rightly does Cudworth conclude that this whole tribe, since they do not know even what are their own opinions, are unworthy that a wise man should seriously dispute with them.

another difference to be observed, and accordingly, another distribution to be made of them. It being first premised that all these fore-mentioned sorts of Atheists (if they will speak consistently and agreeably to their own principles) must needs suppose all things to be one way or other necessary. For though Epicurus introduced contingent liberty, yet it is well known, that he therein plainly contradicted his own principles. And this indeed was the first and principal thing intended by us in this whole undertaking, to confute that false hypothesis of the mundane system, which makes all actions and events necessary upon atheistic grounds, but especially in the mechanic way. Wherefore, in the next place we must observe, that though the principles of all Atheists introduce necessity, yet the necessity of these Atheists is not one and the same, but of two different kinds; some of them supposing a necessity of dead and stupid matter, which is that which is commonly meant by ὑλικὴ ἀνάγκη, or material necessity, and is also called by Aristotle, an absolute necessity of things:[3] others, the necessity of a plastic life, which the same Aristotle calls an hypothetical necessity. For the Anaximandrian and Democritic Atheists do both of them assert a material and absolute necessity of all things; one in the way of qualities, and the other of motion and mechanism; but the Stoical and Stratonical Atheists assert a plastical and hypothetical necessity of things only.

Now, one grand difference betwixt these two sorts of Atheisms and their necessities lies in this, that the former, though they make all things necessary, yet they suppose them also to be fortuitous; there being no inconsistency between these two. And the sense of both the Anaximandrian and Democritic Atheisms seems to be thus described by Plato:[4] Πάντα κατὰ τύχην ἐξ ἀνάγκης συνεκεράσθη, "All things were mingled together by necessity according to fortune." For that nature, from whence these Atheists derived all things, is at once both necessary and fortuitous. But the plastic Atheisms suppose such a necessary nature for the first principle of things, as is not merely fortuitous but regular, orderly and methodical; the

[3] It is scarcely needful for me to deny that Aristotle ever hinted at the distinction of necessity into absolute and hypothetical, so as to designate under this one word material necessity and the necessity of plastic life. In those passages where he designedly discusses the doctrine of necessity, no trace of this kind of thing occurs. Vid. Analytic. Posterior. lib. 2. p. 243. tom. 1. opp. et Metaph. lib. 5. cap. 5. p. 324. tom. 4.

[4] Read the tenth book, De Leg. p. 666. where among other things, Plato says that this was the opinion of the Atheists of his time: Πάντα ὁπόσα τῇ τῶν ἐναντίων κράσει κατὰ τύχην ἐξ ἀνάγκης συνεκεράσθη, "That contrary things met their contraries by chance, and that they were mingled together by necessity." So also Laërtius states the opinion of Democritus, lib. 9. segm. 44, 45. p. 573. Compare, moreover, the notes on sect. 13. supra. where the learned Doctor seems to deny what here he concedes.

Stoical excluding all chance and fortune universally, because they subject all things to one plastic nature ruling over the whole universe; but the Stratonical doing it in part only; because they derive things from a mixture of chance and plastic nature both together.

And thus we see that there is a double notion of nature amongst Atheists, as well as Theists; which we cannot better express than in the words of Balbus, the Stoic, personated by Cicero:[5] Alii naturam censent esse vim quandam sine ratione, cientem motus in corporibus necessarios; alii autem vim participem ordinis, tanquam viâ progredientem. Cujus solertiam, nulla ars, nulla manus, nemo opifex, consequi potest imitando; seminis enim vim esse tantam, ut id quanquam perexiguum, nactumque sit materiam, quâ ali augerique possit, ita fingat et efficiat, in suo quidque genere, partim ut per stirpes alantur suas, partim ut movere etiam possint, et ex se similia sui generare: "Some by nature mean a certain force without reason and order, exciting necessary motions in bodies; but others understand by it such a force, as participating of order proceeds as it were methodically. Whose exquisiteness no art, no hand, no opificer can reach to by imitation. For the force of seed is such, that though the bulk of it be very small, yet if it get convenient matter for its nourishment and increase, it so forms and frames things in their several kinds, as that they can partly through their stocks and trunks be nourished, and partly move themselves also, and generate their like." And again; Sunt qui omnia naturæ nomine appellent, ut Epicurus; sed nos, cum dicimus naturâ constare administrarique mundum, non ita dicimus, ut glebam, aut fragmentum lapidis, aut aliquid ejusmodi, nulla cohærendi natura; sed ut arborem, ut animalia, in quibus nulla temeritas, sed ordo apparet et artis quædam similitudo. "There are some who call all things by the name of nature, as Epicurus; but we, when we say that the world is administered by Nature, do not mean such a nature as is in clods of earth and pieces of stone, but such as is in a tree or animal, in whose constitution there is no temerity, but order and similitude of art." Now, according to these two different notions of nature, the four forementioned forms of Atheism may be again dichotomized after this manner; into such as derive all things from a mere fortuitous and temerarious nature, devoid of all order and methodicalness; and such as deduce the original of things from a certain orderly, regular and artificial, though senseless nature in matter. The former of which are the Anaximandrian and Democritic Atheisms; the latter, the Stoical and Stratonical.

[5] De Nat. Deor. lib. 2. cap. 32. p. 3001. tom. 9. opp. The words of Cicero are not quoted here entire, but some are omitted here and there for brevity's sake.

It hath been already observed, that those Atheisms that derive all things from a mere fortuitous principle, as also suppose every thing, besides ὕλη ἄποιος, "the bare substance of matter" or extended bulk, to be generated and corrupted; though they asserted the eternity of matter, yet they could not, agreeably to their own hypothesis, maintain the eternity and incorruptibility of the world. And accordingly hereunto, both the Anaximandrian[6] and Democritic[7] Atheists did conclude the world to be γενόμενον καὶ φθαρτὸν, "such as was at first made, and should be again corrupted." And upon this account, Lucretius concerns himself highly herein, to prove both the novity of the world, and also its future dissolution and extinction, that

Totum nativum mortali corpore constat.[8]

But instead of the world's eternity, these two sorts of Atheists introduced another paradox, namely an ἀπειρία κόσμων, "an infinity of worlds;" and that not only successive, in that space which this world of ours is conceived now to occupy, in respect of the infinity of past and future time, but also a contemporary infinity of co-existent worlds, at all times, throughout endless and unbounded space.

However, it is certain that some persons atheistically inclined[9] have been always apt to run another way, and to suppose that the frame of things and system of the world ever was from eternity, and ever will be to eternity, such as now it is, dispensed by a certain orderly and regular, but yet senseless and unknowing nature. And it is prophesied in scripture that such Atheists as these should especially abound in these latter days of ours: "There shall come in the last days (ἐμπαῖκται) atheistical scoffers, walking after their own lusts, and saying, Where is the promise of his coming? For since the fathers fell asleep, all things continue as they were from the beginning of the creation,"

[6] Vide Diog. Laërt. lib. 9. segm. 44. p. 573.
[7] Vide Eundem lib. 2. segm. 1. 2. p. 78. 79.
[8] Lucretius, lib. 5. v. 322. p. 268.
[9] And what learned man, I ask, could be ignorant of this? For it was notorious that Aristotle, and very many of the Peripatetics, were of opinion that the world had never been created and would never be destroyed, Vid. Pet. Gassend. Phys. sect. 1. lib. 1. cap. 6. p. 162. Jac. Thomasius de Stoica Mundi Exustione, Diss. 4. p. 58. and others. More of the ancient philosophers doubtless were of this opinion. Hence I perceive that Manilius in Astron. lib. 1. v. 86. p. m. 5. among the opinions of philosophers concerning the world, mentions this, and in the very first place, as if it were a principal sentiment:

Quem sive ex nullis repetentem semina rebus,
Natali quoque egere placet, semperque fuisse,
Et fore, principio pariter fatoque carentem.

"Who, tracing in the universe no seminal principles, believed it fatherless and eternal, destitute of origin, and beyond the influence of fate."

2 Peter, iii. Which latter words are spoken only according to the received hypothesis of the Jews, the meaning of these Atheists being quite otherwise, that there was neither creation nor beginning of the world; but that things had continued such as now they are, from eternity. As appears also from what the Apostle there adds by way of confutation: "That they were willingly ignorant of this, that by the word of God the heavens were of old, and the earth standing out of the water and in the water; and that as the world that then was, overflowing with water, perished, so the heavens and earth, which now are, by the same word are kept in store, and reserved unto fire against the day of judgment and perdition of ungodly men." And it is evident that some of these Atheists at this very day march in the garb of enthusiastical religionists, acknowledging no more a God than a Christ without them, and allegorizing the day of judgment and future conflagration into a kind of seemingly mystical, but really atheistical nonsense.[10] These, if they did philosophize, would resolve themselves into one or other of those two hypotheses before mentioned; either that of one plastic, orderly, and methodical, but senseless nature, ruling over the whole universe; or else that of the life of matter, making one or other of these two natures to be their only God or Numen; it being sufficiently agreeable to the principles of both these atheistic hypotheses (and no others) to maintain the world's both ante and post-eternity; yet so as that the latter of them, namely, the Hylozoists, admitting a certain mixture of chance together with the life of matter, would suppose, that though the main strokes of things might be preserved the same, and some kind of constant regularity always kept up in the world, yet that the whole mundane system did not in all respects continue the same, from eternity to eternity, without any variation. But as Strabo tells us,[1] that Strato Physicus maintained, "the Euxine

[10] Who they are whom the learned doctor here censures I cannot ascertain; but among the fanatics with whom England then abounded, it is certain that there were those who altogether obscured the sacred writings, and turned them from their proper sense by allegories. Nor is it unknown that, in every age, philosophers have existed, who, lest the sacred writings should seem too unlike their comments, contend that the literal sense, their bark as it were, is to be abandoned, and their pith or spiritual meaning must be got at. Bened. de Spinoza, under this designation chastised Maimonides, because he did not hesitate thus violently to torture the sacred writings, so as to make them teach what he himself taught, Vid. Tractat. Theol. Politicus, cap. 7. p. 99, 100. Nevertheless, that impious writer himself afterwards fell into the same vice, most foolishly affirming that what the sacred writers say concerning the resurrection of our Saviour, and some other matters, must not be taken literally. Vide his Opera Posthuma, Ep. 24. p. 456. We have brought forward this very example of Spinoza, in order that it may appear that Cudworth was guilty of no rashness when he wrote that men who have renounced God and all religion, conceal their crimes under the garb of enthusiastic religionists.

[1] Geograph lib. i. p. m. 46. 47. Very properly is it observed in the text that they who regard the world as eternal, nevertheless, do not on that account take away all the changes and variations of the mundane system, or settle it that the form of the

sea at first to have had no outlet by Byzantium into the Mediterranean, but that by the continual running in of rivers into it, causing it to overflow, there was in length of time a passage opened by the Propontis and Hellespont; as also that the Mediterranean sea forced open that passage of the Herculean straits, being a continual isthmus or neck of land before; that many parts of the present continent were heretofore sea, as also much of the present ocean habitable land:" so it cannot be doubted but that the same Strato did likewise suppose such kind of alternations and vicissitudes as these, in all the greater parts of the mundane system.

But the Stoical Atheists, who made the whole world to be dispensed by one orderly and plastic nature, might very well, and agreeably to their own hypothesis, maintain, besides the world's eternity, one constant and invariable course or tenor of things in it, as Plinius Secundus[2] doth, who, if he were any thing, seems to be one of these Atheists: Mundum et hoc quod nomine alio cœlum appellare libuit, (cujus circumflexu reguntur cuncta) Numen esse, credi par est, æternum, immensum, neque genitum, neque interiturum————Idem rerum naturæ opus, et rerum ipsa natura, "The world, and that which by another name is called the heavens, by whose circumgyration all things are governed, ought to be believed to be a Numen, eternal, immense, such as was never made, and shall never be destroyed." Where, by the way, it may be again observed, that those Atheists who denied a God, according to the true notion of him, as a conscious, understanding Being, presiding over the whole world, did notwithstanding look upon either the world itself, or else a mere senseless plastic nature in it, as a kind of Numen or Deity, they supposing it to be ingenerable and incorruptible. Which same Pliny, as upon the grounds of the Stoical Atheism he maintained against the Anaximandrians and Democritics the world's eternity and incorruptibility, so did he likewise in way

world is at no time changed. Cudworth might have confirmed this statement by the example of Aristotle himself, who, though he contended that, generally, the world would never be dissolved and destroyed, nevertheless, did not deny that destruction threatened various parts of the world. Let especially his Meteorologic. lib. 1. cap. 14. p. 770. tom. 1. opp. be referred to, where he forcibly maintains that the same regions of earth are not always full of water or not always dry, but that where the sea now is, there land may be, and that where the land now is, there the sea may spread itself; that rivers also change their places, and other things of the same kind. Still, all these things are not inconsistent with his general opinion that the world will never be destroyed; but that while various parts are changed, the whole will remain perfect and immutable. Ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀνάγκη τοῦ ὅλου γίγνεσθαι μέν τινα μεταβολήν, μὴ μέντοι γένεσιν καὶ φθορὰν, εἴπερ μένοι τὸ πᾶν, l. c. p. 773. "It is necessary that the world undergo some change, but not generation or corruption, since, as a whole, it remains entire." Certainly, all must be of this opinion, however pertinaciously they contend for the eternity of the world, unless they wish to be regarded as destitute equally of understanding and of perception.

[2] Nat. Hist. lib. 2. cap. 1.

of opposition to that *ἀπειρία κόσμων*, that "infinity of worlds," of theirs, assert, that there was but one world, and that finite. In like manner we read concerning that famous Stoic Boëthus,[3] whom Laërtius affirms to have denied the world to be an animal, (which, according to the language and sense of those times, was all one as to deny a God) that he also maintained, contrary to the received doctrine of the Stoics, the world's ante-eternity and incorruptibility; Philo in his treatise *περὶ ἀφθαρσίας κόσμου*, or "the incorruptibility of the world," testifying the same of him.

Nevertheless, it seems that some of these Stoical Atheists did also agree with the generality of the other Stoical Theists, in supposing a successive infinity of worlds generated and corrupted, by reason of intervening periodical conflagrations; though all dispensed by such a stupid and senseless nature, as governs plants and trees. For thus much we gather from those words of Seneca before cited,[4] where describing this atheistical hypothesis, he tells us, that though the world were a plant, that is, governed by a vegetative or plastic nature, without any animality, yet

[3] See what has been said as to the opinions of this philosopher, sect. 29. From which it will be evident that he ought not, on any account, to be looked upon as worse than other Stoics, or classed among Atheists. But that this Stoic contended for the eternity of the world, as well as for the burning up of other things, Philo intimates in the treatise adverted to by the learned Doctor, p. 947. *Βοηθὸς γοῦν καὶ Ποσειδώνιος καὶ Παναίτιος, ἀνδρες ἐν τοῖς Στωϊκοῖς δόγμασιν ἰσχυκότες, ἅτε θεόληπτοι, τὰς ἐκπυρώσεις καὶ παλιγγενεσίας καταλιπόντες, πρὸς θειότερον δόγμα τὸ τῆς ἀφθαρσίας τοῦ κόσμου παντὸς ηὐτομόλησαν*, "Boethus, Posidonius and Panætius, philosophers well versed in the Stoical system, as if divinely inspired, passing over both destructions and renewals, betook themselves to the more divine dogma of the incorruptibility of the world." Philo moreover, p. 952. after the intervening of a few things, quotes the reasoning of Boethus, by which he suffered himself to be persuaded that the world is eternal. In this reasoning the chief argument, which I cannot omit, is "If the world either commenced, or will be destroyed, something would have been created out of nothing," which none of the Stoics believed. *Εἰ γεννητὸς καὶ φθαρτὸς ὁ κόσμος, ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος τι γενήσεται· ὅπερ καὶ τοῖς Στωϊκοῖς ἀποπώτατον εἶναι δοκεῖ.* If Dr. Cudworth had read the demonstration of Boethus itself, he would have entertained a more favourable opinion of the philosopher, nor would he have permitted himself to regard him as an Atheist. For he commends in very high terms the providence of God, and even contends for the eternity of the world on this ground, that should it be destroyed, God would cease to exercise his universal control. The language of the philosopher is altogether worthy of him; a part of it I subjoin, that the stain of Atheism may no longer attach to him. *Ἔτι πρὸς τούτοις ἐὰν ἐκπυρωθῇ τὰ πάντα, τί κατ' ἐκεῖνον ὁ Θεὸς πράξει τὸν χρόνον; ἢ τὸ παράπαν οὐδὲν; καὶ μήποτ' εἰκότως· νυνὶ μὲν γὰρ ἕκαστα ἐφορᾷ, καὶ πάντων, οἷα γνήσιος πατὴρ, ἐπιτροπεύει, καὶ εἰ δεῖ τ' ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν, ἡνιόχου καὶ κυβερνήτου τρόπον ἡνιοχεῖ καὶ πηδαλιουχεῖ τὰ σύμπαντα*, "Besides if all things be destroyed what then becomes of God? Does he become altogether nothing? Never! For now he superintends all affairs, exercising paternal care over the universe, and in one word directing and guiding all things as a pilot or a charioteer." More of the same kind he there maintains. From the same argument it moreover appears that the sentiment of Boethus which we have already quoted from Laertius is correctly expounded, *that the world is not an animal.* For he pretty plainly rejects the opinion of the Stoics, who thought that God *was* the soul of the world. *Ψύχη δὲ τοῦ κόσμου κατὰ τοὺς ἀντιδοξοῦντας ὁ Θεός.* "According to the opinion of our opponents," therefore not his own opinion, "God is the soul of the world." Unless therefore I am greatly deceived, Boethus ought not to be reckoned among those who are properly called Atheists.

[4] Vide Sect. 26. supra, and the notes on that section.

notwithstanding, ab initio ejus usque ad exitum, &c., it had both a beginning, and will have an end; and from its beginning to its end, all was dispensed by a kind of regular law, even its successive conflagrations too, as well as those inundations or deluges, which have sometimes happened. Which yet they understood after such a manner, as that in these several revolutions and successive circuits or periods of worlds, all things should be ἀπαράλλακτα, "exactly alike," to what had been infinitely before, and should be again infinitely afterwards. Of which more elsewhere.

XXXIV. This quadripartite Atheism, which we have now represented, is the kingdom of darkness divided, or labouring with an intestine seditious war in its own bowels, and thereby destroying itself. Insomuch that we might well save ourselves the labour of any confutation of Atheism, merely by committing these several forms of Atheism together, and dashing them one against another, they opposing and contradicting each other, no less than they do Theism itself. For first, those two pairs of Atheisms, on the one hand the Anaximandrian and Democritic, on the other the Stoical and Stratonical, do absolutely destroy each other; the former of them supposing the first principle of all things to be stupid matter devoid of all manner of life, and contending that all life as well as other qualities is generable and corruptible, or a mere accidental thing, and looking upon the plastic life of nature as a figment or phantastic capricio, a thing almost as formidable and altogether as impossible as a Deity; the other, on the contrary, founding all upon this principle, that there is a life and natural perception essential to matter, ingenerable and incorruptible, and contending it to be utterly impossible to give any account of the phenomena of the world, the original of motion, the orderly frame and disposition of things, and the nature of animals, without this fundamental life of nature.

Again, the single Atheisms belonging to each of these several pairs quarrel as much also between themselves. For the Democritic Atheism explodes the Anaximandrian qualities and forms, demonstrating that the natural production of such entities out of nothing, and the corruption of them again into nothing, is of the two rather more impossible than a divine creation and annihilation. And on the other side, the Anaximandrian Atheist plainly discovers, that when the Democritics and Atomics have spent all their fury against these qualities and forms, and done what they can to solve the phenomena of nature without them another way, themselves do, notwithstanding, like drunken men reel and stagger back into them, and are unavoidably necessitated at last to take up their sanctuary in them.

In like manner, the Stoical and Stratonical Atheists may as effectually undo and confute each other; the former of them urging against the latter, that besides that prodigious absurdity of making every atom of senseless matter infallibly wise or omniscient, without any consciousness, there can be no reason at all given by the Hylozoists, why the matter of the whole universe might not as well conspire and confederate together into one, as all the single atoms that compound the body of any animal or man; or why one conscious life might not as well result from the totum of the former, as of the latter; by which means the whole world would become an animal or God. Again, the latter contending, that the Stoical or Cosmo-plastic Atheist can pretend nó reason, why the whole world might not have one sentient and rational, as well as one plastic soul in it, that is, as well be an animal as a plant; Moreover, that the sensitive souls of brute animals, and the rational souls of men, could never possibly emerge out of one single, plastic and vegetative soul in the whole universe; and lastly, that it is altogether as impossible, that the whole world should have life in it, and yet none of its parts have any life of their own, as that the whole world should be white or black, and yet no part of it have any whiteness or blackness at all in it: And therefore that the Stoical Atheists, as well as the Stoical Theists, do both alike deny incorporeal substance but in words only, whilst they really admit the thing itself; because one and the same life, ruling over all the distant parts of the corporeal universe, must needs be an incorporeal substance, it being all in the whole, and all acting upon every part, and yet none of it in any part by itself; for then it would be many, and not one. From all which it may be concluded, that Atheism is a certain strange kind of monster, with four heads, that are all of them perpetually biting, tearing, and devouring one another.

Now though these several forms of Atheism do mutually destroy each other, and none of them be really considerable or formidable in itself, as to any strength of reason which it hath; yet as they are compared together among themselves, so some of them may be more considerable than the rest. For first, as the qualities and forms of the Anaximandrian Atheist, supposed to be really distinct from the substances, are things unintelligible in themselves; so he cannot, with any colour or pretence of reason, maintain the natural production of them out of nothing, and the reduction of them again into nothing, and yet withstand a divine creation and annihilation, as an impossibility. Moreover, the Anaximandrian Atheism is as it were swallowed up into the Democritic, and further improved in it; this latter carrying on the same design, with more seeming artifice, greater plausibility of wit, and a more pompous show of something where indeed

there is nothing. Upon which account, it hath for many ages past beaten the Anaximandrian Atheism in a manner quite off the stage, and reigned there alone. So that the Democritic or Atomic Atheism seems to be much more considerable of the two, than the Anaximandrian or Hylopathian.

Again, as for the two other forms of Atheism, if there were any life at all in manner, as the first and immediate recipient of it, then in reason this must needs be supposed to be after the same manner in it, that all other corporeal qualities are in bodies, so as to be divisible together with it, and some of it be in every part of the matter; which is according to the hypothesis of the Hylozoists. Whereas on the contrary the Stoical Atheists supposing one life only in the whole mass of matter, after such a manner, as that none of the parts of it by themselves should have any life of their own, do thereby, no less than the Stoical Theists, make this life of theirs to be no corporeal quality or form, but an incorporeal substance; which is to contradict their own hypothesis. From whence we may conclude, that the Cosmo-plastic or Stoical Atheism is, of the two, less considerable than the Hylozoic or Stratonical.

Wherefore amongst these four forms of Atheism, that have been propounded, these two, the atomical or Democritical, and the Hylozoic or Stratonical are the chief. The former of which, namely the Democritic Atheism, admitting a true notion of body, that (according to the doctrine of the first and most ancient Atomists) it is nothing but resisting bulk devoid of all manner of life; yet because it takes for granted, that there is no other substance in the world besides body, does therefore conclude, that all life and understanding in animals and men is generated out of dead and stupid matter, though not as qualities and forms (which is the Anaximandrian way) but as resulting from the contextures of atoms, or some peculiar composition of magnitudes, figures, sites and motions; and consequently that they are themselves really nothing else but local motion and mechanism; which is a thing that some time since was very pertinently and judiciously both observed and perstringed by the learned author of the Exercitatio Epistolica, now a reverend bishop.[5] But the latter, namely the Hylozoic, though truly acknowledging on the contrary, that life, cogitation and under-

[5] Dr. Seth Ward, Savilian Professor of Astronomy in the University of Oxford; and successively Bishop of Exeter and Salisbury. In a work entitled In Thomæ Hobbii Philosophiam Exercitatio Epistolica ad amplissimum eruditissimumque virum D. Johannem Wilkinsium, S.T.D. Collegii Wadhamensis Gardianum. Cui subjicitur Appendicula ad calumnias, ab eodem Hobbio in sex documentis nuperrime in auctorem congestas, responsoria, 1656, 8vo. In sect. 4. chap. 3. p. 225. of this book, the talent and eloquence of which are considerable, the author labours to show that sense, imagination, skill and sagacity, both in men and in beasts, according to Hobbes are nothing more than local motion with reaction, which opinion he refutes.

standing are entities really distinct from local motion and mechanism, and that therefore they cannot be generated out of dead and stupid matter, but must needs be somewhere in the world, originally, essentially; and fundamentally; yet because they take it also for granted, that there is no other substance besides matter, do thereupon adulterate the notion of matter or body, blending and confounding it with life, as making them but two inadequate conceptions of substance, and concluding that all matter and substance, as such, hath life and perception or understanding, natural and inconscious, essentially belonging to it; and that sense and conscious reason or understanding in animals arises only from the accidental modification of this fundamental life of matter by organization.

We conclude therefore, that if these two atheistic hypotheses, which are found to be the most considerable, be once confuted, the reality of all Atheism will be *ipso facto* confuted; there being indeed nothing more requisite to a thorough confutation of atheism than the proving of these two things; first, that life and understanding are not essential to matter as such; and secondly, that they can never possibly rise out of any mixture or modification of dead and stupid matter whatsoever. The reason of which assertion is, because all Atheists, as was before observed, are mere Corporealists, of which there can be but these two sorts; either such as make life to be essential to matter, and therefore to be ingenerable and incorruptible: or else such as suppose life and every thing besides ὕλη ἄποιος, the bare substance of matter, or extended bulk, to be merely accidental, generable or corruptible, as rising out of some mixture or modification of it. And as the proving of those two things will overthrow all Atheism, so it will likewise lay a clear foundation, for the demonstrating of a Deity distinct from the corporeal world.

XXXV. Now that life and perception, or understanding, should be essential to matter as such, or that all senseless matter should be perfectly and infallibly wise (though without consciousness) as to all its own congruities and capabilities, which is the doctrine of the Hylozoists; this, I say, is an hypothesis so prodigiously paradoxical, and so outrageously wild, as that very few men ever could have atheistic faith enough to swallow it down and digest it. Wherefore this Hylozoist Atheism hath been very obscure ever since its first emersion, and hath found so few fautors and abettors, that it hath looked like a forlorn and deserted thing. Neither indeed are there any public monuments at all extant, in which it is avowedly maintained, stated, and reduced into any system. Insomuch that we should not have taken any notice of it at this time, as a particular form of Atheism, nor have conjured it up out of its grave, had we not understood that Strato's ghost had began to

walk of late; and that among some well-wishers to Atheism, despairing in a manner of the atomic form, this Hylozoic hypothesis began already to be looked upon as the rising sun of Atheism,————Et tanquam spes altera Trojæ, it seeming to smile upon them, and flatter them at a distance, with some fairer hopes of supporting that ruinous and desperate cause.

Whereas on the contrary, that other atomic atheism, as it insists upon a true notion of body, that it is nothing but resisting bulk; by which means we, joining issue thereupon, shall be fairly conducted on to a clear decision of this present controversy, as likewise to the disentangling of many other points of philosophy; so it is that which hath filled the world with the noise of it, for two thousand years past; that concerning which several volumes have been formerly written, in which it hath been stated and brought into a kind of system; and which hath of late obtained a resurrection amongst us, together with the atomic physiology, and been recommended to the world anew, under a specious show of wit and profound philosophy.

Wherefore, as we could not here insist upon both these forms of Atheism together, because that would have been to confound the language of Atheists, and to have made them, like the Cadmean offspring, to do immediate execution upon themselves; so we were in all reason obliged to make our first and principal assault upon the atomic atheism, as being the only considerable, upon this account, because it is that alone which publicly confronts the world, and like that proud uncircumcised Philistine, openly defies the hosts of the living God; intending nevertheless in the close of this whole discourse, (that is, the last book) where we are to determine the right intellectual system of the universe, and to assert an incorporeal Deity, to demonstrate, that life, cogitation and understanding do not essentially belong to matter, and all substance as such, but are the peculiar attributes and characteristics of substance incorporeal.

XXXVI. However, since we have now started these several forms of Atheism, we shall not in the mean time neglect any of them neither. For in the answer to the second atheistic ground, we shall confute them all together at once, as agreeing in this one fundamental principle: That the original of all things in the universe is senseless matter, or matter devoid of all animality or conscious life. In the reply to the fourth atheistic argumentation, we shall briefly hint the grounds of reason, from which incorporeal substance is demonstrated. In the examination of the fifth, we shall confute the Anaximandrian Atheism there propounded, which is, as it were, the first sciography and rude delineation of Atheism. And in the confutation of he sixth, we shall show, how the ancient atomic atheists

did preventively overthrow the foundation of Hylozoism. Besides all which, in order to a fuller and more thorough confutation, both of the Cosmo-plastic and Hylozoic Atheisms, we shall in this very place take occasion to insist largely upon the plastic life of nature, giving in the first place, a true account of it; and then afterwards showing, how grossly it is misunderstood, and the pretence of it abused by the asserters of both these Atheistic hypotheses. The heads of which larger digression, because they could not be so conveniently inserted in the contents of the chapter, shall be represented to the reader's view at the end of it.

XXXVII. For we think fit here to observe, that neither the Cosmo-plastic or Stoical, nor the Hylozoic or Stratonical Atheists are therefore condemned by us, because they suppose such a thing as a plastic nature, or life distinct from the animal; albeit this be not only exploded, as an absolute non-entity, by the Atomic Atheists, who might possibly be afraid of it, as that which approached too near to a Deity, or else would hazard the introducing of it; but also utterly discarded by some professed Theists of later times,[6] who might notwithstanding have an undiscerned tang of the mechanic Atheism, hanging about them, in that their so confident rejecting of all final and intending causality in nature, and admitting of no other causes of things, as philosophical, save the material and mechanical only; this being really to banish all mental, and consequently divine causality, quite out of the world; and to make the whole world to be nothing else but a mere heap of dust, fortuitously agitated, or a dead cadaverous thing, that hath no signatures of mind and understanding, counsel and wisdom at all upon it; nor indeed any other vitality acting in it, than only the production of a certain quantity of local motion, and the conversation of it according to some general laws; which things the Democritic Atheists take for granted, would be all as they are, though there were no God. And thus Aristotle[7] describes this kind of philosophy, that it made the whole world to consist, *ἐκ σωμάτων μόνον, καὶ μονάδων τάξιν μὲν ἐχόντων, ἀψύχων δὲ πάμπαν*, "of nothing but bodies and monads," that is, atoms or small particles

[6] Besides Hobbes, Descartes and his followers are here intended. But it is also well-known that some of the followers of Descartes did not in this matter adopt the views of their master, and others spared no pains to interpret his opinions somewhat more agreeably. Vid. Descartes in Princip. Philos. P. 1. sect. 36. p. 37. and P. 3. sect. 2. p. 50. &c.

[7] De Cœl. lib. 2. cap. 12. p. 656. tom. 1. opp. The learned Doctor, when he wrote this sentence, seems to have been thinking of something else. For Aristotle in this passage speaks concerning himself, not respecting Democritus or his followers. After saying that he might have usefully examined and discussed many things concerning planets and constellations, he adds that he would consider the stars only as bodies. *Ἡμεῖς, ὡς περὶ σωμάτων μόνον αὐτῶν καὶ μονάδων, τάξιν μὲν ἐχόντων, ἀψύχων δὲ πάμπαν, διανοούμεθα.*

of matter "only ranged and disposed together into such an order, but altogether dead and inanimate."

2. For unless there be such a thing admitted as a plastic nature, that acts ἕνεκά του, for the sake of something, and in order to ends, regularly, artificially, and methodically, it seems, that one or other of these two things must be concluded; that either in the efformation and organization of the bodies of animals, as well as the other phenomena, every thing comes to pass fortuitously, and happens to be as it is, without the guidance and direction of any mind or understanding; or else, that God himself doth all immediately, and, as it were with his own hands, form the body of every gnat and fly, insect and mite, as of other animals in generations, all whose members have so much of contrivance in them, that Galen professed he could never enough admire that artifice, which was in the leg of a fly (and yet he would have admired the wisdom of nature more, had he been but acquainted with the use of microscopes): I say, upon supposition of no plastic nature, one or other of these two things must be concluded;[8] because it is not conceived by any,

[8] But I apprehend there are many who will maintain that it is not necessary for those who deny a plastic nature to adopt either of these opinions. I. They who adopt the philosophy of Descartes will complain that injustice is done to them, and will affirm that they do not attribute the production of all things to the fortuitous agitation of matter. And those who contend that God has joined fixed laws of motion with matter, and that he preserves these laws; and who moreover affirm that from these fixed and maintained laws of motion the production of the universe has been effected; these, I say, so far from referring all things to accident and the fortuitous motion of matter, seem in the judgment of some to attribute too much to fate and necessity. If I am not mistaken, the opinion of Descartes lies somewhere between that of those who attribute the origin of things to matter and motion, and that of those who regard all things as proceeding from God. For he maintained that matter was bound by fixed laws of motion; nevertheless, that God governs and directs the motions of matter. Vid. Nich. Malebranche Eclaircissement sur l'Optique, sect. 39. p. 602. towards the end of the book De Inquirenda Veritate, and many other writers of the same class. II. We know also that many philosophers affirm that bodies frame for themselves a soul; some of whom think that the animated principle or soul lies concealed in every seed, others that the soul is introduced into the seed extrinsically and by God. See, out of many, Dan. Sennertus De Generatione Viventium, tom. 1. cap. 1. p. 123. and William Harvey De Generatione Animal. Exercit. 49. p. 271. In fact, Dr. Cudworth himself does not seem to be far off from the former of these views, since, though in this chapter he often speaks as if nature were a sort of plastic thing, uniformly and separately acting, lower down, sect. 22. he does not hesitate to approve of the opinion of Aristotle, who thought that nature was partly mind, endowed with reason and sense. They who are of this opinion do not attribute the construction of bodies either to the motion of matter only, or to God only, yet they are not believers of such a plastic power as Dr. Cudworth maintains. III. Nor are there wanting among both ancient and modern philosophers those who maintain, that there is in the seed itself a plastic or producing power, and that bodies are produced and formed by this power. As Nigrisolius, an Italian, of our own times, refuted by Antonio Conti, who fancied I know not what—a *lumen seminale*. Vid. Recueil des Pieces Philosoph. De M. Liebnitz, Clark, Newton, tom. 2. p. 337. These, not wisely indeed, since they seem as if concealing ignorance under the phraseology they adopt, neither approve of the opinions which the learned Doctor mentions, nor are in favour of his plastic nature. IV. The most illustrious philosophers of our own age, and even many of the followers of Descartes, regard all bodies as formed at the commencement of the creation with

that the things of nature are all thus administered, with such exact regularity and constancy every where, merely by the wisdom, providence and efficiency of those inferior spirits, demons or angels. As also, though it be true, that the works of nature are dispensed by a divine law and command, yet this is not to be understood in a vulgar sense, as if they were all effected by the mere force of a verbal law or outward command, because inanimate things are not commendable nor governable by such a law. And therefore besides the divine will and pleasure, there must needs be some other immediate agent and executioner provided,[9] for the producing of every effect; since not so much as a stone, or other heavy body, could at any time fall downward,

minds, by God himself, and that therefore no new body is now produced, but only that the minute corpuscles, long since created by God, are expanded, evolved, and increased to their proper size gradually, and by the aid of the laws of motion. Vid. Malebranche, Recherche de la Verité, lib. 2. cap. 7. p. 324. and Eclaircissement sur l' Optique, p. 607. 608. Leibnitz, in the Journal des Scavans, A 1695. p. 449. and many others whom it is not necessary here to name. Neither do these philosophers adopt either of the alternatives Dr. Cudworth mentions. For they do not attribute every thing to the laws of matter, nor do they maintain that God now creates every animal and every man. I say nothing of the *formæ substantiales* of the Peripatetics, and of other things of the same kind. I am unwilling, nevertheless, either to oppose the doctrine of plastic nature, or to represent the opinions of these philosophers concerning the production of bodies as preferable to this doctrine of Dr. Cudworth, whatever may be thought of my reference to their opinions. I bring forward both those which I have mentioned, and those which I may yet mention, for the sake of illustration, not of contention. For I have resolved to adopt, in this place, the opinion of no one on a matter so difficult, but to leave all to the judgment of the more sagacious. What, however, I deem necessary to be known of the notions maintained, and the controversies carried on, in more modern times respecting plastic natures, it is my intention to add in the preface.

[9] Still that there have been and that there are those who believe this, is beyond all controversy. I do not speak of those Platonists and ancient Christians who taught that there were presiding spirits set over each kind of animals by God, concerning whom Joh. Bapt. Cotlierius treats, Ad Hermæ Pastorem, lib. 1. vis. 4. p. 82. t. 1. P.P. Apostol. Nor do I mention many others, both of the Jews, Egyptians, and ancient heretics, who, as appears from Ireneus, Tertullian, and many others, taught that this world and all bodies which it contains were formed by certain genii vastly inferior to the supreme God. I will only refer to one or two of the more recent philosophers who hold this sentiment. Joh. Bodinus some time ago was of this opinion. He says, in Univ. Naturæ Theatre, lib. 5. p. 631. 632: "Quemadmodum in republica bene constituta non minus sunt necessarii carnifices, lictores, vespillones, quam magistratus ac judices et curatores: sic in hac republica mundana Deus ipse ad RERUM GENERATIONEM, PROCREATIONEM, ac tutelam angelos locis omnibus cœlestibus, elementaribus, animantibus, ——— principes ac moderatores collocavit," "As in a well constituted state, there are of necessity executioners, lictors, and those who perform yet meaner offices, as well as magistrates, judges, and superintendents, so in this mundane system, God himself has appointed for the generation and procreation of things, and for their defence, angels over all celestial regions, over the elements, and over all living beings —— as princes and governors." And at the present time the reverend the minister of the French church at Baruthin, in a letter to Jac. L'Enfant, has propounded this opinion, and attempted to maintain it by some passages out of the sacred writings. Vid. Biblioth. German. t. 9. p. 157. 158. It is needless to mention more, since the celebrated Bayle also maintains that those of the followers of Descartes, who attribute so much to the general laws of motion, betake themselves to the doctrine of universal mind and intelligent nature, that they may explain, I know not by what law, the forming of bodies. Diction. Histor. et Critique, tom. 1. v. Cainites, p. 718.

merely by the force of a verbal law, without any other efficient cause; but either God himself must immediately impel it, or else there must be some other subordinate cause in nature for that motion. Wherefore the divine law and command, by which the things of nature are administered, must be conceived to be the real appointment of some energetic, effectual and operative cause for the production of every effect.

3. Now to assert the former of these two things, that all the effects of nature come to pass by material and mechanical necessity, or the mere fortuitous motion of matter, without any guidance or direction, is a thing no less irrational than it is impious and atheistical.[1] Not only because it is utterly unconceivable and impossible, that such infinite regularity and artificialness, as is every where throughout the whole world, should constantly result out of the fortuitous motion of matter; but also because there are many such particular phenomena in nature, as do plainly transcend the powers of mechanism, of which therefore no sufficient mechanical reasons can be devised, as the motion of respiration in animals: as there are also other phenomena, that are perfectly cross to the laws of mechanism; as for example, that of the distant poles of the equator and ecliptic, which we shall insist upon afterward. Of both which kinds there have been other instances proposed by my learned friend Dr. More,[2] in his Enchiridion Metaphysicum, and very ingeniously improved by him to this very purpose, namely, to evince, that there is something in nature besides mechanism, and consequently substance incorporeal.

Moreover, those Theists, who philosophize after this manner, by resolving all the corporeal phenomena into fortuitous mechanism, or the necessary and unguided motion of matter, make God to be nothing else in the world, but an idle spectator of the various results of the fortuitous and necessary motions of bodies; and render his wisdom altogether useless and insignificant, as being a thing wholly inclosed and shut up within his own breast, and not at all acting abroad upon any thing without him.

Furthermore, all such mechanists as these, whether Theists or Atheists, do, according to that judicious censure passed by Aristotle long since upon Democritus, but substitute as it were χεῖρα ξυλίνην τέκτονος,[3] "a carpenter's or artificer's wooden hand, moved by strings and wires, instead of a living hand."

[1] It will doubtless be denied that any part of this argument, if directed against Descartes and his followers, pertains to them. They will complain that the opinions of their master are not correctly stated.

[2] Compare More's Antidote against Atheism, book 2. p. 37. almost throughout, and his Apology for Descartes, p. 115. of his works.

[3] De part. An. lib. 1. cap. 1. p. 473. t. 2. opp. But the meaning of the sentence in Aristotle differs widely from its meaning here. After that philosopher had censured those investigators into nature who were solicitous concerning the matter and shape of

They made a kind of dead and wooden world, as it were a carved statue, that hath nothing neither vital nor magical at all in it. Whereas to those, who are considerative, it will plainly appear, that there is a mixture of life or plastic nature, together with mechanism, which runs through the whole corporeal universe.

And whereas it is pretended, not only that all corporeal phenomena may be sufficiently solved mechanically, without any final, intending, and directive causality, but also that all other reasons of things in nature, besides the material and mechanical, are altogether unphilosophical, the same Aristotle[4] ingeniously exposes the ridiculousness of this pretence after this manner; telling us, that it is just as if a carpenter, joiner, or carver should give this account, as the only satisfactory, of any artificial fabric or piece of carved imagery, ὅτι ἐμπεσόντος τοῦ ὀργάνου τὸ μὲν κοῖλον ἐγίνετο, τὸ δὲ ἐπίπεδον, "that because the instruments, axes and hatchets, planes and chissels happened to fall so and so upon the timber, cutting it here and there, that therefore it was hollow in one place, and plain in another, and the like; and by that means the whole came to be of such a form." For is it not altogether as absurd and ridiculous, for men to undertake[5] to give an account of the formation and organization of the bodies of animals, by mere fortuitous mechanism, without any final or intending causality, as why there was a heart here,[6] and brains there; and why the heart had so many and such different valves in the entrance and outlet of its ventricles; and why all the other organic parts, veins and arteries, nerves and muscles, bones and cartilages, with the joints and members, were of such a form? Because, forsooth, the fluid matter of the seed happened to move so and so in several places, and thereby to cause all those differences, which are also diverse in different animals; all being the necessary result of a certain quantity of motion at first indifferently impressed upon the small particles of the matter of this

things, but were not at all concerned as to their essence or the power inherent in them, he adds: Λίαν οὖν ἁπλῶς εἴρηται καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ τέκτων λέγει περὶ χειρὸς ξυλίνης, "This therefore is very stupidly said: as if a carpenter (answering to the question respecting the cause and nature of any work, that he made it with his own hand) should speak of that wooden hand of his (and not acknowledge that some internal power directed that hand.)" Aristotle here speaks with his usual conciseness and obscurity; on which account I have subjoined these explanatory clauses.

[4] De part. An. lib. 1. cap. 1. p. 92. Dr. Cudworth shortens this somewhat longer passage; but a little lower down he brings it forward, omitting the words which are quoted here.

[5] Vide Descartes. Libr. de Homine, et de Formatione Fœtûs.

[6] Those who have read the book which Descartes left, De Homine et de Formatione Fœtûs, will be at no loss as to whom these words are intended covertly to censure. But they who give themselves up entirely to the guidance of Descartes cannot deny that their master in this book has but very inadequately met the expectation of intelligent persons. Vid Malebranche, Recherche de la Verité, lib. 2. cap. 7. p. 324. &c.

universe turned round in a vortex. But, as the same Aristotle adds, no carpenter or artificer is so simple as to give such an account as this, and think it satisfactory, but he will rather declare, that himself directed the motion of the instruments, after such a manner, and in order to such ends: Βέλτιον ὁ τέκτων· οὐ γὰρ ἱκανὸν ἔσται αὐτῷ, τὸ τοσοῦτον εἰπεῖν, ὅτι ἐμπεσόντος τοῦ ὀργάνου, &c. ἀλλὰ διότι τὴν πληγὴν ἐποιήσατο τοιαύτην, καί τινος ἕνεκα, ἐρεῖ τὴν αἰτίαν, ὅπως τοιόνδε ἢ τοιονδήποτε τὴν μορφὴν γένηται,[7] "A carpenter would give a better account than so, for he would not think it sufficient to say, that the fabric came to be of such a form, because the instruments happened to fall so and so, but he will tell you that it was because himself made such strokes, and that he directed the instruments and determined their motion after such a manner, to this end that he might make the whole a fabric fit and useful for such purposes." And this is to assign the final cause. And certainly there is scarcely any man in his wits,[8] that will not acknowledge the reason of the different valves in the heart from the apparent usefulness of them, according to those particular structures of theirs, to be more satisfactory, than any which can be brought from mere fortuitous mechanism, or the unguided motion of the seminal matter.

4. And as for the latter part of the disjunction, that every thing in nature should be done immediately by God himself; this, as according to vulgar apprehension,[9] it would render divine Providence operose, solicitous, and distractious, and thereby

[7] De Part. An. lib. 1. cap. 1.

[8] But it ought to be acknowledged that these two things are not so utterly opposed that they cannot be believed together. Suppose that with Descartes I attribute the whole human frame to mechanical laws, yet if at the same time I allow that God makes those laws, there will be nothing to hinder my regarding every member of the human frame as fitly accommodated and formed with a view to its particular end.

[9] But if I know any thing of human nature, I am convinced that any one who refers the arrangement and formation of all things to God will find supporters among the multitude as easily, or even more easily, than he who philosophizes concerning plastic nature or other causes. To most persons this philosophizing is difficult; to believe that God creates all things is easy. However this may be, they who think it unworthy of the divine majesty to interfere in every thing, seem to me to act with childish inconsistency; for they rashly attribute to God the anxieties which finite men, occupied in their various pursuits, experience, and without consideration they judge that to be suitable to the divine Being which is thought befitting and honourable in an earthly ruler. But it ought to be borne in mind that the nature of God is infinite, that no cares can perplex him, that no multiplicity of occupations, however large, can disturb or agitate him; nor ought it to be forgotten, that those things which are reckoned great and splendid among men are for the most part proofs of human weakness and defect. Kings and rulers of this world, who employ so many instruments of their will, what else, I ask, do they declare than this, that they are equal to but few things—that is, that they are men of infirm and contracted power? I might add that they who are accustomed to obey the nod of great men, and be at the beck of their superiors, are for the most part ministers but of voluptuousness and sloth. Is it then the part of a reasonable man, in estimating the glory and majesty of God, to take for his rule those things which are but proofs of infirmity and imperfection, sometimes even of vices, among men.

make the belief of it to be entertained with greater difficulty, and give advantage to Atheists; so, in the judgment of the writer De Mundo, it is not so decorous in respect of God neither, that he should *αὐτουργεῖν ἅπαντα*, set his own hand, as it were, to every work, and immediately do all the meanest and triflingest things himself drudgingly, without making use of any inferior and subordinate instruments: *Εἴπερ ἄσεμνον ἦν αὐτὸν δοκεῖν Ξέρξην αὐτουργεῖν ἅπαντα, καὶ διατελεῖν ἃ βούλοιτο, καὶ ἐφιστάμενον διοικεῖν, πολὺ μᾶλλον ἀπρεπὲς ἂν εἴη τῷ θεῷ. Σεμνότερον δὲ καὶ πρεπωδέστερον τὴν δύναμιν αὐτοῦ, διὰ τοῦ σύμπαντος κόσμου διήκουσαν, ἥλιόν τε κινεῖν καὶ σελήνην*, &c.[1] "If it were not congruous in respect of the state and majesty of Xerxes the great king of Persia, that he should condescend to do all the meanest offices himself; much less can this be thought decorous in respect of God. But it seems far more august, and becoming of the divine majesty, that a certain power and virtue, derived from him, and passing through the universe, should move the sun and moon, and be the immediate cause of those lower things done here upon earth.".

Moreover, it seems not so agreeable to reason neither, that nature, as a distinct thing from the Deity, should be quite superseded or made to signify nothing, God himself doing all things immediately and miraculously; from whence it would follow also, that they are all done either forcibly and violently, or else artificially only, and none of them by any inward principle of their own.

Lastly, This opinion is further confuted by that slow and gradual process, that is in the generations of things, which would seem to be but a vain and idle pomp, or a trifling formality, if the agent were omnipotent: as also by those *ἁμαρτήματα*, (as Aristotle calls them) those errors and bungles, which are committed, when the matter is inept and contumacious; which argue the agent not to be irresistible, and that nature is such a thing, as is not altogether uncapable (as well as human art) of being sometimes frustrated and disappointed, by the indisposition of matter. Whereas an omnipotent agent, as it could dispatch its work in a moment, so it would always do it infallibly and irresistibly; no ineptitude or stubbornness of matter being ever able to hinder such a one, or make him bungle or fumble in any thing.

5. Wherefore since neither all things are produced fortuitously, or by the unguided mechanism of matter, nor God himself may reasonably be thought to do all things immediately and miraculously; it may well be concluded, that there is a plastic nature

[1] Cap. 7.

under him, which, as an inferior and subordinate instrument, doth drudgingly execute that part of his providence, which consists in the regular and orderly motion of matter; yet so as that there is also, besides this, a higher providence to be acknowledged, which, presiding over it, doth often supply the defects of it, and sometimes overrule it; forasmuch as this plastic nature cannot act electively, nor with discretion. And by this means the wisdom of God will not be shut up nor concluded wholly within his own breast, but will display itself abroad, and print its stamps and signatures every where throughout the world; so that God, as Plato[2] (after Orpheus) speaks, will be not only the beginning and end, but also the middle of all things; they being as much to be ascribed to his causality, as if himself had done them all immediately, without the concurrent instrumentality of any subordinate natural cause. Notwithstanding which, in this way it will appear also to human reason, that all things are disposed and ordered by the Deity, without any solicitous care or distractious providence.

And indeed those mechanic Theists, who rejecting a plastic nature affect to concern the Deity as little as is possible in mundane affairs, either for fear of debasing, and bringing him down to too mean offices, or else of subjecting him to solicitous incumberment, and for that cause would have God to contribute nothing more to the mundane system and economy, than only the first impressing of a certain quantity of motion upon the matter, and the after-conserving of it, according to some general laws: these men (I say) seem not very well to understand themselves in this. Forasmuch as they must of necessity either suppose these their laws of motion to execute themselves, or else be forced perpetually to concern the Deity in the immediate motion of every atom of matter throughout the universe, in order to the execution and observation of them. The former of which, being a thing plainly absurd and ridiculous, and the latter that, which these philosophers themselves are extremely abhorrent from, we cannot make any other conclusion

[2] De Legibus, lib. 4. p. 600. opp. I apprehend all will be glad to have the passage of Plato, here alluded to, quoted, Θεὸς (ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ παλαιὸς λόγος) ἀρχήν τε καὶ τελευτὴν καὶ μέσα τῶν ὄντων ἁπάντων ἔχων, εὐθεῖαν περαίνει κατὰ φύσιν περιπορευόμενος, "God (as was anciently said) is the beginning, the end, and the middle of all things." What Plato here calls παλαιὸς λόγος, Dr. Cudworth supposes to have been taken from Orpheus. And indeed among the verses attributed to Orpheus there are sentiments not very dissimilar in Apul. de Mundo, p. m. 25.

Ζεὺς πρῶτος γένετο, Ζεὺς ὕστατος ἀρχικέραυνος,
Ζεὺς κεφαλή, Ζεὺς μέσσα.

First of all is Jupiter; he also is the last,
Jupiter is both beginning and the middle.

than this,[3] that they do but unskilfully and unawares establish that very thing, which in words they oppose; and that their laws of nature concerning motion are really nothing else but a

[3] But this is incredible, nor is there any passage from Descartes or his friends, from whence may be understood that what they called the laws of motion were ever considered by them as animated nature, governing and directing matter; nor is it at all doubtful that they always distinguished between those laws and the divine power which first impressed them on matter and which still preserves them in action. Vide Descartes, Ep. 82. tom. 1. p. 237. I am, however, unwilling to be the arbiter of this strife, although I will not deny that from the time I first acquired a knowledge of these matters which are beyond the common reach, it has always struck me that the followers of Descartes, and the friends of plastic nature, are not very far apart from each other. But I will hint at two things which, if I am not deceived, will be found of some moment towards understanding the whole controversy. I. Descartes himself was not so far off from the doctrine of plastic nature as his adversaries judged. Grant this to him, that God from the beginning impressed on matter its general laws; add also, that these laws are the guide and rule of all generation and procreation; he will no longer oppose your assigning to matter a sort of producing genius, or nature, or call it by what name you please, nor your maintaining that nature forms, according to the direction of such laws, whatever is generated. He concedes, in many places, that the aid of God is necessary that these laws in matter may be preserved, and that what is respectively suitable to them may be effected. So that he at once acknowledges that there must be some exterior power to render these laws efficient in producing whatever it may please God should exist. If it be said that God does not apply this exterior power, Descartes will not be opposed, nay he will permit it to be maintained that any other nature or power inferior to God directs and governs the motions of matter. The reason why he has so obscurely expressed this in his writings himself, may be lest he should seem to associate God with matter as its life and soul. That I have said nothing of Descartes here but what he would consent to, a passage from a letter of his to Dr. Henry More, clearly expressed, written not long before his death, and found among his papers, will abundantly show. Epp. tom. 1. Ep. 72. p. m. 237. "Translatio illa quam motum voco, non est res minoris entitatis, quam sit figura; nempe est modus in corpore. Vis autem Movens potest esse ipsius Dei, conservantis tantumdem translationis in materia, quantum a primo creationis momento in ea posuit, vel etiam substantiæ creatæ, ut mentis nostræ, vel cujusvis alterius rei, cui vim dederit corpus movendi: et quidem illa vis in substantia creata est ejus modus, non autem in Deo: quod quia non ita facile ab omnibus potest intelligi, nolui de ista re in scriptis meis agere, ne viderer favere eorum sententiæ, qui Deum, tamquam animam mundi materiæ unitam, considerant," "That transference which I call motion is a thing of not less real existence than is figure; for it is a mode of body. The MOVING POWER may be an attribute either of God, who continually preserves in matter that degree of motion which was impressed upon it by the impulse it received at its creation, or else perhaps of some CREATIVE SUBSTANCE, as our own mind, or ANY other thing endued with the power of originating motion (here we see the plastic nature again). This power, existing in created substance, is a mode of it, but not so in God, which because it is not altogether easy of comprehension I have FORBORNE to treat of the matter at all in my writings, lest I should seem to countenance the opinion of those who consider God as the pervading Spirit of the material universe." These things were said by Descartes to Dr. H. More, who, as all who are skilled in these matters know, was the great patron of plastic nature, or of what was called the hylarchic principle. It is evident, therefore, that they who teach the doctrine of a plastic nature plead most justly the support of Descartes. That distinguished philosopher permits that nature or a power of this kind should be associated with mechanical laws, so that all procreation is accomplished according to a settled law and order. Now let it be considered what of this controversy yet remains. Ask in the first place, of the advocate of a plastic nature, whether he thinks that matter is bound by fixed laws? Whether he will grant that his plastic nature, while it frames and forms things, must be bound by and obey these laws? Whether he imagines that nature can effect whatever it pleases from whatever part of matter? Perhaps he will answer in such manner that it may well enough be understood that but little controversy remains between himself and what he believes on the one side, and Descartes and such of his friends as are wise

plastic nature, acting upon the matter of the whole corporeal universe, both maintaining the same quantity of motion always in it, and also dispensing it (by transferring it out of one body into another) according to such laws, fatally impressed upon it. Now if there be a plastic nature, that governs the motion of matter every where, according to laws, there can be no reason given, why the same might not also extend farther to the regular disposal of that matter, in the formation of plants, and animals, and other things, in order to that apt coherent frame and harmony of the whole universe.

6. And as this plastic nature is a thing, which seems to be in itself most reasonable, so hath it also had the suffrage of the best philosophers in all ages. For first, it is well known that Aristotle concerns himself in nothing more zealously than this, that mundane things are not effected merely by the necessary and

on the other. I determine nothing on this point. Let those determine to whom the matter properly belongs. II. The advocates of plastic nature maintain their opinion on this account chiefly, that it relieves the Deity of a perpetual and most troublesome task, and moreover removes from the eternal and infinitely wise Author of the universe all blame on account of those vices and deformities which every where afflict nature. They say that they who maintain that God is the immediate cause of all things, most unworthily impose on him an endless burden—an incredible multitude of anxious concerns; nor do they spare Descartes, inasmuch as he maintained that the laws of motion in matter were preserved by God, which they think is as if he maintained that God never enjoyed leisure and repose. But these advocates of plastic nature themselves, since they maintain that the Deity is ever watchful lest their nature should occasion any great calamity; since they deny that it is endowed with judgment, and with a faculty of distinguishing between right and wrong; since they think that God governs his own actions; since, in one word, they maintain that God corrects and amends what perhaps nature may do wrong, not to mention other matters; do they impose less of care and less of trouble on God than those against whom they contend? That master certainly has enough to do who must continually take care that the servants whom he employs, unskilful and void of reason, do not err; who must preside over all the actions of his agents, and who must apply the fitting remedy to all the defects and mischiefs they occasion. And there will be, I no ways doubt, those who think it much more suitable and simple to regard God as effecting all things himself, than to associate with him a nature, neither wise nor powerful, but exceedingly ignorant, and whose acts he must perpetually direct; especially if they bear in mind that God is infinitely powerful, to whom therefore no confusion or adjustment of matter can create anxiety, any more than is occasioned by creating out of nothing. Is that master the happier man who possesses the power of conducting his own affairs, and who employs the aid of no servant, or he who must avail himself of the aid of servants of little care and prudence, the mischiefs of whose unskilfulness and rashness are always to be guarded against? Why, moreover, they should smile at the God of Descartes preserving the laws of motion I cannot find out. For what difference can there be between a Deity always watchful lest plastic nature should do mischief, and always correcting its errors, and a Deity watching over and preserving the laws of motion in matter? As to what pertains to the deformities and defects, if such words may be permitted, which are every where beheld in the universe, though plastic nature be associated with God, many will maintain that this does not lessen the difficulty. For if God always observes what nature does, if he governs its actions, if he takes care that it transgresses no law, if he corrects its mistakes, is not he after all the final cause of all things? Is not the master who never trusts a servant out of his sight, and who directs all his labours, the author of the faults into which that servant falls. I do not say these things as approving of the sentiment of Descartes, or of any other; I state freely what has occurred to me, that readers may the more easily judge concerning the whole of this dissertation of Dr. Cudworth.

unguided motion of matter, or by fortuitous mechanism,[4] but by such a nature as acts regularly and artificially for ends; yet so as that this nature is not the highest principle neither, or the supreme Numen, but subordinate to a perfect mind or intellect; he affirming, that νοῦς αἴτιον καὶ φύσις τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς, "that Mind, together with nature was the cause of this universe;" and that heaven and earth, plants and animals, were framed by them both; that is, by Mind as the principal and directive cause, but by nature as a subservient or executive instrument: and elsewhere joining in like manner God and nature both together, as when he concludes, "That God and nature do nothing in vain."

Neither was Aristotle the first broacher or inventor of this doctrine, Plato before him having plainly asserted the same.[5]

[4] The first two books of Aristotle's physics place it beyond all doubt that that philosopher said a great deal about a φύσις or nature whence all things proceeded. He maintains that this nature is of two kinds, the one substance, the other form, Physic. lib. 2. cap. 1. p. 464. and cap. 2. 465. tom. 1. opp. His form rather than his substance is nature, since it is the efficient and active agent, yet he does not deny that this form acts according to a certain end, lib. 2. cap. 8. p. 475. But this nature of Aristotle, of which perhaps he did not himself form an entirely accurate notion, is a very different thing from the plastic nature of Dr. Cudworth, which in some way is a partaker of reason, and is governed by the will of God But Aristotle deprives his nature, whatever it is, of all sense, and binds it to material necessity, Physic. lib. 2. cap. 11. p. 478. Moreover, it is well known that he entirely removes Deity from the government of mundane affairs. I suspect that this form or nature of Aristotle does not greatly differ from that θερμότης ψυχική, or animal warmth, springing, I suppose, from the sun and stars, which he elsewhere pronounces present in all things, as the cause of universal generation, De Generat. Animal. lib. 3. cap. 11. p. 664. whence he has this dogma, that all things are full of soul, ὡς τρόπον τινὰ πάντα ψυχῆς εἶναι πλήρη. But what will become of those two passages by which Dr. Cudworth endeavoured to prove that Aristotle sought to associate God with nature? I will briefly answer this question. As to the first, I affirm confidently that it is not to be found in Aristotle. The memory and prepossessions of the excellent author somewhat misled him. There is no passage in Aristotle like this, unless my eyes deceive me, except the following: Λέγοντας, τὰ μὲν ζῶα καὶ τὰ φυτὰ ἀπὸ τύχης μήτε εἶναι μήτε γίγνεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἤτοι ΦΥΣΙΝ, ἢ ΝΟΥΝ, ἤ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερον εἶναι τὸ ΑΙΤΙΟΝ, "There are those that think that animals and plants are not fortuitously produced, but that the cause of them is either nature or mind, or something else of that kind," Physic. Auscult. lib. 2. cap. 4. p. 470. But in this passage Aristotle states not his own opinion, but that of others, and he does not associate, but plainly disjoins mind and nature. The other dogma, that God and nature do nothing in vain, is to be found both in Aristotle and in other ancient authors. But it inculcates no more than that not God only, but nature also, acts with fixed design; it does not subject nature to the control of God, nor affirm that it performs its operations by his aid.

[5] Here again I am compelled to complain not of the sagacity of the learned author, but of the too strong affection with which he regarded the opinions he had imbibed. I could show, did space permit, from De Legibus, lib. 12. from the Symposium, and from other works of Plato, that that philosopher attributed the production and procreation of all things to a soul diffused through the universe. I readily concede that Plato's soul of the universe is very similar to the plastic procreating nature of which the learned author here treats. Hear the testimony of Apuleius respecting the doctrine of Plato, p. 32. "Sed illam cœlestem animam, fontem animarum omnium, optimam et sapientissimam, VIRTUTEM ESSE GENITRICEM, SUBSERVIRE etiam FABRICATORI DEO et præsto ad omnia inventa ejus." "But that celestial soul, the fountain and source of all souls, the best and the wisest, the plastic energy, obeys the will of the great Creator, God, and promptly performs his bidding." Add that also of Chalcidius, a not

For in a passage already cited, he affirms, that "Nature together with reason, and according to it, orders all things;" thereby making nature, as a distinct thing from Deity, to be a subordinate cause under the reason and wisdom of it. And elsewhere he resolves, that there are ἔμφρονος φύσεως αἰτίαι, αἷς ὑπηρετούσαις ὁ Θεὸς χρῆται, "certain causes of a wise and artificial nature, which the Deity uses as subservient to itself;" as also, that there are ξυναίτια, οἷς ξυνεργοῖς Θεὸς χρῆται, "con-causes, which God makes use of, as subordinately co-operative with himself."

Moreover, before Plato, Empedocles philosophized also in the same manner, when supposing two worlds, the one archetypal, the other ectypal, he made φιλία and νεῖκος, "friendship" and "discord," to be the ἀρχὴ δραστήριος, the "active principle" and "immediate operator" in this lower world; he not understanding thereby, as Plutarch[6] and some others have conceited, two substantial principles in the world, the one of good, the other

unskilful interpreter of the Timæus, Comm. in Tim. sect. 53. p. 299. "Hæc est illa rationabilis anima mundi, quæ gemina juxta meliorem naturam veneratione tutelam præbet inferioribus, divinis dispositionibus obsequens, providentiam nativis impertiens, æternorum similitudine prõpter cognationem beata." "This is that rational soul of the world, which, from reverence to the superior nature, protects the inferior, caring for things produced in obedience to divine commands, happy in its harmony with and likeness to the eternal gods." But the excellent author, since, as will afterwards appear, he was anxious to compare Plato's trinity with that which Christians profess, judged it right to free this soul of the world from the office and duty of producing. For the Holy Spirit and this soul of the world would be too unlike each other if to this soul the whole business of procreating and producing be referred, though, as I shall elsewhere show, many of the ancient fathers were not so cautious, nor did they distinguish between the Holy Spirit and this producing soul of the world. Besides this soul of the world therefore, another procreating nature was devised, to which the author is desirous of maintaining that Plato attributed the whole power of production. In which matter he followed the modern Platonists, who, as all who are acquainted with these matters know, added to the three principles of Plato, a fourth, or nature, Vide Proclus in Timæum Platonis, 1050. This subject will be treated of more fully below. It is enough to have intimated here that the passages which the author quotes are not favourable to the plastic nature for which he pleads. For the first, let any one who can, find it in Plato; I am almost certain that the attempt will be vain. See what we have intimated above, cap. 3. sec. 8. The two remaining passages, after having sought for them a long time and with great care, I at length met with in a part where I least expected to find them. But they neither are as quoted in the text, nor do they treat concerning plastic or procreating nature, but refer to the senses of man, which Plato says wait upon the acts of God, the Creator: Ταῦτ' οὖν πάντ' ἔστι τῶν ξυναιτίων, οἷς Θεὸς ὑπηρετοῦσι χρῆται, τὴν τοῦ ἀρίστου κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν ἰδέαν ἀποτελῶν· δοξάζεται δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν πλείστων οὐ ξυναίτια, ἀλλ' αἴτια εἶναι τῶν πάντων, "But all these (human senses) are of that class which assist the causes of things, which God uses as his servants in realizing as far as possible the idea of the supremely excellent. Most, however, think that these are not joint, but sole causes." A little further down he says: Τὸν δὲ νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης ἐραστὴν ἀνάγκη τὰς τῆς ἔμφρονος φύσεως αἰτίας πρώτας μεταδιώκειν, "He, who professes himself an admirer of intelligence and wisdom, must investigate the first causes of an intelligent and wise nature," Plato in Timæo, sect. 36. p. 256. I observe the mention of an intelligent nature in this latter passage, but I do not understand it to be separate from the soul.

[6] De Iside et Osiride, p. 370. tom. 2. opp. The venerable professor Wolf, in Manichæism. ante Manichæum, sect. 30. p. 120. mentions others of the ancients who were of this opinion.

of evil, but only a plastic nature, as Aristotle in sundry places intimates:[7] which he called by that name, partly because he apprehended that the result and upshot of nature in

[7] Neither Aristotle, nor any other of the ancients, have any where said that the friendship and discord of Empedocles is the one plastic nature, so denominated by Empedocles from the double office it performs of separating and conjoining. I am aware that some regard φιλία and νεῖκος, as efficient natures and causes, nor do I forget that Clemens Alexan. Exhort. ad Gentes, cap. 5. p. 55. 56. represents Empedocles as adding these two principles to the number of the gods. But there was never a single writer, so far as I know, who ever supposed these two things to be the one nature which produces and again dissolves all bodies. Nor does the doctrine of Empedocles allow of any one's thinking so: he, I am convinced, in the same manner as Epicurus did, ascribed the production and formation of the first living substances to the fortuitous motions of matter. Read Aristotel. Physicor. lib. 2. cap. 8. p. 475. tom. 1. opp. But to return to Aristotle, he no where treats more fully of the friendship and discord of Empedocles than in lib. 1. Metaphys. cap. 4. p. 267. In this passage, then, he first says it may be seen, that these two things are the causes, the one of good, the other of evil; but he acknowledges that this was not an opinion of Empedocles. He afterwards returns to the subject, and affirms that these two principles are not sufficient to explain the natures of things: Οὔτ' ἐν τούτοις εὑρίσκει τὸ ὁμολογούμενον· πολλαχοῦ γοῦν αὑτῷ ἡ μὲν φιλία διακρίνει, τὸ δὲ νεῖκος συγκρίνει· ὅταν μὲν γὰρ εἰς τὰ στοιχεῖα διΐστηται τὸ πᾶν ὑπὸ τοῦ νείκους, τότε γὰρ πῦρ εἰς ἓν συγκρίνεται, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων στοιχείων ἕκαστον· ὅταν δὲ πάντα ὑπὸ τῆς φιλίας συνιῶσιν εἰς τὸ ἕν, ἀναγκαῖον ἐξ ἑκάστου τὰ μέρεα διακρίνεσθαι πάλιν, "But in these things will not be found what the philosopher desires should follow from them; for in many places his friendship disjoins, his discord unites. When by discord the universe is dissolved into its elements, then fire is united and every one also of the other elements. And when all things by friendship are united, the particles of each are of necessity again separated." I have no mind to explain the force and meaning of this passage, which I think is not very abstruse, but for the present I gather from it that Aristotle neither reckoned the friendship and discord of Empedocles to be one and the same thing, nor did he take them as Cudworth supposed for a nature operating in a certain way, and according to assigned laws. Aristotle was of opinion, as he openly acknowledges in what follows, that these two principles were a moving power concealed in matter. I, for my own part, have often wondered how, what Empedocles meant by these two words, could seem so obscure and almost inexplicable to learned men. That philosopher intended by them what had long been known and maintained by many, but he invested it with new names, and explained it with greater licence, as poets are wont to explain things, so that many have been induced to fancy that he devised something new and remote from the opinions of all others, and that he joined two natures to the four principles of things which existed independently, and were endued with efficient power, whereas he was at the farthest possible distance from this. They who write in poetic strains are accustomed to speak of affections and properties, as though they were persons and natures independently existing. Empedocles, who committed his doctrines to poetic numbers, did the same thing. Following the opinions of the ancients, he nevertheless adorned an old and obsolete doctrine with new names, and moreover, he wrote as if he thought that mind and purpose were present to this friendship and discord. More clearly to explain this point, 1. Empedocles was of that class who regarded matter as endowed by nature with qualities, or who taught the opinions we have referred to in chap. 1. sec. 13. 14. But of qualities, as all know, some are opposed to others, as moist to dry, cold to hot, sweet to bitter. 2. He fancied a rude and unformed mass of matter, or to use the name employed by the ancients, a chaos, in which all these opposing and contrary qualities had from eternity been mingled together:

Congestaque eodem
Non bene junctarum discordia semina rerum.

Ovid. Metamorph. lib. 1. v. 5. 3. From these contrary qualities, mingled in this manner, it could not but happen that fierce contention and tremendous strife should arise:

all generations and corruptions amounted to nothing more than mixtures and separations, or concretion and secretion of pre-existent things; and partly because this plastic nature is that which doth reconcile the contrarieties and enmities of particular things, and bring them into one general harmony in the whole. Which latter is a notion that Plotinus, describing this very seminary reason or plastic nature of the world, (though taking it in something a larger sense than we do in this place) doth ingeniously pursue after this manner: Ἀντιθεὶς δὲ ἀλλήλοις τὰ μέρη, καὶ ποιήσας ἐνδεᾶ, πολέμου καὶ μάχης σύστασιν καὶ γένεσιν εἰργάσατο· καὶ οὕτως ἐστὶν εἷς πᾶς, εἰ μὴ ἓν εἴη· γενόμενον γὰρ ἑαυτῷ τοῖς μέρεσι πολέμιον, οὐτῶς ἓν ἐστι καὶ φίλον, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ δράματος λόγος εἷς, ὁ τοῦ δράματος, ἔχων ἐν αὐτῷ πολλὰς μάχας· τὸ μὲν οὖν δρᾶμα τὰ μεμαχημένα οἷον εἰς μίαν ἁρμονίαν ἄγει σύμφωνον. ——— Ὡς τε μᾶλλον ἄν τις τῇ ἁρμονίᾳ τῇ ἐκ μαχομένων εἰκάσειε,[8] "The seminary reason or plastic nature of the universe, opposing the parts to one another, and making them severally indigent, produces by that means war and contention. And therefore, though it be one, yet notwithstanding it consists of different and contrary things. For there being hostility in its parts, it is nevertheless friendly and agreeable in the whole; after the same manner as in a dramatic poem, clashings and contentions are reconciled into one harmony. And therefore, the seminary and plastic nature of the world may fitly be resembled to the harmony of disagreeing things." Which Plotinic doctrine may well pass for a commentary upon Empedocles, accordingly as Simplicius briefly represents his sense: Ἐμπεδοκλῆς δύο κόσμους

Obstabatque aliis aliud, quia corpore in uno
Frigida pugnabant calidis, humentia siccis,
Mollia cum duris, sine pondere habentia pondus.

Here we have that which Empedocles called νεῖκος and discord. Beausobre, in his Hist. de Manich. p. 32, 33. explains the matter very differently. 4. But after long strife and fierce contentions, cognate qualities, or those particles of matter which were of the same kind, cohered and came together; whether by a divine power, or by any natural instinct I do not now inquire. The dry and fiery particles were formed into one mass, in like manner the watery particles, the terrestrial and the ethereal. Thus, from this unformed chaos four principles of things emerged. Here we have the φιλία and friendship of Empedocles:

Natura
Dissociata locis concordi pace ligavit.

The same discord and friendship remain up to this time in the universe, and according to the opinion of Empedocles are the efficient causes of whatever befals matter; but in what manner I have no opportunity of explaining at length in this place. But there is a time when this strife will cease. After innumerable contentions, one thing only will obtain dominion; discord being removed, friendship will prevail, and all contrary qualities and diverse principles will return to fire alone. Clemens Alexan. Stromat. lib. 5. cap. 14. p. 711. It is not, therefore, the doctrine which Empedocles taught, but the phraseology he employed, which has perplexed learned men, and occasioned so many contentions among both ancients and moderns concerning his meaning. As to the quotations from Simplicius and Plotinus, which Dr. Cudworth brings forward, they do not in any way contribute to his object.

[8] En. 3. lib. 2. sec. 16. p. 267. opp.

συνίστησι, τὸν μὲν ἡνωμένον καὶ νοητὸν, τὸν δὲ διακεκριμένον καὶ αἰσθητὸν καὶ ἐν τούτῳ κόσμῳ τὴν ἕνωσιν ὁρᾷ καὶ τὴν διάκρισιν,[9] "Empedocles makes two worlds, the one united and intelligible, the other divided and sensible; and in this lower sensible world, he takes notice both of unity and discord."

It was before observed, that Heraclitus likewise did assert a regular and artificial nature as the fate of things in this lower world; for his "reason passing through the substance of all things, or ethereal body, which was the seed of the generation of the universe," was nothing but that spermatic or plastic nature which we now speak of. And, whereas there is an odd passage of this philosopher's recorded:[1] *Κόσμον τόνδε οὔτε τις θεῶν οὔτ' ἀνθρώπων ἐποίησε,* "That neither any God nor man made this world," which as it is justly derided by Plutarch for its simplicity, so it looks very atheistically at first sight; yet because Heraclitus has not been accounted an Atheist, we therefore conceive the meaning of it to have been this, that the world was not made by any whatsoever after such a manner as an artificer makes a house, by machines and engines, acting from without upon the matter, cumbersomely and moliminously, but by a certain inward plastic nature of its own.

And as Hippocrates[2] followed Heraclitus in this, (as was before declared,) so did Zeno and the Stoics also; they supposing, besides an intellectual nature as the supreme architect and master-builder of the world, another plastic nature as the immediate workman and operator: which plastic nature hath been already described, in the words of Balbus, as a thing which acts not fortuitously, but regularly, orderly and artificially. And Laërtius tells us,[3] it was defined by Zeno himself after this manner:

[9] In Arist. de Cœl. lib. 1. cap. 10. p. 71. Edit. Græc. Venet. 1526. fol.

[1] Apud Plutarch. de Animæ Procreat. ex Timæo, tom. 2. opp. p. 1014, et apud Clement. Alexandrin. Stromat. lib. 5. cap. 14. p. 711. Concerning Heraclitus what seemed necessary has been already said, in chap. 3. sect. 28. Few, I apprehend, will approve of Dr. Cudworth's interpretation of the passage quoted, nor would he himself have approved of it, had he read not Plutarch only, but Clemens also. From this, further, it is evident that *Heraclitus* thought there were two worlds; one eternal, the other mutable. His eternal world was the first matter of the world which he thought was fire. From this a world was produced liable to corruption, this is the system of things which we behold brought together and generated out of that eternal matter. Moreover, respecting that eternal world, what his words, as quoted by Clemens teach, ought to be taken as his doctrine. Wherefore, from this you will gather nothing except that Heraclitus, just as other ancient philosophers, believed the eternity of matter, and thought that chaos, whence all things sprung, had not been created. So that, had not other things been had recourse to, this opinion among just judges would not suffice to rank Heraclitus among Atheists. This has not escaped the observation of that ingenious patron of Heraclitus, Godof. Olearius, in Diss. Prima de Rerum Omnium Genes. ex Mento Heraclit, sect. 13. p. 852. in Stanley's Hist. Philosoph. vol. 1.

[2] Concerning the nature which Hippocrates maintained, enough has been said in chap. 3. sec. 8. nor will I here repeat what I have said respecting the Stoics and Zeno in chap. 3. sec. 28.

[3] In Vita Zen. lib. 7. segm. 148. p. 459.

Ἔστι δὲ φύσις ἕξις ἐξ αὐτῆς κινουμένη κατὰ σπερματικοὺς λόγους, ἀποτελοῦσά τε καὶ συνέχουσα τὰ ἐξ αὐτῆς ἐν ὡρισμένοις χρόνοις, καὶ τοιαῦτα δρῶσα ἀφ' οἵων ἀπεκρίθη, "Nature is a habit moved from itself according to spermatic reasons or seminal principles, perfecting and containing those several things, which in determinate times are produced from it, and acting agreeably to that from which it was secreted."

Lastly, as the latter Platonists and Peripatetics have unanimously followed their masters herein, whose vegetative soul also is no other than a plastic nature; so the Chymists and Paracelsians insist much upon the same thing, and seem rather to have carried the notion on further, in the bodies of animals, where they call it by a new name of their own, the Archeus.

Moreover, we cannot but observe here, that, as amongst the ancients they were generally condemned for downright Atheists, who acknowledged no other principle besides body or matter, necessarily and fortuitously moved, such as Democritus and the first Ionics; so even Anaxagoras himself, notwithstanding that he was a professed Theist, and plainly asserted mind to be a principle, yet, because he attributed too much to material necessity, admitting neither this plastic nature nor a mundane soul, was severely censured, not only by the vulgar, (who unjustly taxed him for an Atheist) but also by Plato and Aristotle as a kind of spurious and imperfect Theist, and one who had given great advantage to atheism. Aristotle, in his Metaphysics, thus represents his philosophy: Ἀναξαγόρας τε γὰρ μηχανῇ χρῆται τῷ νῷ, πρὸς τὴν κοσμοποιΐαν, καὶ ὅταν ἀπορήσῃ διὰ τίν' αἰτίαν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐστὶ, τότε ἕλκει αὐτὸν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις πάντα μᾶλλον αἰτιᾶται τῶν γινομένων ἢ νοῦν,[4] "Anaxagoras useth mind and intellect, that is, God, as a machine in the Cosmopœia; and when he is at a loss to give an account of things by material necessity, then, and never but then, does he draw in mind or God to help him out; but otherwise he will rather assign any thing else for a cause than mind." Now, if Aristotle censure Anaxagoras in this manner,[5] though a professed Theist, because he did but seldom make use of a mental cause for the solving of the phenomena of the world, and only then when he was at a loss for other material and mechanical causes, (which it seems he sometimes confessed himself to be) what would that philosopher have thought of those our so confident Mechanists of later times, who will never vouchsafe so much as once to be beholden

[4] Lib. 1. cap. 4. p. 267. tom. 4. opp.

[5] In this passage Aristotle does not accuse Anaxagoras of impiety or Atheism, nor does he severely and manifestly blame him, but he simply mentions that though he maintained some other principle than matter, or a cause of motion distinct from matter, yet he seldom makes use of this principle in explaining the operations of nature.

to God Almighty for any thing in the economy of the corporeal world, after the first impression of motion upon the matter?

Plato likewise, in his Phædo,[6] and elsewhere, condemns this Anaxagoras by name for this very thing, that though he acknowledged mind to be a cause, yet he seldom made use of it for solving the phenomena; but in his twelfth De Legibus, he perstringeth him unnamed, as one who, though a professed Theist, had notwithstanding given great encouragement to atheism, after this manner:[7] Λέγοντες ὡς νοῦς εἴη ὁ διακεκοσμηκὼς πάνθ' ὅσα κατ' οὐρανὸν, αὐτοὶ δὲ πάλιν ἁμαρτάνοντες ψυχῆς φύσεως, ὅτι πρεσβύτερον εἴη σωμάτων, ἅπαντ', ὡς εἰπεῖν ἔπος, ἀνέτρεψαν πάλιν, τὰ γὰρ δὴ πρὸ τῶν ὀμμάτων πάντα αὐτοῖς ἐφάνη, τὰ κατ' οὐρανὸν φερόμενα, μεστὰ εἶναι λίθων, καὶ γῆς, καὶ πολλῶν ἄλλων ἀψύχων σωμάτων, διανεμόντων τὰς αἰτίας παντὸς τοῦ κόσμου· ταῦτ' ἦν τὰ τότε ἐξειργασμένα πολλὰς ἀθεότητας, "Some of them, who had concluded, that it was mind, that ordered all things in the heavens, themselves erring concerning the nature of the soul, and not making that older than the body, have overturned all again; for heavenly bodies being supposed by them to be full of stones, and earth, and other inanimate

[6] Page 393. It is so. Plato grievously complains that Anaxagoras even when he had maintained that all things were set in order, and adorned by mind, yet afterwards betook himself to natural causes, thus solving all phenomena. Nevertheless he does not on that account pronounce Anaxagoras an Atheist.

[7] Page 967. Steph. Dr. Cudworth omits some things in citing this passage, nor does he quote the whole sentence of Plato. It is exceedingly probable that Anaxagoras is here censured by Plato for having philosophized concerning celestial bodies more freely than the multitude, and even Socrates, were prepared to tolerate. Vide Xenophon de Reb. Socrat. Memorabil. lib. 4. p. 644. I confess that at first sight it did not seem to agree with what Anaxagoras taught, since Plato affirms that they whom he censures made mind more recent than body. If we may credit ancient testimonies, Anaxagoras was not so insane as to maintain that reason and mind were produced subsequently to bodies, or that they originated in any disposition or modification of matter: such as maintained that opinion are in my judgment in no respect better than Atheists. This question is however set at rest if the language employed by Plato be accurately looked into. For that philosopher does not say, that those of whom he speaks made mind more recent than bodies, but he intimates only that they reasoned as if they believed mind to be the more recent Διανοηθέντες δὲ ὡς νεώτερον. So that to me Plato only seems to intimate, what elsewhere he has left on record, that Anaxagoras acted with no great wisdom, because he endeavoured to overthrow the original causes of things from the very condition of matter. Nor did he call to his aid God and mind, except when compelled to do so by some great and otherwise inexplicable difficulty. From this cause it seems to have happened that many make mind inferior to corporeal things and leave to Deity almost no hand in constructing the universe. But as to what Dr. Cudworth intimates, in the latter part of the sentence this, if I do not greatly err, is uttered less by his reason, than by the indignation he entertained against those who at that time were accounting for every thing in the universe by mechanical laws. The multitude in almost every age, and especially in the age of Plato, have accused of atheism all those who were devoted to the more recondite and sublime studies and inquiries, but can this be taken as proof that nature itself impels men to this, that all shall be taken for Atheists who, in explaining the causes of natural things, are known to attribute much to the laws of motion, and to account the accidents of bodies as of great weight and importance. Judgments of this kind among the common people indicate rather the levity and rashness of men than the instincts of reason and nature.

things, (dispensing the causes of the whole universe) they did by this means occasion much atheism and impiety.

Furthermore, the same Plato there tells us, that in those times of his, astronomers and physiologers commonly lay under the prejudice and suspicion of atheism amongst the vulgar, merely for this reason, because they dealt so much in material causes; Οἱ πολλοὶ διανοοῦνται, τοὺς τὰ τοιαῦτα μεταχειρισαμένους, ἀστρονομίᾳ τε καὶ ταῖς μετὰ ταύτης ἀναγκαίαις ἄλλαις τέχναις, ἀθέους γίγνεσθαι, καθεωρακότας ὡς οἷόντε γιγνόμενα ἀνάγκαις τὰ πράγματ', ἀλλ' οὐ διανοίαις βουλήσεως ἀγαθῶν περὶ τελουμένων, "The vulgar think, that they, who addict themselves to astronomy and physiology, are made Atheists thereby, they seeing as much as is possible, how things come to pass by material necessities, and being thereby disposed to think them not to be ordered by mind and will, for the sake of good." From whence we may observe, that, according to the natural apprehensions of men in all ages, they who resolve the phenomena of nature into material necessity, allowing of no final nor mental causality, (disposing things in order to ends) have been strongly suspected for friends to atheism.

7. But because some may pretend, that the plastic nature is all one with an occult quality, we shall here show, how great a difference there is betwixt these two. For he, that asserts an occult quality for the cause of any phenomenon, does indeed assign no cause at all of it, but only declare his own ignorance of the cause: but he, that asserts a plastic nature, assigns a determinate and proper cause, nay the only intelligible cause, of that which is the greatest of all phenomena in the world, namely the τὸ εὖ καὶ καλῶς, "the orderly, regular and artificial frame" of things in the universe, whereof the mechanic philosophers, however pretending to solve all phenomena by matter and motion, assign no cause at all. Mind and understanding is the only cause of orderly regularity; and he that asserts a plastic nature, asserts mental causality in the world; but the fortuitous mechanists, who, exploding final causes, will not allow mind and understanding to have any influence at all upon the frame of things, can never possibly assign any cause of this grand phenomenon, unless confusion may be said to be the cause of order, and fortune or chance of constant regularity; and therefore themselves must resolve it into an occult quality. Nor indeed does there appear any great reason, why such men should assert an infinite mind in the world,[8] since they do not

[8] But the followers of Descartes will stoutly affirm that they do not exclude God from all direction in the affairs of the world, since they affirm that he preserves the laws of motion. See note at sec. 6. from whence also the reason and propriety of what was maintained, sec. 7. appear.

allow it to act any where at all, and therefore must needs make it to be in vain.

8. Now, this plastic nature being a thing which is not without some difficulty in the conception of it, we shall here endeavour to do these two things concerning it; first, to set down a right representation thereof; and then afterwards to show, how extremely the notion of it hath been mistaken, perverted and abused by those Atheists, who would make it to be the only God Almighty, or first principle of all things.

How the plastic nature is in general to be conceived, Aristotle instructs us in these words: Εἰ ἐνῆν ἐν τῳ ξύλῳ ἡ ναυπηγικὴ, ὁμοίως ἂν τῇ φύσει ἐποίει,[9] "If the naupegical art, that is, the art of the shipwright, were in the timber itself operatively and effectually, it would there act just as nature doth." And the case is the same for all other arts. If the œcodomical art, which is in the mind of the architect, were supposed to be transfused into the stones, bricks and mortar, there acting upon them in such a manner as to make them come together of themselves, and range themselves into the form of a complete edifice, as Amphion was said, by his harp, to have made the stones move, and place themselves orderly of their own accord, and so to have built the walls of Thebes; or if the musical art were conceived to be immediately in the instruments and strings, animating them as a living soul, and making them to move exactly, according to the laws of harmony, without any external impulse: these, and such like instances, in Aristotle's judgment, would be fit iconisms or representations of the plastic nature, that being art itself acting immediately upon the matter as an inward principle in it. To which purpose the same philosopher adds, that this thing might be further illustrated by another instance or resemblance,[1] Μάλιστα δὲ δῆλον, ὅταν τις ἰατρεύει αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν, τούτῳ γὰρ ἔοικεν ἡ φύσις, "Nature may be yet more clearly resembled to the medicinal art, when it is employed by the physician in curing himself." So that the meaning of this philosopher is, that nature is to be conceived as art acting not from without and at a distance, but immediately upon the thing itself which is formed by it. And thus we have the first general conception of the plastic nature, that it is art itself, acting immediately on the matter as an inward principle.

9. In the next place, we are to observe, that though the plastic nature be a kind of art, yet there are some considerable preeminences which it hath above human art: the first whereof is this, that whereas human art cannot act upon the matter otherwise than from without and at a distance, nor communicate itself

[9] Phys. lib. 2. c. 8. p. 447. tom. 1. opp.

[1] But Dr. Cudworth acknowledges a little lower down, sec. 11. that this comparison is not an apt illustration of his plastic nature.

to it, but with a great deal of tumult and hurliburly, noise and clatter, it using hands and axes, saws and hammers, and after this manner with much ado, by knockings and thrustings, slowly introducing its form or idea (as for example of a ship or house) into the materials; nature in the mean time is another kind of art, which insinuating itself immediately into things themselves, and there acting more commandingly upon the matter as an inward principle, does its work easily, cleverly, and silently. Nature is art as it were incorporated and embodied in matter, which doth not act upon it from without mechanically, but from within vitally and magically;[2] Οὔτε χεῖρες ἐνταῦθα, οὔτε πόδες, οὔτε τι ὄργανον ἐπακτὸν ἢ σύμφυτον, ὕλης δὲ δεῖ, ἐφ' ἧς ποιήσει, καὶ ἣν ἐν εἴδει ποιεῖ παντὶ που δῆλον. Δεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ μοχλεύειν ἀφελεῖν ἐκ τῆς φυσικῆς ποιήσεως· ποῖος γὰρ ὠθισμός, ἢ τὶς μοχλεία, &c., "Here are no hands, nor feet, nor any instrument, connate, or adventitious, there being only need of matter to work upon, and to be brought into a certain form, and nothing else. For it is manifest that the operation of nature is different from mechanism, it doing not its work by trusion or pulsion, by knockings or thrustings, as if it were without that which it wrought upon." But as God is inward to every thing, so nature acts immediately upon the matter, as an inward and living soul, or law in it.

10. Another pre-eminence of nature above human art is this, that whereas human artists are often to seek and at a loss, and therefore consult and deliberate, as also upon second thoughts mend their former work; nature, on the contrary, is never to seek what to do, nor at a stand; and for that reason also (besides another that will be suggested afterwards) it doth never consult nor deliberate. Indeed Aristotle intimates, as if this had been the grand objection of the old atheistic philosophers against the plastic nature, That because we do not see natural bodies to consult or deliberate, therefore there could be nothing of art, counsel or contrivance in them, but all came to pass fortuitously. But he confutes it after this manner:[3] Ἄτοπον δὲ τὸ μὴ οἴεσθαι ἕνεκά του γίνεσθαι, ἐὰν μὴ ἴδωσι τὸ κινοῦν βουλευσάμενον, καίτοι καὶ ἡ τέχνη οὐ βουλεύεται, "It is absurd for men to think nothing to be done for ends, if they do not see that which moves

[2] Plotin. En. 3. lib. 8. sec. 1. p. 344. Dr. Cudworth was wont to quote the later Platonic authors on this subject, and not seldom to adopt their very words and forms of expression. The terms which he employs throughout his book are taken from the Platonic vocabulary, and it must be acknowledged that none of the ancient philosophers approached nearer to his opinion than these Platonists. There are long and acute discussions extant concerning nature as producing and originating, especially in every part of Plotinus and Proclus which the learned Doctor had entirely imbibed.

[3] Phys. lib. 2. c. 8. p. 477. tom. 1. opp. Aristotle nowhere preserves the argument exactly which is here quoted: from his words, which Cudworth immediately afterwards gives, the learned Doctor imagines that there were in that age some who attacked the doctrine of plastic nature with an argument of this kind.]

to consult, although art itself doth not consult." Whence he concludes, that nature may act artificially, orderly and methodically, for the sake of ends, though it never consult or deliberate. Indeed human artists themselves do not consult properly as they are artists, but whenever they do it, it is for want of art, and because they are to seek, their art being imperfect and adventitious: but art itself or perfect art is never to seek, and therefore doth never consult or deliberate. And nature is this art,[4] which never hesitates nor studies, as unresolved what to do, but is always readily prompted; nor does it ever repent afterwards of what it hath formerly done, or go about, as it were upon second thoughts, to alter and mend its former course, but it goes on in one constant unrepenting tenor, from generation to generation, because it is the stamp or impress of that infallibly omniscient art, of the divine understanding, which is the very law and rule of what is simply the best in every thing.

And thus we have seen the difference between nature and human art; that the latter is imperfect art, acting upon the matter from without, and at a distance; but the former is art itself, or perfect art, acting as an inward principle in it. Wherefore when art is said to imitate nature, the meaning thereof is, that imperfect human art imitates that perfect art of nature, which is really no other than the divine art itself; as before Aristotle, Plato had declared in his Sophist,[5] in these words: Τὰ φύσει λεγόμενα. ποιεῖσθαι θείᾳ τέχνῃ, "Those things, which are said to be done by nature, are indeed done by divine art."

11. Notwithstanding which we are to take notice in the next place, that as nature is not the Deity itself, but a thing very remote from it, and far below it, so neither is it the divine art,

[4] I apprehend that the sentiments here uttered concerning nature will be thought by some more liberal and honourable than can be made consistent with what is said above, sec. 5. or lower down, sect. 11, 12, 15. I. The author had elsewhere maintained that nature was wanting in the faculty of choosing and judging. Here however, he speaks as if it performs every operation with deliberate counsel. For he asserts, not to mention other matters, that nature never undertakes any thing of which it has afterwards to repent. II. Elsewhere he concedes that sometimes God amends and corrects the errors and faults into which nature falls, but here he seems to intimate that nature never commits a fault or does any thing to be afterwards amended. I omit other things. They however who treat on a subject which they themselves confess that they but imperfectly understand, and which is surrounded with much of obscurity, are wont commonly to use expressions mutually inconsistent, and to affirm in one place what in another they overthrow. This indulgence we ought to give to human weakness, since we somewhat moderately censure our own faults of the same kind.

[5] The Sophist. in the last dialogue p. 168. opp. But care must be taken that in these words of Plato the φύσις be not understood as equivalent to our author's plastic nature. Plato having intimated that there were some who denied a God, and affirmed that all things were created by φύσις, or nature, adds that he would maintain that the things which they profanely declared were created by φύσις, were framed with divine wisdom and skill. How greatly this sentiment differs from Dr. Cudworth's interpretation, is clear enough; he forsooth imagines that Plato said the effects which plastic nature produced proceed from divine skill, or that plastic nature follows the divine skill as its guide and rule of action.

as it is in itself pure and abstract, but concrete and embodied only; for the divine art considered in itself is nothing but knowledge, understanding, or wisdom in the mind of God. Now knowledge and understanding, in its own nature, is κεχωρισμένον τι, "a certain separate and abstract thing," and of so subtle and refined a nature, as that it is not capable of being incorporated with matter, or mingled and blended with it as the soul of it. And therefore Aristotle's second instance, which he propounds as most pertinent to illustrate this business of nature by, namely, of the physican's art curing himself, is not so adequate thereunto; because when the medicinal art cures the physician, in whom it is, it doth not there act as nature, that is, as concrete and embodied art, but as knowledge and understanding only, which is art naked, abstract, and unbodied; as also it doth its work ambagiously, by the physician's willing and prescribing to himself the use of such medicaments, as do but conduce, by removing of impediments, to help that, which is nature indeed, or the inward archeus to effect the cure. Art is defined by Aristotle[6] to be λόγος τοῦ ἔργου ἄνευ ὕλης, "the reason of the thing without matter;" and so the divine art or knowledge in the mind of God is unbodied reason; but nature is ratio mersa et confusa, reason immersed and plunged into matter, and as it were fuddled in it, and confounded with it. Nature is not the divine art archetypal, but only ectypal; it is a living stamp or signature of the divine wisdom; which though it act exactly according to its archetype, yet it doth not at all comprehend nor understand the reason of what itself doth. And the difference between these two may be resembled to that between the λόγος ἐνδιάθετος, "the reason of the mind and conception," called verbum mentis, and the λόγος προφορικὸς, "the reason of external speech;" the latter of which, though it bear a certain stamp and impress of the former upon it, yet itself is nothing but articulate sound, devoid of all understanding and sense. Or else we may illustrate this business by another similitude, comparing the divine art and wisdom to an architect, but nature to a manuary opificer; the difference betwixt which two is thus set forth by Aristotle[7] pertinently to our purpose: Τοὺς ἀρχιτέκτονας περὶ ἕκαστον τιμιωτέρους καὶ μᾶλλον εἰδέναι νομίζομεν τῶν χειροτεχνῶν, καὶ σοφωτέρους, ὅτι τὰς αἰτίας τῶν ποιουμένων ἴσασιν· οἱ δ' ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν ἀψύχων ἔνια, ποιεῖ μὲν, οὐκ εἰδότα δὲ ποιεῖ, οἷον καίει τὸ πῦρ· τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄψυχα φύσει τινὶ ποιεῖν τούτων ἕκαστον· τοὺς δὲ χειροτέχνας δι' ἔθος, "We account the architects in every thing more honourable than the manuary opificers, because they understand the reason of things done; whereas the

[6] De Partib. Animal. lib. 1. cap. 1. p. 472. tom. 2. opp.
[7] Met. lib. 1. cap. 1. p. 260. tom. 4. opp.

other, as some inanimate things, only do, not knowing what they do; the difference between them being only this, that inanimate things act by a certain nature in them, but the manuary opificer by habit." Thus nature may be called the χειροτέχνης, or manuary opificer,[8] that acts subserviently under the architectonical art and wisdom of the divine understanding,[9] ἢ ποιεῖ μὲν οὐκ εἰδυῖα, "which does do without knowing the reason of what it doth."

12. Wherefore as we did before observe the pre-eminences of nature above human art, so we must here take notice also of the imperfections and defects of it, in which respect it falls short of human art, which are likewise two; and the first of them is this, that though it act artificially for the sake of ends, yet itself doth neither intend those ends, nor understand the reason of that it doth. Nature is not master of that consummate art and wisdom, according to which it acts, but only a servant to it, and a drudging executioner of the dictates of it. This difference betwixt nature and abstract art or wisdom is expressed by Plotinus in these words:[1] Τί διοίσει τῆς λεγομένης φύσεως φρόνησις; ὅτι ἡ μὲν φρόνησις πρῶτον, ἡ δὲ φύσις ἔσχατον, ἴνδαλμα γάρ φρονήσεως· ἡ φύσις, καὶ ψυχῆς ἔσχατον ὄν, ἔσχατον καὶ τὸν ἐν αὐτῇ ἐλλαμπόμενον λογὸν ἔχει. οἷον εἰ ἐν κηρῷ βαθεῖ διϊκνεῖτο εἰς ἔσχατον ἐπὶ θάτερα ἐν τῇ ἐπιφανείᾳ τύπος· ἐνάργους μὲν ὄντος τοῦ ἄνω, ἴχνους

[8] I. Although the excellent author spares no pains that he may give his readers a correct idea of the nature concerning which he treats, and may distinguish it from divine skill; there will nevertheless be many I have no doubt, who will be in the dark respecting it. Nor do I hesitate to say that some things are said here much more calculated to perplex than to explain and render the subject clear. I pass over the reference to medical skill healing the physician himself, which perhaps will be considered somewhat too subtle. I would like to have it shown how, since skill is a thing entirely apart from matter, plastic nature can be skill conjoined with matter, and yet unlike medical skill consulting the physician himself. But I cease to wonder at and inquire into these and other similar points, when I see the learned Doctor occupied in attempts to explain what, according to his own acknowledgment, he but imperfectly understood. II. What difference there is between an architect and the manual labourer, it was not necessary for our author to resort to Aristotle to show. All know this well enough who are but moderately observant of ordinary life. This comparison is in my judgment even less suited to explain the difference between plastic nature and deity, than was Aristotle's from the physician. Plastic nature forsooth, is art, the image of the divine art, intelligent, if I rightly catch the meaning of Cudworth, and acquainted with what it does, and the rules by which it operates. What similarity is there in this to a workman who follows out with the labour of his hands, the plans of the architect? He knows nothing of architecture, nor of the laws of building; he only adjusts the material, fits it, and disposes of it as the builder directs. Were nature any thing of this kind, God would be the architect and builder of all things, nor could nature be accused of any fault, but the charge would lie against God, at whose command and direction nature, itself unintelligent, operates. I will say in one word what I think: the views which the learned author here gives concerning his plastic nature scarcely seem consistent, or capable of being harmonized with each other.

[9] Plotinus, whom chiefly Cudworth familiarly quotes, speaks thus in his book Utrum Stellæ aliquid agant. Ennead. 2. lib 3. cap. 17. p. 147.

[1] From lib. 2. de Dubitationibus Animæ, Ennead. 4. lib. 4. cap. 13. p. 467.

δὲ ἀσθενοῦς ὄντος τοῦ κάτω, ὅθεν οὐδὲ οἶδε φύσις, μόνον δὲ ποιεῖ. "How doth wisdom differ from that which is called nature? verily in this manner, that wisdom is the first thing, but nature the last and lowest; for nature is but an image or imitation of wisdom, the last thing of the soul, which hath the lowest impress of reason shining upon it; as when a thick piece of wax is thoroughly impressed upon by a seal, that impress, which is clean and distinct in the superior superficies of it, will in the lower side be weak and obscure; and such is the stamp and signature of nature, compared with that of wisdom and understanding, nature being a thing which doth only do, but not know." And elsewhere the same writer declares the difference between the spermatic λόγοι, or reasons, and knowledges or conceptions of the mind in this manner; Πότερα δὲ οἱ λόγοι οὗτοι οἱ ἐν ψυχῇ νοήματα; ἀλλὰ πῶς κατὰ τὰ νοήματα ποιήσει; ὁ γὰρ λόγος ἐν ὕλῃ ποιεῖ, καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν φυσικῶς, οὐ νόησις, οὐδὲ ὅρασις, ἀλλὰ δύναμις τρεπτικὴ τῆς ὕλης, οὐκ εἰδυῖα, ἀλλὰ δρῶσα μόνον, οἷον τύπον καὶ σχῆμα ἐν ὕδατι,[2] "Whether are these plastic reasons or forms in the soul knowledges? but how shall it then act according to those knowledges? for the plastic reason or form acts or works in matter, and that which acts naturally is not intellection nor vision, but a certain power of moving matter, which doth not know, but only do, and makes as it were a stamp or figure in water.

And with this doctrine of the ancients, a modern judicious writer and sagacious inquirer into nature seems fully to agree, that nature is such a thing as doth not know, but only do: for after he had admired that wisdom and art, by which the bodies of animals are framed, he concludes, that one or other of these two things must needs be acknowledged, that either the vegetative or plastic power of the soul, by which it fabricates and organizes its own body, is more excellent and divine than the rational; or else, "in naturæ operibus neque prudentiam nec intellectum inesse, sed ita solum videri conceptui nostro, qui secundum artes nostras et facultates, seu exemplaria à nobismetipsis mutuata, de rebus naturæ divinis judicamus; quasi principia naturæ activa effectus suos eo modo producerent, quo nos opera nostra artificialia solemus:[3] "That in the works of

[2] Ennead. 2. lib. 3. cap. 17. p. 147. Utrum Stellæ aliquid agant.

[3] Harv. de Gen. Animal. ex. 49. p. 145. ed. London 1551. Of how much weight the authority of Harvey is in confirming this sentiment, will be better understood if his words be quoted entire. "Quoniam igitur, in pulli fabrica ars et providentia non minus elucescunt, quam in hominis ac totius mundi creatione; necesse est, fateamur, in generatione hominis caussam efficientem ipso homine superiorem et præstantiorem dari, vel facultatem vegetativam, sive eam animæ partem, quæ hominem fabricat et conservat, multo excellentiorem et diviniorem esse, magisque similitudinem Dei referre, quam partem ejus rationalem, cujus tamen excellentiam miris laudibus supra omnes omnium animalium facultates extollimus, tamquam quæ jus et imperium in illas

nature there is neither prudence nor understanding, but only it seems so to our apprehensions, who judge of these divine things of nature according to our own arts and faculties, and patterns borrowed from ourselves: as if the active principles of nature did produce their effects in the same manner as we do our artificial works." Wherefore we conclude, agreeably to the sense of the best philosophers, both ancient and modern, that nature is such a thing, as though it act artificially, and for the sake of ends, yet it doth but ape and mimic the divine art and wisdom, itself not understanding those ends which it acts for, nor the reason of what it doth in order to them; for which cause also it is not capable of consultation or deliberation, nor can it act electively, or with discretion.

13. But because this may seem strange at the first sight, that nature should be said to act ἕνεκά του, "for the sake of ends," and regularly or artificially, and yet be itself devoid of knowledge and understanding, we shall therefore endeavour to persuade the possibility, and facilitate the belief of it, by some other instances; and first by that of habits, particularly those musical ones of singing, playing upon instruments, and dancing. Which habits direct every motion of the hand, voice, and body, and prompt them readily, without any deliberation, or studied consideration, what the next following note or motion should be. If you jog a sleeping musician, and sing but the first words of a song to him, which he had either himself composed, or learnt

obtineat, cuique cuncta creata famulentur. Vel saltim fatendum est," &c. "Since then in the construction of the chicken, art and forethought are as evident as in the forming of man, and of the whole world of beings, it is requisite we confess that in the production of man some efficient cause should be supposed, superior to and more excellent than man himself, or that the vegetative faculty, or that part of the soul which frames and preserves man, should be more excellent, more divine, and more resembling God, than his rational part, the excellency of which, nevertheless, we are accustomed so wonderfully to extol above all the faculties of all other animals whatever, as that which obtains and exercises authority over them, and is universally obeyed by them," &c. Then follow the words quoted by Dr. Cudworth. The preceding paragraph of Harvey would have been more suitable to the learned Doctor's purpose, but it would have appeared from it that Harvey did not form the idea of such a nature as he speaks of. He preferred, therefore, to use the words which he quoted. Harvey referred the formation and production of all things to God. l. c. p. 290. "Quapropter, rem recte pieque reputaverit, qui rerum omnium generationes ab eodem illo æterno atque omnipotente Numine deduxerit.—Nec magnopere litigandum censeo, quo numine primum hoc Agens compellandum aut venerandum veniat, sive Deus, sive Natura Naturans, sive Anima Mundi appelletur. Id enim omnes intelligunt,—quod ubique præsens singulis rerum naturalium operibus non minus adsit, quam toti universo, quod numine suo sive providentia, arte ac mente divina cuncta animalia procreet." "On which account that writer speaks correctly and piously, who deduces the production of all things from the same eternal and almighty will.—Nor do I think it worth while to contend very much under what name this agent shall be addressed or worshipped; whether he shall be called Deus or Natura Naturans or Anima Mundi. For all understand this—that he is every where present, not less in every natural operation than in the whole universe—that providence creates all animals at its own will, with skill and divine intelligence." It is God, therefore, according to Harvey, and not nature, who acts with forethought, skill, and wisdom.

before, he will presently take it from you, and that perhaps before he is thoroughly awake, going on with it, and singing out the remainder of the whole song to the end. Thus the singers of an exercised lutonist, and the legs and whole body of a skilful dancer, are directed to move regularly and orderly, in a long train and series of motions, by those artificial habits in them, which do not themselves at all comprehend those laws and rules of music or harmony, by which they are governed. So that the same thing may be said of these habits, which was said before of nature, that they do not know, but only do. And thus we see there is no reason why this plastic nature (which is supposed to move body regularly and artificially) should be thought to be an absolute impossibility, since habits do, in like manner, gradually evolve themselves in a long train or series of regular and artificial motions, readily prompting the doing of them, without comprehending that art and reason by which they are directed. The forementioned philosopher illustrates the seminary reason and plastic nature of the universe, by this very instance: Ἡ τοίνυν ἐνέργεια αὐτῆς τεχνικὴ· ὥσπερ ἂν ὁ ὀρχούμενος, κινούμενος εἴη· ὁ γὰρ ὀρχιστὴς, τῇ οὕτω τεχνικῇ ζωῇ ἔοικεν αὐτος, καὶ ἡ τέχνη αὐτὸν κινεῖ, καὶ οὕτω κινεῖ, ὡς τῆς ζωῆς αὐτῆς τοιαύτης πως οὔσης,[4] "The energy of nature is artificial, as when a dancer moves; for a dancer resembles this artificial life of nature, forasmuch as art itself moves him, and so moves him as being such a life in him." And agreeably to this conceit, the ancient mythologists represented the nature of the universe by Pan playing upon a pipe or harp,[5] and being in love with the nymph Echo; as if nature did, by a kind of silent melody, make all the parts of the universe every where dance in measure and proportion, itself being as it were in the mean time delighted and ravished with the re-echoing of its own harmony. Habits are said to be an adventitious and acquired nature, and nature was before defined by the Stoics[6] to be ἕξις, or a habit; so that there seems to be no other difference between these two than this, that whereas the one is acquired by teaching, industry and exercise; the other, as was expressed by Hippocrates[7], is

[4] Ennead. 3. lib. 2. cap. 16. p. 267. opp.

[5] Many ancient writers concur in this explanation of the fable of Pan, who thought that this deity was a representative either of the universe or of the ethereal spirit pertaining to the universe. See Gerh. Joh. Vossius, De Ididolatr. Gent. lib. 7. cap. 3. p. 721. But others think Pan intended to represent the sun only. See Gilb. Cuperi Harpocrates, p. 88. I am of neither of these opinions, but think with the most ancient Christian fathers, that these explanations of ancient fables were invented by philosophers, to conceal the baseness of the deities who were worshipped. Other things which I might here intimate, I shall designedly omit. The thing speaks for itself as to how much of correctness or of force there is in this comparison between plastic nature and Pan playing upon his pipe and being in love with the nymph.

[6] Apud Diogen. Laërt. lib. 7. segm. 148. p. 459.

[7] Epidemicor. lib. 6. sect. 5. p. 509. tom. 1. edit. Vander Linden. Compare what we have said cap. 3. sect. 7. A not very dissimilar doctrine is found in Hippocrates, lib. περὶ τροφῆς. sect. 8. p. 597. tom. 1 opp. Φύσιες πάντων ἀδίδακτοι,

ἀπαίδευτος καὶ οὐκ μαθοῦσα, "unlearned and untaught," and may in some sense also be said to be αὐτοδίδακτος, "self-taught,"[8] though she be indeed always inwardly prompted, secretly whispered into, and inspired by the divine art and wisdom.

14. Moreover, that something may act artificially and for ends, without comprehending the reason of what it doth, may be further evinced from those natural instincts that are in animals, which without knowledge direct them to act regularly, in order both to their own good, and the good of the universe. As for example; the bees in mellification, and in framing their combs and hexagonial cells, the spiders in spinning their webs, the birds in building their nests, and many other animals in such like actions of theirs, which would seem to argue a great sagacity in them, whereas notwithstanding as Aristotle observes:[9]

"Nature uses no instructor." But the φύσις of Hippocrates differs very widely from the plastic nature of Dr. Cudworth.

[8] I suppose that the learned Doctor was thinking of the opinion of Harvey in these words, for he, De Generat. Animal. Exercit. 50. calls nature αὐτοδίδακτον. As to what pertains to the comparison of plastic nature with habits, which is here suggested, I think that there is less of fitness and propriety in it than the excellent author imagined. I. Plastic nature is something subsisting by itself, it is not a faculty of any other nature. But what is habit? Assuredly nothing but the faculties and powers of mind. For although Dr. Cudworth here speaks of these habits as if they were natures existing by themselves, and endued with efficient power, it is nevertheless clear, that they are nothing more than the soul itself, more expertly employing its powers upon some matters than on others, or the properties of the soul. The habit of singing and of dancing, what are they? the powers of the soul producing more quickly than it was wont, a long series of motions and of tones. The habit of writing a letter, what is it but the power of the soul applying with the greatest readiness its faculty of memory? But is it proper to compare an acquired power of any kind with a nature independently existing and acting? II. Plastic nature neither reasons, nor thinks, nor deliberates; nor is it conscious of its own acts, but it operates only according to a fixed law in some such way as if it were governed by fate. Is the soul when its habits are in exercise itself inactive? This will not be pretended. The soul of the dancer or of the singer thinks what motions and tones are fitting, and what are not, what shall follow and what shall not, nor while a man is singing or dancing can the mind either sleep or become inactive. But since the mind has long been accustomed to these motions, it thinks and deliberates with so much rapidity, that a man is scarcely aware of his own thoughts and reasonings. I never believed

Chironomon Ledam molli saltante Batillo:

While the gentle Batillus is dancing the gracefully gesticulating (dance) Leda:
Juv. Sat. 6. v. 68.

although nothing can be imagined swifter than his motions, he entirely ceased from mental action, and that his body and feet were as if unconsciously urged on and moved without thought; just as he who readily recites a speech which has been committed to memory, although he seems not at all to think or to meditate, nevertheless reflects and labours with his mind; so they also who are skilled in music, strike the harp with incredible celerity. III. Nature knows not with what design and to what end it acts. But they do know who employ the habit of dancing, singing, writing, or any thing else. No one sings or dances except for the sake of being pleased, or giving pleasure, nor can he be ignorant that this is the object of his singing and dancing. I pass over other things. I do not discuss this matter for the purpose of entirely overthrowing a plastic nature. Let it live by all means if it can sustain itself, I only contend that it cannot with propriety be compared with habits.

[9] Physicor. lib. 2. cap. 10. p. 476. tom. 1. opp.

οὔτε τέχνῃ, οὔτε ζητήσαντα, οὔτε βουλευσάμενα ποιεῖ, "they do these things, neither by art, nor by counsel, nor by any deliberation of their own;" and therefore are not masters of that wisdom, according to which they act; but only passive to the instincts and impresses thereof upon them. And indeed to affirm that brute animals do all these things by a knowledge of their own, and which themselves are masters of, and that without deliberation and consultation, were to make them to be endued with a most perfect intellect, far transcending that of human reason; whereas it is plain enough that brutes are not above consultation, but below it, and that these instincts of nature in them are nothing but a kind of fate upon them.[1]

15. There is in the next place another imperfection to be observed in the plastic nature, that as it doth not comprehend the reason of its own action, so neither is it clearly and expressly conscious of what it doth; in which respect it doth not only fall short of human art, but even of that very manner of acting, which is in brutes themselves, who though they do not understand the reason of those actions, that their natural instincts lead them to, yet they are generally conceived to be conscious of them, and to do them by fancy; whereas the plastic nature in the formation of plants and animals seems to have no animal fancy, no express συναίσθησις, "con-sense" or "consciousness" of what it doth. Thus the often commended philosopher, Ἡ φύσις οὐδὲ φαντασίαν ἔχει, ἡ δὲ νόησις φαντασίας κρείττων, φαντασία δὲ μεταξὺ φύσεως τύπου καὶ νοήσεως· ἡ μέν γε οὐδενὸς ἀντίληψιν οὐδε σύνεσιν ἔχει,[2] "Nature hath not so much as any fancy in it; as intellection and knowledge is a thing superior to fancy, so fancy is superior to the impress of nature, for nature hath no apprehension nor conscious perception of any thing." In a word, nature is a thing that hath no such self-perception or self-enjoyment in it, as animals have.

16. Now, we are well aware, that this is a thing which the narrow principles of some late philosophers[3] will not admit of, that there should be any action distinct from local motion besides expressly conscious cogitation. For they, making the first general heads of all entity to be extension and cogitation, or extended being and cogitative, and then supposing that the essence of cogitation consists in express consciousness, must needs by this means exclude such a plastic life of nature,

[1] I could scarcely have expected this comparison, drawn from the instinct of brute animals, in an author who is of opinion that there are souls in beasts, and that their motions are directed by mind. For when mind governs, but little opportunity is left for the operations of instinct. I do not urge that the learned author speaks on behalf of these instincts, as if they were natures possessing freedom of action without liberty of choice.

[2] Ennead. 4. lib. 4. sect. 13. de Dubitat. Animæ, lib. 2. p. 407.

[3] I scarcely need say that Descartes and his followers are here referred to.

as we speak of, that is supposed to act without animal fancy or express consciousness. Wherefore we conceive,[4] that the first heads of being ought rather to be expressed thus: resisting or antitypous extension, and life, (*i. e.* internal energy and self activity;) and then again, that life or internal self-activity is to be subdivided into such as either acts with express consciousness and synæsthesis, or such as is without it; the latter of which is this plastic life of nature: so that there may be an action distinct from local motion, or a vital energy, which is not accompanied with that fancy, or consciousness, that is in the energies of animal life; that is, there may be a simple internal energy or vital autokinesy, which is without that duplication that is included in the nature of *συναίσθησις*, "consense and consciousness," which makes a being to be present with itself, attentive to its own actions, or animadversive of them, to perceive itself to do or to suffer, and to have a fruition or enjoyment of itself. And indeed, it must be granted, that what moves matters or determines the motion of it vitally, must needs do it by some other energy of its own, as it is reasonable also to conceive, that itself hath some vital sympathy with that matter which it acts upon. But we apprehend that both these may be without clear and express consciousness. Thus the philosopher: *Πᾶσα ζωὴ ἐνέργεια, καὶ ἡ φαύλη, ἐνέργεια δὲ, οὐχ ὡς τὸ πῦρ ἐνέργει, ἀλλ' ἡ ἐνέργεια αὐτῆς, κἂν μὴ αἴσθησίς τις παρῇ, κίνησίς τις οὐκ εἰκῇ,*[*] "Every life is energy, even the worst of lives, and therefore that of nature. Whose energy is not like that of fire, but such an energy, as though there be no sense belonging to it, yet it is not temerarious or fortuitous, but orderly and regular."

Wherefore this controversy, whether the energy of the plastic

[4] The very learned Jean le Clerc, referring to this passage, is pleased to afford it some support and confirmation. "Il est certain," he says, "que la distribution, que l'on fait des etres en certaines Especes, n'est fondée que sur l'etendue de nos connoissances, et que si l'on dit qu'il n'y a que des Esprits, ou des etres qui pensent, et qui ont un sentiment interieur d'euxmemes; et des corps, ou des etres etendus solides et divisibiles; c'est parce que l'on n'a des idées distinctes, ou que l'on croit telles que de ces deux especes d'etres. Mais on ne peut pas s'assurer qu'il n'y a rien dans la nature que ce dont on a des idées distinctes. Qui oseroit nier que Dieu ne puisse avoir fait des etres, dont il ne nous a donne aucune idée? Dieu nous a t'il fait pour connoitre tout, ou est il oblige de nous decouvrier tous ses secrets? C'est ce qu'on n'oseroit dire, puis qu'il y a une infinité des choses, qui nos ignorons. Mais on dira que cela ne suffit pas, pour assurer qu'il y a quelque nature differente de celles qui nous connoissons. Il est vrai, et je n'ai pas dessein de concluire de notre seule ignorance qu'il y a des substances, qui nous ne connoissons pas. Il suffit que l'on m'accorde qui ce raisonnement ne vaut rien: je n'ai point d'idée de cette substance, donc elle n'est point. Cela etant ainsi il s'agira de savoir si nous n'avons pas sujet de croire qu'il n'y a quelque chose dans la nature, qui n'est ni esprit ni corps de la maniere dont nous les avons definis." Bibliotheque Choisée, tom. 2. art. 2. p. 107. 108. The same idea, that there are other kinds of living natures besides minds and bodies, a very learned countryman of Dr. Cudworth's, Nehemiah Grew, not to mention others, has pursued fully, and with great erudition, in Cosmologia Sacra, or a Discourse of the Universe, lib. 2. passim.

[*] Ennead 3. lib. 2. cap. 16. De Provid. lib. 1. p. 267.

nature be cogitation or no, seems to be but a logomachy, or contention about words. For if clear and express consciousness be supposed to be included in cogitation, then it must needs be granted, that cogitation doth not belong to the plastic life of nature: but if the notion of that word be enlarged, so as to comprehend all action distinct from local motion, and to be of equal extent with life, then the energy of nature is cogitation.

Nevertheless, if any one think fit to attribute some obscure and imperfect sense or perception, different from that of animals, to the energy of nature, and will therefore call it a kind of drowsy, unawakened, or astonished cogitation, the philosopher before mentioned will not very much gainsay it: *Εἴτις βούληται σύνεσίν τινα ἤ αἴσθησιν αὐτῇ διδόναι, οὐχ οἷον λέγομεν ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τὴν αἴσθησιν ἢ τὴν σύνεσιν, ἀλλ' οἷον εἴ τις τὴν τοῦ ὕπνου τῇ τοῦ ἐγρηγορότος προσεικάσειε,*[4] "If any will needs attribute some kind of apprehension or sense to nature, then it must not be such a sense or apprehension as is in animals, but something that differs as much from it as the sense or cogitation of one in a profound sleep differs from that of one who is awake." And since it cannot be denied but that a plastic nature hath a certain dull and obscure idea of that which it stamps and prints upon matter, the same philosopher[5] himself sticks not to call this idea of nature, *θέαμα* and *θεώρημα*, "a spectacle" and "contemplamen," as likewise the energy of nature towards it, *θεωρία ἄψοφος*, "a silent contemplation;" nay, he allows, that nature may be said to be, in some sense, *φιλοθεάμων*, "a lover of spectacles or contemplation."

17. However, that there may be some vital energy without clear and express *συναίσθησις*, "con-sense" and "consciousness, animadversion, attention," or "self-perception," seems reasonable upon several accounts. For first, those philosophers themselves, who make the essence of the soul to consist in cogitation, and again, the essence of cogitation in clear and express consciousness, cannot render it any way probable that the souls of men in all profound sleeps, lethargies, and apoplexies, as also of embryos in the womb, from their very first arrival thither, are never so much as one moment without expressly conscious cogitations; which if

[4] Ennead 3. lib. 8. sect. 3. De Naturâ, Contemplat. et Uno, p. 345. 6.

[5] Ibid. The opinion of Plotinus may best be expressed in his own words: *Θεώρουσα γὰρ θεώρημα αὐτῆς ἀναπαύεται, γενόμενον αὐτῇ ἐκ τοῦ ἐν αὐτῇ καὶ σὺν αὐτῇ μένειν, καὶ θεώρημα εἶναι, καὶ θεωρία ἄψοφος, ἀμυδροτέρα δὲ· ἑτέρα γὰρ αὐτῆς εἰς θέαν ἐναργεστέρα· ἡ δὲ εἴδωλον θεωρίας ἄλλης.* "For it reposes in the contemplation of its own image, an image created by its eternal unity and self-absorption, and implying, as the condition of its existence, an object and an act of contemplation; the latter being silent, and successively more feeble. For in part, this contemplation is immediate and bright, in part it is the reflection of another reflection." Lib. de Natura, Contemplatione et uno. Ennead 3. lib. 8. cap. 3. p. 345. A little before he had said, "It must be remembered, that I, being myself the result of contemplation, have necessarily a nature prone to contemplate." (*τὴν φύσιν φιλοθεάμονα,*) which words Nature, whom Plotinus introduces speaking, herself utters.

they were, according to the principles of their philosophy, they must, ipso facto, cease to have any being. Now, if the souls of men and animals be at any time without consciousness and self-perception, then it must needs be granted that clear and express consciousness is not essential to life. There is some appearance of life and vital sympathy in certain vegetables and plants, which, however called sensitive-plants and plant-animals, cannot well be supposed to have animal sense and fancy, or express consciousness in them; although we are not ignorant in the meantime, how some endeavour to solve all those phenomena mechanically. It is certain that our human souls themselves are not always conscious of whatever they have in them; for even the sleeping geometrician hath, at that time, all his geometrical theorems and knowledges some way in him; as also the sleeping musician, all his musical skill and songs: and therefore, why may it not be possible for the soul to have likewise some actual energy in it, which it is not expressly conscious of? We have all experience of our doing many animal actions non-attendingly, which we reflect upon afterwards; as also that we often continue a long series of bodily motions, by a mere virtual intention of our minds, and as it were by half a cogitation. That vital sympathy by which our soul is united and tied fast, as it were in a knot, to the body, is a thing that we have no direct consciousness of, but only in its effects. Nor can we tell how we come to be so differently affected in our souls, from the many different motions made upon our bodies. As likewise we are not conscious to ourselves of that energy whereby we impress variety of motions and figurations upon the animal spirits of our brain in our fantastic thoughts. For though the geometrician perceive himself to make lines, triangles, and circles in the dust with his finger, yet he is not aware how he makes all those same figures first upon the corporeal spirits of his brain, from whence notwithstanding, as from a glass, they are reflected to him, fancy being rightly concluded by Aristotle[6] to be a weak and obscure sense. There is also another more interior kind of plastic power in the soul, (if we may so call it) whereby it is formative of its own cogitations, which itself is not always conscious of; as when, in sleep or dreams, it frames interlocutory discourses betwixt itself and other persons, in a long series, with coherent sense and apt connexions, in which oftentimes it seems to be surprised with unexpected answers and repartees, though itself were all the while the poet and inventor of the whole fable. Not only our nictations for the most part when we are awake, but also our nocturnal volutations in sleep, are performed with very little or no consciousness. Respiration, or that motion

[6] De Animâ, lib. 3. cap. 3. 4. p. 45. s. tom. 2. opp.

of the diaphragma and other muscles which causes it, (there being no sufficient mechanical account of it) may well be concluded to be always a vital motion, though it be not always animal; since no man can affirm that he is perpetually conscious to himself of that energy of his soul which does produce it when he is awake, much less when asleep. And lastly, The Cartesian[7] attempts to solve the motion of the heart mechanically seem to be abundantly confuted by autopsy and experiment, evincing the systole of the heart to be a muscular constriction, caused by some vital principle, to make which nothing but a pulsific-corporeal quality in the substance of the heart itself, is very unphilosophical and absurd. Now, as we have no voluntary imperium at all upon the systole and diastole of the heart, so are we not conscious to ourselves of any energy of our own soul that causes them; and therefore we may reasonably conclude from hence also,[8] that there is some vital energy, without animal fancy or synæsthesis, express consciousness and self-perception.

[7] Vide Cartes. Libr. de Homine et de Formatione Fœtus, P. 2. p. 195. s.

[8] It was Dr. Cudworth's purpose to show by these arguments and illustrations, that nature could do something without clearly knowing or perceiving what. On this point therefore he yields me next to nothing of what I greatly desired. I cannot understand what is to hinder God, whose power is infinite, from framing natures with the power of acting according to fixed laws, yet not clearly perceiving what they accomplish, when I find even men constructing machines which perform certain offices, yet are themselves destitute of all intelligence and knowledge. Men moreover perform many things, so to speak, mechanically, of which they have no distinct notion; as is clear from what is done under the impulse of anger or any other violent emotion. With regard to the examples mentioned in the text, I could, were I anxious to lengthen this note, take some exceptions against them. The first may surely be omitted. For though the Cartesians be unable to prove that the mind oppressed by disease is conscious of its own thoughts, it will be equally difficult for their adversaries to prove the contrary, that at that time it is not conscious of its own operations. The third example taken from geometry and music is not relevant; for the question is not whether there be powers in nature operating without being conscious of their own operation. This no prudent man will deny; but the question is whether any faculty uses the powers it has acquired without being conscious that it is using them. This question, other examples taken from the actions of the soul might better determine; although perhaps even among these there might be some things not altogether suitable. These however, I for the present omit. I am anxious to mention briefly a few other things. I. This whole discussion of Dr. Cudworth's would have been much more perspicuous, had he prefixed a clear definition of the terms he employs especially of his συναίσθησις, "consense" or "consciousness." Since he has omitted to do this, as men are variously disposed, they will deny that the point is explained with sufficient clearness. II. I cannot see why the excellent author should have thought proper to take away from plastic nature this inner sense and consciousness. Certainly I can find no reason why he should not have left intelligence and consciousness to it. I know that the later Platonists whom chiefly he follows did so. But their argument was widely different from that of our author. I shall have another opportunity of more fully treating concerning the doctrines and arguments of this class of philosophers, and of showing that they endeavoured to harmonize their speculations concerning plastic nature with Christianity. III. Dr. Cudworth wished by the examples he brought forward to show that the soul performs many operations of which it has no clear perception. But these very examples were regarded by the learned Jean Le Clerc as going further, and showing, what he was disposed to give credit to, that there is a certain middle principle in man—a principle betwixt soul and body, whence proceeded actions, attributed by Dr. Cudworth to the

18. Wherefore the plastic nature, acting neither by knowledge nor by animal fancy, neither electively nor hormetically, must be concluded to act fatally, magically and sympathetically. And thus that curious and diligent inquirer into nature, before commended, resolves: Natura tanquam fato quodam, seu mandato secundum leges operante, movet, "Nature moveth as it were by a kind of fate or command, acting according to laws."[9] Fate, and the laws or commands of the Deity concerning the mundane economy, (they being really the same thing) ought not to be looked upon, neither as verbal things, nor as mere will and cogitation in the mind of God, but as an energetical and effectual principle, constituted by the Deity, for the bringing of things decreed to pass. The Aphrodisian philosopher,[10] with others of the ancients, have concluded, that fate and nature are but two different names for one and the same thing; and that

soul. Bibliotheque Choisée. tom. ii. p. 113. "La respiration et le mouvement du cœur sont des effets auxquels notre ame n'a aucune part, comme M. Cudworth l'a fort bien remarquè, et qui cependant ne parvissent pas se faire mæchaniquement. Dans les mouvemens volontaires, nos ames ne savent point ce qu'il faut faire pour remuer nos membres; elles ne font que commander, et il y a quelcun qui execute fidelement ce qu'elles ordonnent, si les organes sont bien disposès. Ne se pourroit-il donc pas faire qu'il y eut un Etre vivant, dans notre corps outre notre ame, qui lui fut subordonnè, sans que notre ame le fut, pour lui obeir; mais dont la puissance seroit bornie eut sort qu'il ne pourroit obeir, que par le moyen des organes disposes d'une certaine maniere.—Ce meme Etre, ebraule par les mouvemens de notre corps, pourroit avertir nos ames, de ce qui s'y passe afin qu'elles ordonnassent ce qui seroit necessaire pour sa conservation, et qu'il fit ce qui est en son pouvoir, pour leur obeir. L'ame seroit, selon cette supposition, semblable à un maitre incapable de ce servir luimeme et qui n'auroit autre pouvoir que celui de commander; et le Principe plastique ressembleroit à un esclave, qui ne sauroit rien des desseins de son maitre, et qui ne feroit qu' executer ses ordres et l'avertir de ce qui concerne ses interets." Should this passage be met with the reply, "Thus three principles in man are supposed," the learned author would urge, 1. That it cannot be made to appear that man is composed of only two principles. 2. That they who think man is composed of but two principles cannot explain the union between the soul and the body without admitting that God directs all human actions, but this they consider to be altogether unworthy of the Divine Majesty. To those who urge that they cannot give an accurate definition of this middle or third nature he answers, (p. 116.) that they themselves are aware of this: that it is a nature furnished with an innate power of acting, so that it spontaneously acts upon both soul and body; that it is a nature which directs the soul how it shall act in the body; finally that it is a nature which faithfully obeys the directions of the mind, the operations of which, nevertheless, it is ignorant of. I pass over what Le Clerc urges in addition, by way of illustrating the point. Sufficient scope for inquiry and meditation is suggested by what I have adverted to. Dr. Cudworth, however, is more cautious and circumspect in this matter, since at sect. 22. he refers these things not to this third principle, but after the example of the schoolmen to the soul, whose inferior operations he adjudges them to be.

[9] The learned author refers here to William Harvey, whose words he quotes from the book, De Generat. Animal. Exercit. 50. p. 289. But Harvey and Cudworth greatly differ in their views of nature. See what has been noted at sect 12.

[10] Libr. De Fato, sect. 6. p. 25. ed. Lond. So the Aphrodisian affirms the Peripatetics to have generally maintained, sect. 6. p. 30. The Stoics likewise affirm fate and nature to be the same thing. Seneca de Beneficiis, lib. 4. c. 8. p. 428. tom. 1. opp. "Naturam vocas, fatum, fortunam; omnia ejusdem Dei nomina sunt varie utentis sua potestate." "You mention nature, fate, fortune, names of this kind are all names of God variously employing his power."

τό τε εἱμαρμένον κατὰ φύσιν, καὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν εἱμαρμένον, "both that which is done fatally is done naturally, and also whatever is done naturally is done fatally:" but that which we assert in this place is only this, that the plastic nature may be said to be the true and proper fate of matter, or the corporeal world. Now, that which acts not by any knowledge or fancy, will or appetite of its own, but only fatally acccording to laws and impresses made upon it, (but differently in different cases) may be said also to act magically and sympathetically. Ἡ ἀληθινὴ μαγεία (saith the philosopher[1]) ἡ ἐν τῷ παντὶ φιλία καὶ νεῖκος, "The true magic is the friendship and discord that is the universe." And again, magic is said to be founded, ἐν τῇ συμπαθείᾳ καὶ τῇ τῶν δυνάμεων τῶν πολλῶν ποικιλίᾳ προς ἓν ζῶον συντελούντων, "in the sympathy and variety of diverse powers conspiring together into one animal." Of which passages though the principal meaning seem to be this, that the ground of magical fascinations is one vital unitive principle in the universe; yet they imply also, that there is a certain vital energy, not in the way of knowledge and fancy, will and animal appetite, but fatally sympathetical and magical. As indeed that mutual sympathy, which we have constant experience of, betwixt our soul and our body, (being not a material and mechanical, but vital thing) may be called also magical.[2]

19. From what hath been hitherto declared concerning the plastic nature, it may appear, that though it be a thing that acts for ends artificially, and which may be also called the divine art, and the fate of the corporeal world; yet for all that it is neither god nor goddess, but a low and imperfect creature. Forasmuch as it is not master of that reason and wisdom, according to which it acts, nor does it properly intend those ends, which it acts for; nor indeed is it expressly conscious of what it doth, it not knowing, but only doing, according to commands and laws impressed upon it. Neither of which things ought to seem strange or incredible, since nature may as well act regularly and artificially, without any knowledge and consciousness of its own, as forms of letters compounded together may print coherent philosophic sense,

[1] Plotin. De Dubit. Animæ, lib. 2. Ennead. 4. lib. 5. cap. 40. p. 434. Plotinus is the philosopher here referred to, for whom Dr. Cudworth had a very strong predilection.

[2] Although these matters are discussed with great erudition, yet I doubt not that they who look more deeply into the subject will feel their want of light. The learned Doctor says, that nature acts *fatally*, *magically* and *sympathetically*, and he shows that these words had previously been used by philosophers. So far well. But what is the true and *proper force* of these words? Here the excellent author gives no explanation. So that I almost incline to think that he merely indicates that nature acts in some special manner, which to distinguish it from other modes of action he calls *fatal*, *magical* and *sympathetic*; but the precise kind of action intended cannot be explained, nor have these words, when used concerning operations of nature, any fixed and determinate force.

though they understand nothing at all:[3] and it may also act for the sake of those ends, that are not intended by itself but some higher being, as well as the saw or hatchet in the hand of the architect or mechanic doth, τὸ σκέπαρνον ἕμεκά του πελεκᾷ, ἀλλ' οὐ προλογιζόμενον, ἀλλὰ τῷ προλογιζομένῳ ὑπηρετοῦν;* "the axe cuts for the sake of something, though itself does not ratiocinate, nor intend or design any thing, but is only subservient to that which does so." It is true that our human actions are not governed by such exact reason, art, and wisdom, nor carried on with such constancy, evenness and uniformity, as the actions of nature are; notwithstanding which, since we act according to a knowledge of our own, and are masters of that wisdom by which our actions are directed, since we do not act fatally only, but electively and intendingly, with consciousness and self-perception, the rational life that is in us ought to be accounted a much higher and more noble perfection than that plastic life of nature. Nay, this plastic nature is so far from being the first and highest life, that it is indeed the last and lowest of all lives, it being really the same thing with the vegetative, which is inferior to the sensitive. The difference betwixt nature and wisdom was before observed, that wisdom is the first and highest thing, but nature the last and lowest; this latter being but an umbratile imitation of the former. And to this purpose, this plastic nature is further described by the same philosopher, in these words: Ἐστι τοίνυν οὗτος ὁ λόγος οὐκ ἄκρατος νοῦς, οὐδ' αὐτονοῦς, οὐδέ γε ψυχῆς καθαρᾶς τὸ γένος· ἠρτημένος δὲ ἐκείνης, καὶ οἷον ἔκλαμψις ἐξ ἀμφοῖν νοῦ καὶ ψυχῆς, καὶ ψυχῆς κατὰ νοῦν διακειμένης γεννησάντων τὸν λόγον τοῦτον,† "The spermatic

[3] But these comparisons ought to be very carefully interpreted, if we would not go over to those who maintain, as it is well known many of the Cartesians did, that God directly effected all things, and performed every thing which is performed in the universe. And if plastic nature be like an axe, if it be like forms of letters, does it greatly differ from those laws of motion which Descartes maintained had been impressed, and were continually preserved in nature by the Deity? I will say what I am led to think on this matter. The longer I consider the discussion here carried on concerning nature, the less clearly and accurately do I understand what it is. And I am almost ready to imagine that the patrons of plastic nature, though they smile at the laws of motion for which Descartes contended, and though they could not agree with those who maintained that the Deity, diffused as it were through the whole universe, effected every thing, nevertheless approach much nearer to both of these than they are ready to allow, and are in fact separated from both but by a slight interval. However this may be, I confess, I do not know how the two things which Dr. Cudworth maintains concerning nature can be harmonized, viz. that it is like an axe, and like the forms of letters, *i. e.* like brute matter, and yet, that it has in itself a portion of divine forethought and providence. If nature be nothing more than an instrument in the hand of God, I am mistaken if it be proper to describe it as Dr. Cudworth does. We perceive that God himself effects all things that are effected. But he first disposes and arranges the portion of matter which afterwards he employs in producing his works. These things, though they should be only slightly thought about, will supply materials for more fully explaining the subject.

* Simplic. in Arist. Phys. lib. 2. p. 33. edi. Græcæ.

† Ennead. 3. lib. 2. c. 16. De Providentia, lib. 1. p. 267.

reason or plastic nature is no pure mind or perfect intellect, nor any kind of pure soul neither; but something which depends upon it, being as it were an effulgency or eradiation from both together, mind and soul, or soul affected according to mind, generating the same as a lower kind of life."

And though this plastic nature contain no small part of divine providence in it; yet, since it is a thing that cannot act electively nor with discretion, it must needs be granted, that there is a higher and diviner providence than this, which also presides over the corporeal world itself; which was a thing likewise insisted upon by that philosopher: *Γίνεται τὰ ἐν τῷ παντὶ οὐ κατὰ σπερματικοὺς, ἀλλὰ κατὰ λόγους περιληπτικοὺς, καὶ τῶν προτέρων, ἢ κατὰ τοὺς τῶν σπερμολόγων λόγους, οὐ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς σπερματικοῖς λόγοις ἔνι, καὶ τῶν γενομένων, παρὰ τοὺς σπερματικοὺς αὐτοὺς λόγους,** "The things in the world are not administered merely by spermatic reasons, but by perileptic, (that is, comprehensive intellectual reasons) which are in order of nature before the other, because in the spermatic reasons cannot be contained that which is contrary to them," &c. Where, though this philosopher may extend his spermatic reasons further than we do our plastic nature in this place, (which is only confined to the motions of matter) yet he concludes, that there is a higher principle presiding over the universe than this. So that it is not ratio mersa et confusa, a reason drowned in matter, and confounded with it, which is the supreme governor of the world, but a providence perfectly intellectual, abstract and released.

20. But though the plastic nature be the lowest of all lives, nevertheless since it is a life, it must needs be incorporeal; all life being such. For body being nothing but antitypous extension, or resisting bulk, nothing but mere outside, aliud extra aliud, together with passive capability, hath no internal energy, self-activity or life belonging to it; it is not able so much as to move itself, and therefore much less can it artificially direct its own motion. Moreover, in the efformation of the bodies of animals, it is one and the self-same thing that directs the whole. That which contrives and frames the eye cannot be a distinct thing from that which frames the ear; nor that which makes the hand from that which makes the foot; the same thing, which delineates the veins, must also form the arteries; and that which fabricates the nerves, must also project the muscles and joints; it must be the same thing that designs and organizes the heart and brain, with such communications betwixt them; one and the self-same thing must needs have in it the entire idea, and the complete model or platform of the whole organic body. For the several parts of matter distant from one another, acting alone by themselves, without any common directrix, being not able to confer

* Ennead. 4. lib. 4. c. 39. De Dub. Animæ, lib. 2. p. 433.

together, nor communicate with each other, could never possibly conspire to make up one such uniform and orderly system or compages, as the body of every animal is. The same is to be said likewise concerning the plastic nature of the whole corporeal universe, in which ἅπαντα πρὸς ἓν συντέτακται, "all things are ordered together conspiringly into one." It must be one and the same thing which formeth the whole, or else it could never have fallen into such an uniform order and harmony. Now that which is one and the same, acting upon several distant parts of matter, cannot be corporeal.

Indeed Aristotle is severely censured by some learned men for this, that though he talk every where of such a nature as acts regularly, artificially and methodically, in order to the best, yet he does nowhere positively declare, whether this nature of his be corporeal or incorporeal, substantial or accidental; which yet is the less to be wondered at in him, because he does not clearly determine these same points concerning the rational soul neither, but seems to stagger uncertainly about them. In the mean time it cannot be denied, but that Aristotle's followers do for the most part conclude this nature of his to be corporeal: whereas notwithstanding, according to the principles of this philosophy, it cannot possibly be such: for there is nothing else attributed to body in it, besides these three, matter, form, and accidents; neither of which can be the Aristotelic nature. First, it cannot be matter; because nature, according to Aristotle, is supposed to be the principle of motion and activity, which matter in itself is devoid of. Moreover, Aristotle concludes,[4] that they, who assign only a material cause, assign no cause at all τοῦ εὖ καὶ καλῶς, "of well and fit," of that regular and artificial frame of things which is ascribed to nature; upon both which accounts, it is determined by that philosopher,[5] that ἡ φύσις μᾶλλον ἀρχὴ καὶ αἰτία τῆς ὕλης, "nature is more a principle and cause than matter;" and therefore it cannot be one and the same thing with it. Again, it is as plain, that Aristotle's nature cannot be the forms of particular bodies neither, as vulgar Peripatetics seem to conceive, these being all generated and produced by nature, and as well corruptible as generable. Whereas nature is such a thing as is neither generated nor corrupted, it being the principle and cause of all generation and corruption.

[4] Metaphys. lib. 1 cap. 3. p. 266. tom. 4. opp.

[5] De Partib. Animal. lib. 1. cap. 1. p. 475. tom. 2. opp. Ἀρχὴ γὰρ ἡ φύσις μᾶλλον τῆς ὕλης, "The principle of things is nature, rather than matter." But Aristotle does not here call nature the *αἰτία*, or cause of things. Perhaps Dr. Cudworth, while he was writing, was thinking of some other words of the philosopher concerning nature, Physic. lib. 2. cap. 1. 462. in which *ἀρχὴ* and *αἰτία* are joined, and nature is spoken of as the principle and cause of both motion and rest. Ὡς οὔσης τῆς φύσεως ἀρχῆς καὶ αἰτίας τοῦ κινεῖσθαι καὶ ἠρεμεῖν. It is worth while to read what the very learned Medicus has observed. Observat. Halens. tom. 3. Obs. 7. p. 143.

To make nature and the material forms of bodies to be one and the self-same thing, is all one as if one should make the seal (with the stamper too) to be one and the same thing with the signature upon the wax. And lastly, Aristotle's nature can least of all be the accidents or qualities of bodies; because these act only in virtue of their substance, neither can they exercise any active power over the substance itself in which they are: whereas the plastic nature is a thing that domineers over the substance of the whole corporeal universe, and which, subordinately to the Deity, put both heaven and earth in this frame in which now it is. Wherefore since Aristotle's nature can be neither the matter, nor the forms, nor the accidents of bodies, it is plain, that according to his own principles, it must be incorporeal.[6]

[6] I have already observed that whatever the nature which Aristotle so often mentions may be, it differs from the plastic nature of our author, which is independent, obeying nevertheless the commands, and acting according to the will of God. I am now about to add other considerations by which this difference may be more manifest; nor should it escape the reader's attention, whether, as Dr. Cudworth asserts, the nature of Aristotle is destitute of body. In the first place, I wish it to be that what Aristotle properly calls nature, is nothing else than that principle from which proceeds all motion and rest in things endued with life and sense. For thus that philosopher more than once eloquently defines nature. Take as an instance his words from Physicor. lib. 2. cap. 1. p. 462. tom. 1. opp. Τὰ μὲν γὰρ φύσει ὄντα πάντα φαίνεται ἔχοντα ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ἀρχὴν κινήσεως καὶ στάσεως, τὰ μὲν κατὰ τόπον, τὰ δὲ κατ' αὔξησιν καὶ φθίσιν, τὰ δὲ κατ' ἀλλοίωσιν, "Whatever things exist by nature seem to have in themselves the principle of motion and of rest, some according to place, some according to increase and diminution, some according to change." He therefore makes his nature different from things without life and sense, or from things having no power of motion. There is no nature, according to him, in wood, none in air, none in the earth. Even from this may be understood how great the difference is between the plastic nature of Dr. Cudworth, and the nature of the Stagirite. Besides, Aristotle's nature remains in men and animals as long as they live, and excites all their necessary motions; but the plastic nature of Dr. Cudworth presides only over the generation and conservation of bodies; it neither governs nor directs all the motions of the heart in both man and animals, nor does it set the feet and other members in motion. The nature of the Peripatetics extends much further therefore, and performs a much larger and more laborious office than that of Dr. Cudworth; if at least I have rightly caught the sentiment of the learned author, which he does not always exhibit with equal clearness, nor does he always appear to be consistent with himself. But what was the principle of motion and rest, to which Aristotle gave the name of nature, and to what class of things did it belong? The philosopher himself would have hesitated, as I imagine, nor would he have easily found words to express his meaning, had he been pressed with this question. He reasoned thus. In matter simply considered there is no power of motion; in what moves and rests therefore, there must be some cause whence motion may arise. But what is that cause? Nature, replies Aristotle; i. e. he confesses that he knows nothing of the matter. For had he clearly perceived what it was, he certainly would not have expressed it by an obscure word, a word moreover which he nowhere defines. The word employed is proof that Aristotle regarded his principle of motion as among occult qualities, so to speak; and does it not follow from hence, that it were vain and useless to make any great effort to understand what the philosopher himself has left doubtful and uncertain. There are considerations that might influence one to adopt the opinion, that the nature of Aristotle is pretty nearly the same thing with what, according to more recent philosophers, as Robert Boyle, J. C. Sturm, and others, seems to be the mechanism or the modus of matter itself, arising out of a certain disposition and arrangement of matter. Observe what has induced me almost to concede to this opinion. Aristotle de Generat. Animal. lib. 4. cap. 3.

21. Now if the plastic nature be incorporeal, then it must of necessity be either an inferior power or faculty of some soul, which is also conscious, sensitive or rational; or else a lower

p. 618. tom. 2. opp. clearly shows that nothing extrinsical comes to man or animal, besides mind or soul, a partaker of reason. Λείπεται δὲ τὸν νοῦν μόνον θύραθεν ἐπεισιέναι, καὶ θεῖον εἶναι μόνον, If mind be the only extrinsical thing pertaining to animals, all other things which constitute an animal must be educed from the force of matter. So that this applies to the principle of motion and rest which he calls nature, if indeed it be a thing separate from intelligence. Aristotle appears to have thought, therefore, that matter was formed and constituted by the same law and in the same condition as men and animals were formed, to originate the faculty of exciting itself to motion and again composing itself to rest; that this faculty remains as long as the body is affected in the same manner as in the beginning, when the animal was produced; but that it ceases if matter receive injury, and if it be disposed in any different manner. That the chief of the Peripatetic sect sometimes inclined to this view, many passages of his writings would show, which however I pass over, lest I should prolong my note to an undue length. But when I reflect on all that he affirms concerning his nature I can scarcely suffer myself to be shaken in this opinion. First, He confesses, as will presently appear, that he scarcely knows whether nature differs from the soul. Next, His nature acts, he says, with fixed purpose and design; he calls it a principle of things, sometimes distinguished from matter. De Partib. Animal. lib. 1. cap. 1. p. 475. tom. 2. opp. He mentions it as the cause of all beauty and order. All which things seem to be of a kind tending to this one point—that nature is a partaker of reason and capable of independent action. The opinion therefore which I have expressed does not appear to be very far from the truth, that the nature of Aristotle is part of that fifth nature, or of that subtle fire which he thinks to be diffused through the universe. Out of this fifth nature, I have shown at the end of chap. 1. p. 99, that the philosopher considered our minds, possessed of reasoning faculties, to have been taken—why not also the principle of motion and of rest or nature? This opinion receives considerable confirmation from Aristotle's determining nature or the soul to be a part of the mind. Refer to what is alleged in the next section. But I think it better to refer the question, what Aristotle's nature is, to the number of inexplicable things, than to attempt by many words to make a thing clear, in explaining which Aristotle was so little consistent with himself, and did not know what decision to come to. It is at all events plain, that the nature of Aristotle, whatever it is, is not a thing without body, though our learned author is at great pains to give a contrary view. Indeed I am certain, and I undertake to prove, if required, that Aristotle is absolutely silent about any one thing that is without body, and of really a simple and spiritual subsistence. He did not even conceive the idea of an incorporeal deity. We are in the habit, however, of explaining his words according to our respective notions, and thus it happens that not unfrequently we attribute to him sentiments altogether different from what he believed, as would appear, were his words explained according to his own intention. The very learned Dr. Cudworth thus closes his argument in proof that the nature of Aristotle was incorporeal: "Aristotle's nature has neither substance, nor form, nor corporeal quality. Therefore it is incorporeal." I am not indeed unwilling to grant that nature differs from matter, strictly and properly so called; but I deny that that which differs from ὕλη, concrete and crass matter, ought on that account to be regarded as incorporeal. Who that is skilled in these matters does not know that the fifth nature of Aristotle is what Cicero calls, Tuscul. Quæst. lib. 1. cap. 17. p. 2588. tom. 8. opp. "non nominatam magis, quam non intellectam," "not named, rather than not comprehended." Aristotle separates this from ὕλη, or the matter of which the four elements are composed. Still he did not on that account regard it as incorporeal. What the ancients called ὕλη, or matter, is a rude concrete and crass substance. To those things which they separate from this matter they assign a greater degree of subtleness, yet not so complete a freedom from all substance and matter as we affirm of spirits. Why the learned author denies nature to be form I do not perceive. Certainly he does this in opposition to Aristotle, who plainly says that nature is form: Ἡ ἄρα μορφὴ φύσις, "Nature is therefore form." Physicor. lib. 2. cap. 1. p. 464. tom. 1. opp. Also in Partib. Animal. lib. 1. cap. 1. p. 472. tom. 2. opp. Besides, the excellent author does not appear to have remembered what the Peripatetics were wont to maintain, respecting

substantial life by itself, devoid of animal consciousness. The Platonists seem to affirm both these together, namely, that there is a plastic nature lodged in all particular souls of animals, brutes and men, and also that there is a general plastic or spermatic principle of the whole universe distinct from their higher mundane soul, though subordinate to it, and dependent upon it:[7] Ἡ λεγομένη φύσις γέννημα ψυχῆς προτέρας δυνατώτερον ζώσης, "That which is called nature is the offspring of a higher soul, which hath a more powerful life in it." And though Aristotle do not so clearly acknowledge the incorporeity and substantiality of souls, yet he concurs very much with this Platonic doctrine, that nature is either a lower power or faculty of some conscious soul, or else an inferior kind of life by itself, depending upon a superior soul.

And this we shall make to appear from his book, De Partibus Animalium,* after we have taken notice of some considerable preliminary passages in it in order thereunto. For having first declared, that besides the material cause, there are other causes also of natural generations, namely these two, ἥτε οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως, "that for whose sake," or the final cause, "and that from which the principle of motion is," or the efficient cause; he determines that the former of these two is the principal: Φαίνεται δὲ πρώτη ἣν λέγομεν ἕνεκά τινος λόγος γὰρ οὗτος, ἀρχὴ δὲ ὁ λόγος, ὁμοίως, ἔντε τοῖς κατὰ τέχνην καὶ τοῖς φύσει συνεστηκόσιν, "The chiefest of these two causes seems to be the final or the intending cause; for this is reason, and reason is alike a principle in artificial and in natural things." Nay, the philosopher adds excellently, that there is more reason and art in the things of nature, than there is in those things that are artificially made by men: Μᾶλλον δ' ἐστὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἐν τοῖς φύσεως ἔργοις, ἢ ἐν τοῖς τῆς τέχνης, "There is more

their forma substantialis, as distinguished from their forma accidentalis and materialis. He had properly shown, from the comparison of the figure of a seal impressed upon the wax, that nature and the accidental and material form are not identical. But this is not the question: the question was whether the substantial form and Aristotle's nature were identical. This many Peripatetics do not hesitate to affirm. I am not unaware that these Peripatetic distinctions of forms are not very clearly traceable in the writings of their master, but still that the foundation of them was laid by Aristotle is, I think, beyond controversy. Whether nature may or may not be freed from corporeal qualities is a question that might at considerable length be disputed. I grant that it ill accords with such qualities; still how it should thence follow that it is not corporeal I do not understand. Moreover, it ought by no means to be overlooked, that the excellent author assumes throughout the discussion, that the nature of Aristotle and his own plastic nature differ in no respect from each other, but perform the same offices, and are endued with the same qualities, the very point in dispute. Any one may conclude, with a tolerable show of argument, that nature is incorporeal, if he first take this for granted, and place it at the basis of his argument. Take away this assumption, and nothing is left that can prove the nature of Aristotle to be incorporeal.

[7] This is Plotinus's definition in his book De Natura, Contemplatione, et Uno, Ennead. 3. lib. 8. cap. 3. p. 345. opp.

* Lib. 1. cap. 1. p. 470. tom. 2. opp.

of final or intending causality, and of the reason of good, in the works of nature, than in those of human art." After which he greatly complains of the first and most ancient physiologers, meaning thereby Anaximander, and those other Ionics before Anaxagoras, that they considered only τὴν ὑλικὴν ἀρχὴν, "the material principle and cause of things," without attending to those two other causes, the principle of motion, and that which aims at ends; they talking only of fire, water, air, and earth, and generating the whole world from the fortuitous concourse of these senseless bodies. But at length Aristotle falls upon Democritus, who being junior to those others before mentioned, philosophized after the same atheistical manner, but in a new way of his own, by atoms; acknowledging no other nature, neither in the universe, nor in the bodies of animals, than that of fortuitous mechanism, and supposing all things to arise from the different compositions of magnitudes, figures, sites, and motions. Of which Democritic philosophy he gives his censure in these following words: Εἰ μὲν οὖν τῷ σχήματι καὶ τῷ χρώματι ἕκαστόν ἐστι, τῶν τε ζώων καὶ τῶν μορίων, ὀρθῶς ἂν Δημόκριτος λέγοι, &c.* "If animals and their several parts did consist of nothing but figure and colour, then indeed Democritus would be in the right: but a dead man hath the same form and figure of body, that he had before, and yet for all that he is not a man; neither is a brazen or wooden hand a hand, but only equivocally, as a painted physician, or pipes made of stone are so called. No member of a dead man's body is that, which it was before, when he was alive, neither eye, nor hand, nor foot. Wherefore this is but a rude way of philosophizing, and just as if a carpenter should talk of a wooden hand. For thus these physiologers declare the generations and causes of figures only, or the matter out of which things are made, as air and earth. Whereas no artificer would think it sufficient to render such a cause of any artificial fabric, because the instrument happened to fall so upon the timber, that therefore it was hollow here, and plain there; but rather because himself made such strokes, and for such ends," &c.

Now in the close of all, this philosopher at length declares, that there is another principle of corporeal things, besides the material, and such as is not only the cause of motion, but also acts artificially in order to ends, ἔστι τι τοιοῦτον, ὃ δὴ καὶ καλοῦμεν φύσιν, "there is such a thing as that which we call nature;" that is, not the fortuitous motion of senseless matter, but a plastic, regular and artificial nature, such as acts for ends and good; declaring in the same place, what this nature is, namely that it is ψυχὴ, ἢ ψυχῆς μέρος, ἢ μὴ ἄνευ ψυχῆς, "soul, or part

* De Part. An. lib. 1. cap. 1.

of soul, or not without soul;" and from thence inferring, that it properly belongs to a physiologer to treat concerning the soul also. But he concludes afterwards, οὐδὲ πᾶσα[8] ψυχὴ φύσις, "that the whole soul is not nature;" whence it remains, that according to Aristotle's sense, nature is ἢ ψυχῆς μέρος, ἢ μὴ ἄνευ ψυχῆς, "either part of a soul, or not without soul;" that is, either a lower part or faculty of some conscious soul; or else an inferior kind of life by itself, which is not without soul, but subordinate to it, and dependent on it.[9]

22. As for the bodies of animals, Aristotle[10] first resolves in general, that nature in them is either the whole soul, or else some part of it: Φύσις ὡς ἡ κινοῦσα, καὶ ὡς τὸ τέλος τοῦ ζώου, ἤτοι πᾶσα ἡ ψυχὴ, ἢ μέρος τι αὐτῆς, "Nature as the moving principle, or as that which acts artificially for ends, (so far as concerns the bodies of animals) is either the whole soul, or else some part of it." But afterward he determines more particularly, that the plastic nature is not the whole soul in animals, but only some part of it: Οὐ πᾶσα ψυχὴ φύσις, ἀλλὰ τι μόριον αὐτῆς, that is, nature in animals, properly so called, is some lower

[8] To these words I will add the sentence of Aristotle which follows, where he says that nature is either one part or more parts of the soul. See p. 474. Ἀλλά τι μόριον αὐτῆς ἐν, ἢ καὶ πλείω.

[9] All that Aristotle here says respecting nature, I. clearly proves, as we have before intimated, that with him nature was an obscure word used to express what he confesses he but imperfectly understood. Aristotle saw that something must be attributed to living substances besides matter, whence generation, motion and rest must arise. But what that something was he did not venture to determine. He therefore says that that unknown something partakes of reason and design, and on that account was to be regarded as not greatly dissimilar to our mind, but he admits it to be very doubtful whether this be a soul independent of and separate from the sentient and rational soul, or whether it be one part or more of a mind endowed with rational faculties. Why, therefore, do we inquire concerning a matter which Aristotle himself acknowledged he knew so little about? Or how can we reckon the Stagirite with the believers in a plastic nature, when he avows that he did not know even what nature was? II. It appears from hence that those who maintain after the Peripatetics and other more recent philosophers, that the soul forms for itself a body, are not very remote from the opinion of Aristotle. See Dan. Sennertus, De Generat. Vivent. tom. 1. cap. 1. p. 123. and William Harvey, De Generat. Animal. p. 121. Aristotle admitted that this power of producing and moving the animal might be nothing else than one or more of the faculties of our mind. III. That opinion concerning the nature of Aristotle which I have again and again put forth, that it is part of a fifth nature or very subtle fire diffused through the universe, which being received in the seed is transferred into the body, here receives considerable confirmation. If this nature be a part of the rational soul, which Aristotle does not deny may be the case, no one can have any further doubt on the matter. For as we have shown, sect. 45. chap. 1. the whole of the rational soul is a particle of that heat; therefore also its parts are so. But if it be a distinct soul, I see nothing to hinder the belief that it comes from the same source, whence the mind or the rational soul proceeds. There are many things on the other hand to prove that it cannot be derived from any other source.

[10] De Partib. Animal. lib. 1. cap. 1. p. 473. But these words are read somewhat differently from this quotation of them: Ἔστιν αὐτὴ (φύσις, properly so called, which Aristotle is in the habit also of calling οὐσία and μορφὴ) καὶ ὡς ἡ κινοῦσα, καὶ ὡς τὸ τέλος. Τοιοῦτον δὲ τοῦ ζώου ἤτοι πᾶσα ἡ ψυχὴ, ἢ μέρος τι αὐτῆς. The passage should be translated, "This nature is both the efficient cause of motion and its final cause. Nature is either the animal soul, or at least a part of it."

power or faculty lodged in their respective souls, whether sensitive or rational.

And that there is plastic nature in the souls of animals, the same Aristotle* elsewhere affirms and proves after this manner: Τί τὸ συνέχον εἰς τἀναντία φερόμενα, τὸ πῦρ καὶ τὴν γῆν· διασπασθήσεται γὰρ, εἰ μήτι ἔσται τὸ κωλῦσον, εἰ δ' ἔστι, τοῦτ' ἔστιν ἡ ψυχὴ, καὶ τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ αὐξάνεσθαι καὶ τρέφεσθαι,[1] "What is that, which in the bodies of animals holds together such things as of their own nature would otherwise move contrary ways, and fly asunder, as fire and earth, which would be distracted and dissipated, the one tending upwards, the other downwards, were there not something to hinder them. Now if there be any such thing, this must be the soul, which is also the cause of nourishment and augmentation." Where the philosopher adds, that though some were of opinion, that fire was that which was the cause of nourishment and augmentation in animals, yet this was indeed but συναίτιόν πως, οὐ μὴν ἁπλῶς γε αἴτιον, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον, ἡ ψυχὴ "only the con-cause or instrument, and not simply the cause, but rather the soul." And to the same purpose he philosophizeth elsewhere:† Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡ πέψις, δι' ἧς ἡ τροφὴ γίνεται τοῖς ζώοις, οὔτε ἄνευ ψυχῆς, οὔτε θερμότητός ἐστι, πυρὶ γὰρ ἐργάζεται πάντα, "Neither is concoction, by which nourishment is made in animals, done without the soul, nor without heat, for all things are done by fire."

[2] And certainly it seems very agreeable to the phenomena, to acknowledge something in the bodies of animals superior to mechanism, as that may well be thought to be, which keeps the more fluid parts of them constantly in the same form and figure, so as not to be enormously altered in their growth by disproportionate nourishment; that which restores flesh that was lost, consolidates dissolved continuities, incorporates the newly received nourishment, and joins it continuously with the pre-

* De Anima, lib. 2. cap. 4. p. 26. tom. 2. opp.

[1] In this passage and in almost the whole of his work De Anima, Aristotle is inclined to the opinion, which we observed him above neither to approve nor disapprove of, that nature is either part of the sentient or rational mind, or that the power of producing, moving, forming, and nourishing the body resides in the soul. It is well known that many of the schoolmen, as they are called, afterwards adopted a great part of this sentiment; they made up the human soul of two parts, one without reason, and one possessed of reason, and thus assigned to it both a vegetative and a sensitive faculty. There is extant a large work of Fortunius Licetus, an Italian philosopher, concerning the origin of the soul, in which that author undertakes to maintain at great length this opinion.

† De Resp. cap. 8. p. 141. tom. 2. opp.

[2] See what was quoted in the notes on sect. 18. from Jean Le Clerc. If I am not deceived in the idea I have formed of this whole discussion concerning nature, the very learned author is somewhat inconsistent with himself. For the most part he maintains concerning it that it is something acting independently and extraneous to man, but here he affirms that it is nothing more than a faculty and power residing in the mind. In which, indeed, as has been already observed he approaches very near the sentiments of the schoolmen. Hence, they who compare the plastic nature with what schoolmen call substantial forms do not very greatly err.

existent parts of flesh and bone, which regenerates and repairs veins consumed or cut off; which causes dentition in so regular a manner, and that not only in infants, but also adult persons; that which casts off excrements, and dischargeth superfluities; which makes things seem ungrateful to an interior sense, that were notwithstanding pleasing to the taste: that nature of Hippocrates,[3] that is the curatrix of diseases, *αἱ φύσιες τῶν νουσέων ἰητροὶ*, and that archeus of the Chymists or Paracelsians, to which all medicaments are but subservient, as being able to affect nothing of themselves without it: I say, there seems to be such a principle as this in the bodies of animals, which is not mechanical but vital; and therefore, since entities are not to be multiplied without necessity, we may with Aristotle conclude it to be *μέρος* or *μόριον τῆς ψυχῆς*, "a certain part of the soul" of those animals, or a lower inconscious power lodged in them.

23. Besides this plastic nature which is in animals, forming their several bodies artificially, as so many microcosms or little worlds, there must be also a general plastic nature in the macrocosm, the whole corporeal universe, that which makes all things thus to conspire every where, and agree together into one harmony. Concerning which plastic nature of the universe the author, De Mundo,[4] writes after this manner: *Καὶ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον διεκόσμησε μία ἡ διὰ πάντων διήκουσα δύναμις*, "One power passing through all things ordered and formed the whole world." Again, he calls the same[5] *πνεῦμα, καὶ ἔμψυχον καὶ γόνιμον οὐσίαν,*

[3] Epidemicor. lib. 6. sect. 5. p. 809. tom. 1. opp. Edit. Vander Linden. See what I have observed on chap. 3. sect. 7. and on sect. 13. of this Digression concerning plastic nature. Hippocrates' nature, if I can judge at all respecting it, is nothing more than the mechanical construction of bodies.

[4] Cap. 5. p. 856. inter Aristot. opp. tom. 1. this book having formerly been erroneously attributed to Aristotle. But the author, whoever he was, spoke not of *κόσμος*, the world, but of *οὐρανὸς*, heaven.

[5] Ibid. cap. 4. p. 852. It is better to quote the whole passage from which these words are taken. After the author had said that among the Greeks the breath is called *πνεῦμα*, he immediately adds: *Λέγεται δὲ ἑτέρως πνεῦμα, ἥτε ἐν φυτοῖς, καὶ ζώοις, καὶ διὰ πάντων διήκουσα, ἔμψυχός τε καὶ γόνιμος οὐσία, περὶ ἧς λέγειν νῦν οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον.* "But the name spirit, *πνεῦμα*, is otherwise applied to that animated and generative substance residing in plants and animals, and pervading all things, concerning which it is not necessary now to speak." I acknowledge that both the passages referred to are so expressed as easily to lead to the opinion into which Dr. Cudworth fell, that the author of this small treatise assigned an individual soul to the world distinct from the supreme Numen. But whoever will read the last chapter of the treatise with care and attention will be of another mind. In that chapter the author repeatedly affirms that God produces, governs, accomplishes all things without aid from any such thing as nature. *Σωτὴρ μὲν γὰρ ὄντων ἁπάντων ἐστὶ, καὶ γενέτωρ τῶν ὅπως δήποτε κατὰ τόνδε τὸν κόσμον συντελουμένων ὁ Θεός*, "God is the preserver of all things contained in the universe, and he is also the parent and producer of all things whatsoever that are accomplished in this world," p. 859. This sentiment being so clearly avowed, he affirms that those things which lie, as it were, nearer to God, whose residence is in the heavens, feel his power more effectually than other things, and that they are freer from any indications of defect. Hence, terrene things, which are at so great a distance from the infinite God, though his energy pervade the whole universe, are in a less degree influenced by his power, and exhibit less of harmony and beauty

"a spirit, and a living, and generative nature;" and plainly declares it to be a thing distinct from the Deity, but subordinate to it and dependent on it. But Aristotle himself, in that genuine work of his before mentioned, speaks clearly and positively concerning this plastic nature of the universe, as well as that of animals, in these words:* Φαίνεται γὰρ, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς τεχναστοῖς ἡ τέχνη, οὕτως ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς πράγμασιν ἄλλη τις ἀρχὴ καὶ αἰτία τοιαύτη, ἣν ἔχομεν, καθάπερ τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν ἐκ τοῦ παντός· διὸ μᾶλλον εἰκὸς τὸν οὐρανὸν γεγενῆσθαι ὑπὸ τοιαύτης αἰτίας, εἰ γέγονε, καὶ εἶναι διὰ τοιαύτην αἰτίαν μᾶλλον, ἢ τὰ ζῶα τὰ θνητά· τὸ γοῦν τεταγμένον καὶ ὡρισμένον πολὺ μᾶλλον φαίνεται ἐν τοῖς οὐρανίοις, ἢ περὶ ἡμᾶς· τὸ δὲ ἄλλοτε ἄλλως, καὶ ὡς ἔτυχε, περὶ τὰ θνητὰ μᾶλλον· οἱ δὲ τῶν μὲν ζώων ἕκαστον φύσει φασὶν εἶναι καὶ γενέσθαι· τὸν δ' οὐρανὸν ἀπὸ τύχης καὶ τοῦ αὐτομάτου τοιοῦτον συστῆναι, ἐν ᾧ ἀπὸ τύχης καὶ ἀταξίας οὐδ' ὁτιοῦν φαίνεται, "It seemeth that as there is art in artificial things, so in the things of nature there is another such like principle or cause, which we ourselves partake of; in the same manner as we do of heat and cold, from the universe. Wherefore it is more probable that the whole world was at first made by such a cause as this, (if at least it were made) and that it is still conserved by the same, than that mortal animals should be so: for there is much more of order and determinate regularity in the heavenly bodies than in ourselves; but more of fortuitousness and inconstant irregularity among these mortal things. Notwithstanding which, some there are, who, though they cannot but acknowledge that the bodies of animals were all framed by an artificial nature, yet they will needs contend that the system of the heavens sprung merely from fortune and chance; although there be not the least appearance of fortuitousness or temerity in it." And then he sums up all into this conclusion: Ὥστε εἶναι φανερὸν, ὅτι ἔστι τι τοιοῦτον, ὃ δὴ καὶ καλοῦμεν φύσιν, "Wherefore it is manifest that there is some such thing as that which we call nature;" that is,[6] that

than celestial and higher things, p. 860. These views he often inculcates, yet he even more frequently maintains that the power of the supreme Numen pervades and influences all things. It appears from hence, I think, that the author of this little treatise is not to be reckoned among those who attribute a soul to the world, nor can the passages from his book which are here quoted be interpreted otherwise than of God directing, according to fixed laws, the affairs of this world, and pervading with his energy even these lower regions; unless indeed we mean to affirm that the author wrote directly against himself. I have made these observations concerning this author the more willingly, because I find, that other writers of considerable talent and reputation do not hesitate to say that he inclined to attribute a soul to the world. Of these writers, I may mention, as an example, Jac. Thomasius, De Stoica Mundi Exustione, Diss. 14. sect. 151. p. 212.

* De Part. An. lib. 1. cap. 1. p. 474.

[6] But with permission of the learned author I take leave to say, that this passage of Aristotle will lead no one who rightly considers it to reckon him among those who maintain the doctrine of a soul of the world. The philosopher speaks not absolutely, but only comparatively. I. He concedes that there is nature in animals, to which we

there is not only an artificial, methodical, and plastic nature in animals, by which their respective bodies are framed and conserved, but also that there is such a general plastic nature likewise in the universe, by which the heavens and the whole world are thus artificially ordered and disposed.

have already frequently referred. II. He censures those who speak of the heavens as formed by accident and chance. III. He compares the sentiment they maintained with the dogma of those who spoke of the heavens as produced and preserved by a certain nature, partaking of a reasoning faculty; nor does he hesitate to prefer the former of these two opinions. IV. Yet he himself decides nothing but, if the heavens were created, which elsewhere he denies, contending that they existed from eternity, he thinks that the opinion of those who attribute nature to heaven is the more feasible and better opinion. He does not, therefore, in this passage speak concerning a soul of the world and of the universe, but only concerning the origin and preservation of heaven, which is a part of this mundane system; nor does he concur with those who assign to the heavens an origin and a nature, for he himself, as is well known, believed that the heavens are eternal; but he says only that those persons who assign a nature to the heavens reason more wisely than they who maintain that they spring from chance and accident. From all which it may be made out that if Aristotle had had a choice between attaching himself to Democritus and to Plato, he would have elected Plato; still it is not on that account to be supposed that he entirely agreed with Plato as to his doctrine of the soul of the world. It will not be impertinent to explain this passage concerning the universe somewhat more fully, inasmuch as I know that very learned men in time past disputed, nor have they yet ceased to dispute, whether Aristotle supposed a soul in this universe or not. Dr. Cudworth also, according to his plan, discusses this question in the text, and inclines to those who adopt the former alternative. In the first place, let it be observed, that the question is not concerning that soul of the world, which he calls, "assistens." There are a few who maintain that Aristotle assigned to a certain sort of intelligence, which the schoolmen call "intellectus agens," the care of the human race; and that he assigned to other intelligences the administration of the affairs of the universe generally. The following, beyond many, are worthy of being consulted on this point: Francisc. Piccolomineus, Lib. de Mund. cap. 3. p. 631. Jac. Thomasius, De Exustione Mundi Stoica, diss. 14. sect. 140. p. 211. The whole question relates to that soul which is called *anima informans*, and it is disputed, whether Aristotle, as we know Plato did, considered a certain soul to be diffused through the universe, from which the souls of men are derived. The leader among those who attribute this opinion to Aristotle, so far as I know, is Clemens Alexandrinus, who censures the philosopher as excluding divine providence, yet as believing that this soul of the world is the Deity. In Protreptic, cap. 5. p. 58. Καὶ ὅ γε τῆς αἱρέσεως πατὴρ, τῶν ὅλων οὐ νοήσας τὸν πατέρα, τὸν καλούμενον ὕπατον, ψυχὴν εἶναι τοῦ παντὸς οἴεται, "The father of the Peripatetic sect, ignorant of the parent of the universe, maintains that he who is called the supreme is the soul of the world." But Thomasius has shown at length, in the first place, that this passage is very ambiguous; secondly, that Clemens seems to have taken it from the author of the treatise De Mundo, which was falsely attributed to Aristotle, and not from that philosopher himself, De Exust. Mund. Stoic. diss. 14. p. 212. When our author, so thoroughly versed in the ancient philosophy, referred to this subject in this way, he could not have remembered Athenagoras, the best interpreter of Clemens, who fully explains how the ancient Christian doctors understood the opinion of Aristotle, or in what sense they attributed to the Stagirite this dogma of the soul of the world. Athenagoras reports, Apologiæ cap. 6. p. 28, that Aristotle attributed both a body and a soul to God. He adds that the philosopher considered the ether and the stars to be the body of God, in all of which he was present as a soul: Αὐτὸν μὲν οὐ κινούμενον, αἴτιον δὲ τῆς τούτου κινήσεως γινόμενον, "Himself unmoved, yet producing the motion of the body, and presiding over it," See how Clemens expresses himself, when he indicates that Aristotle regarded God as the soul of the world. I shall not easily concede that this was the opinion of Aristotle, but I am not now inquiring, what might be Aristotle's opinion, but what many of the ancient Christians, and especially Clemens, deemed his opinion to be. They thought that

24. Now whereas Aristotle, in the forecited words, tells us that we partake of life and understanding from that in the universe, after the same manner as we partake of heat and cold from that heat and cold that is in the universe; it is observable that this was a notion borrowed from Socrates;[7] (as we under-

Aristotle regarded God himself, not certain intelligences, as governing the motions of the stars and the system of the heavens; from whence it appears that they came very near the opinion of those who maintain that by Aristotle an *anima informans* was attributed to the world, or at least, to the system of the heavens and to air. For as our mind is said to shape our body, so, if the stars and the atmosphere be the body of Deity, God may, in a certain sense, be called the soul that shapes them. But, as was just now observed, I have no doubt that they attributed a dogma to Aristotle with which he did not at all concur. Nor is it less certain, that if even he were of this opinion, there was much less of agreement in this point between him and Plato than many suppose. Others much more plainly endeavour to reconcile Aristotle with Plato, in this particular; formerly, those who are known by the name of later Platonists, as Proclus, Plotinus, Porphyry, whose chief endeavour it was to take away all disagreement between Plato and Aristotle; more recently, some of the Peripatetics, as well as very many of the disciples of Plato, whose names I need not mention. On the other hand, many Peripatetics affirm that Aristotle was entirely opposed to the doctrine of a soul of the world, and strenuously contend that nothing can be found in his writings which admits of either this Stoical or Platonical gloss. See what Jac. Thomasius de Stoic. Mundi Exustione, diss. 14. p. 212. maintains in favour of this opinion. Not so long since, Leibnitz, De la Conformité de la Foi et de la Raison, sect. 8. p. 12. maintained the same opinion, not now to mention others. After considering the matter well, I do not think either party altogether right. Aristotle certainly was no great friend to the soul of the world which Plato fancied, at which indeed none will be astonished who examine his philosophy. But still, he did not altogether renounce the doctrine of a soul of the world, though the phrase itself is not found in his writings. Aristotle every where concedes that there is a sort of vital warmth pervading all nature, intense and subtle, which opinion we have mentioned already. What, I ask, is this θερμότης ψυχική of Aristotle, but a kind of *anima informans*? Why may it not be said respecting it, as Manilius says concerning the soul of the world:

> Quum spiritus unus
> Per cunctas habitet partes, atque irriget orbem
> Omnia pervolitans?

"Since one spirit pervades all its parts, and flying through all refreshes the whole world," Astron. lib. 2. v. 64. p. 31. Although, therefore, Aristotle abstained from using the name, that he might not appear to approve of the sentiment of Plato, yet he fancied some sort of soul or spirit of the world, in a certain way *informans*, to use the word of the schoolmen, although it was not altogether what Plato, following Pythagoras, had imagined. I am unwilling to be regarded as originating this sentiment; there are writers who rank Aristotle among the advocates of the doctrine of a soul of the world, calling his vital heat to witness for their representations. Nor has it escaped me that Gassendi has said, Physic. sect. 3. lib. 3. p. 243. tom. 2. "Aristotelem facile pertrahi posse ad sententiam de anima mundi," "That Aristotle may easily be regarded as supporting the opinion of the world's having a soul." But these authors have altogether omitted the distinction which there is between Plato's soul of the world and the soul of Aristotle. See the notes on the following section.

[7] Never can I without great difficulty and regret bring myself to oppose the opinions of the learned author, to whom I feel myself both in talent and information so far inferior. But when truth requires me to differ, I dare not be silent. In proportion as the authority of any one is weighty, may it be apprehended that as limpets to a rock, people will adhere to his opinions and be so greatly caught and entangled with a name, as to drink in and imbibe the seeds of all errors. I, therefore, freely and ingenuously confess that in this whole paragraph, the excellent author so mingles and confuses things that differ, as to seem sometimes to be a Platonist, at other times an echo of Aristotle, establishing at the same time, next to nothing, and neglecting all due arrange-

stand both from Xenophon and Plato) that philosopher having used it as an argumentation to prove a Deity. And the sense of it is represented after this manner by the Latin poet:*

> Principio cœlum ac terram, camposque liquentes,
> Lucentemque globum lunæ, Titaniaque astra,
> Spiritus intus alit, totosque infusa per artus
> Mens agitat molem, et magno se corpore miscet.
> Inde hominum pecudumque genus, vitæque volantum.

From whence it may be collected, that Aristotle did suppose this plastic nature of the universe to be ἢ μέρος ψυχῆς, ἢ μὴ ἄνευ ψυχῆς, "either part of some mundane soul," that was also conscious and intellectual, (as that plastic nature in animals is) "or at least some inferior principle depending on such a soul." And indeed, whatever the doctrine of the modern Peripatetics be, we make no doubt at all but that Aristotle himself held the world's animation, or a mundane soul; forasmuch as he plainly declares himself concerning it elsewhere in his book De Cœlo,† after this manner: Ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς ὡς περὶ σωμάτων μόνον αὐτῶν, καὶ μονάδων, τάξιν μὲν ἐχόντων, ἀψύχων δὲ πάμπαν, διανοούμεθα· δεῖ δὲ ὡς μετεχόντων ὑπολαμβάνειν πράξεως καὶ ζωῆς, "But we commonly think of the heavens as nothing else but bodies and monads, having only a certain order, but altogether inanimate; whereas, we ought on the contrary, to conceive of them as partaking of life and action:" that is, as being endued with a rational or intellectual life. For so Simplicius‡ there rightly expounds the place: Δεῖ δὲ ὡς περὶ ἐμψύχων αὐτῶν συλλογίζεσθαι, καὶ λογικὴν ἐχόντων ψυχὴν, ὡς καὶ πράξεως καὶ ζωῆς λογικῆς μετέ-

ment in both his arguments and explanations. The following considerations show that this assertion is not rashly or falsely hazarded. Our author here makes Socrates the parent of that notion of the soul of the world, which he maintains Plato and Aristotle both affirmed. But I scarcely know any thing more questionable than this. I know that in the Timæus of Plato, Socrates commends Timæus as discussing the doctrine of the soul of the world, nor have I failed to observe that in every part of Plato's writings Socrates argues as if he were imbued with this opinion. But who, of any, even a slight measure of acquaintance with ancient literature, is not aware that from all questions of this kind concerning nature, Socrates was altogether averse, and that he laughed at Anaxagoras and other philosophers who pursued only physical studies, and that Plato falsely attributed to Socrates what he had either learned from the Pythagoreans, or had himself feigned, in order to obtain for it greater currency? See Diogenes Laërt. lib. 3. segm. 35. p. 185. and Menage on this passage. Xenophon, moreover, whom Dr. Cudworth commends beyond Plato, is so far from introducing Socrates as disputing concerning the soul of the world, that there was nothing about which he was less concerned than about expounding these subtle discussions of the physical philosophers. See Memorabil. Socratis, lib. 1. p. 561. According to Xenophon, Socrates highly commends the excellency of the mind which he says is given to us by the gods. See as above, p. 564. But there is nothing either there or elsewhere concerning a soul of the world, and nothing respecting plastic nature. Much less is it true, as the learned author intimates, that Socrates destroyed with this opinion, as it were with a sword, all atheistical contemners of a divine intelligence.

* Virgil. Æneid. lib. 6. v. 724.

† Lib. 2. c. 12. p. 656. tom. 1. opp.

‡ Comment. in Lib. de Cœlo, f. 126

χειν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ποιεῖν, καὶ κατὰ τῶν ἀλόγων ψυχῶν κατηγοροῦμεν, καὶ κατὰ τῶν ἀψύχων σωμάτων, τὸ δὲ πράττειν κυρίως κατὰ τῶν λογικῶν ψυχῶν κατηγοροῦμεν, "But we ought to think of the heavens as animated with a rational soul, and thereby partaking of action and rational life. For (saith he) though ποιεῖν be affirmed not only of irrational souls, but also of inanimate bodies, yet the word πράττειν does only denominate rational beings." But further, to take away all manner of scruple or doubt concerning this business, that philosopher before, in the same book* Ῥητῶς, affirmeth, ὅτι ὁ οὐρανὸς ἔμψυχος, καὶ ἀρχὴν κινήσεως ἔχει, "that the heaven is animated, and hath a principle of motion in itself;" where, by the heaven, as in many other places of Aristotle[8] and Plato, is to be understood the whole world.

There is indeed one passage in the same book De Cœlo, which,

* Aristot. de Cœlo, lib. 2. cap. 2. p. 642. tom. 1. opp.

[8] In what sense and within what limits Aristotle may be said to have professed the doctrine of a mundane soul, is clear from what has been already said. But the learned author requires that more illustration should be given. He labours to make out not only that Aristotle attributed to the world just such a soul as Plato and Pythagoras did, but also, that that philosopher maintained the doctrine of the plastic nature, for which he himself contended, and which was distinct and separate from the mundane soul. On what ground this is done the following observations will show. Here that he might maintain that the Stagirite contended for a mundane soul, 1. he quotes a passage from his book De Cœlo. But this passage treats of stars and planets, which Aristotle affirms to be animals, an opinion which it is well known a great many of the ancients, both Platonists, Jews, Christians, and others approved. See Pet. Dan. Huet. in Origenian. lib. 2. Quæst. 8. p. 126. Joh. Bap. Cotelerius, Not. ad Clementis Recognitiones, tom. 1. P. P. Apostol. p. 550. and Basnage, Histoire des Juifs, tom. 4. c. 8. p. 179. The force of this reasoning does not appear to me very great: "Aristotle believed that the stars were animals endowed with intelligence and reason. Therefore also, he believed that the whole world was endowed with intellectual life." Why it may be again and again affirmed, that different parts of the universe are endowed with life, but does it follow that the whole universe is regarded as an animal? Neither does the comment of Simplicius, which the learned author subjoins, at all aid him. For Simplicius was of that sect who are called the later Platonists. With how much earnestness they sought to bring Aristotle to the opinions of Plato, every one knows who has only touched upon inquiries of this kind. 2. He commends another dogma of Aristotle in which he says that the heavens are endowed with life, ἔμψυχος, and have the principle of motion; in which indeed under the name of heaven οὐρανὸς he intimates that the whole world is contained. But this every one will at once reject who looks into Aristotle himself. Not that, were it even as our author represents, the opinion he contends for would be much strengthened. I will explain somewhat more fully, since the matter stands thus, what the opinion of Aristotle really was. It was usual with him, although he does not use the word οὐρανὸς in one sense only, yet most commonly to employ it for all that region which extends from the loftiest part of heaven, or the highest sphere where he thought God himself resided, down to the lowest parts of earth and our own abode: Λέγομεν οὐρανὸν τὸ περιεχόμενον σῶμα ὑπὸ τῆς ἐσχάτης περιφορᾶς, "We call that heaven which beginning at the loftiest orb comes down even to us." De Cœlo. lib. 1. cap. 9. p. 360. tom. 1. opp. This heaven Aristotle very often affirms to be only body, but a body which is simple, and of its own accord, and by its own nature set in motion and urged to circular movement. See De Cœlo. lib. i. c. 2. 3. 4. Ἀναγκαῖον εἶναί τι σῶμα ἁπλοῦν, ὃ πέφυκε φέρεσθαι τὴν κύκλῳ κίνησιν κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φύσιν. There was no reason therefore, why the learned author should suppose that the heaven of Aristotle consisted of body and soul; an idea which indeed never entered the philosopher's mind. His entire heaven is corporeal, though in its natural qualities it is entirely different from other bodies. Aristotle certainly is not inconsistent with himself when he affirmed that this very heaven is endowed with life and with the prin-

at first sight, and slightly considered, may seem to contradict this again; and therefore probably is that which hath led many into a contrary persuasion, that Aristotle denied the world's animation:* Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὔτε ὑπὸ ψυχῆς εὔλογον ἀναγκαζούσης μένειν ἀίδιον· οὐδὲ γὰρ τῆς ψυχῆς οἷον τ' εἶναι τὴν τοιαύτην ζωὴν ἄλυπον καὶ μακαρίαν· ἀνάγκη γὰρ καὶ τὴν κίνησιν μετὰ βίας οὖσαν, πεφυκότος τοῦ πρώτου σώματος ἄλλως καὶ κινεῖν συνεχῶς, ἄσχολον εἶναι, καὶ πάσης ἀπηλλαγμένην ῥαστώνης ἔμφρονος· εἴγε μηδ' ὥσπερ τῇ ψυχῇ τῇ τῶν θνητῶν ζώων ἐστὶν ἀνάπαυσις, ἡ περὶ τὸν ὕπνον γινομένη τοῦ σώματος ἄνεσις, ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖον Ἰξίονός τινος μοῖραν κατέχειν αὐτὴν ἀίδιον καὶ ἄτρυτον, "But it is not reasonable neither to think that the heavens continue to eternity, moved by a soul necessitating or violently compelling them. Nor indeed, is it possible, that the life of such a soul should be pleasurable or happy: forasmuch as the continual violent motion of a body (naturally inclining to move another way) must needs be a very unquiet thing, and void of all mental repose, especially when there is no such relaxation as the souls of mortal animals have by sleep; and therefore, such a soul of the world as this must of necessity be condemned to an eternal Ixionian fate." But in these words Aristotle does not deny the heavens to be moved by a soul of their own, (which is positively affirmed by him elsewhere) but only by such a soul as should violently and forcibly agitate, or drive them round, contrary to their own natural inclination, whereby, in the mean time, they tended downwards of themselves towards the centre. And his sense concerning the motion of the heavens is truly represented by Simplicius, in this manner: Τὸ δὲ ὅλον φυσικὸν καὶ ἔμψυχον ὑπὸ ψυχῆς κυρίως κινεῖται, διὰ μέσης τῆς φύσεως, "The whole world or heaven being as well a natural, as an animalish body, is moved properly by soul; but yet by means of nature also, as an instrument, so that the motion of it is not violent." But whereas Aristotle there insinuates, as if Plato had held the heavens to be moved by a soul violently, contrary to their nature; Simplicius, though sufficiently addicted to Aristotle, ingenuously acknowledges his error herein, and, vindicating Plato

ciple of motion. He divided all bodies into two kinds—animate and inanimate, compound and simple. The inanimate, destitute of motion, require some extraneous force to set them going; the animate move spontaneously and from their own nature, nor do they require any exterior impulse. See also Metaphys. lib. 14. cap. 2. p. 472. tom. 4. opp. Heaven with him was just such a body as we have already seen. The force therefore of this sentence of Aristotle is simply this, heaven is a body in which is included a spontaneous moving power which other bodies are destitute of; wherefore, unless I am very much mistaken, Dr. Cudworth does not make it appear from these words of Aristotle, that the philosopher attributed a soul to heaven and to the universe. I will not deny that according to him a vital heat pervades the heavens, from whence he says, that minds proceed. But not now to mention other things, since the heavens are neither moved nor formed by this vital heat, it is evident that between it and a mundane soul, as Plato called it, there is a very wide difference.

* Lib. 2. cap. 1. page 640. tom. 1. opp.

from that imputation, shows how he likewise held a plastic nature, as well as a mundane soul; and that amongst his ten instances of motion,* the ninth is that of nature, *τὴν ἕτερον ἀεὶ κινοῦσαν, καὶ μεταβαλλομένην ὑφ' ἑτέρου*, "that which always moves another, being itself changed by something else;" as the tenth, that of the mundane soul, *τὴν ἑαυτὴν κινοῦσαν καὶ ἕτερα*, "that which originally both moves itself and other things:" as if his meaning in that place were, that though nature be a life and internal energy, yet it acts subserviently to a higher soul, as the first original mover.[9]

* De Leg. lib. 10.

[9] I will collect into this one note what I think should be observed in this discussion. I. The learned author has incorrectly interpreted the passage of Aristotle, following somewhat inconsiderately the later Platonists, Simplicius especially, the very worst interpreter of things of this kind. Aristotle does not intimate, even by a single word in the passage, that he is speaking of the violent motion of the heavens, and repelling those who consider them to be whirled round in a circle by a soul contrary to their nature, but rejects entirely the notion of a soul in the heavens. In the introduction to the chapter, he takes for granted what he thinks has been proved in the first book, that the heavens are in their own nature eternal, and that they cannot by any means be dissolved or destroyed. Then from the views of those who thought otherwise, he adds that this opinion might be strengthened; since that if their views were ridiculous and absurd, it would follow of necessity that that was the only correct view which he maintained. On this account principally he adverts to and laughs at the notion of the ancients, of the heavens resting on the shoulders of Atlas, lest they should fall. He immediately adds, that they who affirmed that a soul was as it were shut up and inclosed in the system of the heavens were not at all wiser: "Ὥσπερ γὰρ περὶ βάρος ἐχόντων καὶ γεηρῶν ἁπάντων τῶν ἄνω σωμάτων, ὑπέστησαν αὐτῷ μυθικῶς ἀνάγκην ἔμψυχον, "For they supposed the necessity of the existence of such a soul, as if the upper heavenly bodies possessed weight, and were of an earthy nature." After the intervening of a few words he proceeds to a confutation of the opinion which Dr. Cudworth quotes; the amount of which is as follows. That a soul of this kind, sustaining the system of the heavens, would be a most miserable soul since it could never be at rest. Hence it is clear that Aristotle speaks in this place not of any violent agitation of the heavens, but of their eternity, and that the soul which he calls *ἀναγκάζουσα* is not a soul violently agitating the heavens, but a soul directing and controlling them, that they might not be destroyed but perpetually remain, or an *anima informans*. He therefore takes away all soul from the system of the heavens, which he maintains are in their own nature stable, perpetual and permanent—moved and excited by their own nature only. And this appears from even the argument which he urges against the patrons of the doctrine of a mundane soul. If the heavens, he says, be a partaker of soul, that soul, since the heavens are in a continual motion, must be exceedingly unhappy, and can never be in a state of rest. Fancy to yourself whatever sort of soul you please, this consideration, according to the opinion of Aristotle, will always meet you, inasmuch as he contends that there is nothing divine, nothing happy, nothing in state of enjoyment, which is not immoveable while every thing else moves. The Stagirite perhaps will not be against assigning to the heavens an *anima assistens*, but an *anima informans*, such as Plato maintained, he will not permit, he never can indeed without overthrowing his whole system. II. Dr. Cudworth, moreover, is scarcely correct and sufficiently careful in saying that Simplicius best explained the views of Aristotle. For Simplicius was one of those who were most anxious to represent Plato and Aristotle as in harmony. III. Aristotle does not censure Plato as our author seems to affirm. But that he insinuates a reference to him is evident from what Plato says concerning a soul originating the motion of the heavens, De Legib. lib. 10. p. 669. IV. Plato enumerates the ten kinds of motion here mentioned, in his De Legib. lib. 10. p. 667. 668. I do not, however, perceive that he at all mentions plastic nature, or that he assigns to it this ninth kind of motion. These are inventions of Simplicius, who always endeavours to harmonize Plato and Aristotle. Plato nevertheless does mention a mundane soul moving the system of the heavens and all the stars, to which he plainly attributes his tenth motion.

But the grand objection against Aristotle's holding the world's animation is still behind; namely, from that in his Metaphysics,* where he determines the highest starry heavens to be moved by an immoveable mover, commonly supposed to be the Deity itself, and no soul of the world; and all the other spheres likewise to be moved by so many separate intelligences, and not by souls. To which we reply, that indeed Aristotle's first immoveable mover is no mundane soul, but an abstract intellect separate from matter, and the very Deity itself: whose manner of moving the heavens is thus described by him:[10] Κινεῖ δὲ ὡς ἐρώμενον, "it moveth only as being loved." Wherefore, besides this supreme unmoved mover, that philosopher supposed another inferior moved mover also, that is, a mundane soul, as the proper and immediate efficient cause of the heavenly motions; of which he speaks after this manner: Κινούμενον δὲ τἆλλα κινεῖ, "that which itself being moved," objectively, or by appetite and desire of the first good "moveth other things." And thus that safe and sure-footed interpreter, Alex. Aphrodisius,† expounds his master's meaning, that the heaven being animated, and therefore indeed moved by an internal principle of its own, is, notwithstanding, originally moved by a certain immoveable and separate nature, which is above soul, τῷ νοεῖν τε αὐτὸ, καὶ ἔφεσιν καὶ ὄρεξιν ἔχειν τῆς ὁμοιώσεως αὐτοῦ, "both by its contemplating of it, and having an appetite and desire of assimilating itself thereunto." Aristotle seeming to have borrowed this notion from Plato,‡ who makes the constant regular circumgyration of the heavens to be an imitation of the motion or energy of intellect. So that Aristotle's first mover is not properly the efficient, but only the final and objective cause of the heavenly motions, the immediate efficient cause thereof being ψυχὴ καὶ φύσις, "soul and nature."

Neither may this be confuted from those other Aristotelic intelligences of the lesser orbs; that philosopher conceiving in like manner concerning them, that they were also the abstract minds or intellects of certain other inferior souls, which moved their several respective bodies or orbs circularly and uniformly, in a kind of imitation of them. For this plainly appears from hence, in that he affirms of these his inferior intelligences likewise, as well as of the supreme mover, that they do κινεῖν ὡς τέλος, "move only as the end."[1]

* Lib. 14. cap. 7. 8. 9. p. 476. s. tom. 4. opp.

[10] Metaph. lib. 14. cap. 8. p. 479. where these and the following words of Aristotle, on which I will say something immediately, are to be found.

† Quæst. Nat. lib. 1. cap. 1. ‡ De Legibus, lib. 10. p. 669. et alias.

[1] In my judgment those writers are perfectly correct, who consider this sentiment of Aristotle respecting intelligences exciting and moving celestial orbs, as a powerful argument against such as would rank this philosopher among the supporters of the doctrine of a mundane soul. For if celestial bodies or orbs move by some interior soul, they move themselves; it cannot be necessary that they should have for their government separate genii, whom Aristotle nevertheless imagined were appointed by

Where it is evident, that though Aristotle did plainly suppose a mundane intellectual soul, such as also contained, either in it, or under it, a plastic nature, yet he did not make either of these

God to preside over their motions. Nor is there any thing in what Dr. Cudworth here brings forward, which can shake any one who is but in a small degree conversant with Aristotle from this opinion. The learned author urges, that strictly speaking according to Aristotle, the Deity does not move the highest orb, but only desires and intends its motion; that there is in that orb itself a soul especially its own, distinct from Deity, by which it is governed. In like manner, he thinks Aristotle's intelligences to be the abstract intellect of souls which only contemplate the motion of their own orbs, but do not themselves move. Nor is he content with this even, but he maintains that besides this soul, Aristotle adds what he calls φύσις, or a plastic nature, to the universe. Great perspicacity, however, is necessary to perceive in Aristotle even the slightest trace of any thing of this kind. I. As to the last mentioned thing, a double mundane soul, or a mundane soul, properly so called, and a plastic nature, not only was this doctrine expounded and maintained by the later Platonists, but also entirely invented by them; for what reason will be afterwards shown. And if even Plato do say what may induce the idea that he was not opposed to this doctrine, certainly Aristotle says nothing of the kind, his whole argument being against this double soul: this indeed I imagine will be sufficiently evident to intelligent persons from what I have already said. II. That the learned author might prove that Deity itself does not move the highest celestial orb, but only desires its motion, since within that orb there is a soul, as it were inclosed, which excites all its necessary motions, he brings forward the words of Aristotle, Metaphys. lib. 14. cap. 7. p. 497. Κινεῖ δὲ ὡς ἐρώμενον· κινούμενον δὲ τἆλλα κινεῖ, "It moveth only as being loved; but that which is itself moved moves other things." This argument is interpreted entirely according to the comment of Prophyry, Plotinus, and other Platonists, to whom may be added also some Aristotelians. Our author takes its first clause as relating to Deity, its last to the mundane soul. But I doubt whether they who have closely studied the sentiments of Aristotle will altogether approve of this. In the very chapter from which these words are taken Aristotle is exceedingly obscure. It could scarcely be otherwise, since he was speaking of things which he did not himself understand. Interpreters have toiled in expounding this chapter as they have toiled nowhere else. Nor do I judge myself capable of so explaining the matter as to remove all doubt, though I am convinced, that the philosopher does not say what Dr. Cudworth attributes to him. I will try notwithstanding whether I can throw any light upon this darkness. Among the principles laid down in Aristotle's physics there is this, "Whatever is in a state of motion must be moved by something else." There are many passages in which this doctrine is clearly laid down. Relying on this principle, he opposes Plato among others, who had asserted that the soul is moved spontaneously, and from this consideration proved its immortality. "The soul is moved," he says. "It is therefore moved by some thing else, it cannot originate motion." See De Anim. lib. 1. cap. 2. p. 4. Therefore since Aristotle altogether opposed an endless progression, and did not doubt that there is in the universe some first principle of motion, it was fit that he should attribute immobility to this first cause whence motion proceeded. For if he had alleged that this cause moved, he would have required a higher ascent to be made, and must have inquired for a new cause of motion. But Aristotle clearly perceived that no small difficulty would arise, how that which is not itself moved can move and excite other beings. In order that he might meet this difficulty he conceived that it was enough to determine as to the manner in which the first cause moved, that it entirely differs from all other kinds of motion traceable in the universe. But he does not by this means meet the whole difficulty. They who are disposed to pursue the inquiry may go on to ask: What kind of motion is this? Aristotle therefore endeavours in this chapter to answer this very natural inquiry. He says forsooth that Deity moves ὡς ἐπιθυμητὸν, ὡς τὸ ὀρεκτὸν, ὡς νοητὸν, ὡς ἐρώμενον, "as a thing to be desired, and a thing longed for, as intelligible and loved." Every one explains these terms according to his own views; some, desirous of throwing light upon their master, introduce readers into new difficulties through their imperfect conception of the force of the words and phrases employed. For example, Guillaume Du Val, a professor of philosophy in Paris, who otherwise surpasses others in perspicuousness, Synop. Analyt. Doctr.

to be the Supreme Deity; but resolved the first principle of things to be one absolutely perfect mind or intellect, separate from matter, which was ἀκίνητος οὐσία,* "an immoveable nature,[2] whose essence was his operation, and which moved only as being loved, or as the final cause: of which he pronounces in this manner:† Ὅτι ἐκ τοιαύτης ἀρχῆς ἤρτηται ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις, "That upon such a principle as this heaven and nature depend;" that is,[3] the animated heaven, or mundane soul, together

Peripatet. p. 44. But there was no reason, I fancy, why learned men should have taken such pains. For these words and phrases are only specimens of the verbiage under which Aristotle conceals, as he sometimes does, his own ignorance. The brevity and obscurity which he employs show that he was conscious that he could not explain the true nature of that motion which Deity, himself immoveable, produces; yet he seems to have understood very well that he must repress the urgency of curious inquirers by new and unwonted words and phrases thrown out as a sop to Cerberus. Had he been conscious that he could meet the expectation of readers, he would have spoken with much greater clearness and perspicuity. The whole force of the sentence, "Deity moves as a thing to be desired and loved," will appear on examination to be very little different from the following. "Deity moves without trouble either to itself or others; as they who are loved by their friends can give commands even by a wink of the eye, and effect whatever they please, even though they themselves do nothing." Which is the same as saying, "I do not know how he excites motion, who himself is unmoved. I know this indeed, that he does not move as other natures move, which even while they move, themselves supply the force by which they are impelled." What else can this be called than concealing ignorance with fine words, and seeming to say a great deal when really nothing is said. Let competent judges decide whether it is credible that the Stagirite wished by these words to maintain, that there is in the highest orb, over which he placed the Deity, a peculiar soul, which moves it; Deity only looking on and not effecting the motion. All that Aristotle says in this last book of his Metaphysics shows that he believed that the Deity was the true and efficient cause of all motion. Out of many things there said, I will only quote this one: Ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχὴ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον τῶν ὄντων ἀκίνητον καὶ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· κινοῦν δὲ τὴν πρώτην καὶ ἀΐδιον καὶ μίαν κίνησιν, "The principle and first of all entities is both per se and by its accidents immoveable, producing, however, the first, the ever-during, the sole motion. On what ground the words which follow, κινούμενον δὲ τἆλλα κινεῖ, are referred to the mundane soul, I cannot discover. They simply mean, that that which is moved communicates motion to other things. Nothing can be more simple or more consistent with the philosophy of Aristotle. I have pursued this point so much the farther, because I perceived with regret, that in explaining this part of the Metaphysics of Aristotle, which treats concerning Deity and intelligent agents, interpreters toil very much, and imagine a good many things, no trace of which can be found in the philosopher's writings; and I find that not a few, even of the Peripatetic tribe, prevail on themselves to very nearly give in to this Platonist interpretation, of which Dr. Cudworth approves. III. To make what he says appear true, our author tells us that Aristotle asserted concerning inferior intelligences, that they ὡς τέλος κινεῖν, "move only as the end." From which he concludes that they do not themselves truly move, but that they only govern and direct the motion, of the inner soul concealed within the orbs over which they preside. But this form of speech, as will not escape the attention of thoughtful readers of Aristotle, signifies nothing more than that they move with a fixed purpose and design. Do not those agents which move bodies with such purpose and design efficiently and truly move?

* Aristot. Metaphysicor. lib. 14. cap. 6. p. 477.

[2] The words of the philosopher are Δεῖ ἄρα εἶναι ἀρχὴν τοιαύτην, ἧς ἡ οὐσία ἐνέργεια, "There must be a principle whose very essence is action."

† Met. lib. 14. cap. 7. p. 479. tom. 4. oper.

[3] Were it certain that in this sentence οὐρανὸς signifies the system of the heavens stimulated by a soul, and φύσις means plastic nature, this interpretation of the words of Aristotle might easily be approved. But we have already seen that it cannot by any argument be made apparent that this is the meaning of these words in Aristotle.

with the plastic nature of the universe, must of necessity depend upon such an absolutely perfect and immoveable mind or intellect.

Having now declared the Aristotelic doctrine concerning the plastic nature of the universe, with which the Platonic also agrees, that it is, ἢ μέρος ψυχῆς, ἢ μὴ ἄνευ ψυχῆς, "either part of a mundane intellectual soul," that is, a lower power and faculty of it "or else not without it, but some inferior thing depending on it;" we think fit to add in this place, that though there were no such mundane soul, as both Plato and Aristotle supposed, distinct from the Supreme Deity, yet there might notwithstanding be a plastic nature of the universe depending immediately upon the Deity itself. For the plastic nature essentially depends upon mind or intellect, and could not possibly be without it; according to those words before cited: Ἐκ τοιαύτης ἀρχῆς ἤρτηται ἡ φύσις, "Nature depends upon such an intellectual principle;" and for this cause that philosopher does elsewhere join νοῦς and φύσις, "mind and nature" both together.

25. Besides this general plastic nature of the universe, and those particular plastic powers in the souls of animals, it is not impossible but that there may be other plastic natures also (as certain lower lives, or vegetative souls) in some greater parts of the universe; all of them depending, if not upon some higher conscious soul, yet at least upon a perfect intellect presiding over the whole. As for example; though it be not reasonable to think, that every plant, herb, and pile of grass, hath a particular plastic life, or vegetative soul of its own, distinct from the mechanism of the body, nor that the whole earth is an animal endued with a conscious soul; yet there may possibly be, for aught we know, one plastic nature or life belonging to the whole terrestrial (or terraqueous) globe, by which all plants and vegetables, continuous with it, may be differently formed, according to their different seeds, as also minerals and other bodies framed, and whatsoever else is above the power of fortuitous mechanism effected, as by the immediate cause, though always subordinate to other causes; the chief whereof is the Deity. And this perhaps may ease the minds of those, who cannot but think it too much to impose all upon one plastic nature of the universe.

26. And now we have finished our first task, which was to give an account of the plastic nature, the sum whereof briefly amounts to this; that it is a certain lower life than the animal, which acts regularly and artificially, according to the direction of mind and understanding, reason and wisdom, for ends, or in order to good, though itself do not know the reason of what it does, nor is master of that wisdom according to which it acts, but only a servant to it, and drudging executioner of the same; it operating fatally and sympathetically, according to laws and

commands prescribed to it by perfect intellect, and impressed upon it; and which is either a lower faculty of some conscious soul, or else an inferior kind of life or soul by itself; but essentially depending upon a higher intellect.

We proceed to our second undertaking; which was to show, how grossly those two sorts of Atheists before mentioned, the Stoical or Cosmo-plastic, and the Stratonical or Hylozoic, both of them acknowledging this plastic life of nature, do mistake the notion of it, or pervert it, and abuse it, to make a certain spurious and counterfeit God-Almighty of it, (or a first principle of all things) thereby excluding the true Omnipotent Deity, which is a perfect mind, or consciously understanding nature, presiding over the universe; they substituting this stupid plastic nature in the room of it.

Now the chief errors or mistakes of these Atheists concerning the plastic nature, are these four following. First, that they make that to be the first principle of all, and the highest thing in the universe, which is the last and lowest of all lives; a thing essentially secondary, derivative, and dependent. For the plastic life of nature is but the mere umbrage of intellectuality, a faint and shadowy imitation of mind and understanding; upon which it doth as essentially depend, as the shadow doth upon the body, the image in the glass upon the face, or the echo upon the original voice. So that if there had been no perfect mind or intellect in the world, there could no more have been any plastic nature in it, than there could be an image in the glass without a face, or an echo without an original voice. If there be Φύσις, then there must be Νοῦς: if there be a plastic nature, that acts regularly and artificially in order to ends, and according to the best wisdom, though itself not comprehending the reason of it, nor being clearly conscious of what it doth; then there must of necessity be a perfect mind or intellect, that is, a Deity, upon which it depends. Wherefore Aristotle does like a philosopher in joining Φύσις and Νοῦς, nature and mind both together; but these Atheists do very absurdly and unphilosophically, that would make a senseless and inconscious plastic nature, and therefore without any mind or intellect, to be the first original of all things.

Secondly, these Atheists augment the former error, in supposing those higher lives of sense or animality, and of reason or understanding, to rise both of them from that lower senseless life of nature, as the only original fundamental light. Which is a thing altogether as irrational and absurd, as if one should suppose the light, that is in the air or ether, to be the only original and fundamental light and the light of the sun and stars but a secondary and derivative thing from it, and nothing but the light of the air modificated and improved by condensation: or as

if one should maintain, that the sun and moon, and all the stars, were really nothing else but the mere reflections of those images that we see in rivers and ponds of water. But this hath always been the sottish humour and guise of Atheists, to invert the order of the universe, and hang the picture of the world, as of a man with his heels upwards. Conscious reason and understanding, being a far higher degree of life and perfection than that dull plastic nature, which does only do, but not know, can never possibly emerge out of it; neither can the duplication of corporeal organs be ever able to advance that simple and stupid life of nature into redoubled consciousness or self-perception; nor any triplication, or indeed milleclupation of them, improve the same into reason and understanding.

Thirdly; for the better colouring of the former errors, the Hylozoists adulterate the notion of the plastic life of nature, confounding it with wisdom and understanding. And though themselves acknowledge, that no animal-sense, self-preception, and consciousness belongs to it, yet they will have it to be a thing perfectly wise, and consequently every atom of senseless matter that is in the whole world, to be infallibly omniscient, as to all its own capacities and congruities, or whatsover itself can do or suffer; which is plainly contradictious. For though there may be such a thing as the plastic nature, that, according to the former description of it, can do without knowing, and is devoid of express consciousness or self-perception, yet perfect knowledge and understanding without consciousness is nonsense and impossibility. Wherefore this must needs be condemned for a great piece of sottishness in the hylozoic Atheists, that they attribute perfect wisdom and understanding to a stupid inconscious nature, which is nothing but χειροτέχνης, the mere drudging instrument, or manuary opificer of a perfect mind.

Lastly, these Atheists err in this, that they make this plastic life of nature to be a mere material or corporeal thing; whereas matter or body cannot move itself, much less therefore can it artificially order and dispose its own motion. And though the plastic nature be indeed the lowest of all lives, yet notwithstanding since it is a life, or internal energy, and self-activity, distinct from local motion, it must needs be incorporeal, all life being essentially such. But the Hylozoists conceive grossly both of life and understanding, spreading them all over upon matter, just as butter is spread upon bread, or plaster upon a wall, and accordingly slicing them out in different quantities and bulks, together with it; they contending, that they are but inadequate conceptions of body, as the only substance; and consequently concluding, that the vulgarly received notion of God is nothing else but such an inadequate conception of the matter of the

whole corporeal universe, mistaken for a complete and entire substance by itself, that is supposed to be the cause of all things: which fond dream or dotage of theirs will be further confuted in due place. But it is now time to put a period to this long, though necessary digression, concerning the plastic life of nature, or an artificial, orderly and methodical nature.

XXXVIII. Plato* gives an account, why he judged it necessary in those times, publicly to propose that atheistic hypothesis, in order to a confutation, as also to produce rational arguments for the proof of a Deity, after this manner: Εἰ μὴ κατεσπαρμένοι ἦσαν οἱ τοιοῦτοι λόγοι ἐν τοῖς πᾶσιν, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, ἀνθρώποις, οὐδὲν ἂν ἔδει τῶν ἐπαμυνόντων λόγων, ὡς εἰσὶ θεοὶ· νῦν δὲ ἀνάγκη, "Had not these atheistic doctrines been publicly divulged, and made known in a manner to all, it would not have been needful to have confuted them, nor by reasons to prove a Deity; but now it is necessary." And we conceive, that the same necessity at this time will justify our present undertaking likewise; since these atheistic doctrines have been as boldly vented, and publicly asserted, in this latter age of ours, as ever they could be in Plato's time, when the severity of the Athenian government must needs be a great check to such designs; Socrates having been put to death upon a mere false and groundless accusation of atheism, and Protagoras, (who doubtless was a real Atheist) having escaped the same punishment no otherwise than by flight, his books being notwithstanding publicly burnt in the market-place at Athens, and himself condemned to perpetual exile, though there was nothing at that time proved against him, save only this one sceptical passage, in the beginning of a book of his:† Περὶ μὲν θεῶν οὐκ ἔχω εἰπεῖν, εἰθ' ὡς εἰσιν, εἰθ' ὡς οὐκ εἰσι· πολλὰ γὰρ τὰ κωλύοντα εἰδέναι, ἥτε ἀδηλότης καὶ βραχὺς ὢν ὁ βίος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, "Concerning the gods, I have nothing at all to say, either that they be or be not; there being many things, that hinder the knowledge of this matter, both the obscurity of the thing itself, and the shortness of human life." Whereas atheism, in this latter age of ours, hath been impudently asserted, and most industriously promoted; that very atomic form, that was first introduced (a little before Plato's time) by Leucippus, Protagoras, and Democritus, having been also revived amongst us, and that with no small pomp and ostentation of wisdom and philosophy.

It was before observed, that there were two several forms of atomical philosophy; first, the most ancient and genuine, that was religious, called Moschical (or if you will Mosaical) and Pythagorical; secondly, the adulterated atheistic atomology,

* De Leg. lib. 10. p. 666. opp.
† Diog. Laërt. vita Prot. lib. 9. segm. 51. p. 576.

called Leucippean or Democritical. Now accordingly, there have been in this latter age of ours two several successive resurrections or restitutions of those two atomologies. For Renatus Cartesius first revived and restored the atomic philosophy, agreeably, for the most part, to that ancient Moschical and Pythagoric form; acknowledging besides extended substance and corporeal atoms, another cogitative incorporeal substance, and joining metaphysics or theology, together with physiology, to make up one entire system of philosophy. Nor can it well be doubted, but that this physiology of his, as to the mechanic part of it, hath been elaborated by the ingenious author into an exactness at least equal with the best atomologies of the ancients. Nevertheless, this Cartesian philosophy is highly obnoxious to censure upon some accounts;[4] the chief whereof is this, that deviating from that primitive Moschical atomology, in rejecting all plastic nature, it derives the whole system of the corporeal universe from the necessary motion of matter, only divided into particles insensibly small, and turned round in a vortex, without the guidance or direction of any understanding nature. By means whereof, though it boast of solving all the corporeal phenomena by mere fortuitous mechanism, and without any final or mental causality, yet it gives no account at all of that, which is the grandest of all phenomena, the τὸ εὖ καὶ καλῶς, "the orderly regularity and harmony of the mundane system." The occasion of which miscarriage hath been already intimated, namely, from the acknowledging only two heads of being, extended and cogitative, and making the essence of cogitation to consist in express consciousness; from whence it follows, that there could be no plastic nature, and therefore either all things must be done by fortuitous mechanism, or else God himself be brought immediately upon the stage for the solving of all phenomena. Which latter absurdity our philosopher being over-careful to avoid, cast himself upon the former, the banishing of all final and mental causality quite out of the world, and acknowledging no other philosophic causes beside material and mechanical. It cannot be denied, but that even some of the ancient religious Atomists were also too much infected with this mechanizing humour; but Renatus Cartesius hath not only outdone them all herein, but even the very Atheists themselves also, as shall be showed afterward; and therefore as much as in him lies, has quite disarmed the world of that grand argument for a Deity[5] taken from

[4] Let what I have given above at sect. 3. 4. concerning the view of Descartes be referred to and compared with the text.

[5] This perhaps is a little too severe and vehement against Descartes. For a writer does not entirely take away the argument which arises from the harmony and the admirable structure of the universe, who repeatedly says that all things which exist in the universe are produced by natural gravities and motions, if only he believes that there

the regular frame and harmony of the universe. To which gross miscarriage of his there might be also another added, th he seems to make matter necessarily existent, and essentially infinite and eternal. Notwithstanding all which, we cannot entertain that uncharitable opinion of him,[6] that he really designed atheism, the fundamental principles of his philosophy being such, as that no atheistic structure can possibly be built upon them. But shortly after this Cartesian restitution of the primitive atomology, that acknowledgeth incorporeal substance, we have had our Leucippus and Democritus too,[7] who also revived and brought again upon the stage that other atheistic atomology, that makes ἀρχὰς τῶν ὅλων ἀτόμους, "senseless and lifeless atoms to be the only principles of all things in the universe:" thereby necessarily excluding, besides incorporeal substance and immortality of souls, a deity and natural morality; as also making all actions and events materially and mechanically necessary.

Now there could be no satisfactory confutation of this atheistic hypothesis, without a fair proposal first made of the several grounds of it to their best advantage, which we have therefore endeavoured in the former chapter. The answers to which atheistic arguments ought, according to the laws of method, to be reserved for the last part of the whole treatise, where we

is a God. For since such a writer refers all those mechanical laws by which he thinks nature is governed to God as their author, whatever these laws effect he assigns to him, and maintains that divine wisdom and power are needed, just as the results of any given machine are properly considered to commend the sagacity and skill of the constructor of the machine. Hence there have been grave and learned men of the Cartesian sect, who, from the constitution and operations of nature, have most ingeniously demonstrated the greatness, the wisdom and the power of God. Of whom the principal is Bernard Nieuwentydt, whose "Right Use of contemplating the Works of the Creator," published first in Dutch, at Amsterdam, 1715, afterwards in both English and French, readily obtains the concurrence and commendation of the truly learned. Concerning other things, which the author here imputes to Descartes, chiefly as to the infinity and eternity of matter, because I do not wish unnecessarily to repeat what has been said a hundred times, I am now silent.

[6] Though there are many who regard Descartes as an Atheist and enemy to all religion, yet almost all who have any pretence to truth and justice incline to this middle sentiment, which leaves him in possession of some sort of religion, but still represents his doctrines as by no means friendly to piety. Dr. Cudworth adopted the opinion of his friend Dr. Henry More, respecting Descartes, as may be seen in the Epistola ad Virum Clarissimum de Cartesio, of that learned author, which is added to his Enchirid. Ethic. and is extant in his philosophical works, sect. 12, 13. p. 123. Of more modern writers, to omit others, this opinion is assented to by Dan. Georg. Morhofius, Polyhistoris tom. 2. lib. 1. cap. 15. p. 111. Jo. Franc. Buddeus, Thes. de Atheismo et Superstitione, cap. 1. p. 152, and of Englishmen, by William Derham, an acute and highly talented author, in his Physico-theology, book 5. chap. 1. p. 385. London edition, 8vo. 1786. by the following also, who have professedly treated on this subject, Andr. Ritterus Dissertat. de Religione Cartesii Gryphisw. 1705, 4to. and Guil. Henr. Beckherus, Diss. Quod Cartesius de omnibus initio suadens dubitare Atheis ideo et Scepticis non sit adscribendus, Regiom. 1724. in 4. They who most recently have charged Descartes with atheism are mentioned by the very learned Gottlieb Stoll, in Introd. ad Histor. Literar. p. 2. cap. 3. sect. 28. p. 597.

[7] This is aimed at Hobbes and his friends, concerning whom it is known that they confined the whole universe of existences to bodies, rejecting every thing incorporeal.

are positively to determine the right intellectual system of the universe; it being properly our work here, only to give an account of the three false hypotheses of the mundane system, together with their several grounds. Nevertheless, because it might not only seem indecorous for the answers to those atheistic arguments to be so long deferred, and placed so far behind the arguments themselves, but also prove otherwise really inconvenient, we shall therefore choose rather to break those laws of method (neglecting the scrupulosity thereof), and subjoin them immediately in this place, craving the reader's pardon for this preposterousness.

It is certain, that the source of all atheism is generally a dull and earthy disbelief of the existence of things beyond the reach of sense; and it cannot be denied but that there is something of immorality in the temper of all Atheists, as all atheistic doctrine tends also to immorality. Notwithstanding which, it must not be therefore concluded, that all dogmatic Atheists came to be such merely by means of gross intemperance, sensuality and debauchery. Plato* indeed describes one sort of Atheists in this manner: Οἷς ἂν πρὸς τῇ δόξῃ τῇ θεῶν ἔρημα εἶναι πάντα, ἀκράτειαί τε ἡδονῶν καὶ λυπῶν προσπέσωσι, μνῆμαί τε ἰσχυραὶ καὶ μαθήσεις ὀξεῖαι παρῶσι, "Such, who together with this opinion, that all things are void of gods, are acted also by intemperance of pleasures and pains, and hurried away with violent lusts, being persons otherwise endued with strong memories, and quick wits." And these are the debauched, ranting and hectoring Atheists. But besides these, that philosopher tell us,† that there is another sort of Atheists also, οἷς μὴ νομίζουσι θεοὺς εἶναι τὸ παράπαν, ἦθος φύσει προσγίνεται δίκαιον, μισοῦντές τε γίγνονται τοὺς κακοὺς, καὶ τῷ δυσχεραίνειν τὴν ἀδικίαν, οὔτε τὰς τοιαύτας πράξεις προσίενται πράττειν, τούς τε μὴ δικαίους τῶν ἀνθρώπων φεύγουσι, καὶ τοὺς δικαίους στέργουσιν, "Such who though they think there be no gods at all, yet notwithstanding being naturally disposed to justice and moderation, as they will not do outrageous and exorbitant things themselves, so they will shun the conversation of wicked debauched persons, and delight rather in the society of those that are fair and just." And these are a sort of externally honest or civilized Atheists. Now what that thing is, which, besides gross sensuality and debauchery, might tempt men to entertain atheistic opinions, the same philosopher also declares; namely, that it is an affectation of singularity, or of seeming wiser than the generality of mankind. For thus when Clinias had disputed honestly against Atheists, from those vulgar topics of the regularity and harmony of the universe, (observable in the courses of sun, moon and

* De Legibus lib. 10. p. 908.

† De Legibus lib. 10. p. 908.

stars, and the seasons of the year) and of the common notions of mankind, in that both Greeks and Barbarians generally agreed in this, that there were gods, thinking he had thereby made a sufficient confutation of atheism, the Athenian Hospes hereupon discovers a great fear and jealousy, which he had, lest he should thereby but render himself an object of contempt to Atheists, as being a conceited and scornful generation of men. ΑΘ. *Φοβοῦμαί γε, ὦ μακάριε, τοὺς μοχθηροὺς, μήπως ὑμῶν καταφρονήσωσιν, ὑμεῖς μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἴστε αὐτῶν πέρι, τὴν τῆς διαφορᾶς αἰτίαν, ἀλλ' ἡγεῖσθε ἀκρατείᾳ μόνον ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν ἐπὶ τὸν ἀκρατῆ βίον ὁρμασθαι τὰς ψυχὰς αὐτῶν*, &c., "I am afraid of those wicked men the Atheists, lest they should despise you: for you are ignorant concerning them, when you think the only cause of atheism to be an intemperance of pleasures and lusts, violently hurrying mens' souls on to a wicked life." Clin. What other cause of atheism can there be besides this? Ath. That which you are not aware of, who live remotely, namely, *ἀμαθία τις μάλα χαλεπὴ δοκοῦσα εἶναι μεγίστη φρόνησις*, "a certain grievous ignorance, which yet notwithstanding hath the appearance of the greatest wisdom." And therefore afterwards, when that philosopher goes about to propose the atheistic hypothesis, he calls it, *τὸν παρὰ πολλοῖς δοξαζόμενον εἶναι σοφώτατον ἁπάντων λόγων*,[8] "that which to many seemeth to be the wisest and profoundest of all doctrines."

[8] What is here quoted from Plato may be found at almost the commencement of the tenth book De Legibus, p. 664. opp. But what Dr. Cudworth in the text asserts that Plato tells us, namely that affectation of singularity, and the desire of being accounted wiser than other men, induces many to become Atheists, though it be in itself very likely, cannot be got from the words of the philosopher by any ordinary method of interpretation. Plato observed that all did not become Atheists from the love of vice, but that some were impelled to this perversity by the inventions of some system of vain philosophy to which they attached themselves. This is that *ἀμαθία χαλεπή*, "dangerous ignorance which they account great wisdom." He then proceeds to explain what kind of wisdom that is which atheistic philosophers eagerly follow after. This wisdom he says is two-fold, some are led into atheism by the Theogonies of the ancient poets, or by their poems on the origin of the universe and of the gods. Others maintain that all things are made by nature and form, in other words, by natural bulk and motion. There is considerable difference between these two things, becoming an Atheist in order to appear more ingenious and wiser than others, and following any system of philosophy which leads to Atheism. There may be one of them without the other. Nor are there wanting examples of miserable men who seek no honour from denying a Deity, yet through the pursuit of some foolish and absurd system of philosophic wisdom, they persuade themselves that there never was a Deity. With these causes of atheism moreover ought to be compared those which the following learned men allege, viz. Matur. Veissiere la Croze, Dissertat. Historiques et Critiques p. 267. Jo. Mullerus, a celebrated divine of Hamburgh, Atheism. devict. Prolegom. cap. 3. p. 35—54. Jo. Franc. Buddeus, Thes. de Atheismo et Superstitione cap. 4. p. 308. Christoph. Matth. Pfaffius, Primit. Tubingens. P. 2. p. 75. Pet. Bayle, Continuation des Pensées sur les Cometes P. 1. sect. 19. p. 69. Dr. Samuel Clarke, Demonstration of the Being, &c., of a God, chap. 1. p. 1. and almost all those who have directed their arguments against Atheism. The celebrated Joh. Alb. Fabricius, in his Delectus Argumentor. pro Veritat. Religion. Christian. cap. 36. p. 653. has cited at some length many other authors on the same subject. I will not add

And we find the same thing at this very day, that Atheists make a great pretence to wisdom and philosophy; and that many are tempted to maintain atheistic opinions, that they may gain a reputation of wit by it. Which indeed was one reason that the rather induced us nakedly to reveal all the mysteries of atheism, because we observed, that so long as things are concealed and kept up in huggermugger, many will be the rather apt to suspect that there is some great depth and profundity of wisdom lodged in them; and that it is some noble and generous truth which the bigotic religious endeavour to smother and suppress.

Now, the case being thus, it was pertinently suggested also by the fore-mentioned philosopher,* οὐ σμικρόν γε τὸ διαφέρον, εἰ φανεῖεν οἱ λόγων ἁπτόμενοι ἀσεβῶν, ἄλλοις τε ἐξάρχοντες, μηδὲ εὖ τοῖς λόγοις, ἀλλ' ἐξημαρτημένως χρώμενοι, "that it must needs be a matter of no small moment for any one to make it appear, that they who maintain wicked atheistical opinions do none of them reason rightly, but grossly fumble in all their ratiocinations." And we hope to effect this in our present undertaking, to make it evident that Atheists are no such conjurers, as (though they hold no spirits) they would be thought to be; no such gigantic men of reason, nor profound philosophers, but that notwithstanding all their pretensions to wit, their atheism is really nothing else but ἀμαθία τις μάλα χαλεπὴ, "a most grievous ignorance," sottishness and stupidity of mind in them.

Wherefore, we shall in the next place conjure down all those devils raised and displayed in their most formidable colours, in the precedent chapter; or rather, we shall discover that they are really nothing else but what these Atheists pretend God and incorporeal spirits to be, mere fantastic spectres and impostures, vain imaginations of deluded minds, utterly devoid of all truth and reality. Neither shall we only confute those atheistic argu-

any thing to what with great propriety, accuracy and ingenuity, those authors have said, except a quotation of great elegance from Lactantius, Instit. Divinar. lib. 7. cap. 1. p. 775. the truth of which a knowledge of the habits of those who occupy the higher stations in society, and intercourse with them, I grieve to say it, fully confirms. "Nostra, quæ tradimus, pravæ vitiosæque mentes aut omnino non intelligent, aut, etiamsi intelligent, dissimulabunt tamen, et hæc vera esse nolent, quia trahuntur a vitiis, et scientes malis suis favent, quorum suavitate capiuntur, et virtutis viam deserunt, cujus acerbitate offenduntur. Qui autem sanati erunt, id est, non ita vitiis immersi, ut sanabiles non sint, et credent his et libenter accedent, et quæcunque dicimus aperta, et plana, et simplicia, et quod maxime opus est, vera et inexpugnabilia illis videbuntur." "Depraved and vicious minds either are entirely ignorant of what we teach, or if they know it they will dissemble and be unwilling to regard it as true, because they are swayed by their vices, and with their eyes open cherish their evil practices, the present pleasure of which attracts them, and forsake the path of virtue, by whose severity they are offended. They who are in their right mind, i. e. who are not so immersed in vice as to be utterly incurable, will believe the things we teach, and will willingly yield to them, regarding them as intelligible, plain, simple, and what is of especial importance, as true and incontrovertible.

* Plato de Legib. lib. 10. p. 667.

ments, and so stand upon our defensive posture, but we shall also assault atheism even with its own weapons, and plainly demonstrate that all forms of atheism are unintelligible nonsense and absolute impossibility to human reason: as we shall likewise, over and above, occasionally insert some (as we think) undeniable arguments for a Deity.

The Digression concerning the Plastic Life of Nature, or an Artificial, Orderly, and Methodical Nature, Sect. 37. *Chap.* 3..

"1. THAT neither the hylozoic nor cosmo-plastic Atheists are condemned for asserting an orderly and artificial plastic nature, as a life distinct from the animal, however this be a thing exploded, not only by the atomic Atheists, but also by some professed Theists, who notwithstanding might have an undiscerned tang of the mechanically-atheistic humour hanging about them. 2. If there be no plastic artificial nature admitted, then it must be concluded, that either all things come to pass by fortuitous mechanism and material necessity, (the motion of matter unguided) or else that God doth *αὐτουργεῖν ἅπαντα*, do all things himself immediately and miraculously, framing the body of every gnat and fly, as it were with his own hand; since divine laws and commands cannot execute themselves, nor be the proper efficient causes of things in nature. 3. To suppose all things to come to pass fortuitously, or by the unguided motion of matter, a thing altogether as irrational as it is atheistical and impious; there being many phenomena, not only above the powers of mechanism, but also contrary to the laws of it. The mechanic Theists make God but an idle spectator of the fortuitous motions of matter, and render his wisdom altogether useless and insignificant. Aristotle's judicious censure of the fortuitous Mechanists, with the ridiculousness of that pretence, that material and mechanical reasons are the only philosophical. 4. That it seems neither decorous in respect of God, nor congruous to reason, that he should *αὐτουργεῖν ἅπαντα*, do all things himself immediately and miraculously, nature being quite superseded and made to signify nothing. The same further confuted by the slow and gradual process of things in nature, as also by those errors and bungles that are committed when the matter proves inept and contumacious, arguing the agent not to be irresistible. 5. Reasonably inferred, that there is a plastic nature in the universe, as a subordinate instrument of divine providence, in the orderly disposal of matter; but yet so as not without a higher providence presiding over it, forasmuch as this plastic nature

cannot act electively or with discretion. Those laws of nature concerning motion which the mechanic Theists themselves suppose, really nothing else but a plastic nature. 6. The agreeableness of this doctrine with the sentiments of the best philosophers in all ages, Aristotle, Plato, Empedocles, Heraclitus, Hippocrates, Zeno, and the Paracelsians. Anaxagoras, though a professed Theist, severely censured, both by Aristotle and Plato, as an encourager of atheism, merely because he used material and mechanical causes more than mental and final. Physiologers and astronomers why vulgarly suspected of atheism in Plato's time. 7. The plastic nature no occult quality, but the only intelligible cause of that, which is the grandest of all phenomena, the orderly regularity and harmony of things, which the mechanic Theists, however pretending to solve all phenomena, can give no account at all of. A God, or infinite mind asserted by them, in vain and to no purpose. 8. Two things here to be performed by us; first, to give an account of the plastic nature, and then to show how the notion of it hath been mistaken and abused by Atheists. The first general account of the plastic nature, according to Aristotle, that it is to be conceived as art itself acting inwardly and immediately upon the matter; as if harmony living in the musical instruments should move the strings of them without any external impulse. 9. Two pre-eminences of the plastic nature above human art. First, that whereas human art acts upon the nature from without, cumbersomely and moliminously, with tumult and hurlyburly, nature acting upon it from within more commandingly doth its work easily, cleverly and silently. Human art acts on the matter mechanically, but nature vitally and magically. 10. The second pre-eminence of nature above human art, that whereas human artists are often to seek and at a loss, anxiously consult and deliberate, and upon second thoughts mend their former work, nature is never to seek, nor unresolved what to do, nor doth she ever repent afterwards of what she hath done, changing her former course. Human artists themselves consult not, as artists, but only for want of art; and therefore nature, though never consulting, may act artificially. Concluded, that what is called nature is really the divine art. 11. Nevertheless, that nature is not the divine art, pure and abstract, but concreted and embodied in matter, *ratio mersa et confusa;* not the divine art archetypal, but ectypal. Nature differs from the divine art, as the manuary opificer from the architect. 12. Two imperfections of the plastic nature, in respect whereof it falls short even of human art; first, that though it act for ends artificially, yet itself neither intends those end, nor understands the reason of what it doth, and therefore cannot act electively. The difference between the spermatic reasons and knowledge. Nature doth but ape or mimic the divine art or wisdom, being not master of that

reason according to which it acts, but only a servant to it, and drudging executioner of it. 13. Proved that there may be such a thing as acts artificially, though itself do not comprehend that art by which its motions are governed; first, from musical habits; the dancer resembles the artificial life of nature. 14. The same further evinced from the instincts of brute animals, directing them to act rationally and artificially, in order to their own good and the good of the universe, without any reason of their own. The instincts in brutes but passive impresses of the divine wisdom, and a kind of fate upon them. 15. The second imperfection of the plastic nature, that it acts without animal fancy, συναίσθησις, express con-sense, and consciousness, and is devoid of self-perception and self-enjoyment. 16. Whether this energy of the plastic nature be to be called cogitation or no, but a logomachy or contention about words. Granted, that what moves matter vitally must needs do it by some energy of its own, distinct from local motion; but that there may be a simple vital energy, without that duplicity, which is in synæsthesis, or clear and express consciousness. Nevertheless, that the energy of nature might be called a certain drowsy, unawakened or astonished cogitation. 17. Instances which render it probable that there may be a vital energy, without synæsthesis, clear and express con-sense, or consciousness. 18. The plastic nature, acting neither knowingly nor fantastically, acts fatally, magically, and sympathetically. The divine laws and fate, as to matter, not mere cogitation in the mind of God, but an energetic and effectual principle; and the plastic nature, the true and proper fate of matter, or the corporeal world. What magic is, and that nature, which acts fatally, acts also magically and sympathetically. 19. That the plastic nature, though it be the divine art and fate, yet for all that, it is neither god nor goddess, but a low and imperfect creature; it acting artificially and rationally no otherwise than compounded forms of letters, when printing coherent philosophic sense; nor for ends, than a saw or hatchet in the hands of a skilful mechanic. The plastic and vegetative life of nature the lowest of all lives, and inferior to the sensitive. A higher providence than that of the plastic nature governing the corporeal world itself. 20. Notwithstanding which, forasmuch as the plastic nature is a life, it must needs be incorporeal. One and the same thing, having in it an entire model and platform, and acting upon several distant parts of matter at once coherently, cannot be corporeal; and though Aristotle nowhere declares whether his nature be corporeal or incorporeal (which he neither doth clearly concerning the rational soul), and his followers conclude it to be corporeal, yet, according to the very principles of that philosophy, it must needs be otherwise. 21. The plastic nature, being incorporeal, must either be a lower

power lodged in souls that are also conscious, sensitive, or rational; or else a distinct substantial life by itself, and inferior kind of soul. How the Platonists complicate both these together; with Aristotle's agreeable determination, that nature is either part of a soul, or not without soul. 22. The plastic nature as to animals, according to Aristotle, a part or lower power of their respective souls. That the phenomena prove a plastic nature or archæus in animals, to make which a distinct thing from the soul is to multiply entities without necessity. The soul endued with a plastic power, the chief formatrix of its own body, the contribution of certain other causes not excluded. 23. That besides that plastic principle in particular animals, forming them as so many little worlds, there is a general plastic nature in the whole corporeal universe, which likewise, according to Aristotle, is either a part and lower power of a conscious mundane soul, or else something depending on it. 24. That no less according to Aristotle than Plato and Socrates, ourselves partake of life from the life of the universe, as well as we do of heat and cold, from the heat and cold of the universe; from whence it appears, that Aristotle also held the world's animation, with further undeniable proof thereof. An answer to two of the most considerable places of that philosopher, that seem to imply the contrary. That Aristotle's first immoveable mover was no soul, but a perfect intellect abstract from matter; but that he supposed this to move only as a final cause, or as being loved, and besides it, a mundane soul and plastic nature, to move the heavens efficiently. Neither Aristotle's nature nor his mundane soul, the supreme Deity. However, though there be no such mundane soul as both Plato and Aristotle conceived, yet notwithstanding, there may be a plastic nature depending upon a higher intellectual principle. 25. No impossibility of some other particular plastic principles; and though it be not reasonable to think that every plant, herb, and pile of grass hath a plastic or vegetative soul of its own, nor that the earth is an animal; yet that there may possibly be one plastic inconscious nature in the whole terraqueous globe, by which vegetables may be severally organized and framed, and all things performed which transcend the power of fortuitous mechanism. 26. Our second undertaking, which was to show how grossly those Atheists (who acknowledge this plastic nature) misunderstand it and abuse the notion, to make a counterfeit God Almighty or Numen of it, to the exclusion of the true Deity. First, in their supposing that to be the first and highest principle of the universe, which is the last and lowest of all lives, a thing as essentially derivative from, and dependent upon a higher intellectual principle, as the echo on the original voice. 27. Secondly, in their making sense and reason in animals to emerge out of a senseless life of nature,

by the mere modification and organization of matter. That no duplication of corporeal organs can ever make one single inconscious life to advance into redoubled consciousness and self-enjoyment. 28. Thirdly, in attributing perfect knowledge and understanding to this life of nature, which yet themselves suppose to be devoid of all animal sense and consciousness. 29. Lastly, in making the plastic life of nature to be merely corporeal; the Hylozoists contending, that it is but an inadequate conception of body, as the only substance; and fondly dreaming, that the vulgar notion of God is nothing but such an inadequate conception of the matter of the whole universe, mistaken for a complete and entire substance by itself, the cause of all things."

CHAPTER IV.

THE idea of God declared, in way of answer to the first atheistic argument. The grand prejudice against the naturality of this idea, as essentially including unity or oneliness in it, from the Pagan polytheism, removed. Proved that the intelligent Pagans generally acknowledged one supreme Deity. What their polytheism and idolatry was; with some account of Christianity. 1. The either stupid insensibility, or gross impudence of Atheists, in denying the word GOD to have any signification, or that there is any other idea answering to it besides the mere phantasm of the sound. The disease called by the philosopher ἀπολίθωσις τοῦ νοητικοῦ, the petrification (or dead insensibility) of the mind. 2. That the Atheists themselves must needs have an idea of God in their minds, or otherwise when they deny his existence, they should deny the existence of nothing. And that they have also the same idea of him with Theists, they denying the very same things which the others affirm. 3. A lemma, or preparatory proposition to the idea of God, that though some things be made or generated, yet it is not possible, that all things should be made, but something must of necessity exist of itself from eternity unmade, and be the cause of those other things that are made. 4. The two most opposite opinions, concerning that which was self-existent from eternity, or unmade, and the cause of all other things made: one, that it was nothing but senseless matter, the most imperfect of all things; the other, that it was something most perfect, and therefore consciously intellectual. The assertors of this latter opinion, Theists in a strict and proper sense; of the former, Atheists. So that the idea of God in general is a perfect consciously understanding being (or mind) self-existent from eternity, and the cause of all other things. 5. Observed, that the Atheists who deny a God, according to the true idea of him, do often abuse the word, calling senseless matter by that name, and meaning nothing else thereby but a first principle, or self-existent unmade thing. That according to this notion of the word God, there can be no such thing as an Atheist, no man being able to persuade himself that all things sprung from nothing. 6. In order to the more punctual declaration of the divine idea, the opinion of those taken notice of, who suppose two self-existent unmade principles, God and matter; and so God not to be the sole, but only the chief principle. 7. That these are but imperfect and mistaken Theists. Their idea of God declared, with its defectiveness. A latitude in Theism. None to be condemned for absolute Atheists, but such as deny an eternal unmade mind, ruling over matter. 8. The most compendious idea of God, an absolutely perfect being. That this includes not only conscious intellectuality and necessary existence, but also omnicausality, omnipotence and infinite power; and therefore God the sole principle of all, and cause of matter. The true notion of infinite power. Pagans acknowledged the divine omnipotence. And that the Atheists supposed infinite power to be included in the idea of God, proved from Lucretius. 9. That absolute perfection implies

something more than power and knowledge. A vaticination in mens' minds of a higher good than either. That God is better than knowledge, according to Aristotle; and that there is morality in the nature of God, wherein his chief happiness consisteth. This borrowed from Plato, who makes the highest perfection, and supreme Deity, to be goodness itself, above knowledge and intellect. God and the supreme good, according to the scripture, love. God no soft or fond love, but an impartial law, and the measure of all things. That the Atheists supposed goodness also be included in the idea of God. The idea of God more explicate and unfolded, a being absolutely perfect, infinitely good, wise, and powerful, necessarily existent; and not only the framer of the world, but also the cause of all things. 10. That this idea of God essentially includes unity or oneliness in it; since there can be but one supreme, one cause of all things, one omnipotent, and one infinitely perfect. This unity or oneliness of the Deity supposed also by Epicurus and Lucretius, who professedly denied a God, according to this idea. 11. The grand prejudice against the naturality of this idea of God, as it essentially includes unity and solitariety, from the polytheism of all nations formerly, besides the Jews, and of all the wisest men and philosophers; from whence it is inferred, that this idea of God is but artificial, and owes its original to laws and institution. An inquiry to be made concerning the true sense of the Pagan polytheism. That the objectors take it for granted, that the Pagan polytheists univerally asserted many self-existent intellectual beings, and independent deities, as so many partial causes of the world. 12. First, the irrationality of this opinion, and its manifest repugnancy to the phenomena, which render it less probable to have been the belief of all the Pagan polytheists. 13. Secondly, that no such thing at all appears, as that ever any intelligent Pagans asserted a multitude of eternal, unmade, independent deities. The Hesiodian gods. The Valentinian Æons. The nearest approach made thereunto by the Manichean good and evil gods. This doctrine not generally asserted by the Greek philosophers, as Plutarch affirmeth. Questioned whether the Persian evil Demon or Arimanius were a self-existent principle, essentially evil. Aristotle's confutation and explosion of many principles, or independent deities. Faustus, the Manichean's conceit, that the Jews and Christians paganized, in the opinion of monarchy, with St. Austin's judgment, concerning the Pagans, thereupon. 14. Concluded that the Pagan polytheism must be understood according to another equivocation in the word gods, as used for created intellectual beings, superior to men, that ought to be religiously worshipped. That the Pagans held both many gods and one God, (as Onatus the Pythagorean declares himself) in different senses: many inferior deities subordinate to one supreme. 15. Further evidence of this, that the intelligent Pagan Polytheists held only a plurality of inferior deities, subordinate to one supreme: first, because after the emersion of Christianity, and its contest with Paganism, when occasion was offered, not only no Pagan asserted a multiplicity of independent deities, but also all universally disclaimed it, and professed to acknowledge one supreme God. 16. That this was no refinement or interpolation of Paganism, as might possibly be suspected, but that the doctrine of the most ancient Pagan theologers, and greatest promoters of polytheism, was agreeable hereunto; which will be proved, not from suspected writings, (as of Trismegist and the Sibyls) but such as are indubitate. First, that Zoroaster, the chief promoter of polytheism in the eastern parts, acknowledged one supreme Deity, the maker of the world, proved from Eubulus in Porphyry, besides his

own words cited by Eusebius. 17. That Orpheus, commonly called by the Greeks the Theologer, and the father of the Grecanic polytheism, clearly asserted one supreme Deity, proved by his own words, out of Pagan records. 18. That the Egyptians themselves, the most polytheistical of all nations, had an acknowledgement amongst them of one supreme Deity. 19. That the poets, who were the greatest depravers of the Pagan theology, and, by their fables of the gods, make it look more aristocratically, did themselves notwithstanding acknowledge a monarchy, one prince and father of gods. That famous passage of Sophocles not to be suspected, though not found in any of these tragedies now extant. 20. That all the Pagan philosophers, who were Theists, universally asserted a mundane monarchy. Pythagoras, as much a Polytheist as any, and yet his first principle of things, as well as numbers, a monad or unity. Anaxagoras' one mind ordering all things for good. Xenophanes' one and all, and his one God the greatest among the gods. 21. Parmenides' supreme God, one immoveable. Empedocles' both many gods junior to friendship and contention, and his one God, called τὸ ἓν, "senior" to them. Zeno Eleates' demonstration of one God, in Aristotle. 22. Philolaus' prince and governor of all God always one. Euclides Megarensis' God, called ἓν τὸ ἀγαθὸν, "one the very good." Timæus Locrus' mind and good, above the soul of the world. Antisthenes' one natural God. Onatus' Corypheus. 23. Generally believed and true, that Socrates acknowledged one supreme God; but that he disclaimed all the inferior gods of the Pagans, a vulgar error. Plato also a Polytheist, and that passage, which some lay so great stress upon, (that he was serious when he began his epistles with God, but when with gods jocular) spurious and counterfeit; and yet he was notwithstanding an undoubted monotheist also in another sense; an asserter of one God over all, of a maker of the world, of a first God, of a greatest of the gods. The first hypostasis of the Platonic trinity properly the king of all things, for whose sake are all things; the father of the cause and prince of the world, that is, of the eternal intellect, or λόγος. 24. Aristotle an acknowledger of many gods, (he accounting the stars such) and yet an express asserter of εἷς κοίρανος, one prince, one immoveable mover. 25. Cleanthes and Chrysippus, Stoics, though they filled the whole heaven, earth, air and sea with gods, yet notwithstanding they acknowledged only one God immortal, Jupiter; all the rest being consumed into him, in the successive conflagrations, and afterwards made anew by him. Cleanthes' excellent and devout hymn to the supreme God. 26. Endless to cite all the passages of the later Pagan writers and polytheists, in which one supreme God is asserted. Excellent discourses in some of them concerning the Deity, particularly Plotinus; who, though he derived all things, even matter itself, from one supreme Deity, yet was a contender for many gods. 27. This not only the opinion of philosophers and learned men, but also the general belief of the Pagan vulgar: that there was one supreme God proved from Maximus Tyrius. The Roman Deus optimus maximus. The Pagans, when most serious, spake of God singularly. Kyrie Eleeson part of the Pagans' litany to the supreme God. The more civilized Pagans at this very day acknowledge one supreme Deity, the maker of the world. 28. Plutarch's testimony, that notwithstanding the variety of Paganic religions, and the different names of gods used in them, yet one reason, mind or providence ordering all things, and its inferior ministers, were alike every where worshipped. 29. Plain that the Pagan Theists must needs acknowledge one supreme Deity, because they generally believed the whole world to be one

animal, governed by one soul. Some Pagans made this soul of the world their supreme God; others an abstract mind superior to it. 30. The Hebrew doctors generally of this persuasion, that the Pagans worshipped one supreme God, and that all their other gods were but mediators betwixt him and men. 31. Lastly, this confirmed from scripture. The Pagans knew God. Aratus' Jupiter, and the Athenians' unknown God, the true God. 32. In order to a fuller explication of the Pagan theology, and showing the occasion of its being misunderstood, three heads requisite to be insisted on. First, that the Pagans worshipped one supreme God under many names; Secondly, that besides this one God, they worshipped also many gods, which were indeed inferior deities subordinate to him; Thirdly, that they worshipped both the supreme and inferior gods in images, statues, and symbols, sometimes abusively called also gods. First, that the supreme God amongst the Pagans was polyonymous, and worshipped under several personal names, according to his several attributes and the manifestations of them, his gifts and effects in the world. 33. That upon the same account, things not substantial were personated and deified by the Pagans, and worshipped as so many several names and notions of one God. 34. That as the whole corporeal world animated was supposed by some of the Pagans to be the supreme God, so he was worshipped in the several parts and members of it (having personal names bestowed upon them) as it were by parcels and piecemeal, or by so many inadequate conceptions. That some of the Pagans made the corporeal world the temple of God only, but others the body of God. 35. The second head proposed, that besides the one Supreme God, under several names, the Pagans acknowledged and worshipped also many gods; *θεοὺς γενητοὺς*, "made gods" created intellectual beings superior to men. 36. The Pythagoric or Platonic trinity of divine hypostases. And the higher of the inferior deities, according to this hypothesis, Nous, Psyche, and the whole corporeal world; with particular Noes and Henades. 37. The other inferior deities acknowledged as well by the vulgar as philosophers, of three sorts. First, the sun, moon and stars, and other great parts of the universe animated, called sensible gods. 38. Secondly, their inferior deities invisible, ethereal and aërial animals, called demons. These appointed by the supreme Deity to preside over kingdoms, cities, places, persons, and things. 39. The last sort of the Pagan inferior deities, heroes and *θεάνθρωποι*, or "men-gods." Euemerus taxed by Plutarch, for making all the Pagan gods nothing but dead men. 40. The third general head proposed, that the Pagans worshipped both the supreme and inferior gods in images, statues, and symbols. That first of all, before images and temples, rude stones and pillars without sculpture were erected for religious monuments, and called *βαιτύλια*, or "Bethels." 41. That afterwards images, statues, and symbols were used, and housed in temples. These placed in the west-end of the temples to face the east; so that the Pagans entering, worshipped towards the west: one probable occasion of the ancient Christians praying towards the east. The golden calf made for a symbolic presence of the God of Israel. 42. All the parts of the entire Pagan religion represented together at once in Plato. 43. That some late writers, not well understanding the sense of Pagans, have confounded all their theology, by supposing them to worship the inanimate parts of the world as such, for gods; therefore distinguishing betwixt their animal and their natural gods. That no corporeal thing was worshipped by the Pagans otherwise than either as being itself animated with a particular soul of its own,

or as being part of the whole animated world, or as having demons presiding over it, to whom the worship was properly directed; or lastly, as being images or symbols of divine things. 44. That though the Egyptians be said to have worshipped brute animals, and were generally therefore condemned by the other Pagans; yet the wiser of them used them only as hieroglyphics and symbols. 45. That the Pagans worshipped not only the supreme God, but also the inferior deities, by material sacrifices. Sacrifices or fire-offerings, in their first and general notion nothing else but gifts and signs of gratitude, and appendices of prayer. But that animal sacrifices had afterwards a particular notion also of expiation fastened on them, whether by divine direction, or human agreement, left undetermined. 46. The Pagans' apology for the three forementioned things. First, for worshipping one supreme God under many personal names, and that not only according to his several attributes, but also his several manifestations, gifts, and effects, in the visible world. With an excuse for those corporeal Theists, who worshipped the whole animated world as the supreme God, and the several parts of it under personal names, as living members of him. 47. Their apology for worshipping, besides the one supreme God, many inferior deities. That they worshipping them only as inferior could not therefore be guilty of giving them that honour which was proper to the supreme. That they honoured the supreme God incomparably above all. That they put a difference in their sacrifices; and that material sacrifices were not the proper worship of the supreme God, but rather below him. 48. Several reasons of the Pagans for giving religious worship to inferior created things. First, that this honour, which is bestowed upon them, does ultimately redound to the supreme God, and aggrandize his state and majesty, they being all his ministers and attendants. 49. That as demons are mediators between the celestial gods and men, so those celestial gods, and all the other inferior deities, are themselves also mediators betwixt man and the supreme God, and as it were convenient steps, by which we ought with reverence to approach him. 50. That there is an honour in justice due to all those excellent beings that are above us; and that the Pagans do but honour every thing as they ought, in that due rank and place, in which the supreme God hath set it. 51. That demons or angels being appointed to preside over kingdoms, cities, and persons, and the several parts of the corporeal universe, and being many ways benefactors to us, thanks ought to be returned to them by sacrifice. 52. That the inferior gods, demons and heroes, being all of them able to do us either good or hurt, and being also irascible, and therefore provokable by our neglect of them, it is as well our interest as our duty to pacify and appease them by worship. 53. Lastly, that it cannot be thought that the supreme God will envy those inferior gods that worship or honour which is bestowed upon them; nor suspected that any of those inferior deities will factiously go about to set up themselves against the supreme God. 54. That many of the Pagans worshipped none but good demons, and that those of them, who worshipped evil ones, did it only in order to their appeasement and mitigation, that so they might do them no hurt. None but magicians to be accounted properly devil-worshippers, who honour evil demons, in order to the gratification of their revenge, lust and ambition. 55. The Pagans plead, that those demons, who delivered oracles, and did miracles amongst them, must needs be good, since there cannot be a greater reproach to the supreme God, than to suppose him to appoint evil demons as presidents and governors over the world, or to suffer them

to have so great a sway and share of power in it. The faith of Plato in divine providence, that the good every where prevails over the bad, and that the Delphic Apollo was therefore a good demon. 56. The Pagans' apology for worshipping the supreme God in images, statues and symbols. That these are only schetically worshipped by them, the honour passing from them to the prototype. And that since we, living in bodies, cannot easily have a conception of any thing without some corporeal image or phantasm, thus much must be indulged to the infirmity of human nature (at least in the vulgar) to the worship of God corporeally in images, to prevent their running to atheism. 57. That though it should appear by this apology of the Pagans, that their case were not altogether so bad as is commonly supposed, yet they cannot be justified thereby in the three particulars above mentioned, but the scripture commendation of them is irrefragable, that knowing God, they did not glorify him as God, or sanctify his name; that is worship him according to his uncommon and incommunicable, his peerless and insociable, transcendant and singular, incomparable and unresemblable nature; but mingled, some way or other, creature-worship with the worship of the creator. First, that the worshipping of one God in his various gifts and effects, under several personal names, a thing in itself absurd, may also prove a great occasion of atheism, when the things themselves come to be called by those names, as wine, Bacchus; corn, Ceres. The conclusion easily following from thence, that the good things of nature are the only deities. But to worship the corporeal world itself animated, as the supreme God, and the parts of it as members of God, plainly to confound God with the creature, and not to glorify him as a Creator, nor according to his separate and spiritual nature. 58. To give religious worship to demons or angels, heroes or saints, or any other intellectual creatures, though not honouring them equally with the supreme God, is to deny God the honour of his holiness, his singular, insociable and incommunicable nature, as he is the only self-originated being, and the Creator of all; of whom, through whom, and to whom are all things. As God is such a being, that there is nothing like him, so ought the worship which is given him, to be such as hath nothing like to it, a singular, separate and incommunicate worship. They not to be religiously worshipped, that worship. 59. That the religious worship of created spirits proceeded chiefly from a fear that if they were not worshipped, they would be provoked and do hurt, which is both highly injurious to good spirits, and a distrust of the sufficiency of God's power to protect his worshippers. That all good spirits uninvoked are of themselves officiously ready to assist those, who sincerely worship and propitiate the supreme Deity, and therefore no need of the religious worship of them, which would be also offensive to them. 60. That men's praying to images and statues is much more ridiculous than children talking to babies made of clouts, but not so innocent; they thereby debasing both themselves and God, not glorifying him according to his spiritual and unresemblable nature, but changing the glory of the incorruptible God into the likeness of corruptible man or beast. 61. The mistake of those, who think none can be guilty of idolatry, that believe one God the maker of the world. 62. That from the same ground of reason, that nothing ought to be religiously worshipped besides the supreme God, or whom he appoints to represent himself, (because he ought to be sanctified and dealt withal, according to his singular nature, as unlike to every thing) it follows, contrary to the opinion of some opposers of idolatry, that there ought also to be a discrimination made between things sacred and profane, and reverence used in divine worship. Idolatry and sacrilege allied. 63. Another scripture

charge upon the Pagans, that they were devil-worshippers; not as though they intended all their worship to evil demons or devils as such, but because their polytheism and idolatry (unacceptable to God and good spirits) was promoted by evil spirits delivering oracles and doing miracles for the confirmation of it; they also insinuating themselves into the temples and statues, therefore the worship was looked upon as done to them. The same thing said of others besides Pagans, that they worshipped devils. 64. Proved that they were evil demons, who delivered oracles, and did miracles amongst the Pagans, for the carrying on of that religion, from the many obscene rites and mysteries, not only not prohibited, but also enjoined by them. 65. The same thing further proved from other cruel and bloody rites, but especially that of man-sacrifices. Plutarch's clear acknowledgement that both the obscene rites and man-sacrifices amongst the Pagans owed their original to wicked demons. 66. That the God of Israel neither required nor accepted of man-sacrifices, against a modern Diatribist. 67. That what faith soever Plato might have in the Delphic Apollo, he was no other than an evil demon, or devil. An answer to the Pagans' argument from divine providence. 68. That the Pagans' religion, unsound in its foundation, was infinitely more corrupted and depraved by means of these four things; first, the superstition of the ignorant vulgar. 69. Secondly, the licentious figments of poets and fable-mongers, frequently condemned by Plato and other wiser Pagans. 70. Thirdly, the craft of priests and politicians. 71. Lastly, the imposture of evil demons or devils. That by means of these four things, the pagan religion became a most foul and unclean thing. And as some were captivated by it under a most grievous yoke of superstition, so others strongly inclined to Atheism. 72. Plato not insensible that the Pagan religion stood in need of reformation; nevertheless supposing many of those religious rites to have been introduced by visions, dreams, and oracles, he concluded that no wise legislator would, of his own head, venture to make an alteration: implying, that this was a thing not to be effected otherwise than by divine revelation and miracles. The generally received opinion of the Pagans, that no man ought to trouble himself about religion, but content himself to worship God, *νόμῳ πόλεως*, according to the law of that country which he lived in. 73. Wherefore God Almighty, in great compassion to mankind, designed himself to reform the religion of the Pagan world, by introducing another religion of his own framing instead of it; after he had first made a preludium thereunto in one nation of the Israelites, where he expressly prohibited, by a voice out of the fire, in his first commandment, the Pagan polytheism, or the worshipping of other inferior deities besides himself; and in the second, their idolatry, or the worshipping of the supreme God in images, statues, or symbols. Besides which, he restrained the use of sacrifices; as also successively gave predictions of a Messiah to come, such as together with miracles might reasonably conciliate faith to him when he came. 74. That afterwards in due time, God sent the promised Messiah, who was the eternal Word hypostatically united with a pure human soul and body, and so a true *θεάνθρωπος*, or "God-man:" designing him for a living temple and visible statue or image, in which the Deity should be represented and worshipped; as also after his death and resurrection, when he was to be invested with all power and authority, for a prince and king, a mediator and intercessor betwixt God and men. 75. That this *θεάνθρωπος*, or "God-man," was so far from intending to require men-sacrifices of his worshippers, as the Pagan demons did, that he devoted himself to be a catharma and

expiatory sacrifice for the sins of the whole world; and thereby also abolished all sacrifices or oblations by fire whatsoever, according to the divine prediction. 76. That the Christian trinity, though a mystery, is more agreeable to reason than the Platonic; and that there is no absurdity at all in supposing the pure soul and body of the Messiah to be made a living temple or Schechinah, image or statue of the Deity. That this religion of one God and one Mediator, or θεάνθρωπος, "God-man," preached to the Pagan world, and confirmed by miracles, did effectually destroy all the Pagan inferior deities, middle gods and mediators, demons and heroes, together with their statues and images. 77. That it is no way incongruous to suppose, that the divine Majesty, in prescribing a form of religion to the world, should graciously condescend to comply with human infirmity, in order to the removing of two such grand evils as polytheism and idolatry, and the bringing of men to worship God in spirit and in truth. 78. That demons and angels, heroes and saints, are but different names for the same things, which are made gods by being worshipped. And that the introducing of angel and saint-worship, together with image-worship, into Christianity, seems to be a defeating of one grand design of God Almighty in it, and the paganizing of that which was intended for the unpaganizing of the world. 79. Another key for Christianity in the Scripture, not disagreeing with the former, that since the way of wisdom and knowledge proved ineffectual as to the generality of mankind, men might, by the contrivance of the gospel, be brought to God and a holy life (without profound knowledge) in the way of believing. 80. That according to the Scripture, there is a higher, more precious and diviner light, than that of theory and speculation. 81. That in Christianity, all the great, goodly, and most glorious things of this world, are slurred and disgraced, comparatively with the life of Christ. 82. And that there are all possible engines in it to bring men up to God, and engage them in a holy life. 83. Two errors here to be taken notice of; the first, of those who make Christianity nothing but an Antinomian plot against real righteousness, and as it were, a secret confederacy with the devil. The second, of those who turn that into matter of mere notion and opinion, dispute and controversy, which was designed by God only as a contrivance, machine or engine, to bring men effectually to a holy and godly life. 84. That Christianity may be yet further illustrated from the consideration of the adversary or Satanical power, which is in the world. This no Manichean substantial evil principle, but a polity of lapsed angels, with which the souls of wicked men are also incorporated, and may therefore be called the kingdom of darkness. 85. The history of the fallen angels in Scripture briefly explained. 86. The concurrent agreement of the Pagans concerning evil demons or devils, and their activity in the world. 87. That there is a perpetual war betwixt two polities or kingdoms in the world, the one of light, the other of darkness; and that our Saviour Christ, or the Messiah, is appointed the head or chieftain over the heavenly militia, or the forces of the kingdom of light. 88. That there will be at length a palpable and signal overthrow of the satanical power, and whole kingdom of darkness, by θεὸς ἀπὸ μηχανῆς, "God appearing in an extraordinary and miraculous manner;" and that this great affair is to be managed by our Saviour Christ, as God's vicegerent, and a visible judge both of quick and dead. 89. That our Saviour Christ designed not to set up himself factiously against God Almighty, nor to be accounted κύριος θεοῦ, "superior to God," but that when he hath done his work, and put down all adversary power, himself will then be subject to God, even the Father, that so God may be all in all. 90. Lastly, having spoken of three forms of re-

ligions, the Jewish, Christian, and the Pagan, and there remaining only a fourth the Mahometan, in which the divine monarchy is zealously asserted, we may now conclude, that the idea of God (as essentially including unity in it) hath been entertained in all forms of religion. An account of that seemingly strange phenomenon of providence; the rise, growth, and continuance of the Mahometan religion not to be attempted by us, at least in this place.

The reader must bear in mind what Dr. Cudworth has intimated in the preface, that these contents of Chap. IV. were written before the chapter itself, and that in course of writing the learned Doctor found it impossible to comprise even one half of the matters therein proposed in one chapter.

I. Having in the former chapter prepared the way, we shall now proceed (with the divine assistance) to answer and confute all those atheistic arguments before proposed. The first whereof was this,[1] that there is no idea of God, and therefore, either no such thing existing in nature, or at least no possible evidence of it.

To affirm that there is no idea of God, is all one as to affirm that there is no conception of the mind answering to that word or name; and this the modern Atheists stick not to maintain, that the word God hath no signification, and that there is no other idea or conception in men's minds answering thereunto, besides the mere phantasm of the sound. Now for any one to go about soberly to confute this, and to prove that God is not the only word without a signification, and that men do not every where pay all their religious devotions to the mere phantasm of a transient sound, expecting all good from it, might very well seem to all intelligent persons a most absurd and ridiculous undertaking; both because the thing is so evident in itself, and because the plainest things of all can least be proved: for[2] ὁ πάντα ἀπόδεικτα νενομικὼς, αὐτὴν ἀπόδειξιν ἀναιρεῖ, "he that thinks all things to be demonstrable, takes away demonstration itself." Wherefore we shall here only suggest thus much, that since there are different words for God in several languages, and men have the same notion or conception in their minds answering to them all, it must needs be granted, that they have some other idea or conception belonging to those words, besides the phantasms of their several sounds. And indeed it can be nothing else, but either monstrous sottishness and stupidity of mind, or else prodigious

[1] For an elucidation of this subject, see our remarks on ch. 2. sect 5.

[2] Proclus, Comm. in Timæum Platonis p. 176. ed. Græcæ Basil. 1534. fol. Other passages of the kind, on the difficulty of demonstrating plain and self-evident things, are met with in Aristotle, Cicero, and other ancient philosophers. Aristotle, Topic. lib. 1. cap. 2. p. 266. t. 1. opp. says: Οὐδὲ δὴ (δεῖ ἐπισκοπεῖν) ὧν σύνεγγυς ἡ ἀπόδειξις, οὐδὲ ὧν λίαν πόρρω· τὰ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔχει ἀπορίαν, τὰ δὲ πλείω, ἢ κατὰ γυμναστικήν, "Neither is it proper to dispute of those things whereof the demonstration is close at hand, nor of those whereof it is too remote; for the former admit of no doubt, and the latter of more than is suitable to mere exercitation."

impudence in these Atheists, to deny that there is any idea of God at all in the minds of men, or that the word hath any signification.

It was heretofore observed by Epictetus,* ἂν τις ἐνίστηται πρὸς τὰ ἄγαν ἐκφανῆ, πρὸς τοῦτον οὐ ῥᾴδιόν ἐστιν εὑρεῖν λόγον, δι' οὗ μεταπείσει τις αὐτὸν· τοῦτο δ' οὔτε παρὰ τὴν ἐκείνου γίνεται δύναμιν, οὔτε παρὰ τὴν τοῦ διδάσκοντος ἀσθένειαν, "that if any man will oppose or contradict the most evident truths, it will not be easy to find arguments wherewith to convince him. And yet this notwithstanding ought neither to be imputed to any inability in the teacher, nor to any strength of wit in the denier, but only to a certain dead insensibility in him." Whereupon he further adds, that there is a double ἀπονέκρωσις or ἀπολίθωσις, "mortification" or "petrification" of the soul; the one, when it is stupified and besotted in its intellectuals; the other, when it is bedeaded in its morals as to that pudor that naturally should belong to a man. And he concludes, that either of these states (though it be not commonly so apprehended) is a condition little less deplorable than that of bodily death; as also that such a person is not at all to be disputed with. For[3] ποῖον αὐτῷ πῦρ ἢ ποῖον σίδηρον προσάγω, ἵν' αἴσθηται ὅτι νενέκρωται; αἰσθανόμενος οὐ προσποιεῖται; ἔτι χείρων ἐστὶ τοῦ νεκροῦ, ἐκτέτμηται γὰρ τὸ αἰδῆμον αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ ἐντρέπτικον, "what sword can one bring, or what fire, by burning or slashing, to make such a one perceive that he is dead? But if he be sensible, and will not acknowledge it, then he is worse than dead, being castrated as to that pudor that belongs to a man." Moreover that philosopher took notice, that in those times, when this denial of most evident truths proceeded rather from impudence than stupidity or sottishness, the vulgar would be apt to admire it for strength of wit and great learning: Ἂν δέ τινος τὸ αἰδῆμον ἀπονεκρωθῇ, τοῦτο ἔτι καὶ δύναμιν καλοῦμεν· "But if any man's pudor be deaded or mortified in him, we call this power and strength."

Now as this was sometimes the case of the Academics, so is it also commonly of the Atheists, that their minds are partly petrified and benumbed into a kind of sottish and stupid insensibility, so that they are not able to discern things that are most evident; and partly depudorated, or become so void of shame, as that though they do perceive, yet they will obstinately and impudently deny the plainest things that are, as this, that there is any idea answering to the word God, besides the phantasm of the sound. And we do the rather insist upon this prodigious

* Arrian, lib. 1. cap. 5. p. 95. ed. Cantabr.

[3] These words are all to be found in Arrian, lib. 1. cap. 5. p. 96. ed. Cantabr. but not in continued order. For the last words: ἐκτέτμηται, &c., stand at some distance from the others, and are not, as here, connected with the preceding by the particle γάρ, as if containing the reason of what is said before. Epictetus is here attacking the Academic philosophers of his time.

monstrosity of Atheists in this place, because we shall have occasion afterwards more than once to take notice of it again in other instances, as when they affirm that local motion and cogitation are really one and the self-same thing, and the like. And we conceive it to be unquestionably true, that it is many times nothing else, but either this shameless impudence, or sottish insensibility in Atheists, that is admired by the ignorant for profoundness of wit and learning:[4] Ἀλλὰ ταύτην δύναμιν εἴπω; μὴ γένοιτο· εἰ μὴ καὶ τὴν τῶν Κιναίδων, καθ' ἣν πᾶν τὸ ἐπελθὸν ἐν μέσῳ καὶ ποιοῦσι καὶ λέγουσι, "But shall I call this power or wit, and commend it upon that account? no more than I will commend the impudence of the Cinædi, who stick not publicly to do and say any thing."

[4] Epict. apud Arrian. as above. Compare the present discussion concerning the conception of a God with the one on the same subject below, chap. 5. sect. 2. &c. where what here appears somewhat obscure is set forth more clearly and distinctly. However, the whole of this disputation on the conception or idea of a God, owing to the ambiguity of words, especially of the term *idea*, is exceedingly obscure and unsatisfactory. Wherefore, it appears to me, if we have to contend with a man who first denies that he can form any conception of God in the mind, and then endeavours to prove from this, that there is no God; he should above all things be compelled to state his own opinion in plain and perspicuous words, and having done this, he will be at once put down. This dogma: "There is no idea of a God imprinted on our minds," admits, if I mistake not, of a threefold acceptation. The first, "There is no idea or image of God innate or implanted by nature in us." To this opinion, as every one knows, many are inclined, who could not without the greatest injustice be accused of impiety towards God. Were an Atheist, however, to espouse this opinion, and undertake to demonstrate thereby, that there is no God, he would be worthy of the derision of all sensible men. Indeed holding such reasoning to be fair, we might also draw this conclusion: "There is no sun, no moon, no stars;" for neither at our birth do we bring with us the images or forms of the heavenly bodies imprinted on our minds. Another sense will be this: "No one can form in the mind a perfect and complete conception of God," which indeed no wise man will deny, there being an innumerable host both of philosophers and theologians, who have publicly testified that no one possesses such vigour of intellect as to be able to form in his mind a perfect conception of God. But this opinion will not be of the slightest avail to an Atheist, who would act childishly and ridiculously, if he denied the existence of a God because he cannot be wholly comprehended by any mortal. For who does not know, that many things to a certainty exist, the nature of which, however, we only partially understand? No rational man will deny that something is eternal; and yet what is more difficult to comprehend than eternity? Shall we on that account deny that there is any thing eternal, because our weak and narrow minds cannot grasp the notion of eternity? There remains therefore the third acceptation, which alone the learned Doctor appears to have in view, and to attribute to the scoffers at religion: "No conception of God can be formed at all in our minds, and the word God has properly no signification, being an empty sound, the force of which no one understands." I doubt indeed, whether any one in possession of his senses, and with his intellect unimpaired by disease, ever entertained this opinion. Hobbes, indeed, who said many things betokening great levity and ignorance, was nevertheless, as we have shown above, exempt from this species of madness. But seeing that the folly of men polluted with lust and crime surpasses all belief, I would not positively deny that there ever has been any one so besotted, as to assert any thing of the kind. Such a one, indeed, I consider, should be commended to God and the physicians, rather than combated against by reason and argument. For what can be done with a man whose perverseness and obstinacy are so great, that although himself unable to impugn a God without forming some notion of him in his own mind, nevertheless denies that there is any notion or idea of God in the mind of any man whatever? Doctor Cudworth, however, has chastised this folly with great force and acuteness.

II. But whatever these Atheists deny in words, it is notwithstanding evident, that even themselves have an idea or conception in their minds answering to the word God, when they deny his existence, because otherwise they should deny the existence of nothing. Nor can it be at all doubted, but that they have also the same idea of God with Theists, they denying the existence of no other thing than what these assert. And as in all other controversies, when men dispute together, the one affirming, the other denying, both parties must needs have the same idea in their minds of what they dispute about, or otherwise the whole disputation would be but a kind of Babel language and confusion; so must it be likewise in this present controversy betwixt Theists and Atheists. Neither indeed would there be any controversy at all between them, did they not both by God mean one and the same thing; nor would the Atheists be any longer Atheists, did they not deny the existence of that very same thing, which the Theists affirm, but of something else.

III. Wherefore we shall in the next place declare what this idea of God is, or what is that thing, whose existence, they that affirm are called Theists, and they who deny Atheists. In order whereunto, we must first lay down this lemma or preparatory proposition, that as it is generally acknowledged, that all things did not exist from eternity, such as they are, unmade, but that some things were made and generated or produced; so it is not possible that all things should be made neither, but there must of necessity be something self-existent from eternity, and unmade; because if there had been once nothing, there could never have been any thing. The reason of which is so evident and irresistible, that even the Atheists confess themselves conquered by it, and readily acknowledge it for an indubitable truth, that there must be something ἀγέννητον, "something which was never made or produced," and which therefore is the cause of those other things that are made, something αὐτόφυες and αὐθυπόστατον, that was "self-originated" and "self-existing," and which is as well ἀνώλεθρον and ἄφθαρτον, as ἀγέννητον, "incorruptible" and "undestroyable" as "ingenerable;" whose existence therefore must needs be necessary, because if it were supposed to have happened by chance to exist from eternity, then it might as well happen again to cease to be. Wherefore all the question now is, what is this ἀγέννητον and ἀνώλεθρον, αὐτόφυες and αὐθυπόστατον, this "ingenerable" and "incorruptible, self-originated" and "self-existent" thing, which is the cause of all other things that are made.

IV. Now there are two grand opinions opposite to one another concerning it: for first, some contend, that the only self-existent, unmade, and incorruptible thing, and first principle of all things, is senseless matter, that is, matter either perfectly

dead and stupid, or at least devoid of all animalish and conscious life. But because this is really the lowest and most imperfect of all beings, others on the contrary judge it reasonable, that the first principle and original of all things should be that, which is most perfect, (as Aristotle[5] observes of Pherecydes, and his followers, τὸ γεννῆσαν πρῶτον ἄριστον τιθέασι, "that they made the first cause and principle of generation to be the best") and then apprehending, that to be endued with conscious life and understanding is much a greater perfection than to be devoid of both, (as Balbus in Cicero[6] declares upon this very occasion: Nec dubium quin quod animans sit, habeatque mentem, et rationem, et sensum, id sit melius, quam id quod his careat) they therefore conclude that the only unmade thing, which was the principle cause and original of all other things, was not senseless matter, but a perfect conscious understanding nature or mind. And these are they who are strictly and properly called Theists, who affirm that a perfectly conscious understanding being or mind, existing of itself from eternity, was the cause of all other things; and they on the contrary, who derive all things from senseless matter, as the first original, and deny that there is any conscious understanding being self-existent or unmade, are those that are properly called Atheists. Wherefore the true and genuine idea of God in general is this, A perfect conscious understanding being (or mind) existing of itself from eternity, and the cause of all other things.

V. But it is here observable, that those Atheists, who deny a God, according to this true and genuine notion of him, which we have declared, do often abuse the word, calling senseless matter by that name; partly perhaps as endeavouring thereby

[5] The passage occurs Metaph. lib. 12. cap. 4. p. 446. tom. 4. opp. but is ambiguous. I shall therefore write it down entire. Aristotle is refuting the opinion of the Pythagoreans on first principles, and comparing it with those of the ancient theologists or poets on the subject. These poets he divides into those who filled all that they wrote with fables, and the *mixed*, as he calls them, or those who tempered fables with certain true precepts. For so I interpret Aristotle; agreeably to the context, and as the subject itself seems to demand. Of the latter class he speaks in this manner: Ἐπεὶ οἵ γε μεμιγμένοι αὐτῶν, καὶ τὸ μὴ μυθικῶς πάντα λέγειν, οἷον Φερεκύδης καὶ ἕτεροί τινες, τὸ γεννῆσαν πρῶτον ἄριστον τιθέασι, "Those poets who are mixed up of both, and do not say every thing in fables, as Pherecydes and some others, hold the first principle of generation to be the best." Here we have the words *Pherecydes and others* so placed as to make it doubtful whether they are to be referred to what precedes or to what follows, or whether Aristotle meant to say, that Pherecydes wrote every thing in fables, or that he held that principle of things to be the best. The few fragments remaining of Pherecydes make it possible to maintain either position. What Clemens Alexandr. indeed, Stromat. lib. 6. p. 741. quotes from his poems, are so obscure and foreign to common sense, or, to use Aristotle's word, so μυθικά, that Hesiod, Orpheus, and the other poets who wrote of the gods, are in comparison with him most lucid and perspicuous. This passage of Aristotle has not been touched upon by the very learned men who have professedly commented on Pherecydes.

[6] De Nat. Deor. lib. 2. cap. 17. p. 2978. tom. 9. opp.

to decline that odious and ignominious name of Atheists, and partly as conceiving that whatsoever is the first principle of things, ingenerable and incorruptible, and the cause of all other things besides itself, must therefore needs be the divinest thing of all. Wherefore by the word God these mean nothing else, but that which is ἀγέννητον, "unmade" or "self-existent," and the ἀρχὴ, or "first principle of things." Thus it was before observed,[7] that Anaximander called infinite matter, devoid of all manner of life, τὸ θεῖον, or "God;" and Pliny, the corporeal world, endued with nothing but a plastic unknowing nature, Numen; as also others in Aristotle,[8] upon the same account, called the inanimate elements gods, as supposed first principles of things, θεοὶ δὲ καὶ ταῦτα, "for these are also gods." And indeed Aristotle himself seems to be guilty of this miscarriage of abusing the word God after this manner, when speaking of love and chaos, as the two first principles of things, he must according to the laws of grammar, be understood to call them both gods:[9]

[7] See cap. 3. sect. 20. &c., and our remarks there. On Pliny see cap. 3. sect. 30. But what Pliny has handed down concerning God and the first principles of all things, is involved in such obscurity and doubt, as to make it easily appear that this writer could scarcely determine with himself what opinions to entertain; although he was unwilling to worship a God such as reason itself bids us worship. He seems to have been superstitious, putting faith in dreams. See Plin. Ep. lib. 3. cap. 5. p. 192. ed. Corte.

[8] This is a mistake of Dr. Cudworth's, for Aristotle does not speak of those philosophers who considered the elements as gods, but of Empedocles and his well-known principles, friendship and discord. I shall produce his own words from his book De Generat. et Corrupt. cap. 6. p. 734. tom. 1. opp. Τὰ στοιχεῖα διακρίνει οὐ τὸ νεῖκος, ἀλλ' ἡ φιλία, τὰ φύσει πρότερα τοῦ θεοῦ. ΘΕΟΙ' ΔΕ' ΚΑΙ' ΤΑΥ'ΤΑ, "Those elements by nature which are prior to God are separated not by discord but by friendship. But these are also gods." After Aristotle, Clemens and Simplicius have affirmed more explicitly, that Empedocles held the four elements as well as friendship and discord to be gods; they all however appear to me to have done him injustice, and not to have understood his opinion correctly. He will be purged from this charge by Aristotle himself, Metaph. lib. 3. cap. 4. p. 295. tom. 4. opp. Clemens Alexandr. Exhortat. ad Gentes, cap. 5. p. 55. 56. Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ὁ Ἀκραγαντῖνος εἰς πλῆθος ἐμπεσών, πρὸς τοῖς τέτταρσι στοιχείοις, τούτοις Νεῖκος καὶ Φιλίαν καταριθμεῖται (θεοῖς), "Empedocles the Agrigentine, falling into the multitude, ranked, not only the four elements, but discord also and friendship among the gods." But on the principles of things being regarded as gods, I find a much more explicit passage in Aristotle, which I shall take the trouble of writing down. The philosopher is speaking of the ancient poets: ΘΕΟΥ'Σ γὰρ ποιοῦντες τὰς ἀρχὰς, καὶ ἐκ τῶν Θεῶν γεγονέναι, τὰ μὴ γευσάμενα τοῦ νέκταρος καὶ τῆς ἀμβροσίας, θνητα γενέσθαι φασί, "For making principles to be gods and to be sprung from the gods, they assert that those natures which did not taste nectar and ambrosia were mortal." Metaph. lib. 3. cap. 4 p. 295. tom. 4. opp. That there were many formerly, however, among the nations ignorant of the true religion, who worshipped fire, earth, and water as gods, is too well-known to require testimonies. See Vossius De Origine et Progressu Idolatr. lib. 2. p. 2. cap. 1. &c. p. 216. &c.

[9] But this passage is not of that nature, that if the whole body of grammarians were sitting in judgment, Aristotle could be accused from it of a wrong application of the word *God*. He adduces this verse from Parmenides:

Πρώτιστον μὲν ἔρωτα Θεῶν μητίσατο πάντων·

and then subjoins Hesiod's verses concerning *love* and *chaos*. A little after follow the words here quoted. The Doctor, however, supposes that the term τούτους, therein

Τούτους μὲν οὖν πῶς χρὴ διανεῖμαι, περὶ τοῦ τίς πρῶτος, ἐξέστω κρίνειν ὕστερον, "Concerning these two (gods) how they ought to be ranked, and which of them is to be placed first, whether love or chaos, is afterwards to be resolved." Which passage of Aristotle's seems to agree with that of Epicharmus:[10] Ἀλλὰ λέγεται μὲν χάος πρῶτον γενέσθαι θεῶν, "But chaos is said to have made the first of gods;" unless we should rather understand him thus, That chaos was said to have been made before the gods. And this abuse[1] of the word God is a thing which the

can only be referred to the Θεῶν, as if the Stagirite had said: "Which of these gods is the first, I shall decide afterwards." But every one will perceive this to be unnecessary. Aristotle's meaning is this: "Which of these, love or chaos, is first, according to the opinion namely of the ancient poets, I shall explain below." But he does not himself intimate whether they are gods or not. Although, if he had indeed written what the Doctor supposes him to have done, still in calling love and chaos gods he would have been giving, not his own opinion, but that of others. But I shall bring forward another more striking passage of Aristotle, Metaph. lib. 14. cap. 8. p. 483. in which he clearly abuses the word *Gods*. Having asserted that the ancients held the stars to be gods, after interposing a few words, he goes on to approve of generally and in a certain measure to adopt as his own both this doctrine and the opinion of those who formerly ascribed divinity to the first principles of things, Ὧν εἴ τις χωρίσας αὐτὸ λάβοι μόνον τὸ πρῶτον, ὅτι ΘΕΟΥΣ ᾠοντο τὰς πρώτας οὐσίας εἶναι, θείως ἂν εἰρῆσθαι νομίσειε, "Of which if any one considers only this separately, that they asserted the first substances to be gods, he will esteem it indeed to be divinely said."

[10] This occurs among his verses on the principles of things, cited by Diogenes Laërtius in his life of Plato, lib. 3. segm. 10. p. 171.

[1] In this disputation on the word *God*, the learned Doctor seems to me to confound three things, which although very closely allied to each other, are nevertheless in a certain respect different. I. To make use of the word God as a designation of matter or the whole nature of things, lest the wickedness meditated against the Deity, should be too apparent. II. To use the word God in a wider sense and to signify thereby things to which it does not properly apply. III. To regard and reverence as gods, things in which there is nothing divine, as the dead, the elements, and animals.—Which last was formerly, as it is at this day, the crime of those, who forgetful of the Creator, worshipped and honoured the things created by him. Concerning these we shall make no inquiry in this place, the discourse being of those only who craftily and designedly abuse the term God. The second may be laid to the charge of many ancient authors. There being indeed several Greeks and Latins, who have applied the terms Θεὸς, Θεῖον, Numen, Deus, to things far remote from the true God, and have called that God and divine, which they deemed noble, excellent and great. Examples of this custom are given by J. Le Clerc in his Ars Critica, par. 2. sect. 1. cap. 3. sect. 4. p. 146. There are those even who do so at this day. This I should not approve of, nor would I contradict Origen and others who consider it to be done by mistake and inadvertently; I should not be easily persuaded indeed, that all have done so with an evil and perverse intention. Hence it is the first alone that we here have to do with: which Dr. Cudworth has exemplified in the instance only of Anaximander. He might out of ancient history have added Epicurus, of whom so many grave authors complain as having left gods in words, to escape odium, but as having taken them away in reality. Of the moderns, Bened. de Spinoza belongs to this class; who, although utterly repudiating all divine nature and reason, is nevertheless careful to employ the word God in his Ethics, lest his doctrine should appear too repulsive. This man had omitted the word God throughout the whole of his book, which was first written in Dutch, using only the term *nature*; but being admonished by Lud. Meyerus, to whom he had given it to be translated into Latin, that if so edited, it would subject him to the greatest odium, and arm the authorities against him as an enemy to God, he therefore suffered the translator to substitute the word *God* instead of *nature*. This Le Clerc, Biblioth. Ancienne et Moderne. tom. 22. par. 1. p. 135. tells us he heard from an unquestionable source.

learned Origen took notice it in his book against Celsus, where he speaks of that religious care, which ought to be had about the use of words:* Ὁ τοίνυν μεγαλοφυέστερον, κἂν ὀλίγην τούτων περίνοιαν εἰληφὼς, εὐλαβηθήσεται, ἄλλα ἄλλοις ἐφαρμύζειν ὀνόματα πράγμασι, μήποτε ὅμοιον πάθῃ τοῖς τὸ Θεὸς ὄνομα ἐσφαλμένως φέρουσιν ἐπὶ ὕλην ἄψυχον, "He therefore, that hath but the least consideration of these things, will take a religious care that he give not improper names to things, lest he should fall into a like miscarriage with those, who attribute the name of God to inanimate and senseless matter." Now according to this false and spurious notion of the word of God, when it is taken for any supposed first principle, or self-existent unmade thing, whatsoever that be, there neither is nor can be any such thing as an Atheist; since whosoever hath but the least dram of reason must needs acknowledge, that something or other existed from eternity unmade, and was the cause of those other things that are made. But that notion or idea of God, according to which some are Atheists and others Theists, is in the strictest sense of it, what we have already declared, "a perfect mind, or consciously understanding nature, self-existent from eternity, and the cause of all other things." The genuine Theists being those, who make the first original of all things universally to be a consciously understanding nature (or perfect mind); but the Atheists properly, such as derive all things from matter, either perfectly dead and stupid, or else devoid of all conscious and animalish life.

VI. But that we may more fully and punctually declare the true idea of God, we must here take notice of a certain opinion of some philosophers, who went as it were in a middle betwixt both the former, and neither made matter alone nor God, the sole principle of all things; but joined them both together and held two first principles or self-existent unmade beings, independent upon one another, God, and the matter. Amongst whom the Stoics are to be reckoned, who, notwithstanding, because they held that there was no other substance besides body, strangely confounded themselves, being by that means necessitated to make their two first principles, the active and the passive, to be both of them really but one and the self-same substance: their doctrine to this purpose being thus declared by Cicero:[2] Naturam dividebant in res duas, ut altera esset efficiens, altera autem quasi huic se præbens, ex qua efficeretur aliquid.

* Lib. 1. p. 19. adv. Celsum, ed. Cant.

[2] Academ. Quæst. lib. 1. cap. 6. p. 2331. tom. 8. opp. But Cicero, in this passage, does not treat of the opinion of the Stoics, but of that of Plato and his ancient followers, or the first Academics. The opinions of the Stoics, however, on God and matter, have been elaborately discussed by Jac. Thomasius, De Stoica Mundi Exustione, p. 14. &c, besides Just. Lipsius, Physiolog. Stoicæ. p. 71. &c.

In eo, quod efficeret, vim esse censebant; in eo, quod efficeretur, materiam quandam; in utroque tamen utrumque. Neque enim materiam ipsam cohærere potuisse, si nulla vi contineretur, neque vim sine aliqua materia; nihil est enim, quod non alicubi esse cogatur. "The Stoics divided nature into two things as the first principles, one whereof is the efficient or artificer, the other that which offers itself to him, for things to be made out of it. In the efficient principle they took notice of active force, in the patient, of matter, but so as that in each of these were both together; forasmuch as neither the matter could cohere together, unless it were contained by some active force, nor the active force subsist of itself without matter, because that is nothing, which is not somewhere." But besides these Stoics, there were other philosophers, who admitting of incorporeal substance did suppose two first principles, as substances really distinct from one another, that were co-existent from eternity, an incorporeal Deity and matter; as for example, Anaxagoras, Archelaus, Atticus, and many more; insomuch that Pythagoras himself was reckoned amongst those by Numenius, and Plato by Plutarch and Laërtius.[3]

[3] Observing that most men, when treating of the opinions of the ancients on the world and on the eternity of matter, discourse with little accuracy, and mingle and confound together things that are distinct; to guard against error, I shall briefly state how, in my opinion, these opinions should be taken. In the first place, as all the ancient philosophers decided, that nothing can come out of nothing, I consider it certain, that they all supposed matter to be eternal. Men the most learned, Huetius, Eugubinus, Pfannerus, and others, whose merits in other respects I have the highest respect for, are of opinion, I am aware, that there were some ancients who asserted the nature of things to be created out of nothing, and consequently denied the eternity of matter. But, as I shall show in another place, the passages brought forward in proof of this, signify merely, that God introduced form and order into confused and rude matter. But matter, which all, I am persuaded, believed to be eternal, was held by some to have existed separately out of God for an infinite period, by others to have been joined with God from all eternity. Dr Cudworth here treats properly of the former; among whom he reckons Anaxagoras, Archelaus, Atticus, and several more, and then according to the opinion of others, Pythagoras also, and Plato. And indeed, that Anaxagoras taught this, is evident from the commencement of his work preserved by Laërtius, lib. 2. segm. 6. p. 82. Πάντα χρήματα ἦν ὁμοῦ, εἶτα νοῦς ἐλθὼν αὐτὰ διεκόσμησε, "All things were together (i. e., there was chaos), then mind came and put them in order." But that Archelaus thought the same, we have the testimony of no ancient author that I know of, except Simplicius, who Comm. in lib. 1. Physic. Aristotelis, p. 7. ed Græcæ. Aldinæ, tells us that Archelaus held the same opinion on first principles as Anaxagoras. What Diogenes and others, however, have recorded of his dogmas appears to me to be such as cannot easily be reconciled with this opinion: nor are the younger Platonists, to whom Simplicius belongs, of that character, that all they relate concerning the precepts of the ancient philosophers is at once to be believed. For as they are always striving to establish an agreement of all philosophers, they therefore not unfrequently pervert their opinions. The Atticus here named is no doubt that Platonist, from whose disputations against Aristotle some noted passages have been extracted by Eusebius, Præparat. Evan. lib. 15. cap. 4. &c. p. 794. See especially Euseb. cap. 6. p. 801. which contains Atticus' disputation on the origin of the world. Add what Æneas Gazæus states in Theophrastus. p. 58. on the opinions of this Atticus concerning the world, with the comments of Casp. Barth. With regard to Pythagoras there are many witnesses; although others will have it, that besides eternal matter he held two principles of all things, the one good, and the other evil. See Jo. Chr. Wolf in Manichæism. ante Manichæos, sec. 2. s. 29. p. 116. Plato's opinion may be

And we find it commonly taken for granted, that Aristotle[4] also was of this persuasion, though it cannot be certainly concluded from thence (as some seem to suppose) because he asserted

called into question. I do not stop to dispute with those who consider Plato to have maintained that the world was created by God out of nothing, as Pet. Dan. Huetius among others has done in his Quæstiones Alnetanæ, nor do I think the words of Hierocles, upon which he mainly relies, signify what he and other learned men suppose: of this elsewhere. But it may be questioned whether Plato supposed that matter existed of itself and separately from God for an infinite period, and that God at a certain time voluntarily proceeded to form and fashion it, or that matter was joined with and emanated from God from all eternity. Each opinion rests upon great authorities. The former is supported not only by the testimony of Plutarch, whose words are brought forward a little below, and of Laërtius, lib. 3. segm. 71. but also by many other passages both of ancient and modern writers. See Wolf, as above quoted, sec. 32. p. 124. To the latter are inclined Probus, Simplicius, and the whole phalanx of those called the later Platonists, who contend that Plato held the world to have emanated from God from all eternity, in the same way as rays from the sun, and therefore, to be posterior to God, not in time, but by nature. On this view see Zacharias Mitylenæus, Dialog. de Opificio Mundi, p. 207. ed Barthii. For my part, indeed, I admit that there is much greater probability in the opinion of those who make Plato to have held, that God at a certain time disposed and formed matter which was separate and distinct from himself; but still, I incline to the view, that all those who asserted two first principles of things, God and matter, supposed a certain union and connexion of these principles. Nor, to confess the truth, can I easily believe those to be in all respects right, who maintain it as Plato's opinion, that God proceeded voluntarily to the formation and disposition of matter altogether distinct from himself. But of this probably elsewhere at some more convenient opportunity. We now come to those who join and associate matter with God. These again, it would seem, ought to be divided into two classes. For there are some who suppose matter to have flowed from God from everlasting, as light from the sun. So thought all those mentioned a little above, who, after the birth of our Saviour went by the name of Platonists. See besides Zacharias, just quoted, Proclus on Plato's Timæus, p. 116. &c. Whether Aristotle may be ranked among them or not, is doubtful. The Platonists indeed, hold him to be unquestionably on their side, nor must it be denied that his opinion is very closely allied to dogmas of this kind. For he expressly declares in his Metaphysics that the world existed from everlasting, connected and associated with God, or the first mover, by some indissoluble bond. But as the whole of Aristotle's doctrine on things not falling under the sight is very obscure; so it is not sufficiently manifest, whether he believed matter to flow from God perpetually or entertained some other notion on this subject, or rather, when appearing to himself to be saying something, in reality said nothing at all. I, therefore, neither wholly assent to, nor dissent from the learned men who make the opinions of the Platonists and Aristotle to be same. Those constituting the other class are such as conceive matter to have been always stored up within God, but yet suppose it to have been cast forth and formed at some certain and definite time; to which opinion it is incredible how many among the ancients and moderns, also even among the Jews and Christians, have been favourable. Consult the most learned Abrah. Hinckelmann, Detectio Fundamenti Bœhmiani. p. 84. and concerning the Indians, Bernierius, Voyages aux Terres aux Grand Mogol. tom. 2. p. 164. concerning the Jews, Jac. Basnage, Histoire des Juifs. tom. 4. p. 136. &c. Nor, as is evident even from Irenæus, was any different opinion entertained by most of those, who disturbed the Holy City in the early period of Christianity.

[4] Some light will be thrown upon what is here said of Aristotle, by the remarks made concerning his opinion a little above. He cannot possibly be ranked among those who assert two separate and distinct first principles of things, God and matter. For the Stagirite associated these two principles most intimately, and supposed God to cohere with this corporeal mass by the very necessity of nature. Wherefore, as I have already said, the later Platonists could with little difficulty draw him to their own opinion concerning the eternal emanation of the world from God. This sect, however, which was fired with an incredible zeal to do away with all discordances of the ancient philosophers, in order to be better able to conflict with the Christians, exceeded all bounds, in contending that Plato also held the same doctrine.

the eternity of the world; Plotinus, Porphyrius, Jamblichus, Proclus, and Simplicius doing the like, and yet notwithstanding maintaining, that God was the sole principle of all things, and that matter also was derived from him.[5] Neither will that passage of Aristotle's in his Metaphysics necessarily evince the contrary, Θεὸς δοκεῖ τὸ αἴτιον πᾶσιν εἶναι καὶ ἀρχή τις, "God seems to be a cause to all things, and a certain principle;" because this might be understood only of the forms of things.

But it is plain, that Plutarch was a maintainer of this doctrine, from his discourse upon the Platonic psychogonia[6] (beside other places): Βέλτιον οὖν Πλάτωνι πειθομένους τὸν μὲν κόσμον ὑπὸ θεοῦ γεγονέναι λέγειν καὶ ᾄδειν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ κάλλιστος τῶν γεγονότων, ὁ δὲ ἄριστος τῶν αἰτίων· τὴν δὲ οὐσίαν καὶ ὕλην, ἐξ ἧς γέγονεν, οὐ γενομένην, ἀλλὰ ὑποκειμένην ἀεὶ τῷ δημιουργῷ, εἰς διάθεσιν καὶ τάξιν αὐτῆς, καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐξομοίωσιν, ὡς δυνατὸν ἦν παρασχεῖν· οὐ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἡ γένεσις, ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ μὴ καλῶς μηδ' ἱκανῶς ἔχοντος, ὡς οἰκίας, καὶ ἱματίου, καὶ ἀνδριάντος, "It is therefore better for us to follow Plato, (than Heraclitus) and loudly to declare, that the world was made by God, For as the world is the best of all works, so is God the best of all causes. Nevertheless, the substance or matter, out of which the world was made, was not itself made; but always ready at hand, and subject to the artificer, to be ordered and disposed by him. For the making of the world was not the production of it out of nothing, but out of an antecedent bad and disorderly state, like the making of a house, garment, or statue."

It is also well known that Hermogenes[7] and other ancient pretenders to Christianity did in like manner assert the self-existence and improduction of the matter, for which cause they

[5] This is directed against those who, in defiance of all truth, make Aristotle to have supposed that God created all things out of nothing: as formerly Georg. Trapezuntius endeavoured to establish, who was refuted by Bessarion, lib. 3. Contra Calumniatorem Platonis, cap. 13. 20. 27. In later times, besides some other ardent admirers of Aristotle, Jo. Zeisold, in particular, in his book De Aristotelis cum Scriptura Sacra Consensu, disp. 2. art, 1. sect. 1. p. 68. argues at great length: Dari Juxta Aristotelem verum mundi principium et creationem cum novitate essendi, "That Aristotle asserts the true principle of the world and creation with new being." Compare what he had said previously, Disp. 2. art. 1. sect. 1. s. 10. &c. p. 60. And to prove the truth of this new and unheard-of opinion, Zeisold appeals to and insists on this very passage above all, from which Dr. Cudworth denies that it can be shown. It occurs Metaphys. lib. 1. cap. 2. p. 263. t. 4. opp. I suspect, therefore, that the learned Doctor, in writing this, was thinking principally of this Zeisold; who also, though without being mentioned by name, seems to be censured by Jac. Thomasius, De Exustione Mundi Stoica, disp. 4. p. 5. 58. &c. He is openly attacked, however, on the same account by Jo. Franc. Buddæus, De Conciliatione Philosophorum cum Scriptura Sacra, in the Observat. Halenses, tom. 3. obs. 13. sect. 7. p. 243.

[6] De Procreat. Animæ ex Timæo, t. 2. opp. p. 1014.

[7] Not only Hermogenes, but almost all those who in the early ages of Christianity disseminated doctrines adverse to Sacred Writ, coupled the eternity of matter with God. To these Tertullian first gave the name *Materiarii* in his book Contra Hermogen. cap. 15. p. 142. opp. which others afterwards retained.

were commonly called Materiarii, or the Materiarian heretics; they pretending by this means to give an account (as the Stoics had done before them) of the original of evils, and to free God from the imputation of them. Their ratiocination to which purpose is thus set down[8] by Tertullian: "God made all things, either out of himself, or out of nothing, or out of matter. He could not make all things out of himself, because himself being always unmade, he should then really have been the maker of nothing: and he did not make all out of nothing, because being essentially good, he would have made nihil non optimum, every thing in the best manner, and so there could have been no evil in the world: but since there are evils, and these could not proceed from the will of God, they must needs arise from the fault of something, and therefore of the matter, out of which things were made." Lastly, it is sufficiently known likewise, that some modern sects of the Christian profession,[9] at this day, do also assert the uncreatedness of the matter. But these suppose, in like manner as the Stoics did, body to be the only substance.

VII. Now of all these, whosoever they were, who thus maintained two self-existent principles, God and the matter, we may

[8] The words here given by Dr. Cudworth are not those of Tertullian or Hermogenes, but his own. But in stating the arguments of Hermogenes in his own language, the learned Doctor supplies some words which Tertullian does not attribute to Hermogenes, and omits others which he does. This will easily appear from Tertullian's own passage, in which he is explaining the reasoning of Hermogenes, cap. 2. p. 138. "Præstruit, Dominum aut de semet ipso fecisse cuncta, aut de nihilo, aut de aliquo. . . . Negat, illum ex semet *ipso* facere potuisse, quia partes ipsius fuissent, quæcunque ex semet ipso fecisset Dominus. Porro in partes non devenire, ut indivisibilem et indemutabilem, et eundem semper, qua Dominus. Ex nihilo non potuisse eum facere sic contendit, bonum et optimum definiens Dominum, qui bona atque optima tam velit facere, quam sit: immo nihil non bonum atque optimum et velle eum et facere. Igitur omnia ab eo bona et optima oportuisse fieri secundum conditionem ipsius. Invenîri autem et mala ab eo facta, utique non ex arbitrio, nec ex voluntate: quia, si ex arbitrio et voluntate, nihil incongruens et indignum sibi faceret. Quod ergo non arbitrio suo fecerit, intelligi oportere ex vitio alicujus rei factum: ex materia esse sine dubio," "He first lays it down, that God made all things either out of himself, or out of nothing, or out of something. . . . . He denies, that he could have made them out of himself, because whatever he had thus made would have been parts of himself; but he could not become parts, being indivisible and immutable and always the same, as God." (This argument Dr. Cudworth overlooks, and in its place substitutes a very different one, altogether *foreign* to Tertullian.) "That he could not have made all out of nothing, he argues by defining God to be good and the best, who would will to make what is good and the best, such as he is himself; nay, farther, that he would will and make nothing but what was good and the best. Therefore, every thing would necessarily have been made by him good and the best, agreeably to his own condition. But we find also evil things made by him: certainly not of his own will; because of his own will he would have made nothing inconsistent with or unworthy of himself. Whatever, therefore, he made not of his own will, must be understood as having been made from the fault of something: undoubtedly of matter."

[9] He means chiefly the Socinians, the principal of whom, it is well known, deny that God constructed the world out of nothing. There are not wanting, however, among the other Christian sects those who hold the same opinion; which indeed, not a great while ago, not to speak of others, was openly professed by one of Dr. Cudworth's own countrymen, Thom. Burnet. See his Archælog. Philos. lib. 2. cap. 9. p. 520.

pronounce universally, that they were neither better nor worse than a kind of imperfect Theists.

They had a certain notion or idea of God, such as it was, which seems to be the very same with that expressed in Aristotle:[10] Ζῶον ἄριστον ἀΐδιον, "An animal the best, eternal;" and represented also by Epicurus in this manner:[11] Ζῶον πᾶσαν ἔχον μακαριότητα μετ' ἀφθαρσίας, "An animal, that hath all happiness with incorruptibility."

Wherein it was acknowledged by them, that besides senseless matter, there was also an animalish and conscious or perceptive nature, self-existent from eternity; in opposition to Atheists, who made matter, either devoid of all manner of life, or at least of such as is animalish and conscious, to be the sole principle of all things. For it hath been often observed, that some Atheists attributed a kind of plastic life or nature to that matter, which they made to be the only principle of the universe. And these two sorts of atheisms were long since taken notice of by Seneca in these words: Universum, in quo nos quoque sumus, expers esse consilii, et aut ferri temeritate quadam, aut naturâ nesciente quid faciat, "The Atheists make the universe, whereof ourselves are part, to be devoid of counsel; and therefore either to be carried on temerariously and fortuitously, or else by such a nature, as which (though it be orderly, regular, and methodical), yet is notwithstanding nescient of what it doth." But no Atheist ever acknowledged conscious animality to be a first principle in the universe; nor that the whole was governed by any animalish, sentient, and understanding nature, presiding over it as the head of it; but as it was before declared, they concluded all animals and animality, all conscious, sentient, and self-perceptive life, to be generated and corrupted, or educed out of nothing, and reduced to nothing again. Wherefore they, who, on the contrary, asserted animality and conscious life to be a first principle and unmade thing in the universe, are to be accounted Theists. Thus Balbus in Cicero declares,[1] that to be a Theist is to assert, ab animantibus principiis mundum esse generatum, "that the

[10] Metaphys. lib. 14. cap. 8. p. 479, t. 4. opp.

[11] He has not expressed the words but the opinion of Epicurus; whose words concerning God in Diogen. Laërtius, lib. 10. segm. 123. p. 655. are these: Πρῶτον μὲν τὸν Θεὸν ζῶον ἄφθαρτον καὶ μακάριον, "In the first place, believe God to be an immortal and happy animal."

[1] De Natura Deor. lib. 2. cap. 30. p. 2099. t. 9. opp. But Balbus in this passage is not considering, who are to be exempted from the number of Atheists, but explaining in what manner the Stoics are wont to distribute the argument concerning God. See Cicero's own words, in order to judge more correctly of Balbus' meaning: "Secunda (pars disputationis de Deo) est, quæ docet, omnes res subjectas esse naturæ sentienti, ab eaque omnia pulcherrime geri: quo constituto, sequitur, ab animantibus principiis eam esse generatam," "The second (part of the argument) is that which teaches, that all things are subject to a sentient nature, and are all most beautifully directed and governed by it: which being established, it follows, that it was generated from animant principles."

world was generated or produced at first from animant principles;" and that it is also still governed by such a nature; res omnes subjectas esse naturæ sentienti, "that all things are subject to a sentient and conscious nature, steering and guiding of them."

But to distinguish this divine animal from all others, these definers added, that it was ἄριστον and μακαριώτατον, "the best and most happy animal;" and accordingly, this difference is added to that generical nature of animality by Balbus the Stoic,[2] to make up the idea or definition of God complete: Talem esse deum certâ notione animi præsentimus; primùm, ut sit animans; deinde, ut in omni natura nihil illo sit præstantius, "We presage concerning God, by a certain notion of our mind; first, that he is an animans, or consciously living being; and then secondly, that he is such an animans, as that there is nothing in the whole universe, or nature of things, more excellent than him."

Wherefore these Materiarian Theists acknowledged God to be a perfectly understanding being, and such as had also power over the whole matter of the universe; which was utterly unable to move itself, or to produce any thing without him. And all of them, except the Anaxagoreans,[3] concluded, that he was the creator of all the forms of inanimate bodies, and of the souls of animals. However, it was universally agreed upon amongst them, that he was at least the orderer and disposer of all; and that therefore he might upon that account well be called the δημιουργὸς, "the maker or framer of the world."

Notwithstanding which, so long as they maintained matter to exist independently upon God, and sometimes also to be refractory and contumacious to him, and by that means to be the cause of evil, contrary to the divine will; it is plain, that they could not acknowledge the divine omnipotence, according to the full and proper sense of it: which may also further appear from these queries of Seneca[4] concerning God: Quantum Deus possit? materiam ipse sibi formet, an datâ utatur? Deus quicquid vult efficiat? an in multis rebus illum tractanda destituant, et à magno artifice pravè formentur multa, non quia cessat ars, sed quia id, in quo exercetur, sæpe inobsequens arti est? "How far God's power does extend? whether he makes his own matter, or only use that which is offered him? whether he can do whatsoever he will? or the materials in many things frustrate and

[2] De Nat. Deor. lib. 2. cap. 17. p. 2977. t. 9. opp.

[3] For Anaxagoras, as is recorded among others by Diogenes Laërtius, lib. 2. segm. 9. p. 85. taught that "living beings were first produced from moisture, heat, and earth," and, although he added mind to matter, nevertheless attributed most of its accidents to natural causes, *ethereal* and *aqueous*, which Plato severely censures him for, Phædo, p 393. opp.

[4] Præf. lib. 1. Quæst. Natural. p. 485. t. 2. opp.

disappoint him, and by that means things come to be ill framed by this great artificer, not because his art fails him, but because that, which it is exercised upon, proves stubborn and contumacious?" Wherefore, I think, we may well conclude, that those Materiarian Theists had not a right and genuine idea of God.

Nevertheless, it does not therefore follow, that they must needs be concluded absolute Atheists: for there may be a latitude allowed in Theism. And though in a strict and proper sense they be only Theists, who acknowledge one God perfectly omnipotent, the sole original of all things, and as well the cause of matter as of any thing else; yet it seems reasonable, that such consideration should be had of the infirmity of human understandings, as to extend the word further, that it may comprehend within it those also, who assert one intellectual principle self-existent from eternity, the framer and governor of the whole world, though not the creator of the matter; and that none should be condemned for absolute Atheists, merely because they hold eternal uncreated matter, unless they also deny an eternal unmade mind, ruling over the matter, and so make senseless matter the sole original of all things. And this is certainly the most agreeable to common apprehensions; for Democritus and Epicurus would never have been condemned for Atheists merely for asserting eternal self-existent atoms, no more than Anaxagoras and Archelaus were, (who maintained the same thing) had they not also denied that other principle of theirs, a perfect mind, and concluded, that the world was made,[5] *μηδενὸς διατάττοντος ἢ διαταξαμένου, τὴν πᾶσαν ἔχοντος μακαριότητα μετ' ἀφθαρσίας*, "without the ordering and disposal of any understanding being, that had all happiness with incorruptibility."

VIII. The true and proper idea of God, in its most contracted form, is this, a being absolutely perfect; for this is that alone, to which necessary existence is essential, and of which it is demonstrable. Now, as absolute perfection includes in it all that belongs to the Deity, so does it not only comprehend (besides necessary existence) perfect knowledge or understanding, but also omni-causality and omnipotence (in full extent of it); otherwise called infinite power. God is not only *ζῶον ἄριστον*, and animans quo nihil in omni natura præstantius, as the materiarian Theists described him, "the best living being;" nor, as Zeno Eleates[6] called him, *κράτιστον πάντων*, "the most powerful of all

[5] These are not the words of any Greek author, but Dr. Cudworth's own. That those, indeed, who hold matter to be eternal, are not on that account necessarily to be classed among Atheists, if not entertaining unworthy notions of God in other respects, both reason itself points out and, since our author's time, Dr. Samuel Clarke has amply and learnedly proved, in his Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God, par. 1. cap. 4.

[6] The authority for this is Aristotle, De Xenocrate, Zenone et Gorgia, cap. 3. p. 640. t. 2. opp.

things; but he is also παγκρατὴς, and παντοκράτωρ, and παντεξούσιος, "absolutely omnipotent," and "infinitely powerful:" and therefore neither matter, nor any thing else, can exist of itself independently upon God; but he is the sole principle and source, from which all things are derived.

But because this infinite power is a thing, which the Atheists quarrel much withal, as if it were altogether unintelligible, and therefore impossible; we shall here briefly declare the sense of it, and render it (as we think) easily intelligible or conceivable, in these two following steps: First, that by infinite power is meant nothing else but perfect power, or else as Simplicius calls it, ὅλη δύναμις, "a whole and entire power," such as hath no alloy and mixture of impotency, nor any defect of power mingled with it. And then again, that this perfect power (which is also the same with infinite) is really nothing else but a power of producing and doing all whatsoever is conceivable, and which does not imply a contradiction; for conception is the only measure of power and its extent, as shall be showed more fully in due place.

Now, here we think fit to observe, that the Pagan Theists did themselves also vulgarly acknowledge omnipotence as an attribute of the Deity; which might be proved from sundry passages of their writings:

Homer. Od. δ'.[7]

Θεὸς ἄλλοτ' ἐπ' ἄλλῳ
Ζεὺς ἀγαθόν τε κακόν τε διδοῖ, δύναται γὰρ ἅπαντα.

Deus aliud post aliud
Jupiter, bonumque malumque dat, potest enim omnia.

And again, Od. ξ'.

Θεὸς δὲ τὸ μὲν δώσει, τὸ δ' ἐάσει,
Ὅττῃ κεν ᾧ Θύμῳ ἐθέλει, δύναται γὰρ ἅπαντα.

Deus autem hoc dabit, illud omittet,
Quodcunque ei libitum fuerit, potest enim omnia.

To this purpose also, before Homer, Linus,[8]

Ῥᾴδια πάντα Θεῷ τελέσαι, καὶ ἀνήνυτον οὐδέν.

[7] The first passage occurs Odyss. Δ. v. 226. 227. the other, Odyss. Ξ. v. 432. 433.

[8] Jamblichus, in his Vita Pythagoræ, cap. 28. p. 117. 118. quotes these two verses, as the commencement of a heroic poem, attributed by the Pythagoreans to Linus.

Ἐλπεσθαι χρὴ πάντα ἐπὶ οὐκ ἐστ' οὐδὲν ἄελπτον·
Ῥᾴδια πάντα Θεῷ τελέσαι, καὶ ἀνήνυτον οὐδέν.

We should hope for all things, for there is nothing that may not be hoped for:
All things are easy for God to perform, and there is nothing impossible.

But Jamblichus adds, that they appear to him not to be Linus' verses but the production of the Pythagoreans.

And after him, Callimachus,[9]

Δαίμονι ῥέξαι πᾶν δυνατόν·

"All th'ngs are possible for God to do, and nothing transcends his power."

Thus also among the Latin poets, Virgil, Æneid the first,

Sed pater *omnipotens* speluncis abdidit atris,

Again, Æneid the second,

At pater Anchises oculos ad sidera lætus
Extulit, et cœlo palmas cum voce tetendit;
Jupiter *omnipotens*, precibus si flecteris ullis:

And, Æneid the fourth,

Talibus orantem dictis, arasque tenentem
Audiit *Omnipotens*.

Ovid in like manner, Metamorph. 1.

Tum pater *omnipotens* misso perfregit Olympum
Fulmine, et excussit subjectum Pelion Ossæ.

And to cite no more, Agatho, an ancient Greek poet, is commended by Aristotle,[10] for affirming nothing to be exempted from the power of God but only this, that he cannot make that not to have been, which hath been; that is, do what implies a contradiction.

[9] Plutarch, De Placitis Philos. lib. 1. cap. 7. p. 880. tom. 2. opp. Ἀνῃρήσθω γὰρ (φησὶν) ὁ ποιητικὸς λόγος σὺν Καλλιμάχῳ τῷ λέγοντι·

Εἰ θεὸν οἶσθα,
Ἴσθ', ὅτι καὶ ῥέξαι δαίμονι πᾶν δυνατόν.

"For away with the dreams of the poets, together with Callimachus, who says:

If thou believest in a God,
Know this also, that all things are possible for the deity to do."

I have written the Greek verses as they are arranged by the illustrious Richard Bentley, Fragmenta Callimachi, N. 137. p. 372.

[10] Eth. Nic. lib. 6. cap. 2. p. 98. tom. 3. opp. Other testimonies of the ancients concerning the divine omnipotence are collected by Tob. Pfanner in his Systema Theologiæ Gentilis, cap. 2. sect. 27. p. 99. to which, if necessary, many more might be added. But it appears doubtful to me, whether or not the authors here cited by Dr. Cudworth entertained the same notion of infinite power, which he himself had put forth a little above. In the first place, Homer could not attribute such a power to his own Jupiter, as we ascribe to God, for he often represents him, the chief of the gods, as prevented from doing this or that thing by the decrees of the fates; and there are many evidences in this poet of divine impotence. The same may be said of Virgil; as those who read his poem must be aware, that his Jupiter, whom he calls omnipotent, is often beset with many difficulties, and that the angry Juno interposes no slight obstacles to thwart his counsels. How many stratagems, how many cares, how many ministers, how many deliberations are necessary to the Jove of Virgil and Homer, to effect the accomplishment of his wishes? I am almost of opinion indeed, that few can be adduced, from the rank of the ancient poets especially, who had the same conception of divine power as ourselves, and that the word *omnipotent* means with most of them nothing more than *multipotent*, or implies merely, that nature is able to accomplish more than men.

Μόνου γὰρ αὐτοῦ καὶ Θεὸς στερίσκεται,
Ἀγένητα ποιεῖν, ἅσσ' ἂν ἦ πεπραγμένα·

Hoc namque duntaxat negatum etiam Deo est,
Quæ facta sunt, infecta posse reddere.

Lastly, that the Atheists themselves under paganism looked upon omnipotence and infinite power as an essential attribute of the Deity, appears plainly from Lucretius; when he tells us, that Epicurus, in order to the taking away of religion, set himself to confute infinite power.

Omne immensum peragravit mente animoque,
Unde refert nobis victor, quid possit oriri,
Quid nequeat: *finita potestas* denique quoique
Quanam sit ratione, atque alte terminus hærens.
Quare relligio pedibus subjecta vicissim
Obteritur, nos exæquat victoria cœlo.[1]

As if he should have said, Epicurus, by showing that all power was finite, effectually destroyed religion; he thereby taking away the object of it, which is an omnipotent and infinitely powerful Deity. And this is a thing, which the same poet often harps upon again, that there is no infinite power, and consequently no Deity, according to the true idea of it. But last of all, in his sixth book, he condemns religionists, as guilty of great folly, in asserting omnipotence or infinite power (that is, a Deity) after this manner:

Rursus in antiquas referuntur relligiones,
Et dominos acres asciscunt, *omnia posse*,
Quos miseri credunt, ignari, quid queat esse,
Quid nequeat, *finita potestas* denique quoique
Quanam sit ratione, atque alte terminus hærens:
Quo magis errantes totâ regione feruntur.

Where though the poet, speaking carelessly, after the manner of those times, seem to attribute omnipotence and infinite power to gods plurally; yet, as it is evident in the thing itself, that this can only be the attribute of one Supreme Deity; so it may be observed, that in those passages of the poets before cited, it is accordingly always ascribed to God singularly. Nevertheless, all the inferior pagan deities were supposed by them to have their certain shares of this divine omnipotence, severally dispensed and imparted to them.

IX. But we have not yet dispatched all that belongs to the entire idea of God; for knowledge and power alone will not make a God. For God is generally conceived by all to be a most venerable and most desirable being: whereas an omniscient and omnipotent arbitrary Deity, that hath nothing either of benignity or morality in its nature to measure and regulate its

[1] De Rerum Nat. lib. 1. v. 75. &c. p. 30. The other passage which follows occurs lib. 6. v. 61. &c. p. 436.

will, as it could not be truly august and venerable, according to that maxim, "Sine bonitate nulla majestas;" so neither could it be desirable, it being that which could only be feared and dreaded, but not have any firm faith or confidence placed in it. Plutarch, in the life of Aristides:[2] Τὸ Θεῖον τρισὶ δοκεῖ διαφέρειν, ἀφθαρσίᾳ, καὶ δυνάμει, καὶ ἀρετῇ· ὧν σεμνότατον ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ θειότατόν ἐστι· ἀφθάρτῳ μὲν γὰρ εἶναι καὶ τῷ κενῷ καὶ τοῖς στοιχείοις συμβέβηκε· δύναμιν δὲ σεισμοὶ καὶ κεραυνοὶ καὶ πνευμάτων ὁρμαὶ καὶ ῥευμάτων ἐπιφοραὶ μεγάλην ἔχουσι, &c., "God seems to excel in these three things, incorruptibility, power, and virtue; of all which the most divine and venerable is virtue: for vacuum and the senseless elements have incorruptibility; earthquakes and thunders, blustering winds and overflowing torrents, much of power and force. Wherefore the vulgar being affected three manner of ways towards the Deity, so as to admire its happiness, to fear it, and to honour it; they esteem the Deity happy for its incorruptibility, they fear and stand in awe of it for its power, but they worship it, that is, love and honour it for its justice." And indeed an omnipotent arbitrary Deity may seem to be in some sense a worse and more undesirable thing, than the Manichean evil god; forasmuch as the latter could be but finitely evil, whereas the former might be so infinitely. However, I think, it can be little doubted, but that the whole Manichean hypothesis, taken all together, is to be preferred before this of one omnipotent arbitrary Deity (devoid of goodness and morality) ruling all things; because there the evil principle is yoked with another principle essentially good, checking and controling it; and it also seems less dishonourable to God, to impute defect of power than of goodness and justice to him.

Neither can power and knowledge alone make a being in itself completely happy; for we have all of us by nature μάντευμά τι (as both Plato and Aristotle call it), a certain divination, presage, and parturient vaticination in our minds, of some higher good and perfection than either power or knowledge. Knowledge is plainly to be preferred before power, as being that which guides and directs its blind force and impetus; but Aristotle himself declares,[3] that there is λόγου τι κρεῖττον, which is λόγου ἀρχὴ, "something better than reason and knowledge, which is the principle and original of all." For (saith he): Λόγου ἀρχὴ οὐ λόγος, ἀλλά τι κρεῖττον, "The principle of reason is not reason, but something better." Where he also intimates this to be the proper and essential character of the Deity: Τί οὖν ἂν κρεῖττον καὶ ἐπιστήμης, πλὴν ὁ Θεὸς, "For what is there, that can be

[2] P. 322. tom. 1. opp.
[3] Magn. Moral. s. Eudem. lib. 7. cap. 14. p. 384. tom. 3. opp.

better than knowledge, but God?" Likewise the same philosopher elsewhere plainly determines,* that there is morality in the nature of God; and that his happiness consisteth principally therein, and not in external things, and the exercise of his power: Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἑκάστῳ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἐπιβάλλει τοσοῦτον, ὅσον περ ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως, καὶ τοῦ πράττειν κατὰ ταύτας, ἔστω συνωμολογημένον ἡμῖν, μάρτυρι τῷ θεῷ χρωμένοις, ὃς εὐδαίμων μέν ἐστι καὶ μακάριος, δι' οὐθὲν δὲ τῶν ἐξωτερικῶν ἀγαθῶν, ἀλλὰ δι' αὐτὸν αὐτὸς, καὶ τῷ ποιός τις εἶναι τὴν φύσιν, "That every man hath so much of happiness, as he hath of virtue and wisdom, and of acting according to these, ought to be confessed and acknowledged by us; it being a thing, that may be proved from the nature of God, who is happy, but not from any external goods, but because he is himself, (or that which he is) and in such a manner affected according to his nature;" that is, because he is essentially moral and virtuous.

Which doctrine of Aristotle's seems to have been borrowed from Plato, who in his dialogues De Republica,[4] discoursing about moral virtue, occasionally falls upon this dispute concerning the *summum bonum*, or chiefest good; wherein he concludes, that it neither consisted in pleasure as such, according to the opinion of the vulgar, nor yet in mere knowledge and understanding, according to the conceit of others, who were more polite and ingenious.† Οἶσθα, ὅτι τοῖς μὲν πολλοῖς ἡδονὴ δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθὸν, τοῖς δὲ κομψοτέροις φρόνησις· καὶ ὅτι τε οἱ τοῦτο ἡγούμενοι οὐκ ἔχουσι δεῖξαι, ἥτις φρόνησις, ἀλλ' ἀναγκάζονται τελευτῶντες τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φάναι, μάλα γελοίως· ὀνειδίζοντες

* De Republica, lib. 7. cap. 1. p. 569. tom. 3. opp.

[4] De Republica, lib. 6. p. 477. opp. Dr. Cudworth has made a few omissions and alterations in Plato's words, but without taking away any thing from their sense and substance. The agreement which the learned Doctor fancies he has found between the opinions of Plato and Aristotle on the goodness of God, I have not been able to perceive. The inquiry is, whether goodness holds the highest place in the divine perfections. This Plato affirmed; but, if I judge correctly, not Aristotle likewise. The God of Aristotle does everything by the necessity of nature. He moves the heavens and every thing else by a certain system: but he neither can desist from this motion nor compose and arrange things differently from what they are. Whatever therefore he communicates to inferior natures, he cannot help communicating. Now what, I ask, of true goodness, properly so called, does such a being possess? Would you call him good, merciful, benignant, who does whatever is done by him from all eternity, and cannot by any means act differently? Or him liberal, who gives what he is compelled by necessity to give? The two passages of Aristotle quoted by the learned Doctor do not militate against this opinion. In the first Aristotle determines, that God is better than reason and is the fountain of reason. This will be readily conceded to him by all, who leave nothing to God but power and wisdom. In the other he asserts that God is happy, not by the possession of external goods, but from his own nature and inherent virtue. But not even this would prove God to be supremely good. They who deny all goodness and justice to God, will nevertheless make no difficulty in adopting this opinion. For my part, indeed, I by no means agree with those, who like the later Platonists, believe it possible to do away with all discrepancy between Plato and Aristotle, it being most certain, that these philosophers are at variance throughout the whole of their doctrines.

† Lib. 6.

γὰρ, ὅτι οὐκ ἴσμεν τὸ ἀγαθὸν, λέγουσι πάλιν ὡς εἰδόσι, "You know, that, to the vulgar, pleasure seems to be the highest good; but to those who are more elegant and ingenuous, knowledge: but they, who entertain this latter opinion, can none of them declare what kind of knowledge it is, which is that highest and chiefest good, but are necessitated at last to say, that it is the knowledge of good, very ridiculously: forasmuch as herein they do but run round in a circle, and upbraiding us for being ignorant of this highest good, they talk to us at the same time, as knowing what it is." And thereupon he adds; Καλῶν ἀμφοτέρων ὄντων, γνώσεώς τε καί ἀληθείας, ἄλλο καὶ κάλλιον ἔτι τοῦτο ἡγούμενος αὐτὸ, ὀρθῶς ἡγήσεται. Ἐπιστήμην δὲ καὶ ἀλήθειαν, ὥσπερ φῶς τε καὶ ὄψιν ἡλιοειδῆ μὲν νομίζειν ὀρθὸν, ἥλιον δὲ ἡγεῖσθαι οὐκ ὀρθῶς, οὕτω καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἀγαθοειδῆ μὲν νομίζειν ἀμφότερα ὀρθὸν, ἀγαθὸν δὲ ἡγεῖσθαι ὁπότερον αὐτῶν οὐκ ὀρθόν, ἀλλ' ἔτι μειζόνως τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἕξιν τιμητέον, "That though knowledge and truth be both of them excellent things, yet he that shall conclude the chief good to be something which transcends them both, will not be mistaken. For as light, and sight, or the seeing faculty, may both of them rightly be said to be soliform things, or of kin to the sun, but neither of them to be the sun itself; so knowledge and truth may likewise both of them be said to be boniform things, and of kin to the chief good, but neither of them to be that chief good itself; but this is still to be looked upon as a thing more august and honourable." In all which of Plato's there seems to be little more, than what may be experimentally found within ourselves; namely, that there is a certain life, or vital and moral disposition of soul, which is much more inwardly and thoroughly satisfactory, not only than sensual pleasure, but also than all knowledge and speculation whatsoever.

Now whatever this chiefest good be, which is a perfection superior to knowledge and understanding; that philosopher[5] resolves, that it must needs be first and principally in God, who is therefore called by him, Ἰδέα τ' ἀγαθοῦ, "the very idea or essence of good." Wherein he trod in the footsteps of the Pythagoreans, and particularly of Timæus Locrus,[6] who making two principles of the universe, mind and necessity, adds concerning the former: Τουτέων τὸν μὲν τᾶς τ' ἀγαθοῦ φύσιος εἶμεν θεόν τε ὀνυμαίνεσθαι ἀρχάν τε τῶν ἀρίστων, "The first of these two is of the nature of good, and it is called God, the principle of the best things." Agreeably with which doctrine of theirs,

[5] I wish he had pointed out the place; for the words concerning God do not occur in Plato, although the like are everywhere to be met with. See lib. 2. De Republica, p. 431. Philebus, p. 77. &c.

[6] De Anima Mundi, cap. 543. among the Scriptores Mythologici, edited by Thomas Gale. Several other testimonies of the ancients on the goodness of God are collected by Tob. Pfanner, in his Systema Theol. Gent. cap. 2. sect. 23. p. 85.

the Hebrew Cabalists[7] also make a Sephirah in the Deity, superior both to Binah and Chochmah, (understanding and wisdom) which they call Chether, or the crown. And some would suspect this Cabalistic learning to have been very ancient among the Jews, and that Parmenides was imbued with it, he calling God in like manner στεφάνην, or "the crown." For which Velleius in Cicero[8] (representing the several opinions of philosophers concerning God) perstringes him amongst the rest; Parmenides commentitium quiddam coronæ similitudine efficit, Stephanem appellat, continentem ardore lucis orbem, qui cingit cœlum, quem appellat Deum.

But all this while we seem to be to seek, what the chief and highest good superior to knowledge is, in which the essence of the Deity principally consists; and it cannot be denied, but that Plato sometimes talks too metaphysically and cloudily about it; for which cause, as he lay open to the lash of Aristotle, so was he also vulgarly perstringed for it, as appears by that of Amphys the poet, in Laërtius:[9]

Τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν ὅ, τι ποτ' ἐστὶν, οὐ τυγχάνειν
Μέλλεις διὰ ταύτην, ἧττον οἶδα τοῦτ' ἐγὼ,
Ἢ τὸ τοῦ Πλάτωνος Ἀγαθόν·

"What good that is, which you expect from hence, I confess, I less understand, than I do Plato's good." Nevertheless, he plainly intimates these two things concerning it: first, that this nature of good, which is also the nature of God, includes benig-

[7] The interpretations given by learned men, however, of the Cabalistic tree are so numerous and so various, that it is difficult to decide whether or not Dr. Cudworth has any grounds for this exposition of the first Sephirah. Consult Wolf's Biblioth. Hebr. vol. 2. lib. 7. cap. 2. sect. 7. &c. p. 1221. &c., and Jo. Fran. Buddeus' Introd. in Hist. Philos. Hebræorum, sect. 39. p. 335. The whole matter is wonderfully beset with difficulties, nor do I believe any one will ever be able to bring forward an exposition of the Sephirah, altogether free from doubt. However, if we assume what to me indeed appears most probable, that the Cabalists meant to give a tabular outline as it were of the perfections of the Supreme Being and of the science of these perfections, we can easily fall into the opinion here maintained by the learned Doctor, that the first Sephirah, which they call Chether, or *the crown*, denotes divine love, as the fountain and principle of all the other divine virtues.

[8] De Nat. Deor. lib. 1. cap. 10. p. 2895. Those who suspect, that Parmenides was led by the example of the Cabalists to call God Στεφανὴ, or "the crown," will not I apprehend find many followers. Even Cicero's own words here quoted amply refute this opinion. With justice therefore, Wolf in his notes Ad Origenis Philosophumena, cap. 11. p. 86. 87. openly repudiates it. Of the opinion entertained by Parmenides concerning God, however, and of the meaning of this passage we shall treat professedly in the sequel, sect. 21.

[9] Lib. 2. segm. 27. p. 181. But if I am not mistaken, these verses do not perstringe Plato for having talked about good too metaphysically, but for having declared this good to be unknown. For the slave introduced by the comic poet says he is ignorant of the good his master expects, just as Plato asserted the nature of his good to be unknown. At any rate, Socrates owns in Plato, that the question concerning the nature of the chiefest good is particularly difficult to explain, and that no one is able to expound it, De Republica, lib. 6. p. 478. 479. Add the dialogue inscribed Parmenides, p. 57. where explicitly: Ἄγνωστον ἡμῖν ἐστι καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν, ὅ, ἐστι, καὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν, "Of the nature of the beautiful itself, and of the good, we are ignorant."

nity in it, when he gives this account[10] of God's both making the world, and after such a manner; "Because he was good, and that which is good hath no envy in it; and therefore he both made the world, and also made it as well, and as like to himself as was possible." And secondly, that it comprehends eminently all virtue and justice, the divine nature being the first pattern hereof; for which cause virtue is defined to be an assimilation to the Deity.[1] Justice and honesty are no factitious things, made by the will and command of the more powerful to the weaker, but they are nature and perfection, and descend downward to us from the Deity

But the Holy Scripture, without any metaphysical pomp and obscurity, tells us plainly, both what is that highest perfection of intellectual beings, which is κρεῖττον λόγου καὶ ἐπιστήμης "better than reason and knowledge," and which is also the source, life, and soul of all morality, namely, that it is love or charity. "Though I speak with the tongue of men and angels, and have not love, I am but χαλκὸς ἠχῶν ἢ κύμβαλον ἀλαλάζον, as sounding brass or a tinkling cymbal," which only makes a noise without any inward life. "And though I have prophecy, and understand all mysteries and all knowledge, and though I have all faith so that I could remove mountains, and have not love, I am nothing;" that is, I have no inward satisfaction, peace, or true happiness. "And though I bestow all my goods to feed the poor, and give my body to be burned, and have not love, it profiteth me nothing;" I am for all that, utterly destitute of all morality virtue, and grace. And accordingly, it tells us also in the next place, what the nature of God is, that he is properly neither power nor knowledge, (though having the perfection of both in him) but love. And certainly, whatever dark thoughts concerning the Deity some men in their cells may sit brooding on, it can never reasonably be conceived, that that which is ἱκανώτατον ἁπάντων καὶ αὐταρκέστατον, "the most self-sufficient and self-happy being," should have any narrow and selfish designs abroad, without itself, much less harbour any malignant and despiteful ones towards its creatures. Nevertheless, because so many are apt to abuse the notion of the divine love and goodness, and to

[10] He expresses, no doubt, these words in Plato's Timæus, p. 527. which I subjoin: Ἀγαθὸς ἦν· ἀγαθῷ δὲ οὐδεὶς περὶ οὐδενὸς οὐδέποτε ἐγγίγνεται φθόνος· τούτου δ' ἐκτὸς ὢν, πάντα ὅτι μάλιστα ἐβουλήθη γενέσθαι παραπλήσια αὑτῷ, "He was good; but the good never entertains envy about anything whatever; therefore being free from this, he willed all things to be made as like himself as possible."

[1] That the ancient Pythagoreans, Platonists, and also Stoics, commonly defined virtue in this manner, is too well known to require proof. Much matter in relation to this argument has been collected together by Ren. Vallinus, in his notes on Boëthius De Consolat. Philos. p. 23. &c. Plato himself, who is principally touched upon here, says among other things, in his Theætetus, p. 128: Ὁμοίωσις Θεοῦ δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον μετὰ φρονήσεως γενέσθαι, "Assimilation to God consists in becoming just, holy, and prudent."

frame such conceptions of it, as destroy that awful and reverential fear that ought to be had of the Deity, and make men presumptuous and regardless of their lives; therefore, we think fit here to superadd also, that God is no soft, nor fond and partial love, but that justice is an essential branch of this divine goodness; God being, as the writer De Mundo[2] well expresses it, νόμος ἰσοκλινὴς, "an impartial law;" and as Plato,[3] μέτρον πάντων, "the measure of all things." In imitation whereof, Aristotle concludes also, that a good man (in a lower and more imperfect sense) is μέτρον τοο, "an impartial measure of things and actions."

It is evident that the Atheists themselves, in those former times of paganism, took it for granted that goodness was an essential attribute of the Deity, whose existence they opposed, (so that it was then generally acknowledged for such by the pagan Theists) from those argumentations of theirs before mentioned, the 12th and 13th, taken from the topic of evils, the pretended ill frame of things, and want of providence over human affairs. Which, if they were true, would not at all disprove such an arbitrary Deity, (as is now fancied by some) made up of nothing but will and power, without any essential goodness and justice. But those arguments of the Atheists are directly levelled against the Deity, according to the true notion or idea of it; and could they be made good, would do execution upon the same. For it cannot be denied, but that the natural consequence of this doctrine, that there is a God essentially good, is this, that therefore the world is well made and governed. But we shall afterwards declare that though there be evil in the parts of the world, yet there is none in the whole; and that moral evils are not imputable to the Deity.

And now we have proposed the three principal attributes of the Deity. The first whereof is infinite goodness with fecundity; the second infinite knowledge and wisdom; and the last infinite, active, and perceptive power. From which divine attributes the Pythagoreans and Platonists seemed to have framed their trinity of archical hypostases, such as have the nature of principles in the universe, and which though they apprehended as several distinct substances, gradually subordinate to one another, yet they many

[2] Cap. 6. p. 865. t. 1. opp. Aristotelis. But the author seems to mean by this precept, not, as the learned Doctor supposes, that the divine goodness is tempered with justice, but that the care of God extends equally to all things.

[3] De Legibus lib. 4. p. 601. Ὁ δὲ Θεὸς ἡμῖν πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἂν εἴη μάλιστα, "God would be to us preeminently the measure of all things;" the meaning of which evidently is: "It behoves us in every action to take God as the example for our imitation, and not men," as the philosopher expressly adds. As Dr. Cudworth cited these words from memory, it is not to be much wondered at, that he deviated a little from their true sense. Of the quotation from Aristotle I say nothing, it being altogether foreign to this question. See De Republica, lib. 3. cap. 4. p. 455. tom. 3. opp. and others.

times extend the τὸ Θεῖον so far as to comprehend them all within it. Which Pythagoric trinity seems to be intimated by Aristotle[4] in these words: Καθάπερ γάρ φασι καὶ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι τὸ πᾶν καὶ τὰ πάντα τοῖς τρίσι διώρισται,* "As the Pythagoreans also say, the universe, and all things are determined and contained by three principles." Of which Pythagoric trinity more afterwards. But now we may enlarge and fill up that compendious idea of God premised, of a being absolutely perfect, by adding thereunto (to make it more particular) 'such as infinitely good, wise, and powerful, necessarily existing, and not only the framer of the world, but also the cause of all things.' Which idea of the Deity is sufficient, in order to our present undertaking.

Nevertheless, if we would not only attend to what is barely necessary for a dispute with Atheists, but also consider the satisfaction of other free and devout minds, that are hearty and sincere lovers of this most admirable and most glorious being, we might venture for their gratification, to propose yet a more full, free, and copious description of the Deity, after this manner. 'God is a being absolutely perfect, unmade or self-originated, and necessarily existing; that hath an infinite fecundity in him, and virtually contains all things; as also an infinite benignity or overflowing love, uninvidiously displaying and communicating itself; together with an impartial rectitude or nature of justice: who fully comprehends himself, and the extent of his own fecundity, and therefore, all the possibilities of things, their several natures and respects, and the best frame or system of the whole: who hath also infinite active and perceptive power: the fountain of all things, who made all that could be made and was fit to be made, producing them according to his own nature, (his essential goodness and wisdom) and therefore according to the best pattern, and in the best manner possible, for the good of the whole; and reconciling all the variety and contrariety of things in the universe into one most admirable and lovely harmony. Lastly, who contains and upholds all things, and governs them after the best manner also, and that without any force or violence, they being all naturally subject to his authority, and readily obeying his law.' And now we see that God is such a being, as

[4] This, however, I can by no means assent to. For this Pythagorean dogma concerning the number three was understood by Aristotle of physical things. Thus, after having said, that three things pertain to magnitude, *line*, *surface*, and *body*, he accommodates the Pythagorean precept to this doctrine. But the reason why the disciples of Pythagoras asserted all things to be contained in three, is shown in numerous passages of the ancients, collected by Jo. Meursius, in his Denar. Pythagoric. cap. 5. p. 35. They meant to inculcate, that in all things these three can be observed, *beginning*, *middle*, and *end*. On this the whole of their natural philosophy turned, namely to adapt the relations of nature to numbers; preposterous, as it evidently is, both in design and order.

* De Cœlo, lib. 1. cap. 1. p. 610. tom. 1. opp.

that if he could be supposed not to be, there is nothing whose existence a good man could possibly more wish or desire.

X. From the idea of God thus declared it evidently appears that there can be but one such being, and that μόνωσις, "unity," oneliness or singularity is essential to it; forasmuch as there cannot possibly be more than one supreme, more than one omnipotent or infinitely powerful being, and more than one cause of all things besides itself. And however Epicurus, endeavouring to pervert and adulterate the notion of God, pretended to satisfy that natural prolepsis or anticipation in the minds of men, by a feigned and counterfeit asserting of a multiplicity of co-ordinate deities, independent upon one supreme, and such as were also altogether unconcerned either in the frame or government of the world, yet himself notwithstanding plainly took notice of this idea of God which we have proposed, including unity or oneliness in it (he professedly opposing the existence of such a Deity); as may sufficiently appear from that argumentation of his, in the words before cited.[5]

> Quis regere immensi summam, quis habere profundi
> Indu manu validas potis est moderanter habenas?
> Quis pariter cœlos omnes convertere, et omnes
> Ignibus ætheriis terras suffire feraces?
> Omnibus inque locis esse omni tempore præsto?

Where he would conclude it to be a thing utterly impossible for the Deity to animadvert, order, and dispose of all things, and be present everywhere in all the distant places of the world at once; which could not be pretended of a multitude of co-ordinate gods, sharing the government of the world amongst them; and therefore it must needs be levelled against a divine monarchy, or one single solitary, supreme Deity, ruling over all. As in like manner, when he pursues the same argument further in Cicero, to this purpose, that though such a thing were supposed to be possible, yet it would be notwithstanding absolutely inconsistent with the happiness of any being, he still proceeds upon the same hypothesis of one sole and single Deity:[6] Sive ipse mundus Deus est, quid potest esse minus quietum, quam, nullo puncto temporis intermisso, versari circum axem cœli admirabili celeritate? Sive in ipso mundo Deus inest aliquis, qui regat, qui gubernet, qui cursus astrorum, mutationes temporum, hominum commoda vitasque tueatur; næ ille est implicatus molestis negotiis et operosis. "Whether you will suppose the world itself to be a God, what can be more unquiet, than without intermission perpetually to whirl round upon the axis of the heaven with such admirable celerity; or whether you will imagine a God in the

[5] Lucretius, De Rerum Nat. lib. 2. v. 1694. p. m. 451.
[6] De Nat. Deor. lib. 1. cap. 20. p. 2909. tom. 9. opp.

world distinct from it, who does govern and dispose all things, keep up the courses of the stars, the successive changes of the seasons, and orderly vicissitudes of things, and contemplating lands and seas, conserve the utilities and lives of men; certainly he must needs be involved in much solicitous trouble and employment." For as Epicurus here speaks singularly, so the trouble of this theocracy could not be thought so very great to a multitude of co-ordinate Deities, when parcelled out among them, but would rather seem to be but a sportful and delightful divertisement to each of them. Wherefore it is manifest that such an idea of God as we have declared, including unity, oneliness, and singularity in it, is a thing which the ancient Atheists, under the times of paganism, were not unacquainted with, but principally directed their force against. But this may seem to be anticipated in this place, because it will fall in afterwards more opportunely to be discoursed of again.

XI. For this is that which lies as the grand prejudice and objection against that idea of God which we have proposed, essentially including μόνωσις, singularity or oneliness in it, or the real existence of such a Deity as is the sole monarch of the universe; because all the nations of the world heretofore (except a small and inconsiderable handful of the Jews), together with their wisest men and greatest philosophers, were generally looked upon as polytheists, that is, such as acknowledged and worshipped a multiplicity of gods. Now, one God and many gods being directly contradictious to one another, it is therefore concluded from hence, that this opinion of monarchy, or of one supreme God, the maker and governor of all, hath no foundation in nature, nor in the genuine ideas and prolepses of mens' minds, but is a mere artificial thing, owing to its original wholly to private fancies and conceits, or to positive laws and institutions amongst Jews, Christians, and Mahometans.[7]

[7] I consider it evident, that the learned Doctor understood by the phrases *opinion founded in nature*, and *ideas and prolepses of men's minds*, what others call *innate ideas;* and that he meant simply that the *idea of the oneliness* or *singularity* of God is implanted in the minds of all men that are born, before they either have the use of reason, or are educated and imbued with learning. This is abundantly shown throughout the whole of his present disputation. In the same sense his opinion was taken also by J. Le Clerc, who to impugn it avails himself of the authority of Jo. Locke, by whom he tells us it has been proved that there are no innate ideas of things at all, not even of God, Bibl. Choisie, tom. 3. p. 32. But the learned writer, Thomas Wise, who has published an abridgment of Dr. Cudworth's book, is unwilling that any discrepancy should exist between Locke and his author. He therefore asserts in the Introduction to this Abridgment, p. 139. that Dr. Cudworth does not expressly say "that the idea of God is innate, nor in any other sense natural, than as it rises up and appears upon the use of the natural faculty of reason." But unless I am altogether mistaken, he has gone further than was necessary in his zeal towards the learned Doctor, who, it is manifest maintained with the Platonists, that the ideas of many things are born with men themselves. The controversy itself about *innate ideas* or the *inherent knowledge of God*, I shall pass over for the present, as a different subject is

For the assoiling of which difficulty, seeming so formidable at first sight, it is necessary, that we should make a diligent inquiry into the true and genuine sense of this Pagan polytheism. For

under consideration. It will be better to speak of some other matters which bear upon this question. I. I should wish it to be observed, that almost all the ancient doctors of the Christian church, who disputed with the nations averse to the true religion, classed the *unity* of the Supreme Being, as Dr. Cudworth has here done, among the notions implanted in the minds of men by nature itself or God. We have a treatise by Tertullian, De Testimonio Animæ, in which he undertakes to prove that a man is led by the very instinct of nature and of his own mind, not only to think that there is a God and one God, but also to profess this in common discourse. Most of the others, of the Latins especially, Minutius, Arnobius, Lactantius, and many more, not to speak at present of the Greeks, follow in Tertullian's footsteps. Arnobius is in particular explicit, lib. 1. Adv. Gentes, p. 23. "Quisquamne est hominum, qui non cum istius principis notione diem primæ nativitatis intraverit? cui non ingenitum, non affixum, imo ipsis pœne in genitalibus matris non impressum, non insitum, esse Regem ac Dominum, cunctorum, quæcumque sunt, moderatorem." "What man is there who did not enter upon the day of his birth with the idea of this principle? in whom is it not inborn and implanted, nay almost imprinted on the very womb of his mother, that there is a Lord and King, the ruler of all things?" II. This opinion, however, has been too far receded from by those who have philosophized in later times. For not to mention Locke and his followers, who hold that no idea is implanted by nature in our minds, there have been others who have gone to still greater lengths, and denied the possibility of its being positively known from reason even, that there is one cause of all things. Among these may be ranked in particular, Papinus, a Frenchman, Essais de Theologie sur la providence et sur la grace, edit. 1687. p. 92. &c. who has been refuted by Pet. Jurien in the Preface to his book, entitled Jugement sur les Methodes d'expliquer la providence et la grace, Rotterd. 1688. 12. and by Monsieur Bayle, Continuation des Pensées sur les Cometes, tom. 2. p. 107. p. 513. III. The argument against an innate knowledge of God, in the discussion of which the learned Doctor has expended so much talent and erudition, does not appear to me to be so formidable as he supposes it. For those who hold that certain ideas or forms of things are implanted in us by nature, including among these the notion of a God and of one God, do not imagine these ideas and notions to be so plain and manifest, that they cannot be perverted and obscured. On the contrary, if I mistake not, they will admit, that these notions are more vivid in some persons than in others, that they are covered over with a sort of rust as it were, and therefore require attention and diligence in order to polish, brighten and purify them; and lastly, that those who indulge their own natural depravity, and bestow no pains upon the purification of their mental faculties, do by their own fault suppress and almost extinguish this innate light of the soul. Who is not aware that the whole body of Pythagoreans and Platonists, than whom none contended more strenuously for innate ideas, nevertheless held instruction and a certain external excitement to be necessary, in order to kindle the latent sparks. These will tell us, that our soul resembles a field, in which some few grains of wheat are mingled with a great quantity of tares. If we suffer the tares to grow, what, I ask, will become of the good seed? Will not their abundance so choke up, displace, and disfigure it, that scarcely a vestige of it shall remain? Allowing, then, that an infinite multitude of men, both in times past and at this day, have believed and do believe in many gods, and have scarcely ever thought of one God, you will establish from thence, that this mass has utterly neglected the culture of their own souls, and have imprudently suffered the field of the mind to become like a brake beset with brambles and thorns; but you will never prove from it, that no good seed, no notion of one God, was committed and entrusted to their minds and implanted in them by nature. For as, when we look upon an unsightly field, completely overgrown with weeds, we have reason certainly for charging the husbandman with carelessness and neglect, but have no argument to prove, that no good and fruitful seed lies hid underneath; so, if we observe a man either altogether uninformed or entertaining foolish and absurd notions of God and truth, we may safely blame his idleness and deplore his wretched condition, but cannot fairly conclude, that his soul brought with it into the world no notion of these whatsoever. I would apply the same remark to those also, who, from the example of

since it is impossible, that any man in his wits should believe a multiplicity of gods, according to that idea of God before declared, that is, a multiplicity of supreme, omnipotent, or infinitely powerful beings; it is certain, that the pagan polytheism, and multiplicity of gods, must be understood according to some other notion of the word gods, or some equivocation in the use of it. It hath been already observed, that there were sometime amongst the Pagans such, who meaning nothing else by gods but understanding beings superior to men, did suppose a multitude of such deities, which yet they conceived to be all (as well as men) native and mortal, generated successively out of matter, and corrupted again into it, as Democritus' idols were. But these Theogonists, who thus generated all things whatsoever, and therefore the gods themselves universally, out of night and chaos, the ocean or fluid matter, (notwithstanding their using the name gods) are plainly condemned both by Aristotle and Plato for down-right Atheists, they making senseless matter the only self-existent thing, and the original of all things.

Wherefore there may be another notion of the word gods, as taken for understanding beings superior to men, that are not only immortal, but also self-existent and unmade. And indeed the assertors of a multiplicity of such gods as these, though they cannot be accounted Theists in a strict and proper sense, (according to that idea of God before declared) yet they are not vulgarly reputed Atheists neither, but looked upon as a kind of middle thing betwixt both, and commonly called Polytheists. The reason whereof seems to be this, because it is generally apprehended to be essential to atheism, to make senseless matter the sole original of all things, and consequently to suppose all conscious intellectual beings to be made or generated. Wherefore they, who on the contrary assert (not one but) many understanding beings unmade and self-existent, must needs be looked upon as those, who of the two approach nearer to theism than to atheism, and so deserve rather to be called Polytheists than Atheists.

And there is no question to be made, but that the urgers of the forementioned objection against that idea of God, which includes oneliness and singularity in it, from the pagan polytheism,

nations destitute of any conception of a God, oppose the innate knowledge of a Supreme Being, as we know has been done by men of the greatest talent, Bayle, Bentley, Locke, and so many others in our time. For suppose nations to exist, having not the slightest knowledge of a Deity; which, however, has never yet been shown: such nations will be an evidence merely of this, that if a man be left to himself alone, and strive not to assist the soul, labouring under the infirmities of our nature, that small spark of divine knowledge deposited therein is easily smothered, and almost destroyed by other things, and by the violence and perversity of the passions. This might be pursued much further, and proved by examples taken from ordinary life; but to those who are even moderately acquainted with things enough has already been said.

or multiplicity of gods, take it for granted, that this is to be understood of many unmade self-existent deities, independent upon one supreme, that are so many first principles in the universe, and partial causes of the world. And certainly, if it could be made to appear, that the pagan Polytheists did universally acknowledge such a multiplicity of unmade self-existent deities, then the argument fetched from thence, against the naturality of that idea of God proposed (essentially including singularity in it) might seem to have no small force or validity in it.[8]

XII. But first, this opinion of many self-existent deities, independent upon one supreme, is both very irrational in itself, and also plainly repugnant to the phenomena. We say first, it is irrational in itself, because self-existence and necessary existence being essential to a perfect being, and to nothing else, it must needs be very irrational and absurd to suppose a multitude of imperfect understanding beings self-existent, and no perfect one. Moreover, if imperfect understanding beings were imagined to exist of themselves from eternity, there could not possibly be any reason given, why just so many of them should exist, and

[8] It will be proper however, to observe here, that most of the ancient Christian doctors, who disputed with the pagan Polytheists, did notwithstanding understand the opinion of their adversaries, as asserting a plurality of gods, co-ordinate and co-equal with each other. This is manifest from many of the arguments, with which both the Greeks and Latins, in their *Apologies*, attack polytheism. Nor is it to be wondered at, considering the confused and perplexed manner in which those ancients discourse, who have written concerning the gods. Lest I should appear to have asserted this without foundation, I shall adduce a striking passage of Æneas Gazæus, from Theophrastus, p. 46. Καὶ νῦν προεῖδεν ὁ Θεὸς, ὅτι τὰς λογικὰς δυνάμεις θαυμάσαντες ἄνθρωποι, ἀνάρχους τε καὶ ἀγεννήτους νομίσαντες, καὶ πολλὰς ΑΡΧΑΣ καὶ μυρίους θεοὺς ποιοῦντες, δημοκρατίαν ἄτακτον ἀντὶ τῆς τεταγμένης μοναρχίας εἰσοίσουσιν, "God foresaw that men, admiring the rational powers, and considering them as *without beginning* and *unmade*, and imagining many *principles* and thousands of gods, would introduce a disorderly democracy instead of a well-ordered monarchy." We here see Æneas attributing to the nations what Dr. Cudworth endeavours to purge them from, namely the worship of a multiplicity of deities, self-existent and without beginning. Not to mention others, Zacharias Mitylenæus, a Christian philosopher of some note, advances the same in his Dialogue De Opificio Mundi, p. 177. Consult also Cyprian, De Idolorum Vanitate, and Athanasius, Contra Gentes. This doctrine, however, appeared so absurd and foolish to the Polytheists themselves, that they loudly complained of injustice done to them, and explained their own opinion respecting a plurality of gods, in the way it is here expounded by the learned Doctor; declaring that they reverenced one Supreme God, and a plurality of other gods, his ministers and inferiors. Of this I could bring forward many evidences from the ancient Christians; but, to avoid prolixity, I shall content myself with the testimony of Orosius alone, which is particularly clear, Histor. lib. 6. cap. 1. p. 417. "Unde etiam," says he, "nunc pagani, quos jam declarata veritas de contumacia magis, quam de ignorantia, convincit, quum a nobis discutiuntur, non se plures Deos sequi, sed sub uno Deo Magno plures ministros venerari, fatentur." "Whence also Pagans, whom the already declared truth convicts of stubbornness more than of ignorance, when hard pressed by us, now confess that they do not follow a multiplicity of gods, but worship several ministering Deities subordinate to one supreme God." See also Minutius Felix in Octavius and Augustine, De Civit. Dei, passim. The controversy, therefore, respecting the real opinion of those who hold a multiplicity of gods, is, as we may perceive, not of recent, but of ancient date.

neither more nor less, there being indeed no reason why any at all should. But if it be supposed that these many self-existent deities happened only to exist thus from eternity, and their existence notwithstanding was not necessary but contingent; the consequence hereof will be, that they might as well happen again to cease to be, and so could not be incorruptible. Again, if any one imperfect being whatsoever could exist of itself from eternity, then all might as well do so, not only matter, but also the souls of men, and other animals; and consequently there could be no creation by any Deity, nor those supposed deities therefore deserve that name. Lastly, we might also add, that there could not be a multitude of intellectual beings self-existent, because it is a thing which may be proved by reason, that all imperfect understanding beings or minds do partake of one perfect mind, and suppose also omnipotence or infinite power; were it not that this is a consideration too remote from vulgar apprehension, and therefore not so fit to be urged in this place.

Again, as this opinion of many self-existent deities is irrational in itself, so is it likewise plainly repugnant to the phenomena of the world. In which, as Macrobius writes,[9] omnia sunt connexa, all things conspire together into one harmony, and are carried on peaceably and quietly, constantly and evenly, without any tumult or hurly-burly, confusion or disorder, or the least appearance of schism and faction; which could not possibly be supposed, were the world made and governed by a rabble of self-existent Deities, co-ordinate, and independent upon one supreme. Wherefore this kind of polytheism was *obiter* thus confuted by Origen:* Πόσῳ οὖν βέλτιον τὸ ἐκ τῶν ὁρωμένων πειθόμενον τοῖς κατὰ τὴν εὐταξίαν τοῦ κόσμου σέβειν τὸν δημιουργὸν αὐτοῦ ἑνὸς ὄντος ἕνα, καὶ συμπνέοντος αὐτοῦ ὅλῳ ἑαυτῷ, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μὴ δυναμένου ὑπὸ πολλῶν δημιουργῶν γεγονέναι, ὡς οὐδ' ὑπό πολλῶν ψυχῶν συνέχεσθαι ὅλον τὸν οὐρανὸν κινουσῶν; "How much better is it, agreeably to what we see in the harmonious system of the world, to worship one only maker of the world, which is one, and conspiring throughout with its whole self, and therefore could not be made by many artificers, as neither be contained by many souls, moving the whole heaven?"[10] Now

[9] The learned Doctor, I fancy, is referring to these words of Macrobius, In Somnium Scipionis, lib. 1. cap. 14. p. 75. "Invenietur pressius intuenti a summo Deo usque ad ultimam rerum fæcem una mutuis se vinculis religans et nusquam interrupta," "There will be found, on a closer inspection, from the Supreme Being down to the lowest dregs of things, one uninterrupted chain of connexion, mutually binding them together."

* Contr. Cels. lib. 1. p. 18. edit. Cantabr.

[10] The argument which Dr. Cudworth here makes use of, against a plurality of Gods, drawn from the peaceful state and harmony of the whole world, is very common among those who wrote against the Polytheists in the early ages of Christianity. Consult Minutius Felix in Octavius, cap. 18. p. 164. where we find this elegant passage among others: "Nisi forte inquirendum putas, utrum unius imperio, an arbitrio plurimorum,

since this opinion is both irrational in itself, and repugnant to the phenomena, there is the less probability, that it should have been received and entertained by all the more intelligent Pagans.

XIII. Who, that they did not thus universally look upon all their gods as so many unmade self-existent beings, is unquestionably manifest from hence, because ever since Hesiod's and Homer's time at least, the Greekish Pagans generally acknowledged a theogonia, a generation and temporary production of the gods; which yet is not to be understood universally neither, forasmuch as he is no Theist, who does not acknowledge some self-existent Deity. Concerning this theogonia, Herodotus writeth after this manner:* "Οθεν γὰρ ἐγένετο ἕκαστος τῶν θεῶν, εἴτε ἀεὶ ἦσαν πάντες, ὁκοῖοί τέ τινες τὰ εἴδεα, οὐκ ἠπιστέατο μέχρι οὗ πρώην τε καὶ χθὲς, ὡς εἰπεῖν λόγῳ· Ἡσίοδον γὰρ καὶ Ὅμηρον ἡλικίην τετρακοσίοισι ἔτεσι δοκέω μὲν πρεσβυτέρους γενέσθαι, καὶ οὐ πλέοσι· οὗτοι δέ εἰσι οἱ ποιήσαντες Θεογονίαν Ἕλλησι, καὶ τοῖσι θεοῖσι τὰς ἐπωνυμίας δόντες, "Whence every one of the gods was generated, or whether they all of them ever were, and what are their forms, is a thing that was not known till very lately; for Hesiod and Homer were (as I suppose) not above four hundred years my seniors. And these were they, who introduced the theogonia among the Greeks, and gave the gods their several names:" that is, settled the pagan theology. Now, if before Hesiod's and Homer's time, it were a thing not known or determined amongst the Greeks, whether their gods were generated, or all of them existed from eternity; then it was not universally concluded by them, that they were all unmade and self-existent. And though perhaps some might in those ancient times believe one way, and some another, concerning the generation and eternity of their gods; yet it does not follow, that they who thought them to be all eternal, must therefore needs suppose

cœleste regnum gubernetur: Quod ipsum non est multi laboris aperire cogitanti imperia terrena, quibus exempla utique de cœlo. Quando unquam regni societas aut fide cœpit, aut sine cruore discessit?" "Unless you think it necessary to inquire, whether the celestial kingdom is governed by one ruler, or is under the control of many: which is not very difficult for any one to show, who examines terrestrial empires, and uses them as examples in regard to heaven. For when did a partnership in sovereignty ever commence in good faith or terminate without bloodshed?" Add Cyprian, De Idolor. Vanitate, p. 227. ed. Baluzzii, Lactantius, De Ira Dei, cap. 11. p. 930. and Athanasius, Contra Gentes, p. 42. 43. tom. 1. opp. who in particular pursues this argument copiously and eloquently, and others, whose names I omit to mention. Now it is clear even from this reasoning, that the ancient doctors of the church so understood the opinion of the nations who professed polytheism, as to suppose them to hold a multiplicity of self-existent Deities, not subject to the control of one superior God; which opinion the learned Doctor here repudiates. For unless this be kept fixed in the mind, the whole force of this argument falls to the ground, as it has no weight against those who fancy gradations of deities, or to use a favourite phrase, a subordination of gods.

* Euter. p. 53. lib. 2. cap. 53. p. 109. edit. Gronov.

them to be also unmade or self-existent. For Aristotle, who asserted the eternity of the world, and consequently also of those gods of his, the heavenly bodies, did not, for all that, suppose them to be self-existent or first principles, but all to depend upon one principle or original Deity. And indeed the true meaning of that question in Herodotus, whether the gods were generated or existed all of them from eternity, is (as we suppose) really no other than that of Plato, εἰ γέγονεν ὁ κόσμος ἢ ἀγενής ἐστι, "whether the world were made or unmade," and whether it had a temporary beginning, or existed such as it is from eternity; which will be more fully declared afterwards. But ever since Hesiod's and Homer's time, that the theogonia or generation of the gods was settled, and generally believed amongst the Greeks, it is certain, that they could not possibly think all their gods eternal, and therefore much less unmade and self-existent.[1]

[1] I shall here comprise all that I consider worthy of observation on this subject. I. The most erudite J. Le Clerc, in his notes on Hesiod's Theogony, p. 3. and p. 37. 38. considers Herodotus to be mistaken, when he says that the crude notions of the Greeks, concerning the generation and origin of the gods proceeded first from Homer and Hesiod. Before his time, the account given by Herodotus had been already called into question by Everard. Feith in his Antiq. Homericæ, lib. 1. cap. 1. p. 4. Both poets, it is certain, relate what they say of the gods, not as something new and of their own invention; hence it is probable that they merely exhibited in a new dress matters already known among the Greeks. II. For my part I consider that any one who only reads Hesiod attentively will come to a right conclusion on the origin of those poems which the Greeks call theogonies. The whole of Hesiod's poem entitled "Theogony" consists of the opinions of the ancient philosophers on the first principles of things, of the fables of the Greeks concerning the ancient heroes and gods, and of poetic figures and fictions, without any regard to order or system. In this poem are evidently interspersed the seeds and principles of the ancient philosophy, but the poet endeavours to adapt to these the notions current among the Greeks of his time concerning the gods. It appears to me, therefore, that the chief object of those who wrote theogonies was to blend the fables of the Greeks respecting their ancient heroes and gods with the physical dogmas of the times, and to show that they were not opposed to each other, or in other words, to combine the religion of the common people with those dogmas of philosophy, which alone they considered to be true. Hence it is clear, why some philosophers also of eminent intellect, such as Parmenides, Orpheus, and others, composed theogonies. They endeavoured to reconcile, as it were, their own precepts on the nature of things with the religious opinions of the multitude, and as these precepts were not the same among all, it therefore happened, that various theogonies were also put forth, and that all those who composed poems of the kind did not hold the same opinions on the origin and the relations of the gods. Among the Greeks, as among almost all nations, there were no doubt certain old poems on the exploits and fortunes of their ancient heroes, now ranked by them among the gods, which poems they used frequently to recite. But there were also current among the same certain axioms and dogmas, imported no doubt from Phœnicia, on the nature and first principles of things. Both of these were made use of by the first writers of theogonies, who blended what was handed down in the poems of their ancestors concerning Jupiter, Saturn, and other gods, with philosophical opinions, and that with different degrees of ingenuity and embellishment. This course was adopted by those Greeks who, at a later period, entered upon new systems of philosophy, and who, to avoid popular odium and at the same time to propagate and give authority to their own opinions, thought it best to adapt these to the history of the gods, in the same way as Hesiod had done heretofore. This therefore being the case,

But though we have thus clearly proved, that all the pagan gods were not universally accounted by them so many unmade self-existent Deities, they acknowledging a theogonia, or a generation of gods; yet it may be suspected notwithstanding, that they might suppose a multitude of them also (and not only one) to have been unmade from eternity and self-existent. Wherefore we add, in the next place, that no such thing does at all appear neither, as that the Pagans or any others did publicly or professedly assert a multitude of unmade self-existent deities. For first, it is plain concerning the Hesiodian gods, which were all the gods of the Greekish Pagans, that either there was but one of them only self-existent, or else none at all. Because Hesiod's gods were either all of them derived from chaos (or the floating water) love itself being generated likewise out of it (according to that Aristophanic tradition before mentioned); or else love was supposed to be a distinct principle from chaos, namely the active principle of the universe, from whence, together with chaos, all the theogonia and cosmogonia was derived. Now if the former of these were true, that Hesiod supposed all his gods universally to have been generated and sprung originally from chaos, or the ocean; then it is plain, that notwith-

if we wish to interpret Hesiod and Homer correctly, it will be necessary for us to consider first of all, which part of their poems is to be referred to the natural philosophy of the time, which to the ancient history of the Greeks, and which, lastly, to the fictions and vagaries of an exuberant imagination. I should wish the same to be said of the other theogonies of the ancients that have come down to us. III. The learned Doctor denies, that he who holds any thing to be eternal must of necessity suppose the same to be self-existent; and this he confirms by the example of Aristotle, who taught that his numina or stars were eternal, and yet made them subject to the Supreme Being. He might, if he had wished, have added the later Platonists, who maintain that gods and the world are eternal, but deny their self-existence, or, as they are wont to say, hold them to be eternal by time but not by nature. Nor are we ignorant of what certain scholastic teachers, as well as some more modern philosophers, have taught concerning the eternal emanation of all things from God. Owing to the ambiguity of words, the whole of this doctrine has always appeared to me to be encompassed with difficulties. I speak not now of the eternity of nature which those maintain who apply the words eternal and eternity differently from the common acceptation. I shall speak only of the phrase *to be self-existent*. This can signify two things, either, *That it is the first cause or supreme head of all things, or exists without a cause*, or, *That it cannot but exist*. If we take the former acceptation, Dr. Cudworth is right in his opinion, and it does not follow, who he that holds the gods to be eternal must necessarily suppose them to be self-existent. Let us suppose a certain eternal succession and order of things and emanations. If we take the above-mentioned phrase in this sense, we must deny the self-existence of all but one, from which the others flow: for they have a cause to which they are subject and upon which they depend. But if to be self-existent means the same as to exist of necessity, or to be unable not to exist, then the Doctor's opinion must be abandoned, and we must affirm, that things which are eternal are also self-existent. For there is no link of this eternal chain but which cannot but exist. All the gods of the Platonists, all the intelligences of Aristotle, exist by the very necessity of nature, and from necessity preserve the order, which they hold. IV. I am not aware by what argument it is made manifest, that the question of the ancient Greeks mentioned by Herodotus, Whether the gods were eternal or generated, and that of Plato, Whether the world was made or unmade, have the same force and meaning. This is a mere conjecture, resting upon no foundation.

standing all that rabble of gods mustered up by him, he could be no other than one of those atheistic Theogonists before mentioned, and really acknowledged no God at all, according to the true idea of him; he being not a Theist, who admits of no self-existent Deity. But if the latter be true, that Hesiod supposed love to be a principle distinct from chaos, namely the active principle of the universe, and derived all his other gods from thence, he was then a right paganic Theist, such as acknowledged indeed many gods, but only one of them unmade and self-existent, all the rest being generated or created by that one. Indeed it appears from those passages of Aristotle* before cited by us, that that philosopher had been sometimes divided in his judgment concerning Hesiod, where he should rank him, whether among the Atheists, or the Theists. For in his book De Cœlo he ranks him amongst those, who made all things to be generated and corrupted, besides the bare substance of the matter, that is, amongst the absolute Atheists, and looked upon him as a ringleader of them; but in his metaphysics, upon further thoughts, suspects, that many of those, who made love the chiefest of the gods, were Theists, they supposing it to be a first principle in the universe, or the active cause of things, and that not only Parmenides, but also Hesiod was such. Which latter opinion of his is by far the more probable, and therefore embraced by Plutarch,[2] who somewhere determines Hesiod to have asserted one Θεὸν ἀγέννητον, or "unmade Deity;" as also by the ancient scholiast upon him, writing thus, that Hesiod's love was ὁ οὐράνιος ἔρως, ὃς καὶ Θεός· ὁ γὰρ ἐξ Ἀφροδίτης νεώτερός ἐστιν, "the heavenly love, which is also God, that other love, that was born of Venus, being junior." But Joannes Diaconus:

* P. 116. 112.

[2] There is no passage respecting Hesiod in Plutarch that is applicable here, except the following, which occurs in De Placitis Philos. lib. 1. cap. 6. p. 880. Ἡσίοδος βουλόμενος τοῖς γεννητοῖς θεοῖς πατέρα συστῆσαι, εἰσήγαγε τοιούτους αὐτὸς γεννήτορας,

Κοῖόν τε κρείονθ', Ὑπερίονά τ' Ἰάπετόν τε·

Διὰ τοῦτο καὶ μυθικὸν κέκληται. "Hesiod wishing to assign a father to the generated gods, introduced the following progenitors:

Imperial Cœus, Hyperion, and Japetus.

On which account it is called fabulous." Plutarch, however, could scarcely be shown from this to have affirmed that Hesiod asserted an unmade God. The learned Doctor wrote from memory, which represented to him this passage somewhat differently from what it really is. To me, indeed, Hesiod's love appears to be nothing but a certain generative or plastic power inherent in matter, which, according to poetic usage he invested with personality. See what has already been remarked above on this subject generally, cap. 3. sect. 17. In the same chapter, sect. 18. we have sufficiently discussed the two-fold love of the Greeks. The authority of Hesiod's interpreters is of little weight, as they are mostly accustomed to take the precepts and opinions of their own times, or of the later Greeks, as their standard in estimating and expounding the dogmas of the ancient poets.

Ἔρωτα δὲ ἐνταῦθα νοητέον, οὐ τὸν τῆς Ἀφροδίτης παῖδα, πῶς γὰρ τῆς μητρὸς μήπω γεγουυίας οὗτος παράγεται; ἀλλ' ἄλλον τινὰ πρεσβυγενῆ ἔρωτα· οἶμαι δὲ τὴν ἐγκατεσπαρμένην φυσικῶς κινητικὴν αἰτίαν ἑκάστῳ τῶν ὄντων, "By love here," saith he, "we must not understand Venus' son, whose mother was yet unborn, but another more ancient love, which I take to be the active cause or principle of motion, naturally inserted into things." Where though he do not seem to suppose this love to be God himself, yet he conceives it to be an active principle in the universe derived from God, and not from matter. But this opinion will be further confirmed afterward.

The next considerable appearance of a multitude of self-existent deities seems to be in the Valentinian thirty gods and æons, which have been taken by some for such; but it is certain, that these were all of them, save one, generated; they being derived by that fantastic deviser of them from one self-originated deity, called Bythus. For thus Epiphanius[3] informs us: Τριάκοντα γὰρ καὶ οὗτος Θεοὺς καὶ Αἰῶνας καὶ Οὐρανοὺς βούλεται παρεισάγειν, ὧν ὁ πρῶτός ἐστι Βυθός, "This (Valentinus) would also introduce thirty gods and æons, and heavens, the first of which is Bythus:" he meaning thereby an unfathomable depth and profundity; and therefore this Bythus was so called by him ὁ ἀωντάτω καὶ ἀκατονόμαστος πατὴρ, "the highest and ineffable Father."

We do indeed acknowledge, that there have been some, who have really asserted a duplicity of gods, in the sense declared, that is of animalish or perceptive beings self-existent; one as the principle of good, and the other of evil. And this ditheism of theirs seems to be the nearest approach, that was ever really made to polytheism; unless we should here give heed to Plutarch,[4] who seems to make the ancient Persians, besides their two gods, the good and the evil, or Oromasdes and Arimanius, to have asserted also a third middle deity, called by them Mithras; or to some ecclesiastic writers, who impute a trinity of gods to Marcion;[5]

[3] Hæres. 31. cap. 2. p. 164. tom. 1. opp. If there have been any who supposed the Valentinian æons to be so many self-existent gods, they have done so against the authority of all ancient writers. These fantasms of Valentine are manifestly *emanations* from God.

[4] De Iside et Osiride, t. 2. p. 369. Διὸ καὶ Μίθρην Πέρσαι τὸν μεσίτην ὀνομάζουσιν, "Wherefore the Persians also are wont to call Mithras the Mediator." On the doctrine of the Persians more will be said below.

[5] See Euseb. Hist. Eccles. lib. 5. cap. 13. p. 177. and the authors cited by Jo. Bapt. Cotelerius, Ad Constit. Apost. p. 339. t. 1. Patr. Apostol. A great portion of the ancient Gnostics inculcated three principles, a good God, an evil demon, and matter: therefore Marcion is not alone chargeable with this. We have in Constit. Apostol. lib. 6. cap. 8. p. 339. t. 1. Patr. Apostol. a striking passage respecting these three principles, which as being intimately connected with this subject, I shall adduce: Οἱ δὲ τρεῖς ἐναντίους θεοὺς ἀνάρχους, ἀεὶ συνόντας ἑαυτοῖς, δοξάζουσι, "Some (of the Gnostics) suppose three contrary gods, without beginning and always existing together."

(though Tertullian[6] be yet more liberal, and increase the number to an ennead.) For those, that were commonly called Tritheists, being but mistaken Christians and Trinitarians, fall not under this consideration. Now, as for that forementioned ditheism, or opinion of two gods, a good and an evil one, it is evident, that its original sprung from nothing else, but first a firm persuasion of the essential goodness of the Deity, together with a conceit, that the evil that is in the world, was altogether inconsistent and unreconcilable with the same; and that therefore for the solving of this phenomenon, it was absolutely necessary to suppose another animalish principle self-existent, or an evil god. Wherefore as these Ditheists, as to all that which is good in the world, held a monarchy, or one sole principle and original; so it is plain, that had it not been for this business of evil (which they conceived could not be solved any other way) they would never have asserted any more principles or gods than one.[7]

The chiefest and most eminent assertors of which ditheistic doctrine of two self-existent animalish principles in the universe, a good God and an evil demon, were the Marcionites and the Manicheans; both of which, though they made some slight pretences to Christianity, yet were not by Christians owned for such. But it is certain,[8] that besides these, and before them too, some of the professed Pagans also entertained the same opinion, that famous moralist Plutarchus Chæronensis being an undoubted patron of it; which in his book De Iside et Osiride he represents, with some little difference, after this manner:[9] Μεμιγμένη γὰρ ἡ τοῦδε τοῦ κόσμου γένεσις καὶ σύστασις ἐξ ἐναντίων, οὐ μὲν ἰσοσθενῶν δυνάμεων, ἀλλὰ τῆς βελτίονος τὸ κράτος ἐστίν· ἀπολέσθαι δὲ τὴν φαύλην παντάπασιν ἀδύνατον, πολλὴν μὲν ἐμπεφυκυῖαν τῷ σώματι, πολλὴν δὲ τῇ ψυχῇ τοῦ παντὸς, ἀεὶ πρὸς τὴν βελτίονα δυσμαχοῦσαν, "The generation and constitution of this world is mixed of contrary powers or principles (the one good, the other

[6] Adv. Marcionem 1. cap. 16. p. 237. 238. But Tertullian is jeering, and makes new deities out of abstract notions and other things, in order to exhibit Marcion's opinion in a worse and more absurd light; it being at that time looked upon by many as fair game, to pervert and warp their adversaries' opinions, and load them with degrading inferences, for the sake of exciting a greater prejudice against them.

[7] The causes, that led men to the notion of an evil deity, are aptly and systematically explained by the author of Recognitiones Clementis, lib. 2. cap. 53. p. 521. t. 1. Patr. Apostol where Simon Magus is introduced as speaking.

[8] The eminent scholar Jo. Christoph. Wolf has professedly treated of this argument in his Manichæismus ante Manichæos, Hamb. 1707-8. wherein he gives a long list of the principal sects that justly or unjustly have been accused of entertaining this opinion, interspersing it with many learned observations.

[9] De Iside et Osiride, p. 371. It cannot safely be inferred, however, from these words, that Plutarch was imbued with this opinion; for he is not so much expounding his own doctrine as that of Plato, which he is there speaking of, and the Egyptians. I say nothing of the opinion set forth in this passage being very different from the dogma of those, who suppose the universe to be governed by two equal and eternal gods.

evil), yet so as they are not both of equal force, but the better of them more prevalent: notwithstanding which, it is also absolutely impossible for the worser power or principle to be ever utterly destroyed, much of it being always intermingled in the soul, and much in the body of the universe, there perpetually tugging against the better principle."

Indeed learned men of later times have, for the most part, looked upon Plutarch here, but either as a bare relater of the opinion of other philosophers, or else as a follower only, and not a leader in it. Notwithstanding which, it is evident, that Plutarch was himself heartily engaged in this opinion, he discovering no small fondness for it, in sundry of his other writings: as for example in his Platonic questions,[10] where he thus declares himself concerning it: Ἢ τὸ πολλάκις ὑφ' ἡμῶν λεγόμενον ἀληθές ἐστιν, ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἄνους ψυχὴ, καὶ τὸ ἄμορφον σῶμα, συνυπῆρχον ἀλλήλοις ἀεὶ, καὶ τὸ οὐδέτερον αὐτῶν γένεσιν ἔσχεν οὐδὲ ἀρχὴν, "Or else that which is often affirmed by us is true, that a mad irrational soul, and an unformed disorderly body, did co-exist with one another from eternity, neither of them having any generation or beginning." And in his Timæan Psychogonia he does at large industriously maintain the same, there and elsewhere[1] endeavouring to establish this doctrine, as much as possibly he could, upon rational foundations.[2] As first, that nothing can be made or produced without a cause; and therefore there must of necessity be some cause of evil also, and that a positive one too; he representing the opinion of those as very ridiculous, who would make the nature of evil to be but ἐπεισόδιον, an accidental appendix to the world, and all that evil, which is in it, to have come in only by the by, and by consequence, without any positive cause. Secondly, that God being essentially good could not possibly be the the cause of evil, where he highly applauds Plato for removing God to the greatest distance imaginable from being the cause of evil. Thirdly, that as God could not, so neither could ὕλη ἄποιος, "matter in itself devoid of all form" and quality, be the cause of evil, noting this to have been the subterfuge of the Stoics.

[10] P. 1003. t. 2. opp. But neither does this passage show that Plutarch is to be ranked among those, who subject the nature of things to two principles. For, not to mention that Plutarch is speaking of two natures subject to the Supreme Being, mind and matter, he here decides nothing, but inquires merely, whether this opinion may not be deemed more true than the rest, that is, he leaves the whole matter to the judgment of his readers, without himself establishing any thing.

[1] The testimonies which can be produced on the question from this treatise of Plutarch's, will have little weight with those who consider, that in it Plutarch is not stating his own opinions, but merely showing and explaining out of Plato's Timæus that philosopher's sentiments regarding the generation of the soul.

[2] All these arguments are brought forward by Plutarch in his book De Iside et Osiride, p. 369. and Psychogonia, p. 1014. 1015. but neither in the order here read, nor in continued succession. He treats in both of the opinions of Plato and others, but does not state the same opinion to be entertained by himself.

Upon which account he often condemns them, but uncertainly, sometimes as such, who assigned no cause at all of evils, and sometimes again as those, who made God the cause of them. For in his Psychogonia[3] he concludes, that unless we acknowledge a substantial evil principle, *αἱ Στοικαὶ καταλαμβάνουσιν ἡμᾶς ἀπορίαι, τὸ κακὸν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἀναιτίως καὶ ἀγεννήτως ἐπεισάγοντες, ἐπεὶ τῶνγε ὄντων οὔτε τὸ ἀγαθὸν, οὔτε τὸ ἄποιον, εἰκὸς ἐστιν οὐσίαν κακοῦ καὶ γένεσιν παρασχεῖν*, "the Stoical difficulties will of necessity overtake and involve us, who introduce evil into the world from nothing, or without a cause, since neither that which is essentially good (as God) nor yet that which is devoid of all quality (as matter) could possibly give being or generation to it." But in his book against the Stoics,[4] he accuses them as those who made God, essentially good, the cause of evil: *Αὐτοὶ τὴν κακῶν ἀρχὴν ἀγαθὸν ὄντα τὸν θεὸν ποιοῦσι, οὐ γὰρ ἡ ὕλη τὸ κακὸν ἐξ αὑτῆς παρέσχηκεν, ἄποιος γάρ ἐστι καὶ πάσας, ὅσας δέχεται, διαφορὰς ὑπὸ τοῦ ποιοῦντος αὐτὴν καὶ σχηματίζοντος ἔσχηκεν· ὥστε ἀνάγκη τὸ κακὸν, εἰ μὲν δι' οὐδὲν, ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, εἰ δὲ διὰ τὴν κινοῦσαν, ἀρχὴν ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ γέγονος ὑπάρχειν*, "Themselves make God being good the principle and cause of evil, since matter which is devoid of quality, and receives all its differences from the active principle that moves and forms it, could not possibly be the cause thereof. Wherefore evil must of necessity either come from nothing, or else it must come from the active and moving principle, which is God." Now from all these premises joined together Plutarch concludes, that the phenomenon of evil could no otherwise possibly be solved, than by supposing a substantial principle for it, and a certain irrational and maleficent soul or demon, unmade, and co-existing with God and matter from eternity, to have been the cause thereof. And accordingly he resolves, that as whatsoever is good in the soul and body of the universe, and likewise in the souls of men and demons, is to be ascribed to God as its only original; so whatsoever is evil, irregular, and disorderly in them, ought to be imputed to this other substantial principle, a *ψυχὴ ἄνους καὶ κακο-*

[3] P. 1015. t. 2. opp.

[4] De Communibus Notitiis contra Stoicos. If these passages of Plutarch be accurately examined, however, there will be found no contradiction between them, nor will Plutarch, as Dr. Cudworth supposes, be at variance with himself. For he does not state in either what the Stoics really thought, but shows what follows and can be elicited from their opinions. The Stoics held two principles of things, God and matter; of which principles they frequently discoursed in such a manner, as though they supposed the cause of evil to reside in neither; nor were they sufficiently consistent with themselves, when they had to explain the origin of evil. God they pronounced to be essentially good, and matter to be devoid of all quality. Hence, in the former passage Plutarch says it will follow from their opinion, that evil sprung from nothing; in the latter he declares, that if the Stoics deny this they will be driven to another absurdity, namely, that evil came from God himself. But on the Stoical doctrine concerning the origin of evil, it will be worth while to consult Wolf's Manichæismus ante Manichæos, sect. 2. p. 149, &c.

ποιὸς, "an irrational and maleficent soul or demon," which insinuating itself every where throughout the world, is all along intermingled with the better principle:[5] Καὶ μὴ πᾶν εἶναι ἔργον τοῦ θεοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν, "So that neither the soul of the universe, nor that of men and demons, was wholly the workmanship of God, but the lower, brutish, and disorderly part of them the effect of the evil principle."

But besides all this, it is evident that Plutarch was also strongly possessed with a conceit, that nothing substantial could be created (no not by divine power) out of nothing pre-existing; and therefore that all the substance of whatsoever is in the world did exist from eternity unmade: so that God was only the orderer or the methodizer and harmonizer thereof. Wherefore as he concluded, that the corporeal world was not created by God out of nothing, as to the substance of it, but only the pre-existing matter, which before moved disorderly, was brought into this regular order and harmony by him; in like manner he resolved, that the soul of the world (for such a thing is always supposed by him) was not made by God out of nothing neither, nor out of any thing inanimate and soulless pre-existing, but out of a pre-existing disorderly soul was brought into an orderly and regular frame:* Ἀκοσμία γὰρ ἦν τὰ πρὸ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου γενέσεως, ἀκοσμία δὲ οὐκ ἀσώματος οὐδὲ ἀκίνητος, οὐδὲ ἄψυχος, ἀλλὰ ἄμορφον μὲν καὶ ἀσύστατον τὸ σωματικὸν, ἔμπληκτον δὲ καὶ ἄλογον τὸ κινητικὸν ἔχουσα· τοῦτο δὲ ἦν ἀναρμοστία ψυχῆς οὐκ ἐχούσης λόγον· ὁ γαρ θεὸς οὔτε σῶμα τὸ ἀσώματον, οὔτε ψυχὴν τὸ ἄψυχον ἐποίησεν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἁρμόνικον ἄνδρα, &c., "There was unformed matter before this orderly world was made, which matter was not incorporeal, nor unmoved or inanimate, but body discomposed and acted by a furious and irrational mover, the deformity whereof was the disharmony of a soul in it, devoid of reason. For God neither made body out of that which was no body, nor soul out of no soul. But as the musician, who neither makes voice nor motion, does by ordering of them, notwithstanding, produce harmony; so God, though he neither made the tangible and resisting substance of body, nor the phantastic and self-moving power of soul, yet taking both those principles pre-existing, (the one of which was dark and obscure, the other turbulent and irrational) and orderly disposing and harmonizing of them, he did by that means produce this most beautiful and perfect animal of the

[5] Plutarch De Psychogon. ex Timæo, p. 1027. Οὕτως ἐνδείκνυται πολλαχόθεν ἡμῖν, τὸ μὴ πᾶν ἔργον εἶναι θεοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν, ἀλλὰ σύμφυτον ἔχουσαν ἐν ἑαυτῇ τὴν τοῦ κακοῦ μοῖραν ὑπ' ἐκείνου διακεκοσμῆσθαι, "Thus it is shown on all hands, that the soul was not wholly the work of God, but that, having in itself an innate portion of evil, it was ordered and disposed by him." From which it is clear, that the interpretation added to the Greek by the learned Doctor expresses the meaning rather than the very words of Plutarch.

* De Psychog. p. 1014. Par.

world." And further to the same purpose: Οὐχὶ σώματος ἁπλῶς, οὐδὲ ὄγκου καὶ ὕλης, ἀλλὰ συμμετρίας περὶ σῶμα καὶ κάλλους καὶ ὁμοιότητος, ἣν ὁ Θεὸς πατὴρ καὶ δημιουργός· ταῦτα δεῖ διανοεῖσθαι καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς, ὡς τὴν μὲν οὔτε ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ γενομένην οὔτε κόσμου ψυχὴν οὖσαν, ἀλλά τινα φανταστικῆς καὶ δοξαστικῆς, ἀλόγου δὲ καὶ ἀτάκτου φορᾶς καὶ ὁρμῆς δύναμιν αὐτοκίνητον καὶ ἀεικίνητον· τὴν δὲ αὐτὸς ὁ Θεὸς διαρμοσάμενος, προσήκουσιν ἀριθμοῖς καὶ λόγοις, ἐγκατέστησεν ἡγεμόνα τοῦ κόσμου γεγονότος γεννητὴν οὖσαν, "God was not the cause or maker of body simply, that is, neither of bulk nor matter, but only of that symmetry and pulchritude which is in body, and that likeness which it hath to himself: which same ought to be concluded also concerning the soul of the world, that the substance of it was not made by God neither; nor yet that it was always the soul of this world, but at first a certain self-moving substance, endowed with a phantastic power, irrational and disorderly, existing such of itself from eternity, which God by harmonizing, and introducing into it fitting numbers and proportions, made to be the soul and prince of this generated world." According to which doctrine of Plutarch's in the supposed soul of the world, though it had a temporary beginning, yet was it never created out of nothing, but only that, which pre-existed disorderly, being acted by the Deity, was brought into a regular frame. And therefore he concludes: Ἡ ψυχὴ νοῦ μετασχοῦσα καὶ λογισμοῦ καὶ ἁρμονίας, οὐκ ἔργον ἐστὶ τοὺ Θεοῦ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ μέρος, οὐδ' ὑπ' αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ γέγονεν, "Soul partaking of mind, reason, and harmony, is not only the work of God, but also a part of him; nor is it a thing so much made by him as from him, and existing out of him." And the same must he likewise affirm concerning all other souls, as those of men and demons, that they are either all of them the substance of God himself, together with that of the evil demon; or else certain delibations from both (if any one could understand it) blended and confounded together; he not allowing any new substance at all to be created by God out of nothing pre-existent. It was observed in the beginning of this chapter, that Plutarch was an assertor of two ἀϑυπόστατα or self-existent principles in the universe, God and matter; but now we understand that he was an earnest propugnor of another third principle (as himself calls it) besides them both, viz., a ψυχὴ ἄνους καὶ κακοποιὸς, "a mad, irrational, and maleficent soul or demon: so that Plutarch was both a Triarchist and a Ditheist, an assertor of three principles, but of two gods; according to that forementioned notion of a God, as it is taken for an animalish or perceptive being self-existent.[6]

[6] It is evident, I think, from what we have remarked a little above on the passages of Plutarch here adduced, that the opinion of Jo. Rualdus, Vita Plutarchi, cap. 9.

We are not ignorant, that Plutarch endeavours with all his might to persuade this to have been the constant belief of all the

and others, who conceive that in speaking of two principles of things, he is detailing not so much his own views as those of Plato and other philosophers, is not entirely destitute of probability, although Dr. Cudworth will have this to be the opinion only of men who have not read Plutarch with sufficient attention. I am satisfied that scarcely a single passage can be produced from his works, in which he expressly avows that this is the doctrine alone to be adopted by any one aspiring to the name of philosopher, or that it is certain and most true: on the contrary, he over and over again says what cannot by possibility be reconciled with two, what he calls, different natures or principles. And yet I do not altogether agree with those who, in the learned Doctor's judgment, are here to be disregarded. For the fact of Plutarch's so often making mention of this opinion, of his being wholly bent upon showing it to have been entertained by Plato, who in his time was esteemed the prince of philosophers, and of his maintaining the whole host of ancient philosophers, with the exception of the Stoics, whom he hated, to have been imbued with it, is I grant a proof that at heart he was inclined to the dogma. We may go so far as to say, therefore, that he held it to be more probable than the other doctrines of philosophers, but not absolutely true and certain. It is evident he was partial to the customs of the Academics, who discoursed freely on both sides of a question, adopting that which accordingly they judged to possess the greater probability. And he intimates sufficiently plainly, that this opinion, if any one, appears preferable to the others; nevertheless, he by no means so identifies himself with it as to imply his decided conviction of its truth. This opinion, however, which Plutarch deemed not improbable, and, as I think, justly attributed to Plato, is widely different from the one entertained by those who imagine two contrary gods, perpetually at war with each other. But as this, I perceive, is understood by few, and as the most learned Doctor himself has not clearly shown Plutarch's drift, I shall endeavour to make it manifest, particularly from his books De Iside et Osiride and De Psychogonia. God existed from all eternity, good and uncontaminated with any vice, from whom therefore no evil could proceed. See his De Iside et Osiride throughout. Also matter was in existence from infinity, in itself devoid of all quality and of all motion; wherefore neither can this matter be considered as the cause of evil: De Psychogonia, p. 1015. *Ἀνομοιότης δὲ περὶ τὴν ὕλην ἄποιον καὶ ἀδιάφορον οὖσαν οὔκ ἐστι*, "There is no evil in matter, it being devoid of all quality and difference:" which he there discusses at greater length. But there was inherent in matter from eternity a certain irrational and maleficent power or nature, agitating this brute matter with disorderly and turbulent motions. This is that soul of Plutarch, *ἐναντία καὶ ἐναντίων δημιουργὸς*, "contrary and the maker of contraries," De Iside et Osiride, p. 370. or *ψυχὴ ἄνους καὶ κακοποιός*, "irrational and maleficent soul," De Psychogonia, p. 1014. *ψυχὴ ἀνάρμοστος καὶ ἀνόητος*, "unharmonized and irrational soul," ib. p. 1029. to pass over other names by which he designates this substance. Now as this soul is destitute of counsel, knowledge, and reason, it is evident, that it is with less propriety termed soul, and that it works evil not by design but by a certain necessity of nature. Wherefore also Plutarch does not hesitate to call it *ἀνάγκη*, "necessity," and to assert that it is that fate of which poets have sung and philosophers discoursed so often, De Psychog. p. 1026. In a word: this maleficent soul is a sort of moving power residing in matter, which is bound by no laws, but carried along in uncertain course. At a definite time God proceeded to the formation of the world out of this matter, De Psychog. p. 1014. but wishing to make it in every respect beautiful and symmetrical, he saw that matter, which had been wonderfully disturbed by the impulses of that irrational soul, was to be ordered and disposed by him, and the irregular and inharmonious motions of the maleficent soul itself corrected and controlled. He therefore did both, first disposing matter and assigning to each element its own place, and then, lest things rightly established should be again rent asunder and disorganized, correcting as far as possible the soul of the world, and imparting to it a portion of his own essence, so to direct its various motions, as to produce the greatest beauty in all things and an admirable harmony of the whole universe. This is so often inculcated by Plutarch, that it is strange there should have been any who attributed to him a widely different opinion. I shall quote some passages out of many: *Ὁ Θεὸς ἐκ τε ταύτης καὶ τῆς νομίμου τε καὶ ἀρίστης οὐσίας ἐκείνης ἔμφρονα καὶ τεταγμένην ἀπεργασάμενος, καὶ καθάπερ εἶδος καὶ τῷ αἰσθητικῷ τὸ νοερὸν καὶ τῷ κινητικῷ τὸ τεταγ-*

pagan nations, and of all the wisest men and philosophers that ever were amongst them. "For this" saith he, in his book De

μένον ἀπ' αὐτοῦ παρασχὼν, ἡγέμονα τοῦ παντὸς ἐγκατέστησεν, "From this (evil soul) and that orderly and best substance God made it prudent and regular, and imparting, as it were, intelligent form to sensitive, regular to moving, appointed it the ruler of the universe," De Psychog. l. c. p. 1016. This, he argues at much length, was meant by Plato in the Timæus, when he said that the soul of the world is compounded of *the different*, that is, that evil substance, and *the same*, ib. p. 1024. 1025. Add another clear passage, occurring nearly at the end of the book, p. 1029. *Ἡ δὲ πρώτη καὶ κυριωτάτη δύναμις ὁρατῶς ἐγκέκραται τῇ ψυχῇ, καὶ παρέχει σύμφωνον αὐτὴν καὶ πειθήνιον, ἀεὶ τῷ κρατιστῷ καὶ θειοτάτῳ μέρει τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων ὁμονοούντων,* "The first and most excellent power is manifestly mixed up with the soul, and renders it harmonious with itself and obedient, all the others being always in unison with the best and most divine part." From this we see the nature, as well as the origin and birth, of that soul, which governs and rules the whole universe. That mundane soul consists of two parts, of that ancient maleficent substance, which before the creation agitated matter with turbulent and disorderly motions, and of a portion of the divine essence, associated with it by God, when he wished to make the world in every respect perfect and complete. The former part is the cause of whatever evils we see arise, the latter provides that the world should sustain no detriment therefrom, and by a certain equable law restrains and controls all things. From this soul of the world were derived, according to Plato's opinion, those souls by which our bodies are governed. What is said of it, therefore, we are to suppose as said of these also. As the soul of the world consists of two parts, one brute and irrational, the other rational and wise; so also our minds. That Plato held this opinion is beyond all question; I shall therefore only adduce the words of Plutarch in confirmation: *Τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς οὐδὲν μὲν εἰλικρινὲς οὐδὲ ἄκρατον· . . . . ἐμφαίνεται δὲ τῷ μὲν ἀλόγῳ τὸ ταραχῶδες, τῷ δὲ λογικῷ τὸ εὔτακτον, ταῖς δὲ αἰσθήσεσι τὸ κατηναγκασμένον, τῷ δὲ νῷ τὸ αὐτοκρατές,* "Of the soul no part is pure or unmixed. In the brute part appears the turbulent nature, in the rational the orderly, in the senses necessity, in the mind self-control." A little after: *Οὐκ ἥκιστα δὲ ἥτε πρὸς τὸ καλὸν διαφορὰ καὶ τὸ αἰσχρὸν, ἥτε πρὸς τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ ἀλγεινὸν αὖθις, οἵ τε τῶν ἐρώντων ἐνθουσιασμοὶ, καὶ πτόησις καὶ διαμάχαι τοῦ φιλοκάλου πρὸς τὸ ἀκόλαστον, ἐνδείκνυνται τὸ μικτὸν ἔκ τε τῆς θείας καὶ ἀπαθοῦς, ἐκ δὲ τῆς θνητῆς καὶ περὶ τὰ σώματα παθητῆς μερίδος,* "Nor least of all do the different motions to the honourable and the base, to the pleasant and the painful, as also the frenzies of lovers, and the trepidation and struggles of virtue against intemperance, show the soul to be mixed up of the divine and passionless portion, and of that which is mortal and subject to the passions," De Psychog. p. 1026. It is already manifest, if I mistake not, both how incorrect most have been in their interpretation of Plutarch's meaning, and also what opinions he really did entertain concerning the cause of evil and the soul of the world. In the first place this opinion is not new or peculiar to Plutarch alone, as men of the greatest learning have supposed. To save time and space, I shall not at present inquire, whether Plato in the Timæus and elsewhere did not hold the same doctrine as this of Plutarch; although on attentively perusing the Timæus, Plutarch always appears to me, I confess, to be no inapt interpreter of him: of which more by and by. But that most of the Platonists both understood their master in the same way, and held the same sentiments themselves, we have the authority of Chalcidius among others, Comm. in Timæum Platonis, cap. 2. sect. 31. p. 287. He shows the ancient expounders of Plato to be at variance as to what is meant by the *same* and *different, divided* and *undivided*, of which this philosopher in the Timæus asserts the soul of the world to be composed. After having enumerated some opinions, he adds, that there are many of the ancients who say, Fuisse semper tam animæ quam corporis vim: nec Deum ex his, quæ non erant, fecisse mundum, sed *ea, quæ erant sine ordine et modo, ordinasse. . . . Inordinatos quippe animi errores et agitationem fluctibus similem, intellectu assignato*, ex inordinata jactatione ad ordinem redegisse. . . . . Quare, quum sensili mundo conveniens anima instituatur, ortum ejus ex individua *una, quæ mens intellectusque est, et alia, quæ per universa corpora dividitur* et scinditur, provenire, "That the power both of soul and body always existed: and that God did not make the world out of those things which did not exist, but ordered and disposed those which were without order and system. . . . . For by assigning to it intellect he reduced the disorderly wan-

Iside et Osiride[7] "is a most ancient opinion, that hath been delivered down from theologers and law-makers, all along to poets and philosophers; and though the first author thereof be unknown, yet hath it been so firmly believed every where, that the footsteps of it have been imprinted upon the sacrifices and mysteries or religious rites, both of barbarians and Greeks; namely, that the world is neither wholly ungoverned by any mind or reason, as if all things floated in the streams of chance and fortune, nor yet that there is any one principle steering and guiding all, without resistance or control; because there is a confused mixture of good and evil in every thing, and nothing is produced by nature sincere. Wherefore it is not one only dispenser of things, who as it were out of several vessels distributeth those several liquors of good and evil, mingling them together, and dashing them as he pleaseth; but there are two dis-

derings and tempestuous agitation and tossing of the soul to regularity and order. . . . . Wherefore, the soul being rendered suitable to the sensible world, its origin proceeds from *one undivided part which is called mind and intellect*, and *another which is divided* and separated through all bodies." We have here the very opinion of Plutarch, which most men consider as strange and singular. Plutarch invented nothing new; but out of the various opinions of Plato's interpreters undertook to state and set forth the one which he deemed to be nearer the truth than the others. This will appear more plainly from what we shall adduce presently. In the next place this opinion of Plutarch differs wonderfully from the absurd fancies of those who hold the existence of two equal and contrary gods. For so far from this maleficent soul of Plutarch admitting of being considered as a god, it scarcely, if at all, deserves the name of a self-existent substance or principle. It is a moving power inherent in matter, but destitute of reason, which God, about to form the world, subdues, corrects and bends to his own will, and finally augments with a new part, that it should be no longer carried along by uncertain impulse. Nothing of this kind belongs to a certain evil god or evil principle, such as we are told the Manicheans and others imagined. Let us, therefore, exempt Plutarch from the number of those who have placed two gods over all things, the one good and the other evil. Lastly, I do not altogether assent either to the learned Doctor's conclusion, that Plutarch asserted three principles of things, a good god, an evil god, and matter. For this evil nature of Plutarch and other Platonists is not self-existent and separable from matter, but a certain power associated with matter, from which it cannot be disconnected. Wherefore, to speak properly and accurately, we must decide that Plutarch introduced only two principles of things, a benignant God and matter animated or acted upon by a certain brute soul. However, if there be agreement with respect to the things themselves, I should not wish to dispute with any one about their number and distinctions. These remarks which I have thought proper to pursue to some length, will not only conduce to a right understanding of the Platonists' opinions on various matters, and help to dispel not a few vulgar errors, but will show also in what way we ought to receive what the learned Doctor by and by argues in defence of Plato against Plutarch.

[7] Tom. 2. opp. p. 369. I would have no one suppose, however, that Plutarch by any means endeavours to make all the ancient philosophers appear to have held his own opinion, just copiously explained by us, on the origin of evil. For he is freed from such suspicion even by this, that he states those philosophers to be at variance and not all of one opinion. Plutarch merely wishes this one thing to be believed, that most of the professors of ancient philosophy, like himself, removed the origin of evil generally from the Supreme Being, and referred it to another nature distinct from God, whom reason points out to the best: but he does not deny, that they adopted various ways and arguments in explaining this doctrine, and, that some approached nearer than others to that opinion, which he attributes to Plato and which he is not unfavourable to himself.

tinct and contrary powers or principles in the world, one of them always leading as it were to the right hand, but the other tugging a contrary way. Insomuch that our whole life, and the whole world is a certain mixture and confusion of these two: at least this terrestrial world below the moon is such, all being every where full of irregularity and disorder. For if nothing can be made without a cause, and that which is good cannot be the cause of evil, there must needs be a distinct principle in nature, for the production of evil as well as good. And this hath been the opinion of the most and wisest men, some of them affirming *θεοὺς εἶναι δύο καθάπερ ἀντιτέχνους*, that there are two gods as it were of contrary crafts and trades, one whereof is the maker of all good, and the other of all evil; but others calling the good principle only a God, and the evil principle a demon, as Zoroaster the magician." Besides which Zoroaster and the Persian Magi, Plutarch pretends, that the footsteps of this opinion were to be found also in the astrology of the Chaldeans, and in the mysteries and religious rites, not only of the Egyptians, but also of the Grecians themselves; and lastly, he particularly imputes the same to all the most famous of the Greek philosophers, as Pythagoras, Empedocles, Heraclitus, Anaxagoras, Plato and Aristotle; though his chiefest endeavour of all be to prove, that Plato was an undoubted champion for it: *Ἀλλὰ ταυτὸ Πλάτων οὐκ ἔπαθε τοῖς ὕστερον, οὐδὲ παριδὼν, ὡς ἐκεῖνοι, τὴν μεταξὺ τῆς ὕλης καὶ τοῦ θεοῦ τρίτην ἀρχὴν καὶ δύναμιν, ὑπέμεινε τῶν λόγων τὸν ἀτοπώτατον, ἐπεισόδιον οὐκ οἶδα ὅπως ποιοῦντα τῶν κακῶν φύσιν ἀπ' αὐτομάτου κατὰ συμβεβηκός. Ἐπικούρῳ μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲ ἀκαρὲς ἐγκλίναι τὴν ἄτομον συγχωροῦσιν, ὡς ἀναίτιον ἐπεισάγοντι κίνησιν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, αὐτοὶ δὲ κακίαν καὶ κακοδαιμονίαν τοσαύτην, ἑτέρας τε περὶ σῶμα μυρίας ἀτοπίας καὶ δυσχερείας, αἰτίαν ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς οὐκ ἐχούσας, κατ' ἐπακολούθησιν γεγονέναι λέγουσιν· ὁ δὲ Πλάτων οὐχ' οὕτως· ἀλλὰ τὴν ὕλην διαφορᾶς ἁπάσης ἀπαλλάττων, καὶ τοῦ θεοῦ τὴν τῶν κακῶν αἰτίαν ἀπωτάτω τιθέμενος*, "But Plato was not guilty of that miscarriage of later philosophers, in overlooking the third power, which is between the matter and God, and thereby falling into the grossest of all absurdities, that the nature of evils was but an accidental appendix to the world, and came into it merely by chance, nobody knows how. So that those very philosophers, who will by no means allow to Epicurus the smallest declension of his atoms from the perpendicular, alleging, that this would be to introduce a motion without a cause, and to bring something out of nothing, themselves do, notwithstanding, suppose all that vice and misery, which is in the world, besides innumerable other absurdities and inconveniences about body, to have come into it, merely by

* De Psychog. p. 1015. Pa.

accidental consequence, and without having any cause in the first principles. But Plato did not so; but divesting matter of all qualities, and differences, by means whereof it could not possibly be made the cause of evils, and then placing God at the greatest distance from being the cause thereof,[8] he consequently resolved it into a third unmade principle between God and the matter, an irrational soul or demon, moving the matter disorderly."

Now because Plutarch's authority passeth so uncontrolled, and his testimony in this particular seems to be of late generally received as an oracle, and consequently the thing taken for an unquestionable truth, that the ditheistic doctrine of a good and evil principle was the catholic or universal doctrine of the pagan Theists, and particularly that Plato, above all the rest, was a professed champion for the same; we shall therefore make bold to examine Plutarch's grounds for this so confident assertion of his; and principally concerning Plato. And his grounds for imputing this opinion to Plato are only these three, which follow. First, because that philosopher in his Politicus[9] speaks of a necessary and innate appetite, that may sometimes turn the heavens a contrary way, and by that means cause disorder and confusion: secondly, because in his tenth de Legibus he speaks of two kinds of souls, whereof one is beneficent, but the other contrary: and lastly, because in his Timæus he supposeth the matter to have moved disorderly before the world was made, which implies, that there was a disorderly and irrational soul consisting with it as the mover of it, matter being unable to move itself. But as to the first of these allegations out of Plato's Politicus, we shall only observe, that that philosopher, as if it had been purposely to prevent such an interpretation of his meaning there as this of Plutarch's, inserts these very words:[10] Μήτ' αὖ δύο τινὲ

[8] These and the following words, although adduced by Dr. Cudworth as Plutarch's, are not however to be found in that author, but are gathered from the whole of his discourse and added to the others by the learned Doctor.

[9] The words which Plutarch supposes to make for his opinion are these: Παρὰ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ ξυνθέντος πάντα τὰ καλὰ κέκτηται· παρὰ δὲ τῆς ἔξωθεν ἕξεως, ὅσα χαλεπὰ καὶ ἄδικα ἐν οὐρανῷ γίνεται, ταῦτα ἐξ ἐκείνης αὐτός τε ἔχει, καὶ τοῖς ζώοις ἐναπεργάζεται, "From him that framed it, it possesses all goods, but from its former deformity, whatever evils and injustice take place in heaven, these it both has itself and entails upon animals." Also these: Προϊόντος δὲ χρόνου, καὶ λήθης ἐγγινομένης ἐν αὐτῷ, μᾶλλον δυνασταύει τὸ τῆς παλαιᾶς ἀναρμοστίας πάθος, καὶ κινδυνεύει διαλυθεὶς εἰς τὸ τῆς ἀνομοιότητος ἄπειρον ὂντα τόπον δοῦναι πάλιν, "But in process of time, oblivion creeping over it, the malady of its pristine disorganization becomes more inveterate, and it is in danger of being dissolved and again reduced to infinite deformity," Politici, p. 176. opp. In the latter words Plutarch has omitted many things, and has briefly stated what Plato discusses at greater length.

[10] These words would be sufficient to refute Plutarch, if he had asserted that Plato introduced two gods, opposing and conflicting with each other. But it will be evident from what has been remarked just above, that both Dr. Cudworth and many other most learned men are wrong in attributing this meaning to Plutarch.

Θεὼ, φρονοῦντε ἑαυτοῖς ἐναντία στρέφειν αὐτὸν, "Neither must any such thing be supposed, as if there were two gods, contrarily minded to one another, turning the heavens sometimes one way, and sometimes another." Which plain declaration of Plato's sense, being directly contrary to Plutarch's interpretation, and this ditheistic opinion, might serve also for a sufficient confutation of his second ground from the tenth De Legibus,[11] as if Plato had there affirmed, that there were two souls moving the heavens, the one beneficent, but the other contrary; because this would be all one as to assert two gods, contrarily minded to one another. Notwithstanding which, for a fuller answer thereunto, we shall further add, that this philosopher did there, first, only distribute souls in general into good and evil, those moral differences properly belonging to that rank of beings, called by him souls, and first emerging in them, according to this premised doctrine: Τῶν ἀγαθῶν αἰτία ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τῶν καλῶν, καὶ κακῶν, καὶ αἰσχρῶν, δικαίων τε καὶ ἀδίκων, "Soul is the cause of good and evil, honest and dishonest, just and unjust." But then afterwards, making inquiry concerning the soul of the world or heaven, what kind of soul that was, he positively concludes, that it was no other than a soul endued with all virtue. ΑΘ. Ἐπειδὴ ψυχὴ μέν ἐστιν ἡ περιάγουσα ἡμῖν πάντα, τὴν δὲ οὐρανοῦ περιφορὰν ἐξ ἀνάγκης περιάγειν φατέον, ἐπιμελουμένην καὶ κοσμοῦσαν, ἤτοι τὴν ἀρίστην ψυχὴν ἤτοι τὴν ἐναντίαν. ΚΛ. Ὦ ξένε, ἀλλὰ ἔκ γε τῶν εἰρημένων οὐδ' ὅσιον ἄλλως λέγειν, ἢ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν ἔχουσαν ψυχὴν μίαν ἢ πλείους περιάγειν αὐτά, "Ath. Hosp. Since it is soul that moves all things, we must of necessity affirm, that the heaven or world is moved by some soul or other, adorning and disposing of it, whether it be the best soul or contrary. Clin. O Hospes, it is certainly not holy nor pious to conclude otherwise, than that a soul endued with all virtue, one or more, moves the world."[1] And as for the last thing urged by Plutarch,

* P. 898. Steph.

[11] It will be proper again to bring forward the very words of Plato, that readers may without difficulty make themselves acquainted with the whole question. Thus, then, writes Plato, De Legibus. lib. 10. p. 669. Ψυχὴν δὴ διοικοῦσαν καὶ ἐνοικοῦσαν ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς πάντῃ κινουμένοις μὲν, οὐ κατὰ τὸν οὐρανὸν ἀνάγκη διοικεῖν φᾶναι; ΚΛ· Τί μὲν. ΑΘ. Μίαν, ἢ πλείους; Μ. Πλείους· δυοῖν μέν γέ που ἐλάττον μηδὲν τιθῶμεν, τῆς τε εὐεργέτιδος, καὶ τῆς τἀναντία δυναμένης ἐξεργάζεσθαι, "Must we not necessarily say, that the soul, governing and residing in all things that move, governs also heaven? Assuredly. One or more? At least more than one: nor ought we to lay down fewer than two, the one beneficent, the other working contrary things." There is no question, but that these words were meant by Plutarch, although both in De Iside et Osiride, p. 370. and De Psychogonia, p. 1014. he only cites Plato's De Legibus generally, without naming any particular passage.

[1] This answer by no means overthrows Plutarch's argument, drawn from the very explicit words of Plato quoted by us a little above. The learned Doctor ought to have shown, how those words, in which Plato asserts two souls, one good, the other evil, are to be understood, so that the consequence deduced from them by Plutarch should not follow. This, however, he has by no means done; but merely brings against Plutarch a passage from the subsequent discourse of Plato, wherein that philo-

that before the world was made, the matter is said by Plato[2] to have been moved disorderly, we conceive, that the philosopher did therein only adhere to that vulgarly received tradition, which was originally Mosaical, that the first beginning of the Cosmopœia was from a chaos, or matter confusedly moved, afterward brought into order.[3] And now we think it plainly ap-

sopher affirms the soul of the world to be full of all virtue; as if it were manifest from this, that in Plato's opinion it cannot possess any depravity. But I. if Plato's words meant what Dr. Cudworth supposes, they would certainly show Plato to have contradicted that which he had expressly declared before and therefore to be strangely inconsistent with himself, but not, that Plato did not assert an evil and disorderly soul to be resident in the nature of things; which indeed he states explicitly. II. As to Plato's affirming of the soul of the world, that it *abounds in all virtue*, this is not repugnant to the opinion which Plutarch attributes to him, and which we have explained at some length above. For the soul of the world, after having received a portion of the divine essence, does certainly abound in every kind of virtue, although its brute and disorderly part nevertheless remains and cannot be altogether annihilated. As a wise man may be said to be replete with every virtue, and is often said to be so by Plato, although his soul according to Plato's idea consists of two parts, the one rational, the other blind and subject to evil commotions: so in like manner what should hinder us from ascribing all virtue to the soul of the world, which God out of himself has adorned, corrected, amended and recalled to a better state, although its worst part still remains and sometimes exercises its influence in defiance of divine reason? III. It is manifest from Plato's whole discourse, if attentively examined, that ψυχὴ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν ἔχουσα, "a soul possessing all virtue," does not mean a soul divested of every evil and perverse impulse, of every vicious propensity, but a soul *studious of order and endowed with reason*. For in the first place the Athenian inquires, whether the soul of the world is replete with mind and virtue, or is destitute of these endowments, φρόνιμος καὶ ἀρετῆς πλήρης. He then shows it to be endowed with virtue and reason from the equable and constant revolution and motion of the heavens and the earth; from which equable motion one can easily infer a nature partaking of reason and wisdom, but hardly a soul polluted with no vice or evil propensity. But why many words? We must either adopt Plutarch's interpretation or confess, that the divine Plato did not know what he was saying, and that when inculcating the gravest of all truths he was guilty of the most shameful contradictions.

[2] In Timæo cap. 14. p. 527. Βουληθεὶς γὰρ ὁ Θεὸς ἀγαθὰ μὲν πάντα, φλαῦρον δὲ μηδὲν εἶναι κατὰ δύναμιν, οὕτω δὴ πᾶν, ὅσον ἦν ὁρατὸν, παραλαβὼν, οὐχ ἡσυχίαν ἄγον, ἀλλὰ κινούμενον πλημμελῶς καὶ ἀτάκτως, εἰς τάξιν αὐτὸ ἤγαγεν ἐκ τῆς ἀταξίας, ἡγησάμενος ἐκεῖνο τούτου παντὸς ἄμεινον, "For God having determined that all things should be good, and nothing bad, as far as was possible, took every thing that was visible, not in a state of rest but moved immoderately and irregularly, and reduced it from disorder into order, judging this to be better." There are several passages in Plato, which place it beyond doubt, that the philosopher conceived matter not to have been in a state of rest, before the Deity proceeded to form and dispose it, but tossed about and agitated by disorderly motions. See espe cially his discourse on the motion of matter in the Politicus, p. 175. 176.

[3] It has already been observed by Jo. Christoph. Wolf, who in other respects takes the part of Dr. Cudworth, that "this answer concedes, rather than invalidates, Plutarch's argument." Manichæismus ante Manichæos, sect. 2. § 33. p. 138. 139. He, therefore, adopts a different course himself to purge Plato; of which we shall speak by and by. Certainly if matter, previously to its being ordered and disposed by the virtue and authority of God, was agitated and impelled by a disorderly motion, and there was no inherent power in matter, as the learned Doctor so often admits, of moving and exciting itself, we must necessarily come to the conclusion, that that motion proceeded from a certain mind and vital nature lying hid in matter. And as that motion was without rectitude or truth and void of all order, must we not of necessity decide, that the beginning of the motion or the nature from which it originated, was destitute of reason, virtue and counsel? Assume, therefore, what is conceded by Dr. Cudworth and you have that maleficent and unmade soul of Plutarch's, which was

pears, that there is no strength at all in any of Plutarch's forementioned allegations, nor any such monster to be found anywhere in Plato, as this substantial evil principle or god, a wicked soul or demon, unmade and self-existent from eternity, opposite and inimicous to the good God, sharing the empire and dominion of the world with him. Which opinion is really nothing else but the deifying of the devil, or prince of evil spirits, making him a co-rival with God, and entitling him to a right of receiving divine honour and worship.

And it is observable that Plutarch himself confesseth this interpretation, which he makes of Plato, to be new and paradoxical, or an invention of his own: Καὶ διὰ τὸ πλείστοις τῶν ἀπὸ Πλάτωνος ὑπεναντιοῦσθαι δεόμενον παραμυθίας,* "Such as because it was contrary to the generally received opinion of Platonists, himself thought to stand in need of some apology and defence." To which purpose, therefore, he adds again: Πρῶτον οὖν, ἣν ἔχω περὶ τούτων διάνοιαν, ἐκθήσομαι πιστούμενος τῷ εἰκότι, καὶ παραμυθούμενος, ὡς ἔνεστι, τὸ ἀληθὲς τοῦ λόγου, καὶ παράδοξον, "I will," saith he, "declare my own opinion first concerning these things, confirming it with probabilities, and, as much as possible I can, aiding and assisting the truth and paradoxicalness thereof.' Moreover, Proclus upon the Timæus takes notice of no other philosophers that ever imputed this doctrine to Plato, or indeed maintained any such opinion of two substantial principles of good and evil, but only Plutarch and Atticus; (though I confess Chalcidius cites Numenius also to the same purpose.) Proclus' words are these:† Οἱ μὲν περὶ Πλούταρχον τὸν Χαιρωνέα καὶ Ἀττικον προεῖναι φασὶ τὴν ἀκόσμητον ὕλην πρὸ τῆς γενέσεως; προεῖναι δὲ καὶ τὴν κακεργάτιν ψυχὴν τὴν τοῦτο κινοῦσαν, πόθεν γὰρ ἡ κίνησις ἦν, ἢ ἀπὸ ψυχῆς; εἰ δὲ ἄτακτος ἡ κίνησις, ἀπὸ ἀτάκτου ψυχῆς, "Plutarchus, Cheronensis, and Atticus maintain, that before the generation and formation of the world, there was unformed and disorderly matter existing (from eternity) together with a maleficent soul: for whence, say they, could that notion of the matter in Plato's Timæus proceed, but from a soul? and if it were a disorderly motion, it must then needs come from a disorderly soul." And as Proclus tells us, that this opinion of theirs had been before confuted by Porphyrius and Jamblichus, as that which was both irrational and impious, so doth he there

corrected and amended by divine wisdom. But it ought by no means to be dissembled that the learned doctor, as appears from what follows, misapprehended the meaning of Plutarch, which, if it had been such as is here explained, would certainly have made this answer of some weight. But Plutarch has not by any means introduced two equal gods, one the fountain of all good, the other evil and perpetually thwarting and opposing his will. He meant merely, that matter before the creation of the world was subject to the dominion of a soul devoid of reason, whose nature was afterwards wholly amended by God and adorned, as far as possible, with divine endowments.

* Psychog. p. 1012. † P. 1014. ‡ P. 116.

likewise himself briefly refel it in these two propositions; first, that πᾶσα ψυχὴ γέννημά ἐστι τοῦ Θεοῦ, "every soul is the offspring of God," and there can be no soul, nor any thing else, besides God self-existing; and secondly: Τὸ κακὸν διαιώνιον ποιεῖν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν, ἄτοπον· οὐ γὰρ ὁμότιμον τῷ Θείῳ τὸ ἄθεον, οὔτε ἐπίσης ἀγέννητον, οὔτε ὅλως ἀντιδιῃρημένον, "It is absurd to make evil alike eternal with good, for that which is godless cannot be of like honour with God, and equally unmade, nor indeed can there be any thing at all positively opposite to God.[4]

[4] I shall comprise in this place what may seem to me necessary towards illustrating and confirming the foregoing. I. Plutarch does not say, that the opinion he is treating of is entirely new and an invention of his own, but simply asserts, that it was opposed by most of the Platonists, of his own time especially; which is a proof that some Platonists before Plutarch approved of it. And I have adduced a passage from Chalcidius a little above, which shows it to have been adopted by not a few of the Platonic sect. II. Although Proclus, In Timæum Platonis, rejects Plutarch's interpretation of Plato, he is himself, nevertheless, not far from holding that opinion. For in Theolog. Platon. lib. 5. cap. 7. p. 259. he argues that this world has a two-fold life, one obscure, and the other more known and less orderly: Διττῆς γὰρ οὔσης ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ζωῆς, τῆς μὲν ἀφανοῦς καὶ νοερωτέρας, τῆς δὲ φυσικωτέρας καὶ ἐμφανοῦς, καὶ τῆς μὲν κατὰ τὴν πρόνοιαν ἀφοριζομένης, τῆς δὲ κατ' εἱμαρμένην ἀτάκτως προϊούσης· ἡ μὲν δευτέρα καὶ πολυειδὴς, καὶ διὰ τῆς φύσεως ἐπιτελουμένη, τῆς θείας ἐξήρτηται τάξεως, "For there is a two-fold life in the world, one obscure and more intellectual, the other more natural, and more manifest and known: whereof the former is determined by forethought, the latter proceeds irregularly according to fate: the second, which is multiform and perfected by nature itself, is dependent upon divine order." This physical life of the world, which proceeds disorderly and obeys the laws of fate, although different in a certain way from Plutarch's maleficent soul, is nevertheless very closely allied to it. III. What need of many words? The whole sect of Platonists, who in other respects are wonderfully at issue in expounding the doctrines of their too obscure master, are unable to reject the main and essential point in the opinion given by Plutarch. For all who do not wish to abandon their preceptor's noblest work, the Timæus, must confess, that the soul of the world is compounded of two parts, *the same* and *different*, or of a certain portion of the divine essence, and of a certain other thing distinct from God and associated with matter. But although, as men beyond measure ingenious, they variously interpret that *different* thing which God combined with a certain portion of himself to form the soul of the world out of both, yet they cannot but allow notwithstanding, that it had existed in matter before it was fashioned by God, that it was something fraught with moving power, and lastly, that its motions deviated from the rule of rectitude and justice. See Chalcidius on these several opinions, In Timæum Platonis, cap. 2. sect. 30. &c. p. 287. and cap. 13. sect. 298. p. 338. 339. and Proclus on the same Timæus, p. 114. &c. But if any one maintains these things, how far, I would ask, is he removed from Plutarch's disorderly soul? Wherefore also, all the Platonists that have come down to us, although they hide themselves under a covering of words, seem, when discoursing of the soul of the world, to be not very much opposed to this opinion. See, from among the Latins even, what Macrobius has, In Somnium Scipionis, lib. 1. cap. 6. p. 26. cap. 14. p. 75. and elsewhere. Nay, the later Platonists themselves, who especially contemn this doctrine, have decided, that if Plato's authority is to be regarded, we must suppose a two-fold soul in the world: of which elsewhere. IV. Concerning Numenius we have the following among many other things in Chalcidius, In Timæum Platonis, cap. 13. sect. 295. p. 337. Numenius Platonem laudat, quod duas mundi animas autumet, unam beneficentissimam, malignam alteram, scilicet sylvam. Quæ licet modice fluctuet, tamen, quia intimo proprioque motu movetur, vivat, et anima convegetetur, necesse est, lege eorum omnium, quæ genuino motu moventur. Quæ quidem etiam patibilis animæ partis, in qua est aliquid corpulentum mortaleque et corporis simile, nuctrix et patrona, sicut rationabilis animæ pars auctore utitur ratione ac Deo. "Numenius cites Plato as asserting two souls of the world, one most beneficent, the other evil, namely matter. Which, although moderately agitated, nevertheless, forasmuch as it

But because it may probably be here demanded what account it was then possible for Plato to give of the original of evils, so as not to impute them to God himself, if he neither derived them from ὕλη ἄποιος, "unqualified matter," (which Plutarch has plainly proved to be absurd) nor yet from a ψυχὴ ἄνους, "an

is moved by an inward motion of its own, must necessarily live and vegetate along with the soul, according to the law of all things that move by genuine and real motion. Which also, indeed, is the author and patron of the sensitive part of the soul, in which there is something corporeal, mortal and similar to body, as the reasonable part of the soul has reason and God for its author." But the learned Doctor ought not to have omitted, that Numenius endeavoured to show also that Pythagoras held the same: which Chalcidius, indeed, copiously explains, saying, sect. 296. p. 388. Ergo juxta Pythagoram sylvæ anima neque sine ulla est substantia, ut plerique arbitrantur, et adversatur providentiæ, consulta ejus impugnare gestiens malitiæ suæ viribus. Sed providentia quidem est Dei opus et officium; cæca vero fortuitaque temeritas ex prosapia sylvæ, "Therefore, according to Pythagoras, the soul of matter is not destitute of any substance, as most men think, and opposes Providence, delighting in thwarting its counsels by the influence of its own maleficence. But providence is the work and office of God; and blind fortuitous temerity the offspring of matter." V. I think it ought to be more especially borne in mind also, that a few sentences further on, this same Chalcidius confirms what we have shown from the remarkable passage of his a little above, that not a few of the Platonists approved of this doctrine. Alii, says he, sect. 298. p. 388, sylvam volunt esse sine generatione, sed anima præditam; quando ante illustrationem quoque motu instabili atque inordinato dixerit eam fluctuasse, quum motus intimus genuinusque sit viventium proprius, quodque idem sæpe alias duas mundi animas dixerit, unam malignam ex sylva, alteram beneficam ex Deo, "Others (of the Platonists) will have matter to be without generation, but endowed with a soul; inasmuch as he asserted that before its enlightenment it was agitated by an unstable and disorderly motion, all inward and genuine motion being proper to the living, and because he often asserted elsewhere two souls of the world, one maleficent from matter, the other beneficent from God." This doctrine, therefore, was not new, nor maintained only by Plutarch, Numenius, and Atticus. VI. What is most surprising of all, Chalcidius contends, that the Hebrews themselves entertained the same opinion and like Plato gave two souls to the world and man. Hear what he says: Quibus Hebræi concinunt, quum dicunt, homini quidem a Deo datam esse animam ex inspiratione cœlesti, quam rationem atque animam rationabilem appellant; mutis vero et agrestibus ex sylva rationis experte jussu Dei vivis animantibus et bestiis terræ gremio profusis: quorum in numero fuerit ille serpens, qui primitias generis humani malis suasionibus illaqueaverit, "With whom the Hebrews agree when they say that to a man a soul was given by God from heavenly inspiration, which they call reason and the rational soul: but to mute animals and beasts of the field, poured from the bosom of the earth, and having life by the command of God, of which number was also that serpent which by evil persuasion beguiled the first of the human race, a soul from irrational matter." An excellent interpreter of Moses certainly! who even here has shown that he ought not to be numbered at all among Christians, since he subsequently abandons this very doctrine which he nevertheless attributes to Moses. Which he would by no means have done, had he considered it his duty to obey the precepts of Christ. VII. I am not aware whether any one has observed that these very Platonists, who with Plutarch held Plato to have referred the origin of evil to a maleficent soul, were nevertheless divided into two sects. This we are told by Stobæus, who has these words, Eclog. Physic. lib. 1. cap. 42. p. 112. ed Plantin. Ἤδη τοίνυν καὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς Πλατωνικοῖς πολλοὶ διαστασιάζουσιν· (For so I think ought it to be written instead of διαστάζουσιν, which is read in the edition of Canterus:) οἱ μὲν εἰς μίαν σύνταξιν καὶ μίαν ἰδέαν τὰ εἴδη καὶ τὰ μόρια τῆς ζωῆς καὶ τὰ ἐνεργήματα συνάγοντες ὥσπερ Πλωτῖνός τε καὶ Πορφύριος, οἱ δὲ εἰς μαχὴν ταῦτα κατατείνοντες, ὥσπερ Νουμήνιος, οἱ δὲ ἐκ μαχομένων αὐτὰ συναρμόζοντες, ὥσπερ οἱ περὶ Ἀττικὸν καὶ Πλουτα̃ρχον, "Moreover, the Platonists even disagree among themselves; some referring the forms, parts, and functions of life to one idea, as Plotinus and Porphyrius, others placing these in opposition, as Numenius, and others compounding these two opposites, as Atticus and Plutarch." We may understand from this passage what we see proved here by other

irrational or maleficent soul of the world or demon," self-existent from eternity; we shall therefore hereunto briefly reply, that though that philosopher derived not the original of evils from unqualified matter, nor from a wicked soul, or demon unmade, yet did he not therefore impute them to God neither, but, as it seemeth, to the necessity of imperfect beings. For as Timæus Locrus had before Plato determined that the world was made by God and necessity, so does Plato himself accordingly declare in his Timæus,[b] ὅτι μεμιγμένη τοῦδε τοῦ κόσμου γένεσις ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ νοῦ συστάσεως, νοῦ δὲ ἀνάγκης ἄρχοντος, "that the generation of this world is mixed and made up of a certain composition of mind and necessity both together, yet so as that mind doth also (in some sense) rule over necessity." Wherefore though, according to Plato, God be properly and directly the cause of nothing else but good, yet the necessity of these lower imperfect things does unavoidably give being and birth to evils. For first, as to moral evils, (which are the chiefest) there is a necessity that there should be higher and lower inclinations in all rational beings vitally united to bodies, and that as autexousious or free-willed, they should have a power of determining themselves more or less either way; as there is also a necessity, that the same liberty of will, (essential to rational creatures) which makes them capable of praise and reward, should likewise put them in a possibility of deserving blame and punishment. Again, as to the evils of pain and inconvenience, there seems to be a necessity that imperfect terrestrial animals, which are capable of the sense of pleasure, should in contrary circumstances (which will also sometimes happen, by reason of the inconsistency and incompossibility of things) be obnoxious to displeasure and pain. And lastly, for the evils of corruptions and dissolutions; there is a plain necessity that if there be natural generations in the world, there should be also corruptions; according to that of Lucretius* before cited,

testimonies also, that on the whole, Numenius, Plutarch, and Atticus were agreed that all motions and all the accidents befalling the nature of things are to be derived, not from one source, but from two causes, but that they differed in their explanation of this opinion. For Numenius and those who thought with him, drew asunder these two souls, and held them always to act and operate separately and not to be joined and compacted together by God. Atticus and Plutarch judged differently, asserting that God associated the evil soul of matter with the other good soul and formed one compound soul out of the two. It appears, therefore, that Numenius is with greater probability and justice, ranked amongst those who maintained two principles of things, one good, the other evil, than Plutarch and Atticus. Not to carry this note to an undue length, I shall reserve what remains to be remarked, for those which are to follow.

[b] P. 533. opp. But if the learned Doctor had produced the entire words of Plato, and not omitted what follows, it would be evident that they favour Plutarch's opinion more than his own. But of this by and by.

* De Rerum Nat. lib. v. 264. p. 77.

Quando alid ex alio reficit natura, nec ullam
Rem gigni patitur, nisi morte adjutam alienâ.

To all which may be added, according to the opinion of many, that there is a kind of necessity of some evils in the world for a condiment (as it were) to give a relish and haut-goust to good; since the nature of imperfect animals is such, that they are apt to have but a dull and sluggish sense, a flat and insipid taste of good, unless it be quickened and stimulated, heightened and invigorated, by being compared with the contrary evil. As also, that there seems to be a necessary use in the world of the κακὰ ἀκούσια, those involuntary evils of pain and suffering, both for the exercise of virtue, and the quickening and exciting the activity of the world, as also for the repressing, chastising, and punishing of those κακὰ ἑκούσια, those "voluntary evils of vice and action." Upon which several accounts, probably, Plato concluded, that evils could not be utterly destroyed, at least in this lower world, which, according to him, is the region of lapsed souls: Ἀλλ' οὐτ' ἀπολέσθαι τὰ κακὰ δυνατὸν, ὦ Θεόδωρε, (ὑπεναντίον γάρ τι τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἀεὶ εἶναι ἀνάγκη) οὐτ' ἐν θεοῖς αὐτὰ ἱδρύσθαι, τήνδε δὲ θνητὴν φύσιν, καὶ τόνδε τὸν τόπον περιπολεῖν ἐξ ἀνάγκης· διὸ πειρᾶσθαι χρὴ ἐνθένδε ἐκεῖσε φεύγειν ὅτι τάχιστα· φυγὴ δὲ ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν, ὁμοίωσις δὲ δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον μετὰ φρονήσεως γενέσθαι,* "But it is neither possible (O Theodorus,) that evils should be quite destroyed (for there must be something always contrary to good) nor yet that they should be seated amongst the gods, but they will of necessity infest this lower mortal region and nature. Wherefore, we ought to endeavour to flee from hence with all possible speed; and our flight from hence is this, to assimilate ourselves to God as much as may be; which assimilation to God consisteth in being just and holy with wisdom." Thus, according to the sense of Plato, though God be the original of all things, yet he is not to be accounted properly the cause of evils, at least moral ones, (they being only defects) but they are to be imputed to the necessity of imperfect beings, which is that ἀνάγκη πολλὰ τῷ θεῷ δυσμαχοῦσα καὶ ἀφηνιάζουσα, "that necessity which doth often resist God, and as it were, shake off his bridle." Rational creatures being, by means thereof, in a capability of acting contrary to God's will and law, as well as their own true nature and good; and other things hindered of that perfection which the divine goodness would else have imparted to them. Notwithstanding which, mind, that is, God, is said also by Plato to rule over necessity, because those evils, occasioned by the necessity of imperfect beings, are over-ruled by the divine art, wisdom and providence, for good; Typhon

* In Thætet. p. 176. Steph.

and Arimanius (if we may use that language) being as it were, outwitted by Osiris and Oromasdes, and the worst of all evils made, in spite of their own nature, to contribute subserviently to the good and perfection of the whole: Καὶ τοῦτο μεγίστης τέχνης ἀγαθοποιεῖν τὰ κακὰ,[6] "and this must needs be acknowledged to be the greatest art of all, to be able to bonify evils, or tincture them with good."

[6] To which of the ancient philosophers this saying belongs, I confess myself ignorant. The like has been said I know by many. I shall speak rather of the matter in hand itself, and inquire whether our excellent author has correctly expounded Plato's opinion concerning the origin of evil. Wolf, in his Manichæism. ante Manichæos, p. 141. 142. has already noticed that Dr. Cudworth here carries his zeal for Plato too far: he himself, however, considers Plato to have derived all evil from the condition of matter. I may be allowed to discuss the subject somewhat more at length, and to dissent in some points from the opinion of this most learned man, whose judgment in other respects I readily prefer to my own. I. Dr. Cudworth is mistaken in supposing, that what Plato says of necessity in his Timæus tends to strengthen the interpretation here given of that philosopher's opinion respecting the origin of evil. This will at once be apparent if we adduce the entire words of Plato. Thus, therefore, in the Timæus, cap. 39. p. 533. opp. Νοῦ δὲ ἀνάγκης ἀρχόντος, τὸ πείθειν αὐτὴν τῶν γιγνομένων τὰ πλεῖστα ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιστον ἄγειν, ταύτῃ κατὰ ταῦτα, δι' ἀνάγκης ἡττωμένης ὑπὸ πειθοῦς ἔμφρονος, οὕτω κατ' ἀρχὰς ξυνίστατο τόδε τὸ πᾶν, "For mind ruling over necessity, inasmuch as by persuasion it led it for the most part to the best events of things, and this yielding and obeying wise persuasion, in this manner arose the first origin of the world." If these words be alone looked to, we shall never be made to believe that a necessity, such as Dr. Cudworth speaks of, was introduced by Plato to show the source of evils. On the contrary, when Plato says, that mind by persuasion overcame necessity and necessity obeyed the persuading mind, Plutarch's opinion of a disorderly soul formerly governing the world, will appear much more probable and more applicable to these words. For what but a soul can be persuaded, and what nature but a soul can obey persuasion. II. Neither, however, do I consider what the learned Doctor has here ingeniously and acutely argued to be altogether wrong. For Plato, since he supposed God to have purposely and wisely made some things more perfect and better than others, that thereby an equal harmony might arise in the whole universe, as all those who have read even his Timæus will be aware of, could not but derive many inconveniences and evils from the very state of things and natures in which they were designedly placed by God. These are what they call the *evils of imperfection*; however, those who have philosophized more recently concerning such matters, have correctly and wisely denied these to be properly called evils. III. There remain the *physical* and *moral* evils. Although Plato nowhere so speaks of these evils as to make his opinion clearly and plainly undertood, yet I consider it evident, that he does not derive the whole of them from one source. In the first place he certainly appears to have supposed, that the condition and nature of matter, which oftentimes opposed the counsels and will of God, who desired every thing to be the best, produced many of the evils that beset this world. This is shown at large by Maximus Tyrius, the Platonist, Dissertation 25. p. 246. whose opinion is elegantly expounded and impugned by Bayle, Dictionnaire, tom. 3. art. Pauliciens, note p. 2212. I shall not repeat here what learned men have long ago advanced on this subject; but shall merely show it to be sufficiently evident from the Timæus itself, that Plato entertained this opinion. I shall give some of his words: thus p. 352. concerning matter: Ταῦτα ἀτάκτως ἔχοντα ὁ Θεὸς ἐν ἑκάστῳ τε αὐτῷ πρὸς αὐτὸ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα συμμετρίας ἐνεποίησεν, ὅσας τε καὶ ὅπῃ δυνατὸν ἦν ἀνάλογα καὶ σύμμετρα εἶναι, "These being in a state of disorder, God imparted to each such a measure and mode of proportion, both towards themselves and towards one another, as each was capable of receiving." We here see, that God gave so much order and symmetry to matter, as its nature would bear; in the same manner as a statuary out of a piece of wood, which promises neither a Minerva nor a Mercury, forms such a statue as the wood will admit of. The Timæus supplies more of the kind, which, to avoid prolixity, I shall now pass over. IV. I deny, however, that Plato traced all physical evils to this one cause; I deny that

And now we have made it to appear (as we conceive) that Plutarch had no sufficient grounds to impute this opinion, of two active perceptive principles in the world (one the cause of

conflagrations, earthquakes, thunders, and other still graver convulsions of things, were held by him to proceed from the nature of matter. From what cause then? I shall answer briefly, and without any circumlocution: from a certain turbulent soul lying hid within matter, or from that brute portion of the soul of the world, which is agitated by disorderly motions, and, unless governed and controled by God, is unable to preserve order. Compare the words I shall now adduce from Plato's Politicus, p. 176. and judge whether it be possible to come to a different conclusion. Plato is speaking of those great convulsions of nature, which happen at definite periods, and explaining their causes and reason, or rather, showing from whence arise those great natural evils which disturb and disorganize the whole globe: Τὸν δὲ δὴ κόσμον πάλιν ἀνέστρεφεν εἱμαρέμνη καὶ ξύμφυτος ἐπιθυμία, "But fate and innate desire again convulsed the whole world." This he states somewhat more fully: Κατ' ἀρχὰς μὲν οὖν ἀκριβέστερον ἀπετέλει, τελευτῶν δὲ ἀμβλύτερον· τούτων δὲ αὐτῷ σωματοειδὲς τῆς συγκράσεως αἴτιον, τὸ τῆς πάλαι ποτὲ φύσεως ξύννροφον, ὅτε πολλῆς ἦν μέτοχον ἀταξίας, πρὶν εἰς τὸν νῦν κόσμον ἀφίκεσθαι, "In the beginning it (the nature of things) executed (the commands of God) more perfectly, in the end more imperfectly; of this, the corporeal part of the composition was the cause, the part which was associated with the ancient nature, when it was full of disorder, before it arrived at its present symmetry." Παρὰ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ ξυνθέντος πάντα καλὰ κέκτηται· παρὰ δὲ τῆς ἔμπροσθεν ἕξεως, ὅσα χαλεπὰ καὶ ἄδικα ἐν οὐρανῷ γίγνεται, ταῦτα ἐξ ἐκείνης αὐτός τε ἔχει, καὶ τοῖς ζώοις ἐναπεργαζεται, "From him that framed the world it possesses all goods; but from its former habit, whatever evils and injustice take place in heaven, these it suffers itself and entails upon animals." More of the same kind are to be found there, which I now pass over. But these, if signifying any thing at all, show most clearly, that in Plato's opinion, before the formation of the world by God, there existed in matter a certain vital power, proceeding neither by system nor reason, but by brute and blind impulse, which God, on constructing the world, having corrected and augmented with a portion of himself, reduced to a better state; but that it still retains that leaven of its old nature, and when it obeys this, as is sometimes the case, then an infinite host of evils arise, and the whole nature of things is disturbed and shaken. V. Let us now come to the evils called *moral*, as also those *physical* evils which pertain especially to the human body. Now, these were all referred by Plato to the soul. Which doctrine of his, indeed, it will be hardly possible to understand, unless we have a previous acquaintance generally with the philosopher's notions respecting the nature and origin of the soul. He supposed then, that man possesses two, or rather three, souls, one partaking of reason, the other, void of reason, and subject to disorderly impulses and commotions. The rational soul was produced by God out of himself; from which it follows, that as God himself is good, it cannot have in itself any evil or vice. But the formation of the other soul, whether one or more, containing the latent causes of anger, desire, appetites, and the other affections of the mind, was together with that of the body entrusted by God to inferior deities, who performed this office to the best of their ability. All this is clearly stated by Plato both briefly elsewhere, and at large in the Timæus, p. 531. opp. From this irrational soul, therefore, and the body together, springs every evil. The body, as compounded by these deities out of different elements, violently opposes the divine soul, to prevent it from exerting its influence. Wherefore, at the beginning, this soul shut up in the body is restrained and overpowered, but in process of time it gradually gains its strength. See Timæus, p. 531. 532. But that soul also which is the mother and nurse of the lusts and desires and the foster-sister of the senses, at first wonderfully disturbs the body, whence it comes to pass that this is harrassed and tormented with various diseases and troubles. Plato, in Charmide, p. 237. Πάντα γὰρ ἔφη ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς ὡρμῆσθαι καὶ τὰ κακὰ καὶ τὰ ἀγαθὰ τῷ σώματι καὶ παντὶ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, καὶ ἐκεῖθεν ἐπιρρεῖν, ὥσπερ ἐκ τῆς κεφαλῆς ἐπὶ τὰ ὄμματα, "For all evils and goods, says he, (Zamolxis, whose opinion Plato assents to) issue forth from the soul into the body and whole man, and flow out from thence, as from the head into the eyes." Then, this same soul, unless the other rational soul keeps continual watch, by degrees assumes to itself the entire control of the body and being a stranger to moderation and order excites in it immoderate desires

good; and the other of evil) to Plato. And as for the other Greek philosophers, his pretences to make them assertors of the same doctrine seem to be yet more slight and frivolous. For he

and vices, and also subjugates the diviner soul itself. Consult Maximus Tyrius, Diss. 25. p. 248. &c. who has ably expounded the whole subject, yet not in all points according to the sense of Plato. For, although the inferior deities commissioned by God with the formation of man, spared no labour to make him as good as possible according to the behest of the Supreme Being, still they were unable entirely to divest that soul of its own nature. Plato, in Timæo p. 543. Μεμνημένοι γὰρ τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς ἐπιστολῆς οἱ συνιστάντες ἡμᾶς, ὅτε τὸ θνητὸν γένος ἐπίστελλεν ὡς ἄριστον εἰς δύναμιν ποιεῖν, οὕτω δὲ κατορθοῦντες καὶ τὸ φαῦλον ἡμῶν, ἵνα ἀληθείας πη προσάπτοιτο, "For those who formed us, being mindful of the paternal mandate by which he had commanded that the human race should be made the best possible, so corrected the worst part of us, that it should also in a certain manner be susceptive of truth." Now, from whence did those inferior deities who framed man obtain that irrational soul which they placed in our body? Of this, indeed, Plato does not clearly inform us in the Timæus; but on taking into account what we have hitherto more than once inculcated, it will be easy to arrive at his opinion. This soul was not derived from God, who is the best; neither did these inferior gods produce it of themselves; nor lastly, did it proceed from matter, which is destitute of qualities and sense. It remains, therefore, that it was a delibation of the above-mentioned disorderly soul of the world. Hence man, according to Plato, bears the image of the whole world: both the world and man being a compound of soul and matter, and the soul of both being partly rational and partly irrational. The rational soul is the mother and origin of all good; the irrational of all evils, of all violent convulsions of nature, and of all evil commotions. We clearly see that this is not an opinion which purges God of every fault, or divests the question concerning the origin of evil of all its difficulties. But we are not inquiring as to the beauty or reasonableness of Plato's doctrine, but simply what were his notions on these matters. VI. In this somewhat copious exposition, I have declared at the same time what I think respecting Plutarch's opinion here impugned by Dr. Cudworth. Indeed, I would not affirm, that that interpretation of Plato is altogether right, or that Plato did not in some points hold a different doctrine from what Plutarch supposes. But in the great darkness and obscurity which Plato seems purposely to have affected, to avoid incurring the hatred of the multitude, who in his senses would be so vain as to assert that he has thoroughly explored and mastered his dogmas concerning things divine? So much, however, I hope I have achieved by the arguments and authorities I have already adduced, that all fair judges will confess, that on the whole Plato must necessarily have entertained some such opinion and that no more probable exposition of him can be hit upon than that given by Plutarch. VII. Since Dr. Cudworth, the venerable Jo. Christoph. Wolf, Manichæismus ante Manachæos, p. 124. &c. has taken up the cause of Plato against Plutarch. He assents to most of Dr. Cudworth's reasoning; but on some points adopts a new line of argument. What he has in common with the learned Doctor, as also, some of his own positions, I have already considered. Lest any thing should be omitted, it remains for us to examine that which seems to carry with it more of weight and probability than the rest. The illustrious scholar was unable to deny, that Plato asserted matter, previously to its formation by God, to have been shaken and agitated by disorderly motion, nor would his sagacity allow him to accept Dr. Cudworth's solution of this difficulty. He, therefore, had recourse to a new argument, affirming, Platonem ipsi materiæ motum per se proprium esse et convenientem statuisse videri, "that Plato appeared to him to have held motion to be of itself proper and convenient to matter." Manich. ante Manichæos, p. 139. and adding: Si inficiari quis illud voluerit, vel manifestus Platonis locus afferendus foret, qui id conceptis verbis neget, vel ostendendum, hanc assertionem cum Platonis principiis conciliari non posse, "If any wish to dissent from the truth of this, he either ought to bring forward some manifest passage of Plato, in which it is denied in express words, or show that the assertion cannot be reconciled with that philosopher's principles." Whilst writing this, the eminent man did not recollect that Plato ascribed to the soul alone the faculty of moving itself by its own proper motion, and from this very thing meant to prove that our souls are immortal, inasmuch as they actuate and move themselves, which is denied to other things compounded

concludes the Pythagoreans* to have held two such substantial principles of good and evil, merely because they sometimes talked of the ἐναντιότητες and συστοιχίαι, the "contrarieties" and "conjugations" of things, such as finite and infinite, dextrous and sinistrous, even and odd, and the like.[7] As also, that

of matter. See on this subject his Phædrus, p. 344. But as he requires a manifest passage of Plato, I shall adduce two, in which Plato expressly declares that all motion springs from the soul. One is from De Legibus, lib. 10. p. 668. Εἰ δ' ἔστι τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχον, ἆρα ἔτι ποθοῦμεν μὴ ἱκανῶς δεδεῖχθαι ψυχὴν ταυτὸν ὂν καὶ τὴν πρώτην γένεσιν καὶ κίνησιν τῶν τε ὄντων, καὶ γεγονότων, καὶ ἐσομένων, καὶ πάντων αὖ τῶν ἐναντίων τούτοις; "But if this be the case, do we yet desire it to be more completely demonstrated, that the soul is one and the same with the first generation and motion of things, that are, and have been, and shall hereafter be, and again of all things contrary to these?" The other passage we have in the Phædrus, p. 344. Ψυχὴ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὅσα κινεῖται, πηγὴ καὶ ἀρχὴ κινήσεως, "The soul is the fountain and principle of motion to all other things that move." Hence Cicero, De Natura Deor. lib, 2. cap. 12. p. 2971. Hunc motum (Plato) in solis animis esse ponit, ab hisque *principium motus* esse ductum putat, "This motion Plato holds to be in souls alone and considers, that from these the principle of motion is to be derived." VIII. Lastly, I think I ought not to omit mentioning, that I find two men of the greatest talents and learning who have expressed themselves in favour of Plutarch's interpretation of Plato. One is Justus Lipsius, Physiolog. Stoicor. lib. 1. diss. 14. p. 32. who briefly touches upon this subject; the other Pet. Gassendi, who, Physic. sect. 1. lib. 1. cap. 5. p. 156. tom. 1. opp. approves of it more openly. He is wrong, however, in supposing that Porphyrius and Proclus were of the same opinion as Plato, it being evident that they held a different one. But why should I speak of the more modern writers? The most ancient Christian author, Clemens Alexandr. Stromat. lib. 5. p. 701. acknowledges, that Plato introduced an evil soul, and makes it to be the same with that nature which Christians call the *devil*.

* Οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι οὐδαμοῦ τὸ κακὸν ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς παρελάμβανον, "The Pythagoreans nowhere admitted evil among the principles." Syrianus in Aristot. Metaphys. MS. p. 218.

[7] Plutarch, as we have already remarked above, does not mean that all the Greek philosophers were imbued with the same opinions which he considered Plato to have held, but merely wishes it to be supposed that all that have philosophized rightly concerning God, removed from him the cause of evils and vices, and referred it, although not all in the same way, to a different nature. I shall not bring forward all that I might say concerning those philosophers whose part Dr. Cudworth is maintaining against Plutarch, as this subject requires a more suitable place, but shall merely speak of those matters, which either appear to me to be especially necessary to be known, or to have been omitted by others. In the first place, therefore, as regards Pythagoras, I confess Plutarch does not very aptly and clearly show from the doctrine of numbers peculiar to this philosopher, that he placed over the universe two natures, the one full of goodness, the other of depravity. For, as is evident from Jo. Meursius' Denarius Pythagoricus, the precepts of Pythagoras concerning numbers, with few exceptions, are overwhelmed with so many doubtful and discordant opinions of ancient authors, as to make it very difficult to say to what physical things he properly applied his numbers. Nor are those destitute of all authority, who hold that Pythagoras derived the origin of all evil from a certain singular nature. I pass over what has been collected by Wolf, Manichæismus ante Manichæos, sect. 2. s. 29. p. 116. from which this at least is manifest, that Pythagoras associated with God eternal matter, from which he conceived a portion of the ills we are afflicted with to have proceeded. I speak not of what others have observed respecting his masters, the Egyptian priests, Zaratas and the Persian Magi. But I shall advance two things which, although omitted, I perceive, by those who have touched upon this argument, appear to me nevertheless to possess some weight in the question. I. Numenius, a no ignoble Pythagorean, sought for the origin of all evil in a peculiar soul lying hid in the world, and has interpreted his master's doctrines in the same sense. On which subject Chalcidius, in Timæum Platonis, cap. 13. sect. 293. p. 307. discourses copiously. II. The ancient Christian fathers, who conversed with the Manichæans, did not hesitate to assert that the wicked

Heraclitus entertained the same opinion, because he spake of παλίντροπος ἁρμονία κόσμου, "a versatile harmony of the world," whereby things reciprocate forwards and backwards, as when a

and foolish notions of this sect were derived principally from the school of Pythagoras, or to number Pythagoras among the parents and founders of the Manichæan sect. Hear the words of Archelaus, an eminent father of the third century, in his *Disputatio cum Manete*, sect. 51. p. 191. ed. Fabricii, t. 2. opp. Hippolyti. "Scythianus dualitatem istam introducit contrariam sibi, *quod ipse a Pythagora* suscepit, sicut et alii omnes hujus dogmatis sectatores, qui omnes dualitatem defendunt, declinantes scripturæ viam directam," "Scythianus introduces that duality contrary to itself, which doctrine he *borrowed from Pythagoras*, as also did all the other followers of this dogma, who all defend the duality, turning aside from the direct road of Scripture." However, if Pythagoras avowed any evil principle of the kind, this notwithstanding appears to be beyond controversy, that he considered it to be much inferior to the Supreme Being, and on that account does not belong to those men who introduced two deities of equal power. For there are more classes than one of those who assert two principles of things, and associate with the good God another nature from which all evil proceeds. Which, as it ought especially to be borne in mind by those who wish to ascertain how far the ancient philosophers were tinctured with this dogma, lest the greatest confusion should arise throughout the entire disputation, and as I perceive it to be lost sight of even by those who in our time have inquired most diligently into the arguments and doctrines of the Manichæans and have considered it a glorious thing to undertake the patronage of this long ago condemned sect; I shall proceed to show, before speaking of the other philosophers. In the first place, then, the whole of those who assert two principles of things may be conveniently distributed into two principal sects; the one holding God and matter to have existed from all eternity, the other imagining, besides matter, another nature, from which all evils proceed; and therefore, properly speaking, introducing three principles of things, God, a vicious nature, and matter. Of which latter opinion, indeed, were almost all those who in the early ages of Christianity contaminated the heavenly doctrine with their own inventions, and are commonly called Gnostics; not to speak at present of many others. Each sect may be again divided into its own subordinate classes. Passing over the former, we shall speak only of the latter subdivision. The *first place* must be assigned to those who make that evil and vicious nature coeval with the good God and equal to him in strength, and who speak of those two gods as harassing each other with eternal conflicts and warring with doubtful and alternate success. That the Manichæans hold this opinion is believed by most men, and that for very cogent reasons. In the *second place* we must rank those who conceive this evil principle to have existed from all eternity, but yet make it much inferior to the supreme God in power and strength. These suppose not only that the good God triumphs over the evil and vicious one in innumerable contests, but also that a time will at length come when the evil principle will be utterly vanquished and destroyed. This opinion seems to me to have been entertained by the ancient Egyptians, and even still to retain its hold in the minds of many eastern nations. The doctrine, I confess, is absurd; nor can it be well understood, how that which existed necessarily and of itself from infinity, can be destroyed and annihilated. But who is not aware, that things which at this day appear to every rational man most absurd and ridiculous, were formerly looked upon by many as the most undeniable of truths. For there is nothing too gross or foolish for the belief of those of ancient, as sometimes even of modern times, who were ambitious to surpass others in reputation for wisdom and learning. To the *third class* belong those who acknowledge one supreme God, but suppose two essences of the greatest excellence as subject to him, the one effecting all the good which takes place, the other the cause and origin of all the evil. But of these two essences they have not all held the same opinion. For some consider these deities, if they may be so called, to be such as they are of their own nature; while others maintain that in the beginning they were both good, but that one degenerated from its goodness, the other, on the contrary, retaining its primitive state. If both be asked, from whence these two principles proceeded, they will not hesitate to answer, from the supreme God; but as to the manner in which this took place they will disagree, one party ranking them among the necessary emanations of God, the other asserting them to have been voluntarily created by him. Nor is it to be wondered at, that a wicked

bow is successively intended and remitted; as likewise because he affirmed all things to flow, and war to be the father and lord of all.[8] Moreover, he resolves, that Empedocles' friendship and con-

and malignant nature, such as that which delights solely in evil, should have emanated from God. For what man even of ordinary information is not aware, that many ancients as well as moderns, including not a few of the Christians, entertained the belief that the farther those things which flow and emanate out of God's nature are separated and removed from it, the more concrete and deteriorated they become? The probability of the latter opinion was so generally recognized, that it found its abettors even among the advocates and champions of Christianity, who so interpreted the doctrine concerning Christ and the evil demon that continually plots against his kingdom, as to hold the former to be the good, and the latter the evil principle, and both to have been generated by God. See what Lactantius says on this subject, Divin. Institut. lib. 2. cap. 8. p. 204. But, to confess the truth, I consider the most ancient opinion of all the eastern nations, who have spoken of two deities, to have been this, that there is one supreme God devoid of all evil, but two genii much inferior to that God, yet of great strength and virtue, who mingle together the good and evil in the world, and eagerly strive sometimes for the safety, sometimes for the injury of mankind: into which opinion, I suspect, they were principally led by having erroneously understood what had been handed down from their ancestors concerning the first human beings beguiled and tempted by the cunning of a malignant genius. By degrees, however, as is usual among mankind, this old doctrine lost much of its true character, and, the supreme Deity having become nearly obliterated from men's memory, those two genii, whom the ancients had made subject to the sovereignty of God, were regarded by the most part as having all things to themselves, and as uncontrolled by the power and laws of a superior. To this class are closely allied those to whom I think we ought to assign the *fourth place*, the ancient poets of the Greeks, Egyptians, and other nations who number the gods, to whom they impute all goods as well as evils, among those deities which they sing of as generated and born of chaos or of mortals, and therefore deny to have been without all origin or beginning. What else are the Egyptian gods, Osiris and Typhon, the former presiding over good, the other over evil, than gods generated at a certain time, not having existed before? Lastly, those form the *fifth class* who hold a certain soul lying hid in matter to be the cause of all evil. To this class I conceive we have already shown that Plutarch, upon sufficient grounds, makes Plato belong; also Atticus, Numenius, and others, are favourable to it. However, neither are these unanimous among themselves, but divided into two sects. For some supposed, that God corrected that malignant soul of the world, as far as possible, and by adding a divine soul formed the two into one; others, that with this evil soul he associated another soul partaking of order, counsel and reason, which was to take care that the old one should not again confound all things, and bring back the ancient chaos. These various and discordant opinions ought to be carefully distinguished in the mind of him who enters into a disputation on the supporters of two principles, if he wishes to come at a clear conception of every thing, and not to open the way to much confusion. For if he rank indiscriminately together all those that have introduced two principles of things and ascribed the cause of all evil to a certain peculiar nature, it will be utterly impossible for him to avoid doing great injustice to some and erroneously expounding the opinion of others.

[8] The learned Doctor's memory has here deceived him in some things. I. Plutarch nowhere, as far as I can see, numbers Heraclitus among those that held a certain peculiar source of evil, because of his having asserted that all things flow and are undergoing perpetual vicissitudes. He would have deserved the ridicule of all sensible men, if he had reasoned thus foolishly: "Heraclitus asserted all things to flow; therefore he derived evil from a certain peculiar soul or nature." II. Nor is the learned Doctor altogether right in what he advances respecting the *versatile harmony of the world*. Plutarch, De Psychogon. ex Timæo, tom. 2. p. 1026. opp. maintains that what Plato calls the soul of the world is designated by philosophers under different names. Among these philosophers he reckons also Heraclitus, who he tells us called this soul of the world παλίντροπος ἁρμονίη κόσμου, ὁκῶς πέρ λυρης καὶ τόξου, "The versatile harmony of the world, like the intension in a lyre or bow." Whether he interprets Heraclitus rightly or otherwise, is not the present concern. But I conceive

tention could be no other than a good and evil god;[9] though we have rendered it probable, that nothing else was understood thereby but an active spermatic power in this corporeal world, causing vicissitudes of generation and corruption. Again, Anaxagoras[10] is intitled by him to the same philosophy, for no other reason but only because he made mind and infinite matter two principles of the universe. And lastly, Aristotle himself cannot 'scape him from being made an assertor of a good and evil god too, merely because he concluded form and privation to be two principles of natural bodies. Neither does Plutarch acquit himself any thing better, as to the sense of whole nations, when this doctrine is therefore imputed by him to the Chaldeans, because their astrologers supposed two of the planets to be beneficent, two maleficent, and three of a middle nature; and to the ancient Grecks, because they sacrificed not only to Jupiter Olympius, but also to Hades or Pluto, who was sometimes called by them the infernal Jupiter.[1] We confess that his interpretation of the traditions and mysteries of the ancient Egyptians is ingenious, but yet there is no necessity for all that, that by their Typhon should be understood a substantial evil principle, or God self-existent, as he contends. For it being the manner of the ancient Pagans (as shall be more fully declared afterwards)

it to be plain, that this *harmony of the world* was not made mention of by Plutarch for the sake of showing that philosopher to have held two principles. III. The only argument, then, by which Plutarch wishes to prove this, is that saying of Heraclitus wherein he asserted war to be the father of all things: Πόλεμον, says he, ὀνομάζει πατέρα καὶ βασιλέα καὶ κύριον πάντων, "He calls war the father, king and lord of all things." De Iside et Osiride, p. 370. But if this war of Heraclitus were a certain evil soul, it would follow according to this, that none of these things that have taken place or do now take place, are to be ascribed to the good God, but all to the evil being, as father, lord and king of all things. But as this is absurd and foreign to the opinion of Heraclitus, nothing remains for us but to conclude that his *war* is neither more nor less than Empedocles' *discord*, or a contrary motion of first principles, from which most of the ancient physiologists believed all things to have proceeded.

[9] There are others besides Plutarch who have understood Empedocles' discord and friendship generally as meant by him to designate two natures, one the cause of good, the other of evil; whose words see collected by Jo. Christoph. Wolf, Manichæism. ante Manichæos, sect. 2. s. 20. p. 120. But to myself, as I have explained at some length above, Diss. on Plastic Nature, sect. 6. these two appear to be the names of things not of persons, by which Empedocles intended the same as most of the ancient physiologists. However, I will not deny Empedocles to have been of the number of those who traced the causes of evils to the condition and various motion of matter.

[10] De Iside et Osiride, p. 370. Certainly Plutarch wronged Anaxagoras, if he intended to state that philosopher's *infinity* to be an evil soul. But to me he seems to have meant merely, that Anaxagoras looked for the origin of evils in mind, not in infinite matter; although on the whole of this subject Plutarch is not very consistent with himself, as appears even from what follows concerning Aristotle. For who, I would ask, will believe that Aristotle's *privation* is the singular nature which generated all evil?

[1] What Plutarch states concerning the Chaldeans and Grecks will have somewhat more of authority, if it be considered, that his general purpose was simply to show, that most nations believed good and evil things not to have sprung from one and the same principle. On the Chaldeans, however, see Wolf's Manichæism. ante Manichæos, p. 45. &c.

to physiologize in their theology, and to personate all the several things in nature; it seems more likely, that these Egyptians did after that manner, only προσωποποιεῖν, "personate" that evil and confusion, tumult and hurliburly, constant alternation and vicissitude of generations and corruptions, which is in this lower world (though not without a divine providence), by Typhon.[2]

[2] Passing over all that learned men have surmised, for the most part not very profoundly, respecting Typhon, and admitting what the learned Doctor spontaneously offers, that Typhon is the image and type of the evils with which this world is afflicted, it remains for us to examine into the truth of his position, that the Egyptians did not mean by this name a certain being the parent of evil, but evil itself, and its various impulses and conversions of the nature of things. I know not, however, whether this opinion will be assented to by any one who, with his mind unbiassed, reads what Diodorus Siculus, Plutarch, and others, have recorded concerning the acts and deeds of Osiris, Isis, and Typhon; which is either entirely destitute of meaning, or shows that they were men, and that they earned for themselves fame and divine honours among posterity by various wars, laws, and inventions. Again, to omit other things, what makes principally against the conjecture is, that according to the account of these same authors, the Egyptians were accustomed to propitiate the anger of Typhon by victims and sacrifices. Plut. De Iside et Osiride, p. 362. Dior. Sic. Biblioth. Histor. lib. 1. p. 9. For no one is in the habit of paying divine worship and honours to notions of his own mind, or to things devoid of intellect and power, or, lastly, to events and the actions of others. For my own part, indeed, although scarcely any subject is obscured and encumbered with more conjectures and surmises of the learned than the religion of the Egyptians, yet on the whole I think the following opinion may be formed respecting their institutions and ceremonies. The gods of their country, Osiris, Isis, Typhon, and others, to whom the Egyptians paid the most devout adoration, were very ancient kings and heroes, who ruled over that people and after death were superstitiously ranked among the gods. Osiris and Typhon, in particular, if there be any meaning in the accounts handed down concerning them, were brothers of diametrically contrary dispositions and pursuits; the latter of whom, by nature cruel and maleficent, entrapped and killed his brother, of a mild and merciful disposition, but was afterwards punished for the fratricide by Isis:

Et quem tu plangens hominem testaris Osirin.

Lucan. Pharsal. lib. 8. v. 133. See what has been remarked generally by J. Le Clerc, in his Explication of the Fable of Adonis, t. 3. Biblioth. Univers. et Histor. p. 12. &c. whose views, however, I do not altogether adopt, and at greater length by the most ingenious Banier in a particular Dissertation concerning Typhon, Histoire de l'Academ. des Inscriptions et Belles Lettres, t. 6. p. 162. In process of time, however, when wise men already began to be ashamed that the people should worship those as gods, whose exploits and fortunes proved them to have been mortals, the Egyptians, like the Greeks, Persians, and other nations, endeavoured to adapt the ancient history of the gods to the precepts cherished by the more intelligent on subjects of natural history and philosophy. From this source, unless I am altogether mistaken, flowed all the theogonies, and all the difficulties and darkness which at this day envelope the systems of ancient nations. Therefore, when the Egyptian philosophers became persuaded that there was a supreme God, free from all vice, and a peculiar nature besides, perpetually opposing his counsels, and blending good with evil, they connected the history of Osiris and Typhon with this doctrine, or mixed up the historical religion of the people with their own philosophical religion, making Osiris to be the same with the good God, and Typhon with the evil nature, the parent of all vice and discord. When once they had entered upon this course, the road was opened for others to attempt the same; and as those who aspired to the reputation of wisdom, as is usual with mortals, were of various sentiments, each interpreted Osiris and Typhon in his own way; from which it came to pass, that nothing is more uncertain than the religion of the Egyptians. See Laur. Pignorius, In Mensam Isiacam, p. 2. &c. For, according to the opinions of each on things natural and divine, so he explained and expounded the history of the

Wherefore, the only probability now left is that of the Persian Magi, that they might indeed assert two such active principles of good and evil, as Plutarch and the Manicheans afterwards did; and we must confess, that there is some probability of this, because besides Plutarch, Laërtius[3] affirms the same of them, δύο κατ' αὐτοὺς εἶναι ἀρχὰς, ἀγαθὸν δαίμονα καὶ κακὸν, "that there are two principles according to the Persian Magi, a good demon and an evil one:" he seeming to vouch it also from the authorities of Hermippus, Eudoxus, and Theopompus. Notwithstanding which, it may very well be questioned, whether the meaning of those Magi were not herein misunderstood, they perhaps intending nothing more by their evil demon than such a Satanical power as we acknowledge; that is, not a substantial evil principle, unmade and independent upon God, but only a polity of evil demons in the world, united together under one head or prince. And this not only because Theodorus in Photius[4]

ancient Egyptian gods, that it might appear consistent with his own dogmas. Wherefore those who wish to comment on the religion and sacred rites of the Egyptians ought cautiously and prudently to distinguish between what pertains to the pristine history of the country, and what was imported into it at a later period by the zeal of the priests and wise men. For owing to this having been neglected by most men, there is scarcely any subject more beset, than it is, with the controversies and dissensions both of ancient and modern writers: some, for instance, holding Osiris to be the sun, others Bacchus, others Oceanus, and others Pluto. And which of them are we to believe? In my opinion none. Osiris was an ancient king of Egypt; but when the Egyptians began to amalgamate their institutions with the philosophic dogmas and axioms of the Greeks and others, one represented Osiris in one form, another in another, as seemed agreeable with the opinions which each had espoused. However, the Egyptians are not to be classed among those who supposed the existence of two equal gods. For as is clear from Plutarch, De Iside et Osiride, p. 362. they held that the power of Typhon becomes gradually weaker, and will at length be entirely destroyed: Τὴν τοῦ Τυφῶνος ἠμαυρωμένην καὶ συντετριμμένην δύναμιν, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ψυχορράγοῦσαν καὶ σφαδαζοῦσαν παρηγοροῦσιν, "They soothe Typhon's obscured and broken power, gasping and struggling in the last agonies." They should be regarded as belonging to those who, as Plutarch tells us, consider the evil god to be a certain genius or demon only. For he divides the whole family of those who make a certain separate numen to preside over evil into two, those who assign equal power to the good and evil god, and those who hold the evil to be weaker than the good. So certainly his words: Νομίζουσιν γὰρ οἱ μὲν, Θεοὺς εἶναι δύο, καθάπερ ἀντιτέχνους, τὸν μὲν γὰρ ἀγαθῶν, τὸν δὲ φαύλων δημιουργόν· οἱ δὲ τὸν μὲν ἀμείνονα Θεὸν, τὸν δὲ ἕτερον δαίμονα καλοῦσιν, "For some suppose that there are two gods, as it were of contrary arts, so that one is the author of good, the other of evil things: others call him that is better a god, but the other a demon only." Nevertheless, it does not appear, that the Egyptians supposed this evil demon to have been created by God, but to be, like that good god, a necessarily self-existent being. For, say they, Osiris and Typhon were brothers; therefore, if Osiris be that god, who is supremely good and great, it follows that we must believe Typhon to be of the same nature and eternity. But, in the great obscurity of ancient matters, who can so unravel all things as to leave no further room for inquiry?

[3] In Proœmio, segm. 8. p. 6. who says he writes this on the authority of Aristotle.

[4] This is Theodorus Mopsvestenus, by whom there were formerly extant three books, De Persarum Magia, out of the first of which Photius, Biblioth. cod. 81. p. 199. relates, that the Persians supposed Zarva, the supreme god of all, to have begotten Homisdn, καὶ τὸν Σατανᾶν, "and Satan." It is probable, as is remarked by Andr. Schottus in his notes on this passage, that the evil genius of the Persians, otherwise called Arimanius, is meant by this word. The learned Doctor, however, is right in laying little stress on this argument derived from a name; for it by no means follows

calls the Persian Arimanius by that very name, Satanas; but also because those very traditions of theirs, recorded by Plutarch himself, seem very much to favour this opinion, they running after this manner: "Ἐπεισι δὲ χρόνος εἱμαρμένος, ἐν ᾧ τὸν Ἀρειμάνιον, λοιμὸν ἐπάγοντα καὶ λιμὸν, ὑπὸ τούτων ἀνάγκη φθαρῆναι παντάπασι καὶ ἀφανισθῆναι, τῆς δὲ γῆς ἐπιπέδου καὶ ὁμαλῆς γενομένης, ἕνα βίον καὶ μίαν πολιτείαν ἀνθρώπων μακαρίων καὶ ὁμογλώσσων ἁπάντων γενέσθαι, "That there is a fatal time at hand, in which Arimanius, the introducer of plagues and famines, must of necessity be utterly destroyed, and when, the earth being made plain and equal, there shall be but one life, and one polity of men, all happy and speaking the same language." Or else, as Theopompus[5] himself represented their sense: Τέλος ἀπολείπεσθαι τὸν Ἅδην, καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἀνθρώπους εὐδαίμονας ἔσεσθαι, μήτε τροφῆς δεομένους, μήτε σκίαν ποιοῦντας· τὸν δὲ ταῦτα μηχανησάμενον θεὸν ἠρεμεῖν καὶ ἀναπαύεσθαι χρόνῳ καλῶς μὲν οὐ πολὺν τῷ θεῷ, ὥσπερ ἀνθρώπῳ κοιμωμένῳ μέτριον, "That in conclusion Hades shall be utterly abolished, and then men shall be perfectly happy, their bodies neither needing food, nor casting any shadow; that God, which contrived this whole scene of things, resting only for the present a certain season, which is not long to him, but like the intermission of sleep to men." For since an unmade and self-existent evil demon, such as that of Plutarch's and the Manichæans, could never be utterly abolished or destroyed; it seems rather probable, that these Persian Magi did, in their Arimanius, either προσωποποιεῖν, "personate evil" only, as we suppose the Egyptians to have done in Typhon; or else understand a Satanical power by it: notwithstanding which, they might possibly sacrifice thereunto (as the Greeks did to evil demons) for its appeasement and mitigation; or else as worshipping the Deity itself, in the ministers of its wrath and vengeance.[6]

from the fact of the Christians designating the prince of evil spirits by the same name which the Persians apply to the evil principle, that they both entertained the same belief respecting each.

[5] These words are extracted from Theopompus by Plutarch in his book De Iside et Osiride, p. 370. t. 2. opp.

[6] Although no one of the learned denies, that the Persians formerly held the existence of two principles of things, one good and the other evil, nevertheless they do not all explain that opinion concerning those two divinities in one and the same manner. For as to what was taught before the time of Zoroaster, I consider it almost useless to inquire, inasmuch as no ancient document has come down to us upon which it would be safe to place any reliance. Some Arabic writers are brought forward by Edw. Pococke, Specim. Hist. Arabum, p. 147. 148. and Thom. Hyde, Historia Religionis Veter. Persarum, cap. 9. p. 163. and cap. 22. p. 299. who say that the Magians before Zoroaster taught the existence of two equal gods, one the author of every thing salutary and good, the other of all evils: from which doctrine they were drawn away by Zoroaster. But, as is pretty well known to all, the later Arabic writers are of too slight authority for us immediately to assent to every thing they relate. Wherefore in an inquiry respecting the religion of the Persians, we ought to pay regard principally to the precepts which these received as handed down from Zoroaster, and to ascertain what belief

However, from what hath been declared, we conceive it does sufficiently appear, that this ditheistic doctrine of a good and evil god, (or a good god and evil demon both self-existent)

they entertained from the time of that philosopher. The opinions prevailing among learned men on this subject are, I observe, chiefly three. The most part make the Persians to have been taught by Zoroaster the worship of two gods, eternal, self-existent, and without any beginning. According to others, the nation professed one supreme and benignant God, but two inferior divinities, subject to this eternal God and created by him, the one good and the other evil. Lastly, others contend that they worshipped one supreme God, the creator and parent of all things, but nevertheless associated with him a certain evil genius, not unlike the wicked demon mentioned in Scripture. So Th. Hyde expounds the religion of the ancient Persians, as above quoted, cap. 20. p. 161. To me the second opinion appears to be better founded than the first and the last, which indeed are altogether destitute of authority. In the first place, it is confirmed by the words of Plutarch and Theopompus, quoted by the learned Doctor. Secondly, there is no passage extant of any Greek author testifying that they taught differently. Lastly, other testimonies also may be added to these. Plutarch, De Iside et Osiride, p. 369. after saying that Zoroaster belonged to those who referred the cause of evil to some peculiar god, immediately subjoins that he introduced three gods, one good, Oromasdes, another evil, Arimanius, and a third intermediate between them, Mithras, called by the Persians *μεσίτης*. A little afterwards he clearly states, that both the good and evil divinity were generated. I know not how this can be explained except as follows: That there are two divinities presiding over good and evil things, but that one supreme deity moderates their designs, who, holding as it were the middle place, so tempers all things, that the universe should not suffer detriment from their mutual opposition and conflicts. Diogenes Laërtius appears to me to be another evidence of no mean authority in this matter, who in the Proëm to his History, p. 6. 7. cites the opinions of the Magians out of the best writers. And in the first place he observes from Aristotle that they introduced two demons, one good the other bad. But a little afterwards he intimates from Hecatæus *καὶ γεννητοὺς τοὺς θεοὺς εἶναι κατ' αὐτούς*, "That also according to them (the Magians) the gods were generated." What can be said plainer than this? The Magians considered their two divinities to be not gods, but genii or demons only, and generated. For on this subject also the authority of Theodorus Mopsvestenus, quoted a little above, is of great consequence, who in Photius, cod. 81. p. 199. expressly testifies, that according to the Persians the supreme god, Zarva, generated out of himself Oromasdes and Satan, or, which is the same thing, a good and evil god. To all these may be added the Arabic and Persian writers, cited by Hyde, Religio veterum Persarum, cap. 22. p. 290. &c. and Pococke, Specim. Histor. Arabum, p. 147. &c. who interpret Zoroaster's doctrine in the same manner. I am not one to suppose that these Persians and Arabians are alone to be listened to. But when I see their accounts in most respects agree with what the Greek authors have left on record respecting the dogmas of Zoroaster, I consider their testimony to be of great weight towards clearing this question of all doubt and uncertainty. It appears evident to me, therefore, that the ancient Persians held this opinion: That there is one supreme and eternal Deity, whom, however, no human intellect can comprehend, and who ought to be worshipped with the internal reverence of the soul rather than by outward rites and ceremonies. That this supreme Being produced from himself, I know not in what manner, two gods, of great might and surpassing virtue, of whom one controls and administers what is useful and necessary to the human race, the other delights in things hurtful and pernicious. That these two deities are continually at war with each other, having God, however, for the moderator and arbiter of their conflicts. That after infinite and prolonged struggles the divinity which approaches nearer to the nature of the supreme Deity will entirely destroy and abolish the evil demon; and that then all things will be full of peace, tranquillity, and happiness.—I am aware that the most acute Bayle has bestowed great labour in attempting to show, in opposition to Hyde, that the Persians and Arabians are not to be attended to in this matter, but that we are rather to believe the Greeks, who say Zoroaster introduced the worship of two equal and self-existent gods, Diction. Histor. et Critique, art. Zoroaster, t. 4. not. F. p. 2928. 2929. And he has been considered by men possessing great eminence in the literary world to have completely set the matter at rest. For

asserted by Plutarch and the Manicheans, was never so universally received amongst the Pagans as the same Plutarch pretendeth. Which thing may be yet further evidenced from hence, because the Manicheans professed themselves not to have derived this opinion from the Pagans, nor to be a subdivision under them, or schism from them, but a quite different sect by themselves. Thus, Faustus in St. Augustin:* Pagani bona et mala, tetra et splendida, perpetua et caduca, mutabilia et certa, corporalia et divina, unum habere principium dogmatizant. His ego valde contraria censeo, qui bonis omnibus principium fateor Deum, contrariis vero Hylen (sic enim mali principium et naturam theologus noster appellat). "The Pagans dogmatize, that good and evil things, foul and splendid, perishing and perpetual, corporeal and divine, do all alike proceed from the same principle. Whereas we think far otherwise, that God is the principle of all good, but Hyle (or the evil demon) of the contrary, which names our theologer (Manes) confounds together." And afterwards Faustus there again determines, that there were indeed but two sects of religion in the world, really distinct from one another, viz. Paganism and Manicheism.† From whence it may be concluded, that this doctrine of two active principles of good and evil was not then looked upon as the generally received doctrine of the Pagans. Wherefore it seems reasonable to think, that Plutarch's imputing it so universally to them, was either out of design, thereby to gain the better countenance and authority

myself, however, I confess my entire ignorance of any Greek authors, who have said what the learned writer assumes them to have done. He appeals to the evidence of Plutarch alone. But if we are to abide by him, as I have already shown, neither Zoroaster nor the Persians, his disciples, will admit of being called worshippers of two equal deities. The rest of his arguments are of no efficacy in this question, which can only be settled by testimonies and authorities. I will not deny, however, that there may perchance have been Persians, who entertained the opinion attributed by Bayle to Zoroaster. Th. Hyde himself, cap. 9. p. 164. does not disown that there was a sect of *Dualists* among the Persians, who professed the worship of two deities possessing equal power and self-existent. Perhaps others also were found among them who maintained the third opinion, and who had the same idea of the evil god as Christians have of the prince of demons. But no account should be taken of minor sects of the kind, when the dispute turns upon the religion and sacred rites of a nation generally. From this it will be evident what judgment we ought to form of the present discussion of Dr. Cudworth. In most that he advances he is right; nor was there any reason why some most learned men should warn us not to follow him in this matter. As to the rest, I consider the names given by the Persians to these two genii, Arimanius and Oromasdes, in the same way as Osiris and Typhon among the Egyptians, to be those of ancient warlike leaders or kings, whose exploits and dispositions, after all memory of ancient things was lost, they adapted to religion and things divine. The conjectures offered by G. Wilh. Leibnitz on this matter, Essais de Theodicée, sect. 138. p. 285 &c. are not unworthy of perusal.

* Contra Faust. lib. 20. cap. 3. p. 237. tom. 8. opp. edit. Benedict.

† Faustus' words in St. Augustine, as above quoted, cap. 4. p. 237. are these: Sectas si quæras, non plus erunt, quam duæ, id est, gentium et nostra, qui eis longe diversa sentimus. "If you inquire about sects, there are no more than two, namely, the pagan and our own, for we think very differently from them."

to a conceit, which himself was fond of; or else because he being deeply tinctured as it were, with the suffusions of it, every thing which he looked upon seemed to him coloured with it. And indeed, for aught we can yet learn, this Plutarchus Cheronensis, Numenius and Atticus,[8] were the only Greek philosophers, who ever in public writings positively asserted any such opinion.

And probably St. Athanasius is to be understood of these, when in his oration Contra Gentes,[9] he writes thus concerning his opinion: Ἑλλήνων οὖν τινες πλανηθέντες τῆς ὁδοῦ, καὶ τὸν Χριστὸν οὐκ ἐγνωκότες, ἐν ὑποστάσει καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὴν εἶναι τὴν κακίαν ἀπεφήναντο, ἁμαρτάνοντες κατὰ δύο ταῦτα, ἢ τὸν δημιουργὸν ἀποστεροῦντες τοῦ εἶναι ποιητὴν τῶν ὄντων, οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἴη τῶν ὄντων κύριος, εἴγε κατ' αὐτοὺς ἡ κακία καθ' ἑαυτὴν ὑπόστασιν ἔχει καὶ οὐσίαν, ἢ πάλιν θέλοντες αὐτὸν ποιητὴν εἶναι τῶν ὅλων, ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ τοῦ κακοῦ δώσουσιν εἶναι, ἐν γὰρ τοῖς οὖσιν καὶ τὸ κακὸν κατ' αὐτούς ἐστι, "Some of the Greeks, wandering out of the right way, and ignorant of Christ, have determined evil to be a real entity by itself, erring upon two accounts; because they must of necessity either suppose God not to be the maker of all things, if evil have a nature and essence by itself, and yet be not made by him; or else that he is the maker and cause of evil; whereas it is impossible, that he, who is essentially good, should produce the contrary." After which that father speaks also of some degenerate Christians, who fell into the same error: Οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν αἱρέσεων ἐκπεσόντες τῆς ἐκκλησιαστικῆς διδασκαλίας, καὶ περὶ τὴν πίστιν ναυαγήσαντες, καὶ οὗτοι μὲν ὑπόστασιν τοῦ κακοῦ παραφρονοῦσιν εἶναι, "Some heretics forsaking the ecclesiastical doctrine, and making shipwreck of the faith, have in like manner falsely attributed a real nature and essence to evil." Of which heretics there were several sects before the Manicheans, sometime taken notice of and censured by pagan philosophers themselves; as by Celsus,[10] where he charges Christians with

[8] What value is to be placed upon all that is here said with some harshness against Plutarch, will be evident from what we have remarked above. The learned Doctor misunderstood Plutarch's opinion, who beyond all question was far removed from the doctrine of those that believed in two equal deities, one good and the other bad. Nor is he alone mistaken, as many of the most learned men, both of this and the last generation, have fallen into the same error: for example, Pet. Bayle, who, although inferior to no one as a sagacious explorer of the dogmas of ancient philosophers, has not hesitated to rank Plutarch among the Manicheans. See Diction. Histor. art. Manicheens, lib. 3. p. 1897. not. 6. and elsewhere. What I say of Plutarch will apply also to Numenius and Atticus, who thought very differently from what Dr. Cudworth supposes. But Plutarch is here justly censured for having asserted, that many entertained the same doctrine as himself concerning the origin of evil, whose minds nothing of the kind ever entered. He is also blamed for this by Bayle, as above, p. 1898. not now to mention the venerable Wolf and others.

[9] Tom. 1. opp. p. 6.

[10] Apud Origen. contra Celsum, lib. 6. p. 303. All that is here stated respecting the ancient Gnostics is true. For long before the appearance of the Manicheans, there were some Christians who asserted this world to have been made by an evil God.

holding this opinion, that there is ἐναντίος τῷ μεγάλῳ θεῷ θεὸς κατηραμένος, "an execrable god contrary to the great God;" and by Plotinus, writing a whole book against such Christians, the ninth of his second Ennead, which by Porphyrius was inscribed πρὸς τοὺς Γνωστικούς, "against the Gnostics."

But if, notwithstanding all that we have hitherto said to the contrary, that which Plutarch so much contends for should be granted to be true, that the pagan theologers generally asserted two self-existent principles (a good God, and an evil soul or demon) and no more, it would unavoidably follow from thence, that all those other gods which they worshipped, were not looked upon by them as so many unmade self-existent beings, because then they should have acknowledged so many first principles. However, it is certain, that if Plutarch believed his own writings, he must of necessity take it for granted, that none of the pagan gods (those two principles of good and evil only excepted) were by their theologers accounted unmade or self-existent beings. And as to Plutarch himself, it is unquestionably manifest, that though he were a Pagan, and a worshipper of all those many gods of theirs, but especially among the rest, of the Delian Apollo, (whose priest he declares himself to have been) yet he supposed them all (except only one good God, and another evil soul of the world) to be no self-existent deities, but θεοὶ γενητοὶ,[1] "generated or created gods" only. And the same is to be affirmed of all his pagan followers, as also of the Manicheans, forasmuch as they, besides their good and evil god, (the only unmade self-existent beings acknowledged by them) worshipped also innumerable other deities.

Hitherto we have not been able to find amongst the Pagans any, who asserted a multitude of unmade self-existent deities; but on the contrary, we shall now find one who took notice of this opinion of πολλαὶ ἀρχαί, "many principles," so far forth as to confute it; and that is Aristotle, who was not occasioned to do that neither, because it was a doctrine then generally received, but only because he had a mind odiously to impute such a thing to the Pythagoreans and Platonists, they making ideas (sometimes called also numbers) in a certain sense, the principles of things. Nevertheless, the opinion itself is well confuted by that philosopher from the phenomena, after this manner: Οἱ δὲ λέγοντες τὸν ἀριθμὸν πρῶτον τὸν μαθηματικόν, καὶ οὕτως ἀεὶ ἄλλην ἐχομένην οὐσίαν καὶ ἀρχὰς, ἑκάστης ἄλλας, ἐπεισοδιώδη τὴν τοῦ παντὸς οὐσίαν ποιοῦσιν, &c. "They who say that mathematical number is the first, and suppose one principle of one thing, and another of another, would make the whole

[1] See Rualdus, in his Vita Plutarchi, cap. 9. Hence the ancient Christian writers, who defend their religion against the Pagans, often bring against them the authority of Plutarch.

* Arist. Met. lib. 14. cap. 10. p. 486. tom. 4. opp.

world to be like an incoherent and disagreeing poem, where things do not all mutually contribute to one another, nor conspire together to make up one sense and harmony; but the contrary," saith he, "is most evident in the world; and therefore there cannot be many principles, but only one." From whence it is manifest that though Aristotle were a worshipper of many gods, as well as the other Pagans, (he somewhere representing it as very absurd to sacrifice to none but Jupiter) yet he was no Polytheist, in the sense before declared, of many unmade self-existent deities, nor indeed any Ditheist neither, no asserter of two understanding principles, a good and evil god, (as Plutarch pretended him to be) he not only here exploding that opinion of πολλαὶ ἀρχαὶ, "many principles," but also expressly deriving all from one; and in that very chapter affirming that good is a principle, but not evil. But as for the Platonists and Pythagoreans there perstringed by him, though it be true, that they made ideas in some sense principles, as the paradigms of things; yet, according to Aristotle's own confession, even in that same chapter, they declared also, that there was ἄλλη ἀρχὴ κυριωτέρα, "another principle more excellent" or "superior;" which is indeed that, that was called by them the τὸ ἓν, or μονὰς, "unity itself," or a "monad," that is, one most simple deity.[2]

Though we did before demonstrate, that the pagan gods were

[2] Aristotle, it is true, in the last chapter of his Metaphysics, disputes against those who held many principles of things. These he divides into certain classes. The first, he says, are those who associate matter with God. He next states that others reckon neither good nor evil among principles. The remaining sects, as being but obscurely touched upon by him, I pass over. Against all he advances this general argument: that those who lay down two contrary principles are compelled to place some other greater principle over them, and therefore to refer all things at last to one cause. Καὶ τοῖς, says he, δύο ἀρχὰς ποιοῦσιν ἄλλην ἀνάγκη ἀρχὴν κυριωτέραν εἶναι, "To those that make two principles, it is necessary that they hold another more excellent principle." Then after a short interval, in which he disputes against numbers and the ideas of things, follow the words which are here quoted, and which are the concluding words of his Metaphysics. But, lest they should be understood differently from what they ought, I wish the following to be attended to. I. Aristotle in defending one principle follows a very different course from those, who take Christ for their leader. For although he professes one god, upon whom all things depend; yet he does not suppose him to rule over matter, or to have formed it out of nothing, but to be connected with matter and all visible things by an indissoluble and eternal bond. Therefore on an accurate examination, that one principle, for which Aristotle contends, will be the whole universe of things consisting of God and matter. II. At the time Aristotle wrote, the Manichean doctrine of two opposite and conflicting gods was unknown to the Greeks. For neither in this chapter, where he is confuting those who held a plurality of principles, does the Stagirite speak of this dogma. He names those who associated with God either matter, or the forms and ideas of things, or numbers; but he makes no mention of two deities. III. It is not the fact, as here stated by Dr. Cudworth, that Aristotle makes *numbers* and *ideas* to be the same. For he expressly distinguishes τὰ εἴδη and οἱ ἀριθμοί. Neither do I know whether what he adds be true, that Aristotle wrongs the Platonists and Pythagoreans in stating that they asserted many principles. For he does not charge them with holding many equal principles; which would have been unfair in him to do: but even Dr. Cudworth cannot deny, that they introduced other principles inferior to the Supreme Deity.

not all supposed by them to be unmade self-existent beings, because they acknowledged a theogonia, a generation and temporary production of gods; yet, forasmuch as it might be suspected, that they held notwithstanding a multitude of unmade deities, we have now made the best inquiry that we could concerning this: and the utmost that we have able yet to discover is, that some few of the professed Pagans, as well as of pretended Christians, have indeed asserted a duplicity of such gods, (viz understanding beings unmade) one good and the other evil, but no more. Whereas, on the contrary, we have found, that Aristotle did professedly oppose this opinion of many principles, or unmade gods, which certainly he durst never have done, had it then been the generally received opinion of the Pagans. And though it be true, that several of the ancient Christians, in their disputes with Pagans, do confute that opinion of many unmade deities; yet we do not find for all that, that any of them seriously charge the Pagans with it, they only doing it occasionally and ex abundanti.[3] But we should be the better enabled to make a clear judgment concerning this controversy, whether there were not amongst the pagan deities a multitude of supposed unmade beings, if we did but take a short survey of their religion, and consider all the several kinds of gods worshipped by them; which may, as we conceive, be reduced to these following heads. In the first place therefore it is certain, that many of the pagan gods were nothing else but dead men, (or the souls of men deceased) called by the Greeks Heroes, and the Latins Manes; such as Hercules, Liber, Æsculapius, Gastor, Pollux, Quirinus, and the like. Neither was this only true of the Greeks and Romans, but also of the Egyptians, Syrians, and Babylonians. For which cause the pagan sacrifices are, by way of contempt, in the Scripture[4] called the sacrifices of the dead; that is, not of dead or lifeless statues, as some would put it off, but of dead men: which was the reason why many of the religious rites and solemnities, observed by the Pagan priests, were mournful and funeral; accordingly as it is expressed in Baruch* concerning the Babylonians, "Their priests sit in their temples, having their clothes rent, and their heads and beards shaven, and nothing

[3] See our remarks above on sect. 11. 12. of this chapter.

[4] Ps. 106. 28. "And they did eat the sacrifices מתים of the dead." Which words are thus interpreted by Jo. Spencer, De Legibus Ritualib. Hebræor. lib. 2. cap. 37. p. 580. lib. 1. ed. Recentiss. Mortuorum, hoc est, idolorum, quæ τῶν Baalim aut heroum defunctorum simulacra fuerunt, "of the dead, that is, of idols, which were the statues of the Baalim or defunct heroes." This exposition, without mentioning the name of Spencer, who taught in the same university as himself, Dr. Cudworth here repudiates. The same Spencer is chiefly alluded to in what he says a little after respecting the cause why the Jewish priests were forbidden to shave the beard and head. See De Legibus Ritual. cap. 18. p. 394. &c.

* Chap. 6. v. 31.

upon their heads; they roar and cry before their gods, as men do at the feast, when one is dead." (Some of which rites are therefore thought to have been interdicted to the Israelitish priests.) And the same thing is noted likewise by the poet[5] concerning the Egyptians:

Et quem tu plangens, hominem testaris, Osirin:

and intimated by Xenophanes the Colophonian,[6] when he reprehensively admonished the Egyptians after this manner: Εἰ θεοὺς νομίζουσι μὴ θρηνεῖν, εἰ δὲ θρηνοῦσι μὴ θεοὺς νομίζειν, "That if they thought those to be gods, they should not so lament them; but if they would lament them, they should no longer think them gods." Moreover, it is well known, that this humour of deifying men was afterwards carried on further, and that living men (as Emperors)[7] had also temples and altars erected to them; nay, human polities and cities were also sometimes deified by the Pagans, Rome itself being made a goddess. Now, no man can imagine that those men-gods and city-gods were looked upon by them as so many unmade self-existent deities, they being not indeed so much as φύσει γεννητοὶ θεοὶ, "gods made or generated by nature," but rather artificially made by human will and pleasure.[8] Again, another sort of the pagan deities were all the

[5] Lucan. Pharsal. lib. 8. v. 133.

[6] Plutarch, De Superstitione, p. 171. tom. 2. opp. has: Εἰ μὲν θεοί εἰσι, μὴ θρηνεῖτε αὐτούς· εἰ δὲ ἀνθρωποι, μὴ θύετε αὐτοῖς, "If they are gods, do not lament for them; but if men do not offer sacrifices to them." Aristotle, Rhetoric. lib. 2. cap. 23. p. 789. opp. states that Xenophanes gave this answer to the Eleans, when consulting him respecting the worship of Leucothea. There is nothing to hinder us from supposing the philosopher to have twice said the same thing.

[7] See Dan. Georg. Morhof's two very learned dissertations, De Divinitate Principum, extant in his Dissertationes, p. 83. &c.

[8] That the gods worshipped by ancient nations were men, has been sufficiently shown by the testimonies and arguments of Christians and others. Of the latter consult only Cicero in his books De Natura Deorum, of the former Lactantius, Cyprian, Tertullian, as also all who formerly defended the Christian rites against the worshippers of vain gods. But how it came to pass, that divine honours were paid to the dead, whose very death proved them not to have been divine, is not equally plain and clear. The most ancient nations believed that there were genii and demons, whose assistance the Supreme God made use of in the government of the world and the administration of human affairs, and whom he sometimes sent among mankind for their safety and advantage. When therefore they saw any one greater and more excellent than the rest of men, in power, or virtue, or wisdom, they superstitiously supposed a genius or demon of the kind to be shut up in his body, and to have been sent from the Deity. On the dissolution of the body this genius, in their opinion, returned to that order from which he had descended: but did not however cease to feel an interest in the affairs of the people over whom he had formerly presided. Hence the supplications, the honours, the sacrifices, decreed and offered to great men and kings after death by the people whom they had ruled. If the kings and heroes had been mild and beneficent, they were considered to have come to us from the family of the better genii, if cruel, severe, and relentless, from the order of the worse. For they supposed the evil genii also to be sometimes concerned in human affairs. The superstition of the people was fostered and augmented by the cunning of the sovereigns, who saw it would be to their advantage to be accounted of divine origin, and by the levity of flatterers, the desire of pleasing, and the like. Catullus, De Nuptiis Thetis et Pelei, v. 65. &c.

greater parts of the visible mundane system or corporeal world, as supposed to be animated, the sun, the moon, and the stars, and even the earth itself, under the names of Vesta and Cybele, the mother of the gods, and the like. Now it is certain also, that none of these could be taken for unmade self-existent deities neither, by those who supposed the whole world itself to have been generated, or had a beginning, which, as Aristotle tells us,[9] was the generally received opinion before his time. There was also a third sort of Pagan deities, ethereal and aerial animals invisible, called Demons, Genii, and Lares, superior indeed to men, but inferior to the celestial or mundane gods before mentioned. Wherefore these must needs be looked upon also by them but as γεννητοὶ θεοὶ, "generated or created gods," they being but certain inferior parts of the whole generated world.

Besides all these, the Pagans had yet another sort of gods, that were nothing but mere accidents or affections of substances, which therefore could not be supposed by them to be self-existent deities, because they could not so much as subsist by themselves. Such as were virtue, piety, felicity, truth, faith, hope, justice, clemency, love, desire, health, peace, honour, fame, liberty, memory, sleep, night, and the like; all which had their temples or altars erected to them. Now this kind of pagan gods cannot well be conceived to have been any thing else, but the several and various manifestations of that one divine force, power and providence, that runs through the whole world (as respecting the good and evil of men) fictitiously personated, and so represented as so many gods and goddesses.[10]

Lastly, there is still another kind of pagan gods behind, having substantial and personal names, which yet cannot be conceived neither to be so many understanding beings, unmade, and

> Præsentes namque ante domos invisere castas
> Nereus, ut sese mortali ostendere cœtu
> Cœlicolæ, nondum spreta pietate, solebant.]

Add Plutarch, De Iside et Oriside, p. 370. tom. 2. opp. ;

[9] De Cœlo, cap. 10. p. 632. lib. 1. opp. Γενόμενον μὲν οὖν τὸν οὐρανὸν ἅπαντες εἶναί φασιν, "all confess the heavens to have been made."

[10] For my part, I conceive these deities to have had their origin in the notion prevalent among the ancient Romans that certain particular deities preside over all things, even the most minute. And as men desire some things, but dislike others as hurtful to them, it hence came to pass, that they assigned deities to both good and evil things. Thus he who dedicated a temple to *piety*, appears to me to have intended the God whose office it is to instil piety into the minds of men. So those who consecrated *fever*, *fear*, and *terror*, meant thereby to appease those deities who respectively are able to banish fear, chase away terror from the mind, or expel fevers from the body. Some portion of this doctrine reached the founders of Christianity themselves, many of whom, as is evident from ancient records, placed over all the vices and virtues peculiar demons and genii, who either imbued the minds of men with certain vices, or adorned them with the contrary virtues. See Hermes' Pastor, and the remarks of Jo. Bapt. Cotelerius on this book, who speaks of the *angels of equity*, *repentance*, *sorrow*, and of other virtues and passions; Recognitiones Clementis lib. 4. cap. 13. p. 541. cap. 3. p. 546. lib. 5. cap. 32 33. p. 554. &c. also what has been collected by Dr. Potter on Clemens Alexandr. t. 1. p. 174.

independent upon any supreme, were it for no other reason but only this, because they have all of them their particular places and provinces, offices and functions severally (as it were) assigned to them, and to which they are confined; so as not to interfere and clash with one another, but agreeably to make up one orderly and harmonious system of the whole; one of those gods ruling only in the heavens, another in the sea, and another in the earth and hell; one being the god or goddess of learning and wisdom, another of speech and eloquence, another of justice and political order; one the god of war, another the god of pleasure; one the god of corn, and another the god of wine, and the like. For how can it be conceived, that a multitude of understanding beings, self-existent and independent, could thus of themselves have fallen into such a uniform order and harmony, and without any clashing, peaceably and quietly sharing the government of the whole world amongst them, should carry it on with such a constant regularity? For which cause we conclude also, that neither those dii majorum gentium, whether the twenty Selecti, or the twelve Consentes, nor yet that triumvirate of gods amongst whom Homer shares the government of the whole world, according to that of Maximus Tyrius:[1] Τριχθὰ Ὁμήρῳ δέδασται τὰ πάντα· Ποσειδῶν μὲν ἔλαχε, πολιὴν ἅλα ναιέμεν αἰεὶ, Ἄιδης δὲ ἔλαχε ζόφον ἠερόεντα, Ζεὺς δὲ οὐρανὸν, "The sea being assigned to Neptune, the dark and subterraneous parts to Pluto, but the heaven to Jupiter;" which three are sometimes called also the celestial, marine, and terrestrial Jupiter; nor lastly, that other Roman and Samothracian trinity of gods, worshipped all together in the capitol, Jupiter, Minerva, and Juno; I say, that none of all these could reasonably be thought by the Pagans themselves, to be so many really distinct, unmade, and self-existent deities.

Wherefore the truth of this whole business seems to be this, that the ancient Pagans did physiologize in their theology; and whether looking upon the whole world animated, as the Supreme God, and consequently the several parts of it as his living members; or else, apprehending it at least to be a mirror, or visible image of the invisible Deity, and consequently all its several parts, and things of nature, but so many several manifestations of the divine power and providence, they pretended, that all their devotion towards the Deity ought not to be huddled up in one general and confused acknowledgment of a supreme invisible Being, the Creator and Governor of all; but that all the several manifestations of the Deity in the world, considered singly and apart by themselves, should be made so many distinct objects of their devout veneration. And therefore in order hereunto did

[1] Diss. 16. p. 163. On all these gods however consult Gerh. Jo. Vossius, De Origine et Progressu Idololatriæ.

they προσωποποιεῖν, "speak of the things in nature, and the parts of the world, as persons," and consequently as so many gods and goddesses; yet so, as that the intelligent might easily understand the meaning, that these were all really nothing else but so many several names and notions of that one Numen, divine force and power, which runs through the whole world, multiformly displaying itself therein. To this purpose Balbus in Cicero; Videtisne, ut à physicis rebus tracta ratio sit ad commentitios et fictos deos? "See you not, how from the things of nature fictitious gods have been made?" And Origen seems to insist upon this very thing, (where Celsus upbraids the Jews and Christians for worshipping one only God) showing, that all that seeming multiplicity of pagan gods could not be understood of so many distinct substantial independent Deities: Δεικνύτω τοίνυν, πῶς αὐτὸς δύναται παραστῆσαι τὸ πλῆθος τῶν καθ' Ἕλληνας θεῶν, ἢ τοὺς λοιποὺς βαρβάρους. Δεικνύτω ὑπόστασιν καὶ οὐσίαν Μνημοσύνης γεννώσης ἀπὸ Διὸς τὰς Μούσας, ἢ Θέμιδος τὰς Ὥρας, ἢ τὰς Χάριτας αἰεὶ γυμνὰς παραστησάτω δύνασθαι κατ' οὐσίαν ὑφεστηκέναι, ἀλλ' οὐ δυνήσεται τὰ Ἑλλήνων ἀναπλάσματα (σωματοποιεῖσθαι δοκοῦντα ἀπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων) δεικνύναι θεούς. To this sense; "Let Celsus therefore himself show, how he is able to make out a multiplicity of gods (substantial and self-existent) according to the Greeks and other Barbarian Pagans; let him declare the essence and substantial personality of that Memory, which by Jupiter generated the muses, or of that Themis, which brought forth the hours; or let him show how the Graces, always naked, do subsist by themselves. But he will never be able to do this, nor to make it appear, that those figments of the Greeks (which seem to be really nothing else but the things of nature turned into persons) are so many distinct (self-existent) deities."[3] Where the latter words are thus rendered in a late edition; Sed nunquam poterit (Celsus) Græcorum figmenta, quæ validiora fieri videntur, ex rebus ipsis deos esse arguere; which we confess we cannot understand; but we conceive the word σωματοποιεῖσθαι, there turned validiora fieri, is here used by Origen in the same sense with προσωποποιεῖσθαι: so that his meaning is, as we have declared, that those figments of the Greeks and other Barbarian Pagans, (which are the same with Balbus' commentitii et ficti Dii)

[1] Lib. 1. p. 18. Edit. Cantab.

[2] De Natura Deor. lib. 2. cap. 28. p. 2995. t. 9. opp.

[3] Dr. Cudworth is wrong here in making the word πρᾶγμα signify *things of nature*. For although Origen was fond of allegory, yet he did not place much value on those physical allegories into which the Stoics and others turned the history of the gods: on the contrary he openly despises them, lib. 4. Contra Celsum, p. 196. &c. To me the plain and obvious sense of Origen's words appears to be: "which seem to have been turned from things into persons;" meaning that the Greeks made gods or persons from things or clothed things in the garb of persons. Observe also, that these words are to be understood only of Mnemosyne, Themis, and the Graces.

are really nothing else but the things of nature, figuratively and fictitiously personated, and consequently not so many distinct substantial deities, but only several notions and considerations of one God, or supreme Numen, in the world.[4]

[4] To me, I confess, the whole of this theory, explaining the fables and histories of the gods on physical grounds and adopted here by the learned Doctor, has always appeared very questionable. Many indeed even of those who are deeply versed in recondite and abstruse matters, consider nothing to be more certain and true; nor am I ignorant, that the most erudite Andr. Christ. Eschenbach not long ago in a specific book, entitled Epigenes or De Poësi Orphica, Norib. 1702. 4. has laboured most strenuously in defence of all that the later Platonists have surmised, for the most part in defiance of all probability, respecting the hidden sense of the ancient fables; not to speak at present of what G. Cuperus on Harpocrates, and many others, have over and over again suggested. But I am convinced notwithstanding, that if learned men had only attentively examined the grounds of these explanations, they would easily have seen that there is nothing in the whole of this system to which any importance can be attached by those who are able to distinguish right from wrong. For the whole rests upon the authority of certain philosophers, who are of too recent date to be believed in all that they have told us out of their own imaginations respecting the doctrines of the ancients. The oldest gods both of the Greek and barbarous nations were men, distinguished among their countrymen for the fame and magnitude of their exploits, and endeared to their recollection by laws, institutions, inventions, and the like, who thus out of gratitude for past benefits were raised by them after death to the rank of gods. The cause why this happened has already been touched upon above. They thought namely that the demons or genii, belonging to that class which God had entrusted with the protection and government of this world, had been shut up for a certain time in the mortal body of Jupiter, Apollo, Isis, &c. that they might the better take care of and administer the affairs of the different nations. But among most of them all natural knowledge of God had not entirely disappeared, and there were not wanting by degrees those who making use of their reason saw, that such ancient heroes could by no means be accounted gods, if all were true that was related of their deeds and origin. At first, therefore, there arose men half poets and half philosophers, who blended the history of these deities with the physical dogmas prevailing in the respective nations at the time, and not only sung of these as having been generated of chaos and night in the very beginning of things, but also invented a new family as it were of gods, distributed according to a variety of functions. Hence those theogonies, examples of which are still extant; which, as any one on attentive perusal will soon perceive, contain a strange and sometimes altogether absurd jumble of ancient history and of the physical science of the period, embellished and amplified by poetic figures. In process of time, however, when various philosophers and physiologers began to appear, this road was by degrees abandoned. For the fictions concerning the gods, interwoven in the poems of Homer, Hesiod, and other poets, were too absurd and foolish to be tolerated by men guided by right reason and possessing intelligence above the vulgar. Therefore, if the matter had depended upon their will, all these poems and fables respecting the gods would have been banished altogether from the several states, and a religion far different from the common one introduced. Take for example Socrates and Plato; the latter of whom in his Euthyphron, p. 48. and elsewhere, represents the former as most highly indignant at the poets, and himself also in his imaginary republic severely proscribes the whole race of poets together with their poems, De Republica, lib. 2. p. 430. &c. But there were two things to prevent the realization of what these philosophers wished, without inconvenience and danger. In the first place the authority of Homer, Hesiod and the other poets stood incredibly high, their poems being text-books to boys in schools, and represented as full of all wisdom by the grammarians and rhetoricians who obtained their livelihood by expounding them. In the next place, the national religion, ceremonies, and festivals depended upon those histories of the gods; to attempt to put an end to which would have been the part of a man wishing to bring down death and destruction upon his own head. It was most dangerous even to enter into dispute with the sophists and priests; nor did many possess the hardihood and magnanimity of Socrates, who declared war against them all, wholly regardless of odium or death. The more prudent,

Now this fictitious personating, and deifying of things, by the Pagan theologers, was done two manner of ways; one, when those things in nature were themselves without any more ado,

therefore, adopted this safer course, accommodating the achievements of the gods to physical matters, and contending that the ancient poets meant to inculcate a far different doctrine from that which their words seemed to imply; thus in a certain manner consulting the interests both of themselves and of reason and philosophy. The truth of this is sufficiently manifest even from what is recorded by Eusebius, De Præpar. Evangel. lib. 1. cap. 9. p. 30. &c. and by Plato, De Republic. lib. 2. p. 429. The road being once opened, it was entered upon by a host of others, each of whom interpreted the history of the gods in his own way. The names of the principal of these, whose works are no longer extant, have been collected from Greek monuments by Th. Gale in his notes on Phornutus, De Natura Deorum, p. 236. which Phornutus was himself of the number. Nor will this appear surprising to any one, not unacquainted with the habits and dispositions of mankind. For not to mention the tendency of most men to consider all science as buried in the grave of the ancients, and the moderns as possessing only its shadow, this course was especially convenient and useful to philosophers and founders of new doctrines, in order to give dignity and eclat to their dogmas and inventions. Every one, indeed, must be aware that if allegories and mystic interpretations be admitted, any history whatever may be twisted into various senses. Suppose, for example, the history of Julius Cæsar or of Alexander the Great to be a fable ingeniously concocted by some philosopher, for the purpose of imparting truth in an occult and recondite manner: this being determined, what, I ask, will become of it? Philosophers will all fly in a body to the interpretation of this fable, and each, if not lacking in ingenuity, will find in it an exemplification of his own theory. One will say, if holding the opinions of Gassendi and others, that the Persian troops are symbols and images of atoms; another of forms and qualities. One will identify Gaul, subdued by Cæsar, with the first matter, another with ether, and another perhaps with the friendship and discord of Empedocles. When once, therefore, the Greek and other nations came to conceive, that the histories of the gods contained the latent seeds of important truths, the force of which it was the province of the wise to develope and disclose, all those who were attached to new opinions, made it their chief point to show, that these were long before signified in the ancient poems. For by persuading others of this they foresaw they would be sufficiently safe from popular odium and the persecutions of the multitude, who placed an infinite value upon these histories. Which things being considered, it will be obvious that it was for the interest of philosophers that this opinion should remain, which afforded them a safe shelter from all attacks. Hence they each endeavoured to draw Homer to his own side; as we may learn from Heraclides' book De Allegoriis Homeri still extant. See Thom. Gale's Scriptores Mythologici, p. 407. &c. Even Epicurus adopted this course, as may be seen from Lucretius, who lib. 2. v. 598. &c. p. 369. interprets the accounts given by the Greek poets concerning the mother of the gods in a physical sense, to show that his opinions were not at variance with the national religion. But none of the Greek philosophers were more zealous in this work than the Stoics, whose diligence in expounding the histories of the gods agreeably with their own opinions, is pleasantly ridiculed by Cicero among others, De Natura Deor. cap. 23. 24. &c. p. 3088. &c. After the birth of our Saviour, when the whole pagan worship was brought under discussion, the polytheists found nothing more available than this explication of the fables and interpretation of the names of the gods, in order to escape the force of the arguments with which Christians attacked them, and to sustain the fabric of their religion already tottering to its fall. And as those philosophers, commonly called the later Platonists, especially exerted themselves in defence of the popular superstitions, which the force of the divine word diffused in every part of the world had completely shaken, so none were more sagacious and subtle than they in interpreting the actions of the gods either in a moral or physiological sense. Of this we have evidence in those works of Porphyry, Proclus, Plotinus, Julian, and others, that have come down to us, which are full of such explications, futile and pointless for the most part, and at all times forced and far-fetched. But as I observe them to be at this day held in high estimation by many even learned men, I wonder these do not recollect that they proceeded from the enemies of Christianity,

or change of names, spoken of as persons, and so made gods and goddesses, as in the many instances before proposed. Another, when there were distinct proper and personal names accommodated severally to those things, as of Minerva to wisdom, of Neptune to the sea, of Ceres to corn, and of Bacchus to wine. In which latter case, those personal names properly signify the invisible divine powers, supposed to preside over those several things in nature; and these are therefore properly those gods and goddesses, which are δωτῆρες ἐάων,[5] "the givers and dispensers of the good things," and the removers of the contrary; but they are used improperly also for the things of nature themselves, which therefore as manifestations of the divine power, goodness and providence personated, are sometimes also abusively called gods and goddesses. This mystery of the pagan polytheism is thus fully declared by Moschopulus:* Ἰστέον, ὅτι πάντα οἱ Ἕλληνες, ἃ δύναμιν ἔχοντα ἑώρων, οὐκ ἄνευ ἐπιστασίας θεῶν τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῶν ἐνεργεῖν ἐνόμιζον, ἑνὶ δὲ ὀνόματι τό τε τὴν δύναμιν ἔχον, καὶ τὸν ἐπιστατοῦντα τοῦτῳ θεὸν ὠνόμαζον· ὅθεν Ἥφαιστον ἐκάλουν τό τε διακονικὸν τοῦτο πῦρ, καὶ τὸν ἐπιστατοῦντα ταῖς διὰ τούτου ἐνεργουμέναις τέχναις, καὶ Δήμητραν τὸν

who had no other means of supporting the desperate cause of their gods, than by those absurd subtleties of which they were unable to give any reason. Although the futility and worthlessness of these allegories is already sufficiently shown by this, that no men are more discordant among themselves than these elegant interpreters forsooth of ancient fables, than whom nothing can be more inconsistent. Therefore those who will have the ancient gods to be natural essences and not figurative personations, ought first of all to decide which of these conjectures they will follow, before they call upon us to adopt their opinions. The ancient champions of Christianity evince a far clearer insight into the craftiness and cunning of these enemies of the truth, inasmuch as in almost all the books formerly written by them in defence of the Christian doctrine, they have convicted these fabricators of allegories of baseness and ignorance; and have shown, that the whole of this machinery was invented for no other reason than as an expedient to veil the deformity of antiquated superstitions. See, of the Greeks, Athenagoras Apolog. cap. 18. p. 80. and Eusebius Præpar. Evangel. lib. 2. cap. 4. p. 67. &c. but especially the author of the Clementina, who surpasses most of the others in perspicuity and weight of argument, Homil. 6. cap. 17. &c. p. 675. &c. compared with Recognit. Clementis, lib. 10. cap. 30. p. 595. &c. tom. 1. Patr. Apost. Of the Latins it will be worth while to consult Arnobius Adv. Gentes, lib. 3. p. 147. lib. 5. p. 225. &c. Prudentius, De Coronis Hymn. 109. p. 112. Lactantius, Divin. Institut. lib. 2. cap. 10. p. 222. Although these things are so, I will not deny however, that poetic figures and other things by degrees caused other gods to be added to those ancient ones, which no one in his senses can for one moment suppose to be men: of which examples will be given in the sequel. Compare what has already been ingeniously remarked on this subject by the learned J. Le Clerc. Biblioth. Chois. tom. 7. p. 92. also Biblioth. Univers. et Histor. tom. 1. p. 245. on the history of Jason and Hercules, tom. 3. on the history of Adonis, tom. 6. p. 55. on the mysteries of Ceres; also in the notes Ad Hesiodum, on most of the Grecian gods. I pass over Bochart, Banier, and other eminent writers, who have touched upon the same matters.

[5] Hesiod. in Theogon. v. 111. p. 21. says:

Οἵ τ' ἐκ τῶν ἐγένοντο θεοί, δωτῆρες ἐάων·

"Celebrate, ye Muses, the gods, who sprung from Heaven and earth are the dispensers of good things."

* In Hesiod. p. 1.

σῖτον καὶ τοὺς καρποὺς, καὶ τὴν δωρουμένην τούτους Θεὸν καὶ ἐπιστατοῦσαν αὐτοῖς, καὶ Ἀθήνην τὴν φρόνησιν, καὶ τὴν ἔφορον τῆς φρονήσεως Θεὸν· καὶ τὸν Διόνυσον τὸν οἶνον καὶ τὸν διδόντα τοῦτον Θεόν· ὃν καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ διδόναι τὸν οἶνον ὁ Πλάτων παράγει, καὶ Διδοίνυσον τοῦτον ποιεῖ εἶτα καὶ Διόνυσον· καὶ Εἰλειθυίας τοὺς τόκους, καὶ τὰς ἐφορώσας τοὺς τόκους Θεάς· καὶ Ἀφροδίτην τὴν συνουσίαν καὶ ἐπιστατοῦσαν ταύτῃ Θεὸν, κατὰ τοῦτο καὶ Μούσας ἔλεγον τάς τε λογικὰς τέχνας, οἷον ῥητορικὴν, ἀστρονομίαν κωμωδίαν, τραγωδίαν, καὶ τὰς ἐφόρους καὶ παρόχους τούτων Θεάς, "We must know, that whatsoever the Greeks (or Pagans) saw to have any power, virtue or ability in it, they looked upon it as not acting according to such power, without the providence, presidency, or influence of the gods; and they called both the thing itself which hath the power, and the deity presiding over it, by one and the same name: whence the ministerial fire used in mechanic arts, and the god presiding over those arts that work by fire, were both alike called Hephestus or Vulcan; so the name Demetra or Ceres was given as well to corn and fruits, as to that goddess which bestows them; Athena or Minerva did alike signify wisdom and the goddess which is the dispenser of it; Dionysus or Bacchus, wine, and the god that giveth wine: (whence Plato etymologizes the name from giving of wine.) In like manner, they called both the child-bearing of women, and the goddesses that superintended over the same, Eilithyia or Lucina; Coitus or copulation, and the deity presiding over it, Aphrodite or Venus. And lastly, in the same manner, by the Muses they signified both those rational arts, rhetoric, astronomy, poetry, and the goddesses, which assist therein or promote the same." Now, as the several things in nature and parts of the corporeal world are thus metonymically and catachrestically called gods and goddesses, it is evident, that such deities as these could not be supposed to be unmade or self-existent, by those who acknowledged the whole world to have been generated and had a beginning. But as these names were used more properly, to signify invisible and understanding powers, presiding over the things of nature, and dispensing of them, however they have an appearance of so many several distinct deities; yet they seem to have been all really nothing else, but as Balbus in Cicero[6] expresses it, Deus pertinens per naturam cujusque rei, "God passing through, and acting in the nature of every thing;" and consequently but several names, or so many different notions and

[6] De Natura Deor. lib. 2. cap. 28. p. 2996. tom. 9. opp. Sed tamen, says he, his fabulis spretis atque repudiatis, Deus pertinens per naturam cujusque rei, per terras Ceres, per maria Neptunus, alii per alia, poterunt intelligi, "but yet, disregarding and repudiating these fables, we shall be able to understand thereby God passing through the nature of every thing, Ceres through the earth, Neptune through the seas, and others through other things."

considerations of that one supreme Numen, that divine force, power, and providence, which runs through the whole world, as variously manifesting itself therein.

Wherefore, since there were no other kinds of gods amongst the Pagans, besides these already enumerated, unless their images, statues and symbols should be accounted such, (because they were also sometimes abusively called gods) which could not be supposed by them to have been unmade or without a beginning, they being the workmanship of men's own hands; we conclude universally, that all the multiplicity of pagan gods, which makes so great a show and noise, was really either nothing but several names and notions of one supreme Deity, according to its different manifestations, gifts and effects in the world, personated; or else many inferior understanding beings, generated or created by one supreme: so that one unmade self-existent Deity, and no more was acknowledged by the more intelligent of the ancient Pagans, (for of the sottish vulgar no man can pretend to give an account in any religion) and consequently the pagan polytheism (or idolatry) consisted not in worshipping a multiplicity of unmade minds, deities, and creators, self-existent from eternity, and independent upon one supreme; but in mingling and blending, some way or other, unduly, creature-worship with the worship of the creator.

And that the ancient pagan Theists thus acknowledged one supreme God, who was the only Θεὸς ἀγέννητος, "unmade and unproduced Deity," (I say Theists, because those amongst the Pagans, who admitted of many gods, but none at all unmade, were absolute Atheists) this may be undeniably concluded from what was before proved, that they acknowledged omnipotence or infinite power to be a divine attribute. Because upon the hypothesis of many unmade self-existent deities, it is plain, that there could be none omnipotent, and consequently no such thing as omnipotence in rerum natura: and therefore omnipotence was rightly and properly styled by Macrobius,[7] summi Dei omnipotentia, it being an attribute essentially peculiar to one supreme and sole self-existent Deity. And Simplicius,[8] likewise a Pagan, confuted the Manichean hypothesis of two self-existent deities from hence

[7] He intended, I suppose, the following passage of Macrobius, In Somnium Scipionis, lib. 1. cap. 17. p. 87. Deum vero, quod non modo mortale animal ac divinum sit, plenum inclytæ ex illa purissima mente rationis, sed quod et virtutes omnes, quæ *illam primæ omnipotentiam summitatis sequuntur*, aut ipse faciat, aut ipse contineat, ipsum denique Jovem veteres vocaverunt, "But the God, who is not only an immortal and divine animal, full of transcendent reason from that most pure mind, but also himself either forms or contains all the virtues which belong to the *omnipotence of the highest supreme*, him the ancients call Jupiter."

[8] I can scarcely assent to Dr. Cudworth's opinion, that Simplicius in these words is confuting those, who according to the Manichean hypothesis, supposed two eternal and equal principles. His words: Καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν παρ' αὐτοῖς λεγόμενος θεός, "The good principle called by them God," if I mistake not, make against it. For they clearly show, that those whom Simplicius censures held only the good principle to be

also, because it destroyed omnipotence:* Ἀναγκάζονται δυό λέγοντες τῶν ὅλων ἀρχὰς (τό τε ἀγαθὸν καὶ το κακὸν) καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν παρ' αὐτοῖς λεγόμενον Θεὸν, μηκέτι πάντων αἴτιον λέγειν, μηδὲ ὡς παντοκράτορα δικαίως ἀνυμνεῖν, μηδὲ δύναμιν αὐτῷ τὴν ἀκροτάτην καὶ ὅλην ἀνατιθέναι, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἡμισὺ τῆς ὅλης δυνάμεως, εἴπερ ἄρα καὶ τοῦτο, "For they, who assert two principles of the universe, (one good, the other evil) are necessitated to grant, that the good principle, called by them God, is not the cause of all things, neither can they praise it as omnipotent, nor ascribe a perfect and whole entire power to it, but only the half of a whole power at most, if so much." Over and besides all which, it hath been also proved already, that the ancient Atheists under paganism directed themselves principally against the opinion of monarchy, or of one supreme Deity ruling over all; from whence it plainly appears, that it was then asserted by the pagan Theists.

And we think it here observable, that this was a thing so generally confessed and acknowledged, that Faustus the Manichean took up this conceit, that both the Christians and Jews paganized in the opinion of monarchy, that is, derived this doctrine of one Deity, the sole principle of all things, only by tradition from the Pagans, and by consequence were no other than schisms or subdivided sects of paganism.[9] Vos desciscentes à gentibus (saith he) monarchiæ opinionem primò vobiscum divulsistis, id est, ut omnia credatis ex deo. Estis sanè schisma, necnon et priores vestri Judæi. De opinione monarchiæ, in nullo etiam ipsi dissentiunt à paganis. Quare constat vos atque Judæos schisma esse gentilitatis. Sectas autem si quæras, non plures erunt quàm duæ, Gentium et nostra, "You revolting from the Gentiles, broke off their opinion of monarchy, and carried it along with you, so as to believe all things to come from God. Wherefore you are really nothing but a schism of paganism, or a subdivided branch of it, and so are your predecessors the Jews; who differ nothing from Pagans neither in this opinion of monarchy. Whence it is manifest, that both Christians and Jews are but schisms of Gentilism. But as for sects of religion, really differing from another, there are but these two, that of the Pagans, and that of ours, who altogether dissent from them." Now though this be false and foolish, as to the Christians and Jews deriving that opinion of monarchy, only by way of tradition, from the Pagans, which is a thing founded in the principles of nature; yet it sufficiently shows this to have been the

God, not the evil likewise; a proof that they belonged to that class who, as Plutarch informs us, De Iside et Osiride, p. 369. called the better principle *God* and the worse *demon*, or, which is the same thing, supposed these two principles to be of unequal rank and power.

* In Epict. cap. 4. [Potius in cap. 34. p. 164. Edit. Salmas.]

[9] S. Aug. contra Faust. lib. 20. [Cap. 4. p. 237. t. 8. opp.] These words of Faustus do not occur in continued order in St. Augustine, but are collected by the learned Doctor from different parts of his discourse.

general sense of the Pagans, that all their gods were derived from one sole self-existent Deity; so that they neither acknowledged a multitude of unmade deities, nor yet that duplicity of them, which Plutarch contended for, (one good and the other evil) who accordingly denied God to be the cause of all things, writing thus in his defect of oracles:[10] Οἱ μὲν οὐδενὸς ἁπλῶς τὸν Θεὸν, οἱ δὲ ὁμοῦ τι πάντων αἴτιον ποιοῦντες, ἀστοχοῦσι τοῦ μετρίου καὶ πρέποντος, "They are guilty of one extreme, who make God the cause of nothing, and they of another, who make him the cause of all things." But this paradox was both late started amongst the Greeks, and quickly cried down by the succession of their philosophers, and therefore prejudiceth not the truth of Faustus' general assertion concerning the Pagans. Which is again fully confirmed by St. Austin in his reply:* Siquis ità dividat, ut dicat eorum, quæ aliquâ religione detinentur, aliis placere unum Deum colendum, aliis multos: per hanc differentiam et pagani à nobis remoti sunt, et Manichæi cum paganis deputantur, nos autem cum Judæis. Hic fortè dicatis, quòd multos deos vestros ex una substantia perhibetis; quasi pagani multos suos, non ex una asserant, quamvis diversa illis officia, et opera, et potestates illis attribuant; sicut etiam apud vos alius deus expugnat gentem tenebrarum, alius ex eâ captâ fabricat mundum, &c. "If one should make another distribution of religionists into such as worship either one God, or many gods; according to this division, the Pagans will be removed from us Christians, and joined with you Manicheans. But perhaps you will here say, that all your many gods are derived from one substance; as if the Pagans did not also derive all their gods from one, though attributing several offices, works, and powers to them; in like manner as amongst you, one God expugns the nation of darkness, another God makes a world out of it," &c. And again afterwards he writes further to the same purpose:† Discat ergò Faustus monarchiæ opinionem non ex gentibus nos habere, sed gentes non usque adeò ad falsos deos esse dilapsas, ut opinionem amitterent unius veri dei, ex quo est omnis qualiscunque natura, "Let Faustus therefore know, that we Christians have not derived the opinion of monarchy from the Pagans, but that the Pagans have not so far degenerated, sinking down into the worship of false gods, as to have lost the opinion of one true God, from whom is all whatsoever nature."

XIV. It follows from what we have declared, that the Pagan polytheism or multiplicity of gods is not to be understood in the sense before expressed, of many Θεοὶ ἀγέννητοι καὶ αὐθυπόστατοι, "many unproduced and self-existent deities," but according to some other notion or equivocation of the word gods. For God

[10] Tom. 2. p. 414. opp.

* Lib. 20. [c. 10. p. 241. tom. 8. opp.]

† St. Aug. contra Faust. lib. 20. c. 19. [p. 246.]

is τῶν πολλαχῶς λεγομένων, "one of those words, that hath been used in many different senses," the Atheists themselves acknowledging a God and gods, according to some private senses of their own (which yet they do not all agree in neither), and Theists not always having the same notion of that word; forasmuch as angels in Scripture are called gods in one sense, that is, as understanding beings superior to men, immortal, holy, and happy; and the word is again sometimes carried down lower to princes and magistrates; and not only so, but also to good men as such, when they are said to be made partakers of the divine nature.[1] And thus that learned philosopher and Christian Boethius,[2] Omnis beatus deus; sed natura quidem unus, participatione verò nihil prohibet esse quamplurimos, "Every good and happy man is a god, and though there be only one God by nature, yet nothing hinders but that there may be many by participation." But then again, all men and angels are alike denied to be gods in other respects, and particularly as to religious worship: "Thou shalt worship the Lord thy God, and him only shalt thou serve." Now this is that, which seems to be essentially included in the pagan notion of the word God or gods, when taken in general, namely, a respect to religious worship. Wherefore a God in general, according to the sense of the pagan Theists, may be thus defined: "An understanding being superior to men, not originally derived from senseless matter, and looked upon as an object for men's religious worship." But this general notion of the word God is again restrained and limited by differences, in the division of it. For such a God as this may be either ἀγέννητος, "ingenerate," or "unproduced," and consequently self-existent; or else γεννητὸς, "generated," or "produced," and dependent on some higher being as its cause. In the former sense, the intelligent Pagans, as we have declared, acknowledged only one God, who was therefore called by them ὁ θεὸς κατ' ἐξοχὴν, according to that of Thales in Laërtius:[3] Πρεσβύτατον τῶν ὄντων ὁ θεὸς, ἀγέννητον γάρ, "God is the oldest of all things, because he is unmade or unproduced, and the only thing that is so:" but in the latter they admitted of many gods, many understanding beings,

[1] 2 Pet. i. 4. Διὰ τούτων γένησθε θείας κοινωνοὶ φύσεως, "That by these ye might be made partakers of the divine nature." But I doubt whether these words of Peter are here to the purpose. For holy men are not here called gods, which savours more of the Stoic and Platonic than of the Christian doctrine, but, as the context shows, are said to come nearest to the nature of God, who is most holy, if they give themselves to holiness, and with sincere piety put off the corrupt manners of the age.

[2] De Consolat. Philos. lib. 3. p. 72. &c. I am not surprised at Boëthius speaking in this manner, whose books show him to have been a most devoted admirer of Plato. For it is a common practice with the Stoics and Platonists to call men gods, as supposing that the sovereign portion of man, namely, the mind and rational soul, emanated from God himself, and is a part of God; and that if a man bestows due care on this part, and abstracts it from the body, he then becomes wholly like unto God, nay altogether a god.

[3] Lib. 1. segm. 35. p. 21. &c.

which, though generated or produced, yet were superior to men, and looked upon as objects for their religious worship. And thus the pagan Theists were both Polytheists and Monotheists in different senses, they acknowledged both many gods and one God; that is, many inferior deities, subordinate to one supreme. Thus Onatus the Pythagorean in Stobæus declares himself:* Δοκεῖ δέ μοι, καὶ μὴ εἷς εἰ μὲν ὁ θεὸς, ἀλλ' εἷς μὲν ὁ μέγιστος, καὶ καθ-ύπέρτερος, καὶ ὁ κρατέων τοῦ παντός· οἱ δ' ἄλλοι πολλοὶ διαφέροντες κατὰ δύναμιν, βασιλεύει δὲ πάντων αὐτῶν ὁ καὶ κράτει καὶ μεγέθει καὶ ἀρετᾷ μείζων· οὗτος δὲ καὶ εἷη ὁ περιέχων τὸν σύμπαντα κόσμον· τοὶ δ' ἄλλοι οἱ θεόντές εἰσι κατ' οὐρανὸν σύν τε τοῦ παντὸς περιαγήσει, κατὰ λόγον ὑποθέοντες τῷ πρώτῳ καὶ νοητῷ, "It seemeth to me, that there is not only one God, but that there is one the greatest and highest God, that governeth the whole world, and that there are many other gods besides him differing as to power, that one God reigning over them all, who surmounts them all in power, greatness, and virtue. That is that God, who contains and comprehends the whole world; but the other gods are those who, together with the revolution of the universe, orderly follow that first and intelligible God." Where it is evident, that Onatus' πολλοὶ θεοὶ, or "many gods," were only the heavenly bodies, or animated stars. And partly from those words cited, but chiefly others, which follow after in the same place (that will be produced elsewhere), it plainly appears, that in Onatus' time there were some who acknowledged one only God, denying all those other gods then commonly worshipped. And indeed Anaxagoras seems to have been such a one; forasmuch as asserting one perfect mind ruling over all (which is the true Deity), he effectually degraded all those other pagan gods, the sun, moon, and stars from their godships, by making the sun nothing but a globe of fire, and the moon earth and stones, and the like of the other stars and planets. And some such there were also amongst the ancient Egyptians, as shall be declared in due place. Moreover, Proclus upon Plato's Timæus† tells us, that there hath been always less doubt and controversy in the world concerning the one God, than concerning the many gods. Wherefore Onatus here declares his own sense, as to this particular, viz., that besides the one supreme God, there were also many other inferior deities, that is, understanding beings, that ought to be religiously worshipped.

But because it is not impossible, but that there might be imagined one supreme Deity, though there were many other θεοὶ ἀγέννητοι, unmade and self-existent gods besides, as Plutarch supposed before, one supreme God, together with a ψυχὴ ἄνους, "an irrational soul or demon unmade," inferior in power to it; therefore we add in the next place, that the more intelligent Pagans did not only assert one God, that was supreme and

* Ecl. Phys. lib. 1. p. 4. Edit. Plantin. † P. 106.

κράτιστος πάντων, "the most powerful of all the gods," but also, who being omnipotent was the principle and cause of all the rest, and therefore the only θεὸς ἀγέννητος καὶ αὐθυπόστατος, "the only unproduced and self-existent Deity." Maximus Tyrius affirms this to have been the general sense of all the Pagans,* that there was Θεὸς εἷς πάντων βασιλεὺς καὶ πατὴρ, καὶ θεοὶ πολλοὶ, θεοῦ παῖδες, συνάρχοντες θεῷ, "One God the king and father of all, and many gods, the sons of God, reigning together with God." Neither did the poets imply any thing less, when Ζεὺς was so often called by the Greeks, and Jupiter by the Latins, πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε, and hominum pater atque deorum, or, hominum satorque deorum, and the like. And indeed the theogonia of the ancient Pagans before mentioned was commonly thus declared by them universally, γεννητοὺς τοὺς θεοὺς εἶναι, "that the gods were generated," or, as Herodotus[4] expresseth it, ὅτι ἕκαστος τῶν θεῶν ἐγένετο, "that every one of the gods was generated or produced;" which yet is not so to be understood, as if they had therefore supposed no God at all unmade or self-existent (which is absolute atheism), but that the οἱ θεοὶ, "the gods," as distinguished from the ὁ Θεὸς or τὸ Θεῖον, from God, or the supreme Deity, were all of them universally made or generated.

But to the end that we may now render this business yet something more easy to be believed, that the intelligent Pagans did thus suppose all their gods save one to have been made or generated, and consequently acknowledged only one θεὸν ἀγέννητον καὶ αὐθυπόστατον, "one unproduced and self-existent Deity," we shall in this place further observe, that the theogonia of those ancient Pagans, their genesis and generation of gods, was really one and the same thing with the cosmogonia, the genesis and generation of the world, and indeed both of them understood of a temporary production both of these gods, and the world. And this we shall first prove from Plato in his Timæus; where he being to treat of the cosmogonia, premiseth this distinction concerning two heads of being; that some were eternal and never made, and some again made or generated, the former whereof he calls οὐσία or essence, the latter γένεσις or generation: adding also this difference betwixt them, that the eternal and immutable things were the proper objects of science and demonstration, but the other generated things of faith and opinion only; Ὅ, τι γὰρ πρὸς γένεσιν οὐσία, τοῦτο πρὸς πίστιν ἀλήθεια,[5] "For what essence is to generation, the same is certainty of truth or knowledge to faith." And thereupon he declares, that his reader was not to expect the same evidence and certainty of truth from him, where he was now to treat of things

* Diss. 1. p. 5. Edit. Lugd. 1631. in 8vo.
[4] Histor. lib. 2. cap. 53. p. 109.
[5] In Timæo, p. 526. opp. The words following occur also in the same passage.

generated (namely, the gods. and the visible world), as if he had been to discourse about things immutable and eternal, in these words: Ἐὰν οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, πολλὰ πολλῶν εἰπόντων περὶ θεῶν καὶ τῆς τοῦ παντὸς γενέσεως, &c. "If, therefore, O Socrates, many things having been spoken by many men, concerning the gods and the generation of the universe, we be not able to discourse demonstratively concerning the same, you ought not at all to wonder at it, or be displeased with us, but on the contrary to rest well satisfied with our performance, if upon this argument we do but deliver probabilities." Where the gods are by Plato plainly referred to *γένεσις* and not to *οὐσία*, to generation and not to eternal or immutable essence, as they are also joined with the generation of the world, as being but a part thereof. Neither is this at all to be wondered at in Plato, since first the whole visible world was no less to him, than it was to the other Pagans, a god; he calling it θεὸν εὐδαίμονα,[6] "a happy God," and before it was yet made, θεὸν ἐσόμενον, "a God about to be made." Not as if Plato accounted the senseless matter of this corporeal world, whether as perfectly dead and stupid, or as endued with a plastic nature only, to be a god (for no inanimate thing was a god to Plato), but because he supposed the world to be an animal, endued with an intellectual soul, and indeed the best of all animals compounded of soul and body: Οὕτως οὖν δὴ κατὰ λόγον τὸν εἰκότα δεῖ λέγειν, τόνδε τὸν κόσμον ζῶον ἔμψυχον ἔννουν τε τῇ ἀληθείᾳ διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ γενέσθαι πρόνοιαν, "Wherefore we are thus according to probability to conclude, that this world was really made by the providence of God an intellectual animal;" whence from an animal forthwith it became a god. So that here we are to take notice of two gods in Plato, very different from one another; one a generated god, this whole world animated, and another that God, by whose providence this world was generated, and thus made an animal and a god; which latter must needs be an unmade, self-existent Deity, and not belong to *γένεσις* but to *οὐσία*, not to generation, but to immutable essence. Again, those greater parts of the world, the sun, the moon, and the stars (as supposed also to be animated with particular souls of their own) were as well accounted by Plato, as by the other Pagans, gods, he plainly calling them there ὁρατοὶ καὶ γεννητοὶ θεοὶ "visible and generated gods." Besides which celestial gods, the earth itself also is supposed by him to be either a god or goddess, according to those ancient copies of the Timæus[7] used

[6] Ibid. cap. 18. p. 241. ed. Fabricii. Οὗτος δὴ πᾶς ὢν ἀεὶ λογισμὸς θεοῦ περὶ τὸν ποτε ἐσόμενον θεὸν λογισθείς, "This God, who was, meditating concerning the God about to be made;" and a little afterwards. Διὰ πάντα δὴ ταῦτα εὐδαίμονα αὐτὸν θεὸν ἐγεννήσατο, "Thus the eternal God generated this perfectly happy God."

[7] In the copies of Plato in use at this day, the reading of this passage, which occurs cap. 25. p. 248. is: Πρώτην καὶ πρεσβυτάτην σωμάτων: but Cicero, as is evident

both by Cicero and Proclus: Γῆν δὲ, τροφὸν μὲν ἡμετέραν, εἱλουμένην δὲ περὶ πὸν διὰ παντὸς πόλον τεταμένον, φύλακα καὶ δημιουργὸν νυκτός τε καὶ ἡμέρας, ἐμηχανήσατο, πρώτην καὶ πρεσβυτάτην θεῶν, ὅσοι ἐντὸς οὐρανοῦ γεγόνασι, "God fabricated the earth also, which is our nurse, turning round upon the axis of the world, and thereby causing and maintaining the succession of day and night, the first and oldest of all the gods generated within the heavens." Where since that philosopher seems the rather to make the earth an animal and a God, because of its diurnal circumgyration upon its own axis, we may conclude, that afterwards, when in his old age (as Plutarch[8] records from Theo-

from his Latin version, and Proclus read θεῶν. So also Chalcidius, who, Comm. in Timæum, p. 248. translates the passage thus: Terram antiquissimam et eximiæ dignitatis Deam, ex eorum numero, qui intra mundi ambitum continentur, Deorum, "The earth, the most ancient and dignified of all the gods, contained within the compass of the world." And in my own opinion this reading is altogether preferable to the received one. For Plato, after interposing something concerning the stars, thus concludes his discourse: Ἀλλὰ ταῦτά τε ἱκανῶς ἡμῖν ταύτῃ καὶ τὰ περὶ θεῶν ὁρατῶν καὶ γεννητῶν εἰρημένα φύσεως ἔχεται τέλος, "But these we have spoken of sufficiently; and thus we finish what we have said respecting the nature of visible and generated gods." Which words clearly show, that he ranked the earth also among the gods which are visible and generated, and of whose generation he had been discoursing. Nor did Diogenes Laërtius read differently, who, De Vitis Philos. lib. 3. segm. 75. p. 211. numbers this among Plato's dogmas, γῆν δὲ πρεσβυτάτην εἶναι τῶν ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ θεῶν, "that the earth is the oldest of the gods in heaven." In the very same manner, to omit others, Plotinus, lib. 2. De Dubiis Animæ Ennead. 4. lib. 4. cap. 22. p. 414. Add to these a passage of Cicero, De Natura Deor. lib. 1. c. 12. p. 2898. Idem (Plato) et in Timæo dicit, et in Legibus, et mundum *Deum* esse, et cœlum, et astra, et *terram*, et animos, et eos, quos majorum institutis accepimus, "The same Plato says both in his Timæus and his laws, that both the world is *God*, and heaven, and the stars, and *earth*, and souls, and those whom we have received as such from the institutions of our ancestors." Let critics, therefore, if they like, emend Plato's passage. The reading σωμάτων, found in our present copies, some critic, I suspect, was bold enough to introduce into Plato from Timæus Locrus' book De Anima Mundi. For this Timæus, p. 552. in. Thom. Gale's Opuscula Veterum Mytholog. has the following concerning the earth: Πρέσβυστα δ' ἐντὶ τῶν ἐντὸς ὡρανῷ ΣΩΜΑΤΩΝ, "It is the oldest of all the *bodies* in the universe." Some learned man having fallen upon this passage, and considered that Plato in the Timæus is not so much expounding his own opinions as those of that ancient Timæus, made no doubt but that the word θεῶν in Plato was a false reading, and that the σωμάτων of Timæus ought to be substituted in its stead.

[8] Plutarch in Quæstion. Platonic. p. 1006. speaks thus of Plato: Θεόφραστος δὲ καὶ προσιστορεῖ, τῷ Πλάτωνι πρεσβυτέρῳ γενομένῳ μεταμελεῖν, ὡς οὐ προσήκουσαν ἀποδόντι τῇ γῇ τὴν μέσην χώραν τοῦ παντός, "Theophrastus likewise informs us that Plato, now grown old, repented of having assigned to the earth the middle place in the universe, not its proper one." The like he says in his Life of Numa, t. 1. opp. p. 312. stating that Plato, in the latter years of his life, assigned the middle place of the universe to some more excellent nature than the earth. If this be true, we may gather from thence that Plato in his old age placed fire, as it is well known the Pythagoreans did, in the centre of the world, where he had before placed the earth. I should not find fault with any one for supposing, that under the name of that more excellent nature to which Plato assigned the central place of the world, we ought to understand the fountain itself of all light and heat, namely the sun. For so, I am aware, it appeared to some most eminent Pythagoreans. But I doubt whether these passages of Plutarch will bear the inference drawn from them by Dr. Cudworth, that Plato entertained the same opinion which Nic. Copernicus broached at a later period, that the earth revolves like a planet round the sun. For he who expels the earth from the

phrastus), he gave entertainment also to that other part of the Pythagoric hypothesis, and attributed to the earth a planetary annual motion likewise about the sun (from whence it would follow that, as Plotinus[9] expresseth it, the earth was ἓν τῶν ἄστρων, "one of the stars"), he was therefore still so much the more inclined to think the earth to be a god as well as the other planets, or at least as the moon; that having been formerly represented in the Orphic tradition but as another habitable earth. For these verses of Orpheus are recorded by Proclus,[10] to that purpose;

> Μήσατο δ' ἄλλην γαῖαν ἀπείρατον, ἣν τε Σελήνην
> Ἀθάνατοι καλέουσιν, ἐπιχθόνιοι δέ τε Μήνην,
> Ἣ πόλλ' οὔρε' ἔχει, πόλλ' ἄστεα, πολλὰ μέλαθρα.

The sense whereof is this; "That God in the cosmogonia or cosmopœia, beside this earth of ours, fabricated also another vast earth, which the immortal gods call Selene, but mortal men Mene or the moon; that hath many hills and vallies, many cities and houses in it." From whence Proclus, though as it seems a stranger to the Pythagoric system, yet being much addicted to these Orphic* traditions, concluded the moon to be γῆν αἰθερίαν,[1] "an ethereal earth."[2]

central place of the world does not necessarily rank it among the planets revolving annually round the sun. Indeed, I fear the learned Doctor has here also sacrificed too much to his partiality for his own opinions.

[9] See lib. 2. De Dubiis Animæ, Ennead. 4. lib. 4. cap. 4. p. 414. where he argues at great length that the earth, like the stars, is both animated and a god. But do not suppose that Plotinus held the earth to be a star: for this he denies in his book De Cœlo, Ennead. 2. lib. 1. cap. 7. p. 101.

[10] Comm. in Timæum Platonis, lib. 4. p. 283. Add what the same Proclus says respecting this ethereal earth, lib. 5. p. 292.

* See Macrob. Som. Scip. lib. 1. cap. 2. p. 58.

[1] Macrobius, In Somnium Scipionis, lib. 1. cap. 11. p. 58. says: Lunam æthereum, terram physici vocaverunt, et habitatores ejus lunares populos nuncuparunt, quod ita esse, plurimis argumentis, quæ nunc longum est enumerare, docuerunt, "Physiologers have called the moon an ethereal earth, and its inhabitants the lunar people: which they have proved to be the case by arguments too numerous to be now given in detail." On which passage it will be worth while to read the remarks of Isaac Pontanus.

[2] I have here a few remarks to make generally. I. I should be willing to admit the truth to a certain extent of what the learned Doctor lays down as the basis of his disputation, that the theogonies of the ancients are nothing but cosmogonies; provided we add what is manifest from Hesiod and others, that the poets who composed those theogonies mixed up at random the opinions of philosophers with ancient histories, and to both added some foolish and absurd things of their own: of which matter I have already spoken above. II. But how this is proved from the fact, that Plato in his Timæus, when treating of the origin and fabrication of the world, discourses of the generation of the gods at the same time, I cannot well understand. For in my judgment it is not fair to reason in this wise: Plato relates that the gods were generated at the same time in which the world was generated and made by God; therefore all the theogonies of the ancients were cosmogonies. III. Nor if that were true, would it immediately be evident from thence, that the ancients made one supreme God preside over this generation of gods and construction of the world. For many, I suspect, of those who wrote theogonies were of opinion, that the whole host of gods worshipped by the people, as well as everything else in the universe, sprung

After all this, Plato, that he might be thought to omit nothing in his Timæan cosmogonia, speaks also of the genesis, ortus, or generation of the poetic gods, under the name of demons, such as Tethys and Phorcys, Saturn and Rhea, Jupiter, and Juno, and the like; which seem to be really nothing else, but the other inanimate parts of the world and things of nature θεοποιηθέντα, that is "fictitiously personated and deified" (as is elsewhere declared). Which whole business was a thing set off by those poets with much fiction and physiological allegory. And though Plato,[3] out of seeming compliance with the laws of his city, pretends here to give credit to this poetic theogonia, as tradition delivered down from the sons of the gods, who must not be supposed to have been ignorant of their parents; yet, as Eusebius[4] well observeth, he doth but all the while slyly jeer it, plainly insinuating the fabulosity thereof, when he affirmeth it to have been introduced not only ἄνευ ἀναγκαίων ἀποδείξεων,[5] "without necessary demonstrations," but also ἄνευ εἰκότων, "without so much as probabilities." Nevertheless Proclus[6] suspecting no such matter, but taking Plato in all this to have been in very good earnest, interprets these poetic gods or demons mentioned by him, to be the gods below the moon, (notwithstanding that the earth was mentioned before by Plato) calling them γενεσιούργους θεούς, "the gods that cause generation," and seeming to understand thereby the animated elements; Jupiter being here not taken, as he is often elsewhere, for the supreme God, but only for the animated ether, as Juno for the animated air. And upon this occasion he runs out into a long dispute, to prove,

from the commotion of rude and undigested matter. Dr. Cudworth admits this in more places than one. IV. As to his statement that Plato, if in his old age he believed the earth to revolve by an annual motion round the sun, must have supposed the earth to be a god, we ought not to interpret it simply and absolutely, but agreeably to Plato's own doctrines. That philosopher maintained that no motion can take place without soul; and the soul be held to be of divine origin. Therefore if he supposed the earth to move round the sun, he must have supposed also that it contained a soul, and therefore that it concealed in itself a god or something divine: if indeed he wished to teach what was consistent and in accordance with his other precepts.

[3] Plato, as is well known, in his book De Legibus, banishes the fables concerning the gods from his republic on account of their impiety.

[4] See his Præpar. Evangel. lib. 2. cap. 7. p. 75. 76.

[5] The philosopher's own words in the Timæus, cap. 26. p. 249. are these: Ἀδύνατον οὖν θεῶν παισὶν ἀπιστεῖν, καίπερ ἄνευ τε εἰκότων καὶ ἀναγκαίων ἀποδείξεων λέγουσιν, "It is impossible not to believe the sons of the gods, although they speak without probabilities and conclusive arguments." These sons of the gods, to whom Plato considers credit should be attached without arguments, are the ancient poets who wrote theogonies, and whom in other places he severely censures and declares to be intolerable in a state. Which of itself is a proof, that Plato is jesting in this place and makes mention of these poetic deities for no other purpose than that he might not like Socrates be accused before the magistrates of impiety. Although it is already sufficiently clear from this, that in this place he does not treat of these poetic gods, but only touches upon them most briefly, and does not hint one word as to what sort of gods he supposes them to be.

[6] Comm. in Timæum Platonis, lib. 4. p. 287.

that not only the stars were animated, but also all the other sublunary bodies or elements: Εἰ γὰρ ὅλος ὁ κόσμος θεὸς εὐδαίμων ἐστὶ, οὐδέν ἐστι τῶν συμπληρούντων αὐτὸν μορίων ἄθεον, καὶ ἀπρονόητον, εἰ δὲ καὶ θεοῦ πάντα μετέχει καὶ προνοίας, θείαν ἔλαχε φύσιν, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ οἰκεῖαι τάξεις θεῶν ἐφεστήκασιν αὐτοῖς, εἰ γὰρ καὶ ὁ οὐρανὸς διὰ μέσων ψυχῶν καὶ νόων μετέχει τῆς μιᾶς ψυχῆς, καὶ τοῦ ἑνὸς νοῦ, τί χρὴ περὶ τούτων οἴεσθαι τῶν στοιχείων; πῶς οὐ πολλῷ μᾶλλον ταῦτα διὰ δή τινων μέσων θείων τάξεων μετείληχε τῆς μιᾶς τοῦ κόσμου θεότητος, "For if the whole world be a happy God, then none of the parts of it are godless, or devoid of providence; but if all things partake of God and providence, then are they not unfurnished of the divine nature; and if so, there must be some peculiar orders of gods presiding over them. For if the heavens by reason of particular souls and minds partake of that one soul and one mind; why should we not conclude the same concerning the elements, that they also by certain intermedious orders of gods, partake of that one divinity of the whole world?" Wherefore a little before the same Proclus highly condemns certain ancient physiologers, whom he supposeth Aristotle* to have followed: Πολλοῖς τῶν φυσιολόγων ἄψυχα εἰκῇ φερόμενα, καὶ ἀπρονόητα ταῦτα εἶναι τὰ στοιχεῖα νενόμισται. τὰ μὲν γὰρ οὐρανία διὰ τὴν ἐν αὐτοῖς τάξιν, νοῦν καὶ θεῶν μετέχειν ὡμολόγουν, τὴν δὲ γένεσιν, ὡς πολυμετάβολον, καὶ ἀόριστον, καὶ ἀπρονόητον ἀπέλιπον, οἷα δὲ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης ὕστερον ἐδίξασε, ταῖς οὐρανίαις περιφοραῖς μόνως ἐπιστήσας, τὰς ἀκινήτους αἰτίας· εἴτε ὀκτὼ εἶεν, εἴτε πλείους· ἄψυχα δὲ τὰ στοιχεῖα ταῦτα καταλείπων· "The elements were thought by most of the ancient physiologers to be inanimate, and to be moved fortuitously without providence. For though they acknowledged the heavenly bodies, by reason of that order that appears in them, to partake of mind and gods; yet they left this sublunary world (or genesis) to float up and down without providence. And these Aristotle afterwards followed, appointing immoveable intelligences to preside over the celestial spheres only, (whether eight or more) but leaving all the lower elements dead and inanimate."

Lastly, besides all those other mundane gods before mentioned, as generated together with the world, though Proclus seems to be of another opinion, yet it is manifest, that Plato doth not there in his Timæus altogether forget those properly called demons, (elsewhere so much insisted upon by him) but in the very next following words he plainly insinuates them, after this manner:[7] Ὅσοι φαίνονται καθ' ὅσον ἂν ἐθέλωσι θεοὶ, "The gods, which appear visibly to us as often as they please, or which can appear and disappear at pleasure," speaking also of their genesis or

* P. 285.

[7] In Timæo, cap. 26. p. 248.

generation as part of the cosmogonia; and then again afterwards calling them νέοι θεοὶ, "junior gods," he describes them as those, whose particular office it was to superintend and preside over human affairs,[8] καὶ κατὰ δύναμιν ὅτι κάλλιστα καὶ ἄριστα τὸ θνητὸν διακυβερνᾶν ζῶον, ὅτι μὴ κακῶν αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ γίγνοιτο αἴτιον, "and to govern this mortal animal man, after the best manner possible, so that he should no otherwise fail of doing well or being happy, than as he became a cause of evil and misery to himself, by the abuse of his own liberty."[9]

And thus much out of Plato's Timæus; but the same thing might be proved also out of his other writings, as particularly from that passage in his tenth book of laws,[10] where he takes notice again of the theogonia of the ancients, and that as it had been depraved and corrupted by a great mixture of impious and immortal fables: Εἰσὶν ἡμῖν ἐν γράμμασι λόγοι κείμενοι. Οἱ μὲν ἔν τισι μέτροις, οἱ δὲ καὶ ἄνευ μέτρων· λέγοντες περὶ θεῶν, οἱ μὲν παλαιότατοι, ὡς γέγονεν ἡ πρώτη φύσις οὐρανοῦ τῶν τε ἄλλων· προϊόντες δὲ τῆς ἀρχῆς οὐ πολὺ θεογονίαν διεξέρχονται, γενόμενοί τε ὡς πρὸς ἀλλήλοις ὡμίλησαν, "There are," saith he, "extant amongst us Athenians, certain stories and traditions, very ancient concerning the gods, written partly in metre, and partly in prose, declaring how the heaven, and the other gods were at first made, or generated, and then carrying on their fabulous theogonia farther, how these generated gods afterward conversed with one another, and ingendering after the manner of men, begat other gods." Where that philosopher taking off his vizard,

[8] In Timæo, cap. 29. p. 252.

[9] To me there appears more truth in the opinion of Proclus, that Plato does not treat at all in the Timæus of those natures properly called demons by the Platonists. Nor do the words here quoted by the learned Doctor from the Timæus prove the contrary. For the first passage relates to the poetic gods, as any one on an attentive inspection of Plato will immediately perceive. He first discourses of the origin of those gods which fall under the eyes and senses, namely, the stars, heaven, earth, &c. He then comes, cap. 26. to those of which the poets sang, Jupiter, Rhea, Saturn: who he says must be believed to exist, and to have been somehow generated, inasmuch as the ancient poets, from whom as sons of the gods it would not be right to withhold our credence, have so recorded. Having explained these matters, he introduces God as addressing these gods in a sort of speech. "All these gods," says he, "which are either always seen or sometimes appear visible to us at pleasure, God thus addressed." He asserts therefore a two-fold race of gods: those who are always visible to the eyes, heaven, the stars, the earth, and those which appear only at intervals. These latter are the gods before spoken of by him, whom the poets feign to have formerly conversed with mankind, and not unfrequently to become manifest to good and wise men. But there is nothing said about demons, nor are those gods, who sometimes appear, demons. In like manner in the second passage the *junior gods*, to whom the supreme and most high God entrusts the care and superintendence of the human race, are not demons, but Plato's celestial gods, the stars and heavenly bodies.

[10] De Legibus, lib. 10. not far from the beginning. But in this passage he is not bitterly inveighing against these fables, as the learned Doctor here supposes, but is merely stating, that they cannot well be reprehended because of their antiquity, although they ought not to be looked upon either as true or useful. He censures these fictions concerning the gods, however, much more severely and freely in his De Republica, lib. 2. p. 430. and Euthyphron, p. 49.

plainly discovers his great dislike of that whole fabulous theogonia, (however he acknowledges elsewhere; that it did contain *ὑπονοίας*,[1] that is physiological allegories under it) as a thing that was destructive of all piety and virtue, by reason of its attributing all human passions and vices to the gods. However, it plainly appears from hence, that the theogonia and the cosmogonia were one and the same thing, the generation of the gods being here the generation of the heaven, and of the sun, moon, and stars, and the like.

Moreover, this same thing is sufficiently manifest also even from Hesiod's own Theogonia, which doubtless was that, which Plato principally aimed at; and if it were not absolutely the first, yet it is the most ancient writing now extant, in that kind. For there in the beginning of that poem, Hesiod[2] invokes his muses after this manner:

> Χαίρετε, τέκνα Διός, δότε δὲ ἱμερόεσσαν ἀοιδήν·
> Κλείετε δ' ἀθανάτων ἱερὸν γένος αἰὲν ἐόντων,
> Οἳ Γῆς ἐξεγένοντο καὶ Οὐρανοῦ ἀστερόεντος,
> Νυκτός δὲ δνοφερῆς, οὓς Ϝ' ἀλμυρὸς ἔτρεφε Πόντος.
> Εἴπατε δ', ὡς τὰ πρῶτα θεοὶ καὶ Γαῖα γένοντο,
> Καὶ Ποταμοί, καὶ Πόντος ἀπείριτος οἰδματι Ϝύων,
> Ἀστρά τε λαμπετόωντα, καὶ Οὐρανὸς εὐρὺς ὑπερθεν,
> Οἵ τ' ἐκ τῶν ἐγένοντο θεοὶ δωτῆρες ἐάων.
>
> Salvete natæ Jovis, date vero amabilem cantilenam:
> Celebrate quoque immortalium divinum genus semper existentium,
> Qui tellure prognati sunt, cœlo stellato,
> Nocteque caliginosa, quos item salsus nutrivit pontus.
> Dicite insuper, ut primum dii et terra facti fuerint,
> Et flumina, et pontus immensus æstu fervens,
> Astraque fulgentia, et cœlum latum superne,
> Et qui ex his nati sunt, dii, datores bonorum.

Where we see plainly, that the generation of the gods is the generation of the earth, heaven, stars, seas, rivers, and other things begotten from them (as probably amongst the rest demons and nymphs, which the same Hesiod speaks of elsewhere). But immediately after this invocation of the muses, the poet begins with Chaos, and Tartara, and Love, as the first principles, and then proceeds to the production of the earth, and of night out of chaos; of the ether, and of day from night: of the starry heavens, mountains, and seas, &c. All which genesis or generation of gods is really nothing but a poetical description of

[1] I know of no passage, wherein Plato openly acknowledges that those ancient fables contain allegories of physical truths. The learned Doctor, I have no doubt, in writing so, had in his mind the following passage of this philosopher, occurring De Republica, lib. 2. p. 430. *Θεομαχίας, ὅσας Ὅμηρος πεποίηκεν, οὐ παραδεκτέον εἰς τὴν πόλιν, οὔτ' ἐν ὑπονοίαις πεποιημένας, οὔτ' ἄνευ ὑπονοιῶν.* "The battles of the gods, of which Homer has sung, are not to be received into a state, whether they contain allegories or are without them." Here, however, Plato does not say that a hidden sense lies concealed in these battles of the gods, but leaves the whole matter undecided.

[2] Theogon. v. 104. &c. p. 19. ed. Clerici.

the cosmogonia; as throughout the sequel of that whole poem all seems to be physiology, veiled under fiction and allegories. And thus the ancient scholia upon that book begin, Ἰστέον, ὅτι ὁ περὶ τῆς Θεογονίας λόγος φυσικὴν διήγησιν τῶν ὄντων ὑπαγορεύει, "We must know, that the whole doctrine of the theogonia contains under it, in way of allegory, a physiological declaration of things;" Hesiod's gods being not only the animated parts of the world, but also all the other things of nature, fictitiously personated and deified, or abusively called gods and goddesses.[3]

Neither was this only the doctrine of the Greeks, that the world was thus made or generated, and that the generation of the world was a theogonia, or a generation of gods, (the world itself and its several parts being accounted such by them) but also, in like manner, of the other barbarian Pagans. For Diogenes Laërtius hath recorded concerning the Persian Magi:* Ἀποφαίνεσθαι περί τε οὐσίας θεῶν καὶ γενέσεως, οὓς καὶ πῦρ εἶναι καὶ γῆν καὶ ὕδωρ, "That they did both assert the being and generation of gods, and also that these gods were fire, and earth, and water;"[4] that is, that the animated elements were gods, (as Proclus also before declared) and that these, together with the world, were generated or had a beginning. And both Laërtius and Diodorus represent it as the opinion of the ancient Egyptians, that the world was generated or had a temporary production; as also, that the sun and moon, and other parts of the world, were gods:† But whereas the same Diodorus writes of certain Egyptian gods: Οἱ γένεσιν ἀίδιον ἐσχηκότες, "Which had an eternal generation;" he seems[5] to mean thereby only the celestial gods, the sun, moon,

[3] The worthy Doctor does not here exhaust the whole of Hesiod's Theogony. Of which, although I have occasionally expressed an opinion of it already, I purpose discoursing more at length in another place. For the sake, however, of throwing light upon matters here spoken of, I cannot refrain from intimating that there are three things to be distinguished in this poem, and by no means to be confounded with one another. I. The ancient history of Greece, which, unless I am wholly mistaken, the poet always mixes up with the physiological notions of his own time. Hereto, for example, belong what he relates respecting Jupiter and Saturn; although traces also appear in them of an older philosophy on the origin of mankind. II. The dogmas and axioms of the ancient philosophers on the origin of all things and on the state and generation of the first men, besides other matters. III. The fictions and figures of the poet himself; for example, in his account of *force, strength, battle*, &c., which as all may perceive are the names of things, personified by the licence of poetry. And this poetic custom of representing inanimate things as persons tended wonderfully to increase the number of the gods in the minds of the ignorant. We shall probably give examples elsewhere.

* In Proæm. p. 2.

[4] This is more clearly shown from a passage in Herodotus, lib. 1. cap. 131. p. 55. Θύουσι δὲ ἡλίῳ τε καὶ σελήνῃ καὶ γῇ καὶ πυρὶ καὶ ὕδατι καὶ ἀνέμοισι· τούτοισι μὲν δὴ μούνοισι θύουσιν ἀρχῆθεν, "The Persians sacrifice to the sun and moon, and to the earth, fire, water, and winds: and to these alone they sacrifice from the beginning."

† In the Persian Sacrifices, Μάγος ἀνὴρ παρεστεὼς ἐπαείδει θεογονίην, one of the Magi standing by sung the Theogonia, (i. e. the Cosmogonia) Herod. in Clio. n. 132. lib. 1. p. 55.

[5] There was no reason why Dr. Cudworth should have stated this somewhat

and stars, as distinct from those other heroes and men-gods which are again thus described by him: Οἱ θνητοὶ ὑπάρξαντες, διὰ δὲ σύνεσιν καὶ κοινὴν ἀνθρώπων εὐεργεσίαν, τετυχηκότες τῆς ἀθανασίας, "Who, though naturally mortal, yet, by reason of their wisdom, virtue, and beneficence towards mankind, had been advanced to immortality."

And by this time we think it doth sufficiently appear that the theogonia of the ancients is not to be understood merely of their heroes and men-gods, or of all their gods, as supposed to have been nothing else but mortal men, ("Dii mortalibus nati matribus," as Cotta, in Cicero,[6] speaks,) who, according to the more vulgar signification of the word, had been generated, (humano more) as some otherwise learned men have seemed to suppose; but that it extends to all the inferior pagan gods, some whereof were parts of the visible world animated, as the sun, moon, stars, and earth: so that their theogonia was the very same thing with the cosmogonia, or at least a part thereof. Notwithstanding which, we deny not but that there was also in the paganic fables of the gods a certain mixture of history and herology interserted, and complicated all along together with physiology.

We are, in the next place, to observe, that both this theogonia and cosmogonia of the ancient Pagans, their generation of the world and gods, is to be understood of a temporary production of them, whereby they were made ἐκ μὴ ὄντων, or from an antecedent non-existence brought into being. For this was the general tradition amongst the Pagans, that the world was made out of an antecedent chaos, as shall be afterwards further declared. And Aristotle[7] affirmeth, that before his time, this genesis and temporary production of the world had been universally entertained by all, and particularly, that Plato was an assertor of the same. Nevertheless, the generality of the latter Platonists[8] endeavour, with all their might to force a contrary

cautiously, as if it were a mere conjecture. For nothing is more certain, if we are to believe Diodorus Siculus, who, Biblioth. Histor. lib. 1. cap. 11. p. 10. informs us, that the most ancient Egyptians first held the sun and moon to be eternal and celestial gods, and then added to the number spirit, fire, earth, ocean and air. After speaking of which gods, Cap. 13. p. 12. he thus concludes his discourse: Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἐν οὐρανῷ θεῶν καὶ γένεσιν ἀΐδιον ἐσχηκότων τοσαῦτα λέγουσιν Αἰγύπτιοι. The gods here said to have had an eternal generation are those deities which were produced and generated along with the world itself. He then comes to the terrestrial gods of the Egyptians, some of whom he says were kings.

[6] De Natura Deor. lib. 3. cap. 18. p. 3075. tom. 9. opp.

[7] De Cœlo, lib. 1. cap. 10. p. 632. tom. 1. opp. Γενόμενον μὲν οὖν (τὸν οὐρανὸν) ἅπαντες εἶναί φασιν, "All affirm the heavens or world to have been made." He states this of Plato expressly in this very chapter.

[8] See especially Proclus, In Timæum Platonis. There was nothing about which these later Platonists were more anxious than to establish an agreement among all the old philosophers, in order to maintain their ground against the Christians, who were wont to ridicule the controversies and squabbles of the ancient sages, and to rely on them as one of the principal reasons why philosophy ought to be contemned and disregarded. See the remarks on this subject, in our Diss. on the disturbances of the church by the later

sense upon his Timæus: which is a thing that Plutarch long since observed after this manner:* Οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν χρωμένων Πλάτωνι, φοβούμενοι, καὶ παραλυπούμενοι, πάντα μηχανῶνται, καὶ παραβιάζονται, καὶ στρέφουσιν, ὥς τι δεινὸν καὶ ἄρρητον οἰόμενοι δεῖν περικαλύπτειν καὶ ἀρνεῖσθαι, τήν τε τοῦ κόσμου τήν τε τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτοῦ γένεσιν καὶ σύστασιν, οὐκ ἐξ ἀϊδίου συνεστώτων, οὐδὲ τὸν ἄπειρον χρόνον οὕτως ἐχόντων, "The most of Plato's followers, being infinitely troubled and perplexed in their minds, turn themselves every way, using all manner of arts, and offering all kind of violence to his text, as conceiving that they ought by all means possible to hide and conceal that opinion (as infand and detestable) of the generation of the world, and of the soul of it,

Platonists. Therefore, as Aristotle had held the eternity of the world, and they themselves, for reasons to be stated by and by, had adopted this dogma of his, it was incumbent upon them to labour with all their might to show, that the same opinion was entertained also by Plato, whose sentiments on things invisible they considered to be of pre-eminent wisdom. But, as any one on a closer investigation will perceive, they did not altogether adhere either to Aristotle's or Plato's opinion, but fostered a peculiar doctrine of their own; asserting indeed that the world is the work of God, which it is manifest Aristotle has nowhere asserted, but that it is eternal, and that there never was a time when it was as yet unmade, or to express it in the words made use of by Ammonius on the same subject, in Zacharias Mitylenæus, Dialog. de Opificio Mundi, p. 209. Θεὸν εἶναι ποιητικὸν ἀΐδιον, τὸν δὲ κόσμον ἀϊδίως γενόμενον, "That God is the eternal Maker, and that the world was made from all eternity." And no one of the ancients, let it be observed in passing, has more clearly expounded or more effectually exploded this dogma of the later Platonic school, than this same Zacharias. There is something, indeed, in the very precepts of this sect on God and things divine, which requires us to hold this opinion of the world and its origin, if we wish to assent to them; but of this elsewhere. At present I shall merely remark, that in all probability their adoption of this opinion was owing to the disputes of the Epicureans with the elder Platonists, and to a fear lest the Christians would get the better of them if they should concede that the world was generated at some definite time. How strenuously the Epicureans opposed Plato's opinion of the temporary production of the world is most clearly shown from the discourse of Velleius in Cicero, De Natura Deor. lib. 1. cap. 9. p. 2891. who says: "Ab utropue sciscitor, cur mundi ædificatores repente extiterint, innumerabilia ante sæcula dormierint.———Isto igitur tam immenso spatio, quæro, cur Pronœa vestra cessaverit. Laboremne fugiebat? At iste nec attingit Deum, nec erat ullus, quum omnes naturæ Numini divino——— parerent. Quid autem erat, quod concupisceret Deus mundum signis et luminibus, tamquam ædilis, ornare? Si, ut Deus ipse melius habitaret; antea videlicet tempore infinito in tenebris, tamquam in gurgustio habitaverat." "I want to know from both, why the makers of the world started up on a sudden, and slept for innumerable ages before. ———Why, I ask, did your Providence remain idle for such an immense space of time? Did it shrink from the labour? But that does not apply to God, nor was there any, forasmuch as all natures obeyed the divine influence. Again, what made the Deity desirous of adorning the world with signs and luminaries, like an edile? Was it, that he himself might have a better habitation; having before, forsooth, dwelt for an infinite period in darkness, as in a dungeon?" Hence, to elude these formidable opponents who had given much trouble to the elder Platonists, the junior Platonists became aware of the necessity of changing the ancient doctrine in this respect and of deciding, that God had made the world from all eternity. For by conceding God and matter to have been separated for innumerable ages, although both had existed from an infinite period, they saw well that the way would be opened for Christians to defend and inculcate their own doctrine of the creation of the world out of nothing. Therefore, to prevent this, they connected God and matter together, as it were by an eternal and indissoluble bond.

* De Psychog. Plat. p. 1017. P.

so as not to have continued from eternity, or through a succession of infinite time." Notwithstanding which, we conceive it to be undeniably evident, that Plato, in his Timæus, doth assert the genesis of the world in this sense, to wit, of a temporary production of it, and as not having existed from eternity, or without beginning. First, because in the entrance of that discourse[9] he opposeth these two things to one another, τὸ ἀεὶ ὄν, "that which always is," and τὸ γένεσιν ἔχον, "that which is generated or made;" and therefore, in affirming the world to have been generated, he must needs deny the eternity thereof. Again, the question is so punctually stated by him afterwards, as that there is no possibility of any subterfuge left, Πότερον ἦν ἀεὶ, γενέσεως ἀρχὴν ἔχων οὐδεμίαν, ἢ γέγονεν, ἀπ' ἀρχῆς τινος ἀρξάμενος; "Whether the world always were, having no beginning or generation, or whether it was made or generated, having commenced from a certain epocha?" To which the answer is, γέγονεν, "that it was made or had a beginning." Moreover, this philosopher there plainly affirms also,[10] that time itself was made or had a beginning; Χρόνος δ' οὖν μετ' οὐρανοῦ γέγονεν, ἵνα ἅμα γεννηθέντες ἅμα καὶ λυθῶσιν, ἄν ποτε λύσις τὶς αὐτῶν γένηται, "Time was made together with the heaven, that being both generated together, they might be both dissolved together likewise, if at least there should ever be any dissolution of them." Besides which he plainly declares, that before this orderly world was produced, the matter of it did move disorderly:[1] Πᾶν ὅσον ἦν ὁρατὸν παραλαβὼν, οὐκ ἡσυχίαν ἄγον, ἀλλὰ κινούμενον πλημμελῶς καὶ ἀτάκτως, εἰς τάξιν αὐτὸ ἤγαγεν ἐκ τῆς ἀταξίας, "God taking all that matter which was, (not then resting, but moving confusedly and disorderly) he brought it into order out of confusion." Which is no more than if he should have said, God made this world out of an antecedent chaos; which, as we said before, was the constant tradition of the ancient Pagans. Now, as to authority, we may well conclude that Aristotle was better able to understand both Plato's philosophy and Greek, than any of those junior Platonists who lived hundreds of years after. And yet we are not quite destitute of other suffrages besides Aristotle's neither, not only Philo the Jew,[2] but also Plutarch and Atticus,[3] who were both of them Platonic Pagans, voting on this

[9] Cap. 12. p. 235.

[10] Cap. 21. p. 245. These words of Plato's in particular are also urged against the junior Platonists by Zacharias Mitylenæus, Dialog. de Opificio Mundi, p. 189.

[1] Timæi. cap. 14. p. 237.

[2] In his book, Quod Mundus sit Incorruptibilis, p. 241. opp. From which passage it is evident that there were those in Egypt even at that time, who interpreted Plato's opinion in the same way as the later Platonists did: to whom Philo particularly opposes the authority of Aristotle.

[3] The former, in his book De Animæ Procreat. p. 1013. 1014. tom. 2. opp. the latter in some extracts preserved by Eusebius, Præparat. Evangel. lib. 15. cap. 6. p. 801.

side, besides Alexander Aphrodisius,[4] a judicious Peripatetic. The only objection considerable is from what Plato himself writes in his third and sixth book of Laws; in the former whereof Clinias and the Athenian Hospes discourse together after this manner, concerning the original or first beginning of commonwealths:* Πολιτείας δ' ἀρχὴν τίνα ποτὲ φῶμεν γεγονέναι; ΚΛ. Λέγεις δὲ πόθεν; ΑΘ. Οἶμαι μὲν ἀπὸ χρόνου μήκους τε καὶ ἀπειρίας, καὶ τῶν μεταξολῶν ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ. ΚΛ. Πῶς λέγεις; ΑΘ. Φέρε, ἀφ' οὗ πόλεις τ' εἰσὶ καὶ ἄνθρωποι πολιτευόμενοι, δοκεῖς ἄν ποτε κατανοῆσαι χρόνου πλῆθος ὅσον γέγονεν; ΚΛ. Οὔκουν ῥᾴδιόν γε οὐδαμῶς. ΑΘ. Τόδε γε ὡς ἄπειρόν τι καὶ ἀμήχανον ἂν εἴη. ΚΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν τοῦτό γε. ΑΘ. Μῶν γε οὖν οὐ μυρίαι μὲν ἐπὶ μυρίαις ἡμῖν γεγόνασι πόλεις ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ, κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τοῦ πλήθους λόγον, οὐκ ἐλάττους ἐφθαρμέναι; πεπολιτευμέναι δ' αὖ πάσης πολιτείας πολλάκις ἑκασταχοῦ; καὶ ποτὲ μὲν ἐξ ἐλαττόνων μείζους, ποτὲ δὲ ἐκ μειζόνων ἐλάττους· καὶ χείρους ἐκ βελτιόνων γεγόνασι, καὶ βελτίους ἐκ χειρόνων; "Ath. What beginning shall we say there was of commonwealths? Cl. Whence would yourself derive them? Ath. I suppose from a great length and infinity of time, through successive changes. Cl. I understand not well what you mean. Ath. Thus therefore, do you think that you are able to determine what length or quantity of time there hath been since cities and polities of men first began? Cl. This is by no means easy to be done. Ath. Wherefore there is a kind of infinity and inestimability of this time. Cl. It is very true. Ath. Have there not then been innumerable cities constituted within this time, and as many again destroyed, of all several forms; they being changed from greater to lesser, and from lesser to greater, from better to worser, and from worser to better?" Now, we say, that if Plato intended here to assert an absolute infinity of time past, then it must needs be granted, that in his old age, when he wrote his book of Laws, he changed his opinion from what it was before when he wrote his Timæus; and if so, he ought in all reason to have retracted the same, which he does not here do. But in very truth, the meaning of this philosopher in those words cited, seems to be this; not that there was an absolute infinity of time past, (as Proclus contends, taking advantage of that word ἀπειρία) but only that the world had lasted such a length of time, as was in a manner inestimable to us, or uncomputable by us; there having happened, as he addeth, in the mean time, several successive destructions and consumptions of

[4] Comm. in Libros Metaphys. Aristot. p. 181. ed. Lut. Paris. 1506. fol. To these authors who endeavoured to purge the memory of Plato from this stain, might be added, if necessary, from the Platonists themselves, Hierocles, of whom below, and from the Christian Fathers, Zacharias Mitylenæus, Augustine, and not a few others.

* Steph. p. 676.

mankind, by means of various accidents, as particularly one most remarkable deluge and inundation of waters. The latter place, in his sixth book of Laws, runs thus:* Ἡ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένεσις ἢ τὸ παράπαν ἀρχὴν οὐδεμίαν εἴληχεν, οὐδ' ἕξει ποτέ γε τελευτήν· ἀλλ' ἦν τε ἀεὶ καὶ ἔσται πάντως· ἢ μῆκός τι τῆς ἀρχῆς ἀφ' οὗ γέγονεν, ἀμήχανον ἂν χρόνου ὅσον γεγανὸς ἂν εἴη, "Either the generation of men had no beginning at all, and will have no end, but always was and always will be; or else there has been an inestimable length of time from the beginning of it." Which place affordeth still more light to the former; for we may well conclude, that by ἄπειρόν τι καὶ ἀμήχανον there was not meant an absolute infinity of time, but only such as had a very remote or distant beginning, because ἀμήχανον here is plainly taken in that sense. We conceive, therefore, that this was Plato's opinion in his old age, when he wrote his book of Laws, that though the world had a beginning, yet it had continued a very long time not computable by us; or at least he thought fit to declare himself after that manner, perhaps by reason of the clamours of Aristotle or some others, against his Timæus, that so he might thereby somewhat mollify that opinion of the novity of the world, by removing the epocha and date thereof to so great a distance.[5]

Now, it is very true what we have several times before suggested, that there have been amongst the Pagans both Theogonists and Cosmogonists too, that were Atheists; they abusing the word gods several ways; some of them, as Anaximander, understanding thereby inanimate worlds successively generated out of senseless matter, and corrupted again into it; others, as Anaximenes and Democritus, allowing that there were certain animals and understanding beings superior to men, but such only as were native and mortal, in like manner as men, and calling these by the name of gods. Of the former of which two philosophers, St. Austin[6] gives us this account: "Anaximenes

* P. 781.

[5] It is the part of a wise man to judge of a philosopher's opinions on the nature of things from those books in which he has professedly treated of physical science, and not from those in which he has discussed political and other subjects. Hence, as Plato has expounded his own doctrines concerning physical things chiefly in the Timæus, we ought to form our estimate of them from this treatise, and not from his book, De Legibus, or other works; nor, if any thing happens to have escaped him in his other works in apparent contradiction to the Timæus, should we be allowed on that account to pervert the Timæus, and so to explain it, as we conceive will be in accordance with such passage. On the contrary, what he has said respecting physical matters in his other books, should be corrected according to the standard of what he has written in the Timæus. The very opposite course has been followed by the later Platonists, who cull from the book, De Legibus and others, in which Plato has touched upon physical matters incidentally, such things as at first sight favour their own doctrines, and then modify and garble the Timæus according to the sense and tenor of these.

[6] De Civitate Dei, lib. 8. cap. 2. p. 147. tom. 7. opp. On this passage of St. Augustine see Observat. Halenses, tom. 2. obs. 19. p. 440.

omnes rerum causas infinito aëri dedit, nec deos negavit aut tacuit, non tamen ab ipsis aërem factum, sed ipsos ex aëre ortos credidit:" "Anaximenes made infinite air to be the first original and cause of all things; and yet was he not therefore silent concerning the gods, much less did he deny them; nevertheless he did not believe the air to have been made by the gods, but the gods to have been all generated out of the air." These were therefore such Theogonists, as supposed all the gods, without exception, to be generable and corruptible, and acknowledged no θεὸν ἀγέννητον at all, no understanding being unmade and self-existent; but concluded senseless matter to be the only ἀγέννητον and original of all things, which is absolute atheism. Notwithstanding which, it is certain, that all the pagan Theogonists were not Atheists, (no more than all their Cosmogonists Theists) but that there was another sort of Theogonists amongst them, who supposed indeed all the inferior mundane gods to have been made or generated in one sense or other; but asserted one θεὸν ἀγέννητον καὶ αὐθυπόστατον, "one supreme unmade self-existent Deity," who was the cause of them all: which Theogonists, for distinction sake from those other atheistic ones, may be called divine.

And that Plato was such a divine Theogonist, is a thing, as we conceive, out of the question: but if there had been any doubt concerning it, it would have been sufficiently removed from those passages before cited out of his Timæus. To which nevertheless, for fuller satisfaction sake, may be added these two following: the first, p. 34.[7] Οὗτος δὴ πᾶς ὅντος ἀεὶ λογισμὸς θεοῦ, περὶ τὸν ποτὲ ἐσόμενον θεὸν λογισθείς. For thus it ought to be read, ὄντος, as it is also in Aldus' edition; and not ὄντως, as in Stephens, following an error in that of Ficinus. And accordingly, the words are thus rendered by Cicero: Hæc Deus is, qui semper erat, de aliquando futuro deo cogitans, lævem eum effecit, et undique æquabilem, &c. "This was the ratiocination or resolution of that God, which always is, concerning that god, which was sometime about to be made, that he should be smooth and spherical," &c. Where again it presently follows in Cicero's version: Sic Deus ille æternus hunc perfectè beatum deum procreavit, "Thus that eternal God procreated this perfectly happy god, the world." Where there is plainly mention made of two gods, one a generated god, the animated world, called elsewhere in Plato θεῖον γεννητὸν, and another eternal and unmade God, innatus et infectus Deus, who was the cause of the world's generation or production; or, to keep close to Plato's own language, one God who belonged to genesis, or that head of being, which he calls generation, and therefore must

[7] Timæi cap. 10. p. 241.

needs have an antecedent cause of his existence, since nothing can be made without a cause; and another God, that was truly and properly οὐσία, "immutable essence," who was the cause of that generated god the universe, and therefore of all things. The other passage of Plato's is page 41. of his Timæus:[8] Ἐπεὶ οὖν πάντες ὅσοι τε περιπολοῦσι φανερῶς, καὶ ὅσοι φαίνονται καθ' ὅσον ἂν ἐθέλωσι θεοὶ, γένεσιν ἔσχον, λέγει πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὁ τόδε τὸ πᾶν γεννήσας, τάδε, Θεοὶ θεῶν, ὧν ἐγὼ δημιουργὸς, πατήρ τε ἔργων, ἃ δι' ἐμοῦ γενόμενα, "When therefore all the gods, both those which move visibly about the heavens, and those which appear to us as often as they please, (that is, both the stars and demons) were generated or created, that God, which made this whole universe, bespake these generated gods after this manner; Ye gods of gods (whom I myself am the maker and father of) attend." Where the words θεοὶ θεῶν, notwithstanding Proclus' other differing conjectures, seem to have been very well rendered by Cicero; Dii, qui deorum satu orti estis, "Ye gods, which are the progeny or off-spring of the gods." And the gods, whose off-spring these generated gods (the animated stars and demons) are said to be, must needs be those ἀΐδιοι θεοὶ, "those eternal gods," elsewhere mentioned in the same Timæus, as where the philosopher calls the world,[9] τῶν ἀϊδίων θεῶν γεγονὸς ἄγαλμα, "a generated or created image of the eternal gods;" as Cicero[10] also is to be understood of these, when he speaks of the world's being made by the gods, and by the counsel of the gods. Now, these eternal gods of Plato, called by his followers θεοὶ ὑπερκόσμιοι, "the supramundane gods," though according to that stricter notion of the word γένεσις, as it is used both in Plato and Aristotle for a temporary production of things ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, they were indeed all ἀγέννητοι, because they never were not, and had no beginning of their existence; yet, notwithstanding were they not therefore supposed by that philosopher to be all αὐτόγονοι and αὐθυπόστατοι, so many "self-originated and self-subsistent beings," or first prin-

[8] Timæi, cap. 26. p. 249.

[9] Ibid. cap. 21. p. 245. &c. But these words, as the context shows, are not said of the world itself but of the soul of the world. The ἀΐδιοι Θεοὶ are here the eternal images or forms of things, called by the later Platonists Θεοὶ νοητοί. For Plato throughout the whole of this treatise teaches that God formed and constructed the world and the world's soul according to a certain eternal exemplar or model. The passage is made clear by what he himself says at the end of this book, where he calls the world εἰκὼν τοῦ νοητοῦ Θεοῦ, "the image of the intelligible God." That is, he supposed the world to be God, and therefore was obliged also to call the eternal exemplar of the world God, and him too, νοητὸν, as being comprehended only by the mind and thought.

[10] I know of no passages, wherein Cicero has stated it as his own opinion, that the world was made by the gods and by the counsel of the gods. But if he has anywhere said this, I am convinced that at the time he never once thought of those eternal gods imagined by the school of later Platonists. Such subtle and acute expounders of Plato were not yet living in Cicero's time, as suddenly started up at a later period, especially in the second and third centuries.

ciples, but only one of them such, and the rest derived from that one: it being very true, as we conceive, what Proclus affirms,* ὅτι ὁ Πλάτων ἐπὶ μίαν ἀρχὴν ἀνάγει πάντα, "that Plato reduces all things to one principle," even matter itself; but unquestionable, that he deriveth all his gods from one. Wherefore all those eternal gods of Plato, (one only excepted) though they were not γέννητοι, or generated in one sense, that is, κατὰ χρόνον, as to a temporary beginning, yet were they notwithstanding, as Proclus distinguisheth, γέννητοι ἀπ' αἰτίας, generated in another sense, as produced from a superior cause, there being only one such ἀγέννητος, one ingenerate or unproduced Deity. Thus, according to Plato, there were two sorts of secondary or inferior and derivative gods; first, the θεοὶ ἐγκόσμιοι, or "mundane gods," such as had all of them a temporary generation with the world, and of whom Plato's theogonia and γενέσεις θεῶν is properly to be understood; and secondly, the ὑπερκόσμιοι and ἀΐδιοι θεοὶ, the "supramundane and eternal gods," which were all of them also, save only one, produced from that one, and dependent on it as their cause. But of these inferior eternal gods of the Platonists and Pythagoreans we are to speak again afterwards. In the mean time it is evident, that in that passage of Plato's before cited, there is plain mention made both of θεοὶ γένεσιν ἔχοντες, of dii orti, "gods who were made or generated" with the world, and of ὁ τόδε τὸ πᾶν γεννήσας, "of one God, who was the maker of them, and of the whole universe," who therefore is himself every way ἀγέννητος, "unmade or unproduced." And accordingly he afterwards subjoins: Καὶ ὁ μὲν δὴ ταῦτα πάντα διατάξας, ἔμενεν ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ κατὰ τρόπον ἥξει· μένοντος δὲ νοήσαντες οἱ παῖδες τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς τάξιν, ἐπείθοντο αὐτῇ, which Cicero thus renders: Atque is quidem (Deus) qui cuncta composuit, constanter in suo manebat statu; qui autem erant ab eo creati (dii), cùm parentis ordinem cognovissent, hunc sequebantur, &c. "Then that God, who framed all things, remained constantly in his former state; and his sons, or the gods that were created by him, observed his order and appointment."[1]

* In Timæum, p. 116.

[1] All that is discussed here concerning the gods of Plato will, I fear, be considered by many to come nearer to the vain and idle subtleties of the junior Platonists, than to the opinion and meaning of Plato himself. I. For those notable distinctions of the gods, so common in the books of these later admirers of Plato, into ἐγκόσμιοι ὑπερκόσμιοι, νοεροὶ and νοητοὶ and I know not what others, have no where been expressly handed down by Plato, but have been invented and forced out of him by those who in the second, third and fourth centuries fancied themselves able to restore what Plato had written in different places on the gods and divine matters to some semblance of a theory, and accommodate it to their own for the most part dry and jejune conceits. In like manner the distinction between the κατὰ χρόνον γεννητὸς and the ἀπ' αἰτιας is nowhere inculcated by Plato, but was first broached by Plotinus, Proclus, and other philosophers of this sect, to enable them the more easily to defend their opinions against adversaries. And, as many other things were borrowed by them from the Christians; so I suspect the Christian doctrine respecting the eternal generation of the Son of

Neither was Plato singular in this, but the generality of the other pagan Theists, who were more intelligent, all along agreed with him herein, as to the generation of the mundane

God first suggested to them this distinction. Those in my opinion are very wrong who draw their estimate of Plato's sentiments on God and things divine from Proclus' Introductio in Theologiam Platonicam, and other books of that stamp. For these do not expound what Plato in reality taught, but what men full of vain and metaphysical conceits wished him to have taught; who always opposed Plato to Christ our blessed Saviour, and endeavoured to found a new kind of doctrine in order to retard the progress of Christianity. But that this sect followed no fixed rule in interpreting Plato, but obeyed only the inventions of their own brain is shown even by the dissensions in which they were involved. For you would sooner yoke griffins with horses, or reconcile those Egyptians who, as Juvenal informs us, fought so inveterately with each other about their gods, than establish an agreement in the opinions of Proclus, Plotinus, Jamblichus, Porphyry, and others, respecting the doctrines of Plato. Nor is it to be wondered at, that all these masters should have found every thing in Plato that they wished. For not to mention that there is nothing too difficult for men to perform who abuse their own talents, the obscurity and inconsistency of Plato himself is incredible. II. The oration especially, which Plato in the Timæus represents the Supreme God of all to have addressed to the inferior gods, has been wonderfully tortured by the ingenuity of interpreters, and has met with almost as many expositions as there have been men who have undertaken to expound it, making use of their own and not another's judgment. For a specimen, see the commments upon it by Jac. Thomasius, De Stoica Mundi Exustione, sect. 22. p. 41. &c. We ourselves shall merely touch upon that part which Dr. Cudworth has brought under discussion. In which two things are to be considered. 1. Who these gods are, whom the Supreme God addresses. 2. Why they are called Θεοὶ Θεῶν," gods of gods." The first question seems to me to have been rightly decided by Dr. Cudworth, who thinks they are those gods chiefly whom the Platonists call ἐγκόσμιοι, namely the heavens, sun, moon, stars. For so Proclus, Comm. in Timæum p. 298. and of the Christian fathers Athenagoras, Apolog. cap. 6. p. 27. have interpreted Plato. And Plato himself puts this exposition beyond doubt. For at the conclusion of the speech, where the most high God exhorts the junior gods to make men, are these words: Ἀπεργάζεσθε ζῶα καὶ γεννᾶτε, τροφήν τε διδόντες αὐξάνετε, καὶ φθίνοντα πάλιν δέχεσθε, "Make animals, and supply them with food, and receive them again when they perish." It is evident from these words that the Supreme Deity is here addressing those gods who are to receive the souls of the dead if they have conducted themselves well. And, that Plato attributes this office to the stars, is evident from what follows a little after, cap. 28. p. 251. "He who has rightly and virtuously finished the course of life assigned him by nature shall return to that star with which he is connected." I shall here take the opportunity of noticing, that Plato maintains in the Timæus the same opinion concerning the origin of the human race, which is well known to have been entertained by the Egyptian and many other philosophers, that men were procreated and produced from the elements according to a certain law by the sun and other heavenly bodies. But this he remodels agreeably to his own system of philosophy, and presents to us in a kind of rhetorical dress; nor does he exclude the Deity from so important an office, as most others did both before and after him. God, he tells us, first ordered and disposed rude matter, agitated by disorderly motion; he then made the sun, moon and stars, endowed with mind and intelligence, which the philosopher calls the visible and junior gods; to these again he assigned the task of forming men and of uniting in them body and soul: the heavenly bodies in obedience to the commands of God gave to men a body from the four elements, and then a soul from themselves. And what does this mean? When divested of rhetorical figures, if I am not mistaken, simply this: The first men were derived and generated out of matter by the power and heat of the sun and stars; and to these was given a soul or divine spark from those eternal fires called stars and heavenly bodies. I now come to the other point, namely the reason why Plato denominates these celestial or animated stars *gods of gods*. The learned Doctor justly rejects the conjectures of Proclus, who Comm. in Timæum, p. 298. thinks they are called gods of gods, because they are gods of their own bodies; which bodies themselves have also acquired the honor of divinity. But before we assent to this somewhat far-fetched opinion, it would

gods; and so were both Theists and Theogonists, they indeed understanding nothing else by their theogonia, or generation of gods, than a divine cosmogonia, or creation of the world by God; forasmuch as they supposed the world itself as animated, and its several parts to be gods. So that they asserted these three things; first, a cosmogonia, the generation of the world, that it was not from eternity, but had a novity or beginning; secondly, that this cosmogonia, or generation of the world, was also a theogonia, or generation of gods, the world itself and several of its parts animated being esteemed such: and lastly, that both these gods and the world were made and produced by one *θεὸς ἀγέννητος καὶ αὐτογενὴς*, one "unproduced and self-originated Deity." All which particulars we may here briefly exemply in P. Ovidius Naso,[1] whose paganity sufficiently appears from his Fasti and all his other writings, and who also went off the stage before Christianity appeared on it, and may well be presumed to represent the then generally received doctrine of the pagans. First, therefore, as for the generation and novity of the world, and its first production out of a chaos, we have it fully acknowledged by him in these following verses:

Ante mare et terras, et, quod tegit omnia, cœlum,
Unus erat toto naturæ vultus in orbe,

be proper for Proclus to show us other passages, in which Plato has called the bodies of the stars Gods. Dr. Cudworth supposes the stars to be called *Θεοὶ Θεῶν* from their having been made, according to Plato's opinion, by the supramundane and eternal gods (*ὑπερκόσμιοι* and *ἀΐδιοι*). But this conjecture is at variance with the words of the Deity himself, who states explicitly in Plato, that the gods he is addressing are his own work, and not that of other gods. For he calls himself their *πατὴρ* and *δημιουργός*. Besides I very much doubt whether it ever was a Platonic doctrine either ancient or modern, that the celestial were generated by the supramundane gods; as I do not remember having met with it in any Platonist. If I know any thing of these matters, those are nearer the truth, who, as Proclus informs us, hold Plato to have meant by the words *Θεοὶ Θεῶν*, that the stars are the express images of other *ideal* stars or *intelligible gods*, as he calls them. For Plato, as is well known to those who have dipped into these subjects, imagine l eternal exemplars or models of all things and therefore also of his gods. But to me there appears a harshness and want of simplicity also in this interpretation: "Ye gods who are the images of other gods, namely the *νοητοί*." Indeed if learned men who have investigated the meaning of this passage had given less scope to their own ingenuity, they would, I consider, have found a much easier solution of the whole matter. The gods, of which Plato calls stars gods, appear to me to be earth, water, fire and the other parts of this visible world. The earth, we have seen a little above, was numbered by Plato among the gods. And the ancients use this term in so wide a sense as to express by it the whole power of nature, and every thing which the earth contains. See Gerh. Joh. Vossius, De Origine et Progressu Idololatriæ lib. 2. part 2. cap. 51. p. 217. But that Plato attributed to the stars a power over earth, water, fire, and air is manifest from his words a little after on the formation of human bodies. If therefore the stars exercise an influence and control over those parts of the universe which are themselves regarded by Plato as gods, it will appear reasonable and consistent that these, being themselves gods and at their own will giving laws to other gods, should be called gods of gods. Nor indeed would it be wrong in my opinion to understand these words of the poetic gods also, spoken of by Plato a little before, namely Jupiter, Saturn and others; for of these gods also, whom Plato describes as having formerly been generated in the same way as men, the stars are gods, inasmuch as almost all of them contributed to the generation and origin of these as well as of the rest of mankind

[1] Metam. lib. I v. 5. &c.

Quem dixere chaos, rudis indigestaque moles,
Nec quicquam nisi pondus iners, congestaque eodem
Non benè junctarum discordia semina rerum.
Nullus adhuc mundo præbebat lumina Titan,
Nec nova crescendo reparabat cornua Phœbe,
Nec circumfuso pendebat in aëre tellus,
Ponderibus librata suis, nec brachia longo
Margine terrarum porrexerat Amphitrite.
Quaque erat et tellus, &c.

Which in Mr. Sandys' English, with some little alteration, speaks thus:

Before that sea, and earth, and heaven was framed,
One face had nature, which they chaos named.
No Titan yet the world with light adorns,
Nor waxing Phebe fills her wained horns;
Nor hung the self-poized earth in thin air placed
Nor Amphitrite the vast shore embraced;
Earth, air, and sea confounded, &c.

In the next place, when there was a world made out of this chaos, that this cosmogonia, or generation of the world, was also a theogonia, or generation of gods, is plainly intimated in these verses:

Neu regio foret ulla suis animalibus orba,
Astra tenent cœleste solum, formæque deorum.[2]

To this sense,

That nought of animals might unfurnished lie,
The gods, in form of stars, possess the sky.

And that all this was effected, and this orderly mundane system produced out of disorderly confused chaos, not by a fortuitous motion of matter, or the jumbling of atoms, but by the providence and command of one unmade Deity, which was also that, that furnished all the several parts of the world with respective animals, the sea with fishes, the earth with men, and the heaven with gods; is thus declared also by the poet:

Hanc Deus et melior litem natura diremit,
Nam cœlo terras, et terris abscidit undas:
Et liquidum spisso secrevit ab aëre cœlum, &c.
Sic ubi dispositam, quisquis fuit ille deorum,

[2] The *forms of gods* are the *gods* themselves. So Cicero, De Natura Deor. lib. 2. cap. 2. p. 2955. Sæpe Faunorum voces exauditæ, sæpe visæ formæ Deorum, "Often were the voices of the Fauns heard, often were the forms of gods seen." In my opinion they are called *forms* by the poet, because the ancients considered the gods not to have substantial bodies, but merely the semblances and forms of human bodies. Nec tamen, as Velleius says in Cicero De Natura Deor. lib. 1. cap. 18. p. 2907. t. 9. opp., ea species (Deorum) corpus, sed quasi corpus, nec sanguinem habet, sed quasi sanguinem, "But yet this form (of the gods) is not body but the semblance of body, nor has it blood but only the semblance of blood." Add cap. 27. p. 2918. Species quædam est Deorum, quæ nihil concreti habet, nihil solidi, nihil expressi, nihil eminentis, sitque pura, levis, pellucida, "The gods have a certain form, which possesses no concretion, no solidity, no feature, no outline, but is pure, light and transparent." And although these words express the opinion of the Epicureans respecting the gods, yet every one versed in ancient matters must be aware, that the like was commonly held by other believers in the existence of gods.

Congeriem secuit, sectámque in membra redegit ;
Principio terram, nè non æqualis ab omni
Parte foret, magni speciem glomeravit in orbis:
Tum freta diffudit, rapidisque tumescere ventis
Jussit, &c.
Sic onus inclusum numero distinxit eodem
Cura Dei, &c.

This strife (with better nature) God decides,
He earth from heaven, the sea from earth divides:
He ether pure extracts from grosser air,
All which unfolded by his prudent care,
From that blind mass; the happily disjoined
With strifeless peace, he to their seats confined, &c.
What God soever this division wrought,
And every part to due proportion brought,
First, lest the earth unequal should appear,
He turned it round in figure of a sphere.
Then seas diffused, commanding them to roar
With ruffling winds, and give the land a shore.
To those he added springs, ponds lakes immense,
And rivers whom their winding borders fence.

Where though that learned paraphrast supposed (and not without some probability neither) that Deus et melior natura, "God and the better nature," were one and the self-same thing, yet we rather conceived them to be distinct, but one of them subordinate to the other as its instrument; God and the plastic nature; accordingly as Aristotle writes in his Physics:[3] Νοῦς καὶ φύσις αἴτιον τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς, "That mind and nature were both together the cause of this universe."

Nevertheless, we cannot but observe in this place, that though that poet speaks more than once of God singularly, as also calls him mundi fabricator, and ille opifex rerum, and mundi melioris origo; yet notwithstanding, where he writes of the making of man, pagan-like, he affirms him, though to have been made by God, yet according to the image or likeness of the gods, which govern all things.

Sanctius his animal, mentisque capacius altæ,
Deerat adhuc, et quod dominari in cætera posset;
Natus homo est: sive hunc divino semine fecit,
Ille opifex rerum, mundi melioris origo:
Sive recens tellus, seductáque nuper ab alto
Æthere, cognati retinebat semina cœli.
Quam satus Iapeto, mistam fluvialibus undis,
Finxit in effigiem moderantum cuncta deorum.

The nobler being, with a mind possest,
Was wanting yet, that should command the rest.
That maker, the best world's original,
Either him framed of seed celestial;
Or earth, which late he did from heaven divide,
Some sacred seeds retained to heaven allied:

[3] For the understanding of this, see the Digression on Plastic Nature, and our remarks on sect. 20. of the same.

Which with the living stream Prometheus mixt,
And in that artificial structure fixt
The form of all the all-ruling deities.

And because some may probably be puzzled with this seeming contradiction, that one God should be said to be the maker of the whole world and of man, and yet the government of all should be attributed to gods plurally, and man said to be made in the image and likeness of the gods; we shall therefore add here, that according to the tenor of the pagan theology, the inferior and minor gods were supposed also to have all of them their several share in the government of things below them: for which cause they are called not only by Maximus Tyrius[4] *συνάρχοντες θεῷ*, "co-rulers with God," but also by Plato himself, *τῷ μεγίστῳ δαίμονι συνάρχοντες*, "the co-governors and co-reigners with the Supreme God." So that the government of this inferior world was by the Pagans often attributed to them jointly, the supreme and inferior gods both together, under that one general name of gods. But the chief of those inferior deities, in whose image man is also said to have been made, as well as in the likeness of the Supreme, were either those celestial gods and animated stars before mentioned by the poet, or else the eternal gods of Plato, which were looked upon likewise as co-makers of the world subordinate.[5]

Besides Ovid, we might instance here in many more of the pagan Theogonists clearly acknowledging in like manner one unmade Deity, which generated both the world and all the other gods in it; as for example, Strabo, who affirming that the world was *τῆς φύσεως ἅμα καὶ τῆς προνοίας ἔργον*, "the joint work both of nature and providence," as it was before ascribed by Ovid* to Deus et melior natura, adds concerning providence or the Deity in this manner: *Τὸ δὲ τῆς προνοίας, ὅτι βεβούληται καὶ αὐτὴ ποικιλοτέρα τις οὖσα, καὶ μυρίων ἔργων δημιουργὸς, ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις ζῶα γεννᾷν, ὡς πολὺ διαφέροντα τῶν ἄλλων· καὶ τούτων τὰ κράτιστα, θεούς τε καὶ ἀνθρώπους, ὧν ἕνεκεν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα συνέστηκε. Τοῖς μὲν οὖν Θεοῖς ἀπέδειξε τὸν οὐρανὸν, τοῖς δ' ἀνθρώποις τὴν γῆν*, "That having a multiform fecundity in it,

[4] Diss. 1. p. 5. ed. Lugd. 1631. 8. The passage from Plato I have been unable to meet with.

[5] The *all-ruling gods, after whose image* Ovid tells us men were formed, are not, as the learned Doctor supposes, either the celestial gods and stars, or Plato's eternal gods, but the gods whom the poets feigned to dwell in heaven and to be endowed with the same form as men. The poet's meaning is: To the rational animal called man was given the form possessed by the gods themselves, Jupiter, Saturn, Apollo, and our bodies were framed after the model of the deities. This is sufficiently clear from Ovid himself, who says that Prometheus, whom he calls *Jupeto satus*, formed men from earth mixed with water in the image of the gods. But who would say that Prometheus made them after the model of the stars and eternal gods? Or who believe him to have been able to fashion man composed of earth and water in the image of the stars and eternal gods?

* Lib. 17. p. 809.

and delighting in variety of works, it designed principally to make animals as the most excellent things, and amongst them chiefly those two noblest kinds of animals, gods and men; for whose sakes the other things were made; and then assigned heaven to the gods, and earth to men, the two extreme parts of the world for their respective habitations." Thus also Seneca in Lactantius,[6] speaking concerning God: Hic cùm prima fundamenta molis pulcherrimæ jaceret, et hoc ordiretur, quo neque majus quicquam novit natura nec melius; ut omnia sub ducibus irent, quamvis ipse per totum se corpus intenderat, tamen ministros regni sui deos genuit, "God, when he laid the foundations of this most beautiful fabric, and began to erect that structure, than which nature knows nothing greater or more excellent; to the end that all things might be carried on under their respective governors orderly, though he intended himself through the whole, as to preside in chief over all, yet did he generate gods also, as subordinate ministers of his kingdom under him." We shall forbear to mention the testimonies of others here, because they may be more opportunely inserted elsewhere; only we shall add, as to Hesiod and Homer, that though they seem to have been sometimes suspected, both by Plato and Aristotle, for atheistic Theogonists, yet as Aristotle did upon maturer thoughts afterwards change his opinion concerning both of them, so is it most probable, that they were no Atheists but divine Theogonists, such as supposed indeed many generated gods, but one supreme unmade Deity, the maker both of the world and them. And this not only for the grounds before alleged concerning Hesiod, and because both of them do every where affirm even their generated gods to be immortal (which no Atheists did), but also for sundry other reasons, some of which may be more conveniently inserted elsewhere.[7] Moreover it hath been already

[6] Divin. Instit. lib. i. cap. 5. p. 40. Add these words of his, which occur in the same part of Lactantius: Non intelligis auctoritatem ac majestatem judicis tui? Rector is orbis terrarum cœlique et Deorum omnium Deus: a quo ista Numina, quæ singula adoramus et colimus, suspensa sunt? "Dost thou not understand the authority and majesty of thy judge? He is God the ruler of the world, of the heavens, and of all the gods: upon whom those deities which we respectively adore and worship depend." This opinion is not at all to be wondered at in a Stoic; as the philosophy he professed does not admit of his thinking otherwise.

[7] It will be of advantage here to read what has been already said above, cap. 3. sect. 17. 18. together with our own remarks. I. To those who ranked Hesiod among Atheists I here add Lactantius, who, Divin. Institut. lib. 1. cap. 5. p. 32. says, Hesiodus non a Deo conditore sumit exordium, sed a chao, quod est rudis inordinataque materiæ confusa congeries: quum explanare ante debuerit chaos, unde, quando, quomodo esse aut constare cœpisset. Nimirum, sicut ab aliquo artifice disposita, ordinata, effecta sunt omnia: sic ipsam materiam fictam esse ab aliquo, necesse est. Quis igitur hanc, nisi Deus, fecerit, cujus potestati subjacent omnia? Sed refugit hoc ille, dum horret incognitam veritatem, "Hesiod does not derive the beginning of things from a divine Creator, but from chaos, a confused mass of rude and undigested matter: whereas he ought to have first explained whence, at what time, and in what manner chaos itself began to exist. For as all things are disposed, ordered, and effected by

intimated, that the generated gods of Hesiod and Homer extend farther than those of Plato's, they being not only the animated parts of the world, but also all the other things of nature fictitiously personated, and improperly or abusively called gods and goddesses; whereof a farther account will be afterwards given.

Neither ought it at all to be wondered at, if these divine Theogonists amongst the Pagans did many times, as well as those other atheistic ones, make Chaos and the Ocean senior to the gods, and Night the mother of them. The former of these being not only done by Hesiod and Homer, but also by the generality of the ancient pagan Theists in Epicharmus;[8] and the latter by Orpheus,[9] an undoubted Theist, in his hymn of the Night:

Νύκτα θεῶν γενέτειραν, ἀείσομαι, ἢὲ καὶ ἀνδρῶν·

Noctem concelebro genetricem hominumque deumque.

They not understanding this absolutely and universally of all the gods without exception, as the other atheistic Theogonists did, as if there had been no unmade Deity at all, but Chaos and Night (that is, senseless matter blindly and fortuitously moved) had been the sole original of all things, but only of the οἱ Θεοὶ, "the gods," so called by way of distinction from God or the supreme Deity, that is, the inferior mundane gods generated together with the world. The reason whereof was, because it was a most ancient, and in a manner universally received tra-

some artificer, so also must matter itself have been formed by some one. Who then could have done this except God, to whose power all things are subject? But the poet shrunk from this, in horror of unknown truth." How any one can dread a truth which is unknown to himself, as Lactantius here asserts of Hesiod, I leave to others to explain. The passage, however, clearly shows, that Lactantius considered Hesiod to have made no mention of a Supreme Being in his Theogony, and to have had no knowledge of a creation. II. That Homer and Hesiod call their gods immortal, cannot, I should think, free them from all suspicion of impiety against the Deity. For, to omit many other things, and without touching upon the question, whether he who takes away God can believe nothing to be eternal and immortal, who does not know, that the epithet immortal is also applied to that to which we assign a long period of duration and life? What is the *immortal fame* and *memory* which many promise to themselves, but lasting fame? The Stoics also, which bears more intimately upon this matter, called their gods immortal, although they believed them to spring up and die at certain and long intervals.

[8] He means, no doubt, the verses of Epicharmus quoted by Diogenes Laërtius in the Life of Plato, lib. 3. segm. 10. p. 170. and of these the third:

Ἀλλὰ λέγεται μὰν χάος πρῶτον γενέσθαι τῶν θεῶν.

But Chaos is said to have been generated the first of the gods.

Add Orpheus, Argonaut. v. 334. p. 24. Hymn. in Oceanum, p. 179. and Fragm. p. 245. ed. Eschenbachii.

[9] P. 99. opp. The same Orpheus, Argonaut. v. 339. p. 24. invoked among other deities, ἀχλύα νυκτὸς ἐρεμνῆς, "the darkness of gloomy night." Hereto add what Proclus, in Timæum Platon. lib. 2. p. 63. culls out of Orpheus on the same subject.

dition amongst the Pagans, as hath been often intimated, that the cosmogonia or generation of the world took its first beginning from a chaos (the divine Cosmogonists agreeing herein with the atheistic ones); this tradition having been delivered down from Orpheus and Linus (amongst the Greeks) by Hesiod and Homer, and others; acknowledged by Epicharmus; and embraced by Thales, Anaxagoras, Plato, and other philosophers, who were Theists; the antiquity whereof was thus declared by Euripides:[10]

Οὐκ ἐμὸς ὁ μῦθος, ἀλλ' ἐμῆς μητρὸς πάρα,
Ὡς οὐρανός τε γαῖα τ' ἦν μορφὴ μία,
Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐχωρίσθησαν ἀλλήλων δίχα,
Τίκτουσι πάντα, κἀνέδωκαν εἰς φάος,
Τὰ δένδρα, πτηνὰ, θῆρας, οὓς θ' ἅλμη τρέφει,
Γένος τε θνητῶν·

Non hic meus, sed matris est sermo meæ,
Figura ut una fuerit et cœli et soli,
Secreta quæ mox ut receperunt statum,
Cuncta ediderunt hæc in oras luminis;
Feras, volucres, arbores, ponti gregem,
Homines quoque ipsos.

Neither can it reasonably be doubted, but that it was originally Mosaical, and indeed at first a divine revelation, since no man could otherwise pretend to know what was done before mankind had any being.[1] Wherefore those pagan Cosmogonists, who were Theists, being Polytheists and Theogonists also, and asserting, besides the one supreme unmade Deity, other inferior mundane gods, generated together with the world, (the chief whereof were the animated stars) they must needs, according to the tenor of that tradition, suppose them as to their corporeal parts at least, to have been juniors to Night and Chaos, and the offspring of them, because they were all made out of an antecedent dark chaos:* Τὴν μυγαλὴν ἐκτεθειάσθαι λέγουσιν (saith Plutarch) ὑπὸ Αἰγυπτίων τυφλὴν οὖσαν, ὅτι τὸ σκότος τοῦ φωτὸς ἡγοῦντο πρεσβύτερον,[2] "The mus araneus being blind, is said to

[10] These verses from Euripides' lost tragedy of Menalippe are preserved by Diodorus Siculus, Biblioth. Histor. lib. 1. cap. 4. and extracted from him by Eusebius, Præparat. Evang. lib. 1. cap. 5. p. 20. Compare Jos. Barnes in the Fragments of Euripides, subjoined to his edition of this tragedian, p. 429. &c. Concerning the chaos believed in by the most ancient nations, many testimonies have been collected by Hugo Grotius, De Verit. Relig. Christ. lib. 1. p. 29. ed. Kœcheri, not to speak at present of others.

[1] I consider this argument to be of little weight towards proving the learned Doctor's position, that the ancient doctrine of a chaos was derived by other nations from Moses. For many, it is notorious, have the temerity to pretend to know what was done before mankind were in being, or what happened to matter before it was arranged and disposed. We know there are several Atheists so mad as to measure by rule, as it were, all the motions of matter by which they imagined it to have been agitated before it acquired its present form.

* Sympos lib. 4. qu. 5. p. 670. t. 2. opp.

[2] To this might be added many other passages of the ancients, which show that most nations considered night to be prior to day. Most of them are given by Grotius De Verit. Rel. Christ. lib. 1. sect. 16. p. 49. Add Jo. Christ. Wolf, Ad Origenis Philosophumena, p. 110.

have been deified by the Egyptians, because they thought that darkness was older than light." And the case was the same concerning their demons likewise, they being conceived to have their corporeal vehicula also; for which cause, as Porphyrius[3] from Numenius writeth, the ancient Egyptians pictured them in ships or boats floating upon the water: Τοὺς δὲ Αἰγυπτίους διὰ τοῦτο τοὺς δαίμονας ἅπαντας οὐκ ἑστάναι ἐπὶ στερεοῦ, ἀλλὰ πάντας ἐπὶ πλοίου, "The Egyptians therefore represented all their demons, as not standing upon firm land, but in ships upon the water." But as for the incorporeal part or souls of those inferior gods, though these divine Theogonists could not derive their original from chaos or matter, but rather from that other principle called Love, as being divinely created, and so having God for their father, yet might they notwithstanding, in another sense, fancy Night to have been their mother too, inasmuch as they were all made ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, "from an antecedent non-existence or nothing," brought forth into being. For which cause there seems to have been in Orpheus a dialogue betwixt the Maker of the world and Night.[4] For that this ancient cabala, which derived the cosmogonia from Chaos and Love, was at first religious and not atheistical, and Love understood in it not to be the offspring of Chaos, may be concluded from hence, because this Love as well as Chaos was of a Mosaical extraction also, and plainly derived from that Spirit of God, which is said in Scripture to have moved upon the waters, that is, upon the chaos; whether by this Spirit be to be meant God himself, as acting immediately upon the matter, or some other active principle derived from God and not from matter (as a mundane soul or plastic nature). From whence also it came, that as Porphyrius testifieth, the ancient Pagans thought the water to be divinely inspired;* Ἡγοῦντο γὰρ προσιζάνειν τῷ ὕδατι τὰς ψυχὰς θεοπνόῳ ὄντι, ὥς φησιν ὁ Νουμήνιος, διὰ τοῦτο λέγων καὶ τὸν προφήτην εἰρηκέναι, ἐμφέρεσθαι ἐπάνω τοῦ ὕδατος θεοῦ πνεῦμα, "They thought, that souls attended upon the water or resorted thereunto, as being divinely inspired, as Numenius writeth, adding the prophet also therefore to have said, that the Spirit of God moved upon the water."

And that this cabala was thus understood by some of the ancient pagan Cosmogonists themselves, appears plainly, not only from Simmias Rhodius and Parmenides, but also from these following verses of Orpheus, or whoever was the writer of those

[3] De Antro Nymphar. p. 56. ed Cantab.

[4] Some verses from the dialogue between Jupiter and Night, formerly occurring among the poems of Orpheus, are yet extant in Proclus and others of the ancients. They are collected by And. Christ. Eschenbach, in his book De Poesi Orphica. p. 29. &c.

* De Ant. Nymph. p. 256.

Argonautics, undoubtedly ancient, where Chaos and Love are thus brought in together:

Πρῶτα μὲν ἀρχαίου Χάεος μελιήφατον ὕμνον,
Ὡς ἐπάμειψε φύσεις, ὡς τ' οὐρανὸς εἰς πέρας ἦλθε,
Γῆς τ' εὐρυστέρνου γένεσιν, πυθμένα τε Θαλάσσης,
Πρεσβύτατόν τε καὶ αὐτοτελῆ πολύμητιν Ἔρωτα,
Ὅσσα τ' ἔφυκεν ἅπαντα, διέκρινε δ' ἄλλον ἀπ' ἄλλου.*

To this sense: "We will first sing a pleasant and delightful song concerning the ancient Chaos, how heaven, earth, and seas were framed out of it; as also concerning that much-wise and sagacious Love, the oldest of all, and self-perfect, which actively produced all these things, separating one thing from another." Where this Love is not only called πολύμητις, of "much-counsel," or "sagaciousness," which implies it to have been a substantial and intellectual thing, but also πρεσβύτατος, "the oldest of all," and therefore senior to Chaos, as likewise, αὐτοτελὴς, "self-perfect," or "self-originated." From whence it is manifest, that according to the Orphic tradition, this Love, which the cosmogonia was derived from, was no other than the eternal unmade Deity (or an active principle depending on it), which produced this whole orderly world, and all the generated gods in it, as to their material part, out of Chaos and Night. Accordingly, as Aristotle determines in his Metaphysics, not only in the place before cited, but also afterward:† Ἕτεροι δέ τινες, ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως, ὅσοι ἡ Νοῦν ἢ Ἔρωτα ποιοῦσιν ἀρχήν,[1] "Others, besides the material cause of the world, assign an efficient, or cause of motion, namely, whosoever make either Mind (and Intellect) or Love a principle." Wherefore we conclude, that that other atheistic cabala, or Aristophanic tradition before mentioned, which accordingly, as Aristotle also elsewhere declareth concerning it, did ἐκ νυκτὸς πάντα γεννᾷν, "generate all things whatsoever," even the gods themselves universally, out of Night and Chaos, making Love itself likewise to have been produced from an egg of the Night: I say, that this was nothing else but a mere depravation of the ancient Mosaic cabala, as also an absolutely impossible hypothesis, it deriving all things whatsoever in the universe, besides the bare substance of senseless matter, in another sense than that before mentioned, out of non-

* P. 17. ed. Steph. † Lib. 1. c. 6. p. 849.

[1] Tom. 4. p. 273. opp. In quoting these words of Aristotle, the learned Doctor omits a part. We find in the original, after ὅσοι, the words φιλίαν καὶ νεικος. the addition of which gives a more restricted sense to the passage. Aristotle's meaning is simply this: "Those who in imitation of Empedocles assign friendship and discord to the four elements, usually make either Intellect or Love the source of all motion." How these words prove that the ancients regarded Love to be, as a God, the first and chief cause of all other existences, I confess I cannot tell.

entity or nothing; as shall be also farther manifested afterwards.[2]

We have now represented the sense and generally received

[2] Concerning the doctrines which Dr. Cudworth has been maintaining in the foregoing section, I could add much by way both of comment and stricture. I fear, however, lest I should be accused of being on the one hand too severe and subtle, or on the other too diffuse and copious. On this account I shall content myself with advancing some considerations which seem to me to have some weight towards making known the opinions of the ancients concerning the origin of the universe and of the gods. I. Readily do I grant the learned Doctor, that the poets, in speaking of Night and Ocean as the progenitors of the gods, meant merely the birth and origin of the inferior and mundane deities; if it be true, that they had no notion of a supreme and almighty power, the Creator and Father of all things, a matter that is still under controversy, nor at all settled here by the learned Doctor. To me, indeed, from a thorough examination of the monuments and religions of antiquity, it appears that the ancestral gods of almost all nations were regarded by their worshippers as those men whom in the beginning the earth spontaneously produced from itself. It was, we know, the belief of nearly every nation that the earth, impregnated by the power of the ether and the stars, brought forth from its womb in different places the progenitors of the human family. (See a remarkable passage in Aurelius Victor, De Orig. Gent. Rom. cap. 1. p. 3. ed. Arnzenius. Hence Brutus, commanded by the oracle to salute his mother, kissed the earth, an action of his that very few have rightly comprehended. See Schottus ad Aurel. Victor, De Viris Illustr. c. 10. p. 94. Similar was the notion of the Gauls, when they affirmed that they were the descendants of Dis, that is, the earth. Cæsar De Bell. Gal. lib. 4. c. 18. p. 310. For many other instances consult *Dissertations melées*; 1740. vol. 1. p. 139. &c.) The marriage of Heaven with Earth, of which Hesiod (Theog. v. 146) and other writers of theogonies have sung, denotes simply that in the beginning celestial energy caused the earth to bring forth men preeminently distinguished by strength, beauty, and virtue. Hence was it, that so many nations were fain to be accounted Aborigines and earth-sprung, a claim few would be disposed to deny them. The Romans, though in other respects not over friendly or over just to the Germans, allowed them quietly to enjoy this honour. Ipsos Germanos, says Tacitus, indigenas crediderim, "There is reason to think that the Germans are an indigenous race." Germ. sect. 2. Now these primary inhabitants, vainly imagined to have been the offspring of Heaven and Earth, were commonly classed in the rank of deities, and accounted by the people not only their ancestors but their gods also, inasmuch as in them was supposed to reside a divine and immortal energy, not shared by those who were afterwards, according to the ordinary laws of nature, produced from male and female. If I am not altogether mistaken, traces of this notion appear in the story recorded by Cicero, of the origin of divination (De Divinatione, lib. 2. c. 23): Tages quidam dicitur in agro Tarquiniensi, cum terra araretur, et sulcus altius esset impressus, extitisse repente, et eum affatus esse qui arabat: cumque concursus factus esset hominum, Hetruscos totam haruspicinæ disciplinam edocuisse, "It is said that one Tages, during the ploughing of Tarquin's field, suddenly sprung from a deepened furrow and accosted the ploughman, and that when the people had assembled in great numbers he taught the Etrurians the whole art of augury." Here we have a man sprung from the earth, and so far surpassing the rest of the human race as to be a possessor of prescience and divination; in a word, a kind of god.

Hesiod (Theog. v. 154. 155.) says:

> Ὅσσοι γὰρ γαίης τε καὶ οὐρανοῦ ἐξεγένοντο
> Δεινότατοι παιδῶν,

"The direct progeny of Earth and Heaven were the mightiest of their posterity." Such was the opinion entertained by all nations of their earliest and earth-sprung ancestors, whose might and virtue, surpassing as it was regarded, they thought worthy of even religious homage and public solemn adoration. The gods of Hesiod, separating from their number the creations of poetry, and the personification of qualities or things, are for the most part the first earth-born race of men. See the account of them,

doctrine of the ancient pagan theologers, that there was indeed a multiplicity of gods, but yet so that one of them only was ἀγέννητος, "ingenerate" or "unmade," by whom all the other

Theog. v. 150. &c. And, to pass over other nations, Tacitus shows that the Germans maintained the same doctrine: Celebrant carminibus antiquis Tuistonem, *deum terra editum*, et filium Mannum originem gentis conditoresque, "In their ancient ballads the god Tuisto *who was born of the earth*, and Mannus his son, are celebrated as the founders of their race." De Mor. Germ. sect. 2. Nor should we omit to notice the fact which the same author records respecting the Semnones, a tribe of the Suevi, sect. 39. He says that they hallow with peculiar reverence a certain grove, from which they imagine that their god, the father of the nation, sprung: Eoque omnis superstitio respicit, tanquam inde *initia gentis, ibi regnator omnium deum*, "The doctrine intended by this veneration is, that this spot is the birth-place at once of their nation and of God the universal ruler." Nothing then, on the one hand, can be more certain than that the ancestral gods of the ancients were simply those extraordinary and mighty men, whom they supposed the earth, impregnated by supernal energy, to have first brought forth; while, on the other hand, it remains a question whether beyond this they acknowledged a universal Deity, the father and creator of all things besides. II. But again, the poetry of antiquity concerning Night the mother, and Chaos or Ocean the father of the gods, contains, if rationally interpreted, sufficient evidence that the subject of the poet was often the nature rather of things than of gods, and that it was his wont to clothe outward realities and scientific doctrines in personal and animated shapes. Unless this be continually remembered, the theogonies will appear to be the dreams of men without either intellect or common sense. Ancient physiologers among the Phœnicians, as appears from the Sanchoninthon quoted by Eusebius, Præpar. Evang. lib. I. cap. 10. p. 33. as well as other nations, taught that the primary elements of things originally lay in a heterogeneous mass, formless and dark. At length, however, they were separated, and then, from the wild congeries of matter and the eternal night, were caused by ethereal energy, to come forth nobler and more illustrious beings. Now, when men of genius wished to present this doctrine in a poetic form, they converted things into persons, called Chaos the father and Night the mother of the deities, and ended by incorporating this Chaos and Night into the number of the gods; a conclusion which, if literally taken, is manifestly irrational and absurd. Posterity, however, neither perceiving the significance of these representations, nor remembering that their originators were poets, a race to whom a certain licence is always permitted, were ignorant and thoughtless enough not only to address hymns to Night as to a goddess, but also to worship and propitiate her by sacrifices and religious ceremonies! Such is the folly inherent in man! Many instances of this poetic style of personifying will be met with in the sequel, and in Hesiod they occur throughout. III. Almost the same thing may be said of *Love*, whom the poets celebrate as the most ancient of the gods; although the learned Doctor spares no pains to prove that it was in reality regarded as a divine being, or at least a kind of generative or plastic nature. On this subject I have said as much as appeared necessary on c. 3. sect. 18.; and my opinion remains unchanged. Love of the ancient poetry seems to me to be a *generative energy*, supposed by early physiologists to be inherent in the nature of things, and accommodated by the poets to the Grecian fables of Cupid and Venus. To show this more clearly I shall proceed, first, candidly to examine Dr. Cudworth's arguments on this point, and then to advance proofs of my own opinion, chiefly from the passages of Hesiod in which he speaks of Venus and Love. To prove that the Love of the ancients was not a product of Chaos, but a better and higher nature, that calmed the strife of the elements, and reduced the universe to form and order, see the testimonies that Battierius has collected from the writings of antiquity concerning this Love, with great learning, though without much judgment. Mus. Helvet. vol. 4. p. 346. &c.

The learned Doctor, 1. contends that this Love was identical with that Spirit who, in the beginning, according to Moses, "brooded upon the face of the waters." I know that many illustrious and learned men have maintained the same opinion, among whom Hugo Grotius stands pre-eminent. See notes on lib. 1. De Verit. Relig. Christ. p. 31. I may add J. A. Schmidt, Diss. De Ovo Mundano, cap. 3. sect. 4, 5, and Edmund Dickinson, Physica Vetus et Vera, c. 5. sect. 2. p. 56. But these learned men after all assume, not prove, their doctrine. Nor indeed do I see by what consi-

gods, together with the world, were made, so as to have had a novity of being or a temporary beginning of their existence; Plato and the Pythagoreans here only differing from the rest in

derations it can be evinced, unless a very slight shade of resemblance be taken as proof that the Spirit of which Moses speaks, and the Love of Orpheus and Hesiod, are identical, the latter being but an imitation and transference of the former.

2. The Doctor quotes the testimony of Porphyry, as proving that a kind of spirit was anciently believed to dwell inherently in the waters. It would take me too long to discuss this whole doctrine of Porphyry; to look at the matter generally will suffice for my purpose. The ancients, I admit, principally the Egyptians, and after them not a few of the Jews, did believe that there resided in water a spiritual essence or kind of plastic nature, which created and perfected all bodies. This appears, from the testimony, not only of Porphyry, but also of that learned Christian writer by whom in, I think, the third century, the Recognitions of Clement were written, who had been, as I have elsewhere shown, an Alexandrian Jew, and was thoroughly skilled in the ancient philosophy. The following passage is worthy of quotation, inasmuch as it admirably illustrates the whole subject. Aquis, says he, inest vis quædam spiritus a Deo dati ex initio; cujus opere habitus futuri corporis in ipso statim semine formari incipit, et per culmum spicamque restitui: turgefacto etenim ex humore seminum grano, per angustos quosdam venarum meatus vis illa spiritus, quæ inesse aquis data est, utpote incorporea transcurrens, ad incrementum semina suscitat, et crescentium species format. Ministerio igitur humidi elementi, cui vitalis ille spiritus insitus semper et ingenitus est, efficitur, ut non solum reparetur, sed ut per omnia similis species et forma his, quæ facta fuerint, seminibus redeat, "There inheres in water something of the energy of that Spirit, which in the beginning was sent forth by God. By this Spirit's operation the form and fashion of a body begin to appear in the very seed, and are perfected in the blade and ear. For as the moisture of the seeds causes the grain to swell, the spiritual energy which, as being incorporeal, resides in water, circulates through narrow veins and channels, makes the seeds to grow, and perfects the conformation of the plant. Through the agency therefore of the watery element, in which this vital Spirit is resident and innate, is brought to pass that under all circumstances the image and form of that, which is produced, resembles the seeds that were sown." Recog. Clem. lib. 8. Patr. Apostol. tom. 1. p. 571. Similar passages may be found in other places, lib. 10. cap. 32. p. 595. lib. 5. cap. 8. p. 556. So Clementin. Hom. 11. sect. 22. p. 704. For my part, I do not see why we should believe that the ancients took this doctrine from Moses, when there is nothing to prevent our concluding that they formed the opinion from an observation of the energy which water actually possesses. If, however, with Dr. Cudworth, any are disposed stoutly to maintain that Moses was the author of the notion, I am not particularly anxious to refute the supposition. Numenius apud Porphyr. refers to the words of Moses. So does the writer of the Clementina, who in Homil. 11. sect. 22. p. 704. says: Τὸ δὲ ὕδωρ οὐχ ὑπὸ πνεύματος τὴν κίνησιν ἔχει, καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα ἀπὸ τοῦ τὰ ὅλα πεποιηκότος θεοῦ τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς ἱκστάσεως ἔχει; οὕτως γὰρ ὁ προφήτης εἴρηκε Μωσῆς, κ. τ. λ. "Does not water derive its motion from some spirit, and is not the Spirit of God, who created all things, the primary cause of existence? Moses the prophet expressly affirms it," &c. Let those who please use this passage as an argument, that the Egyptians and other nations took their notion from Moses, though indeed I may think otherwise. Still, granting all this, there appears to me no reason in the world why it should also be conceded that the *Love spoken of by the poets* was identical with this Holy Spirit. For even supposing that ancient philosophers were indebted to Moses for their belief that all water was pervaded by a generative energy, it does not at all follow that ancient poets were also indebted to him for what they wrote concerning Love.

3. Our author also cites the testimonies of Parmenides, Simmias, Orpheus, Aristotle. Respecting the former two of these, I have already spoken above on ch. 3. sect. 18. That Aristotle affords no assistance to the theory in question, I proved a little while ago. It therefore remains that I should inquire into the sentiments of Orpheus concerning this Love. Now the very passage which Dr. Cudworth has quoted from this poet, abundantly demonstrates that he had no such exalted notions of Love, as the learned Doctor imagines. For although indeed he celebrates its birth with great

this, that though they acknowledged the world and all the mundane gods to have generated together in time, yet they supposed certain other intelligible and supramundane gods also,

splendour of language, he places it after Chaos, after the division of the elements, in fine, after the creation of the land and sea. Does not this show that he believed love to be like other things—the offspring of Chaos? But I will quote some other verses of Orpheus, from which his conviction will even far more clearly appear. They occur in the same book. Argonaut. v. 12.

Ἀρχαίου μὲν πρῶτα χάους ἀμέγαρτον ἀνάγκην,
Καὶ Κρόνον, ὃς ἑλόχευσεν ἀπειρεσίοισιν ὑφ' ὅλκοῖς
Αἰθέρα, καὶ διφυῆ περιωπέα κυδρὸν Ἔρωτα
Νυκτὸς ἀειγνήτης πατέρα κλυτόν.

"I have sung necessity, the source of primeval Chaos, and Saturn, leading on in endless train the ether, and Love, two-fold, celebrated, and glorious, the renowned progenitor of eternal Night."

Chaos itself could not have been wilder than philosophy like this. First we have Chaos and Necessity; these together give birth to Saturn; Saturn to the ether. Lastly uprises Love and becomes the father of Night. Take away from this its poetic dress, and you will have this doctrine:—By the eternal decree of fate, the elements, lying hitherto in confusion, were arranged into a certain order; which having been done, Time, previously non-existent, began its course. Long afterwards the more subtle atoms carried on high formed the ether, whose energy excited the generative power in the rest of matter. From all this, therefore, I think that I cannot justly be called upon to assent to the opinion of the learned Doctor respecting Love. I will now proceed to exhibit my own idea. It is, as I have already avowed, my belief, that the Love spoken of in theogonies is neither a god, nor a personal existence, nor any separate nature at all, but an attribute, the procreative power in fact conjoined with matter, invested by the poets with a personal dress. In order to show this, I shall first assume, what will be readily granted by all learned persons, that the bards of antiquity in exhibiting the physical doctrines of their ancestors, under a poetic form, for the most part rather distorted these doctrines by their metaphors than fairly illustrated them. The assertion appears self-evident, nor is it contradicted by those who have shown themselves most familiar with ancient philosophy, as Grotius, Le Clerc, Bochart, Salmasius, and others. This being the case, it follows that the representations of the poets are to be explained by a reference to the physical notions generally current among the people; and that the plain meaning of their ornate rhapsodies is to be sought in those expositors of ancient dogmas, who have written in a lucid style and rejected metaphor. Among these, two are pre-eminent, Diodorus Siculus and that Sanchoniathon, whoever he was, from whom Eusebius has largely quoted, Præpar. Evan. lib. 1. cap. 10. p. 33. &c. Cologne, 1688, folio. Reference to either of them will afford convincing proof in support of my opinion concerning Love. But, passing by Sanchoniathon, I shall only briefly refer to the testimony which Diodorus Siculus gives as to the ancient popular belief upon the point in question. He then, Biblioth. Hist. lib. 1. cap. 10. p. 18. exhibits the origin of the universe as follows: The heavens and the earth were at first one commingled mass. At length substances of different kinds were separated, the lighter and more igneous atoms ascending to form the stars and the sun, while the more gross and heavy sank into the lowest place, and were shaped into the earth. This was at first soft and slimy, but was hardened by the solar heat which also exerted such an influence upon it that in several places its surface swelled, and fœtus were conceived. Nourishment was ministered to these embryoes by night, from a circumfused nebula or mist, until their chrysalids (as they may be called) being broken, the various kinds of living beings came forth. The earth, however, gradually lost this productive power, so that now both men and animals are born under another law. These statements Diodorus confirms by the authority of Euripides, who was a disciple of Anaxagoras. And if they be compared with the writings of Hesiod and other ancient poets respecting Chaos and Love, it will be seen that, though all may not have sung in precisely the same strains, their representations may, for the most part, be traced to doctrines similar to the foregoing, and that their

which however produced from one original Deity, were nevertheless eternal or without beginning. But now we must acknowledge that there were amongst the pagan Theists some of a

Love is nothing more than the generative power said to have been excited in matter. [Schukford has contrived other explanations. Biblioth.Brit. tom. 10. part 1. p. 143. &c.]

But we may appeal still more confidently to Hesiod, of whose theogony I will proceed with as much brevity as possible to illustrate that part which belongs to the present subject, in the hope that I may in some measure open the way to others who may desire to explore the opinions of the ancients, and to read this poet in a new and clearer light. He first lays down three original elements of things, Chaos, Earth, and Love, v. 116, &c. ; From Chaos were born Erebus and Night, v. 123 ; and from Night sprang forth Day and Ether, v. 124. Earth produced Heaven, the Mountains, the Sea, and, consorting with Heaven, the Ocean, with many deities whom it is needless to mention, v. 125. &c. What the poet adds concerning Chaos and its offspring, Erebus, Night, Day, and Ether, I omit as not connected with my design. And indeed, to tell the truth, I must believe that here, instead of exhibiting (as he ought to have done) the real doctrines of the ancients, the poet has perverted and adulterated them all. For Chaos among the ancients denotes the rude and undigested mass of all things ; but Hesiod *separates* Earth, and its offspring, as Heaven, Ocean, and the rest, *from Chaos* ; which shows that with him Earth meant almost the same thing as other ancient writers denoted by Chaos, and that his Chaos was (though perhaps he did not perceive it) quite another idea from theirs. But I pass to other matters. The poet, then, although he imagines three primary elements, Chaos, Earth, and Love, gives no share whatever to Love in those acts of generation which he proceeds to enumerate. Nay he does not even make further allusion to it or its operations, but descants exclusively on the respective products of Chaos and Earth. Now I put it to all impartial persons, whether these be not proofs that his Love was not a separate and independent existence, but a certain power and energy residing in Chaos and Earth, animating each of these principles, and exciting it to the act of generation ? Chaos conceives ; Earth also conceives. In both therefore there must necessarily have operated some generative and productive energy. It is this, consequently, that under the appellation of Love Hesiod describes. The principles of things were *two*, and each was excited to action by an interior, generating power.

I shall now consider what our poet teaches respecting the offspring of Earth. Hereby I shall at once establish and corroborate my opinion, and also discover the principle from which I am convinced all must set out who would understand the ancient poets, to whom I have been referring. " Earth first produced Heaven radiant with constellations," (v. 126, 127), that is, the fiery and more subtle particles of matter flew off from the rest, and rose to the loftier regions, forming the heavens and the stars. " Then she brought forth the high mountains ... and the sterile sea." (129) meaning, as I think, simply this:—The softer and more yielding parts of the earth were in several places depressed, whereby valleys and abysses were hollowed out ; consequently the water hitherto diffused over the whole of the land flowed into these depths, and at the same time mountains were discovered.

Then Earth, consorting with her own offspring Heaven, gave birth to several Deities, and last of all to Saturn, (v. 133, &c.) afterwards to the Cyclops, and many others whom it would be useless to enumerate. (v. 139.) Here the poet begins to mix up with ancient philosophic opinions the narratives and fables, current among the Greeks respecting their gods, as Saturn, Jupiter, the Cyclops, and to accommodate the mythologic narrative to the scientific theory. At the same time it is not difficult to draw from the twisted combination, the thread of physical doctrine that runs through all. It was as we have already seen from Diodorus and others, the belief of the ancients that the earth while yet soft and new-created, was so impregnated by celestial and sidereal energy as to produce the various tribes of animals, and, especially, men distinguished for bodily strength and for the endowments of divine virtue ; those, in short, who were afterwards regarded as gods by the nations in whose territories they were respectively fabled to have sprung. For I have shown above that the great ancestral deities of the Greeks, as enumerated by Hesiod, were those human immortals, whom ancient tradition affirmed to have been brought forth into light by their mother Earth. But Heaven treated his children with cruelty, and confined them within the caverns of

different persuasion from the rest, who therefore did not admit of any theogonia in the sense before declared, that is, any temporary generation of gods, because they acknowledged no cosmogonia, no temporary production of the world, but concluded it to have been from eternity.

That Aristotle was one of these is sufficiently known, whose inferior gods therefore, the sun, moon and stars, must needs be ἀγέννητοι, or "ingenerate," in this sense, so as to have had no

the earth. v. 155, 156. Here the erudite Le Clerc, Notæ ad Hesiod. in loc. discerns the traces of ancient history. I on the contrary recognize those of more ancient philosophy, as appears, not only from the passage itself, but from the whole scope of the poem. The influence of the sky and stars, which in those primeval times asserted its greatest strength, induced for a while such a dryness over the earth as to prevent the progeny conceived in its womb from attaining the required maturity, and therefore from coming forth into light.

Thereupon Earth resorted to fraud, and gave to her son, the wily Saturn, a sharp toothed scythe, with which he so mutilated his father, as to prevent his future union with her. Let learned men here search for hidden mysteries, or discover with admiration, relics of ancient history; for my part, taking away the metaphors and personifications of poetic licence, all appears obvious and clear. Saturn with his scythe is Time. And the significance of the whole allegory is this: when a long succession of ages had passed away, the heaven lost its generative power, that is, experienced a gradual diminution and loss of that intense and subtle energy, by the original influence of which mankind had been produced from the earth. I appeal to all who possess either erudition or common sense, whether any explanation can be in itself more simple or more consistent, both with ancient doctrines, and with the poem itself than this? But those ignorant of poetic language and style have been most wonderfully and without end disturbed by the scythe with sharp teeth—the name of Saturn, the mutilated body of Heaven, and so on. They might have been spared their anxiety, had they reflected that their concern was with a poet, and one too who was ingeniously endeavouring to harmonize the opinions of philosophers with the common religious belief.

The parts cut off by Saturn were cast into the sea, and borne along till from the foam surrounding them, Venus arose, accompanied by Love, (v. 181—206.) Here again the poet gives to scientific theory a shape borrowed from mythologic fable. No doubt Venus was a woman—perhaps a Queen—of Cyprus. But Hesiod, since the Greeks held this Venus to have been in her age pre-eminently amorous, and at the same time regarded her as a goddess, intertwined in consistency with his purpose a story respecting her birth with his account of the origin of the world. We must take that purpose into consideration, and strip of their poetic adornments the ancient dogmas, which under such attire, are concealed. The poet, then, designs to embody the idea that the generative energy by which the heaven was formerly pervaded was not all dissipated, but transferred from the heaven to the waters, in which, as we have a little before shown, the ancients believed a spiritual and productive power to reside. Accordingly, those who were previously brought into being by celestial and sidereal influence, to wit men, are now conceived and produced by that plastic energy, animating water, and so residing in semen, which is a kind of fluid. The foam from which Venus is fabled to have sprung without doubt represents the human seed, and symbolizes the generative and plastic power latent in it.

From this specimen, I think that all will clearly perceive the truth of the opinion I have so often expressed, that the authors of theogonies either combined physical doctrines with the Greek mythologic stories, or else endeavoured to refer the latter to the former, as their original; casting, at the same time, by the inventions and metaphors of their genius, such a cloud of obscuration over what otherwise would have been easy to understand, that many among both ancients and moderns have sought through the darkness in vain for a ray of light. At all events, I trust that my explanation of the correspondence between some of the poetic fables and the doctrines of the philosophers, will be approved by all, if not for its erudition or ingenuity, at least for its perspicuousness and ease.

temporary production, because the whole world to him was such. And if that philosopher[3] be to be believed, himself was the very first, at least of all the Greeks, who asserted this ingenerateness or eternity of the world, he affirming, that all before him did γεννᾶν τὸν κόσμον, and κοσμοποιεῖν, "generate or make the world;" that is, attribute a temporary production to it, and consequently to all those gods also, which were a part thereof. Notwithstanding which, the writer De Placitis Philosophorum,[4] and Stobæus,[5] impute this dogma of the world's eternity to certain others of the Greek philosophers before Aristotle, (besides Ocellus Lucanus,[6] who is also acknowledged by Philo to have been an assertor thereof.) And indeed Epicharmus, though a Theist, seems plainly to have been of this persuasion, that the world was unmade, as also that there was no theogonia, nor temporary production of the inferior gods, from these verses of his,[7] according to Grotius' correction:

[3] De Cœlo, lib. 1. cap. 10. p. 623. tom. 1. opp.

[4] In this passage he represent Xenophanes to have maintained that the world was ἀγέννητον καὶ ἀΐδιον, "unoriginated and eternal." This opinion of Xenophanes is still more clearly and copiously exhibited by Plutarch in his *Stromata*, from which Eusebius quotes, Præpar. Evan. lib. 1. cap. 8. p. 23.

[5] Here Stobæus asserts Xenophanes, Parmenides and Melissus to have denied γένεσιν καὶ φθορὰν "the doctrines of generation and dissolution." I pass over Philolaus and Aristæus, who in the same passage are not obscurely declared to have held similar opinions. A much clearer view of the doctrine of Parmenides may again be found in Plutarch, as quoted by Eusebius, Præp. Ev. lib. 1. cap. 8. p. 23. See also the Philosophumena of Origen, cap. 11. p. 86.

[6] Of this author a singular work is extant, De Mundi Æternitate, to be found among the Scriptores Veteres Mythologici, edited by T. Gale, p. 501. Philo mentions having read it, Lib. de Mundo non Interituro, opp. p. 940. Stobæus, it may be added, Eclog. Phys. lib. 1. cap. 24. makes similar reference to Ocellus.

[7] These verses, with others of the same author, are preserved by Diogenes Laërtius, lib. 3. sect. 10. p. 170. Their precise meaning however has been much disputed, and especially by those erudite scholars, Marqu. Gudius and Pierre Petit, as may be seen from Gilles Menage, Comment. in Laërtium, p. 142. &c. Still, however, they may be explained. They evince at least that Epicharmus believed only the *forms* of things to be mutable, while to things themselves, including of course the elements which he accounted Gods, he ascribed eternity. In the age of Philo there were already some who denied Aristotle to have originated the notion of the eternity of the universe, and who affirmed that it had long ago been held by the Pythagoreans: Ἔνιοι δ' οὐκ Ἀριστοτέλη τῆς δόξης εὑρετὴν λέγουσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν Πυθαγορείων τινάς, "Several say that it was not Aristotle, but some of the Pythagoreans who first started this doctrine," in his book De Mundo non Interituro, p. 940. Gassendi moreover remarks that Censorinus attributes this opinion to all the Pythagoreans, and to Plato himself, Phys. sect. 1. lib. 1. cap. 6. p. 162. As to Plato, it will be seen by and by that although in his extant works he clearly teaches the origin of the universe, it is nevertheless not quite certain, what was his real conviction on the doctrine in question. At present I would confine myself to those others who are said before the time of Aristotle to have advocated the eternity of the world: although the Stagirite himself professes that he was the first to maintain this opinion. And after a careful examination of the subject itself, and those remains of the ancients that bear upon it, I must avow it as my belief, both that in claiming for himself the origination of this theory Aristotle spoke the truth, and that at the same time they are not far wrong, who own that before his time others were imbued with the same erroneous notion. For in fact there were *two* theories respecting the eternity of the world which, on the one hand, ancient writers with their customary disregard of order and perspicuity have confounded, and

'Αλλ' ἀεί τοι θεοὶ παρῆσαν, ὑπέλιπον δ' οὐ πώποκα·
Τάδε δ' ἀεὶ πάρεσθ' ὅμοια, διὰ δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀεί.
'Αλλὰ λέγεται μὲν χάος πρᾶτον γενέσθαι τῶν θεῶν·
Πῶς δὲ ; ἀμάχανον γ' ἀπὸ μηδὲ τινος ὅ, τι πρᾶτον μόλοι·
Οὐκ ἄρ' ἔμολε πρᾶτον οὐδέν, οὐδὲ μὰ Δία δεύτερον,
Τῶν δέ γ' ὧν ἄμμες νῦν λέγομεν ὠδ' εἶναι μέλλει τάδε.*

Nempe Dî semper fuerunt, atque nunquam intercident:
Hæc quæ dico semper nobis rebus in iisdem se exhibent.
Extitisse sed deorum primum perhibetur chaos:
Quînam verò ? nam de nihilo nîl pote primum existere.
Ergo nec primum profecto quicquam, nec fuit alterum :
Sed quæ nunc sic appellantur, alia fient postmodum.

Where, though he acknowledges this to have been the general tradition of the ancient Theists, that Chaos was before the gods, and that the inferior mundane gods had a temporary generation, or production with the world; yet notwithstanding does he conclude against it, from this ground of reason, because nothing could proceed from nothing, and therefore, both the gods, and indeed whatsoever else is substantial in the world, was from eternity unmade, only the fashion of things having been altered.

Moreover, Diodorus Siculus affirms the Chaldeans likewise to have asserted this dogma of the world's eternity :† Οἱ δ' οὖν Χαλδαῖοι τὴν μὲν τοῦ κόσμου φύσιν ἀΐδιόν φασιν εἶναι, καὶ μήτε ἐξ ἀρχῆς γένεσιν ἐσχηκέναι, μήθ' ὕστερον φθορὰν ἐπιδέξεσθαι,

between which, on the other, moderns have neglected with the requisite carefulness to discriminate. One party maintained that this universe, as we behold it now, in its whole structure and form, has from eternity so existed as that, with the exception of minute and trivial changes not denied by them, it has always been absolutely the same, remaining at this moment altogether what it was countless ages ago. This was the opinion of Aristotle. See his Physics, lib. 8. his Metaphysics, lib. 12. and on Generation and Dissolution, lib. 2. Others, however, while believing both the matter and form of the universe to have been eternal, feigned a kind of eternal succession of worlds, averring that from the gradual decay and dissolution of one, another was simultaneously formed. This opinion found many advocates even before the time of Aristotle, Heraclitus to wit, Empedocles, Parmenides, many of the Stoics, and afterwards of the Pythagoreans. Its adherents held in one sense, indeed, that the world was originated ; but in another that it was eternal and unproduced. Hence they had no notion at all of the chaos of the poets, and the opinions therewith connected. From this two-fold opinion it has come to pass that ancient testimonies as to these philosophers are conflicting—and that too among Christian as well as profane authors—some asserting that they maintained the universe to have been originated, others that they believed it eternal. The way is now clear both to vindicate Aristotle from the charge of misrepresentation, and to interpret rightly the opinions of the ancients concerning the universe. The former of the two opinions abovementioned was maintained by no philosophers, or by very few indeed anterior to Aristotle. So that he truly affirms, "that all his predecessors declared the Heaven created, none eternal," that is to say in the sense in which *he* believed it eternal. The latter theory was the favourite of those Pythagoreans and others who are quoted as having been advocates of the eternity of the universe before Aristotle, which, were this the place for doing so, I could establish by several ancient testimonies. It is evident, moreover, from the verses of Epicharmus, if rightly considered, that it is the second of the above-stated opinions and not the doctrine of Aristotle which is there exhibited. And he was a Pythagorean.

* Excerp. p. 478. † L. 2. p. 82.

"The Chaldeans affirm the nature of the world to be eternal, and that it was neither generated from any beginning, nor will ever admit corruption." Who, that they were not Atheists for all that (no more than Aristotle), appears from those following words of that historiographer: Τήν τε τῶν ὅλων τάξιν τε καὶ διακόσμησιν, θείᾳ τινὶ προνοίᾳ γεγονέναι, καὶ νῦν ἕκαστα τῶν ἐν οὐρανῷ γινομένων, οὐχ ὡς ἔτυχεν, οὐδ' αὐτομάτως, ἀλλ' ὡρισμένῃ τινὶ καὶ βεβαίως κεκυρωμένῃ θεῶν κρίσει, συντελεῖσθαι, "They believe also, that the order and disposition of the world is by a certain divine providence, and that every one of those things, which come to pass in the heavens, happens not by chance, but by a certain determinate and firmly ratified judgment of the gods." However, it is a thing known to all, that the generality of the later Platonists stiffly adhered to Aristotle in this; neither did they only assert the corporeal world, with all the inferior mundane gods in it, to be ἀγεννήτους, or "ingenerate," and to have existed from eternity, but also maintained the same concerning the souls of men and all other animals, (they concluding that no souls were younger than body or the world;) and because they would not seem to depart from their master Plato, therefore did they endeavour violently to force this same sense[8] upon Plato's words also.

[8] I have already noticed the opinion of the later Platonists, and need not now repeat what I have said. If the doctrine of Plato is, as I imagine it ought to be, estimated from those books of his which we possess, especially the Timæus, there can be no doubt whatever that he believed the world to have been formed and created by God. It was therefore presumption and folly in his later disciples to attempt, in plain defiance of truth, to corroborate their dogma of the world's eternity from any at least of the extant writings of their master. Whether, notwithstanding, the divine philosopher wrote as he really thought, is made doubtful by a passage of Aristotle, in which he asserts Plato and his associates to have avowed that they taught their doctrine respecting the creation of the universe, not because they really thought that the world was originated, but simply for the sake of facilitating the instruction of the more ignorant and unenlightened. The passage is worth quoting; it occurs, De Cœlo lib. 1. c. 10. Ἣν δέ τινες βοήθειαν ἐπιχειροῦσιν ἐπιφέρειν ἑαυτοῖς, τῶν λεγόντων, ἄφθαρτον μὲν εἶναι, γενόμενον δέ, οὐκ ἔστιν ἀληθές· ὁμοίως γάρ φασι τοῖς τὰ διαγράμματα γράφουσι, καὶ σφᾶς εἰρηκέναι περὶ τῆς γενέσεως, οὐκ ὡς γενομένου ποτέ, ἀλλὰ διδασκαλίας χάριν, ὡς μᾶλλον γνωριζόντων, ὥσπερ τὸ διάγραμμα γιγνόμενον θεασαμένους, "The plea by which some, who teach that the world though indestructible is yet created, endeavour to justify themselves will not hold good. They argue, that they speak of the origin of the universe from the same principle as mathematical instructors draw diagrams, not because the thing is so in reality, but the better to illustrate their subject and the more easily instruct their pupils." Aristotle indeed utterly repudiates this evasion of the Platonists—perhaps of Plato himself; at all events it must be allowed that it is by no means certain what Plato really and truly believed upon the subject. It is therefore the less surprising that there subsequently arose advocates of the eternity of the universe, who, seeing that the authority of Plato was necessary to shield them from odium, did not scruple to refer the contrary written notions of that philosopher to the mere play of genius. Philo Judæus corroborates these statements, lib. de Mundi Æternitat. p. 941. he says: Τινὲς δ' οἴονται σοφιζόμενοι, κατὰ Πλάτωνα γεννητὸν λέγεσθαι τὸν κόσμον, οὐ τὸ λαβεῖν γενέσεως ἀρχήν, ἀλλὰ τὸ εἴπερ εγίγνετο, μὴ ἂν ἑτέρως, ἢ τὸν εἰρημένον συστῆναι τρόπον, ἢ διὰ τὸ ἐν γενέσει καὶ μεταβολῇ τὰ μέρη θεωρεῖσθαι, "Some however, sophistically affirm that the universe is said by Plato to be γεννητὸς or generate, not because

Notwithstanding which, concerning these latter Platonists, it is here observable, that though they thus asserted the world, and all inferior gods and souls to have been *ἀγεννήτους*, according to that stricter sense of the word declared, that is, to have had no temporary generation or beginning, but to have existed from eternity; yet by no means did they therefore conceive them to be *αὐτογενεῖς καὶ αὐθυποστάτους*, "self-originated, and self-existing," but concluded them to have been all derived from one sole self-existent Deity as their cause, which therefore, though not in order of time, yet of nature was before them. To this purpose Plotinus:* *Νοῦν πρὸ αὐτοῦ εἶναι, οὐχ ὡς χρόνῳ πρότερον αὐτοῦ ὄντα, ἀλλ' ὅτι παρὰ νοῦ ἐστι καὶ φύσει πρότερος ἐκεῖνος, καὶ αἴτιον τούτου, ἀρχέτυπον οἷον καὶ παράδειγμα εἰκόνος· καὶ δι' ἐκεῖνον ὄντος καὶ ὑποστάντος ἀεὶ τόνδε τὸν τρόπον*, "Mind or God was before the world, not as if it existed before it in time, but because the world proceeded from it, and that was in order of nature first as the cause thereof, and its archetype or paradigm; the world also always subsisting by it and from it." And again elsewhere to the same purpose:† *Οὐ τοίνυν ἐγένετο, ἀλλ' ἐγίνετο καὶ γενήσεται, ὅσα γεννητὰ λέγεται, οὐ δὲ φθαρήσεται, ἀλλ' ἤ ὅσα ἔχει εἰς ἄ*, "The things, which are said to have been made or generated, were not so made, as that they ever had a beginning of their existence, but yet they were made, and will be always made, (in another sense;) nor will they ever be destroyed otherwise than as being dissolved into those simple principles, out of which some of them were compounded." Where though the world be said never to have been made as to a temporary beginning, yet in another sense, is it said to be always made, as depending upon God perpetually as the emanative cause thereof. Agreeably whereunto, the manner of the world's production from God is thus declared by that philosopher:‡ *Οὐκ ὀρθῶς οἱ φθείρουσι καὶ γεννῶσιν αὐτὸν, ὅστις γὰρ τρόπος τῆς ποιήσεως ταύτης, οὐκ ἐθέλουσι συνιέναι, οὐδ' ἴσασιν, ὅτι ὅσον ἐκεῖνα ἐλλάμπει, οὐ μήποτε τὰ ἄλλα ἐλλείπει*, "They do not rightly, who corrupt and generate the world, for they will not understand what manner of making or production the world had, to wit, by way of effulgency or eradiation from the Deity." From whence it follows, that the world must needs have been so long as there was a God, as the light was co-eve with the sun.

he believed it to contain the principle of generation, but because if it were indeed created that was the only way of accounting for its production, inasmuch as we see its parts in constant reproduction and change." Philo would have judged more leniently of these commentators on Plato, if he had known or remembered that perhaps the philosopher himself, and certainly those of his first disciples with whom Aristotle conversed, did in fact maintain that opinion, comparing their own theory of the world's origin to those figures by which geometricians instruct the unskilled.

* En. 3. lib. 2. c. 1. † En. 2. lib. 9. c. 3.

‡ En. 5. lib. 8. c. 12.

So likewise Proclus[9] concludes, that the world was ἀεὶ γιγνόμενος, καὶ ἐλλαμπόμενος ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄντος, "always generated or eradiated from God," and therefore must needs be eternal, God being so. Wherefore these latter Platonists supposed the same thing concerning the corporeal world, and the lower mundane gods, which their master Plato did concerning his higher eternal gods; that though they had no temporary production, yet they depended no less upon one Supreme Deity, than if they had been made out of nothing by him. From whence it is manifest, that none of these philosophers apprehended any repugnancy at all betwixt these two things; existence from eternity, and being caused and produced by another. Nor can we make any great doubt, but that if the latter Platonists had been fully convinced of any contradictious inconsistency here, they would readily have disclaimed that their so beloved hypothesis of the world's eternity; it being so far from the truth what some have supposed, that the assertors of the world's eternity were all Atheists, that these latter Platonists were led into this opinion no otherwise than from the sole consideration of the Deity; to wit, its ἀγαθοειδὴς βούλησις, καὶ γόνιμος δύναμις, "its essential goodness, and generative power, or emanative fecundity," as Proclus plainly declares upon the Timæus.*

Now, though Aristotle were not acted with any such divine enthusiasm as these Platonists seem to have been, yet did he notwithstanding, after his sober manner, really maintain the same thing; that though the world and inferior mundane gods had no temporary generation, yet were they nevertheless all produced from one Supreme Deity as their cause. Thus Simplicius represents that philosopher's sense:† Ἀριστοτέλης οὐ γίνεσθαι ἀξιοῖ τὸν κόσμον, ἀλλὰ κατ' ἄλλον τρόπον ὑπὸ Θεοῦ παράγεσθαι, "Aristotle would not have the world to have been made, (so as to have had a beginning) but yet nevertheless to have been produced from God after some other manner." And again afterwards: Ἀριστοτέλης τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καὶ τῆς ἀϊδίου κινήσεως αὐτοῦ θεὸν λέγων, ὅμως ἀγέννητον αὐτὸν ἀποδείκνυσι, "Aristotle, though making God the cause of the heaven and its eternal motion, yet concludes it notwithstanding to have been ingenerate or unmade;" that is, without beginning. However, we think fit here to observe, that though Aristotle do for the most part express a great deal of zeal and confidence for that opinion of the world's eternity, yet doth he sometimes for all

[9] There are still extant *eighteen arguments* of his by which he impugned the Christian doctrine of the world's not being eternal, but having been created by God, at a definite period; which arguments were opposed by J. Philoponus in the same number of books written against the eternity of the world.

* Page 116. † In Arist. Phys. lib. 8. p. 320. b. Edit. Aldi.

that seem to flag a little, and speak more languidly and sceptically about it; as for example, in his book De Partibus Animalium, where he treats concerning an artificial nature:* Μᾶλλον εἰκὸς τὸν οὐρανὸν γεγενῆσθαι ὑπὸ τοιαύτης αἰτίας, εἰ γέγονε, καὶ εἶναι διὰ τοιαύτην αἰτίαν, μᾶλλον ἢ ζῶα τὰ θνητά, "It is more likely, that the heaven was made by such a cause as this, (if it were made) and that it is maintained by such a cause, than that mortal animals should be so; which yet is a thing more generally acknowledged." Now it was before declared, that Aristotle's artificial nature was nothing but the mere executioner or opificer of a perfect mind, that is, of the Deity; which two therefore he sometimes joins together in the Cosmopœia, affirming that Mind and Nature, that is, God and Nature were the cause of this universe.

And now we see plainly, that though there was a real controversy amongst the pagan Theologers, (especially from Aristotle's time downward) concerning the cosmogonia and theogonia, according to the stricter notion of those words, the temporary generation or production of the world and inferior gods, or whether they had any beginning or no; yet was there no controversy at all concerning the self-existency of them, but it was universally agreed upon amongst them, that the world and the inferior gods, however supposed by some to have existed from eternity, yet were nevertheless all derived from one sole self-existent Deity as their cause: Ὑπὸ θεοῦ παραγόμενοι ἢ ἐλλαμπόμενοι, "being either eradiated or produced from God." Wherefore it is observable, that these pagan Theists, who asserted the world's eternity, did themselves distinguish concerning the word γεννητὸν ortum, natum, et factum, as that which was equivocal; and though in one sense of it, they denied that the world and inferior gods were γεννητοὶ, yet notwithstanding did they in another sense clearly affirm the same. For the word γεννητὸν (say they)† strictly and properly taken, is τὸ ἐν μέρει χρόνου τὴν εἰς τὸ εἶναι πάροδον λαχόν, "that which in respect of time passed out of non-existence into being," or ὃ τὸ πρότερον μὴ ὂν, ὕστερον δὲ ὄν, "that which being not before, afterwards was." Nevertheless they acknowledge, that in a larger sense, this word γεννητὸν may be taken also for τὸ ὁπωσοῦν ἀπ' αἰτίας ὑφιστάμενον, "that which doth any way depend upon a superior Being as its cause." And there must needs be the same equivocation in the word ἀγέννητον, so that this in like manner may be taken also, either χρονικῶς, for that which is ingenerate in respect of time, as having no temporary beginning; or else for that which is ἀπ' αἰτίας ἀγέννητον, "ingenerate or unproduced from any cause:" in which latter sense, that word ἀγέννητον, or unmade,

* Lib. 1. c. 1. p. 474. tom. 2. opp.

† Simplic. in Arist. Phys. fol. 265.

is of equal force and extent with *αὐθυπόστατον* or *αὐτογενὲς*, "that which is self-subsistent or self-originated;" and accordingly it was used by those pagan Theists, who concluded *ὅτι ὕλη ἀγέννητος, i. e.* "that matter was unmade," that is, not only existed from eternity without beginning, but also was self-existent, and independent upon any superior cause. Now, as to the former of these two senses of those words, *γεννητὸν* and *ἀγέννητον*, the generality of the ancient pagans, and together with them Plato, affirmed the world, and all the inferior gods, to be *γεννητοὺς* "to have been made in time," or to have had a beginning; (for whatever the latter Platonists pretend, this was undoubtedly Plato's notion of that word, and no other, when he concluded the world to be *γεννητὸν*, forasmuch as himself expressly opposes it to *ἀΐδιον*, "that which is eternal.") But on the contrary, Aristotle, and the latter Platonists, determined the world, and all the inferior gods, to be in this sense *ἀγεννήτους*, "such as had no temporary beginning," but were from eternity. However, according to the latter sense of those words, all the pagan Theologers agreed together, that the world, and all the inferior gods, whether having a beginning, or existing from eternity, were notwithstanding *γεννητοὶ ἀπ' αἰτίας*, "produced or derived from a superior cause;" and that thus there was only one *θεὸς ἀγέννητος*, "one unproduced and self-existent Deity," who is said by them to be *αἰτίας κρείττων καὶ πρεσβύτερος*, "superior to a cause, and older than any cause," he being the cause of all things besides himself. Thus Crantor, and his followers in Proclus, zealous assertors of the world's eternity, determined,* *γεννητὸν λέγεσθαι τὸν κόσμον, ὡς ἀπ' αἰτίας ἄλλης παραγόμενον, καὶ οὐκ ὄντα αὐτόγονον οὐδὲ αὐθυπόστατον*, "that the world" (with all the inferior mundane gods in it) notwithstanding their being from eternity, "might be said to be *γεννητοὶ*, that is orti or made, as being produced from another cause, and not self-originated or self-existing." In like manner Proclus himself,[10] that grand champion for the world's eternity,

‡ In Timæ. p. 85.

[10] In his Introductio in Theologiam Platonicam, which the learned doctor when he wrote the above does not seem to have had at hand. Proclus has dwelt upon this subject with even more length and explicitness than in his work just cited. We will therefore quote from it a few passages of immediate reference to the point in hand. In lib. 1. c. 28. p. 66. &c. Proclus argues at great length for what he styles the *ἀγεννησία* of the gods, strenuously denying that they were produced or generated. *Αὐτοὶ οἱ θεοὶ γενέσεων ὑπερίδρυνται, καὶ τῆς κατὰ χρόνον ὑποστάσεως*, "The gods are throned above all generated things and mortal or created substance." A little after he gives the reason of this opinion: *Τὸ ἀδιαίρετον καὶ ἀδιάκριτον καὶ ἡνωμένον ἀγέννητόν ἐστιν*, "That which is individual, undiscerptible and one is unbegotten." And inasmuch as he was aware, that to this might be opposed the written doctrines of the ancients and of Plato himself, he maintains that all their instructions are to be interpreted by reason, and in accordance with an occult sense: *Ὥστε καὶ εἴ τινες γενέσεις ἐπὶ θεῶν μυθικοῖς πλάσμασιν ὑπὸ τοῦ Πλάτωνος λέγοιντο,—δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν, ὅπως τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεται, καὶ ὡς ἐνδείξεως ἕνεκα συμβολικῆς ταῦτα σύγκειται,*

plainly acknowledged, notwithstanding, the generation of the gods and world in this sense, as being produced from a superior cause: Λέγομεν θεῶν γενέσεις, τὴν ἄῤῥητον αὐτῶν πρόσοδον ἐνδεικνύμενοι, καὶ τὴν τῶν δευτέρων ἑτερότητα, πρὸς τὰς αἰτίας αὐτῶν, "We call it the generations of the gods, meaning thereby, not any temporary production of them, but their ineffable procession from a superior first cause." Thus also Sallustius,[1] in his book De Diis et Mundo, where he contends the world to have been from eternity, or without beginning, yet concludes both it and the other inferior gods to have been made by one Supreme Deity, who is called by him, ὁ πρῶτος Θεὸς, "the first God." For, saith he: Μεγίστης τῆς δυνάμεως οὔσης, οὐκ ἀνθρώπους ἔδει καὶ ζῶα μόνα ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ θεούς τε καὶ δαίμονας, "God, or the first cause, having the greatest power, or being omnipotent, ought therefore to make not only men, and other animals, but also gods and demons." And accordingly this is the title of his 13th chapter: Πῶς τὰ ἀΐδια λέγεται γίγνεσθαι, "How eternal things may be said to be made or generated." It is true indeed (as we have often declared) that some of the pagan Theists asserted God not to be the only ἀγέννητον καὶ αὐθυπόστατον, "the only unmade and self-existent being," but that matter also was such; nevertheless, this opinion was not so generally received amongst them, as is commonly supposed: and though some of the ancient fathers confidently impute it to Plato, yet there seems to be no sufficient ground for their so doing; and Porphyrius, Jamblichus, Proclus, and other Platonists, do not only professedly oppose the same as false, but also as that which was dissonant from Plato's principles.[2] Wherefore, ac-

"Thus even although Plato does speak, by a figment, of the origin and generation of the gods, we must observe the manner in which the statement is made and regard it as merely a figurative illustration." He does not however deny that "the descent of the gods from the Supreme," may be justly called a kind of generation: Ἡ πρόοδος ἡ τῶν θεῶν ἀπ' αἰτίας προϊοῦσα τῆς ἀρίστης κατὰ χρόνον γένεσις κυρίως ὀνομάζεται. Then after a few intervening remarks he thus closes his argument, p. 68. Ἀγέννητοι μὲν οὖν οἱ θεοί· τάξις δ' ἔστιν ἐν αὐτοῖς πρώτων τε καὶ μέσων καὶ τελευταίων προόδων, καὶ ὑπεροχαὶ δυνάμεων, καὶ ὑφέσεις, "The gods, therefore, are ingenerate, but there is in them, nevertheless, an order of descent, first, middle, and last. There are also superior and inferior degrees of power." In another place, too, he acknowledges that the world, and "the gods who have to do with the world are in a certain sense generated:"—οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐγκόσμιοι θεοὶ γεννητοί πώς εἰσι. lib. 6. c. 2. p. 341. And lower down that "the gods in one sense are generate and in another ingenerate:" Ὥστε καὶ γεννητοί πώς εἰσι καὶ ἀγέννητοι. These remarks will I think tend to confirm and illustrate the learned Doctor's observations on the twofold use of the words γεννητὸς and ἀγέννητος among the latter Platonists.

[1] Cap. 13. p. 269. inter. Scriptor. Mythologic. Tho. Gale editos. 9. Sallust was a disciple of Proclus, and in the above mentioned book he exhibits the dogmas of the philosophers who are called the later Platonists, much more perspicuously than others of the school. In several things however he dissents from Proclus. For even among those philosophers were sects, attacking one another with mutual acrimony and inflicting divers wounds.

[2] The excellent author surely forgets, how hardily these younger Platonists whom

cording to that larger notion of the word ἀγένητον, as synonymously with αὐτογενὲς and αὐϑυπόστατον, there were very many of the pagan Theologers, who agreed with Christians in this, ὅτι αὐτὸ ἀγέννητον ὁ Θεὸς, καὶ οὐσία αὐτοῦ ὡς ἂνε ἴποι τις, ἡ ἀγεννησία, "that God is the only ungenerate or unmade being, and that his very essence is ingenerability or innascibility; all other things, even matter itself, being made by him. But all the rest of them (only a few Ditheists excepted), though they supposed matter to be self-existent, yet did they conclude, that there was only εἷς Θεὸς ἀγέννητος, "only one unmade or unproduced God," and that all their other gods were γεννητοὶ, in one sense or other, if not as made in time, yet at least as produced from a superior cause.[3]

he praises were accustomed to bend the dicta of their great master into accordance with their own theories. The ancient Christian fathers do not seem to me far wrong in affirming that Plato held matter to be equally eternal with that Supreme power, who afterwards arranged it and out of it shaped and constructed the universe. But of this more hereafter.

[3] Since our own times have witnessed a revival of the question, once debated with so much excitement between Christian fathers and Platonic philosophers, "whether or not it were possible for God to have created the universe from all eternity," and since there are not a few acute and learned men who are ready to decide in the affirmative, I think that it will be labour well-bestowed if I here advance a few observations on this dogma of the Platonists, its origin and history. (A letter of C. Bovillus, in which he denies the possibility of such a creation, is preserved by Fabricius, Bibl. Lat. mëd. ævi, p. 932. &c.) The later disciples of Plato, while they acknowledged the universe to be the work of God, maintained at the same time that it is a work without beginning and eternal, or, in other words, that the supreme Deity has created this world from everlasting. They attributed, therefore, an origin to the world, but, to use the words of Chalcidius, (in Timæum, sect. 23) non temporarium, sed causativum, "one not in point of time, but of cause." This entire doctrine, while on the one hand it is recondite beyond the reach of common understanding, is, on the other, of such a nature that in the bare exposition of it, it is necessary to use words either entirely new, or applied in unaccustomed senses. Thus, in books treating of this opinion, the words *origin, beginning, eternal, generated, ingenerate, made, produced*, and the like, have a doubtful and ambiguous signification. For example, the authors grant that the universe had a "beginning"—that it was "originated"—but then such phrases are not used by them to designate the idea which they have in ordinary language. viz., 'that of being born or coming into existence at a certain time,' but simply that of 'having a cause and not being self-originated.' So again with the word "eternal," which, when applied to the Supreme Deity, indicates 'a nature self-existent, without succession, and unaffected by change;' but which, on the contrary, used in reference to the gods and the world, denotes, 'substances and beings which, although they have always existed, are yet dependent upon a cause, experiencing succession, and subject to partial vicissitude.' As several among both the early and the more modern Christian writers have neglected to observe this ambiguity, it has often happened that they have attributed to these Platonists sentiments very foreign to their real doctrines. These doctrines have been accurately and fully displayed, as well as learnedly confuted, by Zacharias Mitylenæus, a Christian philosopher, in his Dialogus De Opificio Mundi, pp. 207. 213. &c. But perhaps they will be more clearly understood by many, if I quote from Augustine the comparison by which Platonists themselves were wont to illustrate their belief. It occurs De Civit. Dei, lib. x. c. 31. p. 203. tom. vii. opp. Sicut enim, inquiunt, si pes ex æternitate semper fuisset in pulvere, semper ei subesset vestigium; quod tamen vestigium a calcante factum, nemo dubitaret, nec alterum altero prius esset, quamvis alterum ab altero factum esset: sic, inquiunt, et mundus atque in illo Dii creati et semper fuerunt, semper existente, qui fecit, et tamen facti sunt, "For, say they, (the Platonists) supposing that a foot had stood

Nothing now remaineth, but only that we show how the pagans did distinguish, and put a difference, betwixt the one supreme unmade Deity, and all their other inferior generated

from eternity in the sand, the footprint would be eternal too; no one would doubt that the print was made by the foot, nor would the former, though an effect of the latter, succeed it in point of time. Just so, the universe and the gods in it are both created and eternal; their Maker is without beginning, and nevertheless they are made." If I may venture to add another simile to this, imagine an eternal chain, consisting of many links fitting together and mutually dependent. Each part of this chain has always existed, brought into being by no agency whatever, and yet all hang from the first, which in its turn hangs upon nothing. This first link of the chain conceive as the supreme Deity of the Platonists; the rest, as inferior gods and the universe.—If, after all, these comparisons fail to satisfy the reader, I trust he will charge the obscurity not to his own want of capacity, but to the notion itself, which cannot possibly be exhibited in language with clearness and precision. Now when the foregoing opinion was universally established among these philosophers, there arose another dispute among them:—whether God thus eternally formed the universe out of matter which, like him, was eternal and self-existing; or whether he produced it from himself, and by the simple exercise of his own will. The latter opinion is maintained by Hierocles Lib. de Providentia apud Photium Biblioth. Cod. 251. p. 1379. as well as by many more, of whom more hereafter: the former was upheld by several others, whom Hierocles refutes in the same book. For that Hierocles is there arguing against those Platonists, who held not that God constructed the world in finite time, though out of eternal matter, but that the universe itself was similarly eternal with the material of which God fashioned it, is plain from the very introduction of his treatise: Οὐ γὰρ ἱκανὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι ὠήθησαν αὐτοτελῶς ὑποστῆσαι κόσμον οἰκείᾳ δυνάμει καὶ σοφίᾳ, ΈΞ ΑΙΤΙΑΤΟΥ ΕΝΕΡΓΟΥΝΤΑ, ἀλλ' ἀγεννήτου ὕλης συνεργίᾳ, "The Deity, forsooth, according to them, is unable to sustain the universe upon himself by his own might and wisdom, although exercising them FROM ETERNITY, but must have the co-operation of uncreated matter!" These Platonists, therefore, acknowledged that God had put forth his creative energy from eternity, while they denied that he had acted independently of matter, imagining on the contrary two uncaused principles of things, God and Matter.

II. This dogma of the Neo-platonists is doubtless related to the opinion of Aristotle respecting the eternity of the universe. They themselves, as appears from Hierocles, Proclus, and other disciples of this school, wished to be considered as maintaining the doctrines which the Stagirite had formerly held. On which account several very learned men, and among them our author, have not scrupled to associate the theory of these Platonists with that of Aristotle, and to discuss them together. After a careful examination of the whole subject, I am constrained to believe that there is a difference between them. For whereas the Neo-platonists represented God as having been actively and laboriously employed from all eternity, Aristotle seems to have assigned to his Deity no task but that of self-contemplation, together with some ineffable exertion of motive energy upon the universal sphere: and while the former maintained that the universe had from an eternal period been created by God, or, if you please, had emanated from God, the latter not only was without the remotest idea of an eternal creation, but even did not allow the Deity to be acquainted with aught that had ever transpired in this lower world. I pass over other particulars tending to illustrate this contrariety.

III. It is therefore my opinion, that this dogma of an eternal creation was unknown before the rise of that philosophic school founded by Ammonius at Alexandria in the second century after Christ, and called the sect of the latter or Neo-platonists. My opinion is confirmed by this, that Philo Judæus, in his work, still extant, De Mundo Corruptioni Experte, while he carefully notices those who before his time taught the eternity of the world, makes no mention of the particular doctrine in question. I might refer also to Clemens of Alexandria, who, in his diligent enumeration of the theories of philosophers, entirely omits this. The Ammonius, however, to whom I have adverted, when he had apostatized from Christianity, and formed the resolution to devise a new system of philosophy, that should be, as it were, a via media between the Christian and pagan religions, produced as a specimen of his skill this theory;

gods. Which we are the rather concerned to do, because it is notorious, that they did many times also confound them together, attributing the government of the whole world to the gods pro-

quite clear, on the one hand, of the Christian doctrine that the universe was at some definite time created by God out of nothing, and, on the other, scarcely more in accordance with the doctrines, so condemned and exploded by Christians, of those ancient philosophers who imagined two eternal principles of things, God and Matter. Origen, who was instructed in the school of Ammonius, had imbibed, together with other erroneous notions, this opinion, which he also fearlessly taught to the disciples who came to him in great numbers. I may refer for proof to passages of Origen himself, adduced by Peter Dan. Huet in his Origeniana, lib. ii. quæst. xii. sect. 4. p. 165. and by Methodius, in his treatise Περὶ τῶν Γεννητῶν preserved by Photius, Biblioth. cod. 235. p. 934. Still they are mistaken who believe that Origen entirely agreed, even in this doctrine, with Ammonius and the Platonists. For here, as in many other things, that learned Christian attempted some modification of the Platonic theory, to bring it nearer to the doctrines of our holy religion. The philosophers whom Origen followed taught that the universe both had been created by God from all eternity, and would remain unimpaired for ever. He, on the other hand, being unable to admit their dogma without modification, inasmuch as it would contradict the plain testimony of the sacred oracles that the universe will be "burnt up" and "dissolved," retained one part of it and rejected the other. He held, with the Platonists, that the universe was eternally formed by God, and at the same time denied that it would continue for ever, but imagined a succession of worlds, supposing whenever one in past or future time is dissolved and destroyed, another is immediately created in its place. As Origen was charged with fundamental heresies, this opinion did not obtain much ground among the Christians; but was included and denounced in the writings of his opponents, with his other heterodox doctrines. Of these I have already named Methodius, from whose book Περὶ Γεννητῶν Photius has extracted many passages bearing upon this controversy.

This doctrine of the Platonists, however, was brought into much greater disrepute during the Arian controversy respecting the deity of the Son of God. For, among other arguments employed by the orthodox, it was urged that the Saviour is, in the scriptures, styled *eternal;* that none can be eternal but God, and that therefore Christ is divine. See Athanasii Orat. II. contra Arianos, pp. 317. 318. tom. 1. opp. And inasmuch as this argument could so readily be set aside by the Platonic doctrine, that any being whatever could be eternal and nevertheless originated and created, it was inevitable that the ministers of religion should set themselves against the dogma, and strenuously maintain that it was impossible for God to create any thing from everlasting. Dion. Petavius has cited many quotations to this effect from ancient writers, in Dogmat. Theol. tom. 1. de Deo, lib. 3. c. 6. p. 145. Nay, there were among the Arians many, generally called Psathyrians, who openly expounded the doctrine of Arius in accordance with the Platonic theory, maintaining that the Son was eternally created by the Father, and not divine. My authority is Theodoretus De Fabulis Hæret. lib. iv. p. 387. vol. 2. opp. A sect this, which doubtless gave opportunity to the authorized masters of celestial wisdom, of inveighing so much the more bitterly against the philosophic notion of which we are speaking. On the other hand, the Platonists all tenaciously persisted in their former opinion, contending for it both by word and writing. It was without hesitation adopted, along with their other doctrines, by Julian, far the most learned of the emperors. And why should I mention other Platonists whose names are so well known, and whom every one knows to have embraced this heresy? Julian then writes, Orat. iv. in Solem p. 132. Ὁ θεῖος οὗτος καὶ πάγκαλος κόσμος, ἀπ' ἄκρας ἀψίδος οὐρανοῦ μέχρι γῆς ἐσχάτης, ὑπὸ τῆς ἀλύτου συνεχόμενος τοῦ θεοῦ προνοίας, ἐξ ἀϊδίου γέγονεν ἀγεννήτως, ἐς τε τὸν ἐπίλοιπον χρόνον ἀΐδιος, "This divine and magnificent world, from the topmost vault of heaven to the lowest abyss of earth, sustained in existence by the changeless providence of God, has been from eternity, without beginning, and will remain ever-during through all succeeding ages." The word ἀγεννήτως, in the above passage, is wrongly rendered by Petavius citra ullam productionem, "independent of any originating power." For Julian agreed with the other Platonists in attributing the world to God as its cause, as may be seen, not only from the above passage, but from another of the same kind in this

miscuously, and without putting any due discrimination betwixt the supreme and inferior (the true reason whereof seems to have been this, because they supposed the supreme God not to do all

oration, p. 145. what he disbelieved was its creation *in time*. I have rather chosen, therefore, to translate the word "without beginning," in accordance with the Platonic doctrine. Seeing, then, that the emperor himself so warmly embraced this theory, it may easily be guessed what was the opinion of the other philosophers of that age. Even they who entertained a sound and moderate Christian creed, and did not, at least openly, slight the authority of the scriptures, but rather endeavoured to blend Platonism with Christianity, could not bring themselves openly to renounce this doctrine. Chalcidius, the commentator on the Timæus, may be taken as an example, who was reputed, not without reason, by many persons, and those, moreover, eminent for learning, to be a sincere believer in Christianity. I quote his words so much the more readily, as they contain not only the assertion of his belief in these notions of the Platonists, but his reason for it. He says, then, in Timæum Platonis, c. 1. sect. 23. pp. 284. 285. Dei operum origo et initium incomprehensibile. Nulla enim certa nota, nullum indicium temporis, ex quo esse cœperunt. Causæ igitur omnium operum Dei tempore antiquiores: et sicut Deus per ævum, sic etiam causæ per ævum. Quod sequitur, ut quidquid a Deo sit, id temporarium non sit; quod temporarium non sit, nulla temporis lege teneatur. Et tempus immutationem ætatis, morbos, senectutem, occasum invehit. His ergo omnibus, quod a Deo instituitur immune est, origoque ejus caussativa est, non temporaria. Et mundus sensilis est opus Dei: origo igitur ejus caussativa, non temporaria. Sic mundus, sensilis licet et corporeus, a Deo tamen factus atque institutus est. "The origin and commencement of the works of God is incomprehensible. For there are no data, no traces of a period from which they began to exist.... The causes, then, of all the works of God, are more ancient than time; and, as God is eternal, so also are these causes eternal. It follows, that whatever is from God cannot be a thing of time; and what is not a thing of time cannot be bound by the laws of time. Now time brings with it periodic change, diseases, old age, dissolution. The workmanship of God, then, is free from all these vicissitudes, and its origin is *causative*, not *temporary*. The material world is the work of God; its origin, therefore, is causative, and not temporary. In this manner the universe, although tangible and corporeal, was created and constituted by Deity." There seem, after all, to have been some among these very Platonists who held that this dogma ought not to be broached publicly, but that the universe should in common be spoken of as though it had been generated. This, according to Julian, was certainly the practice of Jamblichus of Chalcis, a philosopher of the highest repute in this sect, who was also, it is equally certain, imitated by others, although Julian himself blames his example. See Orat. iv. in Solem p. 146. Οἶδα μὲν, says he, καὶ Πλάτωνα τὸν μέγαν καὶ μετὰ τοῦτον τὸν Χαλκιδέα Ἰαμβλίχον—ἄχρις ὑποθέσεως τῷ γεννήτῳ προσχρωμένους, καὶ οἱονεὶ χρονικήν τινα τὴν ποίησιν ὑποτιθεμένους·—πλὴν ἀλλ' ἐμοίγε—οὐδαμῶς ἐστι παρακινδυνευτέον, "I know that the great Plato himself, and after him Jamblichus the Chalcidian, have employed the hypothesis of the generation [of the universe], and granted, for the sake of argument, the supposition of a creation in time. For my part, I will incur no such perplexity." That, however, many did not follow the plan of Jamblichus, is clear enough from the fact, that in the fifth century there was more public and bitter controversy respecting this dogma than there had ever previously been. The Platonists, both of Alexandria and Athens, men, too, not of mean name, spared no pains to demonstrate its truth. Their zeal roused Zacharia, of Mitylene, a Christian philosopher, who attacked their theory in an erudite and subtle work yet extant, entitled, Dialogus de Opificio Mundi. Proclus, than whom the Platonic school of this era boasted no greater philosopher, published a work in exposition and defence of the eternity of the universe: to which Joannes Philoponus replied, in the nineteen books mentioned a short time ago. I pass over Sallustius, the disciple of Proclus, who in his Libellus de Diis et Mundo, in like manner contends for the doctrine; nor need I name the Christian writers who, in books of one kind or another, unceasingly attacked it. In the next age, however, all the splendour and glory of the Platonic school had passed away, and by degrees this doctrine lost all influence and authority. Still this did not hinder Boëthius, whom for many centuries all philosophers have regarded with veneration as their common instructor, from openly avowing

immediately in the government of the world, but to permit much to his inferior ministers), one instance of which we had before in Ovid, and innumerable such others might be cited out

his favourable disposition towards it. In Consol. Philos. lib. 5. this illustrious man writes as follows:—Non recte quidam; qui, quum audiunt visum Platoni, mundum hunc nec habuisse initium temporis, nec habiturum esse defectum, hoc modo conditori conditum mundum fieri co-æternum, putant. Aliud est enim per interminabilem duci vitam, quod mundo Plato tribuit, aliud interminabilis vitæ totam pariter complexam esse præsentiam, quod divinæ mentis proprium esse, manifestum est. Neque enim Deus conditis rebus antiquior videri debet *temporis quantitate*, sed simplicius potius *propriatate naturæ*. "Some there are who when they receive the opinion of Plato, that this universe neither had a temporal beginning nor ever will have an end, wrongly conclude that the creation is therefore similarly eternal with its Creator. For, clearly, it is one thing to be conducted in a succession through interminable existence, which is Plato's idea of the universe, and another thing to embrace at once the whole presence of eternity, which is an exclusive attribute of the Divine Spirit. For God must not be thought older than the creation in point of TIME, but prior to it by NECESSITY and ESSENCE." We have here the selfsame distinction that we have before noticed between *temporary* and *causative* origination. After a few intervening remarks, he continues: Itaque, si digna rebus nomina velimus imponere, Platonem sequentes, Deum quidem æternum, mundum vero dicamus esse perpetuum. "If, therefore, we wish to express our ideas by precise terms, let us, if we adopt the doctrine of Plato, call God *eternal*, but the world *perpetual*."

These remarks are sufficient to establish the assertion of the learned Doctor, that we are not forthwith to accuse of irreligion and blasphemy those who have avowed that they believed the universe to be in a certain sense eternal. I am disinclined, by fear of prolixity, to descend into the dark ages and the era of scholastic philosophy. Those who are learned in such matters, will not forget how long and fiercely it was debated in the schools, whether God could have created the world from all eternity or not. A question answered affirmatively by many of great merit and weight of character, and negatively by several others. See G. I. Vossii Theses Historico-theolog. Disp. 1. sect. 14. p. 19. The controversy has now come down to our own times, and has exercised the skill of our philosophers, as well as theologians, among whom there are many to whose names has never been affixed the brand of heterodoxy, who nevertheless imagine that no disrespect is offered to the Divine Majesty, by the supposition that the world was created by God from all eternity. See Jo. Herm. *ab* Elswich *in* Jo. Hen. *a* Seelen Philocalia Epistolica, p. 410. &c.

IV. Of the outward causes, so to speak, by which the Platonists were led to entertain the doctrine we have stated concerning the universe, enough has been already said. The inner causes, or arguments by which they fortified their theory, may be gathered from Origen (lib. i. περὶ ἀρχῶν); Sallustius (Lib. de Diis et Mundo, c. 13); Proclus (xviii. Argumenta pro Æternitate Mundi); Zacharias of Mitylene (Dialog. de Opificio Mundi, p. 214), and several others. To which I would add, from among more recent writers, Pierre Poiret, as having very skilfully displayed and confuted the arguments of those who maintain that the world was formed by God from all eternity. Meditat. Rational. de Deo, Anima, et Malo, lib. iii. c. 16. sect. 9. p. 438. ed. 1685. See also pp. 674. 675. The adherents of this dogma differed in many respects one from another, nor did the Platonists all pursue one course of argument, as will be evident to any one who compares Plotinus with Proclus. I think, however, all things being considered, that the basis of their reasoning universally was the apprehension that it would make God a mutable being to suppose the world created by him in time. Had they deigned to present their argument in a popular manner and apart from subtlety, I imagine they would have reasoned somewhat thus: God is the same to-day, and at this moment, as he has been from all eternity. For no liability to change can befall the majesty of the Great First Cause. But now God is active in energy, universal in providence, supreme in dominion, and, in short, of infinite power. These, therefore, have been his attributes from everlasting. If he has eternally been thus active, provident, and almighty, he must necessarily have been acting, creating, and administering: if, moreover, he has been a Ruler, there has also evidently been a world for him to govern. Take, therefore, eternity from the universe, and you at the same time take stability and unchangeableness from the Supreme God.

of their most sober writers. As for example, Cicero, in his first book of laws;[4] Deorum immortalium vi, ratione, potestate, mente, numine, natura omnis regitur; "The whole nature, or universe, is governed by the force, reason, power, mind, and divinity of the immortal gods." And again in his second book, Deos esse dominos ac moderatores omnium rerum, eáque quæ geruntur, eorum geri judicio atque numine; eosdémque optimè de genere hominum mereri, et qualis quisque sit, quid agat, quid in se admittat, qua mente, qua pietate religiones colat, intueri; piorúmque et impiorum habere rationem; à principio civibus suasum esse debet, "The minds of citizens ought to be first of all embued with a firm persuasion, that the gods are the lords and moderators of all things, and that the conduct and management of the whole world is directed and overruled by their judgment and divine power; that they deserve the best of mankind, that they behold and consider what every man is, what he doth and takes upon himself, with what mind, piety, and sincerity, he observes the duties of religion; and lastly, that these gods have a very different regard to the pious and the impious." Now such passages as these, abounding every where

This same notion as to the immutability of God, it doubtless was, that led them to separate the idea of succession from that of Deity: a subject to which we shall return. For they could not understand how that could be immutable to which any thing was past or future. Among others, Boethius has enlarged upon this argument, De Consol. Philos. lib. v. p. 137. When they had arrived at this conclusion, they seem to have reasoned as follows: Time, the notion of which includes the succession of moments, of months, of years, is utterly alien from the nature of Deity. Imagine, however, that God framed the universe, not from eternity, but at a certain definite time, and to what inference must you inevitably come? To this, as I imagine, that there was once a time when God existed alone. In granting this, however, you make the admission, that there was a certain period before the creation of the world. You place God, therefore, in time. But where there is time, there is succession; and where succession, change. Hence, unless you would make the Deity mutable, shun the opinion of the Christians respecting the formation of the universe. In this manner, as I suppose, reasoned the Platonists. For my part, remembering how many eminent Christian theologians have been favourable to the theory under consideration, I would impose no belief respecting it on any man; neither would I arrogate to myself the claim of deciding the merit of these and other arguments. I do, however, candidly confess, that the entire avoidance, or at best the modest and fearful discussion of questions so apt as these to involve the intellect of man in endless sophistry, as well as to unsettle the minds of the weak, together with a simple and honest reception of those truths which inspired men have revealed concerning the creation of the universe by God, have always appeared to me more befitting, than acute and subtle inquiry into the origin of the world and the infinite perfections of Deity; an investigation, indeed, which is scarcely ever pursued without utter forgetfulness of our infirm and wretched condition.

[4] The former passage occurs De Leg. lib. 1. c. 7. the latter lib. 2. c. 7. But in this same treatise (lib. 1. c. 7), he clearly separates the supreme God, the Creator of mankind, whom he calls mens divina, and Deus præpotens, from the other gods, dii; who, with men, are as citizens subject to the relations and laws of the universe. He that would read these books, De Legibus, in the proper manner, must continually bear in mind a sentence that occurs, c. 6. Quoniam in populari ratione omnis nostra versatur oratio, populariter interdum loqui necesse est. "As the whole of our discussion respects a popular subject, we are necessitated sometimes to speak in popular language."

in pagan writings, it is no wonder if many, considering their theology but slightly and superficially, have been led into an error, and occasioned thereby to conclude the pagans not to have asserted a divine monarchy, but to have imputed both the making and governing of the world to an aristocracy or democracy of co-ordinate gods, not only all eternal, but also self-existent and unmade. The contrary whereunto, though it be already sufficiently proved, yet it will not be amiss for us here in the close, to show how the pagans, who sometimes jumble and confound the supreme and inferior gods altogether, do notwithstanding at other times many ways distinguish between the one supreme God, and their other many inferior gods.

First, therefore, as the Pagans had many proper names for one and the same supreme God, according to several particular considerations of him, in respect of his several different manifestations and effects in the world; which are oftentimes mistaken for so many distinct deities (some supposing them independent, others subordinate), so had they also, besides these, other proper names of God, according to that more full and comprehensive notion of him, as the maker of the whole world, and its supreme governor, or the sole monarch of the universe. For thus the Greeks called him Ζεὺς and Ζῆν, &c., the Latins Jupiter and Jovis, the Babylonians Belus and Bel, the Persians Mithras and Oromasdes, the Egyptians and Scythians (according to Herodotus[5]), Ammoun and Pappæus. And Celsus in Origen concludes it to be a matter of pure indifferency, to call the supreme God by any of all these names, either Ζεὺς, or Ammoun, or Pappæus, or the like;* Κέλσος οἴεται μηδὲν διαφέρειν, Δία Ὕψιστον καλεῖν, ἢ Ζῆνα, ἢ Αδωναῖον, ἢ Σαβαὼθ, ἢ (ὡς Αἰγύπτιοι) Ἄμμουν, ἢ (ὡς Σκῦθαι) Παππαῖον. "Celsus thinks it to be a matter of no moment, whether we call the highest and supreme God, Adonai and Sabaoth, as the Jews do; or Dia and Zena, as the Greeks; or, as the Egyptians, Ammoun; or, as the Scythians, Pappæus." Notwithstanding which, that pious and jealous father expresseth a great deal of zeal against Christians then using any of those pagan names.[6] "But we will rather endure any torment," saith he, "than confess Zeus (or Jupiter) to be God; being well assured, that the Greeks often really worship, under

[5] Hist. lib. 4. c. 59. This author says no more than that, in his opinion, Jupiter might be with great propriety—ὀρθότατα—called in the Scythian language Pappæus, i. e. he identifies the Scythian deity Pappæus, not over wisely, with that God whom the Greeks called Zeus. From which we may indeed conclude that this Pappæus, worshipped by the Scythians, had obtained the highest rank among the gods of that nation; but scarcely that he was the one supreme and omnipotent Deity, or that the Scythians gave that name to the Creator and Governor of all. The account which Origen and Celsus give of this god seems to rest on the sole authority of Herodotus.

* Lib. 5. c. Celsum, p. 261.

[6] These are not the exact words of Origen, but only their sense. He adverts to the same subject Contr. Celsum, lib. 1. p. 18. 19. edit. Cantabr.

that name, an evil demon, who is an enemy both to God and men. And we will rather suffer death, than call the supreme God Ammoun, whom the Egyptian enchanters thus invoke; λεγέτωσαν δὲ καὶ Σκύθαι τὸν Παππαῖον Θεὸν εἶναι τὸν ἐπὶ πᾶσιν· ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς οὐ πεισόμεθα· τιθέντες μὲν τὸν ἐπὶ πᾶσι θεὸν, ὡς δὲ φίλον τῷ λαχόντι τὴν Σκυθῶν ἐρημίαν, καὶ τὸ ἔθνος αὐτῶν καὶ διάλεκτον οὐκ ὀνομάζοντες τὸν Θεὸν, ὡς κυρίῳ ὀνόματι τὸν Παππαῖον. Σκυθιστὶ γὰρ τὸ προσηγορικὸν τὸν Θεὸν, καὶ Αἰγυπτιστὶ, καὶ πάσῃ διαλέκτῳ ᾗ ἕκαστος ἐντέθραπται, ὀνομάζων, οὐχ ἁμαρτήσεται, and though the Scythians call the supreme God Pappæus, yet we, acknowledging a supreme God, will never be persuaded to call him by that name, which it pleased that demon (who ruled over the Scythian desert, people, and language) to impose. Nevertheless, he that shall use the appellative name for God, either in the Scythian, Egyptian, or any other language which he hath been brought up in, will not offend."* Where Origen plainly affirms the Scythians to have acknowledged one supreme God, called by them Pappæus, and intimates, that the Egyptians did the like, calling him Ammoun. Neither could it possibly be his intent to deny the same of the Greeks and their Zeus, however his great jealousy made him to call him here a demon; it being true in a certain sense, which shall be declared afterward, that the pagans did oftentimes really worship an evil demon, under those very names of Zeus and Jupiter, as they did likewise under those of Hammon and Pappæus.

In the mean time, we deny not, but that both the Greeks used that word Zeus and the Latins Jupiter, sometimes φυσικῶς, for the ether,[7] fire, or air, some accordingly etomologizing Ζεὺς from Ζέω, others Δεὺς from δεύω: whence came those forms of speech, sub Jove, and sub Dio. And thus Cicero: Jovem Ennius nuncupat ità dicens.

> Aspice hoc sublime candens, quem invocant omnes Jovem.

Hunc etiam augures nostri cùm dicunt, Jove fulgente, Jove tonante; dicunt enim in cœlo fulgente, tonante, &c.† The reason of which speeches seems to have been this, because in ancient times some had supposed the animated heaven, ether, and air, to be the supreme deity. We grant moreover, that the same words have been sometimes used ἱστορικῶς also, for an hero or deified man, said by some to have been born in Crete, by others in Arcadia. And Callimachus,[8] though he were very angry with

* L. 5. p. 262.

[7] See the testimony which G. J. Vossius has gathered from the writings of the ancients, De Origine ac Progressu Idololatriæ, lib. 2. c. 84. p. 268.

† De Nat. Deor. lib. 2. 223. Lamb. cap. 25. p. 2992. tom. 9. opp.

[8] Hymn. in Jovem, v. 8. 9. p. 4.

the Cretians for affirming Jupiter's sepulchral monument to have been with them in Crete, as thereby making him mortal:

> Κρῆτες ἀεὶ ψεῦσται, καὶ γὰρ τάφον, ὦ ἄνα, σεῖο,
> Κρῆτες ἐτεκτήναντο· σὺ δ' οὐ θάνες, ἐσσὶ γὰρ αἰεί.
>
> Cretes semper mendaces, tuum enim, rex, sepulchrum
> Extruxerunt: tu vero non es mortuus, semper enim es.

Himself, nevertheless, (as Athenagoras[9] and Origen[10] observe) attributed the beginning of death to him, when he affirmed him to have been born in Arcadia; ἀρχὴ γὰρ θανάτου ἡ ἐπὶ γῆς γένεσις, "because a terrene nativity is the beginning of death." Wherefore this may pass for a general observation here, that the pagan theology was all along confounded with a certain mixture of physiology and herology, or history blended together. Nevertheless it is unquestionable, that the more intelligent of the Greekish Pagans did frequently understand by Zeus that supreme unmade Deity, who was the maker of the world, and of all the inferior gods. Porphyrius in Eusebius thus declares their sense:* Τὸν Δία, τὸν Νοῦν κόσμου ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, ὃς τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ ἐδημιούργησεν, ἔχων τὸν κόσμον, "By Zeus, the Greeks understand that mind of the world which framed all things in it, and containeth the whole world." Agreeable whereunto is that of Maximus Tyrius:[1] Κάλει τὸν μὲν Δία, νοῦν πρεσβύτατον, καὶ ἀρχικώτατον, ᾧ πάντα ἕπεται καὶ πειθαρχεῖ, "By Jupiter you are to understand that most ancient and princely mind, which all things follow and obey." And Eusebius himself, though not forward to grant any more than needs he must to Pagans, concludes with this acknowledgment hereof,† Ἔστω ὁ Ζεὺς μηκέθ' ἡ πυρώδης καὶ αἰθέριος οὐσία, ὥσπερ τοῖς παλαιοῖς ἐνομίζετο, κατὰ τὸν Πλούταρχιν, ἀλλ' αὐτὸς ὁ ἀνωτάτω Νοῦς, ὁ τῶν ὅλων δημιουργός, "Let Jupiter therefore be no longer that fiery and ethereal substance, which the ancient Pagans, according to Plutarch, supposed him to be; but that highest mind, which was the maker of all things." But Phornutus[2] by Jupiter understands the soul of the world, he writing thus concerning him: Ὥσπερ δὲ ἡμεῖς ἀπὸ ψυχῆς διοικούμεθα, οὕτω καὶ ὁ κόσμος ψυχὴν ἔχει τὴν συνέχουσαν αὐτὸν, καὶ αὕτη καλεῖται Ζεὺς, αἰτία οὖσα τοῖς ζῶσι τοῦ ζῆν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο βασιλεύειν ὁ Ζεὺς λέγεται τῶν ὅλων, "As we ourselves are governed by a soul, so hath the world in like manner a soul,

[9] In Legation. pro Christianis, cap. 26. p. 121.
[10] Contra Celsum, p. 137. The Greek words which follow are also from Origen.
* Præp. Ev. lib. 3. cap. 9. p. 100.
[1] Diss. 29. Utri melius de Diis senserint, Poetæ an Philosophi, p. 290.
† Præp. Ev. lib. 3. cap. 13. p. 119.
[2] Dr. Cudworth has not quoted the passage quite entire. After the words, καλεῖται Ζεὺς, Phornutus has, πότερον διὰ τὸ σώζουσα καὶ αἰτία, κ. τ. λ., "Being the preserver and cause," &c.

that containeth it: and this is called Zeus, being the cause of life to all things that live; and therefore Zeus or Jupiter is said, to reign over all things." However, though these were two different conceptions amongst the Pagans concerning God, some apprehending him to be an abstract mind separate from the world and matter, but others to be a soul of the world only; yet, nevertheless they all agreed in this, that Ζεὺς or Jupiter was the supreme moderator or governor of all. And accordingly, Plato,* in his Cratylus, taking these two words, Ζῆνα and Δία both together, etomologizeth them as one, after this manner: Συντιθέμενα εἰς ἓν δηλοῖ τὴν φύσιν τοῦ θεοῦ, οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἡμῖν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν, ὅστις ἐστὶν αἴτιος μᾶλλον τοῦ ζῆν, ἢ ὁ ἄρχων τε καὶ βασιλεὺς τῶν πάντων· συμβαίνει οὖν ὀρθῶς ὀνομάζεσθαι οὕτως, τῷ Θεὸς εἶναι, δι' ὃν ζῆν ἀεὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ζῶσιν ὑπάρχει, διείληπται δὲ δίχα (ὥσπερ λέγω) ἓν ὂν τὸ ὄνομα, τῷ Διὶ καὶ Ζηνί, "These two words compounded together declare the nature of God; for there is nothing which is more the cause of life both to ourselves and all other animals, than he, who is the prince and king of all things; so that God is rightly thus called, he being that by whom all things live. And these are really but one name of God, though divided into two words." But because it was very obvious then to object against this position of Plato's, that Zeus or Jupiter could not be the prince of all things, and first original of life, from the theogonia of Hesiod and other ancient Pagans, in which himself was made to have been the son of Κρόνος, or Saturn; therefore, this objection is thus preoccupated by Plato, Τοῦτον δὲ Κρόνου υἱὸν ὑβριστικὸν μὲν ἄν τινι δόξειεν εἶναι ἀκούσαντι ἐξαίφνης, "Whoever shall hear this (saith he) will presently conclude it to be contumelious to this Zeus or Jupiter (as he hath been described by us) to be accounted the son of Chronos or Saturn." And in answer hereunto, that philosopher stretcheth his wits to salve that poetic theogonia, and reconcile it with his own theological hypothesis; and thereupon he interprets that Hesiodian Ζεὺς or Jupiter into a compliance with the third hypostasis of his divine triad, so as properly to signify the superior soul of the world: Εὔλογον δὲ, μεγάλης τινὸς διανοίας ἔκγονον εἶναι τὸν Δία. Κρόνος γὰρ τὸ καθαρὸν αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀκήρατον τοῦ Νοῦ· ἔστι δὲ οὗτος Οὐρανοῦ υἱὸς, ὡς λόγος, "Nevertheless, it is reasonable to suppose Zeus or Jupiter to be the offspring of some great mind; and Chronos or Saturn signifieth a pure and perfect mind eternal; who again is said to be the son of Uranus or Cœlius."[3] Where it is manifest that Plato endeavours to accommodate this poetic trinity of gods, Uranus, Chronos, and

* P. 396. Edit. Steph.

[3] I wish that the learned doctor had rather left this interpretation of Plato to the modern Platonists who invented it, as Plotinus and the rest, than made it his own. For although the philosopher does certainly in this place make mention of Chronos, Zeus, and Uranus, I see there no vestige of the "triad" referred to, and still less of an en-

Zeus, or Cœlius, Saturn, and Jupiter, to his own trinity of divine hypostases, τ'αγαθὸν, νοὺς and ψυχὴ, the "first good," a "perfect intellect," and the "highest soul." Which accommodation is accordingly further pursued by Plotinus in several places, as Enn. 5. lib. I. cap. 4. and Enn. 4. lib. 8. cap. 13. Nevertheless, these three archical hypostases of the Platonic trinity, though looked upon as substances distinct from each other, and subordinate, yet are they frequently taken altogether by them for the whole supreme deity. However, the word Ζεὺς is by Plato severally attributed to each of them; which Proclus thus observed upon the Timæus: Λέγωμεν, ὅτι πολλαὶ μέν εἰσι τάξεις καὶ παρὰ Πλάτωνι τοῦ Διός· Ἄλλος γὰρ ὁ δημιουργὸς Ζεὺς, ὡς ἐν Κρατύλῳ γέγραπται, καὶ ἄλλος ὁ Πρῶτος τῆς Κρονίας τριάδος, ὡς ἐν Γοργίᾳ λέγεται, καὶ ἄλλος ὁ ἀπόλυτος, ὡς ἐν τῷ Φαίδρῳ παραδίδοται, καὶ ἄλλος ὁ οὐρανίος, εἴτε ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀπλανοῦς εἴτε ἐν τῇ Σατέρου περιόδῳ, "We say, therefore, that there are several orders, ranks, or degrees of Zeus or Jupiter in Plato; for sometimes he is taken for the Demiurgus or opificer of the world, as in Cratylus; sometimes for the first of the Saturnian triad, as in Gorgias; sometimes for the superior soul of the world, as in Phædrus; and lastly, sometimes for the lower soul of the heaven." Though by Proclus' leave, that Zeus or Jupiter which is mentioned in Plato's Cratylus (being plainly the superior Psyche or soul of the world) is not properly the Demiurgus or opificer, according to him: that title rather belonging to νοῦς or intellect, which is the second hypostasis in his trinity.

As for the vulgar of the Greekish Pagans, whether they apprehended God to be νοῦν ἐξῃρημένον τοῦ κόσμου, "a mind or intellect separate from the world," or else to be a soul of the world only, it cannot be doubted, but that by the word Zeus they commonly understood the supreme Deity in one or other of those senses, the father and king of gods; he being frequently thus styled in their solemn nuncupations of vows, Ζεῦ πάτερ, Ζεῦ ἄνα, "O Jupiter, father," and "O Jupiter, king." As he was invoked also, Ζεῦ βασιλεῦ in that excellent prayer of an ancient poet, not without cause commended in Plato's Alcibiades,[4]

Ζεῦ Βασιλεῦ, τὰ μὲν ἐσθλὰ καὶ εὐχομένοις καὶ ἀνεύκτοις
Ἄμμι δίδου· τὰ δὲ δεινὰ καὶ εὐχομένοις ἀπαλέξειν·

"O Jupiter king, give us good things, whether we pray or pray not for them; but withhold evil things from us, though we should pray never so earnestly for them." But the instances

deavour to accommodate the poetic trinity to his own. In my opinion, the very worst interpreters of Plato are those, who after the Christian era assumed the title of Platonists. Their minds were all so prepossessed and imbued with these "three principles," as to send them hunting for them with great sagacity, but little good sense, every where through the works of Plato, whose doctrines they would fain seem exclusively to inculcate.

[4] In Alcibiade secundo, sive De Precatione, p. 40.

of this kind being innumerable, we shall forbear to mention any more of them. Only we shall observe that Zeus Sabazius was a name for the Supreme God, sometime introduced amongst the Greeks, and derived in all probability from the Hebrew "Sabaoth," or "Adonai Tsebaoth," "the Lord of Hosts," (that is, of the heavenly hosts) or the Supreme Governor of the world. Which, therefore, Aristophanes took notice of as a strange and foreign god, lately crept in amongst them,[5] that

[5] G. J. Vossius, who has treated largely of this Deity, professes and learnedly defends the same conjecture respecting the origin of the name Sabazius: De Origine et Progressu Idololatr. lib. 2. c. 14. p. 140. Others have followed in his footsteps. Vide Elias Schedius de Diis Germanis, p. 340. I nevertheless am of opinion that the recorded testimonies of ancient authors on the subject entirely demolish this guess. For, I. It was, all agree, from Thrace, that this deity was first introduced to the Greeks, and afterwards to the Romans too. To this the ancient inscriptions preserved by Gruter, testify. And is it credible that the Thracians worshipped the God of the Hebrews? II. His worship was full of impurities and crimes, on account of the nightly vigils, the drinking assemblies, and other abominable practices that were required. This was the reason why Aristophanes would have this Sabazius ejected from the state, as also Cicero hints, De Leg. lib. 2. c. 15. Compare the Wasps of Aristophanes, near the commencement. For the same reason, several, both Greeks and Romans, imagined that this god was no other than Bacchus or Liber. See Macrobius, Saturnal. lib. 1. c. 18. p. 288. Cic. de Nat. Deor. lib. 3. c. 23. Also Jamblichus de Myster. Ægypt. sect. 3. c. 9. p. 69. The same reason lastly, according to Valerius Maximus, determined the Romans not to permit the morals of their citizens to be debased by the worship of this god. See Adr. Turnebus ad Ciceronem de Legibus, p. 3364. Euseb. Præp. Evan. lib. 2. c. 3. p. 64. III. Mysteries were celebrated in honour of this God, called *Sabazia*, in which, according to Arnobius, Contra Gentes, lib. 5. p. 215. the initiated had a golden serpent put in at their breast, and taken out again at the lower part of their garments. Let those learned men who follow Cudworth and Vossius say what they please; never will I bring myself to believe that there is any, even the slightest, relationship between so filthy and obscene a deity as this, and the most High God whom the Hebrews worshipped, or that the title of a god so infamous could be borrowed from that most holy name SABAOTH. Nor do I entertain the notion of those who after Eustathius and Stephanus, find the origin of this appellation in the name of the Sabii, a people somewhere in Thrace or Phrygia. For not to mention that no tribe so called has yet been found in one country or the other, I think that the theory is about as wise as one that should derive the name of Apollo from a people of Greece called Apollinei, or that of Hercules, from the Herculei, somewhere or other in Asia. I am quite aware that tribes have often been designated by the names of those whom they regarded as gods, or rather as the founders of their race, but I do not recollect any instances of gods being named after the people who worshipped them. I know that the Teutones were so called from Teut, whom they venerated as a god, but I should think it absurd to suppose that the god was called Teut because the Teutonic nation thought fit to adopt his worship! I do not set more value on the opinion of those who with Turnebus fancy the word derived from σαβάζεσθαι, which they say is the same with *bacchari*. For it is much more likely that the word σαβάζεσθαι originated in the worship of this god Sabazius, than that the name of the deity was taken from the verb; just as the word *bacchari* is derived from the frantic worship of Bacchus—not Bacchus from bacchari. Pelloutier again, Hist. des Celtes, tom. 2. p. 276. &c., cleverly argues that Sabazius is the supreme German deity, Taut, and derives the name from the word Sauffen, as if you were to write Saufaus. But why should I pursue the theories and guesses of others? Rather would I give my own idea about this *Jupiter Sabazius*. And in my opinion, Sabazius was a very ancient king of the Thracians, who conferred many benefits upon that people, and was therefore deified after death. I am led to this conclusion, not only by the statement of Cicero, De Nat. Deor. lib. 3. c. 25. that the Bacchus in whose honour the Sabazia were instituted, was originally a king in Asia, 'regem Asiæ præfuisse,' but also by the very rites and mysteries celebrated in his name. For I am

ought to be banished out of Greece; these several names of God being then vulgarly spoken of as so many distinct deities, as shall be more fully declared afterwards. We shall likewise elsewhere show, that besides Ζεὺς, Πὰν also was used by the Greeks as a name for that God, who is the supreme moderator and governor of the whole world.

That the Latins did in like manner, by Jupiter and Jovis, frequently denote the supreme Deity and Monarch of the universe, is a thing unquestionable; and which does sufficiently appear from those epithets that were commonly given to him, of optimus and maximus the "best and the greatest;" as also of omnipotens, frequently bestowed upon him by Virgil and others. Which word Jupiter or Jovis, though Cicero[6] etymologize it à juvando, or from juvans pater, as not knowing how to do it otherwise; yet we may rather conclude it to have been of a Hebraical extraction, and derived from that Tetragrammaton, or name of God, consisting of four consonants; whose vowels, (which it was to be pronounced with) though they be not now

quite certain that those gods, in whose honour mysteries were performed, were men renowned among the Greeks, the Egyptians, and the Assyrians, for good and illustrious deeds, to preserve the memory of whom, grateful posterity instituted festivals and special religious ceremonies, in which the benefits of which these persons had been the authors were typified. In the Sabazian rites I find that the initiated partook of unmixed wine, and that a golden serpent was put into their bosom, and afterwards drawn forth. The former circumstance proves to me that that Sabazius, whoever he really was, first instructed the Thracians and Phrygians in the art of planting and rearing vines; and from the latter, I am inclined to believe that he also discovered and communicated to his subjects remedies for the venom and bite of serpents, and for all other poison, a fact that is most aptly symbolized by that ceremony. The Greeks, who were pleased with every thing that fostered their passions, and who, moreover, possessed a kind of innate longing for novelty, did not hesitate when they had become acquainted with the existence of these rites, to adopt them into the commonwealth, and yet, as passages of Aristophanes show, not without the indignant protest of wise and virtuous men, who could not endure that the morals of the people should be corrupted by such barbarous and licentious observances. The Greeks moreover were accustomed, as the passage just quoted from Herodotus illustrates, to identify with their own Jupiter, and also to call by his name whatever deity they observed to occupy the supreme place among the gods of any other people. Since, therefore, they had heard that this Sabazius was chief among the gods of the Thracians, they scrupled not to give him the name of Jupiter, and at the same time to call Jupiter also Sabazius. Not a few of the Romans afterwards followed this example after they had likewise appointed their Sabazian rites, as inscriptions dedicated Jovi Sabazio testify. Many, however, are unwilling to admit this conclusion, supposing, because they perceive a slight difference between the rites of Jupiter and the mysteries of Sabazius, that the latter deity ought rather to be identified with Liber Pater or Bacchus. I have a little before alluded to the opinions of Cicero and Macrobius on the subject. In a similar manner to the above, I think that we ought to argue concerning almost all those foreign gods whom Greeks and Romans introduced into their states, and rashly confounded with their own ancestral deities.

[6] Cicero, however, is not speaking here in his own character, but in that of the Stoics, who held that the ether was signified by the name of Jove, De Nat. Deor. lib. 2. c. 25. The derivation which the learned Doctor here suggests of the word *Jovis*, from the name JEHOVAH, is approved by many other erudite men; but this is not the place for discussing it. See, as one of many authorities, El. Schedius de Diis German. pp. 338. 340.

certainly known, yet must it needs have some such sound as this either *Jovah*, or *Javoh*, or Ἰεύω or Ἰάω, or the like; and the abbreviation of this name was *Jah*. For as the Pagan nations had, besides appellatives, their several proper names for God, so also had the Hebrews theirs, and such as being given by God himself, was most expressive of his nature, it signifying eternal and necessary existence.

But, in the next place, we shall suggest, that the Pagans did not only signify the Supreme God by these proper names, but also frequently by the appellatives themselves, when used not for a god in general, but for the God, or God κατ' ἐξοχὴν, and by way of eminency. And thus ὁ θεὸς and θεὸς are often taken by the Greeks, not for θεῶν τις, "a god," or "one of the gods," but for God, or the Supreme Deity. We have several examples hereof in passages before-cited occasionally in this very chapter, as in that of Aristotle's: Τί οὖν ἂν κρεῖττον καὶ ἐπιστήμης πλὴν ὁ θεὸς, "What is there therefore that can be better than knowledge, but only God?" As also that other of his, that happiness consisteth principally in virtue, ἔστω συνωμολογημένον ἡμῖν μάρτυρι τῷ θεῷ χρομένοις, "It is a thing that ought to be acknowledged by us from the nature of God." So, likewise, in that of Thales: Πρεσβύτατον πάντων ὁ θεὸς, ἀγέννητον γὰρ, "God is the oldest of all things, because he is unmade:" and that of Maximus Tyrius: Πολλοὶ θεοὶ παῖδες θεοῦ καὶ συνάρχοντες θεῷ, "Many gods, the sons of God, and co-reigners together with God." Besides which, there have been others also mentioned, which we shall not here repeat. And innumerable more instances of this kind might be added, as that of Antiphanes:[7] Θεὸς οὐδενὶ ἔοικεν, διόπερ αὐτὸν οὐδεὶς ἐκμαθεῖν ἐξ εἰκόνος δύναται, "God is like to nothing, for which cause he cannot be learned by any from an image:" This of Socrates:[8] Εἰ ταύτῃ φίλον τῷ θεῷ, ταύτῃ γινέσθω, "If God will have it so, let it be so." And that of Epictetus:[9] Σὺ μόνον μέμνησο τῶν καθολικῶν, τί ἐμὸν, τὶ οὐκ ἐμὸν; τί θέλει με ποιεῖν ὁ Θεὸς νῦν, "Do thou only remember these catholic and universal principles, what is mine, and what is not mine? what would God have me now to do? and what would he have me not to do?" But we shall mention no more of these, because they occur so frequently in all manner of Greek writers, both metrical and prosaical.

Wherefore we shall here only add, that as the singular θεὸς was thus often used by the Greeks for God κατ' ἐξοχὴν, or "in way of eminency," that is, for the supreme Deity; so was like-

[7] In Grotius' Excerp. Veter. Tragicor. et Comicor. p. 632.

[8] This celebrated reply of Socrates to the announcement of Crito that the hour of death was at hand, is given by Plato in Crit. c. 2. Epictetus, according to Arrian, often mentioned it with great praise.

[9] Apud Arrian. Comm. de Disp. Epicteti. lib. 4. p. 385. Edit. Cantabrig.

wise the plural Θεοὶ frequently used by them for the inferior gods, by way of distinction from the supreme. As in that usual form of prayer and exclamation: Ὦ Ζεῦ καὶ Θεοί, "O Jupiter and the gods;" and that form of obtestation: Πρὸς Διὸς καὶ Θεῶν, "By Jupiter and the gods." So in this of Euripides:[10]

Ἀλλ' ἐστὶν, ἔστι· κἂν τις ἐγγελᾷ λογῷ,
Ζεὺς καὶ Θεοὶ, βρότεια λεύσαντες πάθη.

Est, (sint licet qui rideat) est Jupiter,
Superique, casus qui vident mortalium.

In which passages, as Jupiter is put for the supreme God, so is Θεοὶ likewise put for the inferior gods, in way of distinction from him. Thus also, Θεὸς and Θεοὶ are taken both together in Plato's Phædo, Θεὸς for the supreme, unmade and incorruptible Deity, and Θεοὶ for the inferior gods only:* Ὁ δέ γε Θεὸς (οἶμαι), ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ αὐτό τὸ τῆς ζωῆς εἶδος παρὰ πάντων ἂν ὁμολογηθείη, μηδέ ποτε ἀπόλλυσθαι. Παρὰ πάντων μεντοι νὴ Δί' (ἔφη) ἀνθρώπων γε, καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, παρὰ Θεῶν, "I suppose, said Socrates, that God, and the very species, essence or idea of life will be granted by all to be incorruptible. Doubtless by all men (said Cebes) but much more, as I conceive, by the gods."† But a further instance will be propounded afterwards of the word Θεοὶ, thus used by way of distinction, for the inferior gods only; as it was before declared, that the theogonia or generation of gods was accordingly understood by the Greeks universally of the οἱ Θεοὶ, that is, the "inferior gods."

Moreover, as the word Θεὸς was taken κατ' ἐξοχὴν, or "by way of eminency," for the supreme God, so was Δαίμων likewise. As for example, in this passage of Callimachus, before cited imperfectly:[1]

Εἰ Θεὸν οἶσθα,
Ἴσθ' ὅτι καὶ ῥέξαι Δαίμονι πᾶν δυνατόν.

Si Deus est tibi notus,
Hoc etiam noris, omnia posse Deum.

Where Θεὸς and Δαίμων are used both alike signanter, for the supreme God. And thus also in that famous passage of another poet:[2]

[10] Vide Grotii Excerpta Veter. Tragicor. et Comicor. p. 417.

* Page 105.

† Plato de Rep. Οὐχ ὑπὸ θεῶν ποτὲ ἀμελεῖται, ὅς ἂν προθυμεῖσθαι ἐθέλῃ δίκαιος γίνεσθαι καὶ ἐπιτηδεύων ἀρετὴν, εἰς ὅσον δυνατὸν ἀνθρώπῳ ὁμοιοῦσθαι Θεῷ, "He will never be neglected of the gods, who endeavours, as much as it is possible for a man, to be like to God," p. 613.

[1] Vide Fragmenta Calimachi à Rich. Bentleio collecta, p. 372.

[2] Who this poet was I have not been able, even by the utmost diligence, to ascertain.

Τοῖς γὰρ ἀλιτροῖς,
Εἰν ἀλὶ καὶ γαίᾳ, κακὰ μύρια δήκαπο Δαίμων.

Homer likewise, in one and the same place,[3] seems to use Θεὸς and Δαίμων both together, after the same manner, for the supreme God:

Οπποτ' ἀνήρ ἐθέλει πρὸς δαίμονα φωτὶ μάχεσθαι,
Ὅν κε θεὸς τιμᾶ, τάχα οἱ μέγα πῆμα κυλίσθη,

Quoties homo vult, adverso numine, cum viro pugnare,
Quem Deus honorat, mox in eum magna clades devolvitur.

Again we conceive, that Jupiter, or the supreme God, was sometimes signified among the Pagans by that expression, θεὸς αὐτὸς, "Deus ipse," as in that of Homer's ninth Illiad:[4]

Οὐδ' εἴ κέν μοι ὑποσταίη Θεὸς αὐτὸς,
Γῆρας ἀποξύσας, θήσειν νέον ἡβώοντα,

Neque si mihi promitteret Deus ipse,
Senectutem abradens, effecturum me juvenem pubescentem.

[3] These verses occur Iliad ρ v. 98. 99. But I cannot by any means approve the interpretation, which the learned Doctor gives of them above. For, if I am qualified to judge, neither δαίμων nor θεὸς signifies, in this passage of Homer, the Supreme Deity. Δαίμων, it is quite evident, refers to Hector, and therefore denotes a *divine mortal*, or, in other words, a great and successful hero. Θεὸς, however, signifies one of the number of the gods, and the sentiment of the passage is, that no human valour can avail against one to whom a god, Mars, Jupiter, Apollo, or any of the rest, grants assistance. No one at all conversant with the opinions of the ancients will wonder that the word δαίμων is here employed to designate an illustrious man. For there can be no doubt that it was long believed by most persons that the *demons*, properly so called, were all, or certainly most of them, the spirits of noble and renowned mortals released from the body. Consult Sextus Empiricus, adv. Physic. lib. 1. sect. 74. p. 568; Chalcidius, Comm. in Timæum Platonis, sect. 135. p. 330; Diogenes Laërtius, lib. 8. sect. 32. p. 514. That a man therefore in whom a *demon* resided, should be himself called by Homer a *demon*, need not be regarded by any as either novel or surprising. Perhaps, however, δαίμων may here signify *fortunate* and *happy*. For as the Greeks called an unfortunate man κακοδαίμων, so also the word εὐδαίμων, and sometimes δαίμων alone, signifies fortunate. That, moreover, the god of this passage is not the Supreme God, is sufficiently plain from the consideration that in all propriety the reference of Homer must be to the particular god who is feigned to have assisted Hector in battle. Now this was Apollo. Not a few similar passages of the ancients, in which the word δαίμων is so associated as to seem to denote the supreme God, were collected before Dr. Cudworth's time by Augustinus Steuchus, De Perenni Philos. lib. 8. c. 22. But many which he quotes are foreign to his purpose. I will, however, give that which I think furnishes the most apt support to the notion. It is a verse of Orpheus, which Proclus quotes, Comm. in Timæum Platonis, lib. 2. p. 95:

Ἕν κράτος, εἷς ΔΑΙΜΩΝ γένετο, μέγας ἀρχὸς ἁπάντων,

"One power there is, one God, the mighty king of all."

[4] Verse 448. I grant that, as Cyril and Justin maintain, the appellation θεὸς here seems to indicate the Supreme God. That, however, it can be proved from the passage that θεὸς αὐτὸς was among those titles under which the Greeks were accustomed to adore the supreme Deity, I confess I cannot see. Suppose any one of us to say, "Even if God himself were to permit me, I could not do it," would that be at all a proof that *God himself* was among us the peculiar appellation of the supreme object of our worship? The word "himself," or one like it, is required by the form of the sentence.

And thus St. Cyril of Alexandria interprets Homer: here* Οὐ γάρ πού φησιν, εἰ καὶ Θεῶν τις ὑπόσχοιτό μοι τοῦ μὲν γήρως ἀπεμπολὴν, παλινάγρετον δὲ τὴν νεότητα, τετήρηκε δὲ τὸ χρῆμα μόνῳ τῷ ἐπὶ πάντας θεῷ, &c. τὸ γάρ τοι Θεὸς αὐτὸς, οὐκ ἐφ' ἕνα τῶν ἐν μύθοις πεπλασμένων τινὰ, αὐτὸν δὲ δὴ μόνον κατασημήνειεν ἂν τὸν ἀληθῶς ὄντα Θεὸν, "Homer doth not say, if any of the gods would promise me freedom from old age, and restitution of youth, but he reserves the matter only to the supreme God; neither doth he refer it to any of the fictitious poetic gods, but to the true God alone." The same language was also spoken in the laws of the twelve tables:[5] Deos adeunto caste, opes amovento: si secus faxint, Deus ipse vindex erit, "Let the gods be worshipped chastly, superfluity of riches and pomp being removed: if men do otherwise, God himself will be the avenger." Where, though the word gods be used generally, so as to comprehend both the supreme and inferior gods under it, yet Deus ipse, "God himself," denotes the supreme God only. In like manner, ὁ Δαίμων αὐτὸς also seems to be taken for the supreme God, in that of Euripides:[6]

Λύσει με ὁ Δαίμων αὐτὸς, ὅταν ἐγὼ θέλω,

which was thus rendered by Horace:

Ipse Deus, simulatque volet, me solvet.

Notwithstanding which, Δαίμων and Δαίμονες are often distinguished from Θεὸς and Θεοὶ, they being put for an inferior

* Contra Jul. lib. 1. p. 27. edit. Spanh. So Justin. Mart. ad Græ. coh. p. 22. Ed. Colon.

[5] These are rather the laws of Cicero, ratified by him, De Leg. lib. 2. c. 8. It does not, again, appear to me from this passage, that the Romans employed the phrase *Ipse Deus* especially to designate the supreme God. All, I imagine, will conceive Cicero's meaning to be, that God, even if men neglect it, will himself punish wrongs committed against him by the profane. And in fact it appears doubtful whether the learned Doctor's explanation of the law is admissible. The intention of Cicero appears to me to be as follows: Let the gods, whoever they may be, adopted and authorized by the state, be reverently worshipped. If any one do otherwise, his crime may truly be hidden from men, to whom the depths of the heart are not revealed, but not from that God whose worship has been polluted. That Deity, therefore, will become the avenger of his own violated sanctity.—It is not, then, essential to understand here the Supreme God, seeing that any god whatever may be appropriately intended by the language employed.

[6] Bacchæ, v. 497. p. 385. Ed Canteri. But ὁ δαίμων αὐτὸς, it is evident from the whole connexion denotes here not the Supreme God, but Bacchus. This jolly deity is represented as answering to Pentheus, who was threatening him with imprisonment, that a god, meaning himself, would come in person to liberate him from the durance. That Horace has imitated this verse in Latin his ancient Scholiast had before observed, and it is evident from the passage itself. The purport of the words of Horace differs, however, very widely from the meaning of Euripides. Vide Andr. Dacier, Remarques sur l'Horace, tom. 7. p. 442. Dr. Cudworth has adopted a perverted reading, Simulatque volet." The passage stands in Horace, Epist. lib. 1. 16. v. 78: simul atque volam."

rank of beings below the gods vulgarly called demons; which word in a large sense comprehends also heroes under it. For though these demons be sometimes called gods too, yet were they rather accounted Ἡμίθεοι, "demi-gods," than gods. And thus Θεοὶ καὶ Δαίμονες, "gods and demons," are frequently joined together, as things distinct from one another; which notion of the word Plato refers to, when he concludes love not to be a god, but a demon only. But of these demons we are to speak more afterwards.

Furthermore, the pagan writers frequently understand the supreme God by the τὸ Θεῖον, when the word is used substantively. As for example, in this of Epicharmus:[7]

> Οὐδὲν διαφεύγει τὸ θεῖον· τοῦτο γινώσκειν σε δεῖ·
> Αὐτὸς ἐσθ' ἡμῶν ἐπόπτης· ἀδυνατεῖ δ' οὐδὲν Θεῷ,
>
> Res nulla est Deum quæ lateat, scire quod te convenit:
> Ipse est noster introspector, tum Deus nil non potest.

So likewise in this of Plato's,[8] πόρρω ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης ἵδρυται τὸ θεῖον, "God is far removed both from pleasure and grief." And Plotinus calls the supreme God, τὸ ἐν τῷ παντὶ θεῖον, "the Divinity that is in the universe." But because the instances hereof are also innumerable, we shall decline the mentioning of any more, and instead of them, only set down the judgment of that diligent and impartial observer of the force of words, Henricus Stephanus,[9] concerning it: Redditur etiam τὸ θεῖον sæpe Deus, sed ita tamen, ut intelligendum sit, non de quolibet Deo ab ipsis etiam profanis scriptoribus dici, verùm de eo quem intelligerent, cùm θεὸν dicebant quasi κατ' ἐξοχὴν ad differentiam eorum, qui multi appellatione θεῶν includebantur, summum videlicet supremúmque Numen, et quasi dicas θεὸν θεῶν ὕπατον καὶ ἄριστον, ut loquitur de Jove Homerus.

Lastly, as τὸ θεῖον so likewise was τὸ δαιμόνιον used by the Greeks for the supreme Numen, or that Divinity which governs the whole world. Thus whereas it was commonly said (according to Herodotus[10]), ὅτι τὸ θεῖον φθονερὸν, "that God was envious;

[7] Apud Clement. Alexandrin. Stromat. lib. 5. p. 708. The translation is by Grotius, Excerpt. Veter. Tragicor. et Comicor. p. 481.

[8] Dr. Cudworth has taken this passage from H. Steph. who does not state whereabouts in Plato it is to be found, Thesaurus Gr. Ling. tom. 1. p. 1534. It occurs, however, in his third epistle, near the beginning.

[9] In Thesaur. Græc. Ling. tom. 1. p. 1534.

[10] Herodotus does not cite these words as a proverbial saying, but gives them in the course of a letter from Amasis to the tyrant Polycrates, Hist. lib. 3. c. 40. The passage in which they occur is as follows: Ἐμοὶ αἱ σαὶ μεγάλαι εὐτυχίαι οὐκ ἀρέσκουσι, τὸ θεῖον ἐπισταμένῳ ὡς ἔστι φθονερόν, "Your splendid fortunes do not please me, for I know how envious the divinity is." As to Aristotle, however, I would rather remain in ignorance where the words attributed to him are to be found, than undergo the immense labour of searching through his multitudinous writings for what, after all, I might not be able to find.

the meaning whereof was, that he did not commonly suffer any great human prosperity to continue long, without some check or counterbuff; the same proverbial speech is expressed in Aristotle: *Φθονερον τὸ δαιμόνιον.* And in this sense the word seems to be used in Isocrates[11] ad Demonicum: *Τίμα τὸ δαιμόνιον ἀεὶ μὲν, μάλιστα δὲ μετὰ τῆς πόλεως,* "Worship God always, but especially with the city, in her public sacrifices." And doubtless it was thus taken by Epictetus in this passage of his:* *Μία ὁδὸς ἐπὶ εὔροιαν· τοῦτο καὶ ὄρθρου, καὶ μεθ' ἡμέραν καὶ νύκτωρ, ἔστω πρόχειρον, ἀπόστασις τῶν ἀπροαιρέτων, τὸ μηδὲν ἴδιον ἡγεῖσθαι, τὸ παραδοῦναι πάντα τῷ δαιμονίῳ, καὶ τῇ τύχῃ,* "There is but one way to tranquillity of mind and happiness: let this therefore always be ready at hand with thee, both when thou wakest early in the morning, and all the day long, and when thou goest late to sleep; to account no external things thine own, but to commit all these to God and fortune." And there is a very remarkable passage in Demosthenes[1] (observed by Budæus) that must not be here omitted; in which we have *οἱ θεοὶ* plainly for the "inferior" or "minor gods" only, and *τὸ δαιμόνιον* for the "supreme God," both together; *εἴσονται οἱ θεοὶ καὶ τὸ δαιμόνιον, τὸν μὴ τὰ δίκαια ψηφισάμενον,* "The gods and the Deity will know or take notice of him that gives not a righteous sentence;" that is, both the inferior gods and the supreme God himself. Wherefore we see, that the word *δαιμόνιον*, as to its grammatical form, is not a diminutive, as some have conceived, but an adjective substantived; as well as *τὸ θεῖον* is. Nevertheless, in pagan writings, *δαιμόνιον* also, as well as *δαίμων*, from whence it is derived, is often used for an inferior rank of beings below the gods, though sometimes called gods too; and such was Socrates' *δαιμόνιον* so commonly known. But the grammar of this word, and its proper signification in pagan writers, cannot better be manifested than by citing that passage of Socrates' own, in his Apology, as written by Plato;† who though generally supposed to have had a demon, was notwithstanding by Melitus accused of atheism: *Ἔστιν ὅστις ἀνθρώπων, ὦ Μέλιτε, ἀνθρώπεια μὲν νομίζει πράγματα εἶναι, ἀνθρώπους δὲ οὐ νομίζει; ἢ ὅστις ἵππους μὲν οὐ νομίζει, ἱππικὰ δὲ πράγματα,* &c. *οὐκ ἔστιν, ὦ ἄριστε ἀνδρῶν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐπὶ τοῦτῳ ἀπόκριναι, ἔσθ' ὅστις δαιμόνια μὲν νομίζει*

[11] In this passage of Isocrates, Orat. ad Demonic. p. m. 9., *δαιμόνιον* signifies not the universal and supreme God, but in general the presiding Deity of any particular state. This appears both from the course of the whole oration, and from the argument by which Isocrates establishes this precept: *Οὕτω γὰρ δόξεις ἅμα τε τοῖς θεοῖς θύειν καὶ τοῖς νόμοις ἐμμένειν,* "For thus will you publicly at once do homage to the gods, and pay allegiance to the laws." *Θεοὶ*, there is no doubt, is in this passage of the same force as *δαιμόνιον*.

* Arr. lib. 4. c. 4. p. 387. Edit. Cantab.

[1] Orat. *Περὶ Παραπρεσβείας*, p. 266. ed. Græc. Basil. 1532. fol.

† P. 27. Steph. There are several omissions in this quotation from Plato, and some alterations.

πράγματα εἶναι, δαίμονας δὲ οὐ νομίζει; οὐκ ἔστιν· ἀλλ' οὖν δαιμόνιά γε νομίζω κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον· εἰ δὲ καὶ δαιμόνια νομίζω, καὶ δαίμονας δήπου πόλλη ἀνάγκη νομίζειν μέ ἐστι. Τοὺς δὲ δαίμονας οὐχὶ ἤτοι θεούς γε ἡγούμεθα εἶναι, ἢ θεῶν παῖδας, &c. "Is there any one, O Melitus, who, acknowledging that there are human things, can yet deny that there are any men? or confessing that there are equine things, can nevertheless deny, that there are any horses? If this cannot be, then no man who acknowledges demonial things can deny demons. Wherefore I being confessed to assert δαιμόνια, must needs be granted to hold δαίμονες also. Now do we not all think, that demons are either gods, or at least sons of the gods? Wherefore for any one to conceive, that there are demons, and yet no gods, is altogether as absurd, as if any should think, that there are mules, but yet neither horses nor asses." However, in the New Testament, according to the judgment of Origen, Eusebius, and others of the ancient fathers, both these words δαίμονες and δαιμόνια are alike taken, always in a worser sense, for evil and impure spirits only.

But over and besides all this, the Pagans do often characterize the supreme God by such titles, epithets, and descriptions, as are incommunicably proper to him; thereby plainly distinguishing him from all other inferior gods. He being sometimes called by them ὁ Δημιουργὸς, "the opifex, architect or maker of the world;" ὁ Ἡγεμὼν τοῦ παντὸς καὶ Ἀρχηγέτης; "the prince and chief ruler of the universe," ὁ Πρῶτος and ὁ Πρώτιστος Θεὸς (by the Greeks) and (by the Latins) Primus Deus, "the first God;" ὁ Πρῶτος Νοῦς, "the first Mind;" ὁ μέγας Θεὸς, "the Great God;" ὁ μέγιστος δαίμων, and ὁ μέγιστος θεῶν, "the greatest God," and "the greatest of the gods;" ὁ Ὕψιστος, "the Highest;" and ὁ ὕπατος θεῶν, "the Supreme of the gods;" ὁ ἀνωτάτω θεὸς, "the uppermost, or most transcendent God;" Princeps ille Deus, "that chief or principal God;" Θεὸς θεῶν, "the God of gods;" and Ἀρχὴ Ἀρχῶν, "the Principle of principles;" Τὸ πρῶτον αἴτιον, "the First Cause;" Ὁ τόδε τὸ πᾶν γεννήσας, "he that generated or created this whole universe;" ὁ κρατέων τοῦ παντὸς, "he that ruleth over the whole world:" Summus Rector et Dominus, "the supreme Governor and Lord of all;" ὁ ἐπὶ πᾶσι θεὸς, "the God over all;" ὁ θεὸς ἀγέννητος, αὐτογενὴς, αὐτοφυὴς, αὐθυπόστατος, "the ingenerate or unmade, self-originated and self-subsisting Deity;" Μονὰς, "a Monad;" Τὸ ἓν καὶ αὐτὸ ἀγαθὸν, "Unity and Goodness itself;" Τὸ ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας, and τὸ ὑπερούσιον, "that which is above essence or supe-essential;" Τὸ ἐπέκεινα νοῦ, "that which is above mind and understanding;" Summum illud et Æternum, neque mutabile neque interiturum, "that Supreme and Eternal Being, which is immutable and can never perish;" Ἀρχὴ, καὶ τέλος, καὶ μέσον

ἀπάντων, "the Beginning, and End, and Middle of all things;" Ἕν καὶ πάντα, "One and all things;" Deus Unus et Omnes, "One God and All Gods;" and lastly, to name no more, ἡ Πρόνοια, or "Providence," as distinguished from Φύσις, "Nature," is often used by them also as a name for the supreme God, which because it is of the feminine gender, the impious and atheistical Epicureans therefore took occasion to call God, ridiculously and jeeringly, Anum fatidicam Pronœam.[2] Now all these, and other such like expressions, being found in the writings of professed Pagans (as we are able to show), and some of them very frequently, it cannot be denied, but that the Pagans did put a manifest difference betwixt the supreme God, and all other inferior gods.

XV. What hath been now declared might, as we conceive, be judged sufficient, in order to our present undertaking; which is to prove, that the more intelligent of the ancient Pagans, notwithstanding that multiplicity of gods worshipped by them, did generally acknowledge one supreme, omnipotent, and only unmade Deity. Nevertheless, since men are commonly so much prepossessed with a contrary persuasion (the reason whereof seems to be no other than this, that because the notion of the word "God," which is now generally received amongst us Christians, is such as does essentially include self-existence in it, they are therefore apt to conceit, that it must needs do so likewise amongst the Pagans); we shall endeavour to produce yet some further evidence for the truth of our assertion. And first, we conceive this to be no small confirmation thereof, because after the publication of Christianity, and all along during that tugging and contest, which was betwixt it and paganism, none of the professed champions for paganism and antagonists of Christianity (when occasion was now offered them), did ever assert any such thing as a multiplicity of understanding deities unmade (or creators), but on the contrary they all generally disclaimed it, professing to acknowledge one supreme self-existent Deity, the maker of the whole universe.[3]

[2] This sneer is put into the mouth of Cotta, an Epicurean, by Cicero, de Nat Deor. lib. 1. c. 8. It was not God, generally speaking, whom they so termed; but the particular deity of the Stoic creed.

[3] I am quite sure there are many to whom these testimonies of former anti-Christian champions will come with less weight and authority, than the matter in hand requires. It appears from many examples, that in the strife and heat of religious controversy it has always been the endeavour of the patrons of ancient errors to divest them of all their hideousness, and thus to make the allegations of those, who accuse these doctrines of vileness and corruption, to appear unjust. To effect which purpose, they bend the chief tenets and dogmas of their forefathers into quite a new shape, and give them an interpretation utterly at variance with all former notions as to their meaning. We might recall to memory the transactions of that age in which Luther assailed papal authority and antiquated German superstition. His Romish opponents flatly denied the truth of his statements respecting the deformity of their

It is a thing highly probable, if not unquestionable, that Apollonius Tyanæus, shortly after the publication of the gospel to the world, was a person made choice of by the policy, and assisted by the powers of the kingdom of darkness, for the doing of some things extraordinary, merely out of design to derogate from the miracles of our Saviour Christ, and to enable paganism the better to bear up against the assaults of Christianity. For amongst the many writers of this philosopher's life, some, and particularly Philostratus, seem to have had no other aim in this their whole undertaking, than only to dress up Apollonius in such a garb and manner as might make him best seem to be a fit corrival with our Saviour Christ, both in respect of sanctity and miracles. Eunapius,[4] therefore, telling us that he mis-titled his book, and that instead of Ἀπολλωνίου βίος, "the life of Apollonius," he should have called it Θεοῦ εἰς ἀνθρώπους ἐπιδημίαν, "the coming down and converse of God with men;" forasmuch as this Apollonius, (saith he) was not a bare philosopher or man, ἀλλά τι θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπου μέσον, "but a certain middle thing betwixt the gods and men." And that this was the use commonly made by the Pagans of this history of Apollonius, namely, to set him up in way of opposition and rivalry to our Saviour Christ, appears sundry ways. Marcellinus, in an epistle of his to St. Austin,[5] declares this as the grand objection of the Pagans against Christianity, (therefore desiring St. Austin's answer to the same;) Nihil aliud Dominum, quàm alii homines facere potuerunt, fecisse vel egisse mentiuntur; Apollonium siquidem suum nobis, et Apuleium, aliósque magicæ artis homines, in medium proferunt, quorum majora contendunt extitisse miracula, "The Pagans pretend that our Saviour Christ did no more than what other men have been able to do, they producing their Apollonius and Apuleius, and other magicians, whom they contend to have done

ancient religion; and their convocations made out a system of religious faith and observance far different from that which had actually prevailed. No doubt the same thing was done in the first ages of Christianity, by the pagan opponents of the professors of the truth; and principally by those philosophers who were ordinarily called Neo-platonists. These, when they perceived that all reverence of the gods would be destroyed, if once the statements of Christians respecting the impiety and vileness of heathen worship could be instilled into the popular mind, and that they themselves would neither be willing nor able in any way to stand forth as defenders of these fearful stains on the national religions; altogether reconstructed the system of popular belief, and with great craft and subtlety, as I could show by innumerable examples, accommodated it to the loftiest doctrines of Christianity. This being the case, I have long thought, that as no judicious man would form his estimate of the religion of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries from the writings of the adversaries of Luther and the other reformers; so neither ought we to consult those philosophers who in the second, third, and fourth lent their aid to the desperate cause of the gods, as the source of our opinions concerning the religious creed of those nations who, before the birth of the Saviour and the origin of Christianity, were devoted to the worship of dumb idols and useless divinities.

[4] In Vit. Sophistarum, Procem. p. 6. 7. ed. Plantin.

[5] Ep. 136. ex Divis. Benedict. tom. 2. opp. p. 304.

greater miracles." And it is well known, that Hierocles, to whom Eusebius[6] gives the commendation of a very learned man, wrote a book against the Christians (entitled Φιλαλήθης, or Λόγοι φιλαλήθεις), the chief design whereof was to compare this Apollonius Tyanæus with, and prefer him before our Saviour Christ: Ἄνω καὶ κάτω θρυλλοῦσι, σεμνύνοντες τὸν Ἰησοῦν, ὡς τυφλοῖς ἀναβλέψαι τε παρασχόντα, καί τινα τοιαῦτα δράσαντα θαυμάσια: They are Hierocles' own words in Eusebius: "The Christians (saith he) keep a great deal of stir, crying up of one Jesus, for restoring sight to the blind, and doing some such other wonders." And then mentioning the Thaumaturgi or wonder-workers amongst the Pagans, but especially Apollonius Tyanæus, and insisting largely upon his miracles, he adds in the close of all: Τίνος οὖν ἕνεκα τούτων ἐμνήσθην; ἵνα ἐξῇ συγκρίνειν τὴν ἡμετέραν ἀκριβῆ καὶ βεβαίαν ἐφ' ἑκάστῳ κρίσιν, καὶ τὴν τῶν Χριστιανῶν κουφότητα· εἴπερ ἡμεῖς μὲν τὸν τοιαῦτα πεποιηκότα, οὐ θεὸν, ἀλλὰ θεοῖς κεχαρισμένον ἄνδρα ἡγούμεθα· οἱ δὲ δι' ὀλίγας τερατείας τινὰς τὸν Ἰησοῦν Θεὸν ἀναγορεύουσι, "To what purpose now have we mentioned all these things? but only that the solid judgment of us (Pagans) might be compared with the levity of the Christians; forasmuch as we do not account him a god who did all these miracles, but only a person beloved of the gods; whilst they declare Jesus to be a God, merely for doing a few wonders." Where, because Eusebius is silent, we cannot but subjoin an answer out of Lactantius (which indeed he seems to have directed against those very words of Hierocles, though not naming of him), it being both pertinent and full:* Apparet nos sapientiores esse, qui mirabilibus factis non statim fidem divinitatis adjunximus, quàm vos, qui ob exigua portenta Deum credidistis———Disce igitur, si quid tibi cordis est, non solùm idcirco à nobis Deum creditum Christum, quia mirabilia fecit, sed quia vidimus in eo facta esse omnia, quæ nobis annunciata sunt, vaticinia prophetarum. Fecit mirabilia; magum putassemus, ut et vos nuncupatis, et Judæi tunc putaverunt; si non illa ipsa facturum Christum, prophetæ omnes uno spiritu prædicassent. Itaque Deum credimus, non magis ex factis operibúsque mirandis; quàm ex illa ipsa cruce, quam vos sicut canes lambitis; quoniam simul et illa prædicta est. Non igitur suo testimonio, (cui enim de se dicenti potest credi?) sed prophetarum testimonio, qui omnia, quæ fecit ac passus est, multo antè cecinerunt, fidem divinitatis accepit; quod neque Apollonio, neque Apuleio, neque cuiquam magorum potest aliquando contingere. "It is manifest that we Christians are wiser than you Pagans, in that we do not presently attribute divinity to a person merely because

[6] Libr. adv. Hieroclem, cap. 2. p. 429. appended to the edition of Philostratus, by Olearius.

* De Justi. lib. 5. cap. 3.

of his wonders; whereas a few portentous things, or extraordinary actions, will be enough with you to make you deify the doer of them; (and so indeed did some of them, however Hierocles denies it, deify Apollonius.) Let this writer against Christianity therefore learn, (if he have any understanding or sense in him) that Christ was not therefore believed to be a God by us Christians, merely because of his miracles, but because we saw all those things done by, and accomplished in him, which were long before predicted to us by the prophets. He did miracles, and we should therefore have suspected him for a magician (as you now call him, and as the Jews then supposed him to be) had not all the prophets with one voice foretold that he should do such things. We believe him therefore to be God, no more for his miracles than from that very cross of his, which you so much quarrel with, because that was likewise foretold. So that our belief of Christ's divinity is not founded upon his own testimony, (for who can be believed concerning himself?) but upon the testimony of the prophets, who sang long before of all those things which he both did and suffered. Which is such a peculiar advantage and privilege of his, as that neither Apollonius nor Apuleius, nor any other magician, could ever share therein." Now, as for the life and morals of this Apollonius Tyanæus, as it was a thing absolutely necessary for the carrying on of such a diabolical design, that the person made use of for an instrument should have some colourable and plausible pretence to virtue; so did Apollonius accordingly take upon him the profession of a Pythagorean; and indeed, act that part externally so well, that even Sidonius Apollinaris,[7] though a Christian, was so dazzled with the glittering show and lustre of his counterfeit virtues, as if he had been enchanted by this magician so long after his death. Nevertheless, whosoever is not very dim-sighted in such matters as these, or partially affected, may easily perceive that this Apol-

[7] Epistolar. lib. 8. ep. 3. p. 462. 463. This passage, together with others to be found in Christian writers, highly laudatory of this Apollonius, have been adduced by me in a specific Dissertation De Varia Apollonii Tyanæi Existimatione, occurring in my Observationes Historico-criticæ. Any one acquainted with sacred history must be aware of the reasons that led so many eminent Christians to heap such extravagant praises upon this impostor and pretender to philosophy. In the first place, many were ardent admirers of the Platonic and Pythagorean philosophy professed by Apollonius. Secondly, they imagined a certain divine influence to reside in many of these philosophers and wise men, for example, Socrates; nor, as is well known, did they proscribe all philosophers from the mansions of the blessed. Again, those imbued with the precepts of the Platonists, ascribed a vast power to demons, and believed that there were certain men who were beloved and assisted by them. Lastly, they were afraid openly to despise and condemn all those who stood in high estimation among the Pagans, lest they should provoke their rancour and animosity, and by that means retard the progress of the Christian religion. Hence Eusebius himself, in attacking Hierocles, does not venture to inveigh too severely against Apollonius; on the contrary, acknowledging his excellence, he contents himself with ridiculing and belabouring his historian Philostratus.

lonius was so far from having any thing of that divine spirit which manifested itself in our Saviour Christ, (transcending all the philosophers that ever were) that he fell far short of the better moralized Pagans; as for example, Socrates, there being a plain appearance of much pride and vain-glory (besides other foolery) discoverable both in his words and actions. And this Eusebius[8] undertakes to evince from Philostratus' own history (though containing many falsehoods in it): Οὐδ' ἐν ἐπιεικέσι καὶ μετρίοις ἀνδράσιν ἄξιον ἐγκρίνειν, οὐχ' ὅπως τῷ σωτῆρι ἡμῶν Χριστῷ παρατιθέναι τὸν Ἀπολλώνιον, "That Apollonius was so far from deserving to be compared with our Saviour Christ, that he was not fit to be ranked amongst the moderately and indifferently honest men." Wherefore, as to his reputed miracle, if credit be to be given to those relations, and such things were really done by him, it must for this reason also be concluded, that they were done no otherwise than by magic and necromancy; and that this Apollonius was but an Archimago or grand Magician. Neither ought this to be suspected for a mere slander cast upon him by partially affected Christians only, since, during his lifetime, he was generally reputed even amongst the Pagans themselves, for no other than a γόης,[9] or "infamous enchanter," and accused of that very crime before Domitian, the emperor:[10] as he was also represented such by one of the Pagan writers of his life, Mœragenes, senior to Philostratus, as we learn from Origen:* Περὶ μαγείας φαμέν, ὅτι ὁ βουλόμενος ἐξετάσαι, πότερόν ποτε καὶ φιλόσοφοι ἁλωτοί εἰσιν αὐτῇ, εἰ μὴ, ἀναγνώτω τὰ γεγραμμένα Μοιραγένει τῶν Ἀπολλωνίου τοῦ Τυανέως μάγου καὶ φιλοσόφου ἀπομνημονευμάτων· ἐν οἷς ὁ μὴ Χριστιανὸς, ἀλλὰ φιλόσοφος, ἔφησεν ἁλῶναι ὑπὸ τῆς ἐν Ἀπολλωνίῳ μαγείας, οὐκ ἀγεννεῖς τινας φιλοσόφους, ὡς πρὸς γόητα αὐτὸν εἰσελθόντας· ἐν οἷς οἶμαι, καὶ περὶ Εὐφράτου πάνυ διηγήσατο, καί τινος Ἐπικουρείου, "As concerning the infamous and diabolical magic, he that would know whether or no a philosopher be temptable by it, or illaqueable into it, let him read the writings of Mœragenes, concerning the memorable things of Apollonius Tyanæus, the magician and philosopher; in which he that was no Christian, but a Pagan philosopher himself, affirmeth some not ignoble philosophers to have been taken with Apollonius' magic, including

[8] Adv. Hieroclem, cap. 4. p. 431.

[9] This is related by Philostratus in his Life of Apollonius, lib. 4. c. 18. p. 156. wherein he tells us that the prefect of the Eleusinian mysteries refused to admit Apollonius, because it was not lawful for him μυῆσαι γόητα, "to initiate an enchanter." I have cited several other passages of the same kind, testifying the infamous character of Apollonius among the Pagans themselves, in my Diss. de Existimatione Apollonii, Observat. Histor. crit. lib. 1. p. 271. &c.

[10] According to the authority of the same Philostratus, Vita Apollonii, lib. 8. cap. 7. p. 327. where he gives a speech purporting to have been made by Apollonius for the purpose of exculpating himself from this charge.

* Con. Cels. lib. 6. p. 302.

(as I suppose) in that number, Euphrates, and a certain Epicurean." And no doubt but this was the reason why Philostratus[1] derogates so much from the authority of this Mœragenes, affirming him to have been ignorant of many things concerning Apollonius (οὐ γὰρ Μοιραγένει τε προσεκτέον, &c.) Because Mœragenes had thus represented Apollonius in his true colours as a magician; whereas Philostratus' whole business and design was, on the contrary, to vindicate him from that imputation: the truth whereof, notwithstanding, may be sufficiently evinced even from those very things that are recorded by Philostratus himself. And here, by the way, we shall observe, that it is reported by good historians, that miracles were also done by Vespasian at Alexandria:* Per eos menses (they are the words of Tacitus) multa miracula evenere, quîs cœlestis favor, et quædam in Vespasianum inclinatio numinum ostenderetur. Ex plebe Alexandrinâ quidam, oculorum tabe notus, genua ejus advolvitur, remedium cœcitatis exposcens gemitu; monitu Serapidis dei, quem dedita superstitionibus gens ante alios colit; precabatúrque principem, ut genas et oculorum orbes dignaretur respergere oris excremento. Alius manu æger, eodem deo auctore, ut pede ac vestigio Cæsaris calcaretur, orabat, "At that time many miracles happened at Alexandria, by which was manifested the heavenly favour and inclination of the divine powers towards Vespasian. A plebeian Alexandrian, that had been known to be blind, casts himself at the feet of Vespasian, begging with tears from him a remedy for his sight, (and that according to the suggestion of the god Serapis) that he would deign but to spit upon his eyes and face. Another having a lame hand (directed by the same oracle) beseeches him but to tread upon it with his foot." And after some debate concerning this business, both these things being done by Vespasian, statim conversa ad usum manus, et cæco reluxit dies; "the lame hand presently was restored to its former usefulness, and the blind man recovered his sight: both which things (saith the historian) some who were eye-witnesses, do to this very day testify, when it can be no advantage to any one to lie concerning it." And that there seems to be some reason to suspect that our archimago, Apollonius Tyanæus, might have some finger in this business also, because he was not only familiarly and intimately acquainted with Vespasian, but also, at that very time, (as Philostratus[2] informeth us) present with him at Alexandria, where he also did many miracles himself. However, we may here take notice of another stratagem and policy of the devil in this, both to obscure the miracles of our

[1] Histor. Apollonii, lib. 1. cap. 3. pp. 5. 6.

* Hist. lib. 4. p. 111.

[2] Ibid. lib. 5. cap. 27. p. 209. &c. Add lib. 8. cap. 7. sect. 2. p. 329. On the matter itself and the miracles of Vespasian, I shall speak by and by.

Saviour Christ, and to weaken men's faith in the Messiah, and baffle the notion of it; that whereas a fame of prophecies had gone abroad every where, that a king was to come out of Judea, and rule over the whole world, (by which was understood no other than the Messiah) by reason of these miracles done by Vespasian, this oracle or prediction might the rather seem to have its accomplishment in him, who was first proclaimed emperor in Judea, and to whom Josephus[3] himself basely and flatteringly had applied it. And since this business was started and suggested by the god Serapis, that is, by the devil (of whose counsel probably Apollonius also was;) this makes it still more strongly suspicable, that it was really a design or policy of the devil, by imitating the miracles of our Saviour Christ, both in Apollonius and Vespasian, to counter-work God Almighty in the plot of Christianity, and to keep up and conserve his own usurped tyranny in the pagan world still.[4] Nevertheless, we shall here show

[3] De Bello Judaico, lib. 5. cap. 5. sect. 4. p. 390. tom. 2. opp.

[4] I have no doubt, however, that these miracles, said to have been performed by Vespasian at Alexandria, are to be classed among the stratagems resorted to by that general for the purpose of misleading the people, and of rendering them favourable to his designs upon the sovereignty; nay, I consider this to be evident from the very accounts given of these miracles by Tacitus and Suetonius. The former tells us that these miracles testified the favour and goodwill of the gods towards the new emperor; the latter, that they invested him with an authority and majesty which before had been wanting to him, see Taciti Histor. lib. 2. cap. 82. sect. 5. Which sufficiently explains his motives. For it was of the highest importance to Vespasian, that Egypt, the richest and most powerful of the provinces, should acknowledge his supremacy, and therefore, something was to be done in order to conciliate the good wishes of the people. Now, as Tacitus openly confesses, there was no nation more devoted to superstition than the Egyptians; who believed not only that the gods very often intermeddled in human affairs, but also, that they imparted a portion of their own virtue to such persons as they honoured with their especial esteem and friendship. Hence, those who were anxious to acquire authority among the Egyptians made it their primary object to appear to hold familiar intercourse with the gods, and to have received from them a superhuman power. And as Vespasian was well aware of this, he judged that nothing would more effectually attach the Alexandrians to his cause than his proving himself by certain facts to be regarded with especial favour by the gods, and in particular, those of Egypt, the principal of whom was Serapis. Hence, certain poor wretches were bribed to counterfeit blindness and lameness, and to pretend that the god Serapis had commanded them during sleep to apply to the new emperor for assistance, and on their having been apparently cured by Vespasian, the Egyptians doubted not but that he was the man whom their gods and Serapis himself accounted worthy of the throne, and they determined to lose property and life rather than resist the favourite and friend of Serapis. For a lengthened investigation of this subject, consult J. Le Clerc, Histor. Eccles. sec. 2. ad A. 138. Christ. Aug. Heumann, Diss. de Miraculis Vespasiani Pœciles, tom. 2. lib. 3. p. 427. &c. and Jo. Serces, Traité des Miracles, p. 276—298. Even the miracles themselves, said to have been performed by Vespasian, are of such a character as to admit on all hands of fraud and deception. And although probably there were some Egyptians who saw through their fallacy, yet no one was so devoted to truth as to consider himself called upon to reveal it at the risk of his life. For most assuredly, had he dared to cast a doubt upon these miracles, he would have been torn to pieces by the priests and the mob. In my opinion, therefore, there is no necessity for bringing in the prince of darkness to account for these prodigies, nor do I think that the emperor required the aid of Apollonius for their performance. For the Egyptian priesthood abounded in cunning and designing men, to whom it was as easy to delude the people by pretended miracles, as it is at this day to many followers of the

Apollonius all the favour we can; and therefore suppose him not to have been one of those more foul and black magicians of the common sort, such as are not only grossly sunk and debauched in their lives, but also knowingly do homage to evil spirits as such, for the gratification of their lusts; but rather, one of those more refined ones, who have been called by themselves Theurgists, such as being in some measure freed from the grosser vices, and thinking to have to do only with good spirits; nevertheless, being proud and vain-glorious, and affecting wonders, and to transcend the generality of mankind, are, by a divine nemesis, justly exposed to the illusions of the devil or evil spirits, cunningly insinuating here, and aptly accommodating themselves to them.[5] However, concerning this Apollonius, it is undeniable that he was a zealous upholder of the pagan polytheism, and a stout champion for the gods, he professing to have been taught by the Samian Pythagoras' ghost how to worship these gods, invisible as well as visible,[6] and to have converse with them.

Romish religion in Italy and Spain. Consult the narrative of Rufinus, Histor. Eccles. lib. 2. cap. 23. respecting the oracle and temple of Serapis, which will convince you that the priests of this Egyptian deity were a race of wicked impostors. Should any one, however, maintain that the devil had some share in this business, and suppose that he instigated his own instruments and slaves to this counterplot, for the purpose of obscuring the miracles of our blessed Saviour and his apostles, I am not disposed altogether to gainsay it. Indeed, when Vespasian is said to have healed the blind by spittle, this does appear to me to be an imitation of our Lord's miracle recorded in John ix. 6. &c As to the other conjecture of our learned author regarding that well-known prediction of a king to come out of Judea, my opinion on the whole is already apparent. To this prediction, made mention of by Tacitus, Suetonius, and Josephus, I should attach no very great importance, nor do I consider that it conduces much, as many eminent men will have it, towards confirming the truth of the Christian religion. But of this probably elsewhere.

[5] The later Platonists divided magic into sorcery and theurgy; the former of which they commended, but held the latter in detestation. Augustinus De Civit. Dei, lib. 10. cap. 9. p. 187. tom. 7. opp. Conantur ista decernere, et illicitis artibus deditos alios damnabiles, quos et maleficos vulgus appellat, hos enim ad *goëtiam* pertinere, dicunt; alios autem laudabiles videri volunt, quibus theurgiam deputant, "They endeavour to distinguish these things, and call those addicted to unlawful arts, damnable, termed also maleficent by the vulgar, as dealing in *sorcery;* but others, to whom they assign *theurgy*, they consider deserving of praise." From this it is easy to understand the meaning of the learned Doctor respecting the magic of Apollonius. The precepts, rules, and rites of theurgy, as it is called, have been treated of by no one more copiously than by Jamblichus, in his celebrated work, De Mysteriis Ægyptiorum. But in numbering Apollonius among Theurgists, Dr. Cudworth seems to acknowledge that there is, and was formerly, an art of conciliating good spirits by certain ceremonies; that some of the later Platonists were skilled in this art; that it is not to be considered vile and detestable; but, because it had been abused to wicked purposes by vain-glorious men, that the Supreme Being suffered evil spirits to impose upon them by counterfeiting the good. I know that there have been many even of the Christian fathers, both ancient and modern, who with Dr. Cudworth have believed in all this; but I know also that other illustrious men have the most weighty arguments on their side for classing all theurgy among the frauds, follies, and absurdities of mankind. Augustine, as above quoted, condemns both these sorts of magic, and considers "that Theurgists as well as sorcerers are deluded by the fallacious rites of demons under the name of angels."

[6] According to Philostratus, Vit. Apollonii, lib. 1. cap. 32. p. 40. Apollonius says he learnt this from Pythagoras, that is, as the phrase ought to be explained, borrowed it from the Pythagorean doctrine. For he nowhere, that I remember, professes to have

For which cause he is styled by Vopiscus,[7] amicus verus deorum, "a true friend of the gods;" that is, a hearty and sincere friend to that old pagan religion, now assaulted by Christianity, in which not one only true God, but a multiplicity of gods were worshipped. But notwithstanding all this, Apollonius himself was a clear and undoubted assertor of one supreme Deity; as is evident from his apologetic oration in Philostratus,[8] prepared for Domitian: in which he calls him, τὸν τῶν ὅλων, and τὸν πάντων δημιουργὸν θεὸν, "that God who is the maker of the whole universe, and of all things." And, as he elsewhere in Philostratus declares both the Indians and Egyptians to have agreed in this theology, insomuch that though the Egyptians condemned the Indians for many other of their opinions, yet did they highly applaud this doctrine of theirs: Τῆς μὲν ὅλων γενέσεώς τε καὶ οὐσίας θεὸν δημιουργὸν εἶναι, τοῦδε ἐνθυμηθῆναι ταῦτα, αἴτιον τὸ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι αὐτὸν, "That God was the maker both of the generation and essence of all things, and that the cause of his making them was his essential goodness:"* so doth he himself very much commend this philosophy of Jarchas, the Indian Brachman,[9] viz., that the whole world was but one great animal, and might be resembled to a vast ship, wherein there are many inferior subordinate governors, under one supreme, the oldest and wisest; as also, expert mariners of several sorts, some to attend upon the deck, and others to climb the masts and order the sails: Ἐν ᾗ τὴν μὲν πρώτην καὶ τελειοτάτην ἕδραν ἀποδοτέον θεῷ γενέτορι τοῦδε τοῦ ζώου, τὴν δὲ ὑπ' ἐκείνῃ θεοῖς, οἱ τὰ μέρη αὐτοῦ κυβερνῶσι· καὶ τῶν ποιητῶν ἀποδεχόμεθα, ἐπειδὴ πολλοὺς μὲν φάσκωσιν ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ θεοὺς εἶναι, πολλοὺς δὲ ἐν θαλάττῃ, πολλοὺς δὲ ἐν πήγαις τε καὶ νάμασι, πολλοὺς δὲ καὶ περὶ γῆν, εἶναι δὲ καὶ ὑπὸ γῆν τινας, "In which the first and highest seat is to be given to that God who is the generator and creator of this great animal; and the next under it to those gods that govern the several parts of it respectively: so that the poets were to be approved of here, when they affirm that there are many gods in the heavens, many in the seas, many in the rivers and fountains, many also upon the earth, and some under the earth." Wherein we have a true representation of the old paganic theology, which both Indians, and Egyptians, and European poets, (Greek and Latin) all agree in; that there is one Supreme God, the maker of the universe, and under

been taught by the ghost of Pythagoras himself, as the learned Doctor here intimates; on the contrary, Philostratus, lib. 1. cap. 7. p. 9. informs us that a certain Euxenus instructed Apollonius in the Pythagorean precepts.

[7] In Vita Aureliani, cap. 14. p. 578. ed. Obrechti.

[8] Lib. 8. The two passages here cited occur together, cap. 7. sect. 7. p. 337.

* Philos. lib. 3. cap. 35. p. 142.

[9] The learned Doctor is mistaken in attributing these words, which occur in Philostratus, Hist. Apollonii, lib. 3. cap. 35. p. 126. to Apollonius himself. They are those of the Brachman Jarchas.

him many inferior generated gods, or understanding beings (superior to men), appointed to govern and preside over the several parts thereof, who were also to be religiously honoured and worshipped by men. And thus much for Apollonius Tyanæus.[10]

[10] Since the period in which this was written by Dr. Cudworth, the history of Apollonius Tyanæus has been much more carefully investigated by learned men in England, France, and Germany, inasmuch as those who wish to overthrow our most holy religion rely upon this man as their chief tower of strength, in their efforts to weaken the force of Christ's miracles, and cease not to nauseate us with citing that obsolete poem of Hierocles and the Platonists, on the resemblance between Christ and Apollonius. Nevertheless, these learned men are not all of one opinion respecting the miracles of this Apollonius; some of them, like Dr. Cudworth and a great many more, ascribing the whole affair to the power and influence of demons, some to fraud and imposture, some to fable, some to a sort of natural magic, and others again remaining undecided. Consult on this variety of opinions, the learned preface of Godofr. Olearius to Philostratus' Life of Apollonius, and my own Dissertation, De Existimatione Apollonii. It is my intention here to touch merely upon those matters which bear more closely upon our author's opinion, and to state my own sentiments regarding this man, so incessantly collauded by the enemies of religion. I. In the first place, then, I candidly confess I am not well pleased with the learned Doctor, when he supposes that Apollonius performed many miracles by the aid of evil spirits: and what is more, that he was instigated by the prince of darkness to obscure and invalidate the miracles of our blessed Saviour. Not to dissemble the truth, I should be tardy in assenting to those who consider an evil spirit to possess the power of deluding men at will, either by sorceries or real miracles, and who, consequently, on hearing of any new and unusual event, immediately ascribe its cause and origin to the powers of hell. Those who entertain such an opinion should take care lest they weaken and impair, if not utterly overthrow, that grand argument for confirming the truth of our religion, which is deduced from the miracles of our Saviour. But I am still more loth to believe that the most Holy God, whose divine purpose was to save mankind through Christ and his doctrine, at the time in which the apostles and disciples of the blessed Lord went abroad through the world, and turned the hearts of nations to obedience by their own and our Saviour's miracles, suffered his adversary likewise to send emissaries of his own, and to endow them with the power of working miracles, so as to thwart the divine counsels, and cause those to perish whom God willed to be saved. Grotius indeed and many others, I am aware, find nothing to be offended with in all this. But for myself, the longer I think upon this opinion, the more assured I feel that it is most injurious to the divine benignity, providence, and wisdom. Among mankind, those are considered to possess very little prudence or wisdom, who, either by silence or inaction, favour the machinations of their enemies, which they are able to resist, although they may not always be aware of their ultimate consequences. Who, I ask, but a madman, would praise a king, who at the very time that he is making the most wholesome laws for his subjects, suffers the minion of a neighbouring enemy to travel unmolested through all his provinces, and corrupt his citizens by contradictory edicts? And shall I suppose, that the Deity who is all-surpassing in wisdom, in love for mankind, in power and in providence, would, at the time when he was seeking to draw all men to himself, permit the sending forth of an infernal agent, armed with the power of working miracles, in order to contravene his own will, by giving stability to insane superstitions, and by strengthening and supporting the Pagan worship? Nay, I would rather believe any thing than this. II. Apollonius, I have no doubt, was a man by nature a fanatic, but at the same time, proud and vainglorious, and thirsting for the distinction of a Pythagoras, or at least of a great philosopher. As he was not gifted with much strength of intellect or sobriety of judgment, and had become acquainted with the Pythagorean doctrine when young, *he was* easily led to the approval and adoption of those principles, which seem especially calculated to foster the visionary fancies of enthusiasts. At the same time, being inordinately ambitious of glory, and perceiving that Pythagoras by means of his own actions and manners, had acquired a reputation far surpassing that of all others, he considered it to be the safest road to dignity and fame to fashion his whole course of life according to this philosopher's example. Hence those journeys to distant nations, the Indians,

The first pagan writer against Christianity was Celsus, who lived in the times of Adrian, and was so profest a polytheist, that he taxes the Jews for having been seduced by the frauds of Moses into this opinion of one God: Ὅτι τῷ ἡγησαμένῳ σφῶν

Babylonians, Egyptians; hence, those miracles and prodigies; hence, the healing of the sick; hence, the singularity affected in his hair, costume, &c. For in all these Pythagoras had become famous. The whole of Philostratus' history, and all that is elsewhere recorded of him, prove this to be a faithful portrait of the man. III. As to his miracles in particular, I would not venture to deny that he performed many things in various places which excited the highest admiration in the multitude. For long before the time of Philostratus, as I have elsewhere shown, not only the friends, but even the enemies of Apollonius, although entertaining different opinions as to the cause of his prodigies, nevertheless confessed that he publicly performed not a few things which were regarded with wonder even by thinking and sensible men. In particular, that which Origen gives us from Mœragenes, a writer by no means friendly to Apollonius, is remarkable. The passage is already quoted by Dr. Cudworth. I cannot agree, therefore, with those learned men who consider the whole of this history to be a fable, and a fiction of Philostratus himself. For if this were to be assented to, there would scarcely remain any thing in the records of antiquity which some one might not be bold enough to question or deny. The character of levity, as becomes a prudent man, I studiously avoid, nor do I suffer myself to disregard that ancient saying of Epicharmus: "To believe nothing hastily is the essence of wisdom." Yet I do not approve of the course adopted by those who fancy they greatly benefit Christianity by rejecting every thing recorded in ancient writings respecting certain illustrious men, as false and fabulous; on the contrary, by shaking the credit of all ancient history, they, in my opinion, do harm to their own religion. For my own part, I ascribe the miracles stated to have been performed by Apollonius, partly to his great skill in the medical art, and partly to the jugglery and imposture with which the quacks and magicians of that period were accustomed to deceive the people. Apollonius belonged to the Pythagoreans, a sect which, according to the injunction of their master, was singularly industrious in the study of medicine, and skilled in eradicating the most obstinate diseases. See Jamblichus, De Vita Pythagoræ, cap. 29. p. 139. cap. 34. p. 194. cap. 35. p. 212. And Porphyry, Vita Pythagoræ, p. 37. 38. Moreover, he had spent a considerable portion of his youth in the celebrated temple of Esculapius at Ægæ, among the priests of this deity. See Philostratus, Hist. Apollonii, lib. 1. cap. 7. 8. 9. p. 8. &c. And who, possessing but a moderate acquaintance with ancient history, is not aware that in former times the priests of Esculapius stood unrivalled as physicians, inasmuch as the whole religion of this god depended solely upon the healing of diseases? See Arnobius, lib. 1. Contra Gentes, p. 35. 36. and Lucian, Philopseudes, p. 333. tom. 2. opp. Having thus acquired a consummate skill in medicine, and travelling from place to place in those eastern countries, in which formerly, as even at this day, from the great scarcity of physicians, those who healed bodily diseases were looked upon as next to gods; it was easy for him by performing a few cures, so to impose upon a rude and ignorant multitude as to be universally regarded as the worker of miracles and a second Esculapius or Chiron. That it was so is proved from the fact that his disciple, Alexander, whose frauds Lucian treats of in his Pseudomantis, obtained a reputation among the nations by the very self-same course, namely, the practice of medicine and a lying pretension to the friendship of Esculapius. See the Pseudoman. tom. 1. opp. p. 750. The other miracles of Apollonius I hold to have been performed by means of those arts by which at that time many impostors, calling themselves Magians, deluded the unwary mob. There are innumerable testimonies extant in ancient authors to show, that the counterfeiting of miracles, for the purpose of acquiring wealth and fame, had in those days become a sort of science. According to Lucian, p. 761. the Celsus to whom he addresses his Pseudomantis had written a specific work upon these arts of the Magians, the loss of which is much to be regretted. That Apollonius was eminently skilled in this science of deception is shown by his disciple Alexander, who is distinctly stated by Lucian to have renewed πᾶσαν τραγῳδίαν, "the whole tragedy" of Apollonius Tyanæus. Of this Alexander, then, Apollonius was the prototype, and as we are made acquainted

* Orig. p. 17, 18.

ἑπόμενοι Μωϋσῇ αἰπόλοι καὶ ποίμενες, ἀγροίκοις ἀπάταις ψυχαγωγηθέντες, ἕνα ἐνόμισαν εἶναι Θεὸν, "Those silly shepherds and herdsmen, following Moses their leader, and being seduced

by Lucian with the arts and impostures of the latter, we may consequently learn from the same author the means by which Apollonius attained such celebrity. Indeed when we compare Philostratus and Lucian, one crow does not bear a greater resemblance to another than Alexander does to Apollonius, who, if he had met with a shrewd and clever writer like Lucian for his biographer, would no doubt have at the present day borne the same infamous character. It will be needless to inquire from what source Apollonius obtained this art, if it be only recollected that he was associated from his childhood with the pagan priests, a race unsurpassed in the dexterity with which they counterfeited prodigies and miracles. IV. If any one be disposed to canvass this subject fairly, and in particular to adapt what is recorded by Lucian of Alexander's tricks and jugglery to the narratives of Philostratus, he may conveniently refer most of Apollonius' miracles to one or other of these two heads. Such, indeed, as do not admit of this mode of explication are so puerile and ridiculous as to bear upon them the evident impress of falsehood. For a proof of this consult the recent investigations into these miracles, professedly entered into by the eminent scholars, the Abbe Hauteville, La Religion Chrêtienne prouvée par les Faits, p. 441. ed Paris, 1722. 4. and J. Serces, Traité des Miracles, p. 290. whose remarks neither space nor the scope of this note will warrant my enlarging upon or transcribing. I shall say a few words respecting Philostratus, simply to show how little dependence is to be placed upon this man, whom some in their incredible folly have dared almost to prefer to the sacred writers. In the first place, the whole of his work was manifestly written with the intention that the Pythagorean and Platonic philosophers, who in the third century opposed the progress of Christianity, might have some one to hold forth as a parallel to our blessed Saviour, illustrious for the number of his miracles. In the next place, being a rhetorician and sophist, and possessing little knowledge of the other sciences, he is utterly regardless of just arrangement and order, commits the most glaring errors in chronology and geography, advances very often what is in direct contradiction with the certain records of Roman history, and, in short, borrows many things from Pliny, Ctesias, and other writers, which at this day are laughed at by all sensible men. Of all this I should have brought forward the most incontestable evidences, had it been in my power to complete my Excercitationes in Philostratum, a work begun by me when a young man. Lastly, the stupidity of Philostratus is such, that he himself sometimes unintentionally contradicts and overthrows what he had before recommended us to believe respecting his Apollonius. At the very commencement of his work he states Apollonius to have been most wise, nay, almost a god, and yet afterwards he makes this same man travel to India in order to learn something from the philosophers of that country. How beautifully consistent all this! A divine man, who is acquainted even with the language of beasts, who penetrates into the inmost recesses of men's minds, and rivals the Deity in miracles, betakes himself to the Brachmans for the purpose of gaining wisdom, who converse with him so learnedly, that "the mad Orestes swears that all men have been mad." But out of the numerous instances that might easily be adduced I shall mention merely one by way of a specimen, which I lately lighted upon in turning over the pages of Philostratus. According to his account, Apollonius understood the language of brute animals, an art which he learnt from the Arabians, lib. 1. cap. 20. p. 25. and we have a tolerably striking example given us to show, that the speech of sparrows was as familiar to him as that of men, lib. 4. cap. 3. p. 141. The matter itself I do not wonder at, as I readily believe that Apollonius, who was imbued with Pythagorean principles, pretended to this as well as other things. For since the Pythagoreans maintained that beasts possess the same souls as men, and that a soul now inhabiting a human body will pass after death into a lion perhaps or a sparrow, it was only consistent in them to allow to beasts and birds a certain use of reason and some sort of language; and lest the thing might seem too hard for belief, to boast that Pythagoras himself, and other illustrious men of his sect, were acquainted with this language. But I do wonder that Philostratus, who tells us this in praise of Apollonius, should nevertheless so far have forgotten himself as to confess openly, in another place, that birds, although able to imitate the sound of the human voice, understand nothing that they say, and do not express their thoughts in any certain

by his rustic frauds, came to entertain this belief, that there was but one only God." Nevertheless, this Celsus himself plainly acknowledged, amongst his many gods, one supreme, whom he sometimes calls τὸν πρῶτον θεὸν, "the first God;" sometimes τὸν μέγιστον θεὸν, "the greatest God;" and sometimes τὸν ὑπερουράνιον θεὸν, "the supercelestial God," and the like. And he doth so zealously assert the divine omnipotence, that he casts an imputation upon the Christians of derogating from the same, in that their hypothesis of an adversary power:* Σφάλλονται δὲ ἀσεβέστατα ἅττα, καὶ περὶ τήνδε τὴν μεγίστην ἄγνοιαν ὁμοίως ἀπὸ θείων αἰνιγμάτων πεπλανημένην, ποιοῦντες τῷ θεῷ ἐναντίον τινὰ, διάβολόν τε καὶ γλώττῃ Ἑβραίᾳ Σατανᾶν ὀνομάζοντες τὸν αὐτόν· ἄλλως μὲν οὖν παντελῶς θνητὰ ταῦτα, καὶ οὐδ' ὅσια λέγειν, ὅτι δὲ ὁ μέγιστος Θεὸς, βουλόμενός τι ἀνθρώποις ὠφελῆσαι, τὸν ἀντιπράσσοντα ἔχει, καὶ ἀδυνατεῖ, "The Christians are erroneously led into most wicked opinions concerning God, by reason of their great ignorance of the divine enigms; whilst they make a certain adversary to God, whom they call the devil, and in the Hebrew language Satan: and affirm, contrary to all piety, that the greatest God, having a mind to do good to men, is disabled or withstood by an adversary resisting him."† Lastly, where he pleads most for the worship of demons, he concludes thus concerning the supreme God: Θεοῦ δὲ οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς ἀπολειπτέον, οὔτε μεθ' ἡμέραν, οὔτε νύκτωρ, οὔτ' ἐς κοινὸν, οὔτ' ἰδίᾳ, λόγῳ τε ἐν παντὶ καὶ ἔργῳ διηνεκῶς, ἀλλά γε καὶ μετὰ τῶνδε, καὶ χωρὶς ἡ ψυχὴ ἀεὶ τετάσθω πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν, "But God is by no means any where to be laid aside, or left out; neither by day nor by night, neither in public nor in private, either in our words or actions; but in everything our mind ought constantly to be directed towards God." A saying that might very well become a Christian.

The next and greatest champion for the pagan cause, in books and writings, was that famous Tyrian philosopher Malchus, called by the Greeks Porphyrius; who published a voluminous and elaborate treatise (containing fifteen books) against the

language. For of Euxenus, the preceptor of Apollonius, he thus speaks: Τὰς δὲ Πυθαγόρου δόξας ἐγίνωσκεν, ὥσπερ οἱ ὄρνιθες, ἃ μανθάνουσι παρὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων· τὸ γὰρ χαῖρε, καὶ τὸ εὖ πρᾶττε, καὶ τὸ Ζεὺς ἵλεως, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα οἱ ὄρνιθες εὔχονται, οὔτε εἰδότες ὅ, τι λέγουσιν, οὔτε διακείμενοι πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ἀλλὰ ἐρρυθμισμένοι τὴν γλῶτταν, "He knew the doctrines of Pythagoras in the same way as birds do those things which they learn from men. For *hail*, and *farewell*, and *may Jupiter be propitious*, and the like wishes, birds utter, without either knowing what they say, or being so and so disposed towards men, but merely possessing a tongue adapted for articulation." Beautiful, truly! Is not this a sort of communing with himself, and, as it were, a silent confession of the falsehood of all that he has written in his work respecting Apollonius' acquaintance with the language of birds? So it comes to pass, that liars, who above all men ought to have good memories, are themselves very often the publishers of their own infamy.

* Orig. lib. 6. p. 303. † Orig. con. Cels. lib. 8. p. 419.

Christians; and yet he, notwithstanding, was plainly as zealous an assertor of one supreme Deity, and one only ἀγέννητον, unmade or self-existent principle of all things, as any of the Christians themselves could be; he strenuously opposing that forementioned doctrine of Plutarch and Atticus concerning three unmade principles, a good God, an evil soul or demon, and the matter; and endeavouring to demonstrate, that all things whatsoever, even matter itself, was derived from one perfect understanding being, or self-originated Deity. The sum of whose argumentation to which purpose we have represented by Proclus upon the Timæus, page 119.

After Porphyrius, the next eminent antagonist of Christianity, and champion for paganism, was Hierocles, the writer of that book entitled (in Eusebius) Φιλαλήθης, or "a lover of the truth;" which is noted to have been a modester inscription than that of Celsus' Ἀληθὴς λόγος, or "true oration." For if Eusebius Pamphili were the writer of that answer to this Philalethes, now extant, as we both read in our copies, and as Photius also read;[1] then must it needs be granted, that Hierocles, the author of it, was either contemporary with Porphyrius, or else but little his junior. Moreover, this Hierocles seems plainly to be the person intended by Lactantius, in these following words:* Alius eandem materiam mordaciùs scripsit; qui erat tum è numero judicum, et qui auctor in primis faciendæ persecutionis fuit: quo scelere non contentus, etiam scriptis eos quos afflixerat, insecutus est. Composuit enim libellos duos, non contrà Christianos, nè inimicè insectari videretur, sed ad Christianos, ut humanè ac benignè consulere videretur. In quibus ita falsitatem scripturæ sacræ arguere conatus est, tanquam sibi esset tota contraria.——Præcipuè tamen Paulum Petrúmque laceravit, cæterósque discipulos, tanquam fallaciæ seminatores; quos eosdem tamen rudes et indoctos fuisse testatus est, "Another hath handled the same matter more smartly, who was first himself one of the judges, and a chief author of the persecution; but being not contented with that wickedness, he added this afterwards, to persecute the Christians also with his pen; he composing two books, not inscribed against the Christians, (lest he should seem plainly to act the part of an enemy) but to the Christians, (that he might be thought to counsel them humanely and benignly:) in which he so charges the holy scripture with falsehood, as if it were all nothing else but contradictions: but

[1] This remark is made in opposition to Jo. Jonsius, who, De Script. Hist. Phil. lib. 3. cap. 18. p. 108. without any authority, states those to be in error who attribute this book against Hierocles to Eusebius Pamphili. See what is said a little below, and add the learned remarks of Godofr. Olearius on this subject, in his Prolegomena to this book, p. 416. The passage of Photius occurs Biblioth. cod. 39. p. 24.

* De Just. lib. 3. c. 2. p. 358.

he chiefly lashes Paul and Peter, as divulgers of lies and deceits, whom notwithstanding he declares to have been rude and illiterate persons." I say, though Hierocles, for some cause or other, be not named here by Lactantius in these cited words, or that which follows, yet it cannot be doubted, but that he was the person intended by him, for these two reasons: first, because he tells us afterward, that the main business of that Christiano-mastix was to compare Apollonius with our Saviour Christ: Cùm facta Christi mirabilia destrueret, nec tamen negaret, voluit ostendere, Apollonium vel paria, vel etiam majora fecisse. Mirum quòd Apuleium prætermiserit, cujus solent et multa et mira memorari. Et ex hoc insolentiam Christi voluit arguere, quòd deum se constituerit: ut ille verecundior fuisse videretur, qui cùm majora faceret (ut hic putat) tamen id sibi non arrogaverit, "That he might obscure the miracles of our Saviour Christ, which he could not deny, he would undertake to show that equal or greater miracles were done by Apollonius. And it was a wonder he did not mention Apuleius too; of whose many and wonderful things the Pagans use to brag likewise. Moreover, he condemns our Saviour Christ of insolency, for making himself a god, affirming Apollonius to have been the modester person, who, though he did (as he supposes) greater miracles, yet arrogated no such thing to himself." The second reason is, because Lactantius also expressly mentions the very title of Hierocles' book, viz. Philalethes. Cùm talia ignorantiæ suæ deliramenta fudisset, cúmque veritatem penitùs excidere connixus est, ausus est libros suos nefarios, ac dei hostes, φιλαλήθεις annotare: "Though pouring out so much folly and madness, professedly fighting against the truth, yet he presumed to call these his wicked books and enemies of God, philaletheis, or friends to truth." From which words of Lactantius, and those foregoing, where he affirms this Christiano-mastix to have written two books, the learned prefacer[2] to the late edition of Hierocles probably concludes, that the whole title of Hierocles' book was this, Λόγοι Φιλαλήθεις πρὸς Χριστιανούς. And I conceive, that the first of those two books of Hierocles insisted upon such things as Porphyrius had before urged against the Christians; but then in the second he added this de novo of his

[2] Dr. Pearson, bishop of Chester, who had then published in London an edition of Hierocles' Comm. in Aurea Carmina Pythagoræ, with a very learned preface, which is also given in the last Cambridge edition of Pet. Needham. See the preface, p. 15. and compare Olearius' Philostratus, p. 420. Since the time of Drs. Cudworth and Pearson, the age of Hierocles, and other matters pertaining thereto, have been ably canvassed by Jo. Albert Fabricius, Biblioth. Græc. lib. 2. cap. 12. p. 429. &c. Godofr. Olearius, Prolegom. ad Librum Eusebii contra Hieroclem, p. 413. Pet. Needham, Præf. ad Novam Hieroclis Editionem, Andr. Dacier, Proleg. ad Gallic. Hieroclis Version. p. 424. and Pet. Bayle, Diction. Histor. art. Hierocles, t. 2. p. 1462. to whom I refer those who take an interest in such learned inquiries.

own, to compare Apollonius with our Saviour Christ:[3] which Eusebius only takes notice of. Wherefore Epiphanius telling us, that there was one Hierocles a prefect or governor of Alexandria, in those persecuting times of Diocletian, we may probably conclude, that this was the very person described in Lactantius, who is said to have been first of the number of the judges, and a principal actor in the persecution; and then afterwards to have written this Philalethes against the Christians, wherein, besides other things, he ventured to compare Apollonius Tyanæus with our Saviour Christ.[4] Now, if this Hierocles who wrote the Philalethes in defence of the pagan gods against the Christians, were the author of those two other philosophic books, the Commentary upon the golden verses, and that De Fato et Providentia, it might be easily evinced from both of them, that he was notwithstanding an asserter of one supreme Deity. But Photius[5] tells us, that that Hierocles who wrote the book concerning fate and providence did therein make mention of Jamblichus, and his junior, Plutarchus Atheniensis: from whence Jonsius, taking it for granted that it was one and the same Hierocles who wrote against the Christians and De Fato, infers that it could not be Eusebius Pamphili, who answered the Philalethes, but that it must needs be some other Eusebius, much junior. But we, finding Hierocles' Philalethes in Lactantius, must needs conclude, on the contrary, that Hierocles, the famous Christiano-mastix, was not the same with that Hierocles who wrote De Fato. Which is further evident from Ænæas Gazeus, in his Theophrastus;* where first he mentions one Hierocles, an Alexandrian, that had been his master, whom he highly extols: Ἀλλ' εἰπέ μοι, ἔτι παρ' ὑμῖν εἰσὶν οἱ τῆς φιλοσοφίας δεικνύντες τὰς τελετὰς, οἷος ἦν Ἱεροκλῆς ὁ διδάσκαλος; "But tell me, I pray you, are there yet left amongst you in Egypt any such expounders of the arcane mysteries of philosophy as Hierocles our master was?" And this we suppose to be that Hierocles, who wrote concerning fate and providence, if not also upon the golden verses. But afterward, upon occasion of Apollonius the Cappadocian, or Tyanæan, he mentions another Hierocles, distinct from the former, namely, him who had so boasted of Apollonius' miracles, in these words:† Ὁ Ἀπολλώνιος

[3] Hæres. 68. Meletian. sect. 2. p. 717. t. 1. opp.

[4] These two arguments, borrowed from Lactantius, do not prove the Hierocles who wrote against the Christians to be the same with the Hierocles who was governor of Alexandria. For Lactantius states, that the one he is speaking of committed all this against the Christians at Nicomedia, not at Alexandria. I consider it probable, however, that this Hierocles who had harassed the Christians at Nicomedia, was afterwards rewarded by the emperor with the government of Alexandria; which city abounded with Christians, and consequently required a most vigilant magistrate.

[5] Biblioth. cod. 214. p. 554. Compare Jonsius, De Scriptor. Histor. Philos. lib. 3. cap. 18. p. 101. and Needham, Præf. ad Hieroclem. p. 18.

* P. 7. edit. Barth. † P. 24.

τὰ ψευδῆ λέγων ἐλέγχεται. Ἱεροκλῆς δὲ οὐκ ὁ διδάσκαλος, ἀλλ' ὁ προβαλλόμενος τὰ θαυμάσια, ἄπιστον καὶ τοῦτο προσέθηκεν, "Thus Apollonius is convinced of falsehood; but Hierocles (not our master) but he that boasts of the miracles (of Apollonius) adds another incredible thing." And though it be probable, that one of these was the author of that commentary upon the golden verses, (for that it should be written by a Christian is but a dream) yet we cannot certainly determine which of them it was. However, that this Hierocles, who was the mastix of Christianity, and champion for the gods, was notwithstanding a professed assertor of one supreme Deity, is clearly manifest also from Lactantius, in these following words: Quam tandem nobis attulisti veritatem? nisi quod assertor deorum eos ipsos ad ultimum prodidisti: prosecutus enim summi dei laudes, quem regem, quem maximum, quem opificem rerum, quem fontem bonorum, quem parentem omnium, quem factorem altorémque viventium confessus es, ademisti Jovi tuo regnum; eúmque summa potestate depulsum in ministrorum numerum redegisti. Epilogus ergo te tuus arguit stultitiæ, vanitatis, erroris. Affirmas deos esse; et illos tamen subjicis et mancipas ei deo, cujus religionem conaris evertere, "Though you have entitled your book Philalethes, yet what truth have you brought us therein, unless only this, that being an assertor of the gods, (contradicting yourself) you have at last betrayed those very gods? For in the close of your book, prosecuting the praises of the supreme God, and confessing him to be the king, the greatest, the opifex of the world, the fountain of good, the parent of all things, the maker and conserver of all living beings, you have by this means dethroned your Jupiter, and, degrading him from his sovereign power, reduced him into the rank of inferior ministers. Wherefore your epilogue argues you guilty of folly, vanity and error, in that you both assert gods, and yet subject and mancipate them under that one God, whose religion you endeavour to overthrow." Where we must confess we understand not well Lactantius' logic; forasmuch as Hierocles' Zeus, or Jupiter, was one and the same with his supreme God, as is also here intimated; and though he acknowledged all the other gods to be but his inferior ministers, yet nevertheless did he contend, that these ought to be religiously worshipped, which was the thing that Lactantius should have confuted.[6] But that

[6] Whether there be any reason for this charge against Lactantius, is uncertain, as Hierocles' work against Christians is no longer extant. The learned Doctor assumes, that Hierocles supposed the Jupiter of the Greeks and Romans to be the supreme God who presides over all things. But he assumes only, not proves. Perhaps Hierocles distinguished Jupiter from the Almighty God, and ranked him among the lesser deities; if he did so, as certainly does appear to be the case, then Lactantius' argument holds good, and Hierocles, to all intents and purposes, has betrayed the cause of his Jupiter. Although, if necessary, Lactantius might be defended upon other grounds.

which we here take notice of is this, that Hierocles, a grand persecutor of the Christians, and the author of that bitter invective against them called Philalethes, though he were so strenuous an assertor of polytheism, and champion for the gods, yet did he nevertheless at the same time clearly acknowledge one supreme Deity, calling him the king (that is, the monarch of the universe), the greatest, the opifex of the world, the fountain of good, the parent of all things, and the maker and conserver of all life.

But the greatest opposer of Christianity every way was Julian the emperor, who cannot reasonably be suspected to have disguised or blanched paganism, because he was an emperor, and had so great an animosity against Christianity, and was so superstitiously or bigotically zealous for the worship of the gods; and yet this very Julian,* notwithstanding, was an unquestionable assertor of one supreme Deity.[7] In his book written against the Christians, he declares the general sense of the Pagans, after this manner: Οἱ γὰρ ἡμέτεροί φασιν, τὸν δημιουργὸν ἁπάντων μὲν εἶναι κοινὸν πατέρα καὶ βασιλέα, νενεμῆσθαι δὲ τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν ἐθνῶν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ἐθνάρχαις καὶ πολιούχοις θεοῖς, ὧν ἕκαστος ἐπιτροπεύει τὴν ἑαυτοῦ λῆξιν οἰκείως αὐτῷ· ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἐν μὲν τῷ πατρὶ πάντα τέλεια, καὶ ἓν πάντα, ἐν δὲ τοῖς μεριστοῖς, ἄλλη παρ' ἄλλῳ κρατεῖ δύναμις, &c. "Our theologers affirm the maker of all to be a common father and king; but that the nations, as to particular things, are distributed by him to other inferior gods, that are appointed to be governors over countries and cities, every one of which administers in his own province agreeably to himself. For whereas in the common Father all things are perfect, and one is all, in the particular or partial deities one excels in one power, and another in another." Afterwards, in the same book he contends, that the Pagans did entertain righter opinions concerning the supreme God, than the Jews themselves:† Ὡς εἰ μὲν ὁ προσεχὴς εἴη τοῦ κόσμου δημιουργὸς ὁ κηρυττόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ Μωσέως, ἡμεῖς ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ βελτίους ἔχομεν δόξας, οἱ κοινὸν μὲν ἐκεῖνον ὑπολαμβάνοντες ἁπάντων δεσπότην, ἐθνάρχας δὲ ἄλλους, οἳ τυγχάνουσι μὲν ὑπ' ἐκεῖνον, εἰσὶ δὲ ὥσπερ ὕπαρχοι βασιλέως, ἕκαστος τὴν ἑαυτοῦ διαφερόντως ἐπανορθούμενος φροντίδα, καὶ οὐ καθίσταμεν αὐτὸν, οὐδὲ ἀντιμερίτην τῶν ὑπ' αὐτὸν θεῶν καθιστα-

* Cyril. cont. Jul. 4. p. 115. edit. Spanhem.

[7] Nor is this at all surprising. For Julian was wholly devoted to the doctrine of the later Platonists, who, as I have already noticed, remodelled and changed the popular religion according to their own fancy, in such a manner as to make it appear neither too absurd nor too unlike the Christian religion. Hence all those who formerly belonged to this sect held the existence of a supreme and eternal God. That Julian was such a Platonist I have shown at length in my Diss. De Turbata per Recentior. Platon. Ecclesia, sect. 14. p. 25. and has been observed also by Ezek. Spanheim, Præf. ad Opera Juliani, p. 12. and Præf. ad Gallic. Version. Cæsar. Juliani, p. 3.

† Page 146. p. 148. edit. Spanhem.

μένων, "If that God, who is so much spoken of by Moses, be the immediate opificer of the whole world, we Pagans entertain better opinions of him, who suppose him to be the common Lord of all; but that there are other governors of nations and countries under him, as prefects or presidents appointed by a king; we not ranking him amongst those partial governors of particular countries and cities, as the Jews do." From both which places it is evident, that, according to Julian's theology, all those other gods, whose worship he contended so much for, were but the subordinate ministers of that one supreme God, the maker of all.

The same thing might be further manifested from Julian's oration made in praise of the sun, as a great god in this visible world; he therein plainly acknowledging another far more glorious Deity, which was the cause of all things:* Εἷς μὲν ὁ τῶν ὅλων δημιουργὸς, πολλοὶ δὲ οἱ κατ' οὐρανὸν περιπολοῦντες δημιουργικοὶ θεοί, "There is one God the maker of all things; but besides him there are many other demiurgical gods moving round the heavens," in the midst of which is the sun. Where we have a clear acknowledgment of one supreme God, and of many inferior deities, both together. Moreover, in the same oration† he declareth, that the ancient poets, making the sun to have been the offspring of Hyperion, did by this Hyperion understand nothing else but the supreme Deity: Τὸν πάντων ὑπερέχοντα, πάντων ἐπέκεινα, περὶ ὃν πάντα, καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα πάντα ἐστίν, "Him who is above all things, and about whom, and for whose sake, are all things." Which supreme Deity is thus more largely described by him in the same oration (where he calls him the king of all things):‡ Οὗτος τοίνυν, εἴτε τὸ ἐπέκεινα τοῦ νοῦ καλεῖν αὐτὸν θέμις εἴτε ἰδέαν τῶν ὄντων, ὃ δή φημι τὸ νοητὸν σύμπαν· εἴτε ἕν, ἐπειδὴ πάντων τὸ ἓν δοκεῖ ὡς πρεσβύτατον· εἴτε ὃ Πλάτων εἴωθεν ὀνομάζειν τὸ ἀγαθὸν· αὕτη δὲ οὖν ἡ μονοειδὴς τῶν ὅλων αἰτία, πᾶσι τοῖς οὖσιν ἐξηγουμένη κάλλους τε καὶ τελειότητος, ἑνώσεως τε καὶ δυνάμεως ἀμηχάνου· κατὰ τὴν ἐν αὐτῇ μένουσαν προτουργὸν οὐσίαν, ἥλιον θεὸν μέγιστον ἀνέφηνεν, &c. "This God, whether he ought to be called that which is above mind and understanding, or the idea of all things, or the one (since unity seems to be the oldest of all things), or else, as Plato was wont to call him, the good; I say, this uniform cause of all things, which is the original of all pulchritude and perfection, unity and power, produced from himself a certain intelligible sun, every way like himself, of which the sensible sun is but an image." For thus Dionysius Petavius rightly declares the sense of Julian in this oration:§ Vanissimæ hujus et loquacissimæ disputationis mysterium est; à principe ac primario Deo, νοητὸν quendam et arche-

* Page 262. edit. Petav. Spanhemii vero, p. 140.
† P. 136. edit. Spanhem.
‡ Page 248. p. 132. edit. Spanhem.
§ P. 274.

typum solem editum fuisse; qui eandem prorsus σχέσιν et τάξιν in genere τῶν νοητῶν habeat, quam in αἰσθητοῖς ille, quem videmus, solaris globus obtinet. Tria itaque discernenda sunt, princeps ille Deus, qui τἀγαθὸν à Platone dicitur, ὁ νοητὸς ἥλιος, ὁ φαινόμενος δίσκος, "The mystery of this most vain and loquacious disputation is this, that from the first and chief Deity was produced a certain intelligible and archetypal sun, which hath the same place or order in the rank of intelligible things, that the sensible sun hath in the rank of sensibles. So that here are three things to be distinguished from one another: first, the supreme Deity, which Plato calls the good; secondly, the intelligible sun, or eternal intellect; and lastly, the corporeal or sensible sun (animated)." Where, notwithstanding, we may take notice, how near this pagan philosopher and emperor, Julian, approached to Christianity, though so much opposed by him, in that he also supposed an eternal mind or intellect, as the immediate offspring of the first fountain of all things; which seems to differ but a little from the Christian λόγος.[8] However, it is plain, that this devout restorer of paganism, and zealous contender for the worship of the gods, asserted no multiplicity of independent self-existent deities, but derived all his gods from one.

As for those other philosophers and learned men, who, in those latter times of the declining of paganism, after Constantine, still stood out in opposition against Christianity; such as Jamblichus, Syrianus, Proclus, Simplicius, and many others, it is unquestionably evident concerning them all, that they clearly

[8] I regret the learned Doctor should have let fall these expressions regarding the affinity of the philosophy of Julian to the Christian doctrine. For there is a vast difference between the eternal generation of the λόγος, an article in the Christian faith, and this everlasting emanation of a sun from God, maintained by Julian and the other Platonists. The whole of this sect believed that the models, forms and images of all visible things were produced from God from all eternity. Hence they could not but suppose that the sun also, which refreshes us with its heat, had its eternal model. Although men have been wont to philosophize with great subtlety and acuteness concerning these eternal models or intelligible world, especially Proclus, Introd. ad Theologiam Platonicam, and Plotinus, yet I am certain they knew not what these eternal forms of sensible things, properly speaking, were, and were unable to explain, whether they were self-existent natures, or, if I may so speak, notions merely of the divine mind. Be that as it may, I consider it evident, that that dogma has nothing in common with Julian's fantasies about an intelligible sun. For what Christian, possessing sound sense and reason, ever asserted that God produced an eternal model, idea, and form of the Son of God, who in process of time was begotten and made visible? or maintained the existence of two Sons of God, like Julian's two suns, the one νοητὸς or intelligible, the other αἰσθητός, or sensible? It is one thing to suppose that a self-existent substance and divine person was begotten of the one God from all eternity in a manner inexplicable to mortals, and another widely different one to suppose that there existed in or out of God an eternal form and idea of every thing that falls under the senses. I can well conceive, that Julian's philosophy may be compared with the doctrine of the Socinians and Arians; but not also with the opinion which orthodox Christians entertain respecting the Son of God. For the followers of Arius and Socinus will concede without difficulty, that the idea or form of that Son of God, born at a certain time in Judea, was in God from all eternity.

acknowledged one supreme Deity as the original of all things. Maximus Madaurensis, a confident and resolved Pagan in St. Austin's time, expressed both his own and the general sense of Pagans, after this manner:* Equidem unum esse Deum summum, sine initio, naturæ ceu patrem magnum atque magnificum, quis tam demens, tam mente captus neget esse certissimum? Hujus nos virtutes per mundanum opus diffusas multis vocabulis invocamus, quoniam nomen ejus cuncti proprium videlicet ignoramus. Ita fit, ut dum ejus quasi quædam membra carptim variis supplicationibus prosequimur, totum colere profectò videamur, "Truly that there is one supreme God, without beginning, as the great and magnificent father of nature; who is so mad or devoid of sense as not to acknowledge it to be most certain? His virtues diffused throughout the whole world (because we know not what his proper name is) we invoke under many different names. Whence it comes to pass, that whilst we prosecute, with our supplications, his, as it were, divided members severally, we must needs be judged to worship the whole Deity." And then he concludes his epistle thus: Dii te servent, per quos et eorum, atque cunctorum mortalium, communem patrem, universi mortales, quos terra sustinet, mille modis, concordi discordia venerantur, "The gods keep thee, by and through whom, we Pagans, dispersed over the whole world, do worship the common Father, both of those gods, and all mortals, after a thousand different manners, nevertheless with an agreeing discord." Longinianus likewise,† another more modest Pagan philosopher, upon the request of the same St. Austin, declares his sense concerning the way of worshipping God, and arriving to happiness, to this purpose: Per minores deos perveniri ad summum Deum non sine sacris purificatoriis,[9] "That we are to come to the supreme God, by the minor or inferior gods, and that not without purifying rites and expiations:" he supposing that besides a virtuous and holy life, certain religious rites and purifications were necessary to be observed in order to that end. In which epistle the supreme God is also styled by him, unus, universus, incomprehensibilis, ineffabilis, et infatigabilis Creator.

* Ep. 43. Inter August. Epistol. Epist. 16. p. 15. tom. 2. opp. edit. Benedict.

† Ep. 21. Inter Epist. August. Epist. 234. p. 647.

[9] These words are not Longinianus', but the argument prefixed to this epistle in St. Augustine. However, I consider we should not attach much faith to these authors of the fourth, fifth and sixth centuries in reference to ancient religions. For at that time, when the cause of polytheism was so weakened and shaken that those who, after the manner of their ancestors, did homage to idols, were scarcely safe from punishment, the friends of these religions not only set them forth to the best possible advantage, but some also started up and contended, that there was but a slight difference, if any, between Christians and Pagans, and therefore that there was no reason why the latter should be persecuted. So it always happens in human affairs. The prostrate and oppressed sects, lest they should appear too dark and deformed in the eyes of those in power, imitate to a certain extent the forms and institutions of that religion which is protected by the public laws.

Moreover, that the Pagans generally disclaimed this opinion of many unmade self-existent deities, appeareth plainly from Arnobius, where he brings them in complaining, that they were falsely and maliciously accused by some Christians as guilty thereof, after this manner:* Frustrà nos falso et calumnioso incessitis et appetitis crimine, tanquam inficias eamus Deum esse majorem; cùm à nobis et Jupiter nominetur, et optimus habeatur et maximus: cúmque illi augustissimas sedes, et Capitolia constituerimus immania, "In vain do you Christians calumniate us Pagans, and accuse us, as if we denied one supreme omnipotent God; though we both call him Jupiter, and account him the best and the greatest, having dedicated the most august seats to him, the vast capitols." Where Arnobius, in way of opposition, shows first, how perplexed and entangled a thing the Pagans' theology was, their poetic fables of the gods nonsensically confounding herology together with theology; and that it was impossible that that Jupiter of theirs, which had a father and a mother, a grandfather and a grandmother, should be the omnipotent God: Nam Deus omnipotens, mente una omnium, et communi mortalitatis assensu, neque genitus scitur, neque novam in lucem aliquando esse prolatus; nec ex aliquo tempore cœpisse esse, vel sæculo. Ipse enim est fons rerum, sator sæculorum ac temporum. Non enim ipsa per se sunt, sed ex ejus perpetuitate perpetua, et infinita semper continuatione procedunt. At verò Jupiter (ut vos fertis) et patrem habet et matrem, avos et avias, nunc nuper in utero matris suæ formatus, &c. "You Pagans confound yourselves with contradictions; for the omnipotent God, according to the natural sense of all mankind, was neither begotten or made, nor ever had a beginning in time, he being the fountain and original of all things. But Jupiter (as you say) had both father and mother, grandfathers and grandmothers, and was but lately formed in the womb; and therefore he cannot be the eternal omnipotent God." Nevertheless Arnobius afterwards considering (as we suppose) that these poetic fables were by the wiser Pagans either totally rejected, or else some way or other allegorized, he candidly dismisseth this advantage, which he had against them, and grants their Jupiter to be the true omnipotent Deity, and consequently that same God, which the Christians worshipped; but from thence infers, that the Pagans therefore must needs be highly guilty, whilst worshipping the same God with the Christians, they did hate and persecute them after that manner: Sed sint, ut vultis, unum, nec in aliquo, vi numinis, et majestate distantes; ecquid ergò injustis persequimini nos odiis? Quid, ut ominis pessimi, nostri nominis inhorrescitis mentione, si, quem Deum colitis, eum et nos? aut quid in eadem

* Lib. 1. p. 19.

causa vobis esse contenditis familiares Deos, inimicos atque infestissimos nobis? etenim, si una religio est nobis vobisque communis, cessat irà cœlestium, "But let it be granted, that (as you affirm) your Jupiter, and the eternal omnipotent God are one and the same; why then do you prosecute us with unjust hatreds, abominating the very mention of our names, if the same God that you worship be worshipped by us? Or if your religion and ours be the same, why do you pretend, that the gods are propitious to you, but most highly provoked and incensed against us?" Where the pagan defence and reply is, Sed non idcirco Dii vobis infesti sunt, quòd omnipotentem colatis Deum; sed quod hominem natum, et quod personis infame est vilibus, crucis supplicio interemptum, et Deum fuisse contenditis, et superesse adhuc creditis, et quotidianis supplicationibus adoratis, "But we do not say, that the gods are therefore displeased with you Christians, because you worship the omnipotent God; but because you contend him to be a God, who was not only born a mortal man, but also died an ignominious death, suffering as a malefactor; believing him still to survive, and adoring him with your daily prayers." To which Arnobius retorts in this manner: "Tell us now, I pray you, who these gods are, who take it as so great an injury and indignity done to themselves, that Christ should be worshipped? Are they not Janus and Saturn, Æsculapius and Liber, Mercurius the son of Maia, and the Theban or Tyrian Hercules, Castor and Pollux, and the like?" Hice ergo Christum coli, et à nobis accipi, et existimari pro numine, vulneratis accipiunt auribus? et obliti paulo ante sortis et conditionis suæ, id, quod sibi concessum est, impertiri alteri nolunt? hæc est justitia cœlitum? hoc deorum judicium sanctum? Nonne istud livoris est et avaritiæ genus? non obtrectatio quædam sordens, suas eminere solummodo velle fortunas, aliorum res premi et in contempta humilitate calcari? natum hominem colimus; quid enim, vos hominem nullum colitis natum? non unum et alium? non innumeros alios? quinimo non omnes quos jam templis habetis vestris, mortalium sustulistis ex numero, et cœlo sideribúsque donastis? Concedamus interdum manum vestris opinationibus dantes, unum Christum fuisse de nobis, mentis, animæ, corporis, fragilitatis et conditionis unius; nonne dignus à nobis est tantorum ob munerum gratiam, Deus dici, Deusque sentiri? Si enim vos Liberum, quòd reperit usum vini; si quòd panis, Cererem; si Æsculapium, quòd herbarum; si Minervam, quòd oleæ; si Triptolemum, quòd aratri; si denique Herculem, quòd feras, quòd fures, quòd multiplicium capitum superavit compescuitque natrices, divorum retulistis in cœlum: honoribus quantis afficiendus est nobis, qui ab erroribus nos magnis insinuatâ veritate traduxit? &c. "Are these the gods who are so much offended with Christ's being worshipped, and

accounted a God by us? they, who being forgetful of their former condition, would not have the same bestowed upon another, which hath been granted to themselves? Is this the justice of the heavenly powers? this the righteous judgment of gods? or is it not rather base envy and covetousness, for them thus to engross all to themselves? We worship indeed one, that was born a man: what then? do you worship no such? not one, and another, and innumerable? and are not almost all of your gods such as were taken from out of the rank of men, and placed among the stars? and will you account that damnable in us, which yourselves practise? Let us for the present yield thus much to your infidelity, and grant, that Christ was but an ordinary man of the same rank and condition with other mortals; yet might we not for all that (according to your principles) think him worthy, by reason of the great benefits we received from him, to be accounted a God? For if you have advanced into the number of your Divi, Bacchus or Liber for inventing the use of wine, Ceres of corn, Æsculapius of herbs, Minerva of the olive, Triptolemus of the plough, and Hercules for subduing beasts, thieves, and monsters; with how great honours ought he to be affected by us, who by the insinuation of divine truth hath delivered us from such great errors of mind?" &c. Which argumentation of Arnobius, though it were good enough ad homines, to stop the mouths of the Pagans, there being more reason that Christ should be made a god, for the benefits that mankind receive from him, than that Bacchus, or Ceres, or Hercules should be so; yet as the same Arnobius himself seems to intimate, it is not sufficient without something else superadded to it, for the justification of Christianity. Neither indeed was that the chief quarrel, which the Pagans had with the Christians, that they had deified one who was crucified (though the cross of Christ was also a great offence to them), but that they condemning the Pagans, for worshipping others besides the supreme omnipotent God, and decrying all those gods of theirs, did themselves notwithstanding worship one mortal man for a God. This Celsus urges in Origen:* Εἰ μὲν δὴ μηδένα ἄλλον ἐθεράπευον οὗτοι πλὴν ἕνα Θεὸν, ἦν ἄν τις αὐτοῖς ἴσως πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ἀτενὴς λόγος· νυνὶ δὲ τὸν ἔναγχος φανέντα τοῦτον ὑπερθρησκέυουσι, καὶ ὅμως οὐδὲν πλημμελεῖν νομίζουσι περὶ τὸν Θεὸν, εἰ καὶ ὑπηρέτης αὐτοῦ θεραπευθήσεται, "If these Christians themselves worshipped no other but one God, or the pure divinity, then might they perhaps seem to have some just pretence of censuring us; but now they themselves give divine honour to one that lately rose up, and yet they persuade themselves, that they do not at all offend God in worshipping that supposed minister

* Lib. 8. p. 385.

of his." Which, as Origen makes there a reply to it, so shall it be further considered by us afterwards.

As for the judgment of the fathers in this particular, Clemens Alexandrinus was not only of this opinion, that the pagans (at least the Greekish) did worship the true God, and the same God with the Christians, (though not after a right manner) but also endeavours to confirm it from the authority of St. Peter:* "That the Greeks knew God, Peter intimates in his predication. There is one God, saith he, who made the beginning of all things, and hath power over their end, &c. Worship this God, not as the Greeks do. Wherein he seemeth to suppose the Greeks to worship the same God with us, though not according to the right tradition received by his Son. He does not enjoin us not to worship that God which the Greeks worship, but to worship him otherwise than they do; altering only the manner of the worship, but not the object, or preaching another God. And what that is, not to worship God as the Greeks do, the same Peter intimated in those words; they worship him in images of wood and stone, brass and iron, gold and silver, and sacrifice to the dead also, as to gods. "Where he adds further, out of St. Peter's predication: "Neither worship God as the Jews do," &c. "The one and only God (saith Clemens) is worshipped by the Greeks paganically, by the Jews judaically, but by us newly and spiritually. For the same God, who gave the two testaments to the Jews and Christians, gave philosophy to the Greeks, δι' ἧς ὁ παντοκράτωρ παρ' Ἕλλησι δοξάζεται, by which the omnipotent God is glorified amongst the Greeks."

Lactantius Firmianus also, in many places, affirms the Pagans to have acknowledged one supreme Deity:† Summum Deum et philosophi et poetæ, et ipsi denique, qui deos colunt, sæpè fatentur: "That there is one supreme Deity, both philosophers and poets, and even the vulgar worshippers of the gods themselves, frequently acknowledge." From whence he concludes, that all the other pagan gods were nothing but the ministers of this one Supreme, and creatures made by him, (he then only blaming them for calling them gods, and giving them religious worship) lib. 1. When he had declared, that it was altogether as absurd to suppose the world to be governed by many independent gods, as to suppose the body of a man to be governed by many minds or souls independent; he adds:‡ Quòd quia intelligunt isti assertores deorum, ita eos præesse singulis rebus ac partibus dicunt, ut tantùm unus sit rector eximius. Jam ergo cæteri non dii erunt, sed satellites ac ministri, quos ille

* Strom. 6, p. 635. [Cap. 5. p. 759. Edit. Potteri.]
† De Ira Dei, p. 727. [Cap. 11. p. 934.]
‡ Lib. I. p. 16. [Cap. 3. p. 25.]

unus, maximus et potens omnium, officiis his præfecit, ut ipsi ejus imperio et nutibus serviant. Si universi pares non sunt, non igitur dii omnes sunt. Nec enim potest hoc idem esse, quod servit et quod dominatur. Nam si Deus est nomen summæ potestatis, incorruptibilis esse debet, perfectus, impassibilis, nulli rei subjectus. Ergo dii non sunt, quos parere uni maximo Deo necessitas cogit, "Which because the assertors of gods well understand, they affirm these gods of theirs so to preside over the several parts of the world, as that there is only one chief rector or governor. Whence it follows, that all their other gods can be no other thing than ministers and officers, which one greatest God, who is omnipotent, hath variously appointed and constituted, so as to serve his command and beck. Now, if all the pagan gods be not equal, then can they not be all gods; since that which ruleth, and that which serveth, cannot be the same. God is a name of absolute power, and implies incorruptibility, perfection, impassibility and subjection to nothing. Wherefore these ought not be called gods, whom necessity compels to obey one greatest God."* Again, in the same book: Nunc satis est demonstrare, summo ingenio viros attigisse veritatem ac propè tenuisse; nisi eos retrorsum infatuata pravis opinionibus consuetudo rapuisset, qua et deos alios esse opinabantur, et ea, quæ in usum hominis Deus fecit, tanquam sensu prædita essent, pro diis habenda et colenda credebant, "It is now sufficient to have shown, that the more ingenious and intelligent Pagans came very near to the truth, and would have fully reached it, had not a certain customary infatuation of evil opinions snatched them away to an acknowledgment of other gods, and to a belief, that those things which God made for the use of men, as endued with sense (or animated), ought to be accounted gods and worshipped; namely, the stars." And afterward:† Quòd si cultores deorum eos ipsos se colere putant, quos summi Dei ministros appellamus, nihil est quod nobis faciant invidiam, qui unum Deum dicamus, multos negemus, "If the worshippers of the gods think, that they worship no other than the ministers of the one supreme God, then there is no cause, why they should render us as hateful who say, that there is one God, and deny many gods."

Eusebius Cæsariensis‡ likewise gives us this account of the Pagans' creed, or the tenor of their theology, as it was then held forth by them: "Ενα γὰρ ὄντα θεὸν, παντοίαις δυνάμεσι, τὰ πάντα πληροῦν, καὶ διὰ πάντων διήκειν, καὶ τοῖς πᾶσιν ἐπιστατεῖν· ἀσωμάτως δὲ καὶ ἀφανως ἐν πᾶσιν ὄντα, καὶ διὰ πάντων διήκοντα· καὶ τοῦτον εἰκότως διὰ τῶν δεδηλωμένων σέβειν φάσι, "The Pagans

* Pag. 28. [Cap. 5. p. 40.] † Pag. 39. [Cap. 7. p. 51.]
‡ Præp. Evang. Lib. [3. c. 13. p. 121.]

declare themselves in this manner, that there is one God, who with his various powers filleth all things, and passeth through all things, and presideth over all things; but being incorporeally and invisibly present in all things, and pervading them, he is reasonably worshipped by or in those things that are manifest and visible." Which passage of Eusebius will be further considered afterward, when we come to give a more particular account of paganism.

What St. Austin's sense was[10] concerning the theology of the pagans hath been already declared; namely, "That they had not so far degenerated as to have lost the knowledge of one supreme God, from whom is all nature whatsoever; and that they derived all their gods from one." We shall now, in the last place, conclude with the judgment of Paulus Orosius,* who was his contemporary: Philosophi dum intento mentis studio quærunt scrutantúrque omnia, unum Deum authorem omnium repererunt, ad quem unum omnia referrentur; unde etiam nunc Pagani, quos jam declarata veritas de contumaciâ magis quàm de ignorantiâ convincit, cùm à nobis discutiuntur, non se plures sequi, sed sub uno Deo magno, plures ministros venerari fatentur. Restat igitur de intelligentia veri Dei, per multas intelligendi suspiciones, confusa dissensio, quia de uno Deo omnium penè una est opinio, "The philosophers of the Gentiles, whilst with intent study of mind they inquired and searched after things, found that there was one God, the author of all things, and to which one all things should be referred. Whence also the Pagans at this very day, whom the declared truth rather convinceth of contumacy than of ignorance, when they are urged by us, confess themselves not to follow many gods, but only under one God to worship many ministers. So that there remaineth only a confused dissension concerning the manner of understanding the true God, because about one God there is almost one and the same opinion of all."[1]

[10] Lib. 20. contra Faustum Manich. cap. 19. p. 246. t. 6. opp.

* His. lib. 6. cap. 1. [P. 416. Edit. Fabricii.]

[1] The testimonies of ancient Christian fathers respecting the pagan religion are not all to be held in the same rank, but ought to be cautiously examined and sifted. There are some of them which so describe the vanity, frivolity, and folly of that religion as to appear even to exceed all due bounds. Whereas those, again, who so severely condemn the public rites, when they conceive it to be their interest, paint the religious dogmas, of the ancient poets and philosophers especially, in such pleasing colours as to make them seem closely to resemble Christians. Their reasons for which were these. I. In the estimation of the nations of antiquity there was nothing more excellent and noble than the philosophers and poets. They hoped, therefore, that the heathens would much sooner adopt, or at least tolerate, the religion of our Saviour, if they could be made to understand that the philosophers and poets, whom alone they held in reverence, had entertained the same opinions as the Christians. II. They were afraid to proscribe these ancient philosophers from heaven, and doom them to the kingdom of darkness, lest they should increase the hatred to Christianity, and throw fresh difficulties in the way of its disciples. They therefore chose to judge mildly of

And by this time we think it is sufficiently evident, that the Pagans, at least after Christianity, though they asserted many gods, they calling all understanding beings superior to men by that name,[1] (according to that of St. Jerome, Deum quicquid supra se esset, Gentiles putabant;) yet they acknowledged one supreme, omnipotent, and only unmade Deity.

XVI. But because it is very possible, that some may still suspect all this to have been nothing else but a refinement and interpolation of paganism, after that Christianity had appeared upon the stage; or a kind of mangonization of it, to render it more vendible and plausible, the better able to defend itself, and bear up against the assaults of Christianity; whilst in the mean time the genuine doctrine of the ancient Pagans was far otherwise: although the contrary hereunto might sufficiently appear from what hath been already declared, yet however, for the fuller satisfaction of the more strongly prejudiced, we shall, by an historical deduction made from the most ancient times all along downwards, demonstrate, that the doctrine of the greatest Pagan polytheists, as well before Christianity as after it, was always the same, that besides their many gods, there was one supreme, omnipotent and only unmade Deity.

And this we shall perform, not as some[2] have done, by laying the chief stress upon the Sibylline oracles, and those reputed writings of Hermes Trismegist, the authority whereof hath been of late so much decried by learned men; nor yet upon such oracles of the Pagan deities,[3] as may be suspected to have been counterfeited by Christians; but upon such monuments of Pagan antiquity, as are altogether unsuspected and indubitate. As for the Sibylline oracles, there may (as we conceive) be two extremes concerning them; one, in swallowing down all that is now extant under that title, as genuine and sincere, whereas

philosophers and poets, rather than excite a greater degree of popular odium by pronouncing upon them a severer sentence. III. The advocates of paganism, as is evident from the *Apologies* of the Christian fathers, in adhering to the worship of their forefathers, accused the Christian religion of novelty. To meet *this* charge, the Christian champions conceived they could do nothing better than maintain that their doctrines had been long ago entertained by the oldest philosophers, Socrates, Homer, Plato, Aristotle, and all others of high authority among the people. On the weightiness of these reasons I shall not now enter into discussion: this, however, I am confident of, that no one who does not bear them constantly in mind can form a correct estimate of what is recorded by Clemens, Origen, Lactantius, Minutius, Athenagoras, and the rest, respecting the religious sentiments of the philosophers and poets. Many, indeed, are represented by Clemens, Lactantius, and others, as believing in one God, and favourable to the Christian doctrine, who ought rather to be classed among those that repudiate all religion, and identify God with nature.

[2] He means Augustus Eugubinus, Mutius Pansa, and others, who wrote expressly to prove an agreement between the ancient Pagans and Christianity. The same, however, had already been done by the earliest fathers, Clemens, Justin, Lactantius, and many others.

[3] These oracles are produced by Justin Martyr, Orat. ad Græcos; Eusebius, Præpar. Evang., and others

nothing can be more manifest, than that there is much counterfeit and supposititious stuff in this Sibylline farrago which now we have. From whence, besides other instances of the like kind, it appears too evidently to be denied, that some pretended Christians of former times have been for pious and religious frauds, and endeavoured to uphold the truth of Christianity by figments and forgeries of their own devising. Which, as it was a thing ignoble and unworthy in itself, and argued that those very defenders of Christianity did themselves distrust their own cause; so may it well be thought, that there was a policy of the devil in it also, there being no other more effectual way than this, to render all Christianity, at least in after-ages, to be suspected. Insomuch that it might perhaps be questioned, whether the truth and divinity of Christianity appear more in having prevailed against the open force and opposition of its professed enemies, or in not being at last smothered and oppressed by these frauds and forgeries of its seeming friends and defenders.[4]

[4] This base custom, justly reprobated by the learned doctor, was, with many other evils, imported into the rest of the Christian flocks from Egypt. So great, indeed, is the perversity of the human mind, that degenerate Christians even could descend to such frauds; although I have no doubt it was the foul example of Egypt, and the corrupt manners of the Alexandrians, that first led the Christian fathers to adopt this unworthy course. The Alexandrine Jews, as is evident even from the history of Aristeas and the Liber Sapientiæ, not to mention many others of the kind, had given instances of this depravity long before the birth of our Saviour, and had invented innumerable falsehoods, partly to show the excellence of their own religion and to fortify it against the attacks of enemies, and partly to assure the minds of their brethren. When, therefore, many of these in after times had joined the ranks of the Christians, they considered themselves at liberty to continue their former practice, and fabricated books of Hermes, Sibylline oracles, and the like, in order to give greater weight and authority to Christianity in the minds of an ignorant multitude. For no one that examines these supposititious works with any attention, can have the slightest doubt of their being the productions of Jews; who themselves, in my opinion, borrowed the abominable custom from the Alexandrine philosophers and Egyptian priests. Jamblichus himself confesses that the priests and sages of Egypt published many books under the name of Hermes, De Mysteriis Ægyptior. cap. 1. p. 1. to which add what Jo. Alb. Fabricius, Biblioth. Græc. lib. 6. cap. 12. sect. 2. p. 128. has noted out of Galen and Diodorus Siculus. These were imitated by the Platonists and Pythagoreans, in whose schools it was a well-known axiom, that it is no sin to uphold the cause of truth by lies and imposture: which I have shown at some length in my Diss. De Turbata per Recent. Platonicos Ecclesia, sect. 26. &c. p. 54. Now these philosophers, prior to the birth of our Saviour, and in the early ages of Christianity stood in high authority among the Egyptians, and publicly taught the youth of Alexandria. Nor, as the example of Philo sufficiently testifies, did the chief of the Jewish masters scruple to have recourse to them for instruction. Afterwards, also, the sons of Christians were entrusted to their care. These facts, in my opinion, tend somewhat to palliate the guilt of Christians in the adoption of a practice so justly censured by Dr. Cudworth. He that is led into a course of deception by simply conforming to the customs prevailing in his own time, and sanctioned by the most celebrated philosophers, although he cannot be altogether justified, is nevertheless, to a certain degree, more excusable than the man who in imposing upon others is actuated solely by his own mental depravity. Nor were the followers of Christ alone contaminated with this crime, as the adversaries of our religion foolishly persuade themselves; for, at the same period, antichristian philosophers also, as well as those pretended Christians the Gnostics, with equal audacity counterfeited writings of Zoroaster, Orpheus, Mesus, and many others: see Porphyry, Vita Plotini, cap. 16. p. 118, and Clemens Alex. Stromat. lib. 1. cap. 15.

The other extreme may be, in concluding the whole business of the Sibylline oracles (as any ways relating to Christianity) to have been a mere cheat and figment; and that there never was any thing in those Sibylline books, which were under the custody of the Quindecimviri, that did in the least predict our Saviour Christ, or the times of Christianity. For notwithstanding all that the learned Blondel hath written, it seems to be undeniably evident from Virgil's fourth Idyllium, that the Cumean Sibyl was then supposed to have predicted a new flourishing kingdom or monarchy, together with a happy state of justice or righteousness to succeed in the latter age of the world:

> Ultima Cumæi venit jam carminis ætas,
> Magnus ab integro sæclorum nascitur ordo.
> Jam redit et virgo, redeunt Saturnia regna,
> Jam nova progenies cœlo delabitur alto, &c,

Moreover, it is certain, that in Cicero's time the Sibylline prophecies were interpreted by some in favour of Cæsar, as predicting a monarchy:* Sibyllæ versus observamus, quos illa furens fudisse dicitur. Quorum interpres nuper falsa quadam hominum fama dicturus in senatu putabatur, eum, quem revera regem habebamus, appellandum quoque esse regem, si salvi esse vellemus. "We take notice of the verses of the Sibyl, which she is said to have poured out in a fury or prophetic frenzy, the interpreter† whereof was lately thought to have been about to declare in the senate-house, that if we would be safe, we should acknowledge him for a king who really was so." Which interpretation of the Sibylline oracles (after Cæsar's death) Cicero was so much offended with, (he also looking upon a Roman monarchy as a thing no less impossible than undesirable) that upon

p. 357. Which fact is a further proof, that it was not, as their enemies foolishly and ridiculously pretended, a certain innate wickedness or the nature of the religion itself, that led Christians to have recourse to those frauds, so much as the manners and customs of the age and the authority of great men: to which, indeed, even those often too readily conform, who are deficient neither in wisdom nor virtue.

[4] In a French work on Sybils, par. 1649.4. not remarkable for elegance of diction, but most profound and erudite. There are, at this day, as formerly, many very learned Englishmen who are displeased with Blondel's work, and fancy that the supposition of there being no allusion to our Saviour in the Sibylline books is dishonourable to those ancient fathers of the church, who so frequently employed them against the Pagans. Hence, like Dr. Cudworth, they decry the present collection of these poems, but contend that those anciently preserved by the Romans contained many oracles referring to Christ, and that God foretold to certain women the future kingdom of the Messiah. See, among many others, Bishop Beveridge, Codex Canon. Illustrat. cap. 4. sect. 10. p. 61. and Dr. Humphr. Prideaux, Histoire des Juifs. tom. 5. livr. 9. p. 190. men of the highest eminence, who follow Dr. Cudworth's example, and adopt the same line of argument. Nor does Isa. Vossius, De Sibyllinis Oracul. cap. 8. p. 66. greatly dissent from this opinion, although he takes a different view as respects the author of these poems.

* Cic. Div. l. 2. [Cap. 54. p. 3238. tom. 9. opp.]

† L. Cotta Quindecimvir.

this occasion he quarrels with those very Sibylline oracles themselves, as well as the readers and expounders of them, after this manner:* Hoc si est in libris, in quem hominem, et in quod tempus est? Callide enim, qui illa composuit, perfecit, ut, quodcunque accidisset, prædictum videretur, hominum et temporum definitione sublatâ. Adhibuit etiam latebram obscuritatis, ut iidem versus aliàs in aliam rem posse accommodari viderentur. Non esse autem illud carmen furentis, tum ipsum poema declarat, (est enim magis artis et diligentiæ quàm incitationis et motus) tum verò ea quæ ἀκροστιχὶς dicitur, cum deinceps ex primis versuum literis aliquid connectitur. Quamobrem Sibyllam quidem sepositam et conditam habeamus, ut id, quod proditum est à majoribus, injussu senatûs nè legantur quidem libri, "If there be any such thing contained in the Sibylline books, then we demand, concerning what man is it spoken, and of what time? For whoever framed those Sibylline verses, he craftily contrived, that whatsoever should come to pass, might seem to have been predicted in them, by taking away all distinction of persons and times. He also purposely affected obscurity, that the same verses might be accommodated sometime to one thing, and sometime to another. But that they proceeded not from fury and prophetic rage, but rather from art and contrivance, doth no less appear otherwise, than from the acrostic in them. Wherefore let us shut up the Sibyl, and keep her close, that according to the decree of our ancestors, her verses may not be read without the express command of the senate." And lastly, he addeth: Cum antistitibus agamus, ut quidvis potius ex illis libris quàm regem proferant, quem Romæ posthac nec dii nec homines esse patientur: "Let us also deal with the Quindecimviri and interpreters of the Sibylline books, that they would rather produce any thing out of them, than a king; whom neither gods nor men will hereafter suffer at Rome." Where, though Cicero were mistaken as to the event of the Roman government, and there were doubtless some predictions in these Sibylline books of a new kingdom or monarchy to be set up in the world; yet that the Roman empire was not the thing intended in them, doth manifestly appear from that description in Virgil's forementioned eclogue; wherein there is accordingly another completion of them expected, though flatteringly applied to Saloninus. Wherefore we conclude, that the kingdom and happy state, or golden age, predicted in the Sibylline oracles, was no other than that of the Messiah, or our Saviour, Christ, and the times of Christianity. Lastly, in that other passage of Cicero's, concerning the Sibylline oracles: Valeant ad deponendas potiùs quàm ad suscipiendas religiones, "Let them be made use of rather for the extinguishing, than the begetting of reli-

* De Div. l. 2. [Ubi supra.]

gions and superstitions;" there seems to be an intimation, as if of themselves they rather tended to the lessening than increasing of the pagan superstitions; and therefore may probably be thought to have predicted a change of that pagan religion, by the worship of one sole Deity to be introduced. Neither ought it to seem a jot more strange, that our Saviour Christ should be foretold by the pagan Sibyl, than that he was so clearly predicted by Balaam, the Aramitic sorcerer. However, those things in the Sibylline verses might have been derived, some way or other, from the scripture prophecies; which there is indeed the more probability of, because that Sibylline prophet made use of those very same figures and allegories in describing the future happy state that are found in the scripture. As for example:

Nec magnos metuent armenta leones;
Occidet et serpens, &c.[5]

Now, as Cicero seems to complain, that in his time these Sibylline oracles were too much exposed to view, so is it very probable, that notwithstanding they were to be kept under the guard of the Quindecimviri, yet many of them might be copied out, and get abroad; and thereby an occasion be offered to the ignorantly zealous Christians, who were for officious lies and pious frauds, to add a great deal more of their own forging to them. Neither indeed is it imaginable, how any such cheat as this should either at first have been attempted, or afterwards have proved successful, had there not been some foundation of truth to support and countenance it. Besides which it is observable, that Celsus, who would have had the Christians rather to have made the Sibyl than our Saviour Christ, a God; taking notice of their using of those Sibylline testimonies against the Pagans, did not tax them for counterfeiting the whole business of these Sibylline oracles, but only for inserting many things of their own into them:* Ὑμεῖς δὲ κἂν Σίβυλλαν, ἤ χρῶνταί τινες ὑμῶν, εἰκότως ἂν μᾶλλον προεστήσασθε ὡς τοῦ θεοῦ παῖδα, νῦν δὲ παρεσγράφειν μὲν εἰς τὰ ἐκείνης πολλὰ καὶ βλάσφημα εἰκῇ δύνασθε, "You Christians might much rather have acknowledged even the Sibyl for the offspring of God; but now you can boldly insert into her verses many, and those maledicent things of your own." Where Origen, that he might vindicate, as well as he could, the honour of Christians, pleads in their defence that Celsus, for all that, could not show what they had foisted into those Sibylline verses; because, if he had been able to have produced more ancient and incorrupt copies, in which such things were not found, he would certainly have done it. Notwithstanding which, it is likely that there were other ancient

[5] Virgil. Eclog. 4. ver. 22. 24.

* Orig. c. Cels. lib. 7. p. 368.

copies then to be found, and that Celsus might have met with them too, and that from thence he took occasion to write as he did. However, this would not justify the present Sibylline books, in which there are forgeries plainly discoverable without copies. Nevertheless, it seems that all the ancient Christians did not agree in making use of these Sibylline testimonies, thus much being intimated by Celsus himself, in the forecited words, ἢ χρῶνταί τινες ὑμῶν, "which some of you make use of;" as they did not all acknowledge the Sibyl to have been a prophetess neither: since, upon Celsus[6] mentioning a sect of Christians called Sibyllists, Origen tells us, that these were such as using the Sibylline testimonies were called so in way of disgrace by other Christians, who would not allow the Sibyl to have been a prophetess: they perhaps conceiving it derogatory to the scriptures.[7] But though there may be some of the ancient Sibylline verses still left in that farrago which we now have, yet it being impossible for us to prove which are such, we shall not insist upon any testimonies at all from thence, to evince, that the ancient Pagans acknowledged one supreme Deity. Notwithstanding which, we shall not omit one Sibylline passage, which we find recorded in Pausanias,[8] (from whence, by the way, it appears also, that the Sibylline verses were not kept up so close, but that some of them got abroad) he telling us, that the defeat of the Athenians at Ægos Potamos was predicted by the Sibyl in these words (amongst others):

[6] See Origen. contra Celsum, lib. 5. p. 272.

[7] The subject of the Sibylline verses has been almost exhausted by J. Alb. Fabricius, Biblioth. Græc. lib. 1. Omitting, therefore, all the conjectures and opinions of others, I shall briefly touch merely upon the remarks here brought forward by the learned Doctor. Like many others of his countrymen, who are unwilling to see the authority of the ancient fathers made light of, Dr. Cudworth supposes the older copies of the Sibylline books to have contained oracles regarding our Saviour and his kingdom, and in proof thereof quotes Virgil and Cicero. Into the truth of this opinion it is not my present intention to inquire, nor indeed would this be an easy task, inasmuch as those ancient poems are either entirely lost, or so mixed up at the present day with forgeries of more recent date, as to baffle all attempts at distinguishing them. I confess, however, that there does not appear to me to be much weight in either of the arguments advanced by the learned Doctor in confirmation of this opinion. If I am not altogether mistaken, Virgil's verses simply mean, that the *great year*, as they called it, was approaching; and therefore that all things would soon be renewed, and those golden times return which poetic fancy ascribed to the age of Saturn. If this was recorded in the Cumæan poem, it was in accordance with the universal belief of the ancients, that on the coming of the great year, or, to use Cicero's words, Somn. Scipionis, Quum ad idem, unde semel profecta sunt, cuncta astra redierint, "when all the stars should return to the place from which they once started," the whole face of the globe would be changed, and a new race of men spring up. So thought the Stoics, so the Platonists, and others. Nor do I see how it can be proved from thence, that the Sibyl prophesied of Christ's kingdom, although many eminent men, I am aware, have supposed so. Cicero tells us, that an oracle was produced in the senate from the Sibylline books, regarding a certain king. But by what arguments, I ask, can it be shown, that Christ was necessarily the king foretold in that oracle? Cicero declares the passage to be obscure, ambiguous, and equivocal, "defining neither times nor persons." Can that, therefore, which was in itself uncertain heretofore, be at this day made clear to us by argument?

[8] In Phocicis, or lib. 10. Græciæ, cap. 9. p. 820. edit. Kuhnii.

Καὶ τότ' Ἀθηναίοισι βαρύστονα κήδεα θήσει
Ζεὺς ὑψιβρεμέτης, οὗπερ κράτος ἐστὶ μέγιστον, &c.

Ac tum Cecropidis luctum gemitúsque ciebit
Jupiter altitonans, rerum cui summa potestas, &c.

Whereto might be added also that of another ancient Peliadean prophetess, in the same writer,[9] wherein the divine eternity and immutability is plainly declared:

Ζεὺς ἦν, Ζεὺς ἔστι, Ζεὺς ἔσσεται, ὦ μεγάλε Ζεῦ.

Jupiter est, fuit, atque erit: O bone Jupiter alme.

Besides these Sibylline prophecies, there are also other oracles of the pagan deities themselves, in which there was a clear acknowledgment of one supreme and greatest God. But as for such of them as are said to have been delivered since the times of Christianity, when the pagan oracles began to fail, and such as are now extant only in Christian writings, however divers of them are cited out of Porphyrius' book of oracles; because they may be suspected, we shall not here mention any of them. Nevertheless, we shall take notice of one oracle of the Clarian Apollo that is recorded by Macrobius,[10] in which one Supreme Deity is not only asserted, but is also called by that Hebrew name (or Tetragrammaton) *Jao:*

Φράζεο τὸν πάντων ὕπατον θεὸν ἔμμεν Ἰάω.

"You are to call the highest and supreme of all the gods, Jao:" though it be very true that that Clarian devil there cunningly endeavoured to divert this to the sun, as if that were the only supreme deity and true "Jao." To which might be added another ancient oracle (that now occurs) of the Dodonean Jupiter,[1] together with the interpretation of Themistocles, to whom it was delivered; wherein he was commanded πρὸς τὸν ὁμώνυμον τοῦ θεοῦ βαδίζειν, "to repair to him who was called by the same name with God;" which Themistocles apprehended to be the king of Persia, μεγάλους γὰρ ἀμφοτέρους εἶναί τε καὶ λέγεσθαι βασιλέας, "because both he and God were alike called (though in different respects and degrees) the great king or monarch."

But as for those writings commonly imputed to Hermes Trismegist, that have been generally condemned by the learned of this latter age, as wholly counterfeit and supposititious, and yet

[9] Ibid. cap. 12. p. 828.

[10] Saturnal. lib. 1. cap. 18. p. 290.

[1] Given by Plutarch, In Vita Themistocl. p. 225. tom. 1. opp. I hold this oracle to be of very little value towards proving the learned Doctor's position; on the contrary, the thing itself shows, that it was either altogether a forgery of Themistocles' own, or if really delivered, was supplied to him by the priests of Jupiter, as a means of flattering the Persian king, whose favour he was anxious to conciliate.

on the contrary, are asserted by Athanasius Kircherus[2] for sincere and genuine: we shall have occasion to declare our sense concerning them more opportunely afterward.

The most ancient theologers, and most eminent assertors of polytheism amongst the Pagans, were Zoroaster in the eastern parts, and Orpheus amongst the Greeks. The former of which was of so great antiquity, that writers cannot well agree about his age. But that he was a Polytheist is acknowledged by all, some affirming it to be signified in his very name, as given him after his death; it being interpreted by them a worshipper of the stars.[3] Neither is it to be doubted but that Ster or Ester, in the Persian language, did signify a star, as it hath been observed also by learned men concerning sundry other words, now familiar in these European languages, that they derived their original from the Persian. Notwithstanding which, it may be suspected that this was here but a Greek termination; the word being not only in the oriental languages written Zertoost and Zaradust, but also in Agathias, Zarades. However, Zoroaster's polytheism is intimated by Plato,[4] where his magic is defined to have been nothing else but θεῶν θεραπεία, "the worship of the gods." Whence by the way we learn also, that the word μαγεία, or magic, was first taken in a good sense, which is confirmed by Porphyrius:* Παρά γε μὴν τοῖς Πέρσαις, οἱ περὶ τὸ θεῖον σοφοὶ καὶ τούτου θεράποντες, Μάγοι μὲν προσαγορεύονται, "Amongst the Persians, those who were skilful in the knowledge of the Deity, and religious worshippers of the same, were called Magi." And as magic is commonly conceived to be founded in a certain vital sympathy that is in the universe, so did these ancient Persian Magi and Chaldeans (as Psellus tells us[5]) suppose συμπαθῆ εἶναι τὰ ἄνω τοῖς κάτω, "that there was a sympathy betwixt the superior and inferior beings;" but it seems the only way at first by them approved, of attracting the influence and assistance of those superior invisible powers, was by piety, devotion, and religious rites. Nevertheless, their devotion was not carried out only to one omnipotent God, but also to many gods; neither is it to be questioned but that this divine magic of Zoroaster shortly after degenerated in many of his followers into the theurgical magic, and at length into γοητεία, "downright

[2] In Œdipo Ægypt. et Obelisco Pamphilio. p. 35. &c.

[3] So it was explained by Dinon and Hermodorus, as we are informed by Diogen. Laërtius, Proœm. segm. 8. p. 6. whose opinion is followed by Scaliger and others of the moderns. On other interpretations of this name and on Zoroaster himself, see J. Alb. Fabricius, Biblioth. Græc. lib. 1. cap. 36. p. 244. and the authors mentioned by him.

[4] In Alcibiade 1. opp. p. 32. Ὧν ὁ μὲν μαγείαν τε διδάσκει τὴν Ζωροάστρου τοῦ Ὡρομάζου· Ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο Θεῶν θεραπεία, "The first of whom (the Magians) teaches the magic of Zoroaster, the son of Oromasius: but this is the worship of the Gods."

* De Abst. lib. 4. p. 165.

[5] In Brevi Dogmat. Chaldaic. Declaratione, published at the end of Servat. Gallæus' edition of the Sibylline Oracles, Amst. 1689-4.

sorcery and witchcraft;" the only thing which is now vulgarly called magic. But how many gods soever this Zoroaster worshipped, that he acknowledged notwithstanding one supreme Deity, appeareth from the testimony of Eubulus, cited by Porphyrius in his De Antro Nympharum:* Πρῶτα μὲν, ὡς ἔφη Εὔβουλος, Ζωροάστρου αὐτοφυὲς σπήλαιον ἐν τοῖς πλησίον ὄρεσι τῆς Περσίδος, ἀνθηρὸν καὶ πηγὰς ἔχον ἀνιερώσαντος, εἰς τιμὴν τοῦ πάντων ποιητοῦ καὶ πατρὸς Μίθρου, εἰκόνα φέροντος αὐτῷ τοῦ σπηλαίου τοῦ κόσμου, ὃν ὁ Μίθρας ἐδημιούργησε, "Zoroaster first of all, as Eubulus testifieth, in the mountains adjoining to Persis, consecrated a native orbicular cave, adorned with flowers and watered with fountains, to the honour of Mithras, the maker and father of all things; this cave being an image or symbol to him of the whole world, which was made by Mithras." Which testimony of Eubulus is the more to be valued, because, as Porphyrius elsewhere[6] informeth us, he wrote the history of Mithras at large in many books, from whence it may be presumed that he had thoroughly furnished himself with the knowledge of what belonged to the Persian religion. Wherefore, from the authority of Eubulus, we may well conclude also, that notwithstanding the sun was generally worshipped by the Persians as a god, yet Zoroaster and the ancient Magi, who were best initiated in the Mithraic mysteries, asserted† another Deity, superior to the sun, for the true Mithras, such as was πάντων ποιητὴς καὶ πατὴρ, "the maker and father of all things, or of the whole world," whereof the sun is a part. However, these also looked upon the sun as the most lively image of this Deity, in which it was worshipped by them; as they likewise worshipped the same Deity symbolically in fire, as Maximus Tyrius informeth us;[7] agreeable to which is that in the magic oracles,[8]

——πάντα πυρὸς ἑνὸς ἐκγεγαῶτα. .

"All things are the offspring of one fire;" that is, "of one supreme Deity." And Julian, the emperor, was such a devout

* P. 254.

[6] De Abstinentia a Carnibus, sect. 16. p. 165.

† That Mithras which was called, ὁ κρύφιος θεὸς, "the hidden God," was not the visible sun.

[7] The passage alluded to is no doubt the following, which occurs, Diss. 38. p. 371. Πέρσαι μὲν πῦρ, ἄγαλμα ἐφήμερον, ἀκόρεστον καὶ ἀδήφαγον, "The Persians worship fire, an image lasting but for a day, voracious and insatiable." Maximus is there treating of the images devised by various nations of the Deity. The Persians, he tells us, make fire the symbol of God. This symbol he compares, as it were, with the images of other nations, which were formed of stone or metal, and could therefore endure for many ages. Hence, as fire is of a far different nature, he calls it ἄγαλμα ἐφήμερον, "an ephemeral image of God," as being quickly extinguished and perishing. The translator's interpretation, elementum quotidianum, has been already justly censured by Gerh. J. Vossius, De Idololatria, lib. 2. cap. 64. p. 237.

[8] Commonly ascribed to Zoroaster, sect. 2. v. 29. p. 1179. in Stanley's History of Philosophy.

sun-worshipper as this, who acknowledged besides the sun, another incorporeal Deity, transcendent to it. Nevertheless, we deny not but that others amongst the Persians, who were not able to conceive of anything incorporeal, might, as well as Heraclitus, Hippocrates, and the Stoics amongst the Greeks, look upon the fiery substance of the whole world (and especially the sun) as animated and intellectual, to be the supreme Deity, and the only Mithras, according to that inscription,[9] "Deo Soli Invicto Mithræ." However, Mithras, whether supposed to be corporeal or incorporeal, was unquestionably taken by the Persians for the supreme Deity, according to that of Hesychius: Μίθρας, ὁ πρῶτος ἐν Πέρσαις θεὸς, "Mithras, the first god among the Persians;" who was therefore called in the inscription,[10] Omnipotent, "Omnipotenti Deo Mithræ." Which first, supreme and omnipotent God was acknowledged by Artabanus, the Persian, in his conference with Themistocles, in these words:* Ἡμῖν δὲ πολλῶν νόμων καὶ καλῶν ὄντων, κάλλιστος οὗτός ἐστι, τὸ τιμᾶν βασιλέα, καὶ προσκυνεῖν εἰκόνα θεοῦ τοῦ τὰ πάντα σώζοντος, "Amongst those many excellent laws of ours, the most excellent is this, that the king is to be honoured and worshipped religiously, as the image of that God, which conserveth all things." Scaliger,[1] with some others (though we know not upon what certain grounds) affirm, that Mither, in the Persian language signified "great," and Mithra, "greater," or "greatest;" according to which, Mithras would be all one with "Deus major" or "maximus," "the greatest God." Wherefore, we conclude that either Herodotus[2] was mistaken, in

[9] Other inscriptions of the kind are still extant. See Anton. Van Dale, Dissert. 9. ad Antiq. et Marmora, p. 16. &c. and Ez. Spanheim, Observ. ad Juliani Cæsares, p. 144. In an ancient stone found at Lyons, and learnedly expounded by J. Martini, a Benedictine monk, in an excellent work, De Veteri Gallorum Religione, cap. 32. p. 418. the word *Soli* is omitted, the reading being simply: *Deo Invicto Mithr.*

[10] In Gruter's Thesaur. Inscrip. p. 84. n. 5. Many more passages of ancient authors, showing the Persian Mithras to have been merely the sun, have been collected by Thom. Gataker in his Adversar. Miscellan. cap. 21. p. 659. tom. 1. opp.

* Plut. Themist.

[1] De Emendat. Temporum, lib. 6. cap. De Hebdomadibus Danielis, p. 588. who is followed by Vossius, De Idololatria, lib. 2. cap. 10. p. 133. Selden, De Diis Syris, syntagm. 2. p. 179. Scheid, De Diis Germanis, p. 146. and others. But Th. Hyde, De Veteri Persar. Religione, cap. 4. p. 67. derives this name from the Persian word *Mihr*, signifying *love* and *mercy*. Andr. Reland, De Veteri Lingua Persica, par. 2. Diss. Miscell. p. 198. considers it to be the Persian word *Mihr* itself, and to signify not only *love*, but also the *sun*: whose opinion has been lately adopted by a very learned countryman of Dr. Cudworth's, Thom. Hutchinson, Index Philol. ad Xenophontem, p. 685. Abr. Hinckelmann, Detect Fundam. Boëhmiani, p. 122. thinks *Mithra* is the Persian *Mader*, pronounced by the Greeks μήτηρ, by the Latins *mater*, in German *Moder* or *Mutter*. J. Martini, Religion des Gaulois, livr. 2. p. 421. has recourse to the Armenian language, and derives *Mithras* from *Mither*, denoting in Armenian, *the one and only God.*

Non nostrum inter vos tantas componere lites.

[2] Hist. lib. 1. cap. 131. p. 55. He, however, distinguishes Mithra from the sun. For after saying that the Persians sacrifice to the sun and moon, he adds, that they

making the Persian Mithras the same with Mylitta, or Venus, (and perhaps such a mistake might be occasioned from hence, because the word Mader or Mether in the Persian language signified Mother, as Mylitta in the Syrian did;) or else rather, that this Venus of his is to be understood of the Ἀφροδίτη οὐρανία,* "the heavenly Venus or Love;" and thus is she there called in Herodotus, Urania; by which though some would understand nothing else but the moon, yet we conceive the supreme Deity, true heavenly Love (the mother and nurse of all things), to have been primarily signified therein.[3]

also worship Urania, having learnt this from the Assyrians and Arabians, and call her Mithra; in which the learned men above quoted contend he is wrong, there being infinite testimony to prove that the Persian Mithras was the sun. They also consider it a mistake to confound Mithras with Venus. See Gataker, Adversar. Miscell. cap. 22. p. 661. If Herodotus be in error, it is owing to the custom common among the Greeks, of identifying the gods of barbarous nations with their own deities. He was told that the Persians attributed to Mithras a generative or procreative power, and well knowing that the Greeks ascribed the same power to Venus, he hastily concluded the Persian Mithras and the Grecian Venus to be one and the same. Hence, having considered that, according to the Grecian notion, Venus and the sun could by no means be regarded as one Deity, he decided that the Persian Mithra was to be distinguished from the sun. But on reviewing the whole subject it appears doubtful to me whether learned men have just cause for this charge against Herodotus. It has already been observed by Jac. Gronovius, Observat. ad Herodot. p. 536. that the historian does not say *Mithras*, but *Mithra*, which word has no relation to the masculine appellation supposed to have been applied by the Persians to the sun under the name Μίθρας. I shall try whether I can throw somewhat more light upon this matter. In the first place, the *Mithra* spoken of by Herodotus is manifestly a female deity, as he makes Urania to be the same with Venus; whereas it is evident from inscriptions and many other testimonies, that with the Persians the sun, *Mithras*, was a male god, and the name *Mithras* of the masculine gender. Hence, probably Herodotus' *Mithra* was a different deity from this Mithras. In the next place, it is no less certain that the Persians added the worship of the moon to that of the sun, and regarded the moon as the sun's wife. On which consult the learned remarks of J. Martini, Religion des Gaulois, livr. 2. p. 421; also the copper-plate engravings of ancient monuments on the worship of Mithras, in Anton. Van Dale's Dissert. in Antiq. et Marmora, which invariably exhibit the effigies of both sun and moon. As, therefore, the sun was called the *god Mithras*, so his inseparable companion, the moon, seems to have been called by them the *goddess Mithra*; nor is this said without authority, since, as is shown by Martini, p. 424. the *goddess Mithra* is mentioned by ancient writers, especially Ambrosius and Cassiodorus. This being the case, I, for my part, should almost acquit Herodotus of the charge, brought against him by learned men, of having transferred the name *Mithras* from the sun to another deity. For he does not deny that the Persians called the sun Mithras, but informs us that besides the sun a certain goddess *Mithra* was worshipped by them; which we have seen to be true. I am not disposed to assert, however, that he is here guilty of no error at all. I consider him to be mistaken in supposing the Persian Mithra to be the same as the Grecian Venus. Again, he, in my opinion, makes an erroneous distinction between the moon and Mithra; for after saying that the Persians sacrifice to the sun and moon, he adds that they worship also the *heavenly Venus* or *Mithra*. But if, as was most probably the fact, the Persians believed in a goddess called *Mithra*, it was certainly the moon. I am not ignorant, indeed, that learned men commonly suppose the *heavenly Venus* and the moon to be the same; in which case, Herodotus would not have been wrong in identifying this Venus with *Mithra*. But whatever may be the weight and plausibility of this opinion, it nevertheless was not entertained by Herodotus, who clearly distinguishes the moon from the heavenly Venus.

* Genetrix.

[3] It is not my intention to treat in this place of the Persian god *Mithras*, and of his numerous rites and mysteries, as this has already been done by men of distinguished

But Zoroaster and the ancient Magi are said to have called the supreme God also by another name, viz. Oromasdes or Or-

learning and ability, among whom Phil. a Turre, Monum. Veteris Antii, stands pre-eminent. It will be sufficient for my purpose to illustrate what is here argued by the learned Doctor and to state the opinion to which after a most careful consideration of this subject, I have myself been led respecting Mithras. I. Dr. Cudworth has adopted a middle course between those who hold the sun to have been the supreme and only God of the Persians and those who maintain that they never believed the sun to be a god, but merely paid to it civil homage and regarded it as the image of the Deity. He grants that many of the Persians prayed to the sun as to the supreme Deity, but that wise men, instructed by Zoroaster, conceived the notion of a god much greater and more excellent than the sun. In so doing he has acted wisely. His countryman, Th. Hyde, spared no pains to purge the Persian religion from the charge of superstition on this score and to prove that the sun was never worshipped by that nation as a deity, De Veteri Persarum Religione, cap. 4. But this I consider to be setting aside the authority of all ancient history, as almost all the grave writers of antiquity who have touched upon Persian affairs testify the contrary. Consult Phil. a Turre, Monum. Veteris Antii, p. 194. who opposes Hyde's opinion. On the other hand, it is by no means credible, that the whole of the Persians were so besotted and insane, as to acknowledge no greater and more excellent deity besides that resplendent orb. This opinion, therefore, of the learned Doctor's is obviously a rational one.

II. He contends that Zoroaster understood by the word *Mithras*, not the sun, but one supreme and most high God, who made the sun and all the stars; and in proof quotes the authority of Eubulus. My own opinion of Zoroaster, as must be evident from my preceding remarks on the religion established by him among the Persians and from those about to follow by and by, is more favourable than that of many others; nor would I deny that he professed a supreme deity superior to the two principles of good and evil. Nay, it appears to me very probable also, I confess, that he used the name Mithras of the supreme Being, of whom he held the sun to be the living image and symbol. Still, I much doubt whether this can be proved on the testimony of Eubulus. This Eubulus was a Platonist, as is evident from Longinus, in Porphyry's Life of Plotinus, cap. 20. p. 127. 128. Hence his words ought not to be taken in a sense not conformable to the nature and character of the Platonic discipline. Now, the junior Platonists held the sun to be the father and author of all things, and maintained that matter was subdued and the whole universe generated by its power. See among many others, Zach. Mitylenæus, Dialog. de Opificio Mundi, p. 173. 176. 184. The statement of Eubulus, therefore, that Zoroaster supposed *Mithras* to be τῶν πάντων ποιητὴς καὶ πατὴρ, "the maker and father of all things," by no means proves him to have held Mithras to be a deity different from and more excellent than the sun, but rather confirms what is evident upon other grounds, that Mithras and the sun are one and the same deity. For what Zoroaster is here said to have affirmed of Mithras, was attributed to the sun by Eubulus and his sect, who, as is well known, were unremitting in their zeal to interpret the sacred rites of all nations agreeably to the principles of their own philosophy.

III. Notwitstanding this, however, I confess there are testimonies extant in ancient authors, which would seem to afford proof that the latter Persians at least invoked a deity superior to the sun in power and majesty. I shall bring forward as evidence a few passages, which have accidentally occurred to me in reading. Xenophon, De Expedit. Cyri, lib. 8. p. 647. introduces Cyrus praying thus: Ζεῦ πατρῷε, καὶ Ἥλιε, καὶ πάντες θεοὶ, δέχεσθε τάδε, "O ancestral Jove, thou Sun, and all ye gods, receive these offerings." Similar to this is the prayer of the Persian king Darius, given by Plutarch, De Fortuna Alexandri M. tom. 2. opp. p. 338. Εἰ δὲ οἴχεται τὰ ἐμὰ, Ζεῦ πατρῷε Περσῶν, καὶ βασίλειοι θεοὶ, "But if my power is gone, O Jupiter, ancestral god of the Persians, and ye royal gods." In these prayers, the *paternal Jupiter* is clearly distinguished from the sun and named before it; which shows that the Persians paid greater honours to that deity than to the sun. But lest there should be any room to surmise that this Jupiter was probably held by the Persians in the same rank as the sun, I shall quote another passage of Xenophon, almost putting the matter beyond all doubt, lib. 1. p. 65. 66. ed. Hutchins. The historian informs us that Cyrus prayed to the ancestral deities Vesta and Jupiter, and the other gods; and thereupon received favourable omens of lightning and thunder: he then adds: Τούτων δὲ φανέντων, οὐδὲν ἔτι ἄλλο οἰωνιζόμενοι ἐπορεύοντο, ὡς οὐδένα λήσαντα τὰ ΤΟΥ ΜΕΓΙΣ-

misdas; however Oromasdes, according to Plato,[4] seems to have been the father of Zoroaster. Thus, besides Plutarch and others,

ΤΟΥ ΘΕΟΥ˜ *σημεῖα*, "When these (lightnings) appeared, without taking any other augury, they proceeded, as the signs of the *Supreme God* could have escaped no one." These words make it evident that the Persians held that God to be supreme who wielded the thunder and lightning to the terror, or sometimes, when piously approached, to the encouragement of mortals. But I know not to what God this power can be ascribed other than the *ancestral Jupiter* invoked by Cyrus. Wherefore if Xenophon's authority is to be relied on, the Persians acknowledged a certain God superior to the sun, who, they supposed, manifested his presence and majesty by thunder and lightning. Herodotus, Histor. lib. 1. cap. 131. p. 55. and Strabo, Geograph. lib. 15. p. 695, make this Jupiter of the Persians to be heaven itself: *Τὸν κύκλον πάντα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ Δία καλέοντες*, says Herodotus, "They call the whole compass of heaven Jupiter." [Most true: for almost all the oriental nations believe the all pervading light to be God.] But in this, I am afraid, these authors are mistaken. The Persians, it is notorious, had no temples, conceiving it to be wrong to shut up their deities within walls, Cicero De Legibus, lib. 2. cap. 19. p. 3352. tom. 19. opp. Hence, in imploring the divine assistance, they lifted up their hands and eyes to the open canopy of heaven, which custom might easily lead the Greeks into the error of supposing that the Persians worshipped heaven itself as the supreme God. But be that as it may, still these passages prove that they acknowledged a Deity superior to the sun in majesty and excellence, and that we ought not to listen to Hesychius and other ancient writers, who made the sun to be the chief and most high God of that nation.

IV. But I shall now philosophize somewhat more freely respecting Mithras and the Persian religion: trusting that any error I may fall into will readily be excused by those who are aware of the great obscurity involving the history of all nations of antiquity. In the first place, then, I lay it down that the gods of the most ancient Persians were three: *Oromasdes, Arimanius,* and *Mithras:* secondly, that these three were heroes, kings, and leaders, illustrious for good deeds and for the greatness of their achievements, and exalted to the rank of gods by the favour and reverence of the people. For, as all nations paid divine honours to the first founders and ancestors of their race after death, I see no reason why we should not suppose the same of the Persians. That Arimanius and Oromasdes [on the etymology of whose names see Beausobre, Hist. de Manich. p. 169] were mighty men and most renowned leaders in war, is shown by G. Wil. Leibnitz among others, Essais de Theodicée par. 1. sect. 138. p. 285. Add the recent German edition of Casp. Abel's Teuton. et Saxon. Antiquities, cap. 1. sect. 6. p. 22. I shall therefore confine my inquiry to Mithras. In my opinion, he was a strong and mighty man or king, who delighted chiefly in horses, dogs, and hunting, and who gave peace and security to his countrymen by ridding the Persian province of wild beasts, robbers, and others pests. His soul they imagined to have been transferred after death to the sun, and from a grateful recollection of past benefits paid to it divine honours, so as to seem to worship the sun itself. That this is not a rash assumption, but an opinion resting upon no slight foundation, will, I think, be shown by the arguments I am now about to adduce. I pass over what I have already more than once intimated, that the ancestral gods of every country were no other than the authors and founders of the race; nor shall I dwell upon the well known fact, that *Mithras* belongs to those names which in Persia and the neighbouring countries were appropriated to men, [Mithra, the son of Labdacus, Disp. of Archelaus with Manes, in Zacagnius' Monum. p. 67. Hagenbuch's Epistol. Epigraph. p. 241. 242. 246.] because many, I know, suppose it to be probable, that those who bore this name received it from their parents from motives of religion towards the god. But, in order to establish my point, I shall appeal to the evidence of the images, mysteries, and sacrifices of Mithras. In the first place, the ancient Persians represented Mithras as a strong and powerful man, guarded with a sword and wearing the Persian turban, who, seated on

[4] In Alcibiades, tom. 1. opp. p. 32. he calls Zoroaster the son *τοῦ Ὀρομάζου*. It is uncertain, however, whether he means by this name the Oromasdes, to whom the Persians assigned the second place among their gods. For as among the Persians and Egyptians there were persons named Mithras, so I have no doubt there were in the former nations others also who received from their parents the name of Oromasdes.

Porphyrius, in the life of Pythagoras:* Παρήνει μάλιστα δ' ἀληθεύειν, τοῦτο γὰρ μόνον δύνασθαι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ποιεῖν θεῷ παρα-

the back of a bull, restrains, overpowers, and despatches the fierce beast, which is at the same time attacked by dogs. See some representations of the kind in Anton. Van Dale's Diss. 9. in Antiq. et Marmora, diss. 1. p. 18. &c. In some images there are also a tame lion, a serpent, and a scorpion. [The ancients say that Mithras was a stealer of oxen, and a robber. See Hist. de l'Acad. des Inscript. tom. 6. p. 365. &c. where Maffeius also attempts an explanation of the words *Nama Sebesion*, found in some stones dedicated to Mithras.] Now, I ask of any one possessing even a slight acquaintance with such matters, whether any thing could better represent a hunter and tamer of wild beasts. If there was nothing else, this image alone would in my mind sufficiently show the origin and exploits of Mithras. Very learned men, I am aware, following the example of the ancient scholiast of Statius, contend that these are symbols of natural things: namely, that the man signifies the sun, the bull the moon, and that the whole group represents the superiority of the sun to the moon. Sol, says this scholiast, lunam minorem potentia sua et humiliorem docens, taurum insidens cornibus torquet, "The sun riding on a bull turns it by the horns, showing thereby that the power of the moon is inferior to his own." See Vossius, De Idololatria, lib. 9. p. 776. Martini, Religion des Gaulois, lib. 2. c. 34. p. 456. But let those who are unwilling to employ their reason assent to interpretations like these. For my part, I conceive we ought to aim at simplicity in expounding the religions of antiquity, nor do I consider that ancient nations possessed so refined and subtle an intellect, as to conceal things which are obvious to every one, under I know not what symbols and images. The superiority of the sun to the moon is evident to the sight and known even to the most ignorant and uninformed. What man in his senses, then, would believe that the Persians, to impart a knowledge of this truth, with which all but the blind must be familiar, had recourse to so far-fetched a symbol. And what relation does a bull bear to the moon? What is meant by the dogs that are at the same time attacking the bull? What by the rest? If the bull be a symbol of the moon, because like the moon it has horns, others, I fear, by the same rule, may take it to be represented by a ram or a goat. And what shall we say of the notion itself imagined to be conveyed in this symbol? I ask whether it be possible for any reasonable man to suppose that a man slaying a bull is an apt image to show the sun to be superior in dignity to the moon. The same may be said of the other explications of this image. It is a custom among the later philosophers and grammarians to make their own conception the standard in judging of the notions of antiquity; hence, they insist that their monuments are symbols of other things, lest, forsooth, the ancients should appear to have entertained absurd and foolish notions respecting the gods or at least cherished different opinions from their own. And yet learned men set the highest value upon these interpretations: whence it very often comes to pass, that they altogether misrepresent the ancient solemnities and exhibit those barbarous nations as much wiser than they really were. Whereas, if they had duly sifted and examined the whole matter, they would no doubt have perceived that there are few of the explications afforded by Plotinus, Proclus, Jamblichus, and so many others, which do not themselves betray their own weakness and insufficiency. The victims recorded to have been sacrificed by the Persians to Mithras furnish me with another argument. Horses were sacred to this god and publicly offered to him; as is manifest from innumerable testimonies of the ancient authors, Xenophon, Philostratus, Herodotus, and others. See Vossius, De Idololatria, lib. 11. cap. 9. p. 132. Sam. Bochart. Hierozoic. lib. 2. cap. 10. p. 175. This I interpret as follows: Mithras in his life time was passionately fond of horses, as their aid cannot well be dispensed with either in subduing savage animals or encountering with enemies. Hence, the Persians, after his death, decreed that horses should be held sacred to his memory. Moreover, it was the popular belief in antiquity, that the shades of the dead retain in another world a fondness for the objects which they prized in this life. Among the Germans and other nations, as is well known, horses were slaughtered at the funeral piles of chieftains and warriors, to be employed by them for pomp or pleasure in the eternal abodes. In like manner, the Persians, knowing their king

* Page 191. [P. 41. edit. Kustern.]

πλησίους, ἐπεὶ καὶ παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ, ὡς παρὰ τῶν Μάγων ἐπυνθάνετο, ὃν Ὡρομάζην καλοῦσιν ἐκεῖνοι, ἐοικέναι τὸ μὲν σῶμα φωτί,

Mithras to have delighted in horses, judged it right to sacrifice to him from time to time fresh troops of horses to enable him still to enjoy his ancient gratification in the empire of the sun. This view, indeed, is very far from being in accordance with those either of the ancients or moderns. Herodotus, Ovid, and others suppose horses to have been consecrated to the sun on account of their swiftness. Ovid, Fast. lib. 1. v. 383.

Placet equo Persis radiis Hyperiona cinctum,
Ne detur celeri victima tarda Deo.

But this reason I hold to be altogether out of the question and never once thought of till all memory of bygone times had become obliterated. For if the Persians had regarded only the swiftness of the victim, it would have been much more appropriate to sacrifice to their god Mithras an eagle or some other bird, as in that respect far superior to horses. Or why should they not have selected the hare or the stag, proverbial for their swiftness, or some other more worthless animal in preference to the generous, valuable, and most useful horse? The longer, indeed, I ponder over this matter, the more rooted is my conviction that no more probable cause can be assigned for this worship of Mithras than the one I have hazarded. I can easily fancy, however, that the Persians themselves by degrees naturally lost sight of the true reason why their ancestors ordained this sacrifice; and in the confusion, in which, from various causes, ancient religions became involved, came to substitute a spurious one in its stead. I come now to the mysteries of Mithras, which afford no slight confirmation of the truth of my opinion. In the first place, I consider it to be unquestionable that mysteries, as they are called, were rites instituted for the purpose of preserving the memory of ancient benefits, inventions, sayings, and exploits, by which the first founders of a people or other illustrious men had attained to celebrity among their countrymen. Nor can this appear surprising to any one who attentively examines into the various mysteries and considers that in our own times, games, festivals, and solemn anniversaries are established, in order to hand down to posterity the remembrance of victories or other great achievements. I am aware that even formerly far other reasons were assigned for these mysteries by the priests, nor am I ignorant that philosophers explained them upon moral or physical grounds, whose authority indeed most of the ancient fathers of the church, as well as learned men of more modern times have thought proper to follow. But these reasons, if compared only with the mysteries themselves sufficiently betray their own fallacy, and are not only forced and far-fetched, but for the most part idle and foolish. I speak not of the great discord prevailing among those who give them a moral or physical interpretation; which ought of itself to be taken as a proof, that all such subtle expositions are destitute of foundation and were not brought forward till posterity had become ashamed of the religions hastily adopted by their forefathers. Hence, as Mithras was one of the deities to whom the ancients dedicated mysteries, the fact of itself appears to me to show that his origin is to be sought for amongst men. But this will become much more manifest, if we look a little more closely into the mysteries of Mithras. To no sacred rites was access more difficult than to these mysteries. The candidates for initiation had previously to undergo daily probations and innumerable tortures and hardships, so that an old author in a passage quoted by Bernh. Montfaucon, Diar. Italic. cap. 14. p. 201. enumerates eighty different kinds of exquisite torments, to which those were obliged to submit who were desirous of witnessing the ceremonies. Consult Phil. a Turre, Monument. Veteris Antii; Ez. Spanheim, Ad Juliani Cæsares, p. 138. 144. J. Ern. Grabius, Spicileg. Patr. et Hæretic. sæc. 2. p. 240. J. Selden, De Diis Syris, syntagm. 1. p. 170. and many others. The object of the priests in thus fencing round the worship of Mithras with so many pains and hardships, was obviously to repel the profane and promiscuous vulgar, and to exclude all from a participation in these solemnities, except the chosen few whose constancy, silence, and mental firmness had been thoroughly tested and ascertained. For those who were found hardy enough to endure years of injury and insult, and to suffer even death rather than abandon the determination once formed of being admitted to a share in their celebration, could safely be relied upon by the priest as not likely to be hereafter so imprudent, as to expose the mysterious worship to the contempt of the populace or to incur the displeasure of Mithras by their loquacity. It remains, therefore, for us to inquire into

τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν ἀληθείᾳ, which we would understand thus: "Pythagoras exhorted men chiefly to the love of truth, as being that

the reason why the priests allowed so few to be admitted into their caves, and those only of tried courage and constancy. Let learned men say what they will about the causes and objects of this institution; for my part, I am thoroughly convinced that this scrupulous caution of Mithras' priests was solely owing to the fear lest a familiarity with these hidden solemnities should make it evident to all that those, in whose honour they were celebrated, were mere men—kings, heroes, and the inventors of useful things. For as they were nothing more than imitations or representations of the acts of bygone times, it was to be feared lest spectators should hence learn that the gods publicly worshipped were men, and that the whole religion was earth-born, and not of heavenly origin. Nor, in my opinion, is the introduction of mysteries generally to be ascribed to any other cause. For rites, which in the earliest times had been common and public, were gradually withdrawn by the crafty priests from the sight of men and surrounded with the severest laws and penalties, that the people might not learn to despise and disregard the gods.

Since his mysteries, therefore, prove Mithras to have been a man, it remains for us to ascertain his character from the ceremonies practised in these mysteries, inasmuch as such rites usually gave a rude representation of the habits and deeds of those to whose memory they were dedicated. That a sort of combat and chase, not now to speak of other things, was exhibited in these mysteries, is placed beyond question. We have a general proof of this in the act of the emperor Commodus, who, as Lampridius informs us, on the occasion of his being initiated, committed a real homicide, when only a feigned one was intended, Vita Commodi, cap. 9. p. 128. Sacra, says Lampridius, Mithriaca homidio vero polluit, quum illic aliquid ad speciem timoris vel dici vel fingi soleat, "He polluted the Mythriac rites with a real homicide, where it is usual for something to be said or feigned to be done for the mere purpose of terror." Consequently, it was the custom for those who were admitted to these rites, to assault each other with weapons, after the manner of hunters and warriors, and to engage in sham fights. This is confirmed by Jul. Firm. Maternus, De Errore Profanar. Religion. p. 414. where he tells us, that persons were consecrated in these mysteries, *armed with a shield, breast-plate, sword, and spear.* We shall now proceed to explain the process. In the first place, the cave in which these mysteries were performed was adorned with the figures of various beasts, such as lions, bulls, boars, dogs, and horses. This is evident not only from the explicit passage of Hierocles, where he says that "Gracchus destroyed the cave of Mithras, and all its monstrous images," Ep. ad Lætam, tom. 4. opp. ed Martian. p. 591. but also from the very images themselves of these beasts, which were dug up not long ago near Zurich, in Switzerland, together with some symbols of Mithras, and of which engravings are given by Bernh. Montfaucon and Jac. Martini, Religion des Gaulois, tom. 1. livr. 4. p. 442. Along with these was found also a hunting spear with a broad iron point, exactly resembling the one with which Mithras slays the bull he is riding upon. In the next place, the persons initiated into these mysteries received the names of various animals. Take, for example, the authority of Porphyry among others, De Abstinentia, lib. 4. cap. 16. p. 165. Τὴν γὰρ κοινότητα ἡμῶν τὴν πρὸς τὰ ζῶα αἰνιττόμενοι διὰ τῶν ζώων ἡμᾶς μηνύειν εἰώθασιν, "For signifying our relation to animals, they (the priests of Mithras) were accustomed to designate us by the names of these." The same author adds that the μύσται were called lions, the women lionesses, and the ministers crows. Nor were the names alone sufficient. It was necessary for those present at these rites to assume also the forms of these animals and to be covered with the skins of lions, bears, and other beasts, and also to imitate their habits and dispositions. For which we have again the authority of Porphyry, Ibid. p. 166. Ὁ τε τὰ λεοντικὰ παραλαμβάνων περίτιθεται παντοδαπὰς ζώων μορφάς, "He who is initiated in these leonine rites puts on the shapes of various animals." The representation of a man clothed with these skins of beasts is given by Montfaucon, Antiq. Expliq. and Martini, as above quoted, p. 470. This custom prevailed even long after the introduction of the Christian religion into Gaul, where, on the calends of January, which were formerly sacred to Mithras, men used to run about from village to village clad in the skins of beasts; as we learn from an old discourse on the calends of January, ascribed by the Benedictines to Cæsarius, in Append. Sermonum Augustini, tom. 5. opp. p. 164. In istis diebus miseri homines, et, quod pejus est, aliqui baptizati sumunt formas adulteras,

alone which could make them resemble God, he having learned from the Magi, that God, whom they call Oromasdes, was as to

species monstrosas. Quis enim sapiens poterit credere, inveniri aliquos sanæ mentis, qui———in ferarum se velint habitum commutare? Alii vestiuntur pellibus pecudum, alii assumunt capita bestiarum, gaudentes et exsultantes, si taliter se in ferinas species transformaverint, "In those days, wretched men, and, what is worse, some of them baptized, assume spurious forms and monstrous disguises. For what wise man will believe that persons in possession of their senses are to be found, who are willing to put on the habit of beasts? Some are clothed with the skins of cattle, others take the heads of beasts, jumping about and rejoicing, as though they had by that means transformed themselves into their savage natures." Which rude and barbarous custom, J. Martini with much probability suspects the Gauls to have retained as a relic of the rites of Mithras. If we combine all these together and at the same time bear in mind the symbol of Mithras, we shall not have to inquire further, as to what took place in those mysteries. A sort of hunt was represented in them. The priests, and their attendants and ministers, disguised themselves in the forms of various kinds of beasts; and the persons initiated, armed with hunting spears and other weapons, made a show of attacking and killing these counterfeit beasts. Which the emperor Commodus either being ignorant of or disregarding, actually killed a priest thus enveloped in skins, of whom the rules of these mysteries ordained only the imaginary slaughter. Now, if it be certain, as we have already shown, that mystic rites represented the habits and acts of those in honour of whose memory they were instituted, we must conclude that Mithras was no other than a strong man and a hunter, who, having freed the Persian province from wild beasts and by that means conferred safety and prosperity upon its inhabitants, was rewarded by a grateful posterity with divine honours. I shall not stop to examine other interpretations of these Mithriac beasts, although they are approved of by men for whose merits and virtues I entertain the highest respect. Porphyry, in the place quoted, brings forward some of these explications. Some, he tells us, suppose these animals to have had reference to the Zodiac; to which opinion he himself appears not to be unfavourable. De Antro Nymphar. p. 254. Celsus, also, in Origen. lib. 6. p. 290. 291. states that these symbols and images represented the relations and courses of the heavenly bodies. And, very recently, the learned J. Martini has shown his concurrence in the same opinion, Religion des Gaulois, tom. I. p. 436. &c. But learned men, in adopting this view, forget the fight represented in the Mithriac rites against these fictitious animals, which cannot, by any law or analogy that I am aware of, be referred to the twelve heavenly signs or the certain courses of the stars. Nor do they bear in mind, that among the animals above stated to have been dug up in Switzerland, there were some not corresponding to any of the names of the stars, for example, a boar and a tiger; which never, as far as I know, have had the honour paid them of a place among the heavenly signs. Others, as the same Porphyry observes, out of Pallas, suppose the men disguised as different animals to have signified, that human souls are shut up in various kinds of bodies and that these bodies are liable to the same affections as irrational animals. To which opinion much weight has been attached in our own time by the excellent Phil. a Turre, Monum. Veteris Antii. It is manifestly redolent, however, of the Platonic school and was no doubt an invention of those later Platonists who, in order to injure the Christian cause, strove to establish a universal harmony of religions, and, in defiance of truth, pretended to find traces of their own dogmas and axioms in the remotest regions and in the religious solemnities of all nations.

Such was the religion of the ancient Persians before the time of Zoroaster. Arimanius, Oromasdes, and Mithras, men illustrious for their achievements and supposed to have been translated after death to the stars, were the popular gods and received public homage and worship. Among these Mithras held the highest place, whose soul, owing to his preeminent virtues, was believed to have migrated to the sun. But when Zoroaster the philosopher appeared, [on his name and doctrine consult Beausobre, Hist. de Manich. p. 163. and p. 816. lib. 1. c. 6] after the manner of almost all philosophers, he accommodated this religion of his ancestors to his own dogmas and principles; and, by the force of his authority, caused most of the priests to assent to and adopt the reformation. At what period this took place I shall not inquire, nor do I think it can be satisfactorily established; I shall also pass over the various fables and fictions of the Greeks respecting this man; as

corporeals most like to light, and as to incorporeals to truth." Though perhaps some would interpret these words otherwise, so

others far more learned than myself have already bestowed a portion of their leisure upon them. I shall keep solely to the fact itself; the great probability of which will be acknowledged by all who carefully sift the whole matter and possess any acquaintance with human nature. In my opinion, then, this Zoroaster was led by philosophizing or otherwise to the following doctrine: That there is one supreme and most high God, devoid of all evil, whose nature is best represented by the sun and fire; that from this supreme Deity were somehow generated two other deities, one the dispenser of all good things to mortals, the other delighting in what is hurtful and pernicious, and that not so much through the fault of the most high God as from its own depravity.—This doctrine he combined with the ancient religion of the Persians, and, as was afterwards done by Greek philosophers, adapted the popular deities, *Mithras*, *Arimanius*, and *Oromasdes*, to his own principles, identifying Mithras with the supreme God, and the others with his two inferior deities of good and evil. Many bowed to his authority: but others would not suffer themselves to be torn from the religion of their forefathers. Hence the discrepancy of ancient authors, some of whom state the sun to have been the supreme and sole God of the Persians, and others only the image of the supreme God. Of the truth, to a certain extent, of both statements, I entertain not a doubt. The latter was the opinion of those who embraced the doctrines of Zoroaster; the former, of such as found it difficult to abstract their minds from visible things. Zoroaster was unable to do away with the sacred rites of Mithras, as neither the priests nor the people would have suffered their abolition. He therefore only ventured to modify and improve them, that they might appear more to harmonize with his own institutes and opinions. Zoroaster, says Porphyry, out of Eubulus, De Antro Nymphar. p. 253. 254. was the first who dedicated a cave to Mithras in the Persian mountains. His motives for this are evident. The philosopher well knew that if these rites continued to be exposed to the gaze of the populace as heretofore and all were allowed to be present, many, in course of time, would discover the Mithras they were worshipping to be, not the supreme God or his image, the sun, but an ancient hero; hence he wisely decreed, that in future they should be celebrated in a most remote spot, namely, in a cave situated in the recesses of the mountains. An act here occurs to me of the emperor Antoninus, recorded by Julius Capitolinus in his Life, cap. 23. p. 83. in these words: Sacra Serapidis a vulgaritate Pelusiæ submovit, "He removed the sacred rites of Serapis at Pelusia from vulgar eyes;" that is, he decreed that the worship of Serapis, which at Pelusia had hitherto been public, should be private and secret. That most sagacious emperor clearly saw, that these rites, if remaining public, would be likely to engender in the minds of the Egyptians a mean and contemptible opinion of the god Serapis, and, above all, might be abused by Christians to the total overthrow of the pagan worship. The like, no doubt, struck Zoroaster: nor, indeed, are the whole of those secret ceremonies called mysteries to be traced to any other source than the fear, lest they should excite a contempt of the gods and shake the religion of the philosophers to its foundation. In my opinion, however, an honourable reason for this institution was not wanting to Zoroaster; who held it forth, perhaps, that the darkness of a cave was of all things best calculated to lead men to a consciousness and due appreciation of the magnitude of that blessing which was conferred upon them by the light of Mithras or the sun. But, as human nature is fond of novelty and the length or tediousness of the journey will not easily deter a people from witnessing those spectacles which they conceive to be associated with their religion, so, it seems, the effect of this decree of Zoroaster for celebrating the rites of Mithras in a far distant cave was not powerful enough to prevent an immense multitude from flocking to the place. Whereupon, either himself or his disciples had recourse to another expedient for excluding the people and proposed so many trials, tortures, and punishments to be undergone by those who wished to be admitted as spectators, that but few could be found willing to purchase a sight of the mysteries at the price of such penalties and hardships. Nevertheless, this religion of Zoroaster, in process of time, met with various corruptions, after a greater intercourse had sprung up between the Persians and other nations, especially the Greeks: from whose religions, as might easily be shown, if necessary, they imported much into their own. Such are the conclusions I have arrived at, on examining the religion of the ancient Persians and estimating the written accounts respecting it by the standard of

as to signify Oromasdes to have been really compounded of soul and body, and therefore nothing else but the animated sun, as Mithras is commonly supposed also to have been. But the contrary hereunto is plainly implied in those Zoroastrian traditions or fables concerning Oromasdes, recorded in Plutarch,[5] ὅτι ἀπέστησε τοῦ ἡλίου τοσοῦτον, ὅσον ὁ ἥλιος τῆς γῆς ἀφέστηκε, "that Oromasdes was as far removed from the sun, as the sun was from the earth." Wherefore, Oromasdes was, according to the Persians, a Deity superior to the sun; God properly as the fountain of light and original of good, and the same with Plato's τἀγαθὸν or "first good." From whom the Persians, as Scaliger informs us, called the first day of every month Ormasda, probably because he was the beginning of all things. And thus Zoroaster and the ancient Magi acknowledged one and the same supreme Deity, under the different names of Mithras and Oromasdes.[6]

reason and human usage. For their certainty and absolute truth I would by no means vouch; nor, in my opinion, would it be consistent either with modesty or good sense to profess to elicit light out of the great darkness of ancient matters. But that they are, for the most part, closely allied to probability, will, I conceive, be granted by those who reflect upon what is wont to take place in all ages of mankind and are not ignorant of the course commonly pursued by the founders of new systems. To confess my sentiments frankly: Those most learned and celebrated men who treat of ancient religions appear to me to rely too much upon the eyes, upon the words of authors, upon the authority of the Greeks and Romans, in short, upon their own memory and reading, and less than they ought upon reason, upon the consideration of human nature, and, lastly, upon the customs of nations. But of this elsewhere.

[5] De Iside et Osiride, p. 370. tom. 2. opp.

[6] I. I neither understand Porphyry's meaning nor can I make out the drift of the learned Doctor's interpretation. What is meant by God as a soul being like truth, let others say. To me truth appears to be a thing that no other nature can resemble, inasmuch as it is not self-existent. But it is the practice of these Platonists, Pythagoreans, and others, frequently to say many things of which they do not themselves understand the meaning, and to conceal their intolerable absurdities under a high-flown phraseology. Those who do not bear this in mind often seek for important mysteries in words that have no signification. In like manner I am altogether at a loss as to what we are to understand by God as corporeal being like to light, and as incorporeal to truth, as Dr. Cudworth explains these words. As far as I recollect σῶμα θεοῦ nowhere signifies corporeal things, nor his ψυχὴ incorporeal things. What is corporeal in God, and what incorporeal, and how the latter of these resembles truth, and the former light, seems to me to be as abstruse and difficult of comprehension as an oracle of the Pythian priestess. However, we learn from this passage, that the Magians attributed a body and soul to God; which it is well known was done also by others. II. It does not immediately follow from this fact, as the learned Doctor would have us suppose, that they held Oromasdes to be the animated sun. For I see no necessity for believing, that those who ascribe a body to God identify him with the sun. III. Neither is Plutarch's statement, that Oromasdes is far distant from the sun, any proof of his being a god superior to the sun and the fountain of all light. For Plutarch merely records that Oromasdes removed far from the sun in order to make the stars. He that for any reason removes to a certain distance from another is not necessarily greater than the one he removes and departs from. IV. On the contrary, that the Persians believed Mithras to be greater and more excellent than Oromasdes, is shown by numerous passages of the ancients quoted by those who have treated professedly of Mithras. V. Lastly, that Mithras and Oromasdes are two names of one god is at variance with the express testimony of Plutarch and other ancient authors, which no one, I conceive, is justified in disregarding and following his own conjectures. I would

But it is here observable, that the Persian Mithras was commonly called Τριπλάσιος, "threefold," or "treble." Thus Dionysius[7] the Pseudo-Areopagite: Καὶ εἰσέτι Μάγοι τὰ μυημόσυνα τοῦ Τριπλασίου Μίθρου τελοῦσιν, "The Persian Magi to this very day celebrate a festival solemnity in honour of the Triplasian (that is, the threefold or triplicated) Mithras." And something very like to this is recorded in Plutarch[8] concerning Oromasdes also: Ὁ μὲν Ὡρομάζης τρὶς ἑαυτὸν αὐξήσας, "Oromasdes thrice augmented or triplicated himself;" from whence it further appears, that Mithras and Oromasdes were really one and the same Numen.[9] Now the Scholiasts upon Dionysius pretend to give a reason of this denomination of the Persian Mithras, Triplasios, or threefold, from the miracle done in Hezekiah's time, when the day was increased, and almost triplicated; as if the Magi then observing the same had thereupon given the name of Τριπλάσιος, or "threefold," to their god Mithras, that is, the sun, and appointed an anniversary solemnity for a memorial thereof. But learned men have already shown the foolery of this conceit;[10] and therefore it cannot well be otherwise concluded, but that here is a manifest indication of a higher mystery, viz. a Trinity in the Persian theology; which Gerardus I. Vossius[1] would willingly understand, according to the Christian

not deny, that there may have been persons who confounded these two deities; but in exploring ancient religions we should look principally to their first foundation, and not inquire how a few individuals may have misinterpreted or corrupted them.

[7] Epist. 7. ad Polycarp. p. 91. t. 2. opp.

[8] De Iside et Osiride, p. 370. t. 2. opp.

[9] Neither do I hold this argument to be of any force towards proving what the learned Doctor wishes us to believe, that Oromasdes and Mithras were merely two names for one and the same god. For, to omit all the rest, Dionysius tells us the Magians called the *sun* τριπλάσιος: but Oromasdes is distinguished and separated from the sun both by Plutarch and Dr. Cudworth himself. Why the sun was called τριπλάσιος will be made apparent by and by.

[10] Gerh. Jo. Vossius, De Idololatria, lib. 2. cap. 9. p. 131. Jo. Selden, De Diis Syris Prolegom. p. 31. and others.

[1] De Orig. et Progressu Idololatr. lib. 2. cap. 9. p. 131. But Dr. Cudworth has here misinterpreted Vossius' meaning, as that great man's own words will show: Fortasse τριπλάσιον dictum (Mithræ sacrum) ob tria illa in Deo eximia, sapientiam ratione intellectus, bonitatem ratione voluntatis, et potentiam in exsequendis omnibus, "Perhaps it (the worship of Mithras) was called τριπλάσιον on account of those three perfections of God, wisdom in respect of intellect, goodness in respect of will, and power in executing all things." Vossius, then, does not seek for traces of the three persons of the godhead in the epithet τριπλάσιος, but suspects merely that the three perfections of God, wisdom, goodness, and power may have been darkly hinted at by this word, nor does he any where declare, that these three virtues are the distinguishing marks of the three persons of the Deity. Besides, Vossius does not speak positively and decisively, but conjectures and supposes. And that he himself attached but little weight to this conjecture is evident from his immediately advancing other suppositions: Sic etiam, he proceeds, dici potuit ab triplici solis effectu, calore, lumine, et distinctione temporis, vel ab triplici dierum mensura, quia alii pares, alii breviores, alii longiores, "It may have been so called also from the threefold effect of the sun, heat, light, and the distinction of time, or from the threefold measure of days, some being equal, some shorter, some longer." I do not assent to any of these suppositions; but yet the

hypothesis, of a divine Triunity, or three hypostases in one and the same Deity, whose distinctive characters are goodness, wisdom, and power. But the magical or Zoroastrian oracles seem to represent this Persian trinity more agreeably to that Pythagoric or Platonic hypothesis, of three distinct substances subordinate one to another, the two first whereof are thus expressed in the following verses:[2]

Πάντα γὰρ ἐξετέλεσε πατὴρ, καὶ νῷ παρέδωκε
Δευτέρῳ, ὃν πρῶτον κλῄζεται ἔθνεα ἀνδρῶν.

two last appear to be preferable to the first, because they pertain to the sun, to which Dionysius properly applied the epithet τριπλάσιος, whereas the first refers only to the supreme God himself, whom none of the ancients ever designated by this name. Instead of Vossius, Dr. Cudworth might have cited his own countryman, J. Selden, who shows himself to be not far from entertaining this opinion, De Diis Syris Prolegom. p. 31. where, after giving an account of the opinion of Dionysius' interpreters, he adds: Alia longe erant triplicis Mithræ mysteria, et, si fas sit dicere, sanctiora, quam quæ hujusmodi peterent exordia, "Far different were the mysteries of the triple Mithras, and, if it be right so to speak, more holy, than to require such explanations." And, more plainly to the same point, Elias Schedius, De Diis Germanorum, p. 330. In later times Pet. Dan. Huet in the Quæst. Alnetan. lib. 2. cap. 3. p. 98. avows openly: Triplex ille Persarum Mithra, Dionysio memoratus, videtur simulacrum esse quoddam Trinitatis, "The triple Mithras of the Persians, spoken of by Dionysius, seems to be a certain image of the Trinity." But I am surprised that this opinion should have been adopted by men possessing a most intimate knowledge of the history and literature of antiquity, who must have known that the ancients represented both the sun and moon with a triple face. Respecting the sun we have the authority of Macrobius, Saturnal. lib. 1. cap. 20. p. 298. who informs us that the Egyptians, to testify that, under the name of Serapis and Isis, they worshipped no other than the sun, added to the images of these deities the figure of a three-headed animal. A triple face, therefore, was at that time the symbol of the sun. That the Persians gave a triform countenance to the moon is recorded by Jul. Firmicus, De Errore Profanar. Religion. p. 413. Persæ et Magi omnes Jovem dividunt in duas potestates, ... et mulierem quidem triformi vultu constituunt, "All the Persians and Magians distinguish Jupiter into two powers, ... and represent a woman with a triform face." Nor will Virgil's verse, Æneid. lib. 14. v. 511. here escape the recollection of many:

Tergeminamque Hecatem, tria virginis ora.

Why the ancients gave a triple face to the sun and moon can be matter only of conjecture. [See Jablonsky, Pantheum Ægypt. t. 1. p. 115. &c.] Julian, Orat. 4. in Solem, p. 148. and 157. supposes the sun to have been pourtrayed threefold on account of his triple virtue and efficiency. Ταῦτά σοι, says he, κατὰ τριπλῆν τοῦ θεοῦ δημιουργίαν ἐν τρισὶ μάλιστα νυξὶν . . . . γράψαι πρός σε ἐτόλμησα, "This I have ventured to send to thee respecting the triple function of the god (the sun), written principally in three nights." But the emperor's discourse concerning this triple virtue is too subtle to be received as true and incontrovertible. Jac. Martini not long ago hazarded the conjecture, that the three faces of the sun represented the three seasons of the year, the ancients having reckoned only three, Religion des Gaulois, t. 1. p. 425. As to myself, I am disposed to follow the view taken by Macrobius, than which nothing can be more simple and clear, that the three faces of the sun and moon denoted the threefold relation of time, present, past, and future. Be this as it may, however, I consider these authorities to show clearly from whence proceeded the name τριπλάσιος, or threefold, which Dionysius gives to Mithras or the sun. Nor is it less manifest from the same, that to apply this appellation, belonging properly to the sun, to the three persons of the godhead, would be just as rational as to contend that the triune God was known to Virgil, because he called Hecate, or the moon, *tergemina*. The learned Doctor himself abandons this opinion, when he argues a little afterwards that Mithras was the second person of the Persian triad.

[2] In the Oracles ascribed to Zoroaster, sect. 2. v. 27. 28. p. 1179. ed Stanleii.

To this sense: "The Father, or first Deity, perfected all things, and delivered them to the second Mind, who is that, whom the nations of men commonly take for the first." Which oracle Psellus[3] thus glosseth upon: Τὴν πᾶσαν κτίσιν δημιουργήσας ὁ τῆς τριάδος πρῶτος πατὴρ, παρέδωκε ταύτην τῷ νῷ· ὄντινα νοῦν τὸ ξύμπαν γένος τῶν ἀνδρων, ἀγνοοῦντες τὴν πατρικὴν ὑπεροχὴν πατὴρ, Θεὸν πρῶτον καλοῦσι, "The first Father of the Trinity, having produced this whole creation, delivered it to Mind or Intellect: which Mind the whole generation of mankind, being ignorant of the paternal transcendency, commonly call the first God." After which, Psellus takes notice of the difference here betwixt this Magical or Chaldaic Theology, and that of Christians: Πλὴν τὸ παρ' ἡμῖν δόγμα ἐναντίως ἔχει, ὡς αὐτὸς ὁ πρῶτος νοῦς, ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ μεγάλου πατρὸς, τὴν κτίσιν πᾶσαν ἐδημιούργησεν, &c. "But our Christian doctrine is contrary hereunto, namely thus: that the first Mind or Intellect, being the Son of the great Father, made the whole creation. For the Father, in the Mosaic writings, speaks to his Son, the idea of the creation; but the Son is the immediate opifex thereof." His meaning is, that according to this Persian or Chaldaic theology, the first hypostasis of the divine Triad was the δημιουργὸς, or "immediate architect of the world;" whereas, according to the Christian as well as Platonic doctrine, he is the second. For which cause, Pletho framed another interpretation of that Magic oracle, to render it more conformable both to the Christian and Platonic doctrine: Ὁ γὰρ πατὴρ ἅπαντα ἐξετέλησε, τὰ νοητὰ δηλαδὴ εἴδη (ταῦτα γάρ ἐστι τὰ ἐκτετελεσμένα τε καὶ τέλεια) καὶ τῷ μεθ' ἑαυτὸν δευτέρῳ θεῷ παρέδωκεν, ἄρχειν δηλαδὴ καὶ ἡγεῖσθαι αὐτῶν, &c. "The Father perfected all things, that is, the intelligible ideas (for these are those things, which are complete and perfect), and delivered them to the second God, to rule over them. Wherefore whatsoever is produced by this God, according to its own exemplar and the intelligible essence, must needs owe its original also to the highest Father. Which second God the generations of men commonly take for the first, they looking up no higher than to the immediate architect of the world." According to which interpretation of Pletho's (the more probable of the two), the second hypostasis in the Magic (or Persian) Trinity, as well as in the Platonic and Christian, is the immediate opifex or architect of the world; and this seems to be properly that, which was called Mithras in Eubulus.

But besides these two hypostases, there is also a third mentioned in a certain other Magic or Chaldaic oracle, cited by Proclus,[4] under the name of Psyche, or the mundane soul:

[3] He and Pletho wrote commentaries on the Oracles of Zoroaster, which are still extant and are interlarded with not a few Platonic figments.

[4] This verse occurs in the oracles of Zoroaster, sect. 6. v. 150. p. 1184. according to

Μετὰ δὲ Πατρικὰς Διανοίας,
Ψυχὴ ἐγὼ ναίω,

"After (or next below) the paternal Mind, I Psyche dwell." Now the paternal Mind, as Psellus informs us, is the second hypostasis before mentioned: Ὁ πατρικὸς νοῦς, ὁ δευτερὸς δηλαδὴ Θεὸς, καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς προσεχὴς δημιουργὸς, "The paternal Mind is the second God, and the immediate demiurgus or opifex of the soul." Wherefore though both those names, Oromasdes and Mithras, were frequently used by the Magi for the τὸ θεῖον, or whole Deity in general, yet this being triplasian or threefold, according to their theology, as containing three hypostases in it; the first of those three seems to have been that which was most properly called Oromasdes, and the second Mithras. And this is not only confirmed by Pletho, but also with this further superaddition to it, that the third hypostasis of that Persian Trinity was that, which they called Arimanius; he gathering as much even from Plutarch[5] himself: Φασὶ περὶ Ζωροάστρου, ὡς τριχῇ τὰ ὄντα διέλοι· καὶ τῇ μὲν πρώτῃ αὐτῶν μοίρᾳ Ὡρομάζην ἐφιστῴη· τοῦτον δ' εἶναι, τὸν ὑπὸ τῶν λογίων πατέρα καλούμενον· τῇδε ἐσχάτῃ Ἀρειμάνην· Μίθραν δὲ τῇ μέσῃ, καὶ τοῦτον δ' ἂν εἶναι τὸν Δεύτερον Νοῦν καλούμενον ὑπὸ τῶν λογίων, "They say, that Zoroaster made a threefold distribution of things, and that he assigned the first and highest rank of them to Oromasdes, who in the oracles is called the Father: the lowest to Arimanes; and the middle to Mithras, who in the same oracles is likewise called the second Mind." Whereupon he observes, how great an agreement there was betwixt the Zoroastrian and the Platonic Trinity, they differing in a manner only in words. And the middle of these, namely, the eternal Intellect, that contains the ideas of all things, being, according to the Platonic hypothesis, the immediate δημιουργὸς and architect of the world, this probably was that Mithras, as we have already intimated, who is called in Eubulus, the Demiurgus of the world, and the maker and father of all things. Now, if that third hypostasis of the Magic or Chaldaic oracles be the same with that which the Persians call Arimanius, then must it be upon such an account as this, because this lower world (wherein are souls vitally united to bodies, and lapsable) is the region, where all manner of evils, wickedness, pains, corruption, and mortality reign. And herewith Hesychius seemeth to agree: Ἀρειμάνης (saith he) ὁ Ἅιδης

the present editions, but is not arranged as here; which, however, does not affect the matter itself.

[5] De Iside et Osiride, p. 370. The Greeks, whose custom it was to apply the names of their own gods to those of barbarous nations and confound the one with the other, perceiving that the Persian accounts of Arimanius agreed in some respects with those given of Pluto, hesitated not to call Arimanius by the name of Pluto, as if they were one and the same god.

παρὰ Πέρσαις, "Arimanius among the Persians is Hades," that is, either Orcus or Pluto; wherein he did but follow Theopompus, who in Plutarch calls Arimanius likewise Hades or Pluto: which it seems was as well the third in the Persian Trinity (or Triplasian Deity) as it was in the Homerican. And this was that Arimanius, whom the Persian king in Plutarch,[6] upon Themistocles' flight, addressed his devotion to: Κατευξάμενος ἀεὶ τοῖς πολεμίοις τοιαύτας φρένας διδόναι τὸν Ἀρειμάνιον, ὅπως ἐλαύνωσι τοὺς ἀρίστους τῶν ἑαυτῶν, "He prayed, that Arimanius would always give such a mind to his enemies, as thus to banish and drive away their best men from them." And indeed from that which Plutarch affirms, διὸ καὶ Μίθρην Πέρσαι τὸν Μεσίτην ὀνομάζουσι, "that the Persians, from their god Mithras, called any mediator, or middle betwixt two, Mithras;" it may be more reasonably concluded that Mithras, according to the Persian theology, was properly the middle hypostasis of that triplasian or triplicated Deity of theirs, than that he should be a middle self-existent god or mediator betwixt two adversary gods unmade, one good, and the other evil, as Plutarch would suppose.[7]

Notwithstanding which, if that, which the same Plutarch and others do so confidently affirm, should be true, that Zoroaster and the ancient Magi made good and evil, light and darkness, the two substantial principles of the universe; that is, asserted an evil demon co-eternal with God, and independent on him, in the very same manner that Plutarch himself and the Manicheans afterward did; yet however it is plain, that in this way also Zoroaster and the Magi acknowledged one only fountain and original of all good, and nothing to be independent upon that one

[6] In Plutarch, Vita Themistoclis, p. 326. But this very passage of itself shows that the Persians believed Arimanius to be the parent and author of all evils. For the Persian king prays of him to instil pernicious thoughts into the minds of his enemies. Whatever evil is contrived by men, they believed was to be ascribed to Arimanius, and every thing beneficial and good to Oromasdes.

[7] The whole of this disputation respecting the Zoroastrian trinity I have elucidated to the best of my ability in the foregoing remarks on the religion and sacred rites of the Persians. The Zoroastrian Oracles, as they are termed, are not, I consider, calculated to give us an insight into the doctrines of the ancient Persians on divine things; nor do I think at all that the Persians worshipped a triplasian deity, as there are so many passages of the ancients to prove that Mithras, Oromasdes and Arimanius were distinct both in their offices and whole nature. The reason, however, why most nations formerly worshipped three primary gods, I shall show by probable arguments in another place. Nevertheless, the learned Doctor has taken a wiser course than those who professed to have discovered the Christian Trinity itself in these three names of the Persians; as after Pletho was done by H. Sanford, De Descensu Christi ad Inferos, lib. 2. sect. 37. according to Th. Gataker, Adversar. Miscellan. cap. 22. p. 662. by Phil. Mornæus, De Veritate Relig. Christ. cap. 6. and others; who are refuted by J. Thomasius, Diss. de Persarum Platonicorumque Trinitate, sect. 23. p. 67. in Christ. Thomasius' Historia Sapient. et Stultitiæ, t. 3. Although, as will be seen from my remarks above, I do not assent to all that the learned Doctor here advances respecting the triplasian Mithras and other matters. My limits would not warrant me in going to any length in this place, either in repeating or confuting all that has been brought forward by others.

good principle or God, but only that, which is so contrary to his nature and perfection, as that it could not proceed from him, namely, evil. But we have already discovered a suspicion, that the meaning of those ancient Magi might possibly be otherwise; they philosophizing only concerning a certain mixture of evil and darkness, together with good and light, that was in the composition of this lower world, and personating the same; as also perhaps taking notice especially therein of evil demons (who are acknowledged likewise in the Magic oracles, and called θῆρες χθονὸς, "beasts of the earth," and χθόνιοι κύνες, "terrestrial dogs"); the head of which might be sometimes called also emphatically ὁ πονηρὸς δαίμων Περσῶν, "the evil demon of the Persians," as being the very same with the devil: all which was under the immediate presidency or government of that God, called by them Arimanius, Hades or Pluto, the third hypostasis in the Triplasian Deity of the Persians. Which suspicion may be yet further confirmed from hence, because the Persian theologers, as appears by the inscriptions, expressly acknowledged the divine omnipotence, which they could not possibly have done, had they admitted of a Manichean substantial evil principle, co-eternal with God, and independent on him. Besides which it is observable, that whereas the Gnostics in Plotinus' time asserted this world to have been made, not so much from a principle essentially evil and eternal, as from a lapsed soul, to weigh down the authority of Plato, that was against them, did put Zoroaster in the other scale, producing a book entitled, Ἀποκαλύψεις Ζωροάστρου, or "the Revelations of Zoroaster," Porphyrius tells us,[8] that himself wrote purposely to disprove those Zoroastrian Revelations, as new and counterfeit, and forged by those Gnostics themselves; therein implying also the doctrine of the ancient Zoroaster no way to have countenanced or favoured that Gnostic heresy. Moreover, the tenets of these ancient Magi, concerning that duplicity of principles, are by writers represented with great variety and uncertainty. That account, which Theodorus in Photius[9] (treating of the Persian magic) gives thereof, as also that other of Eudemus in Damascius,[10] are

[8] Vita Plotini, cap. 16. p. 119. ed. Fabricii. Also Clemens Alexandr. Stromat. lib. 1. p. 357. informs us that the followers of Prodicus, who are known to have been Gnostics, boasted of having the secret books of Zoroaster in their possession. But what the learned Doctor here states respecting the motives of the Gnostics in forging these books is founded upon no authority of ancient writers, but upon conjecture only, as are also some others of the matters eruditely discussed in this place.

[9] Biblioth. cod. 81. p. 199.

[10] He alludes to a manuscript work of Damascius the Platonic philosopher, Περὶ τῶν Πρώτων Ἀρχῶν, or "Concerning First Principles;" extracts from which have lately been given by J. Christ. Wolf, in his Anecdot. Græc. t. 3. p. 195. including the very passage from Eudemus on the Persian Magi here appealed to by the learned Doctor. The same, however, had already been cited by Th. Hyde, De Veteri Persar. Religione. This passage, if rightly expounded, corroborates what I have said

both of them so nonsensical, that we shall not here trouble the reader with them; however, neither of them suppose the Persian Arimanius, or Satanas, to be an unmade self-existing demon. But the Arabians, writing of this Altanawiah, or Persian duplicity of good and evil principles, affirm, that according to the most approved Magi, light was Kadiman, the most ancient and first god, and that darkness was but a created god; they expressly denying the principle of evil and darkness to be coeve with God, or the principle of good and light. And Abulfeda represents the Zoroastrian doctrine (as the doctrine of the Magi reformed) after this manner:* "That God was older than darkness and light, and the creator of them, so that he was a solitary being, without companion or corrival; and that good and evil, virtue and vice, did arise from a certain commixture of light and darkness together, without which this lower world could never have been produced; which mixture was still to continue in it, till at length light should overcome darkness; and then light and darkness shall each of them have their separate and distinct worlds, apart from one another."

If it were now needful, we might make it further evident, that Zoroaster, notwithstanding the multiplicity of gods worshipped by him, was an assertor of one supreme, from his own description of God, extant in Eusebius:† Θεός ἐστιν ὁ πρῶτος ἄφθαρτος, ἀΐδιος, ἀγέννητος, ἀμερὴς, ἀνομοιότατος, ἡνίοχος παντὸς καλοῦ, ἀδωροδόκητος, ἀγαθῶν ἀγαθώτατος, φρονίμων φρονιμώτατος, ἔστι δὲ καὶ πατὴρ εὐνομίας καὶ δικαιοσύνης, αὐτοδίδακτος, τέλειος, καὶ ἱεροῦ φυσικοῦ μόνος εὑρετής, "God is the first incorruptible, eternal, unmade, indivisible, most unlike to every thing, the head or leader of all good, unbribable, the best of the good, the wisest of the wise; he is also the father of law and justice; self-taught, perfect, and the only inventor of the natural holy." Which Eusebius tells us, that this Zoroastrian description of God was contained verbatim in a book entitled, "A holy Collection of the Persian Monuments;" as also that Ostanes (himself a famous magician, and admirer of Zoroaster) had recorded the very same of him in his Octateuchon.[1]

Now we having, in this discourse concerning Zoroaster and

above on sect. 13. on the religion and institutions of the Magians; from which it will be evident also, what opinion we ought to form of the positions here advanced by the learned Doctor. For the most part they depend solely upon conjecture; nor does Dr. Cudworth himself disown that the accounts of the ancients respecting the doctrine of the Magians are involved in the greatest doubt and uncertainty.

* Pocock Spec. Hist. Ar. p. 146—148. † Præp. Ev. lib. 1. [cap. 10. p. 42.]

[1] In this definition some words are omitted. Towards the beginning of that given in Eusebius, God is described also as κεφαλὴν ἔχων ἱέρακος, "having the head of a hawk," and towards the end as φυσικὸς καὶ σοφὸς, "natural and wise." But I should class the whole of this definition among the things invented by the Greeks long after the time of Zoroaster, for the purpose of confirming their own dogmas by the authority of so great a man.

the Magi, cited the oracles, called by some magical, and imputed to Zoroaster, but by others Chaldaical; we conceive it not improper to give some account of them here. And indeed if there could be any assurance of the antiquity and sincerity of those reputed oracles, there would then need no other testimony to prove, that either Zoroaster and the Persian Magi, or else at least the Chaldeans, asserted not only a divine monarchy, or one supreme Deity the original of all things, but also a trinity consistently with the same.

And it is certain, that those oracles are not such novel things as some would suspect, they being cited by Synesius,[2] as then venerable, and of great authority, under the name of ἱερὰ λόγια, "holy oracles;" and there being, of this number, some produced by him, that are not to be found in the copies of Psellus and Pletho; from whence it may be concluded, that we have only some fragments of these oracles now left. And that they were not forged by Christians, as some of the Sibylline oracles undoubtedly were, seems probable from hence, because so many Pagan philosophers make use of their testimonies, laying no small stress upon them; as, for example, Damascius, out of whom Patritius hath made a considerable collection of such of these oracles as are wanting in Psellus' and Pletho's copies. And we learn from Photius, that whereas Hierocles' book of fate and providence was divided into seven parts, the drift of the fourth of them was this, τὰ λεγόμενα λόγια, εἰς συμφωνίαν συνάγειν, οἷς Πλάτων ἐδογμάτισε, "to reconcile the reputed oracles with Plato's doctrines." Where it is not to be doubted, but that those reputed oracles of Hierocles were the same with these Magic or Chaldaic oracles; because these are frequently cited by philosophers under that name of λόγια, or oracles. Proclus upon the Timæus: Ὑπό τε Πλάτωνος, καὶ Ὀρφέως, καὶ Λογίων, ποιητὴς καὶ πατὴρ ὑμνεῖται τοῦ παντὸς, πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε· γεννῶν μὲν τὰ πλήθη τῶν θεῶν, ψυχὰς δὲ πέμπων εἰς γενέσεις ἀνδρῶν· "The maker of the universe is celebrated both by Plato and Orpheus, and the oracles, as the father of gods and men, who both produceth multitudes of gods, and sends down souls for the generations of men." And as there are other fragments of these cited by Proclus elsewhere, under the name of λόγια, or oracles,[4] so doth he sometimes give them that higher title of θεοπαράδοτος θεολογία, and μυσταγωγία, "The theology

[2] In particular throughout the whole of his book, De Insomniis. Nicephorus, the Greek interpreter of this book, Schol. p. 363. &c., attaches great importance to these oracles, and quotes some remarkable passages out of them. But the Zoroastrian oracles are already spoken of by Nicolaus Damascenus, Excerpt. Valesian. p. 460. long before the time of Synesius: if indeed they be the same with those which we have at this day.

[3] Biblioth. cod. 214. p. 553. * Pag. 97.

[4] The same is done in Synesius, De Insomniis, p. 138. 140. and other authors.

that was of divine tradition or revelation." Which magnificent encomium was bestowed in like manner upon Pythagoras' philosophy by Jamblichus,[5] that being thought to have been derived in great part from the Chaldeans and the Magi: Ἐκ θεῶν αὐτῆς παραδοθείσης τὸ κατ' ἀρχὰς, "This philosophy of Pythagoras, having been first divinely delivered, or revealed by the gods, ought not to be handled by us without a religious invocation of them." And that Porphyrius was not unacquainted with these oracles neither, may be concluded from that book of his entitled, Περὶ τῆς ἐκ λογίων φιλοσοφίας, "concerning the philosophy from oracles;" which, consisting of more parts, one of them was called, Τὰ τῶν Χαλδαίων λόγια, "the oracles of the Chaldeans:"[6] which, that they were the very same with those we now speak of, shall be further proved afterward. Now, though Psellus affirms, that the Chaldean dogmata contained in those oracles were some of them admitted both by Aristotle and Plato; yet does he not pretend these very Greek verses themselves to have been so ancient. But it seems probable from Suidas,[7] that Julian, a Chaldean and theurgist, the son of Julian a philosopher,

[5] Vita Pythagor. cap. 1. p. 1. 2. ed. Kusteri.

[6] What is stated here respecting Porphyry is altogether uncertain. It is evident, from the testimony of Æneas Gazæus, in his Theophrastus, p. 56. that Porphyry, in a certain work, produced oracles of the Chaldeans, to prove matter to be generated. But, although probably these oracles were the same with those at the present day inscribed with the name of Zoroaster, still it is by no means clear that they were brought forward by him in a book concerning the philosophy from oracles. On the contrary, it is more likely that they were given in his six books Περὶ ὕλης, or, "Concerning matter." See Luc. Holstenius, De Vita et Scriptis Porphyrii, cap. 9. p. 56. However, that Porphyry treated of τὰ λόγια, we have also the authority of Marinus, in Vita Proclis, cap. 26. p. 61.

[7] The Doctor here follows the opinion of Fr. Patricius, the well-known editor of these oracles. It has already been controverted, however, by Pet. Lambecius, Prodromi Histor. Litter. lib. 1. cap. 7. p. 93. who complains of the too great license in interpreting Suidas' word, γράφειν, in the sense of μεταφράζειν, or *vertere*; and therefore supposes this Julian to be the father and author of those oracles called at this day Zoroastrian. In opposition to Lambecius, the opinion of Patricius and Cudworth is ably defended by J. Alb. Fabricius, Biblioth. Gr. lib. 1. cap. 36. sect. 14. p. 251. who treats of these oracles at some length. For my part, I neither agree entirely with Lambecius nor Patricius. The passage of Suidas does not speak of a translation or explication of the Chaldean oracles by Julian, but states that this philosopher, whom many of the ancients rank among the Magians, wrote λόγια, "short precepts," as I translate it, in verse, on Theurgical subjects: for the term λόγια is used by the later Greeks of a collection of short unconnected sayings or sentences, such as the κύριαι δόξαι of Epicurus. But I see nothing in Suidas to favour Lambecius' opinion, that the oracles of Julian are the same with the Zoroastrian: which is a matter most uncertain. I should think, indeed, that this man, being desirous of appearing deeply versed in the secret sciences of the pagans, wrote laws and precepts upon them out of his own head. To confirm Patricius' opinion, Fabricius urges, I. That the oracles of Zoroaster are already spoken of by Nic. Damascenus. But that proves nothing, unless it first be shown that the oracles cited by Damascenus are the same with those which are now extant. II. That the writings of Julian were read by the later Platonists, who, however, did not ascribe these oracles to Julian, but to a much higher source. This, I acknowledge, is a proof that the Zoroastrian oracles were not written by Julian; but it does not show, that Julian translated these oracles into Greek verse, which the Chaldeans had probably written in prose.

(who wrote concerning demons and telesiurgics) was the first that turned those Chaldee or magic oracles into Greek verse; Ἰουλιανὸς, ἐπὶ Μάρκου Ἀντονίνου τοῦ βασιλέως, ἔγραψε θεουργικὰ, τελεστικὰ, λόγια δι' ἐπῶν, "Julian, in the time of Marcus Antoninus, the emperor, wrote the theurgic and telestic oracles in verse." For that there is something of the theurgical magic mixed together with mystical theology in these oracles, is a thing so manifest from that operation about the Hecatine circle, and other passages in them, that it cannot be denied; which renders it still more unlikely that they should have been forged by Christians. Nevertheless, they carry along with them (as hath been already observed) a clear acknowledgment of a divine monarch, or one supreme Deity, the original of all things, which is called in them the father, and the paternal principle, and that intelligible [8] ὃ χρή σε νοεῖν νόου ἄνθει, "that cannot be apprehended otherwise than by the flower of the mind;" as also that[9] "one fire, from whence all things spring." Psellus, thus glossing upon that oracle, "All things were the offspring of one fire:" Πάντα τὰ ὄντα, τά τε νοητὰ, καὶ αἰσθητὰ, ἀπὸ μόνου θεοῦ τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἔλαβον, καὶ πρὸς μόνον θεὸν ἐπέστραπται, &c. Ἀπταιστον οὖν τὸ λόγιον, καὶ πλῆρες τοῦ ἡμετέρου δόγματος, "All things, whether intelligible or sensible, receive their essence from God alone, and return back again only to him; so that this oracle is irreprehensible, and full of our doctrine." And it is very observable, that these very same oracles expressly determined also that matter was not ἀγέννητος, "unmade," or "self-existent," but derived in like manner from the Deity. Which we learn from Proclus upon Plato's Timæus, where, when he had positively asserted, that there is ἓν πάντων αἴτιον, "one thing the cause of all things;" and τἀγαθὸν, πάντων αἴτιον ὂν, εἶναι καὶ ὕλης αἴτιον, "that the supreme good, being the cause of all things, is also the cause of matter:" he confirms this assertion of his from the authority of the oracles,* Ἀπὸ ταύτης καὶ τῆς τάξεως καὶ τὰ λόγια παράγει τὴν πολυποίκιλον ὕλην· ἔνθεν ἄρδην θρώσκει γένεσις πολυποικίλου ὕλης, "From this order, also, do the oracles deduce the generation of the matter, in these words; from thence (that is, from one supreme Deity) altogether proceeds the genesis of the multivarious matter." Which unquestionably was one of those very magic or Chaldee oracles;[10] and it may be further proved from hence, because it was by Porphyrius set down amongst them, as appears from Æneas Gazeus in his Theo-

[8] Oraculor. sect. 3. v. 58. p. 1180.

[9] Sect. 2. v. 59. p. 1179.

Εἰσὶ πάντα πυρὸς ἑνὸς ἐκγεγαῶτα,

"All things are the offspring of one fire."

* Pag. 118.

[10] Sect. 1. v. 20. in our collection.

phrastus:[1] Οὐ γὰρ ἀγέννητος οὐδὲ ἄναρχος ἡ ὕλη, τοῦτό σε καὶ Χαλδαῖοι διδάσκουσι, καὶ ὁ Πορφύριος· ἐπιγράφει δὲ καθόλου τὸ βιβλίον, ὃ εἰς μέσον προάγει, τῶν Χαλδαίων τὰ λόγια, ἐν οἷς γεγονέναι τὴν ὕλην ἰσχυρίζεται, "Neither was matter void of generation or beginning, which the Chaldeans and Porphyrius teach thee; he making this the title of a whole book published by him, The Oracles of the Chaldeans; in which it is confirmed that matter was made."

Moreover, that there was also in these magic or Chaldee oracles, a clear signification of a divine triad, hath been already declared. But we shall here produce Proclus' testimony for it too: Οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἡ θεοπαράδοτος θεολογία φησὶ συμπεπληρῶσθαι τὸν κόσμον ἐκ τῶνδε τῶν Τριῶν· λέγει γοῦν ἡ ψυχὴ περὶ τοῦ Διὸς ἐπέκεινα τοῦ δημιουργήσαντος τὸ πᾶν, "Thus the divinely delivered (or inspired) theology affirmeth the whole to have been completed from these three; Psyche, or the mundane soul, therein speaking concerning that Zeus or Jupiter, who was above the maker of the world, in this manner," &c.[2] For we have already declared, that Proclus' Θεοπαράδοτος θεολογία, "Theology of divine tradition or revelation," is one and the same thing with the λόγια, or oracles. To which testimony of Proclus we might also superadd that oracle cited out of Damascius by Patritius:[3]

Παντὶ γὰρ ἐν κόσμῳ λάμπει Τριὰς, ἧς Μόνας ἄρχει.

"In the whole world shineth forth a triad or trinity, the head whereof is a monad or perfect unity;" than which nothing can be plainer.[4]

[1] Pag. 56.

[2] Comm. in Timæum Plat. p. 116. Marinus also, Vita Procli, cap. 26. p. 62. uses the phrase θεοπαράδοτα λόγια.

[3] Sect. 1. v. 5.

[4] The learned Doctor does not clearly explain what conclusions we ought to come to regarding the oracles of Zoroaster. We may easily gather from his arguments, however, that his opinion was the same as that entertained by Stanley, Le Clerc, Fabricius, and other learned men, who maintain that these oracles, although not to be ascribed to Zoroaster, nevertheless contain the ancient doctrine of the Chaldeans on things divine. My own sentiments on this subject will be shown by what follows. I. That the ancient Persians commonly attributed certain λόγια, or precepts, to Zoroaster, is testified by Nicol. Damascenus, De Vita Zoroast. in the Excerpt. Valesii, p. 460; where he states, amongst other things, that they followed the λόγια of Zoroaster, in ordaining that dead bodies should not be burnt. II. I confess myself ignorant, however, whence those which at this day bear the name of Zoroaster first received that name. The younger Platonists, who, according to Marinus, Vita Procli, cap. 26. p. 61. were accustomed publicly to interpret these oracles, never, as far as I know, ascribed them to Zoroaster, but are in the habit of calling them simply λόγια, τὰ ἱερὰ λόγια, θεοπαράδοτα λόγια, and, lastly, τὰ λόγια Χαλδαϊκά. In like manner, Nicephorus Gregoras, who lived in the fourteenth century, in his Expositio Libri Synesii de Insomniis, does not assign the name of any author; neither did Psellus nor Plethus, the first collectors and expounders of these oracles, state them to be Zoroaster's, but called them merely Chaldean or Magian oracles, or simply λόγια, although they assert that the dogmas of Zoroaster are contained in them. Nay, not even Lodoicus Toletanus, who first edited part of these oracles in Greek, Paris, 1538.4, ventured to attribute them to

XVII. And now we pass out of Asia into Europe, from Zoroaster to Orpheus. It is the opinion of some eminent philologers of latter times, that there never was any such man as Orpheus, but only in fairy land; and that the whole history of Orpheus was nothing but a mere romantic allegory, utterly devoid of all truth and reality. But there is nothing alleged for this opinion from antiquity, save only this one passage of Cicero's concerning Aristotle;* Orpheum poetam docet Aristoteles nunquam fuisse, "Aristotle teacheth, that there never was any such man as Orpheus the poet:" in which, notwithstanding, Aristotle seems to have meant no more than this, that there was no such poet as Orpheus senior to Homer, or that the verses vulgarly called Orphical were not written by Orpheus. However, if it should be granted that Aristotle had denied the existence of such a man, there seems to be no reason at all why his single testimony should here preponderate against that universal consent of all

Zoroaster: expressing the title, agreeably no doubt to his own MS., in these words, Μαγικὰ λόγια τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ Ζωροάστρου Μάγων. I should wish to know, therefore, from those who are versed in these matters, who it was, whether Patricius or some earlier writer, that first took upon himself to designate by the name of Zoroaster oracles, which the ancients referred to no author, but ascribed generally to the Chaldeans. It is manifest, indeed, that those who estimate Zoroaster's doctrine from these verses, take a very unsafe and slippery course. III. However the whole subject of these oracles is beset with difficulties, and almost inexplicable, nor is it possible to decide with any certainty as to their drift and meaning, as we have only small portions of them culled from a variety of authors. It is, indeed, unquestionable, that the junior Platonists possessed a collection of oracles, or magic precepts, as early as the second century after the birth of our Saviour, which they pretended to have been received by them from the Chaldean Magians and to contain the ancient doctrines of the oriental philosophers. It is also certain, that the oracles we have at the present day belonged to that collection, as most of them are extracted from the commentaries of the Platonists. Lastly, it is certain that this sect of philosophers attached the highest value to these oracles: which is shown, not only by the magnificent praises they bestow upon them, but also by the expositions of Jamblichus, Proclus, Syrianus, and others. Whether, however, they were forged by the Platonists, or really translated from the Chaldaic language into Greek, seems to be matter of controversy. IV. For my own part, I incline to the opinion, that the whole of these oracles are the production of some Platonist of the second century: and shall now state the reasons that have led me to this. In the first place, as I have shown elsewhere, these philosophers considered it fair to have recourse to such like frauds and impostures. In the next place, in order to oppose the Christians, who were wont to appeal to the quarrels of philosophers as an argument of the truth of their own religion, their sole endeavour at this period was to show that all the philosophers that ever existed were in perfect harmony with each other, and, in particular, that the orientals inculcated the same doctrines as Plato and the Greeks. To attain which object, it became sometimes necessary to attribute to the oriental sages many things altogether foreign to their precepts, and to father upon them spurious writings of later times. Again, there is a singular affinity between these Platonic philosophers and those oracles. In both, the dogmas are the same; as also the phrases and words. Lastly, the doctrine in these oracles, concerning the three principles of things, savours, if I mistake not, of the later Platonic school, and seems to have been broached at the time when those philosophers did all in their power to imitate and parallel the Christian tenets regarding the Deity, in order to sustain the desperate cause of polytheism. Nevertheless, I here decide nothing, but advance only probable conjecture; from which any one, relying upon better authorities or arguments, can exercise his own judgment in dissenting.

* De Nat. Deor. lib. 1. p. 211.

antiquity, which is for one Orpheus, the son of Œager, by birth a Thracian, the father or chief founder of the mythical and allegorical theology amongst the Greeks, and of all their most arcane religious rites and mysteries; who is commonly supposed to have lived before the Trojan war, (that is, in the time of the Israelitish judges) or at least to have been senior both to Hesiod and Homer; and also to have died a violent death, most affirming him to have been torn in pieces by women. For which cause, in that vision of Herus Pamphylius in Plato,* Orpheus' soul being come down again into another body, is said to have chosen rather that of a swan (a reputed musical animal) than to be born again of a woman, by reason of that great hatred which he had conceived of all womankind, for his suffering such a violent death from them. And the historic truth of Orpheus was not only acknowledged by Plato, but also by Isocrates, senior to Aristotle likewise (in his oration in the praise of Busiris;[5]) and confirmed by that sober historiographer Diodorus Siculus,[6] he giving this account of Orpheus, "That he was a man who diligently applied himself to literature, and having learned τὰ μυθολογούμενα, or the mythical part of theology, travelled into Egypt, where he attained to further knowledge, and became the greatest of all the Greeks in the mysterious rites of religion, theological skill, and poetry." To which Pausanias addeth,† that he gained great authority, οἷα πιστευόμενος εὑρηκέναι ἔργων ἀνοσίων καθαρμοὺς, νόσων τε ἰάματα, καὶ τροπὰς μηνιμάτων θείων, "as being believed to have found out expiations for wicked actions, remedies for diseases, and appeasements of the divine displeasure." Neither was this history of Orpheus contradicted by Origen,[7] when Celsus gave him so fit an occasion, and so strong a provocation to do it, by his preferring Orpheus before our Saviour Christ. To all which may be added, in the last place, that it being commonly concluded,[8] from the Greek word θρησκεία, that the Greeks derived their Teletæ and mysteries of religion from the Thracians, it is not so unreasonable to think, with the learned Vossius,[9] that Xamolxis was the founder of them, (and not Orpheus) this Xamolxis being by most reported to have been Pythagoras' servant, and consequently too much a junior; and though Herodotus[10] attribute

* De Rep. l. 10. lib. 4. p. 162.
[5] P. 452.
[6] Biblioth. Histor. lib. 4. cap. 25. p. 221.
* Lib. 9. p. 586.
[7] Adv. Celsum, lib. 7. p. 368.
[8] So Suidas, Plutarch, and others, named by G. J. Vossius, De Orig. et Progr. Idololatriæ, lib. 2. cap. 57. p. 226. Of moderns who have adopted the same notion, the number is infinite.
[9] De Ar. Poët. Natura, cap. 13.
[10] Hist. lib. 4. cap. 96. p. 252. 253. The learned Doctor is wrong, however, in adding that Herodotus conceived Zamolxis to have been a demon. The historian states, that the Thracians so believed: but has no doubt, himself, that this philosopher was a man who lived long before the time of Pythagoras.

more antiquity to him, yet did he conceive him to have been no other than a demon, who, appearing to the Thracians, was worshipped by them; whereas in the mean time, the general tradition of the Greeks derived the Thracian religious rites and mysteries from Orpheus, and no other, according to this of Suidas: Λέγεται ὡς Ὀρφεὺς Θρᾷξ, πρῶτος ἐτεχνολόγησε τὰ Ἑλλήνων μυστήρια, καὶ τὸ τιμᾶν θεὸν θρησκεύειν ἐκαλήσεν, ὡς Θρᾳκίας οὔσης τῆς εὑρέσεως, "It is commonly said, that Orpheus, the Thracian, was the first inventor of the religious mysteries of the Greeks, and that religion was from thence called Threskeia, as being a Thracian invention." Wherefore, though it may well be granted, that, by reason of Orpheus' great antiquity, there have been many fabulous and romantic things intermingled with this history; yet there appears no reason at all why we should disbelieve the existence of such a man.[1]

But though there were such a man as Orpheus, yet may it very well be questioned, for all that, whether any of those poems commonly entitled to him and called Orphical, were so ancient, and indeed written by him. And this the rather, because Herodotus declares it as his own opinion, that Hesiod and Homer where the ancientest of all the Greek poets:* Οἱ δὲ πρότερον ποιηταὶ λεγόμενοι τούτων τῶν ἀνδρῶν γενέσθαι, ὕστερον ἐγένοντο, "And that those other poets, said to have been before them, were indeed juniors to them;" meaning hereby, in all probability, Orpheus, Musæus, and Linus. As also because Aristotle[2] seems plainly to have followed Herodotus in this, he mentioning the

[1] Herewith compare the arguments brought forward by J. Alb. Fabricius, Biblioth. Græc. lib. 1. cap. 18. p. 111. and Olaus Borrichius, De Poëtis Diss. prima. sect. 17. to prove the real existence of Orpheus. For my part I should, without difficulty, agree with these learned men, that the authority of so many of the ancients, showing Orpheus to have existed, is to be preferred to the single judgment of Aristotle; but I can by no means be brought to believe that the words of Cicero are to be interpreted otherwise than as follows: That Aristotle taught that there never was such a man as the Orpheus celebrated in ancient authors [as is proved, Bibl. Raisonnée, t. 13. par. 2. p. 341]. Cicero is in this passage attacking the opinion of the Epicureans on the nature of thought, who supposed that the images of all things float about in the world, and strike the souls of men, and that from this impulse of the images, thoughts arise in the mind. To show the futility of this opinion, he reminds them that we are accustomed sometimes to think of fictitious and imaginary things, which cannot have any images, inasmuch as the things themselves never existed; and proves this by the example of Orpheus. Orphei, says he, imago in animum meum sæpe incurrit, "The image of Orpheus frequently occurs to my mind," namely, of him who is recorded to have come from Thrace to Greece, and to have been torn in pieces by women. But, according to the authority of Aristotle, this Orpheus never existed. Whence, therefore, this image? Whence the form of the man in my mind?—From which it is manifest, that the whole reasoning of Cicero falls to the ground, if any other sense be put upon his words than the one which I have expressed.

[2] If Herodotus really thought as the learned Doctor here supposes him to have done, Aristotle does not follow in his footsteps. For Herodotus believed Orpheus to have existed, although subsequently to Homer and Hesiod; whereas Aristotle, according to the testimony of Cicero, denied that there ever was such a man: which opinions are altogether at variance.

* Lib. 2. p. 53. [Cap. 53. p. 109.]

Orphic poems (in his book of the soul) after this manner:* Τὰ Ὀρφικὰ καλούμενα ἔπη, "The verses that are called Orphical." Besides which, Cicero[3] tells us, that some imputed all the Orphic Poems to Cercops, a Pythagorean; and it is well known, that many have attributed the same to another of that school, Onomacritus, who lived in the times of the Pisistratidæ: wherefore, we read more than once in Sextus Empiricus, of Ὀνομάκριτος ἐν τοῖς Ὀρφικοῖς, "Onomacritus in the Orphics." Suidas also reports, that some of the Orphic poems were anciently ascribed to Theognetus, others to Timocles, others to Zopyrus,[4] &c. From all which Grotius† seems to have made up this conclusion, "That the Pythagorics entitled their own books to Orpheus and Linus, just in the same manner as ancient Christians entitled theirs, some to the Sibyls, and others to Hermes Trismegist." Implying therein, that both the Orphic poems and doctrine owed their very being and first original only to the Pythagoreans. But on the other side, Clemens Alexandrinus[5] affirmeth that Heraclitus, the philosopher, borrowed many things from the Orphic poems. And it is certain, that Plato[6] does not only very much commend the Orphic hymns for their suavity and deliciousness, but also produces some verses out of them, without making any scruple concerning their author. Cicero himself,‡ notwithstanding what he cites out of Aristotle to the contrary, seems to acknowledge Orpheus for the most ancient poet, he writing thus of Cleanthes:[7] "In secundo (libro de natura deorum) vult Orphei, Musæi, Hesiodi, Homerique fabellas accommodare ad ea, quæ ipse de diis immortalibus scripserat, ut etiam veterrimi poetæ, qui hæc ne suspicati quidem sint, Stoici fuisse videantur." "Cleanthes, in his second book of the nature of the gods, endeavours to accommodate the fables of Orpheus, Musæus, Hesiod, and Homer, to those very things which himself had written concerning them; so that the most ancient poets, who never dreamed of any such matter, are made by him to have been Stoics." Diodorus Siculus[8] affirmeth Orpheus to have been the author of a most excellent poem: and Justin Martyr, Clemens Alexan-

* Lib. 1. cap. 7. sect. 7.

[3] De Nat. Deor. lib. 1. cap. 38. p. 2940. tom. 9. opp.

[4] Consult G. J. Vossius, De Poetis Græc. cap. 4. and J. A. Fabricius, Biblioth. Græc. lib. 1. cap. 19. p. 117. and Ad Sextum Empir. p. 136.

† Proleg. in Flor. Stob.

[5] Stromat. lib. 6. cap. 2. p. 752.

[6] Plato seems to commend the Orphic hymns for their suavity, De Legib. lib. 8. p. 643. although no verses are there quoted by him. In the Cratylus, however, p. 265. he produces two verses from Orpheus, on the origin of the gods. He also mentions Orpheus in the Dialog. Ion. p. 144. and the Sympos. in which passage he openly reprehends him for his foolish fables concerning the gods.

‡ De Nat. Deor. lib. p. 201. Lamb.

[7] Cicero relates this not of Cleanthes, but of Chrysippus. Although it appears to me to be of little weight towards corroborating the present argument.

[8] Biblioth. Histor. lib. 4. cap. 25. p. 221.

drinus, Athenagoras,[9] and others, take it for granted, that Homer borrowed many passages of his poems from the Orphic verses, and particularly that very beginning of his Iliad:

Μῆνιν ἄειδε, θεὰ————

Lastly, Jamblichus testifieth that by most writers Orpheus was represented as the ancientest of all the poets; adding moreover, what dialect he wrote in:* Αἱ πλείους τῶν ἱστοριῶν ἀποφαίνουσι κεχρῆσθαι τῇ Δωρικῇ διαλέκτῳ καὶ τὸν Ὀρφέα πρεσβύτερον ὄντα τῶν ποιητῶν, "Most of the historiographers declare that Orpheus, who was the ancientest of all the poets, wrote in the Doric dialect." Which, if it be true, then those Orphic fragments that now we have, (preserved in the writings of such as did not Dorize) must have been transformed by them out of their native idiom.[10] Now, as concerning Herodotus, who supposing Homer and Hesiod to have been the ancientest of all the Greek poets, seemed therefore to conclude the Orphic poems to have been pseudepigraphous; himself intimates, that this was but a singular opinion, and as it were paradox of his own,[1] the contrary thereunto being then generally received. However, Aristotle probably might therefore be the more inclinable to follow Herodotus in this, because he had no great kindness for the Pythagoric or Orphic philosophy. But it is altogether irrational and absurd to think that the Pythagorics would entitle their books to Orpheus, as designing to gain credit and authority to them thereby, had there been no such doctrine before, either contained in some ancient monument of Orpheus, or at least transmitted down by oral tradition from him. Wherefore, the Pythagorics themselves constantly maintain, that before Pythagoras' time, there was not only an Orphic cabala extant, but also Orphic poems. The former was declared in that ancient book, called Ἱερὸς λόγος, or, "The Holy Oration," if we may believe Proclus upon the Timæus.† Πυθαγόρειος ὢν ὁ Τίμαιος, ἕπεται ταῖς Πυθαγορείων ἀρχαῖς· αὗται δὲ εἰσὶν αἱ Ὀρφικαὶ παραδόσεις· Ἃ γὰρ Ὀρφεὺς δι'

[9] Athenagoras states generally, Legat. pro Christianis, cap. 15. p. 64. 65. that Homer followed Orpheus in many things. Clemens, Stromat. lib. 6. cap. 2. p. 738. and 751. endeavours to prove the same by some examples, in which, however, I do not find the one here adduced. Indeed, as far as I know, this is alleged by Justin alone, Cohort. ad Græcos, p. 17. opp. who, however, does not say that Homer borrowed this commencement of his poem from Orpheus, but only that he imitated that of the Orphic poem.

* De Vita Pyth. cap. 34. [P. 195. 196.]

[10] It may be contended by others with equal, or, if I mistake not, greater probability, that those Orphic fragments, which want the Doric character, are counterfeit, and falsely ascribed to the most ancient Orpheus.

[1] In calling Homer and Hesiod the most ancient of poets, Herodotus uses the phrase: Ἐμοί γε δοκέειν, "In my opinion." But I much doubt whether these words are of such force as to imply that no one thought so besides Herodotus, and that the opinion was new and till then unheard of.

† P. 291.

ἀπορρήτων λόγων μυστικῶς παραδέδωκε, ταῦτα Πυθαγόρας ἐξέμαθεν ὀργιασθεὶς ἐν Λεβήθροις τοῖς Θρᾳκίοις, Ἀγλαοφήμῳ τελεστικὰ μεταδιδόντος· Ταῦτα γάρ φησιν ὁ Πυθαγόρας ἐν τῷ Ἱερῷ λόγῳ, "Timæus, being a Pythagorean, follows the Pythagoric principles, and these are the Orphic traditions; for what things Orpheus delivered mystically, (or in arcane allegories) these Pythagoras learned when he was initiated by Aglaophemus in the Orphic mysteries, Pythagoras himself affirming as much in his book called, 'The Holy Oration.'" Where Proclus, without any doubt or scruple, entitles the book inscribed Ἱερὸς λόγος, or, "The Holy Oration," to Pythagoras himself. Indeed, several of the ancients have resolved Pythagoras to have written nothing at all, as Fla. Josephus, Plutarch, Lucian, and Porphyrius; and Epigenes in Clemens Alex. affirms that the Ἱερὸς λόγος, or "Holy Oration," was written by Cercops, a Pythagorean. Nevertheless, Diogenes Laërtius thinks them not to be in good earnest, who deny Pythagoras to have written any thing; and he tells us, that Heraclides acknowledged this, Ἱερὸς λόγος, or "Holy Oration," for a genuine and indubitate fœtus of Pythagoras. Jamblichus is also of the same opinion, as the most received; though confessing some[2] to have attributed that book to Telauges, Pythagoras' son. But whoever was the writer of this Hieros Logos, whether Pythagoras himself, or Telauges, or Cercops, it must needs be granted to be of great antiquity, according to the testimony whereof, Pythagoras derived much of his Theology from the Orphic traditions. Moreover, Ion Chius, in his Trigrammi, testified, as Clemens Alexandrinus informeth us,* that Pythagoras himself referred some poems to Orpheus as their author; which is also the general sense of Platonists as well as Pythagoreans. Wherefore upon all accounts it seems most probable, that either Orpheus himself wrote some philosophic or theologic poems, though certain other poems might be also fathered on him, because written in the same strain of mystical and allegorical theology, and as it were in the same spirit with which this Thracian prophet was inspired; or at least, that the Orphic doctrine was first conveyed down by oral cabala or tradition from him, and afterwards, for its better preservation, expressed in verses, that were imputed to Orpheus, after the same manner as the golden verses written by Lysis were to Pythagoras. And Philoponus[3] intimates this latter to have been Aristotle's opinion concerning the Orphic verses; he glossing thus upon those words of Aristotle before cited: Καλου-

[2] Of these I consider it unnecessary to speak, as they have been ably treated of by J. A. Fabricius, Biblioth. Græc. lib. 1. cap. 19. sect. 2. p. 119. and lib. 2. cap. 12. sect. 4. p. 452. who has pointed out the different passages.

* Strom. lib. 1. p. 333. [P. 397. Edit. Potteri.]

[3] Comm. in Aristot. Libr. 3. De Anima, fol. 2. ed. Græc. Venet. 1553. fol.

μένοις εἶπε, ὅτι μὴ δοκεῖ Ὀρφέως τὰ ἔπη, ὡς καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν τῷ περὶ φιλοσοφίας λέγει. Αὐτοῦ γάρ εἰσι τὰ δόγματα, ταῦτα δή φασιν Ὀνομάκριτον ἐν ἔπεσι καταθεῖναι, "Aristotle calls them the reputed Orphic verses, because they seem not to have been written by Orpheus himself, as the same Aristotle affirmeth in his book of philosophy. The doctrine and opinions of them indeed were his, but Onomacritus is said to have put them into verse." However, there can be no doubt at all made, but that the Orphic verses, by whomsoever written, were some of them of great antiquity, (they being much older than either Aristotle, Plato, or Herodotus) as they were also had in great esteem amongst the Pagans; and therefore, we may very well make a judgment of the theology of the ancient Pagans from them.[4]

[4] The question of Orpheus and the Orphic poems is encompassed with innumerable difficulties, which not even the sagacious would be able to remove, except upon surmises and conjectures. I shall merely notice one or two points more particularly pertaining to this place: for the rest, those who wish to know more of the subject, may consult Fabricius, Borrichius, Vossius, and others. Our learned author does not appear to make a sufficiently accurate distinction here between two questions, which however, are in fact distinct and separate. The first is: whether there existed in the most ancient times a certain Thracian, named Orpheus, who enlightened Greece with his poems and sung many things concerning the gods. The other: whether the Orphic poems now extant, and occurring especially in the works of the ancient champions of Christianity and of the later Platonists, are fragments of the poems of that most ancient bard. The former question, notwithstanding what Aristotle may say, ought, I think, to be answered in the affirmative by all those who are not disposed to consider the testimonies of so many ancient authors, who have quoted Orpheus and his poems, to be destitute of every vestige of truth. Indeed, if neither Orpheus himself, nor any doctrine or poems of his ever existed, I confess myself unable to discover, either by reasoning or conjecture, what could have led posterity thus falsely to ascribe many things to this imaginary bard. The other question is disposed of by the learned Doctor in such a way as to merit our commendation of his prudence and modesty. He merely requires that the great antiquity and authority of the Orphic poems be acknowledged; but leaves it altogether undecided as to what author they are to be ascribed to. I should have assented altogether to this opinion, if he had immediately added what he concedes afterwards, that the whole of the productions bearing the name of Orpheus are not to be placed in the same rank. The very great antiquity of some of them I would not for a moment question, such as those to be found in Plato, Diodorus, and others; nor would I by any means deny that a poem ascribed to Orpheus was in existence long before the time of our Saviour; while on the other hand, if I am not mistaken, some of the more recent ones bear evident marks of fraud and imposture. More than one of those quoted by Justin Martyr and other Christian writers appear to me to be of a character more suitable to the author of the Sybilline poems than to Orpheus, and evidently breathing the Christian doctrine; and this indeed, is confessed a little afterwards by the learned Doctor himself. Nor do I consider the Orphic poems with which the later Platonists, according to Marinus, Vita Procli, cap. 20. were so delighted, as to interpret and inculcate them in their own schools, to be of high antiquity, but, like many others, to have been forged by that crafty and deceitful sect of philosophers, for the purpose of showing that even Orpheus belonged to their creed. Hence, it must be clear that, to my mind, great caution should be exercised in judging of those verses of Orpheus which are extant in Proclus and others of his school. One thing, indeed, will be obvious to every one who compares the fragments of Orpheus with each other, namely, that they are inconsistent, and profess no uniform doctrine respecting God, which is a proof that they are the composition of various authors. Of the Orphic poems, which at this day are read entire, and have lately been edited by

Now that Orpheus, the Orphic doctrine, and poems, were polytheistical, is a thing acknowledged by all. Justin Martyr[5] affirms, that Orpheus asserted three hundred and sixty-gods; he also bestows upon him this honourable title,[6] (if it may be so accounted) of πολυθεότητος πατὴρ καὶ πρῶτος διδάσκαλος, "the father and first teacher of polytheism amongst the Greeks;" he supposing[7] that Homer derived his polytheism from him: Ὅμηρος τῆς πολυθεότητος Ὀρφέως ζηλώσας δόξαν, μυθωδῶς μὲν πλειόνων θεῶν μέμνηται, ἵνα μὴ δόξῃ τῆς Ὀρφέως ἀπᾴδειν ποιήσεως, "Homer emulating Orpheus' polytheism, did himself therefore fabulously write of many gods, that he might not seem to dissent from his poems, whom he had so great a veneration for." With which also agreeth the testimony of Athenagoras:[8] Ὀρφεὺς καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα θεῶν πρῶτος ἐξεῦρεν, καὶ τὰς γενέσεις διεξῆλθε, καὶ ὅσα ἑκάστοις πέπρακται εἶπε, ᾧ καὶ Ὅμηρος τὰ πολλὰ καὶ περὶ θεῶν μάλιστα ἕπεται, "Orpheus first invented the very names of the gods, declaring their generations, and what was done by each of them; and Homer, for the most part, follows him therein." Indeed, the whole mythical theology, or fables of the gods, together with the religious rites amongst the Greeks, are commonly supposed to have owed their first original to no other but Orpheus. In which Orphic fables, not only the things of nature, and parts of the world, were all theologized, but also all manner of human passions, imperfections, and vices (according to the literal sense) attributed to the gods. Insomuch, that divers of the Pagans themselves took great offence at them; as, for example, Isocrates,* who concludes that a divine Nemesis or vengeance was inflicted upon Orpheus for this impiety: Ὀρφεὺς ὁ μάλιστα τῶν τοιούτων λόγων ἁψάμενος, διασπασθεὶς τὸν βίον ἐτελεύτησε, "Orpheus, who was most of all guilty in this kind, died a violent death." Also Diog. Laërtius[9] for this cause made a question whether he should reckon Orpheus amongst the philosophers or no: and others have concluded that Plato ought to have banished Orpheus likewise out of his commonwealth, for the same reason that he did Homer[10] which is thus expressed, "for not

And. Christ. Eschenbach, I say nothing. Not one of them appears to me to be genuine or truly Orphic, although I am perfectly willing that others should dissent from this opinion.

[5] Apologia 2. pro Christianis, p. 104.

[6] I do not remember a passage wherein Justin styles Orpheus the father of polytheism; he, however, calls him its first teacher, in his Cohort. ad Græcos, p. 15.

[7] Cohort. ad Græcos, p. 17.

[8] Apologia pro Christ. cap. 15, p. 64.

* Laudat. Busiridis, p. 452.

[9] Proœm. segm. 4. p. 5.

[10] He has expressed the words of Plato, De Legibus, lib. 2. p. 429. who considers it to be particularly a matter for censure in the ancient poets that they have lied μὴ καλῶς, "not well."

lying well concerning the gods." And here we may take notice of the monstrosity and extravagancy of Orpheus' fancy, from what Damascius[1] and others tell us, that he made one of his principles to be δράκοντα κεφαλὰς ἔχοντα προσπεφυκυίας ταύρου καὶ λέοντος, ἐν μέσῳ δὲ θεοῦ πρόσωπον, καὶ ἐπὶ ὤμων πτερὰ, "a Dragon, having the heads both of a bull and a lion, and in the midst the face of a god, with golden wings upon his shoulders;" which, forsooth, must be an incorporeal deity and Hercules, with which Nature (called Ananche and Adrastea) was associated. Nevertheless, the generality of the Greekish Pagans, looking upon this Orpheus not as a mere fanciful poet and fabulator, but as a serious and profound philosopher, or mystical theologer, a person transcendantly holy and wise; they supposed all his fables of the gods to be deep mysteries and allegories, which had some arcane and recondite sense under them; and therefore had a high veneration for him, as one who did ἀληθέστερον θεολογεῖν (as Athenagoras writes[2]) "more truly theologize than the rest," and was indeed divinely inspired. Insomuch, that Celsus would rather have had the Christians to have taken Orpheus for a god, than our Saviour Christ,* ἄνδρα ὁμολογουμένως ὁσίῳ χρησάμενον πνεύματι, καὶ αὐτὸν βιαίως ἀποθανόντα, "as being a man unquestionably endued with a holy spirit, and one, who also (as well as the Christians' Jesus) died a violent death."

But that Orpheus, notwithstanding all his polytheism or multiplicity of gods, acknowledged one supreme unmade Deity, as the original of all things, may be first presumed from hence, because those two most religious philosophic sects, the Pythagoreans and Platonists, not only had Orpheus in great esteem, he being commonly called by them ὁ Θεολόγος, "the theologer," but were also thought in great measure to have owed their theology and philosophy to him, as deriving the same from his principles and traditions. This hath been already intimated, and might be further proved. Pythagoras, as we are informed by Porphyrius and Jamblichus,[3] learned something from all these four, from the Egyptians, from the Persian Magi, from the Chaldeans, and from Orpheus, or his followers. Accordingly, Syrianus[4] makes Ὀρφικαὶ καὶ Πυθαγορικαὶ ἀρχαὶ, "the Orphic

[1] These words of Damascius are among those extracted by Wolf from his unedited work On First Principles, Anecdota Græc. tom. 3. p. 254. Compare the fragment of Orpheus preserved by Athenagoras, Legat. pro Christian. cap. 16. p. 72.

[2] Apolog. pro Christianis, cap. 15. p. 64.

* C. Cels. lib. 7. p. 367.

[3] See the latter in his Vita Pythagor. cap. 28. p. 122. where he confesses it to be probable that Pythagoras learned many things from the Orphic doctrine. With regard to Porphyry, however, the learned Doctor's memory has deceived him; as he neither in his Vita Pythagor. nor elsewhere, numbers Orpheus among the preceptors of Pythagoras.

[4] Comm. ad lib. 3. 13. 14. Metaphys. Aristotelis, fol. 59. b. &c. a work not yet edited in Greek, but known only from a Latin translation of Bagolinus, published at Venice, 1558. 4.

and Pythagoric principles to be one and the same." And as we understand from Suidas,[5] the same Syrianus wrote a book intitled, *Συμφωνία Ὀρφέως, Πυθαγόρου καὶ Πλάτωνος*, "The harmony of Orpheus, Pythagoras and Plato. Proclus, besides the place before cited, frequently insists upon this elsewhere, in his commentary upon the Timæus, as p. 289.: *Πυθαγόρειον δὲ καὶ τὸ ταῖς Ὀρφικαῖς ἕπεσθαι γενεαλογίαις. Ἄνωθεν γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς Ὀρφικῆς παραδόσεως διὰ Πυθαγόρου καὶ εἰς Ἕλληνας ἡ περὶ θεῶν ἐπιστήμη προῆλθεν*, "It is Pythagorical to follow the Orphic genealogies. For from the Orphic tradition downward by Pythagoras was the knowledge of the gods derived to the Greeks." And that the Orphic philosophy did really agree and symbolize with that, which afterwards was called Pythagoric and Platonic, and was of the same strain with it, may be gathered from that of Plato in his Cratylus, where he speaks concerning the etymology of the Greek word *σῶμα*:* *Δοκοῦσι μέντοι μοι μάλιστα θέσθαι οἱ ἀμφὶ Ὀρφέα τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα, ὡς δίκην διδούσης τῆς ψυχῆς, τοῦτον δὲ περίβολον ἔχειν, ἵνα σώζηται, δεσμωτηρίου εἰκόνα· εἶναι οὖν τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦτο αὐτό, ἕως ἂν ἐκτίσῃ τὰ ὀφειλόμενα τὸ σῶμα*, "Orpheus and his followers seem to me to have given the best etymology of this word *σῶμα* (from *σώζεσθαι*), that the soul is here in a state of punishment, its body being a prison to it, wherein it is kept in custody, till its debts or faults be expiated, and is therefore called *σῶμα*." Now these three philosophies, the Platonic, Pythagoric and Orphic, symbolizing so much together, it is probable, that as the Platonic and Pythagoric, so the Orphic likewise derived all their gods from one self-existent Deity.

Which may be further manifested from that epitome of the Orphic doctrine, made long since by Timotheus the chronographer in his Cosmopœia, still extant in Cedrenus[6] and Eusebii Chronica, and imperfectly set down by Suidas (upon the word Orpheus) as his own, or without mentioning the author's name: *Ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἀνεδείχθη τῷ κόσμῳ ὁ αἰθὴρ, ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ δημιουργηθείς*, "First of all the ether was made by God, and after the ether a chaos; a dark and dreadful night then covering all under the whole ether." *Σημαίνων τὴν νύκτα προτερεύειν*, "Orpheus hereby signifying (saith Timotheus) that Night was senior to Day," or that the world had a beginning: *Εἰρηκὼς ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ ἐκθέσει, ἀκατάληπτόν τινα καὶ πάντων ὑπέρτατον εἶναι, προγενέστερόν τε καὶ δημιουργὸν ἁπάντων, καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ αἰθέρος, καὶ πάντων τῶν*

[5] Voce *Συριανὸς*, Lexic. t. 3. p. 410. ed. Kusteri.

* P. 400. Steph.

[6] Chronograph. fol. 46. &c. Compare Andr. Christ. Eschenbach, Epigenes seu de Poësi Orphica, p. 87. &c. who gives the whole of this Orphic fragment from Cedrenus and illustrates it in his usual manner; with which it will be worth while also to compare the copious extracts from the same Timotheus on the Orphic Theogony, made by J. Malalas, Historia Chronica, p. 88. &c.

ὑπ' αὐτὸν τὸν αἰθέρα,[7] "He having declared also in his explication, that there was a certain incomprehensible Being, which was the highest and oldest of all things, and the maker of every thing, even of the ether itself, and all things under the ether. But the earth being then invisible by reason of the darkness, a light breaking out through the ether illuminated the whole creation; this light being said by him, to be that highest of all Beings (before mentioned),[8] which is called also counsel and life." Ταῦτα τὰ τρία ὀνόματα (to use Suidas' words here) μίαν δύναμιν ἀπεφήνατο, καὶ ἓν κράτος τοῦ δημιουργοῦ πάντων θεοῦ, τοῦ πάντα ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος παραγαγόντος εἰς τὸ εἶναι, "These three names in Orpheus (light, counsel and life) declaring one and the same force and power of that God, who is the maker of all, and who produceth all out of nothing into being, whether visible or invisible." To conclude with Timotheus: Ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς, Ὀρφεὺς, ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ βίβλῳ συνέταξεν, ὅτι διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν τριῶν ὀνομάτων μίας θεότητος, τὰ πάντα ἐγένετο, καὶ αὐτός ἐστι τὰ πάντα, "And the same Orpheus in his book declared, that all things were made by one Godhead in three names, and that this God is all things."[9]

But that Orpheus asserted one supreme Deity, as the original of all things, is unquestionably evident from the Orphic verses themselves; of which notwithstanding, before we mention any in way of proof, we shall premise this observation, or rather suspicion of our own, that there seem to be some Orphic verses supposititious, as well as there were Sibylline; they being counterfeited either by Christians or Jews. For we must freely profess for our own part, that we cannot believe all that to be genuine, which is produced by ancient fathers as Orphical; that is, either to have been written by Orpheus himself, or else by Onomacritus, or any other Pagan of that antiquity, according to the Orphic cabala or tradition.

[7] In Malalas, p. 89. these words are read a little differently, but to nearly the same sense.

[8] The reading of the passage is better in J. Malalas than in Cedrenus, whom the learned Doctor follows: Οὗ ὄνομα ὁ αὐτὸς Ὀρφεὺς ἀκούσας ἐκ τῆς μαντείας ἔξειπε· μή τινα φᾶναι, τὰ Ἐρικεπέω· ὅπερ ἑρμηνεύεται τῇ κοινῇ γλώσσῃ, βουλὴ, φῶς, ζωοδοτήρ, "Whose name Orpheus having heard from the Oracle declared, that no one should utter Ericepeo, which in the common language signifies counsel, light, the giver of life."

[9] If Timotheus had copied out the whole of this fragment of Orpheus it would have been much easier to understand what amount of credit is due to him. But, as has been justly observed by Eschenbach, Epigenes, p. 90. he totally changed the order of the poem, and fancied himself able to show, by garbled extracts culled here and there, that Orpheus' doctrine on the origin of the world was not much at variance with the account given by Moses, and that the three persons in one Supreme Deity was a tenet long ago propounded by that poet. Which renders this testimony altogether suspected and worthless. The recklessness of the later Greeks is well known; who, in order to elicit proofs of their own theories, frequently scrupled not to inflict the gravest injuries on the writers of antiquity.

As for example, this concerning Moses:[10]

> Ὡς λόγος ἀρχαίων, ὡς ὑδρογενὴς διέταξεν,
> Ἐκ θεόθεν γνώμαισι λαβὼν κατὰ δίπλακα θεσμόν·
>
> Ut habet sermo antiquorum, ut ex-aqua-ortus descripsit,
> Acceptâ divinitùs lege, quæ duplicia præcepta continet.

And this that is commonly understood of Abraham:[1]

> Οὐ γάρ κέν τις ἴδοι θνητῶν, μερόπων κραίνοντα,
> Εἰ μὴ μουνογενής τις ἀπόῤῥωξ φύλου ἄνωθεν
> Χαλδαίων, ἴδρις γὰρ ἦην ἀστροίο πορείης.
>
> Non enim quispiam mortalium videre posset eum, qui hominibus imperat,
> Nisi Unigenitus quidam profectus ab antiqua origine gentis
> Chaldæorum; sciebat enim astri cursum.

The manifest forgery of which might make one suspect also some other passages, such as this concerning the divine Logos:[2]

[10] Extant in Eusebius, among others, Præpar. Evang. lib. 13. cap. 12. p. 664. 665. together with other verses of Orpheus, among which is found also the following oracle concerning Abraham. According to Eusebius' account, all those verses were extracted from a certain work written by Aristobulus, a Jew, and Peripatetic philosopher, and addressed to Ptolemy, king of Egypt. But these verses are read very differently in Justin Martyr, Cohort. ad Gentes and Apolog. 2. where not a few of those found in Eusebius are wanting, including the verses concerning Moses and Abraham, which would be in vain looked for in the fragment of Orpheus as exhibited by Justin. Hence it is clear, that there was some Christian or Jew, who interpolated the ancient verses of Orpheus agreeably to his own conceptions. To me it appears most likely to have been a Jew, because the interpolated verses favour the Jewish rather than the Christian cause, and relate to those persons, who of all others were held in reverence by the Jews, namely, Moses and Abraham. Nor do I disapprove of the conjecture of Eschenbach, who, in his Epigenes, p. 148. suspects Aristobulus himself, a learned Jew, to have disfigured Orpheus with his own fictions, in order to enhance the glory and authority of his own nation and ancestors. At all events, the imposture is neither inconsistent with the character of the Jews, who are known to have been guilty of many similar attempts, especially in Egypt, for the sake of promoting their own interests with other nations; nor foreign to the designs of Aristobulus, which the fact itself shows to have been altogether fraudulent and concocted for the deception of the Egyptian king. For Aristobulus had undertaken to prove this, which he himself must have known to be false, that the Greek philosophers and poets had borrowed all that was sound and wise in their doctrines from the Jews. In this oracle of Orpheus others read ὑλογενὴς, who I have no doubt are mistaken.

[1] That this oracle is correctly understood of Abraham is, in my opinion, satisfactorily proved by the erudite arguments of H. Grotius in his Comment. ad Matthæum, cap. 5. 31. p. 95. 96. as also by the numerous testimonies of the ancients, collected by J. Alb. Fabricius, Codex Pseudepigr. Veter. Testam. t. 1. cap. 109. p. 350. &c. and t. 2. p. 81. who represent Abraham to have been most intimately versed in astronomy. Hence, I consider, we ought by no means to agree with Pet. Dan. Huet, who supposes it to have reference to Moses; which conjecture is sufficiently refuted by the fact that this μουνογενὴς is stated to have sprung from the Chaldeans.

[2] Fr. Viger, the translator of Eusebius' Præpar. Evang. in which this decree of Orpheus occurs, lib. 13. cap. 12. p. 664. 665. renders the λόγος θεῖος in the first verse oracula divina, "divine oracles." But Justin Martyr, Cohort. ad Græcos, p. 16. and Apolog. 2. p. 105. does not hesitate to refer it to the eternal Son of God. In my opinion, Viger has given the true sense of Orpheus, who is here not thinking of the most holy λόγος, or "Word." Wherefore there is no reason for our supposing this verse to be the forgery of some Christian. We ought rather to say that Justin lost sight of Orpheus' meaning while endeavouring to discover in it traces of the Christian doctrine.

Εἰς δὲ λόγον θεῖον βλέψας, τούτῳ προσέδευε,
Ἰθύνων κραδίης νοερὸν κύτος.

Wherefore it being not ingenuous to lay stress upon that for the proof of any thing, which ourselves believe not to be sincere and genuine; we shall here cite no Orphic verses for the acknowledgment of one supreme Deity, but only such as we find attested in Pagan writings. As first of all that copy produced by Proclus upon the Timæus:*

Τοὔνεκα σὺν τῷ παντὶ Διὸς πάλιν ἐντὸς ἐτύχθη,
Αἰθέρος εὐρείης ἠδ' οὐρανοῦ ἄγλαον ὕψος,
Πόντου τ' ἀτρυγέτου, γαίης τ' ἐρικυδέος εὐρη·
Ὠκεανός τε μέγας, καὶ νείατα τάρταρα γαίης,
Καὶ ποταμὸς, καὶ πόντος ἀπείριτος, ἄλλά τε πάντα,
Πάντες τ' ἀθάνατοι μάκαρες θεοὶ, ἠδὲ θέαιναι
Ὅσσα τ' ἦν γεγαῶτα, καὶ ὕστερον ὀππόσ' ἔμελλεν
Ἐγίνετο· Ζηνὸς δ' ἐνὶ γαστέρι σύῤῥα πεφύκει.

To this sense: "Wherefore, together with the universe, were made within Jupiter the height of the ethereal heaven, the breadth of the earth and sea, the great ocean, the profound Tartara, the rivers and fountains, and all the other things, all the immortal gods and goddesses. Whatsoever hath been, or shall be, was at once contained in the womb of Jupiter."

Proclus understands this of the ideas of all things being in God, before the world was produced, that is, in order of nature only, he supposing them in time coeve. However, it is plain, that all things are said to be contained in the womb and fecundity of one self-originated Deity, not only all the other gods and goddesses, but every thing else whatsoever.[3]

Again Proclus, in the same place, ushers in another copy of Orphic verses (which are also found in the writer de Mundo) after this manner: Τῶν δὲ ἰδεῶν πλήρης ὢν, διὰ τούτων ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὰ ὅλα περιείληφε, ὡς καὶ τοῦτο ἐνδεικνύμενος ὁ λόγος ἐπήγαγε, "The Demiurgus, or maker of the world, being full of ideas, did by these comprehend all things within himself, as that theologer also declareth in these following verses:"

Ζεὺς πρῶτος γένετο, Ζεὺς ὕστατος ἀρχικέραυνος·
Ζεὺς κεφαλή, Ζεὺς μέσσα· Διὸς δ' ἐκ πάντα τέτυκται·
Ζεὺς ἄρσην γένετο, Ζεὺς ἄμβροτος ἔπλετο νύμφη·
Ζεὺς πύθμην γαίης τε καὶ οὐρανοῦ ἀστερόεντος·

* Page 95.

[3] Eschenbach, who in his Epigenes, p. 69. has given a sort of illustration of this and the following oracle, considers them both to form a portion of the poem said to have been entitled by Orpheus Κρατῆρες. This learned man made a most careful collection of the sayings of Orpheus, scattered through various authors, but in my opinion was not always happy in expounding them. He mostly adopted the explanations of the junior Platonists, who, however, are known to have explored ancient authors for the sake of discovering their own dogmas in them rather than their true meaning, and to have been inflamed with an insane love of allegory.

Ζεὺς πνοίη πάντων· Ζεὺς ἀκαμάτου πυρὸς ὁρμή·
Ζεὺς πόντου ῥίζα· Ζεὺς ἥλιος ἠδὲ σελήνη·
Ζεὺς βασιλεὺς· Ζεὺς αὐτὸς ἁπάντων ἀρχιγένεθλος·
Ἓν κράτος, εἷς Δαίμων γένετο, μέγας ἀρχὸς ἁπάντων.

Which likewise in plain prose is this: "The high-thundering Jove is both the first and the last; Jove is both the head and middle of all things; all things were made out of Jupiter; Jove is both a man and an immortal maid; Jove is the profundity of the earth and starry heaven; Jove is the breath of all things; Jove is the force of the untameable fire; Jove the bottom of the sea; Jove is sun, moon and stars; Jove is both the original, and king of all things: there is one power, and one God, and one great ruler over all."[4]

Where though there be many strange expressions, yet this seems to be the strangest of them all, that Jupiter should be said to be both a man and an immortal maid. But this is nothing but a poetic description of ἀῤῥενόθηλυς, "male and female together." And it was a thing very familiar with all the mystical theologers amongst the Pagans, to call God ἀῤῥενόθηλυν, "male and female together;" they signifying thereby emphatically, "the divine fecundity," or "the generative and creative power of the Deity;" that God was able from himself alone to produce all things. Thus Damascius the philosopher,[5] writing of this very Orphic theology, expounds it, ἀρσενόθηλυν αὐτὴν ὑπεστήσατο, πρὸς ἔνδειξιν τῆς πάντων γεννητικῆς οὐσίας, "The Orphic theology calls the first principles hermaphroditic, or male and female together; thereby denoting that essence, that is generative or productive of all things." And that learned and pious Christian bishop, Synesius,[6] it seems, thought the expres-

[4] This oracle occurs in many ancient writers, but is not read by all in the same form and order; on which see Eschenbach, De Poësi Orphica, p. 72. &c.

[5] See Wolf's Excerpta, from the unpublished work of Damascius on first principles, in his Anecdot. Græc. t. 3. p. 354.

[6] Hymn. 2. v. 63. 64. p. 318. opp. ed. Petavii. A variety of matter respecting the twofold sex in God and gods, as fancied in particular by the later Platonists and Pythagoreans, and the custom among many of the ancients of calling God male and female, has been collected from various monuments by J. Alb. Fabricius, Bibliograph. Antiquar. cap. 8. sect. 7. p. 234. and Cod. Apocryph. N. T. t. 1. p. 361. b. and by J. Christ. Wolf, Ad Philosoph. Origenis, p. 39. For my part I shall inquire merely into the origin of this custom; nor do I consider there will be much difficulty in discovering it. It is notorious that, prior to the birth of our Saviour, there were already men who strove to reduce the popular religions and the foolish notions entertained respecting gods and goddesses to some show of reason, and to reconcile them with the decrees of philosophers. After our Saviour's birth, as is manifest from so many authorities, those philosophers who were desirous of being reputed followers of Pythagoras and Plato spent much time and study upon this labour. But scarcely any thing threw a greater obstacle in the way of their design than the fact of females being ranked in the number of the gods; which clearly proved, as was contended by most of the more wise, that the gods had been men united with wives, and formerly entangled in the love of women, and therefore that the paying of divine honours to them was madness and impiety. These goddesses were made subjects for the severest ridicule and

sion so harmless, that he scrupled not himself to make use of it, in those elegant and devout hymns of his to God Almighty:

Σὺ πατὴρ, Σὺ δ' ἐσσὶ μάτηρ,
Σὺ δ' ἄῤῥην, Σὺ δὲ θῆλυς,

Tu Pater, Tu es Mater,
Tu Mas, Tu Fœmina.

Besides these, there are also certain other Orphic verses, scattered up and down in Proclus, but cited altogether in Eusebius[7] out of Porphyrius, in which the whole world is represented as one great animal, God being the soul thereof.

sarcasm by the Academics and other philosophers of declared hostility to all religion. Thus Velleius in Cicero, De Nat. Deorum, lib. 1. cap. 34. p. 2932. says: Nam quod et mares Deos et feminas esse dicitis, quid sequatur, videtis, "For in asserting that there are male and female gods, you see what follows." They were exposed also to the attacks of Christians, whose object was to show the turpitude of the popular religions. From among many I shall quote the testimony of Arnobius alone, who, lib. 3. adv. Gentes, p. 132. inveighs with great bitterness against the goddesses of the pagans: Quid dicitis, says he among other things, O sancti atque impolluti antistites religionum? Habent Dii sexus, et genitalium membrorum circumferunt fœditates? O pura, O sancta atque ab omni turpitudinis labe disparata divinitas! Lubet videre Deas gravidas, Deas fœtas, gliscentibusque per dies alvis, intestini ponderis morositate cunctari: parturire alias tractu longo, et manus obstetricas quærere: illas telis gravibus et dolorum acuminibus fixas ejulare, et hortari, et inter hæc omnia suppetias Junonis implorare Lucinæ, "What say you, ye holy and unpolluted champions of religions? Have the gods then sexes, and do they carry about with them the impurities of genital members? . . . . O pure, O holy, O spotless divinities! . . . Delightful must it be to behold pregnant goddesses," &c. The Stoics, therefore, had long ago rejected these goddesses, and called the marriages of the gods errors and idle superstitions, referring the whole to physical things. Genera, says the Stoic, in Cicero De Nat. Deor. lib. 2. cap. 28. p. 2996. t. 9. opp. *conjugia*, cognationes (Deorum) omniaque introducta ad similitudinem imbecilitatis humanæ . . . . et creduntur stultissime, et plena sunt futilitatis summæque levitatis, "The genders, marriages, affinities (of the gods), and all those things introduced in resemblance of human weakness, are most foolishly believed, and full of the grossest absurdity." Subsequently, however, greater subtlety was brought to bear upon this matter by the later Platonists, some of whom, in order to ward off the weapons of Christians, taught that the notion entertained by the ignorant multitude of the two sexes of the gods was to be understood of the twofold divine power; others held that the ancient philosophers, by this fiction of Jupiter and Juno, intended to represent, by an image as it were, that there exists in God a power of producing from himself, and by one act, all those things which, in the ordinary course of nature, are caused by the union of male and female. In signification of which they called God androgynous, or male and female together. In process of time these opinions, which manifestly betray their own fallacy, were more widely diffused, and gave occasion to fanatics and men of perverted minds to invent various absurdities, and to pass them off for abstruse wisdom with those who were ignorant of the causes that gave rise to the whole theory. With respect to the Orphic verses themselves, which have led to these remarks, they are the production, I do not doubt, of a Platonist, who considered it a glorious thing to adorn the tenets of his sect with the name of Orpheus. The same is my opinion, if it be only mine, of the oracle following. They both appear to me to savour of the Platonic rather than of the Orphic doctrine.

[7] Præpar. Evang. lib. 3. cap. 9. p. 100. I do not believe the third of these verses to have been removed from its proper place, as Dr. Cudworth intimates a little below, nor do I see any reason for doing so. But entertaining the opinion that all the ancient poets made *love* and *mind* more ancient than chaos itself, and that these two are used by them *as* names of the Supreme Deity, he is displeased at finding counsel and love here associated with water, earth, night and day, and placed below the Supreme Deity. But, if I mistake not, it has already been clearly shown by us above, that the learned Doctor thinks somewhat too favourably of the doctrine of the ancient poets, whose fables do not admit of being reconciled with the precepts and rules of sound reason.

Ἐν δὲ δέμας βασιλεῖον ἐν ᾧ τάδε πάντα κυκλεῖται,
Πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ, καὶ γαῖα, καὶ αἰθὴρ, νὺξ τε καὶ ἦμαρ·
Καὶ Μῆτις, πρῶτος γενέτωρ, καὶ Ἔρως πολυτερπής·
Πάντα γὰρ ἐν μεγάλῳ Ζηνὸς τάδε σώματι κεῖται·
Τοῦ δήτοι κεφαλὴν μὲν ἰδεῖν, καὶ καλὰ πρόσωπα,
Οὐρανὸς αἰγλήεις, ὃν χρύσεαι ἀμφὶς ἔθειραι
Ἄστρων μαρμαρέων περικαλλέες ἠερέθονται, &c.

Omnia regali sunt hæc in corpore clausa,
Ignis, et unda, et terra, æther cum nocte dieque;
(Consilium, primus genitor, cum numine amoris;)
Juppiter immenso sub corpore cuncta coërcet:
En hujus caput eximium, vultùsque decoros
Undique resplendens cœlum, cui pendula circum
Aurea Cæsaries astrorum lumina fundit:
Sunt oculi Phœbus, Phœboque adversa recurrens
Cynthia, &c.

Where probably that one verse,

Καὶ Μῆτις, πρῶτος γενέτωρ, καὶ Ἔρως πολυτερπής,

though truly Orphical, and indeed divine, (it signifying, that mind and love were the first begetters and original of all things) was notwithstanding clapped in unduly out of some other place. But from all these citations it plainly appears, that according to the Orphic theology, though there were many gods and goddesses too admitted, yet there was one original and king of them all, one supreme Deity acknowledged. We are not ignorant, that some of the ancient and learned fathers,[8] conceiving it contradictious for Orpheus at the same time to assert both many gods and one God, apprehended this to be a convenient salvo for this difficulty, to suppose, that Orpheus had by fits and turns been of different humours and persuasions; first a rank polytheist, asserting three hundred gods and more; and then afterwards a converted monotheist, they being the rather led into this opinion by reason of certain counterfeit Orphic verses in Aristobulus, made probably by some ignorant Jew; wherein Orpheus is made to sing a palinodia or recantation, for his former error and polytheism. But we must crave leave, with all due respect, to dissent from reverend antiquity in this; it plainly appearing from that first Orphic excerption in Proclus, that Orpheus at the same time acknowledged both one unmade Deity (the original of all things), and many generated gods and goddesses, that were all contained in it.[9]

[8] Justin Martyr. Cohort. ad Græcos, p. 15. and Apolog. 2. pro Christian. p. 104. Clemens Alexandr. Protrept. Cap. 7. p. 63. and Cyrillus Alexandr. lib. 1. adv. Julianum, p. 25. Others, however, I doubt not, will maintain this disagreement in the Orphic poems to be a proof that they are not the production of one man: the verses in which many gods are celebrated belonging to an ancient author, but those which sing the praises of one God to some later impostor who abused the name of Orpheus.

[9] The learned Doctor is right in dissenting from the opinion of these fathers: but I do not know whether the solution he gives of the discrepancy in the Orphic poems will

Having now made it sufficiently evident from such Orphic fragments as have been acknowledged by Pagan writers, and by them cited out of Orpheus' hymns and rhapsodies, that the opinion of monarchy or one self-existent Deity, the original of all things, was an essential part of the Orphic theology or cabala; we shall here further observe, that besides this opinion of monarchy, (but consistently with the same) a trinity also of divine hypostases subordinate was another part of this Orphic cabala. Proclus upon Plato's Timæus,* making an inquiry into Plato's demiurgus or opifex of the world, gives us an account, amongst other Platonists, of the doctrine of Amelius (who was contemporary with Plotinus, and who is said to have taken notice of what St. John the evangelist had written concerning the Logos, as agreeing with the Platonic and Pythagoric hypothesis[10]) after this manner: Ἀμέλιος δὲ τρίτον ποιεῖ, τὸν Δημιουργὸν, καὶ Νοῦς τρεῖς, Βασιλεῖς τρεῖς, τὸν Ὄντα, τὸν Ἔχοντα, τὸν Ὁρῶντα· διαφέρουσι δὲ οὗτοι, ὅτι ὁ μὲν πρῶτος Νοῦς, ὄντως ἐστὶν ὃ ἐστιν· Ὁ δὲ δεύτερος, ἔστι μὲν τὸ ἐν αὑτῷ νοητὸν, ἔχει δὲ τὸ πρὸ αὑτοῦ, καὶ μέτεχει πάντως ἐκείνου, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο δεύτερος· Ὁ δὲ τρίτος, ἔστι μὲν τὸ ἐν αὑτῷ, καὶ οὗτος νοητόν· (πᾶς γὰρ νοῦς τῷ συζυγοῦντι νοητῷ ὁ αὐτός ἐστιν) ἔχει δὲ τὸ ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ· καὶ ὁρᾷ τὸ πρῶτον· ὅσῳ γὰρ πλείω ἡ ἀπόστασις, τοσοῦτῳ τὸ ἔχον ἀμυδρότερον. This passage being very remarkable, we thought fit to set it down at large, and shall here translate it: "Amelius makes a threefold demiurgus or opifex of the world, three minds and three kings; him that is, him that hath, and him that beholds. Which three minds differ thus, in that the first is essentially that which he is (or all perfection): the second is its own intelligible, but hath the first (as something distinct from it), and indeed partakes thereof, and therefore is second. The third is also that intelligible of its own (for every mind is the same thing with its correspondent intelligible), but hath that which is in the second, and beholds the first. For how much soever every being departs from the first, so much the obscurer is it." After which Proclus immediately subjoins: Τούτους οὖν τοὺς τρεῖς νόας καὶ δημιουργοὺς ὑποτίθεται, καὶ τοὺς παρὰ τῷ Πλάτωνι, τρεῖς βασιλέας, καὶ τοὺς παρ' Ὀρφεῖ τρεῖς, Φάνητα, καὶ Οὐρανὸν, καὶ Κρόνον, καὶ ὁ μάλιστα παρ' αὐτῷ δημιουργὸς ὁ Φάνης ἐστίν, "Amelius therefore supposeth these three minds and demiurgic principles of his to be both the same with Plato's three kings, and with Orpheus' trinity of Phanes, Uranus, and Cronus; but Phanes is supposed by him to be principally the demiurgus."

meet with general approval. He supposes, that as Orpheus sung sometimes of one and sometimes of many gods, he acknowledged at the same time both one God and a plurality of other gods.

* Page 93.

[10] See Eusebius, Præpar. Evang. lib. 11. cap. 18. 19. p. 540.

Where though Proclus (who had some peculiar fancies and whimsies of his own, and was indeed a confounder of the Platonic theology, and a mingler of much unintelligible stuff with it) does himself assert a monad or unity, superior to this whole trinity; yet does he seem nevertheless rightly to contend against Amelius, that it was not the first hypostasis neither in the Platonic nor Orphic trinity that was chiefly and properly the demiurgus or opifex of the world, but the second. And thus Proclus' master Syrianus had before determined, that in the Orphic theology, the title of Opifex did properly belong to Orpheus' *πρωτόγονος θεὸς*, or "first begotten God," which was the same with Plato's *Νοῦς*, or "Divine Intellect." Agreeably whereunto Proclus' conclusion is: *Τίς μὲν οὖν ὁ δημιουργός ἐστι, καὶ ὅτι Νοῦς θεῖος τῆς ὕλης ποιήσεως αἴτιος, εἰρήσθω διὰ τούτων· καὶ ὅπως ὑπό τε Ὀρφέως καὶ Πλάτωνος, ὁ αὐτὸς ἀνυμνεῖται δημιουργὸς Ζεύς, ἀπὸ τούτων ὑπομεμνήσθω*, "Thus much may suffice to have declared, who is the demiurgus of the world, namely, that it is the divine Intellect, which is the proper and immediate cause of the whole creation; and that it is one and the same demiurgical Jupiter, that is praised both by Orpheus and Plato." Now besides this, it is observable that Damascius, in his book *Περὶ ἀρχῶν*,[2] or "concerning the principles" (not yet published), giving an account of the Orphic theology, tells us, amongst other things, that Orpheus introduced *τρίμορφον θεὸν*, "a triform deity." To all which may be added what was before cited out of Timotheus the chronographer, that God had three names, light, counsel, and life; and that all things were made by one Deity under these three several names. Where Cedrenus,[3] the preserver of that excellent fragment of antiquity, concludes in this manner: *Ταῦτα Τιμόθεος συνεγράψατο ὁ χρονογράφος, λέγων τὸν Ὀρφέα πρὸ τοσούτων χρόνων εἰπόντα, Τριάδα ὁμοούσιον δημιουργῆσαι τὰ πάντα*, "These things Timotheus the chronographer wrote, affirming Orpheus, so long ago, to have declared, that all things were made by a co-essential or consubstantial Trinity." Which, though otherwise it might be looked upon suspiciously, because that Timotheus was a Christian (especially in regard of that word *ὁμοούσιον*), yet by comparing it with what we have before alleged out of pagan writers, it appears, that so far as concerns an Orphic trinity, it was not altogether vainly written, or without ground by him.[4]

[1] Comm. in Libros aliquot Metaphys. Aristotelis, p. 33.

[2] See Wolf's Extracts from this work of Damascius, sect. 13. in his Anecdot. Græc. tom. 3. p. 252. 253.

[3] The very same is to be found in J. Malalas, Historia Chron. tom. 1. p. 92.

[4] With every respect for our learned author, I cannot suffer myself to suppose, except upon better testimony, that Orpheus asserted three persons in one God. I am aware, that men of no mean talent and learning share with him in this opinion; among whom, to omit the more ancient, as also those mentioned by Gabr. Naudæus, Apolog.

But we have not yet done with Orpheus and the Orphic theology, before we have made one further reflection upon it, so as to take notice of that strong and rank haut-goust which was in

pro magnis viris falso Magiæ accusat. p. 138. the Jesuit Andr. Kircher stands pre-eminent, who, Œdipi Ægypt. Gymn. Hierogl. class. 3. cap. 4. p. 150. not only maintains that the three names in Orpheus, *βουλη*, *φάος*, *καὶ ζωη*, are the three first Sephiroth of the Cabalists, but also, cap. 12. p. 194. by an admirable or rather idle subtlety, and in a manner different from Dr. Cudworth, elicits from these poems the doctrine of the Trinity. Nor does the opinion of P. Dan. Huet, Quæst. Alnetan. lib. 2. cap. 3. p. 95. differ much from this. But, setting aside the great authority of men so eminent, I scarcely find a single argument for agreeing with him. I shall only examine what is brought forward here and subsequently by Dr. Cudworth on this subject, passing over the arguments of those of more humble abilities and learning. I. As to Amelius' having, according to Proclus, supposed the three deities of Orpheus, Phanes, Uranus, and Cronus, to be Plato's three principles, this in my opinion is of little importance. Not long ago, a Benedictine, P. Pezronius, did not hesitate to affirm these Orphic Gods to have been three very ancient kings and heroes of the Gauls or Celts, Antiquité de la Nation et de la Langue des Celts, p. 50. which opinion was adopted by J. Basnage, in opposition to the view taken by our author respecting the Orphic Trinity, Histoire des Juifs, tom. 4. cap. 4. sect. 4. p. 50. But this path, which leads through uncertain acceptations of phrases and obsolete words to conjectures still more uncertain, I consider much too slippery and doubtful to be trodden with safety. Let us, therefore, take another. In the first place, the authority of Amelius, a Platonist of more than ordinary levity, is not sufficiently grave to command our immediate assent to his identification of the three Orphic Gods with the three principles of Plato. The whole of the Platonic sect, after the birth of our Saviour, was more expert in corrupting and perverting, than in illustrating and explaining, the opinions of ancient authors, which they always maintained to be closely allied to their own principles. The whole of their efforts were directed to this one point, to accommodate their theories, as far as possible, to the precepts of Christians. Following the example of these, therefore, they put forth the grossest absurdities respecting a triune deity, and laboured with unremitting zeal to prove the high antiquity of their own doctrine and its accordance with the principles of all the philosophers of bygone days. Hence all, who had possessed weight or influence formerly, were dragged to their own side by imposture or violence. Moreover, most of this class, as is evident from those of their works now extant, were remarkable for great weakness of judgment, and followed rather the fallacies of a delusive imagination than the precepts of sound and just reasoning. What sensible man then, I ask, would rely on the authority of these persons? Again, what Orpheus relates of those three gods cannot by any means be reconciled with the precepts of the Platonists regarding three principles or the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. See the fragment of Orpheus preserved by Athenagoras, Apolog. pro Christian. cap. 16. p. 72. and Eschenbach's Observationes De Poësi Orphica, p. 95. &c. For my part, I take the same view of this theogony ascribed to Orpheus as of all other ancient theogonies, namely, that it is a confused jumble of ancient history, and of the physical science of the period; nor do I consider this poet, whoever he was, to have had any other object than that of remodelling the popular religion, in conformity with the dogmas he had espoused on various subjects of natural philosophy. II. The testimonies of Syrianus and Damascius have the same weight with me as those of Proclus and Amelius. These men are unworthy of being believed by men of ordinary sense; as is evident even from this alone, that there are almost as many different opinions among them respecting their imaginary threefold Deity as there are philosophers. III. The chronographer Timotheus belongs to that class of later Greeks who gave new authority to the old proverb respecting Greek faith, and proved that nothing could surpass them in mendacity. Besides, he does not produce Orpheus' verses in evidence of his own opinion, that Orpheus sung of three persons in one God, and consequently leaves us no means of judging upon what arguments it is founded. If he rested it merely upon the fact of Orpheus having called his first principle, counsel, light, and life, I should hold the whole demonstration to be utterly worthless. For if any one designates God by various names, is this necessarily a proof that he asserts three persons in one God? But what need is there of many words?

it, of making God to be all. As, for example, if we may repeat the forecited passages, and put in the name of God, instead of Ζεὺς or Jupiter; Διὸς πάλιν ἐντὸς ἐτύχθη, "This universe, and all things belonging to it, were made within God." Ζηνὸς δ' ἐνὶ γαστέρι σύρρα πεφύκει, "All things were contained together in the womb of God." Ζεὺς κεφαλὴ, Ζεὺς μέσσα, "God is the head and middle of all things." Ζεὺς πύθμην γαίης," &c., "God is the basis of the earth and heaven; God is the depth of the sea; God is the breath of all (or the air that we breathe); God is the force of the untameable fire; God is sun, moon, and stars." Ἓν τε δέμας βασιλεῖον, "There is one kingly (or divine) body;" and

Πάντα γὰρ ἐν μεγάλῳ Ζηνὸς τάδε σώματι κεῖται,

"For all these things lie in the great body of God." And thus was the Orphic theology before represented also by Timotheus,[5] the chronographer: Διὰ τῆς θεότητος πάντα ἐγένετο, καὶ αὐτός ἐστι πάντα, "All things were made by God, and himself is all things."

But further to prove, that the ancient Greekish Pagans were indeed of such a religious humour as this, to resolve all things into God, and to make God all, we shall here cite a remarkable testimony of Plutarch's, out of his "Defect of Oracles:"* Δύο πάσης γενέσεως αἰτίας ἐχούσης, οἱ μὲν σφόδρα παλαιοὶ θεολόγοι καὶ ποιηταὶ τῇ κρείττονι μόνον τὸν νοῦν προσέχειν εἵλοντο, τοῦτο δὴ τὸ κοινὸν ἐπιφθεγγόμενοι πᾶσι πράγμασι,

Ζεὺς ἀρχὴ, Ζεὺς μέσσα, Διὸς δ' ἐκ πάντα πέλονται·

ταῖς δ' ἀναγκαίαις καὶ φυσικαῖς, οὐκ ἔτι προσήεσαν αἰτίαις· οἱ δὲ νεώτεροι τούτων καὶ φυσικοὶ προσαγορευόμενοι, τουναντίον ἐκείνοις, τῆς καλῆς καὶ θείας ἀποπλανηθέντες ἀρχῆς, ἐν σώμασι καὶ πάθεσι σωμάτων, πληγαῖς τε καὶ μεταβολαῖς καὶ κράσεσι τίθενται τὸ σύμπαν, "Whereas there are two causes of all generation (the divine and the natural), the most ancient theologers and poets attended only to the more excellent of these two (the divine cause), resolving all things into God, and pronouncing this of them universally, that God was both the beginning, and middle, and that all things were out of God. Insomuch, that these had no regard at all to the other natural and necessary causes of things. But, on the contrary, their juniors, who were called Physici (or naturalists), straying from this most excellent and divine principle, placed all in bodies, their passions, collisions, mutations, and

The whole of those verses of Orpheus adduced by Timotheus are to be looked upon with suspicion, as being, if not downright forgeries, at least manifestly interpolated. And what is this ἔκθεσις, or exposition of Orpheus, quoted from Timotheus by Cedrenus and Malalas? Is it Orpheus' own, or that of some one else? For my part, I have no doubt of its being the production of some later Greek. And, if this be the case, the whole of Timotheus' argument evidently falls to the ground.

[5] In Cedrenus and Malalas, ibid.

* Page 436.

commixtures together." Where, by the most ancient theologers and poets, Plutarch plainly meant Orpheus and his followers, it being an Orphic verse that is here cited by him, whereby he gives also an acknowledgment of their antiquity. But by their juniors, who are called Physici, he could understand no other than those first Ionic philosophers, Anaximander, Anaximenes, Hippo, and the rest, whom those degenerate Italics afterward followed, atomizing atheistically, Leucippus, Democritus, and Epicurus. So that here we have another confirmation also of what was before asserted by us, that the Ionic philosophers after Thales, and before Anaxagoras, were generally atheistical. And, indeed, from them the word Φυσικοὶ, or Naturalists, came to be often used as synonymous with Ἄθεοι, or Atheists. Now these two are here condemned by Plutarch for two contrary extremes; the one, who resolved all into natural and necessary causes, that is, into matter, motion, and qualities of bodies, leaving out the divine cause, as guilty of atheism; the other, who altogether neglecting the natural and necessary causes of things, resolved all into the divine cause, as it were swallowing up all into God, as guilty of a kind of fanaticism. And thus we see plainly, that this was one grand arcanum of the Orphic cabala, and the ancient Greekish theology, that God is all things.

Some fanatics of latter times[6] have made God to be all, in a gross sense, so as to take away all real distinction betwixt God and the creature, and indeed to allow no other being besides God; they supposing the substance of every thing, and even of all inanimate bodies, to be the very substance of God himself, and all the variety of things that is in the world, to be nothing but God under several forms, appearances, and disguises. The Stoics anciently made God to be all, and all to be God, in somewhat a different way; they conceiving God properly to be the active principle of the whole corporeal universe, which yet (because they admitted of no incorporeal substance) they supposed, together with the passive or the matter, to make up but one and the same complete substance. And others, who acknowledged God to be an incorporeal substance, distinct from the matter, have notwithstanding made all to be God also, in a certain sense; they supposing God to be nothing but a soul of the world, which, together with the matter, made up all into one entire divine animal. Now the Orphic theologers cannot be charged with making God all, in that first and grossly fanatic sense; as if they took away all real distinction betwixt God and the creature, they so asserting God to be all, as that notwith-

[6] Rob. Fludd and his followers, who at that time were very numerous in England; also Jac. Behmen and others. See Fludd's Preface to his Philosophia Mosaica; P. Gassendi, Examen Philos. Fluddanæ, cap. 1. p. 229. tom. 3. opp. and Abr. Hinckelmann, Detectio Fundam. Boëhmiani, p. 2. &c.

standing they allowed other things to have distinct beings of their own. Thus much appearing from that riddle, which in the Orphic verses was proposed by the maker of the world, to Night:

Πῶς δέ μοι ἕν τι τὰ πάντ' ἔσται, καὶ χωρὶς ἕκαστον,*

"How can all things be one, and yet every thing have a distinct being of its own?" Where Ἕν τι τὰ πάντα, "all things one," or "one all things," seems to be the supreme Deity, or divine Intellect, as Proclus also interprets it: Τὰ ὅλα περιέχων ὁ Ζεὺς καὶ πάντα μοναδικῶς καὶ νοερῶς, κατὰ τούτους χρησμοὺς, μετὰ τῆς νυκτὸς ὑφίστησι, καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐγκόσμια θεῶν, καὶ τὰς μοίρας τοῦ παντὸς, "Jupiter, who containeth the universe, and all things within himself, unitively and intellectually, according to these Orphic oracles, gives a particular subsistence of their own also to all the mundane gods, and other parts of the universe." And this is χωρὶς ἕκαστον, in that forecited Orphic verse, "Every thing apart by itself," the whole produced or created universe, with all its variety of things in it; which yet are Orphically said to be God also in a certain other sense, that shall be declared afterward. Nor can the Orphic theologers be charged with making God all in the second Stoical sense, as if they denied all incorporeal substance, they plainly asserting, as Damascius and others particularly note, Θεὸν ἀσώματον, "an incorporeal Deity." But as for the third way, it is very true, that the Orphic theologers did frequently call the world the body of God, and its several parts his members, making the whole universe to be one divine animal; notwithstanding which, they supposed not this animated world to be the first and highest God, but either Δεύτερον θεὸν, as the hermaic or trismegistic writers call it, "the second God;" or else, as Numenius and others of the Platonists speak, Τρίτον θεὸν, "the third God;" the soul thereof being as well in the Orphic as it was in the Pythagoric and Platonic trinity, but the third hypostasis; they supposing two other divine hypostases superior thereunto, which were perfectly secrete from matter. Wherefore, as to the supreme Deity, these Orphic theologers made him to be all things, chiefly upon the two following accounts; first, because all things coming from God, they inferred, that therefore they were all contained in him, and consequently were, in a certain sense, himself; thus much being declared in those Orphic verses cited by Proclus[7] and others,

Πάντα τάδε κρύψας, αὖθις φάος ἐς πολυγηθὲς
Μέλλεν ἀπὸ κραδίης προφέρειν, πολυθέσκελα ῥέζων.

* Proclus in [lib. 2. p. 112.]

[7] Comm. in Timæum Platonis, lib. 2. p. 95. The same verses occur in Clemens Alexandr., Aristot. De Mundo, Eusebius, and others, but not in the same form in all. See Eschenbach, De Poësi Orphica, p. 74.

Which Apuleius thus renders,[8]

> Namque sinu occultans, dulces in luminis oras
> Cuncta tulit, sacro versans sub pectore curas.

The sense whereof is plainly this; "That God at first hiding or occultly containing all things within himself, did from thence display them, and bring them forth into light, or distinct beings of their own, and so make the world." The second is, because the world produced by God, and really existing without him, is not therefore quite cut off from him, nor subsists alone by itself as a dead thing, but is still livingly united to him, essentially dependent on him, always supported and upheld, quickened and enlivened, acted and pervaded by him; according to that Orphic passage:[9] Ἐν δ' αὐτοῖς αὐτὸς περινίσσεται, "God passes through and intimately pervades all things."

Now, it is very true that some Christian theologers also have made God to be all, according to these latter senses; as when they affirm the whole world to be nothing else but Deum explicatum, "God expanded or unfolded," and when they call the creatures, as St. Jerome and others often do, radios Deitatis, "the rays of the Deity." Nay, the Scripture itself[10] may seem to give some countenance also hereunto, when it tells us, that of him, and through him, and to him are all things; which in the Orphic theology is thus expressed; "God is the beginning, and middle, and end of all things;* that ἐν αὐτῷ ἐκτίσθη τὰ πάντα, "all things were made in him,"† as in the Orphic verses: Διὸς ἐντὸς ἐτύχθη; that τὰ πάντα ἐν αὐτῷ συνέστηκε, "all things consist in him;" that, "in him we live and move and have our being;"‡ that God doth ζωοποιεῖν πάντα, "quicken all things,"§ and that he ought to be made, πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν, "all in all;" which supposeth him in some sense to be so. Notwithstanding which, this is a very ticklish point, and easily liable to mistake and abuse: and, as we conceive, it was the mistake and abuse of this one thing which was the chief ground and original of the both seeming and real polytheism, not only of the Greekish and European, but also of the Egyptian and other Pagans, as will be more particularly declared afterwards; they concluding, that because God was all things, and consequently, all things God,

[8] De Mundo, p. m. 25.

[9] This is found along with others in Justin Martyr, Cohort. ad Gentes and Apolog. secunda, in Clemens, Eusebius, and others. See Eschenbach, De Poësi Orphica, p. 136. Justin however reads, not περινίσσεται, but περιγίγνεται, which gives a different sense.

[10] Some of these passages are foreign to the question. For example, how Col. i. 16. where all things are said to have been made in Christ, can assist the cause of those who make all things to be God, I am at a loss to perceive. And yet it is on such passages that the fanatics, here spoken of by Dr. Cudworth, are accustomed to rely for support. See Hinckelmann's Detect. Fundam. Boëhmiani. p. 70.

* Col. i. 16. † Col. i. 17. ‡ 1 Tim. vi. 13. § 1 Cor. xv. 28.

that therefore God ought to be worshipped in all things, that is, in all the several parts of the world, and things of nature, but especially in those animated intellectual beings which are superior to men. Consentaneously whereunto, they did both θεολογεῖν ἅπαντα, "theologize or deify all things," looking upon every thing as having ὑπερφύσικόν τι, "something supernatural," or a kind of divinity in it; and also bestow several names upon God, according to all the several parts of the world, and things of nature, calling him in the starry heaven and ether, Jupiter; in the air, Juno; in the winds, Æolus; in the sea, Neptune; in the earth and subterraneous parts, Pluto; in learning, knowledge, and invention, Minerva and the Muses; in war, Mars; in pleasure, Venus; in corn, Ceres; in wine, Bacchus; and the like.[1]

[1] That by far the greater portion of ancient philosophers held the opinion, that God is all things and that the whole of this universe is in a certain respect God, is a fact so generally acknowledged at this day, that men of the greatest learning and intelligence admit of but few exceptions to the number and reckon among the masters of Ben. Spinoza almost all the noted sages of antiquity. I shall not follow out this long argument, as other matters are at present under consideration, but shall confine myself to a brief illustration of the doctrine of Orpheus, the subject here in question, especially as I observe his name to have been passed over by those who have searched into ancient writers for traces of *Spinozism before Spinoza*. In the first place, then, it is obvious that the language of those, who assert God to be all things and all things to be in God, admits of easy explanation. For, not to speak of the expressions of holy writ, there were among Christians teachers of no inconsiderable eminence and free too from all suspicion of impiety towards God, who did not hesitate to make use of this phrase. Neither is there the slightest doubt that those who adopt this dogma do not interpret it in the same manner, but, though employing the same words, entertain some a worse and some a better opinion. Both the followers of Spinoza and those who tread in the footsteps of Fludd and the mystics, inculcate God to be all things and all things to be God. But, apart from the words, we may perceive a great distinction between the two classes and may learn that the flagitiousness of the former cannot fairly be charged upon the latter. Hence it follows, that in canvassing the dogmas of ancient philosophers, who have taught any thing of the sort, we ought to exercise caution and by no means to place them all in the same category. II. This being the case, it remains for us to inquire among whom we are to class this real or fictitious Orpheus, whether among those who accept this dogma in an evil and impious sense, or among such as express by a harsh phraseology sentiments by no means deserving of condemnation. Dr. Cudworth is wholly intent upon showing, that Orpheus taught a sound and pure doctrine, and was uncontaminated by the conceits of fanatics, Stoics, and others. I could have wished he had brought forward such authorities on the subject as admitted of no question, and accustomed as I am to pay all possible respect to the ancients, I should have been the first to express my concurrence. But in the first place he assumes Orpheus to have held the same opinion as the junior Platonists and not only to have professed an incorporeal God, but also like them to have regarded the world as a second or third God; although, upon what testimony he does so, I do not perceive. From the extant remains of the Orphic verses nothing of the kind can be elicited, and to place any reliance upon the Platonists themselves in this matter, who boast of Orpheus as having favoured their own principles, would be just as safe as to believe those chemists of the present day, who foolishly pretend that Moses, Peter, Paul, Hermes, and all other pious and learned men, devoted their attention to the transmutation of metals. Having, however, assumed this without sufficient testimony, the learned doctor proceeds still farther and, calling in the aid of some verses of Orpheus, endeavours to show the reason, why Orpheus asserted God to be all things. But, as will by and by be made appear, he does not interpret those verses in the sense required by the order and context of the whole poem; but seems in his explanation to have regarded what the

However, it is unquestionably evident from hence, that Orpheus with his followers, that is, the generality of the Greekish Pagans, acknowledged one universal and all-comprehending Deity, one that was all; and consequently could not admit of many self-existent and independent deities.

opinion of Orpheus ought to have been, rather than what it really was. III. The whole of this question ought to be decided by certain verses of Orpheus, extant in some of the ancient authors and collected by Eschenbach, De Poësi Orphica, p. 68. &c. If these be impartially examined, it will be evident that their author, whoever he was, acknowledged, 1. An eternal first principle of things, in whom all things that are now seen were contained, or in whom the whole universe and all the natures therein lay concealed. This is clearly shown by those eight verses above cited by Dr. Cudworth, from Proclus, In Timæum Plat. p. 95. and beginning with: *Τοὔνεκα σὺν τῷ παντί*, &c. The same is most plainly to be inferred from those verses, a portion of which he brings forward in this very place, wherein God is said to have hidden and contained all things within himself and afterwards to have brought forth and displayed them. I pass over the others to the same purport to be found in Proclus and Eusebius. But God, in whom all things were contained from all eternity, 2. at some finite time brought forth from his own bosom the earth, seas, gods and goddesses, sun, moon, in short, all things. Of this, the same verses afford such evidence, as leaves no room for doubt. 3. Hence, all things that exist, having proceeded from God himself, are God and members and parts of God. This the poet expounds at large in Eusebius, Præpar. Evangel. lib. 3. cap. 9. p. 100. and describes this world as the body of God. "Heaven," says he, "is the head of God, the sun his eyes, the regions of air his arms, shoulders, and breast, the earth and mountains his belly," and so on. Which, if divested of poetic figure, plainly signifies that there is nothing in the whole nature of things, that has not emanated from God and does not constitute a member and portion of him. By combining all these together, it will be easy to ascertain what opinion the so-called Orpheus entertained of the divine nature. He imagined to himself an eternal chaos and supposed that God and matter were associated together from infinity, or that all things now existing were hidden within God himself; but that at a certain time, whether voluntarily or by fate I know not, God cast forth that matter from his bosom, and so produced the world and all things contained in it: hence, that all things in existence, fire, water, sun, moon, and the rest, are Jove or God himself, and the whole universe the body as it were of God: that together with matter there emanated from the same God a certain spirit, which diffused through the whole of matter animates all things, and supplies the cause and origin of human souls: lastly, that that mind itself from which all thing flowed, since its separation from matter, is seated aloft above the regions of ether and, though beyond the reach of mortal knowledge, governs all things. Orpheus, in Justin Martyr, Cohort. ad Gentes, p. 15.

Οὐδέ τίς ἐσθ' ἕτερος χωρὶς μεγαλόν βασιλῆος,
Αὐτὸν δ' οὐχ ὁρόω· περὶ γὰρ νέφος ἐστήρικται.

Neither is there any other besides the mighty king.
But him I see not; for a dense cloud intervenes.

And a little afterwards:

Οὗτος γὰρ χάλκειον ἐς οὐρανὸν ἑστήρικται
Χρυσέῳ εἰνὶ θρόνῳ· γαίης δ' ἐπὶ πόσσι βέβηκε.

For he is firmly seated in the brazen heavens
Upon his golden throne; and stands with his feet upon the earth.

Perhaps he added also that a time will come when all things will return into God. This opinion concerning God is different I confess from that of the Stoics, as well as from the doctrine of those who consider God to be the soul of the world, or a nature diffused and passing through the whole of matter; lastly, it differs also from the impious conceits of Spinoza; but it varies very little, if at all, from the dogmas of those fanatics, who assert as confidently that all things emanated from God, as if they had themselves

XVIII. Having treated largely concerning the two most eminent Polytheists amongst the ancient Pagans, Zoroaster and Orpheus, and clearly proved, that they asserted one supreme Deity; we shall in the next place observe, that the Egyptians themselves also, notwithstanding their multifarious polytheism and idolatry, had an acknowledgment amongst them of one supreme and universal Numen.

There hath been some controversy amongst learned men, whether polytheism and idolatry had their first rise from the Egyptians, or the Chaldeans, because the Pagan writers for the most part give the precedency here to the Egyptians; Lucian himself,[2] who was by birth a Syrian, and a diligent inquirer into the antiquities of his own country, affirming that the Syrians and Assyrians received their religion and gods first from the Egyptians: and before Lucian, Herodotus,[3] the father of history, reporting likewise that the Egyptians were the first that

been witnesses of the whole operation. This opinion of the emanation of all things from God is of very great antiquity. It prevailed among many eastern nations, as A. Hinckelmann has endeavoured to prove, Detectio Fundam. Boëhmiani, p. 84. &c. and. as is shown at great length by J. Basnage, Histoire des Juifs, lib. 4. cap. 7. p. 129. and cap. 8. p. 159. was long ago adopted by the Jewish Cabalists. Neither, as we shall by and by make appear, did the Indians and Egyptians consider it unworthy of being entertained. It is not to be wondered at, therefore, that this Orpheus, whose poems we are considering, should have been imbued with the same dogma. And yet the opinion of all believers in this doctrine is not one and the same; the notions of some being more correct and rational than those of others. Some of them profess an eternal emanation of things from God; in which class there are those who place Aristotle himself; it is more certain that all the junior Platonists ought be ranked in it. Others believe this emanation to have taken place at some finite time, as Weigel, Fludd, Behmen, and others. These again either hold the things that emanated from God to be of the same nature as God himself, which indeed is impious and altogether absurd; or maintain that God from whom things flowed and the things themselves are, as body and spirit, different; which error, although dangerous, is more pardonable. Some suppose God to have produced all things from himself of his own accord and uncontrolled by any thing else. Others attribute the whole to fate and necessity and believe God to have been unable not to generate the world from himself. Some suppose all things to have flowed from the Supreme Being in a short time. Others consider the work to have been perfected at long intervals. But who is to enumerate all the absurd fancies of men, who rave rather than reason, and who estimate divine greatness according to their own puny intellect and circumscribed knowledge? To which of these sects Orpheus belonged, in the absence of documents that can be relied on, it would be very difficult to say. To myself he appears to have come nearest to the opinion of the Indians, as explained by Franc. Banier, Voyage aux Etats de grand Mogol, tom. 2. p. 164. In a matter so obscure it will be sufficient to hazard probable conjecture.

[2] The passage of Lucian here meant is, I have no doubt, the following, from his book, De Dea Syria, t. 2. opp. p. 656. 657. Πρῶτοι μὲν τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὧν ἡμεῖς ἴδμεν, Αἰγύπτιοι λέγονται θεῶν τε ἐννοίην λαβεῖν——μετὰ δὲ οὐ πολλοστῷ χρόνῳ παρ' Αἰγυπτίων λόγον Ἀσσύριοι ἐς θεοὺς ἤκουσαν·——καὶ ἔστιν ἱρὰ καὶ ἐν Συρίῃ, οὐ παρὰ πολὺ τοῖς Αἰγυπτίοισι ἰσοχρονέοντα, "The Egyptians are said to be the first men that we know of, who obtained a knowledge of the gods.——Not long afterwards the Assyrians received the doctrine of the gods from the Egyptians.——There are in Syria also temples of not much later date than those of Egypt."

[3] Histor. lib. 2. cap. 4. p. 90.

erected temples and statues to the gods. But whether the Egyptians or Chaldeans were the first Polytheists and Idolators, there is no question to be made, but that the Greeks and Europeans generally derived their polytheism and idolatry from the Egyptians. Herodotus affirms in one place,[4] that the Greeks received their twelve gods from thence; and in another,[5] that σχέδον καὶ πάντα τὰ ὀνόματα τῶν θεῶν ἐξ Αἰγύπτου ἐλήλυθεν εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα, "almost all the names of gods came first out of Egypt into Greece." In what sense this might be true of Ζεὺς itself, though the word be originally Greekish, shall be declared afterwards: but it is probable that Herodotus had here a further meaning, that the very names of many of the Greekish gods were originally Egyptian. In order to the confirmation of which, we shall here propound a conjecture concerning one of them, viz., Ἀθηνᾶ, called otherwise by the Greeks, Pallas, and by the Latins, Minerva. For first, the Greek etymologies of this word seem to be all of them either trifling and frivolous, or violent and forced. Plato, in his Cratylus[6] having observed that according to the ancient allegorical interpreters of Homer, Ἀθηνᾶ was nothing else but νοῦς or διάνοια, "Mind or Understanding," personated and deified, conceived, that the first imposers of that name, intending to signify thereby divine wisdom, called it Ἀθηνᾶ, as θεοῦ νόησιν, "the Understanding of God," or "the Knowledge of divine things;" as if the word had been at first Θεονόη, and thence afterwards transformed into Ἀθηνᾶ. But being not fully satisfied himself with this etymology, he afterwards attempts another, deriving the word from νόησις ἐν τῷ ἤθει, "knowledge concerning manners, or practical knowledge;" as if it had been at first Ἠθονόη, and from thence changed into Ἀθηνᾶ. Others of the Greeks have deduced this word ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀθρεῖν, because it is the property of wisdom to collect all into one, supposing that it was at first Ἀθρηνᾶ. Others would fetch it from θῆλυς and Alpha privative, because Minerva or wisdom, though she be a goddess, yet hath nothing of feminine imperfection in her. Others again would etymologize it, ἀπὸ τοῦ μὴ πεφυκέναι θήνεσθαι καὶ ὑποτάττεσθαι τὴν ἀρετήν, "because virtue or wisdom is of such a noble and generous temper, as that it scorns to subject itself to any base and unworthy servitude." Lastly, others would derive it, ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰθέρος, affirming it to have been at first Αἰθερονεία.[7] From all which uncertainty of the Greek concerning the etymon of this word Ἀθηνᾶ, and from the frivolousness or forcedness of these conjectures, we may rather conclude, that it was not originally Greekish, but exotical,

[4] Ibid. and lib. 4. cap. 50. p. 108. [5] Lib. 4. cap. 50. p. 108. [6] P. 267

[7] All these etymologies of the name Ἀθηνᾶ are collected together by Phornutus, in his book De Natura Deor. cap. 20. p. 185. occurring among Gale's Scriptores Veterum Mythol.

and probably, according to Herodotus, Egyptian. Wherefore, let us try whether or no we can find any Egyptian word from whence this Ἀθηνᾶ might be derived. Plato, in his Timæus,[8] making mention of Sais, a city in Egypt, where Solon sometimes sojourned, tells us: Ὅτι τῆς πόλεως θεὸς ἀρχηγός ἐστιν, Αἰγυπτιστὶ μὲν τοὔνομα Νηίθ, Ἑλληνιστὶ δὲ, ὡς ὁ ἐκείνων λόγος, Ἀθηνᾶ, "That the president or tutelar God of that city was called in the Egyptian language Neith, but in the Greek, as the same Egyptians affirm, Ἀθηνᾶ." Now, why might not this very Egyptian word Neith, by an easy inversion, have been at first turned into Thien, or Θὴν, (men commonly pronouncing exotic words ill-favouredly) and then by additional Alphas at the beginning and end, transformed into Ἀθηνᾶ? This seems much more probable than either Plato's Θεονόη, or Ἠθονόη, or any other of those Greek etymologies before-mentioned.[9] And as the Greeks thus derived the names of many of their gods from the Egyptians, so do the Latins seem to have done the like, from this one instance of the word Neptune; which, though Varro[10] would deduce *à nubendo*, as if it had been Nuptunus, because the sea covers and hides the land, and Scaliger with others,

[8] P. 524. opp.

[9] The learned Doctor has overlooked the conjecture of G. J. Vossius, who agrees with him in supposing the name Ἀθηνᾶ to have come, not from the Greek, but from the Egyptian, or some other foreign language; but suspects that it is derived either from the noun אֵיתָן, "strong, lasting," or from the Chaldaic, הִגֵּה, "to meditate, imagine," and therefore, that it ought properly to be written, Ἀθηνάα or Ἀθηνᾶ, De Origine et Progressu Idololatr. lib. 2. cap. 42. p. 199. It would not be difficult for any one possessing a moderate share of ingenuity, to invent other etymologies; but it will be much better, as the whole matter is involved in impenetrable darkness, to disregard them altogether and to class them among the useless labours of learned men. But let each enjoy his own fancy; for my own part I shall withhold my assent, till I see something better and more satisfactory. Thus much, however, I am certain of, that Minerva or Athena was a daughter of Jupiter, king of Thessaly, who was passionately devoted to literature and philosophy, and to whom her father, as a patrimony, gave the city called after her name Athenæ. To this opinion I am led even by the single account given by Apollodorus, Biblioth. lib. 3. cap. 13. sect. 1. p. 222. I pay no attention, therefore, to those who conceive either wisdom itself or some other fine thing to be implied by the name. This daughter of Jupiter is said to have sprung from the brain of her father, as having surpassed the rest of his children in mental capacity. For the brain being considered by many of the ancients to be the seat of the soul, those who wished to proclaim the wisdom of this virgin, fancied they could not do this better than by saying that she was not produced by the ordinary course of nature, but sprung from her father's brain, in token of her transcendent wisdom. In process of time divine honours were paid to her by her fellow-citizens, and she was made to preside over the liberal arts, literature, and philosophy, the objects of her former admiration. Let those who think they can discover any thing higher and nobler in these fables, consider how they are to prove their theories to the satisfaction of wise men; with me they never will have much weight. Athena, therefore, I hold to have been this royal virgin's proper name, which, according to the testimony of Apollodorus, she imposed upon the city presented to her by her father. But as to the origin of this name, if I am not mistaken, we shall never be in a condition to explain, it till we have become more intimately acquainted with the nature and genius of the language which prevailed in Greece at that period.

[10] On these notions of Varro and Scaliger see Vossius, De Origine et Progressu Idololatr. lib. 2. cap. 77. p. 269.

ἀπὸ τοῦ νίπτειν, "from washing," this being the chief use of water; yet, as the learned Bochart[1] hath observed, it may with greater probability be derived from the Egyptian word Nephthus, Plutarch telling us:[2] Ὅτι Νεφθὺν καλοῦσι τῆς γῆς τὰ ἔσχατα καὶ παρύρια καὶ ψαύοντα τῆς θαλάσσης, "That the Egyptians called the maritime parts of the land, or such as border upon the sea, Nephthus." Which conjecture may be further confirmed from what the same Plutarch elsewhere[3] writes, that as Isis was the wife of Osiris, so the wife of Typhon was called Nephthus. From whence one might collect, that as Isis was taken sometimes for the earth, or the goddess presiding over it, so Nephthus was the goddess of the sea. To which may be further added out of the same writer, that Nephthus was sometimes called by the Egyptians Ἀφροδίτη, or Venus, probably because Venus is said to have risen out of the sea. But whatever may be thought of these etymological conjectures, certain it is, that no nation in the world was ever accounted by the Pagans more devout, religious, and superstitious, than the Egyptians, and consequently, none was more polytheistical and idolatrous. Isocrates, in his praise of Busiris, gives them a high encomium for their sanctity; and Herodotus[4] affirmeth of them, that they were θεοσεβέες περισσῶς μάλιστα πάντων ἀνθρώπων, "exceedingly more religious and more devout worshippers of the Deity, than all other mortals." Wherefore they were highly celebrated by Apollo's oracle,[5] (recorded by Porphyrius) and preferred before all other nations for teaching rightly αἰπεινὴν ὁδὸν μακάρων, "that hard and difficult way, that leadeth to God and happiness." But in the scripture,[6] Egypt is famous for her idols, and for her spiritual whoredoms and fornications; to denote the uncleanliness whereof she is sometimes joined with Sodom. For the Egyptians, besides all those other gods that were worshipped by the Greeks and other Barbarians; besides the stars, demons, and heroes; and those artificial gods which they boasted so much of their power of making, viz., animated statues; and this peculiar intoxication of their own, which rendered them infamous and ridiculous even amongst all the other Pagans, that they worshipped brute animals also, in one sense or other:

> Quis nescit, Volusi Bithynice, qualia demens
> Ægyptus portenta colat? Crocodilon adorat
> Pars hæc, illa pavet saturam serpentibus Ibin.*

[1] Phaleg lib. 1. cap. p. 9. 10. and lib. 4. cap. 30. p. 283.
[2] De Iside et Osiride, p. 336. [3] Ibid. p. 355.
[4] Hist. lib. 2. cap. 37. p. 102.
[5] It is extant entire in Euschius, Præpar. Evangel. lib. 9. cap. 10. p. 412.
[6] See Rev. xi. 8. and the commentators on the passage. Add Matur. Veissiere la Croze's Histoire du Christianisme des Indes, livr. 6. p. 436.
* Juv. Sat. 15.

Concerning which Origen against Celsus thus writeth:* Παρ' οἷς προσιόντι μέν ἐστι λαμπρὰ τεμένη, καὶ ἄλση, καὶ προπυλαίων μεγέθη τε καὶ κάλλη καὶ νεὼ θαυμάσιοι, καὶ σκηναὶ πέριξ ὑπερήφανοι, καὶ θρησκεῖαι, μάλα δεισιδαίμονες καὶ μυστηριώτιδες· ἤδη δὲ εἰσιόντι, καὶ ἐνδοτέρω γενομένῳ, θεωρεῖται προσκυνούμενος αἴλουρος, ἢ πίθηκος, ἢ κροκόδειλος, ἢ τράγος, ἢ κύων, "To him that cometh to be a spectator of the Egyptian worship, there first offer themselves to his view most splendid and stately temples sumptuously adorned, together with solemn groves, and many pompous rites and mystical ceremonies; but as soon as he enters in, he perceives that it was either a cat, or an ape, a crocodile, or a goat, or a dog, that was the object of this religious worship."[7]

* Lib. 3. p. 121.

[7] These are not Origen's words, but those of Celsus. Many more passages of ancient authors, in which the ceremonies and gross superstitions of the Egyptians are held up to ridicule, have been collected by the learned Laur. Pignorius, Expositio Mensæ Isiacæ, p. 5. 6. and Herm. Witsius, Ægyptiaca, lib. 2. cap. 4. sect. 13. p. 82. I shall advert to a few of the other matters here touched upon by Dr. Cudworth. I. It was at that period a question among some learned men in England, who were engaged in a controversy with the Papists concerning the true meaning of idolatry, as well as among others, whether polytheism and superstition first emanated from the Chaldeans or the Egyptians. Those who consider the infamy to belong to the Egyptians avail themselves of not a few passages of the ancients, but especially of the authority of Lucian, as here quoted, and Herodotus. Add Ammianus Marcellinus, Histor. lib. 22. and the remarks of Henr. Valesius on the same, p. 345. 346. On the other hand they who accuse the Chaldeans of this crime, are able to fortify their opinion with numerous testimonies both of Jews and Christians, who either refer the origin of idolatry to Seruch: see Alb. Fabricius, Cod. Pseudepigr. V. T. par. 1. p. 336. or tell us that Terah the father of Abraham was the first who made statues and images of the gods: see Dion. Vossius ad Maimonid. de Idololatria, p. 7. or lastly, that Abraham was expelled from his country on account of this very polytheism, which at that time had sprung up in Chaldea: see Maimonides, De Idololatria, cap. 1. sec. 6. p. 6. &c. For my part, I think the whole of this controversy might be dispensed with; nor do I understand, why we are to decide that the worship of images and vain gods emanated originally from any one nation. Such is the perverseness and depravity of the human mind and so great our natural tendency to error, that I can easily conceive it possible for several nations to have of themselves degenerated into this folly, independently of foreign example or instruction. And in this opinion any one will readily concur with me, who only reflects upon the immense diversity of superstitions and deities which characterizes the religious worship of ancient nations. The Chaldeans, the Egyptians, the Greeks, the Gauls, had all their different gods, and the modes in which these gods were to be appeased were as various almost as the people. And does not this incredible discrepancy clearly show that most nations were their own instructors in impiety and superstition, or that they had among themselves the founders of their respective religions, and did not all borrow their ceremonies and worship from one people? II. The learned Doctor's assertion that the Greeks received their gods and religion from the Egyptians, is founded upon the authority of the gravest writers, both ancient and modern. See the testimonies collected by J. Marsham, Dr. Cudworth's contemporary and countryman, Canon Chronic. Ægyptiac. sæc. 1. p. 34. sæc. 8. p. 113. sæc. 9. p. 124. 132. sæc. 10. p. 259. sæc. 11. p. 264. and to his remarks add Athenagoras' Apolog. pro Christian. cap. 24. p. 111. On the contrary, there are not wanting learned men who consider the Greeks to have given their gods to the Egyptians. To confess the truth, I can assent to neither of these opinions. The history itself of the Grecian and Egyptian gods shows that both nations had ancestral and peculiar gods of their own; and that Jupiter, for example, is altogether different from the Egyptian Osiris, and that Minerva cannot be identified with Isis, unless we first blot out from ancient books all recorded accounts of these goddesses. The gods of the Egyptians were their most ancient kings and heroes, endeared to posterity by the glory of their warlike exploits and the multitude of their

But notwithstanding this multifarious polytheism and idolatry of these Egyptians, that they did nevertheless acknowledge one supreme and universal Numen, may first be probably collected from that fame, which they had anciently over the whole world

good actions: nor will history permit us to take a different view of those of Greece. When in after times the Greeks, for the purposes of commerce, or for the sake of acquiring information, made frequent voyages to Egypt, and cultivated a friendly intercourse with no people more ardently than with the Egyptians, it soon came to pass that the different religious ceremonies of the two nations, and their widely distinct gods, were blended and confounded with each other. The Greeks, like the Romans after them, were accustomed to designate by the names of their own ancestral gods, those deities of another nation to which they seemed to bear any resemblance, and thus insensibly led the ignorant to suppose, that the same gods were worshipped by both nations. Osiris and Jupiter are as different as Cæsar and Alexander the Great. But, observing that the same rank among the gods was assigned by the Egyptians to Osiris as they themselves attributed to Jupiter, they hesitated not to give the name of Jupiter to Osiris, and to confound the religion of the two deities. The Neith here spoken of was doubtless an ancient goddess of the Egyptians, and as the Greeks perceived that the functions ascribed to this goddess in the Egyptian theology were nearly the same with those supposed to belong to Minerva in their own, they rashly concluded that Neith was Minerva, and thus made one deity out of the two. The same was the case with the other deities. The Egyptian priesthood, a race never surpassed in arrogance, encouraged this notion of the Greeks; and, anxious to make their own appear to be the most ancient of nations, boldly but falsely asserted that not only the Greeks, but all other nations, had borrowed their gods from Egypt. Nor did the Greeks and Syrians hesitate to put faith in these vain men, who were ever ready to forge annals of immense antiquity and to appeal to the evidence of their own secret books, which, however, no one was allowed to inspect. And this levity it is, that has given occasion to so many disquisitions of learned men and has produced such a variety of unsupported etymologies of names and words. The custom, let me observe also, of applying the names of their own deities to those of foreign nations, which prevailed among the Greeks and Romans, introduced into the theology of the ancients the various Jupiters, Venuses, Marses, Mercuries, &c. of which mention is made by Cicero, De Natur. Deor. lib. 3. and other early writers. For every nation devoted to the worship of the gods had, for instance, a goddess presiding over the interests and vows of lovers: each worshipped a Deity held to be supreme over the other gods: each ascribed to a certain god the care of war and arms. All these deities were designated by the Greeks and Romans respectively as Venus, Jupiter, Mars, as if they were the same with their own gods of these names, because they were said to exercise nearly the same functions, and as if the Persians, Babylonians, Chaldeans, and other nations, worshipped mortals who were known from history to have died in Greece. Hence the three, or even more than three, Jupiters of the ancients, the four Venuses, as many Marses, Mercuries, Apollos. It would have been easy, however, to avoid this confusion, if they had investigated the exploits, history, and worship of the several deities; which doubtless would have taught them, that all the goddesses said to take charge of nuptials and amours were not the Venus, nor all the deities presiding over wars and conflicts the Mars, of the Greeks and Romans. III. From these remarks, it will be evident what opinion I entertain of the labours and conjectures of those who endeavour to elicit the meaning of the names of Grecian deities from the languages of Eastern nations. Great as is the authority of those who have been pleased to adopt this course, of Bochart, Selden, Hinckelmann, and many others, to whom I am willing to pay all reasonable respect and deference, still, unless they first prove, that at the period when these were the gods of the Greeks, that nation spoke the language from which they wish to derive their names, I shall scarcely be brought to give my assent. For example, Neptune, as even Bochart himself does not deny, was a king, who ruled over the Grecian islands. If any one, therefore, wishes me to believe that his name was derived from the Egyptian word Nephthus, I shall ask him, in turn, to show me, that that language, adopted at a later period by the Egyptians, prevailed among the Greeks at the time when Neptune lived in that country. Unless he does this, no show of learning will prevail upon me to listen to his conjecture.

for their wisdom. The Egyptians are called by the Elei in Herodotus,[8] σοφώτατοι ἀνθρώπων, "the wisest of men;" and it is a commendation that is given to one[9] in the same writer, "that he excelled the Egyptians in wisdom, who excelled all other mortals." Thus is it set down in the Scripture for Moses' encomium, "that he was learned in all the wisdom of the Egyptians;"[10] and the transcendency of Solomon's wisdom is likewise thus expressed by the writer of the book of Kings,[1] that it excelled "the wisdom of all the children of the east-country, and all the wisdom of Egypt." Where by the children of the east are chiefly meant the Persian Magi, and the Chaldeans; and there seems to be a climax here, that Solomon's wisdom did not only excel the wisdom of the Magi, and of the Chaldeans, but also that of the Egyptians themselves. From whence it appears, that in Solomon's time Egypt was the chief school of literature in the whole world, and that the Greeks were then but little or not at all taken notice of, nor had any considerable fame for learning. For which cause, we can by no means give credit to that of Philo, in the life of Moses,[2] that besides the Egyptian priests, learned men were sent for by Pharaoh's daughter out of Greece to instruct Moses. Whereas it is manifest from the Greekish monuments themselves, that for many ages after Solomon's time, the most famous of the Greeks travelled into Egypt to receive culture and literature, as Lycurgus, Solon, Thales, and many others, amongst whom were Pythagoras and Plato. Concerning the former of which Isocrates writes,[3] that coming into Egypt, and being there instructed by the priests, he was the first that brought philosophy into Greece; and the latter of them is perstringed by Xenophon,[4] because Αἰγύπτου ἠράσθη καὶ τῆς Πυθαγόρου τερατώδους σοφίας, not contented with that simple philosophy of Socrates (which was little else besides morality), "he was in love with Egypt, and that monstrous wisdom of Pythagoras." Now, as it is not probable that the Egyptians, who were so famous for wisdom and learning, should be ignorant of one supreme Deity, so is it no small argument to the contrary, that they were had in so great esteem by those two divine philosophers, Pythagoras and Plato. We grant indeed, that after the Greeks began to flourish in all manner of literature,

[8] Histor. lib. 2. cap. 160. p. 151.

[9] Rampsinitus king of Egypt. Herodot. lib. 2. cap. 121. p. 135. in praising a clever thief uses these words: Αἰγυπτίους μὲν γὰρ ἄλλων προκεκρίσθαι, ἐκεῖνον δὲ Αἰγυπτίων.

[10] See Acts 7. 22.

[1] 1 Kings iv. 29.

[2] Lib. 1. p. 605. Compare J. Marsham, Canon Chronic. sæc. 9. p. 142. who also attacks Philo's statement.

[3] In Laudatione Busiridis, p. 450.

[4] In a fragment of an epistle to Æschines, preserved by Eusebius, Præpar. Evangel. lib. 14. cap. 12. p. 745.

the fame of the Egyptians was not only much eclipsed (so that we hear no more of Greeks travelling into Egypt upon the former account), but also that their ardour towards the liberal sciences did by degrees languish and abate; so that Strabo[5] in his time could find little more in Egypt, besides the empty houses and palaces, in which priests, formerly famous for astronomy and philosophy, had dwelt. Nevertheless, their arcane theology remained more or less amongst them unextinct to the last, as appears from what Origen, Porphyrius, and Jamblichus have written concerning them.[6]

The learning of the Egyptians was either historical, or philosophical, or theological. First the Egyptians were famous for their historic learning and knowledge of antiquity, they being confessed in Plato[7] to have had so much ancienter records of

[5] Geograph. lib. 17. p. 764.

[6] Those who maintain that the Greeks imported their literature and science from Egypt, as is done by many learned men, are not to be understood as speaking of the whole of the Grecian philosophy. J. Marsham, Canon Chronic. sæc. 9. p. 154. says: Est extra omnem controversiam, Græcorum veteres, doctrina maxime insignes, . . . tam sacram, quam moralem suam disciplinam inde deduxisse, "It is beyond all question that the ancient Greeks, most eminent for learning, derived their sacred as well as moral doctrine from that source." That the earlier Greeks received the elements of navigation, astronomy, and geometry from the Egyptians I should not attempt to deny, as many testimonies to that effect are to be found in ancient writers. Nor can it be doubted that Thales, Plato, and Pythagoras travelled into Egypt for the sake of learning, and transferred some portions of the Egyptian doctrines into their own philosophy. But this is no proof whatever that the whole of Grecian learning was of Egyptian origin. In the first place, that many of the Greeks in ancient times philosophized upon physical and moral subjects, according to their own notions, and without ever once having seen Egypt, admits of no manner of controversy, and must be known indeed to all who recollect the examples of the seven wise men, of Socrates, Anaxagoras, and so many others. Again, the philosophers who did visit Egypt had long before devoted themselves to the study of philosophy, and repaired thither not so much for the sake of acquiring knowledge as of enriching and enlarging what information they were already in possession of. So far, therefore, from having borrowed the whole of their philosophy from the Egyptians, their motive in visiting that country was rather to compare the dogmas of the Egyptians with their own. Besides, the Grecian philosophy itself, divided as it was into so many sects, each of which relied upon totally distinct principles, sufficiently proves that its authors depended upon their own mental resources, rather than upon foreign instruction; and that, instead of following in the track of the Egyptians, they each sought out a path of their own to the knowledge of truth. In short, though the Greeks were indebted to the Egyptians for the first elements of geometry and astronomy, yet it is also certain that they afterwards far surpassed them in these sciences. The very close affinity of some of the Grecian dogmas to those of the Egyptians, I do not mean to dispute. But still, this affinity does not prove the argument of those against whom these remarks are directed. For, setting aside the possibility of the Greeks having been led by mere study to the same ideas as had before occurred to the Egyptians, since many of their dogmas bear a very close resemblance to those of the Chaldeans and other nations, it may fairly be presumed that they received these from the Phenicians, whose intercourse with the Greeks, it is well known, was of the highest antiquity. This being the case, I should admit that the Greeks were excited by the example of Egypt to more vigorous application to philosophic studies, and that some of their fields of science were fertilized from Egyptian streams, but I never can be induced to believe that the whole of their philosophy emanated from that country.

[7] In Timæo, p. 524. &c.

time than the Greeks, that the Greeks were but children or infants compared with them. They pretended to a continued and uninterrupted series of history from the beginning of the world downward, and therefore seem to have had the clearest and strongest persuasions of the Cosmogonia. Indeed it cannot be denied, but that this tradition of the world's beginning was at first in a manner universal among all nations. For concerning the Greeks and Persians we have already manifested the same; and as Sanchoniathon* testifieth the like concerning the Phenicians, so does Strabo† likewise of the Indian Brachmans, affirming, that they did agree with the Greeks in many things, and particularly in this, ὅτι γεννητὸς ὁ κόσμος καὶ φθαρτὸς, "that the world was both made and should be destroyed." And though Diodorus[8] affirm the contrary of the Chaldeans, yet we ought in reason to assent rather to Berosus,[9] in respect of his greater antiquity, who represents the sense of the ancient Chaldeans after this manner: Γενέσθαι χρόνον, ἐν ᾧ τὸ πᾶν σκότος καὶ ὕδωρ . . . . τὸν δὲ Βῆλον, ὃν Δία μεθερμενεύουσι, μέσον τεμόντα τὸ σκότος, χωρίσαι γῆν καὶ οὐρανὸν, ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, καὶ διατάξαι τὸν κόσμον . . . ἀποτελέσαι δὲ τὸν Βῆλον καὶ ἄστρα καὶ ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην καὶ τοὺς πέντε πλανήτας, "That there was a time when all was darkness and water, but Bell (who is interpreted Jupiter), cutting the darkness in the middle, separated the earth and heaven from one another, and so framed the world; this Bell also producing the stars, the sun, and the moon, and the five planets." From which testimony of Berosus, according to the version of Alexander Polyhistor, by the way it appears also, that the ancient Chaldeans acknowledged one Supreme Deity, the maker of the whole world, as they are also celebrated for this in that oracle of Apollo, which is cited out of Porphyry by Eusebius:‡

Μοῦνοι Χαλδαῖοι σοφίην λάχον, ἠδ' ἀρ' Ἑβραῖοι,
Αὐτογένεθλον ἄνακτα σεβαζόμενοι θεὸν ἁγνῶς.

Where the Chaldeans are joined with the Hebrews, as worshipping likewise in a holy manner one self-existent Deity. Wherefore, if Diodorus were not altogether mistaken, it must be concluded, that in the latter times the Chaldeans (then perhaps receiving the doctrine of Aristotle) did desert and abandon the tradition of their ancestors concerning the Cosmogonia. But the Egyptians, however they attributed more antiquity to the world than they ought, yet seem to have had a constant per-

* Euseb. Chron. p. 6. † Lib. 15. p. 715.
[8] Biblioth. Histor. lib. 2. p. 83. ed. Hanov. 1604.
[9] This fragment of Berosus is given by Geo. Syncellus in his Chronic. p. 29. Compare J. Alb. Fabricius' Biblioth. Græc. lib. 6. cap. 12. vol. 14. p. 187. 189.
‡ Euseb. Præp. Evang. lib. 9. cap. 10.

suasion of the beginning of it, and the firmest of all other nations: they (as Kircher tells us) therefore picturing Horus, or the world, as a young man beardless, not only to signify its constant youthful and flourishing vigour, but also the youngness and newness of its duration. Neither ought it to be suspected, that though the Egyptians held the world to have had a beginning, yet they conceived it to be made by chance without a God, as Anaximander, Democritus, and Epicurus afterwards did; the contrary thereunto being so confessed a thing, that Simplicius, a zealous contender for the world's eternity, affirms the Mosaic history of its creation by God to have been nothing else but *μύθοι Αἰγύπτιοι*, "Egyptian fables." The place is so considerable, that I shall here set it down in the author's own language:* *Εἰ δὲ τὸν τῶν Ἰουδαίων νομοθέτην ἐνδείκνυται λέγοντα; ἐν ἀρχῇ ἐποίησεν ὁ θεὸς τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὴν γῆν· ἡ δὲ γῆ ἦν ἀόρατος καὶ ἀκατασκεύαστος· καὶ σκότος ἐπάνω τῆς ἀβύσσου, καὶ πνεῦμα θεοῦ ἐπεφέρετο ἐπάνω τοῦ ὕδατος· εἶτα ποιήσαντος αὐτοῦ τὸ φῶς, καὶ διαχωρίσαντος ἀνὰ μέσον τοῦ φωτὸς καὶ ἀνὰ μέσον τοῦ σκότους, ἐπήγαγε, καὶ ἐκάλεσεν ὁ θεὸς τὸ φῶς ἡμέραν, καὶ τὸ σκότος νύκτα· καὶ ἐγένετο ἑσπέρα καὶ ἐγένετο πρωὶ ἡμέρα μία· εἰ οὖν ταύτην τοῦ χρόνου νομίζει γένεσιν τὴν ἀπὸ χρόνου, ἐννοείτω ὅτι μυθικὴ τίς ἐστιν ἡ παράδοσις, καὶ ἀπὸ μύθων Αἰγυπτίων εἱλκυσμένη*, "If Grammaticus here mean the lawgiver of the Jews, writing thus, [In the beginning God made heaven and earth, and the earth was invisible and unadorned, and darkness was upon the deep, and the Spirit of God moved upon the water;] and then afterward when he had made light, and separated the light from the darkness, adding, [And God called the light day, and the darkness night, and the evening and the morning were the first day:] I say, if Grammaticus think this to be the first generation and beginning of time, I would have him to know, that all this is but a fabulous tradition, and wholly drawn from Egyptian fables."[10]

As for the philosophy of the Egyptians, that besides their physiology, and the pure and mixed mathematics (arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy), they had another higher kind of philosophy also concerning incorporeal substances, appears from hence, because they were the first assertors of the immortality of souls, their pre-existence and transmigration, from whence their incorporeity is necessarily inferred. Thus Herodotus:† *Πρῶτοι τόνδε τὸν λόγον Αἰγύπτιοι εἰσὶ εἰπόντες, ὡς ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴ ἀθάνατός ἐστι· τοῦ σώματος δὲ καταφθίνοντος, ἐς ἄλλο ζῶον*

* Simpl. in Arist. Phys. lib. 8. fol. 268. col. 1.

[10] Other testimonies of the ancients, proving that the Egyptians believed in the generation and future dissolution of the world, are adduced by Grotius, De Veritate Relig. Christian. lib. 1. sect. 16. p. 34. Compare also Herm. Witsius' Ægyptiaca, lib. 1. cap. 4. sect. 1. p. 11. 12.

† Euterp. 123.

ἀεὶ γινόμενον εἰσδύεται, &c., "The Egyptians were the first asserters of the soul's immortality, and of its transmigration, after the death and corruption of this body, into the bodies of other animals successively, viz. until it have run round through the whole circuit of terrestrial, marine, and volatile animals, after which (they say) it is to return again into a human body; they supposing this revolution or apocatastasis of souls to be made in no less space than that of three thousand years." But whether Herodotus were rightly catechized and instructed in the Egyptian doctrine as to this particular or no, may very well be questioned; because the Pythagoreans, whom he there tacitly reprehends for arrogating the first invention of this to themselves, when they had borrowed it from the Egyptians, did represent it otherwise; namely, that the descent of human souls into these earthy bodies was first in way of punishment, and that their sinking lower afterwards into the bodies of brutes, was only to some a further punishment for their further degeneracy; but the virtuous and pious souls should after this life enjoy a state of happiness in celestial or spiritual bodies. And the Egyptian doctrine is represented after the same manner by Porphyrius in Stobæus,[1] as also in the hermetic or trismegistic writings. Moreover, Chalcidius[2] reports, that Hermes Trismegist, when he was about to die, made an oration to this purpose: "That he had here lived in this earthly body but an exile and stranger, and was now returning home to his own country; so that his death ought not to be lamented, this life being rather to be accounted death." Which persuasion the Indian Brachmans also were embued withal, whether they received it from the Egyptians (as they did some other things) or no: Τὸν μὲν ἐνθάδε βίον, ὡς ἂν ἀκμὴν κνομένων εἶναι, τὸν δὲ θάνατον γένεσιν εἰς τὸν

[1] There is extant in Stobæus' Eclog. Phys. lib. 2. cap. 7. p. 200. &c. a tolerably long fragment from Porphyry's book, Περὶ τοῦ ὑφ' ἡμῖν, "Of that which is in our own power," wherein he treats of Plato's opinion on the state of souls previously to their entrance into bodies, and fancies it to have been derived from the Egyptian dogma of the passing of souls through the twelve heavenly signs; which fragment, I have no doubt, is here meant by the learned Doctor, as nothing else of the kind is to be found in Stobæus. I do not know, however, whether there is much in this passage to overthrow the authority of Herodotus. For, not to mention that Porphyry merely starts a conjecture of his own respecting the origin of Plato's opinion, although the passage certainly shows that the Egyptians supposed souls to migrate through many stars and heavenly signs previously to their union with bodies, still it does not prove that they denied such a circuit or revolution of souls as Herodotus speaks of.

[2] This oration of the dying Hermes is quoted entire by Fr. Patricius, in his Prolegomena to Hermes' works, who states that he borrowed it from Chalcidius, but without mentioning the particular work of that author. Herm. Conringius, in his book De Hermetica Ægyptiorum Medicina, cap. 6. p. 56. wherein he gives this oration, knowing that there is no work of Chalcidius extant except his Comm. in Timæum Platonis, does not hesitate to refer his reader to that commentary. But it would be in vain to look for these words in the published edition of Chalcidius. Wherefore, either Patricius' memory was at fault, or he had some other work of Chalcidius, or, lastly, possessed a larger Commentary of Chalcidius than the one now in print.

ὄντως βίον, "That this life here is but the life of embryos, and that death [to good men] is a generation or birth into true life."* And this may the better be believed to have been the Egyptian doctrine, because Diodorus[3] himself hath some passages sounding that way; as that the Egyptians lamented not the death of good men, but applauded their happiness, ὡς τὸν αἰῶνα διατρίβειν μέλλοντες καθ' ᾅδου μετὰ τῶν εὐσεβῶν,† "as being to live ever in the other world with the pious."[4] However, it being certain

* Strabo, lib. 15. p. 715. [3] Biblioth. Histor. lib. 1. p. 33.

† Domicilia Viventium Diversoria appellant. Diod.

[4] As most of the opinions held by the Egyptians on religion and things divine, are at this day made the subject of controversy and doubt, so their doctrine concerning the state of souls after death seems to be involved in more difficulty than many suppose. Both the priests and people, it is well known, held souls to be eternal and immortal, nor is it less certain that they both believed the descent of souls into bodies, whether compulsory or voluntary I cannot say. It remains, however, to ascertain, whether Herodotus is right in representing the Egyptians as asserting the transmigration of all souls into the bodies of brutes, till after a long space of time they return to the human body; or as Dr. Cudworth seems to recommend, we are to reject his authority, and believe that they sentenced only the souls of the wicked to so many journeys and perigrinations, but not also those of the good and wise, which, on the contrary, they supposed to pass into the council of the gods. If ancient authors be consulted, the subject would appear almost inexplicable; as both sides can appeal to the testimony of the gravest writers. Herodotus' account is confirmed by Hecatæus, an ancient author who wrote a book on the philosophy of the Egyptians, and according to Diogenes Laërtius, Procem. segm. 2. p. 8. numbered this among their doctrines: Τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ ἐπιδιαμένειν, καὶ μετεμβαίνειν, "that the soul is permanent and migrates into other bodies." He is also borne out by many other writers, whom, for the sake of brevity, I shall pass over. But the testimony of Æneas Gazæus, a most grave author, is particularly striking, who, in his Theophrastus or Dialogue on the resurrection of the dead, p. 14. clearly imputes to them the same doctrine: Αἰγυπτίοις μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ τὴν αὐτὴν ψυχὴν καὶ ἄνθρωπον, καὶ βοῦν, καὶ κύνα, καὶ ὄρνεα, καὶ ἰχθὺν μεταμπίσχεσθαι· καὶ νῦν μὲν αὐτοῖς, οἷόν τι θηρίον, μύρμηξ ἢ κάμηλος, τὴν γῆν νέμεται, νῦν δὲ εἰς ἰχθὺν ὁλισθήσασα, κῆτος ἢ μεμβράς γενομένη, τὴν θάλατταν ἔδν· αὖθις δὲ εἰς ὀρνέου φύσιν μετατιθεμένη, κολοιὸς ἢ ἀηδὼν ὄφθεισα, εἰς ἀέρα διέπτη, ἄλλοτε ἄλλο δεικνύουσα τῶν ζώων, ἕως ἅπαντα διεξελθοῦσα πάλιν ἀναδράμοι, ὅθεν τὸ πρῶτον κατέβη, "The Egyptians suppose the same soul to be invested in succession with the body of a man, an ox, a dog, a bird, a fish; and that at one time, as a beast, for example, an ant or a camel, it feeds upon the ground; at another gliding into a fish, and becoming a whale or an anchovy, it lives in the water; at another, transformed into a bird, as a crow or a nightingale, it flies into the air; and so on, representing animal after animal, till it has passed through all, and returns to where it first came from." I purposely pass over the arguments which might be deduced in confirmation of this opinion from the facts themselves, for instance, from the worship of beasts. On the contrary, there are not wanting testimonies in favour of the other opinion, adopted by Dr. Cudworth. I shall not touch upon those brought forward by himself, but shall produce two others exceedingly pertinent to the subject. One is from Porphyry, who, De Abstinentia, lib. 4. sect. 10. p. 157. relates out of Euphantus, that in carrying out a corpse the Egyptians prayed thus to the gods in the name of the person dead: Ὦ δέσποτα ἥλιε, καὶ θεοὶ πάντες, οἱ τὴν ζωὴν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις δόντες, προσδέξασθέ με, καὶ παράδοτε τοῖς ἀϊδίοις θεοῖς συνοίκον, "O imperial sun, and all ye gods that give life to mortals, receive me, and grant me to be an associate of the eternal gods." Those who addressed the gods with this prayer evidently supposed, that the souls of the dead were first transferred to the sun and stars and, after having been duly purified therein, migrated to the council of those gods whom the Platonists called *eternal*. The other is in Plutarch, who in his book De Iside et Osiride, p. 362. t. 2. opp. tells us, that the Egyptians, τὸν ὑποχθόνιον τόπον, εἰς ὃν οἴονται τὰς ψυχὰς ὑπέρχεσθαι, μετὰ τὴν τελευτήν, Ἀμένθην καλοῦσι, σημαίνοντος τοῦ ὀνόματος τὸν λαμβάνοντα καὶ διδόντα, "call the place into which they suppose souls to

from this Egyptian doctrine of pre-existence and transmigration, that the Egyptians did assert the soul's incorporeity, it cannot reasonably be doubted, but that they acknowledged also an in-

pass after death Amenthe, which name signifies one that receives and gives." Those who entertained sentiments like these respecting the state of souls after death can hardly be supposed to have believed in those migrations into beasts and other animals. Which opinion, therefore, is to be adopted? For my part, on examining the whole matter, I conceive that neither Herodotus and his party are to be abandoned, nor are the others to be charged with misrepresentation. I have often been surprised that learned men, who have devoted themselves to the investigation of the history and opinions of the Egyptians, as well as of other nations, so deal with their subject, as though some common code of belief had prevailed among them and all the philosophers and priests had taught the same thing throughout the whole of the country, and therefore spare no pains in the endeavour to harmonize in some measure the various and conflicting accounts respecting the Egyptians. As nothing, I consider, is more unfounded than such a notion, so nothing can be more misapplied than such zeal. They judge of the ancients from the habits and manners of our own times; and as there are amongst us certain forms of doctrine by which all are in a certain way bound to abide, they suppose the like to have obtained among the Egyptians and other nations, and that all who presided over divine matters were imbued with the same opinions; which most assuredly is very far from the truth. For the present I shall pass over the other nations, in which it is most notorious the greatest latitude of opinion existed, and shall speak only of Egypt. In this country, there was that wonderful diversity of sentiment on subjects both of science and religion, that I should almost believe the sects and doctrines in Egypt to have been as numerous as the colleges and orders of priests. The popular religion of the Egyptians was so discordant, that sanguinary wars often arose in consequence of the variety of gods. So Juvenal, Sat. 15:

> Summus utrimque
> Inde furor vulgo, quod Numina vicinorum
> Odit uterque locus:

and others. In like manner, that the hidden and mystic doctrine professed by the priests differed according to the different character and temper of the men, is abundantly testified by the remains of it now extant. For the Egyptian theology is differently represented by Jamblichus, De Mysteriis Ægyptiorum, by Porphyry, Epistola ad Anebonem, and by Plutarch: as has already been justly remarked by Henr. Conringius, in his book De Hermetica Ægyptiorum Medicina, cap. 12. p. 124. Nor were the discrepancies fewer in astrological, mathematical, and historical subjects; a fact easily to be demonstrated, if necessary, from the numerous authorities of ancient writers. Wherefore to inquire generally into the religion of the Egyptians, and to attempt a satisfactory explanation of the creed of the entire people on the subject of the gods and sacred things, would, I consider, be just as wise as to undertake to show, what opinion is universally entertained by physicians on the causes of diseases, it being notorious that the greatest discord prevails among them. Let us not waste our time, then, in vain endeavours to reconcile the Egyptians with each other, whom all accounts concerning them incontestably prove to have had no common religion. And this being the case, I am certain also that they agreed in no general opinion on the state of souls after death. The priests with whom Herodotus conversed imagined certain circuits of souls through various bodies. Others, however, exempted those of the wise and good from these long wanderings, and transferred them at once to the council of the gods. Others again fancied the wandering souls of the dead to ascend to the stars, and there to be purified till they should become worthy of the society of heaven. Others taught that they descend after death to some subterraneous place; and others perhaps solaced their ignorance with other similar conceits. And, looking at the thing as we ought to do, how, I would ask, could it be otherwise? Those who, like the Egyptians, are bound by no laws of doctrine or creed, and have no other oracle to consult besides their own perplexed and bewildered *reason*, must necessarily, according to the various tempers and capacities of mankind, fall into various and conflicting opinions in attempting to expound abstruse subjects. An example of this is afforded by those very philosophers who maintained the transmigration of souls: who, although

corporeal Deity. The objection against which, from what Porphyrius writeth concerning Chæremon, will be answered afterwards.

We come in the last place to the theology of the Egyptians. Now it is certain, that the Egyptians, besides their vulgar and fabulous theology (which is for the most part that which Diodorus Siculus describes), had another ἀπόῤῥητος θεολογία, "arcane and recondite theology," that was concealed from the vulgar, and communicated only to the kings, and such priests and others as were thought capable thereof; these two theologies of theirs differing, as Aristotle's exoterics and acroamatics. Thus much is plainly declared by Origen, whose very name was Egyptian, it being interpreted Horo-genitus (which Horus was an Egyptian God),* upon occasion of Celsus' boasting, that he thoroughly understood all that belonged to Christianity: "Celsus (saith he) seemeth here to me to do just as if a man travelling into Egypt, where the wise men of the Egyptians, according to their country learning, philosophize much about those things that are accounted by them divine, while the idiots in the mean time hearing only certain fables, which they know not the meaning of, are very much pleased therewith: Celsus, I say, doth as if such a sojourner in Egypt, who had conversed only with those idiots, and not been at all instructed by any of the priests in their arcane and recondite mysteries, should boast, that he knew all that belonged to the Egyptian theology." Where the same Origen also adds, that this was not a thing proper neither to the Egyptians only, to have such an arcane and true theology, distinct from their vulgar and fabulous one, but common with them to the Persians, Syrians, and other barbarian pagans: Ἃ δὲ εἶπον περὶ Αἰγυπτίων σοφῶν τε καὶ ἰδιωτῶν δυνατὸν εἰπεῖν καὶ περὶ Περσῶν, &c., "What we have now affirmed (saith he) concerning the difference betwixt the wise men and the idiots amongst the Egyptians, the same may be said

agreeing on the general points of the doctrine, were sadly at issue when they came to explain it in detail. See Æneas Gazæus, in his Theophrastus, p. 14. II. The opinion which the learned Doctor here ascribes to Pythagoras and his disciples, concerning the state of souls, is, I conceive, not warranted by the authority of ancient writers. I would not deny that there were in this sect some who supposed the souls of wise men to pass immediately to the heavenly mansions, and those of others to migrate into various bodies; but I do deny that Pythagoras himself, and the chief of his disciples, held this opinion. Pythagoras, it is well known; taught that his own soul had passed through various bodies, and had formerly animated Æthalides the son of Mercury, Euphorbus, Hermotimus, and others, before it entered his own body. See Diog. Laërtius, lib. 8. segm. 4. 5. p. 490. 491. and Jamblichus, Vita Pythagoræ, cap. 28. p. 112. Also, Porphyry, in his life of Pythagoras, sect. 19. p. 24. expressly attributes to him the same opinion that Herodotus ascribes to the Egyptians. Nay, there are verses still extant of Empedocles, whose name stood so high among the Pythagoreans, wherein he states himself to have been a boy, a girl, a plant, and a fish. See Diog. Laërtius, lib. 8. segm. 77. p. 539. For further testimony consult G. Elmenhorst on Minutius Felix, p. 352. ed. Gronovii.

* Lib. 1. p. 11.

also of the Persians, amongst whom the religious rites are performed rationally by those that are ingenious, whilst the superficial vulgar look no further in the observation of them than the external symbol or ceremony. And the same is true likewise concerning the Syrians and Indians, and all those other nations who have, besides their religious fables, a learning and doctrine." Neither can it be dissembled, that Origen in this place plainly intimates the same also concerning Christianity itself; namely, that besides the outside and exterior cortex of it (in which, notwithstanding, there is nothing fabulous) communicated to all, there was a more arcane and recondite doctrine belonging thereunto, which all were not alike capable of; he elsewhere observing this to be that wisdom that St. Paul spake "amongst the perfect." From whence he concludes, that Celsus vainly boasted, Πάντα γὰρ οἶδα, "For I know all things belonging to Christianity," when he was acquainted only with the exterior surface of it. But concerning the Egyptians, this was a thing most notorious and observed by sundry other writers; as, for example, Clemens of Alexandria, a man also well acquainted with the affairs of Egypt: Αἰγύπτιοι οὐ τοῖς ἐπιτυχοῦσι τὰ παρὰ σφίσιν ἀνετίθεντο μυστήρια, οὐδὲ μὴν βεβήλοις τὴν τῶν θείων εἴδησιν ἐξέφερον, ἀλλ' ἢ μόνοις γε τοῖς μέλλουσιν ἐπὶ τὴν βασιλείαν προ�ιέναι, καὶ τῶν ἱερέων τοῖς κριθεῖσιν εἶναι δοκιμωτάτους, ἀπό τε τῆς τροφῆς, καὶ τῆς παιδείας, καὶ τοῦ γένους,* "The Egyptians do not reveal their religious mysteries promiscuously to all, nor communicate the knowledge of divine things to the profane, but only to those who are to succeed in the kingdom, and to such of the priests as are judged most fitly qualified for the same, upon account both of their birth and education." With which agreeth also the testimony of Plutarch, he adding a further confirmation thereof from the Egyptian Sphinxes:† Ὁ ἐκ μαχίμων ἀποδεδειγμένος [βασιλεὺς] εὐθὺς ἐγένετο τῶν ἱερέων, καὶ μετεῖχε τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἐπικεκρυμμένης τὰ πολλὰ μύθοις καὶ λόγοις, ἀμυδρὰς ἐμφάσεις τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ διαφάσεις ἔχουσιν· ὥσπερ ἀμέλει καὶ παραδηλοῦσιν αὐτοὶ πρὸ τῶν ἱερῶν τὰς σφίγγας ἐπιεικῶς ἱστάντες, ὡς αἰνιγματώδη σοφίαν τῆς θεολογίας αὐτῶν ἐχούσης, "When amongst the Egyptians there is any king chosen out of the military order, he is forthwith brought to the priests, and by them instructed in that arcane theology, which conceals mysterious truths under obscure fables and allegories. Wherefore they place Sphinxes before their temples, to signify, that their theology contained a certain arcane, and enigmatical wisdom in it." And this meaning of the Sphinxes in the Egyptian temples is confirmed likewise by Clemens Alexandrinus:[5] Διὰ τοῦτό τοι καὶ Αἰγύπτιοι

* Strom. lib. 5. p. 508. † De Is. et Os. 354.

[5] Stromat. lib. 5. cap. 4. p. 664.

πρὸ τῶν ἱερῶν τὰς σφίγγας ἱδρύονται, ὡς αἰνιγματώδους τοῦ περὶ θεοῦ λόγου, καὶ ἀσαφοῦς ὄντος, "Therefore do the Egyptians place Sphinxes before their temples, to declare thereby, that the doctrine concerning God is enigmatical and obscure." Notwithstanding which, we acknowledge, that the same Clemens gives another interpretation also of these Sphinxes, or conjecture concerning them, which may not be unworthy to be here read: Τάχα δὲ καὶ ὅτι φιλεῖν τε δεῖ καὶ φοβεῖσθαι τὸ θεῖον· ἀγαπᾷν μὲν ὡς προσηνὲς καὶ εὐμενές τοῖς ὁσίοις, δεδιέναι δὲ ὡς ἀπαραιτήτως δίκαιον τοῖς ἀνοσίοις, θηρίου γὰρ ὁμοῦ καὶ ἀνθρώπου ἡ σφὶγξ αἰνίσσεται τὴν εἰκόνα, "But perhaps the meaning of those Egyptian Sphinxes might be also to signify, that the Deity ought both to be loved and feared; to be loved as benign and propitious to the holy, but to be feared as inexorably just to the impious, the Sphinx being made up of the image both of a man and a lion." Moreover, besides these Sphinxes, the Egyptians had also Harpocrates and Sigalions in their temples, which are thus described by the poet,[6]

Quíque premunt vocem, digitóque silentia suadent,

they being the statues of young men pressing their lips with their finger. The meaning of which Harpocrates is thus expressed by Plutarch:* Τὸν δὲ Ἁρποκράτην, οὐ θεὸν ἀτελῆ καὶ νήπιον, ἀλλὰ τοῦ περὶ θεῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις λόγου νεαροῦ καὶ ἀτηλοῦς καὶ ἀδιαρθρώτου προστάτην καὶ σωφρονιστὴν, διὸ τῷ στόματι τὸν δάκτυλον ἔχει προσκείμενον, ἐχεμυθίας καὶ σιωπῆς σύμβολον, "The Harpocrates of the Egyptians is not to be taken for an imperfect and infant God, but for the president of men's speech concerning the gods, that is but imperfect, balbutient, and inarticulate, and the regulator or corrector of the same; his finger upon his mouth being a symbol of silence and taciturnity." It is very true, that some Christians have made another interpretation of this Egyptian Harpocrates, as if the meaning of it had been this; that the gods of the Egyptians had been all of them really nothing else but mortal men, but that this was a secret that was to be concealed from the vulgar. Which conceit, however it be witty, yet it is devoid of truth; and doubtless the meaning of those Egyptian Harpocrates was no other than this, that either the supreme and incomprehensible Deity was to be adored with silence, or not spoken of without much caution and circumspection; or else that the arcane mysteries of theology

[6] Ovid; who however, Metamorph. lib. 9. speaks, not in the plural, but in the singular only of Harpocrates, as follows:

Quique premit vocem, digitoque silentia suadet.

This subject is fully illustrated by Gisb. Cuper, in his Harpocrates, p. 22.

* De Is. et Osir.

were not to be promiscuously communicated, but concealed from the profane vulgar.[7] Which same thing seems to have been also signified by that yearly feast kept by the Egyptians in honour of Thoth or Hermes, when the priests, eating honey and figs, pronounced those words, Γλυκὺ ἡ ἀλήθεια, "Truth is sweet;" as also by that amulet which Isis was fabled to have worn about her, the interpretation whereof was Φωνὴ ἀληθὴς,[8] "True speech."

[7] Those who feel inclined to listen to these interpretations of the statue of Harpocrates, are welcome to do so as far as I am concerned: on the other hand, however, as they are all founded upon mere conjecture, I may in turn be excused for withholding my assent, and for considering this very diversity of explanations to be a strong proof, that the later Egyptians were either ignorant, or affected to be ignorant, of the true meaning of this image. Indeed, this Harpocrates, I doubt not, was a man, the son of Isis and Osiris, as Plutarch, De Iside et Osiride, p. 377. expressly tells us, and snatched away probably by a premature death; whom the Egyptians, to mitigate the parents' grief, consecrated and worshipped as a god. In process of time, however, when all memory of these circumstances was lost and the Egyptian priests became ashamed of so mean an origin of their religion, they illustrated or rather obscured the statue of Harpocrates with a variety of explanations, each contradicting and invalidating the other, and, while the multitude still kept to the ancient history, occasionally drew over even learned men to their opinions. In our own times, Gisb. Cuper, fortified by not a few authorities and sayings of ancient writers, has undertaken to prove Harpocrates to have been a symbol of the sun. But the expositions here given can be maintained by arguments of equal weight, nor would any one who supposed Harpocrates to be the moon have to complain of a total lack of ancient testimony on his side. So true is what I have already stated, that there is no spot upon which we can place a foot with safety, when once we commit ourselves to the guidance of these new interpreters of Egyptian mysteries.

[8] Both are made mention of by Plutarch, De Iside et Osiride, p. 378. It may be worth while, I conceive, to make a few remarks in this place on the causes of the secret and mysterious theology which flourished in most nations, so that readers may be better enabled to form an opinion on this question generally, and estimate the weight of the arguments here advanced by the learned Doctor. The ancestral and national gods of almost all countries were men, distinguished among their fellow-citizens for the greatness of their exploits and the number of their good actions, and, for the most part, the first founders of their nation. These were after death raised by a grateful people to heaven and enrolled amongst the gods. For it was the prevailing belief of the most ancient nations, that good demons or genii resided in the bodies of great men, who on finishing their earthly career were transformed into gods. Omitting other testimonies, consult Plutarch, De Iside et Osiride, p. 362. Ὁ μὲν γὰρ Ὄσιρις καὶ ἡ Ἶσις ἐκ δαιμόνων ἀγαθῶν εἰς ΘΕΟΥΣ μετήλλαξαν, "For Osiris and Isis were changed from good demons into gods." Hence public sacrifices were decreed to them and festivals appointed, in which were performed certain ceremonies commemorating the deeds achieved by these great men: which ceremonies in ancient times, before literature or learned men were in existence, occupied the place of annals and records. But when men began to devote themselves to the study of letters and philosophy, it necessarily followed, that many became scandalized at the idea of paying divine honours to mortals whom those ceremonies proved to have died. Then it was that the priests, to prevent the same opinion from being infused into the minds of the people, the consequences of which they foresaw would be so fatal to their own interests, removed from public view those rites which had formerly been decreed in remembrance of historical occurrences. Here we see the origin of the so called mysteries, and at the same time the reason why so few, and those only of long and severely tested fidelity, were permitted to witness their celebration. But neither were the initiated themselves held all in the same rank by the priests, as numerous testimonies might be adduced to show, but while they revealed to some the true origin of these mysteries, to others again, on whose weaker judgments less reliance could be placed, they assigned philosophical causes for them. The next step of the priests, who were at the same time philosophers, was to reduce the history

This ἀπόῤῥητος θεολογία, this arcane and recondite theology of the Egyptians, was concealed from the vulgar two manner of

of the gods itself to the standard of reason and to an accordance with their own principles and dogmas: a practice which first started up in Egypt, from whence all the mania for allegory seems to have flowed. Hence they inculcated, that the statues, the sacrifices, the food and costume of the priests, all the holy rites and observances, the temples themselves, in a word, every thing sacred and religious, had some hidden physical, or moral, or metaphysical meaning, and induced not a few to put faith in their representations. But the dissension and inconsistency of those who offered these explanations, sufficiently proved to the wise, that the whole were mere fables and fictions, invented for the purpose of deluding the ignorant and unwary. For as the entire system depended solely upon their own mental resources, and as they held no common opinion on physical or moral subjects, it necessarily came to pass that as many interpretations were put forth as there were priests not entirely destitute of learning or sagacity. There are extant at this day expositions of the kind, in admirable discordance with each other, which prove to demonstration, that not a particle of truth or sound knowledge is to be found in them. How various and contradictory the interpretations of the Egyptian religion were, we may learn sufficiently from Plutarch, De Iside et Osiride, and indeed I am at a loss to conceive, how any one who carefully peruses this author can any longer put faith in those ancient mystagogues and hope to glean any satisfactory information from a mass of conflicting absurdities. But learned men sometimes pay more regard to the authority of ancient Greek and Latin writers, who are known to have fallen into these snares, than to the accurate truth, which, if so disposed, they might easily arrive at under the guidance and auspices of the ancients themselves. But to proceed, the whole of the popular religion rested upon these histories of the gods and sacred rites, which the priests, however, were accustomed to expound in reference to wisdom and philosophy. It was greatly to be feared, therefore, lest if these moral and mystic explications should become familiar to the vulgar, the religion itself would crumble to pieces, and the temples of the gods be deserted: a result which would prove ruinous to the interests of the priests. For if the Egyptians should once become persuaded that Isis and Osiris were not gods, but either the sun, or the moon, or the earth, or nature, or ether, or any thing else of the kind, they would immediately understand that they had no occasion for priests, or victims, or sacred rites. Hence the ministers of the religions adopted every precaution to prevent their interpretations of the divine worship from becoming public. Their beautifully devised mysteries were expounded in secret among themselves, or to a few of the more select disciples; while the people were not only suffered, but enjoined, to retain those notions respecting Isis, Osiris, Bacchus, Jupiter, and the other gods, which had survived from bygone times, and formed the groundwork, as it were, of the religion established by laws and institutions. From this we may clearly learn the origin and nature of that secret and recondite theology which found favour with most of the ancients, and especially with the Egyptians. Compounded of various interpretations of the public religions, to which so much of authority and weight ought to be attached, as is due to men who pervert the faith of the ancients and falsify the whole of history, for the purpose of assigning some colourable pretext for most foul and abominable institutions; it was studiously kept secret, lest those rites upon which depended the safety of the priesthood should be brought into disrepute and contempt. So far, therefore, from agreeing with those who suppose the Egyptians to have veiled precepts of true and sound wisdom under cunningly devised signs and images, I am disposed rather to consider the whole of this symbolical philosophy as a later invention of the priests, who gave the most convenient explanation in their power of the statues consecrated by their ancestors and of ceremonies instituted in remote ages, in order that they might appear to harmonize with the decrees of wise men, and might not betray their own extreme hideousness and deformity. To confess my candid opinion, no rational man, I consider, was ever so foolish, as to shroud in images and symbols and withdraw from public observation doctrines, which he knew to be useful and true, and which were capable of being set forth in plain and perspicuous language. On the contrary, it is the common resource of those who pass off impostures upon the people, to clothe the nakedness of their dogmas in splendid garb and far-fetched figures. Now I would ask of those, who conceive incredible wisdom to lie concealed underneath these figures of the ancient Egyptians, to explain

ways, by fables of allegories, and by symbols or hieroglyphics.[9] Eusebius[1] informs us, that Porphyrius wrote a book Περὶ τῆς ἀλληγορουμένης Ἑλλήνων καὶ Αἰγυπτίων θεολογίας, "Concerning the allegorical theology both of the Greeks and Egyptians." And here by the way we may observe, that this business of allegorizing in matters of religion had not its first and only rise amongst the Christians, but was a thing very much in use among the pagan Theologers also: and therefore Celsus in Origen[2] commends some of the Christians for this, that they could allegorize ingeniously and handsomely. It is well known, how both Plutarch and Synesius[3] allegorized those Egyptian

to me the cause that induced these men to veil their learning in such dark and impenetrable enigmas. Was it done for the sake of the priests or of the people? No one certainly would say of the former. For why should they have employed them for the sake of the priests, who well knew the meaning of such symbols? It was therefore on account of the people. But why, I ask, was it necessary to place the images of abstruse things before the eyes of the people, to whom they were anxious to prevent any portion of their doctrine from becoming known? Can any thing exceed the folly of wishing to keep the people in ignorance of all true science and yet at the same time exhibiting before them the signs and symbols of the truth? I can easily believe, indeed, that the later Egyptians assigned a certain signification to every sacred statue, but that this signification was handed down from those who first erected those statues, I wholly deny. The sphinxes, for example, I admit to have been an ancient image among the Egyptians, consecrated for the sake of ornament, or from motives of superstition: but the various interpretations of this image I hold to be of recent date and invented by posterity in order to give a certain dignity to the institutions of their ancestors and excite reverence towards themselves and their sacred observances. From these remarks, it will be easy to learn what opinion we ought to entertain of the arguments by and by put forth by our learned author, after the example of others. Add also what we shall advance presently respecting the pillars of Hermes. . .

[9] Why the Egyptians should have adopted this method of withdrawing their philosophy from the knowledge of the people, I am exceedingly anxious to learn, inasmuch as they had the power of keeping it entirely to themselves and of preserving it inviolate in the hidden recesses of their temples, to which no access was allowed to the profane. To me that man appears very inconsistent and ridiculous, who, wishing his thoughts and designs to be kept secret and possessing the power of concealing them, nevertheless exhibits a tablet in the hall of his mansion, expressing them in figures and images. It is certain there have been men not destitute of learning, who supposed that knowledge might be better impressed upon the minds of the more ignorant by placing before their eyes certain marks and images borrowed from physical things; nor shall I for a moment dispute it. But I can hardly be induced to believe that any reasonable man would be so mad as to commit to stones, and statues, and public monuments, a philosophy which he wished no one to become acquainted with and which he had the power of concealing and confining exclusively to himself. Indeed, I should rather adopt the opinion of Eusebius, who, after bringing forward many interpretations of such images from Porphyry, and ridiculing the whole of them, thus concludes his account: "Οτι δὲ τῶν νεῶν ἐστι ταῦτα σοφίσματα, μήδ' ὄναρ τῶν παλαιῶν εἰς ἐνθύμησιν ἐλθόντα, "That they are the devices of moderns, and never entered the minds of the ancients, even in a dream." Præparat. Evangel. lib. 3. cap. 7. p. 98. 99.

[1] It is not sufficiently certain whether Porphyry wrote such a book or not. This had been conjectured before by Dion. Petavius, Notæ ad Julian. p. 88. on the strength of certain passages of Eusebius, Præpar. Evang. lib. 3. cap. 13. p. 118. But it is clearly shown by Luc. Holstenius, Vita Porphyrii, cap. 9. p. 53. 54. that the book from which Eusebius there quotes so many things is no other than Porphyry's work, Περὶ Ἀγαλμάτων. [3] Lib. 1. p. 14. ed. Spenceri.

[3] The former, in his De Iside et Osiride, the latter in the book De Providentia, p. 89. This very variety of interpretations entirely destroys the credit of his philosophy,

fables of Isis and Osiris, the one to a philosophical, the other to a political sense. And the Egyptian hieroglyphics, which were figures not answering to sounds or words, but immediately representing the objects and conceptions of the mind, were chiefly made use of by them to this purpose, to express the mysteries of their religion and theology, so as that they might be concealed from the profane vulgar. For which cause the hieroglyphic learning of the Egyptians is commonly taken for one and the same thing with their arcane theology, or metaphysics. And this the author of the questions and answers Ad Orthodoxos[4] tells us was anciently had in much greater esteem amongst the Egyptians than all their other learning; and that therefore Moses was as well instructed in this hieroglyphic learning and metaphysical theology of theirs as in their mathematics. And for our parts, we doubt not, but that the Mensa Isiaca,[5] lately published, containing so many strange and uncouth hieroglyphics in it, was something of this ἀπόῤῥητος θεολογία, this "arcane theology" of the Egyptians, and not mere history, as some imagine; though the late confident Œdipus seems to arrogate too much to himself, in pretending to such a certain and exact interpretation of it. Now, as it is reasonable to think, that in all those pagan nations where there was another theology besides the vulgar, the principal part thereof was the doctrine of one supreme and universal Deity, the Maker of the whole world; so can it not well be conceived, what this ἄῤῥητος, and ἀπόῤῥητος, and αἰνιγματώδης θεολογία, this "arcane," and "mysterious," and "enigmatic theology" of the Egyptians, so much talked of, should be other than a kind of metaphysics concerning God, as one perfect, incorporeal Being, the original of all things.

We know nothing of any moment, that can be objected against this, save only that which Porphyrius, in his epistle to Anebo, an Egyptian priest, writeth concerning Chæremon :[6]* Χαιρήμων μὲν γὰρ, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι, οὐδ' ἄλλο τι πρὸ τῶν ὁρωμένων κόσμων ἡγοῦνται, ἐν ἀρχῇ λόγων τιθέμενοι τοὺς Αἰγυπτίων, οὐδ' ἄλλους θεοὺς, πλὴν τῶν πλανητῶν λεγομένων, καὶ τῶν συμπληρούντων τὸν ζωδιακὸν, &c. "Chæremon and others acknowledge nothing before this visible and corporeal world, alleging for the countenance of their opinion such of the Egyptians as talk of no other

[4] Inter Justini Martyris Opera, Question. et Respons. sect. 25. p. 406.

[5] A figure of this table, together with a learned commentary, was published by Laur. Pignorius. On the other interpretations, see Fabricius' Biblioth. Græc. lib. 1. cap. 14. sect. 5. p. 95. The individual here called Œdipus is Athanasius Kircher, whose Œdipus Ægyptiacus did not answer the expectation of learned men.

[6] This epistle is prefixed entire to the edition of Jamblichus' De Mysteriis Ægyptior. published at Oxford, by Dr. Tho. Gale, shortly after the appearance of Dr. Cudworth's work.

* Pr. Ev. lib. 3. cap. 4.

gods, but the planets and those stars that fill up the Zodiac, or rise together with them, their decans, and horoscopes, and robust princes, as they call them; whose names are also inserted into their almanacs or ephemerides, together with the times of their risings and settings, and the prognostics or significations of future events for them." For he observed, that those Egyptians, who made the sun the Demiurgus or architect of the world, interpreted the stories of Isis and Osiris, and all those other religious fables, into nothing but stars and planets, and the river Nile, *καὶ ὅλως πάντα εἰς τὰ φυσικὰ, καὶ οὐδὲν εἰς ἀσωμάτους καὶ ζώσας οὐσίας ἑρμηνεύειν,* "and referred all things universally into natural or inanimate, nothing into incorporeal and living substances." Which passage of Porphyrius concerning Chæremon, we confess, Eusebius lays great stress upon, endeavouring to make advantage of it, first against the Egyptians, and then against the Greeks and other Pagans, as deriving their religion and theology from them: "It is manifest from hence (saith he), that the very arcane theology of the Egyptians deified nothing but stars and planets, and acknowledged no incorporeal principal or demiurgic reason as the cause of this universe, but only the visible sun." And then he concludes in this manner: "See now what is become of this arcane theology of the Egyptians, that deifies nothing but senseless matter or dead inanimate bodies." But it is well known that Eusebius took all advantages possible to represent the Pagans to the worst, and render their theology ridiculous and absurd; nevertheless, what he here urgeth against the Egyptians is the less valuable, because himself plainly contradicts it elsewhere, declaring that the Egyptians acknowledged a demiurgic reason and intellectual architect of the world, which consequently was the maker of the sun; and confessing the same of the other Pagans also. Now to affirm, that the Egyptians acknowledged no other deity than inanimate matter and the senseless corporeal world, is not only to deny that they had any *ἀπόῤῥητος θεολογία*, any arcane theology at all (which yet hath been sufficiently proved) but also to render them absolute Atheists. For if this be not atheism, to acknowledge no other deity besides dead and senseless matter, then the word hath no signification. Chæremon indeed seems to impute this opinion (not to all the Egyptians) but to some of them; and it is very possible, that there might be some Atheists amongst the Egyptians also, as well as amongst the Greeks and their philosophers. And doubtless this Chæremon himself was a kind of astrological Atheist; for which cause we conclude, that it was not Chæremon the Stoic, from whom notwithstanding Porphyrius in his book of abstinence citeth certain other things concerning the Egyptians, but either that Chæremon, whom Strabo made use of in Egypt, or else some

other of that name.[7] But that there ever was or can be any such religious Atheists, as Eusebius with some others imagine, who though acknowledging no Deity, besides dead and senseless matter, notwithstanding devoutly court and worship the same, constantly invoking it and imploring its assistance, as expecting great benefit to themselves thereby; this we confess is such a thing as we have not faith enough to believe, it being a sottishness and contradictious nonsense, that is not incident to human nature. Neither can we doubt, but that all the devout Pagans acknowledged some living and understanding deities or other; nor easily believe that they ever worshipped any inanimate or senseless bodies, otherwise than as some way referring to the same, or as images and symbols of them. But as for that passage in Porphyrius' epistle concerning Chæremon, where he only propounds doubts to Anebo the Egyptian priest, as desiring further information from him concerning them, Jamblichus hath given us a full answer to it, under the person of Abammo another Egyptian priest, which notwithstanding hath not hitherto been at all taken notice of, because Ficinus and Scutellius, not understanding the word Chæremon to be a proper name, ridiculously turned it in their translations, "optarem" and "gauderem," thereby also perverting the whole sense. The words in the Greek MS. (now in the hands of my learned friend Mr. Gale) run thus:[8] *Χαιρήμων δὲ καὶ οἵτινες ἄλλοι τῶν περὶ τὸν κόσμον ἅπτονται πρώτων αἰτίων, τὰς τελευταίας ἀρχὰς ἐξηγοῦνται· ὅσοι τε τοὺς πλανήτας, καὶ τὸν ζῳδιακὸν, τοὺς δὲ δεκανοὺς, καὶ ὡροσκόπους, καὶ τοὺς λεγομένους κραταίους ἡγεμόνας παραδιδοῦσι, τὰς μεριστὰς τῶν ἀρχῶν διανομὰς ἀναφαίνουσι· τά τε ἐν τοῖς ἀλμενικιακοῖς μέρος τι βραχύτατον περιέχει τῶν Ἑρμαϊκῶν διατάξεων, καὶ τὰ περὶ ἀστέρων ἢ φάσεων, ἢ κρύψεων, ἢ σελήνης αὐξήσεων, ἢ μειώσεων ἐν τοῖς ἐσχάτοις εἶχε τὴν ἐν Αἰγυπτίοις αἰτιολογίαν· φυσικά τε οὐ λέγουσιν εἶναι πάντα Αἰγύπτιοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ζωὴν, καὶ τὴν νοερὰν ἀπὸ τῆς φύσεως διακρίνουσιν· οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῦ παντὸς μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐφ' ἡμῶν, νοῦν τε καὶ λόγον προστησάμενοι καθ' ἑαυτοὺς ὄντας, οὕτως δημιουργεῖσθαι φασὶ τὰ γιγνόμενα,* "But Chæremon and those others, who pretend to write of the first causes of the world, declare only the last and lowest principles, as likewise they who treat of the planets, the zodiac, the decans, the horoscopes, and the robust princes. And those things, that are in the Egyptian almanac (or ephemerides) contain the least part of the Hermaical institutions, namely, the phases and occultations of the stars, the increase and

[7] On the different Chæremons see Fabricius' Biblioth. Græc. lib. 3. cap. 15. p. 392. and on this one consult Gale's notes on Jamblichus, p. 303. where he observes also that the reading Χαιρήμην of some of the MSS. gave occasion to the ridiculous translations of Ficinus and Scutellius.

[8] These words of Jamblichus are from the book De Mysteriis Ægyptior. sect. 8. cap. 4. p. 160.

decrease of the moon, and the like astrological matters; which things have the lowest place in the Egyptian ætiology. Nor do the Egyptians resolve all things into (senseless) nature, but they distinguish both the life of the soul, and the intellectual life from that of nature, and that not only in ourselves, but also in the universe; they determining mind and reason first to have existed of themselves, and so this whole world to have been made. Wherefore they acknowledge before the heaven, and in the heaven, a living power, and place pure mind above the world, as the Demiurgus and architect thereof." From which testimony of Jamblichus, who was but little junior to Porphyrius, and contemporary with Eusebius, and who had made it his business to inform himself thoroughly concerning the theology of the Egyptians, it plainly appears, that the Egyptians did not generally suppose (as Chæremon pretended concerning some of them) a senseless inanimate nature to be the first original of all things, but that as well in the world as in ourselves, they acknowledged soul superior to nature, and mind or intellect superior to soul, this being the Demiurgus of the world. But we shall have afterwards occasion more opportunely to cite other passages out of this Jamblichus' Egyptian mysteries to the same purpose.[9]

Wherefore there is no pretence at all to suspect, that the Egyptians were universally Atheists and Anarchists, such as supposed no living understanding Deity, but resolved all into senseless matter, as the first and highest principle; but all the question is, whether they were not Polyarchists, such as asserted a multitude of understanding deities self-existent or unmade. Now, that monarchy was an essential part of the arcane and true theology of the Egyptians, A. Steuchus Eugubinus, and many other learned men, have thought to be unquestionably evident from the Hermetic or Trismegistic writings, they taking it for granted, that these are all genuine and sincere. Whereas there is too much cause to suspect, that there have been some pious frauds practised upon these Trismegistic writings, as well as there were upon the Sibylline; and that either whole books of them have been counterfeited by pretended Christians, or at least several spurious and suppositititious passages here and there inserted into some of them. Isaac Casaubon,[10] who was the first

[9] On the opinion to be entertained generally of the religion of the Egyptians, I shall speak below at the conclusion of this disputation; merely remarking here, that Jamblichus is not a man to be implicitly believed when expounding the Egyptian dogmas. For he estimates the doctrine of this nation according to his own notion of things, and adapts the whole of their philosophy to the standard of the junior Platonic school; which, to any one not altogether unacquainted with these matters, is manifest throughout the whole of his book. However, I willingly admit that there were in Egypt at that time men who held the opinions here ascribed by Jamblichus to the Egyptians, but what I contend for is, that we cannot learn from thence the nature of the ancient Egyptian philosophy and theology generally.

[10] Exerc. 1. in Baronium, num. 18. p. 54. &c.

discoverer, has taken notice of many such in that first Hermetic book, entitled, Pœmander; some also in the fourth book, inscribed Crater, and some in the thirteenth called the "Sermon in the mount concerning regeneration;" which may justly render those three whole books, or at least the first and last of them, to be suspected.[1] We shall here repeat none of Casaubon's condemned passages, but add one more to them out of the thirteenth book, or "Sermon in the mount," which, however omitted by him,[2] seems to be more rankly Christian than any other: Λέγε μοι τοῦτο, τίς ἐστι γενεσιουργὸς τῆς παλιγγενεσίας; ὁ τοῦ θεοῦ παῖς, ἄνθρωπος εἷς, θελήματι θεοῦ, "Tell me this also, who is the cause or worker of regeneration? The Son of God, one man by the will of God." Wherefore, though Ath. Kircherus[3] contend with much zeal for the sincerity of all these Trismegistic books; yet we must needs pronounce of the three forementioned, at least the Pœmander properly so called, and the "Sermon in the mount," that they were either wholly forged and counterfeited by some pretended Christians, or else had many spurious passages inserted into them. Wherefore, it cannot be solidly proved from the Trismegistic books after this manner, as supposed to be all alike genuine and sincere, that the Egyptian Pagans acknowledged one supreme and universal Numen: much less can the same be evinced from that pretended Aristotelic book, De secretiore parte divinæ sapientiæ secundùm Ægyptios, greedily swallowed down also by Kircherus, but unquestionably pseudepigraphous.[4]

Notwithstanding which, we conceive, that though all the Trismegistic books, that now are or have been formerly extant, had been forged by some pretended Christians, as that book of the arcane Egyptian wisdom was by some philosopher, and imputed to Aristotle; yet would they for all that, upon another account, afford no inconsiderable argument to prove, that the Egyptian Pagans asserted one Supreme Deity: viz. because every cheat and imposture must needs have some basis or foundation of

[1] On these books of Hermes, see Warburton's Divine Legation of Moses, t. 1. p. 442.

[2] Before the learned Doctor wrote this, however, it had already been remarked by Hen. Conringius, that the whole of this book carries on the face of it the Christian doctrine of regeneration and borrows its phraseology from the language of the New Testament; De Hermet. Ægyptior. Medicina, cap. 4. p. 46.

[3] In his Obeliscus Pamphyl. p. 35. and Œdipus Ægyptiac. Gymnas. Hieroglyph. class 12. cap. 3. Other writers, who contended for the great excellence and antiquity of these books of Hermes, are enumerated in particular by J. Fr. Buddeus, Histor. Eccles. Vet. Testam. par. 1. p. 346. and Jo. Alb. Fabricius, Biblioth. Græc. lib. 1. cap. 8. p. 58. the latter of whom has treated most largely of these Hermetic books, and of those who have repudiated or admired them; approving for his own part of the opinion here adopted by our author, and maintained also by Conringius, and to a certain extent by Borrichius.

[4] On this book, which is falsely attributed to Aristotle, see Fabricius' Biblioth. Græc. lib. 3. cap. 6. p. 162.

truth to stand upon; there must have been something truly Egyptian in such counterfeit Egyptian writings (and therefore this at least of one Supreme Deity), or else they could never have obtained credit at first, or afterwards have maintained the same. The rather, because these Trismegistic books were dispersed in those ancient times, before the Egyptian paganism and their succession of priests were yet extinct; and therefore had that, which is so much insisted upon in them, been dissonant from the Egyptian theology, they must needs have been presently exploded as mere lies and forgeries. Wherefore, we say again, that if all the Hermaic or Trismegistic books that are now extant, and those to boot, which being mentioned in ancient fathers have been lost, as the τὰ γενικὰ, and the τὰ διεξοδικὰ, and the like, had been nothing but the pious frauds and cheats of Christians, yet must there needs have been some truth at the bottom to give subsistence to them; this at least, that Hermes Trismegist, or the Egyptian priests, in their arcane and true theology, really acknowledged one supreme and universal Numen.[5]

But it does not at all follow, that, because some of these Hermaic or Trismegistic books now extant were counterfeit or supposititious, that therefore all of them must needs be such; and not only so, but those also that are mentioned in the writings of ancient fathers, which are now lost. Wherefore, the learned Casaubon seems not to have reckoned or concluded well, when from the detection of forgery in two or three of those Trismegistic books at most, he pronounces of them all universally, that they were nothing but Christian cheats and impostures. And probably he was led into this mistake by reason of his too securely following that vulgar error (which yet had been confuted by Patricius), that all that was published by Ficinus under the names of Hermes Trismegist, was but one and the same book Pœmander, consisting of several chapters; whereas they are all indeed so many distinct and independent books, whereof Pœman-

[5] There is no doubt, as our learned author justly remarks, that the so called Hermetic books contain some things borrowed from the ancient doctrine of the Egyptians. For the crafty impostor who fabricated them could easily foresee that not the slightest credit would be attached to these volumes, unless they exhibited some admixture of those principles and dogmas which were ascribed by the Egyptians to Hermes. His subsequent observation, however, that unless this had been the case they never could have been acceptable to the Egyptians and obtained great authority among them, would have carried much more weight with it, if he had shown us, on sufficient evidence, that the Egyptian theologians did attach any value to them. For nowhere that I know of is it mentioned that on the appearance of these writings they were either rejected and repudiated or publicly received and sanctioned by the Egyptians. There was formerly a kind of contest between degenerate Christians and the later Platonists, which should be the more clever in fathering their own fictions upon the philosophers of antiquity. For both considered it of paramount importance to impress the vulgar with a notion that their own doctrines were recognized by the wise men of all ages. I should suppose, therefore, that each tried their skill in counterfeiting Hermetic books. [Hermes was a Gnostic. See Beausobre, Hist. de Manich. t, 2. p. 201. &c.]

der is only placed first. However, there was no shadow of reason why the Asclepius should have fallen under the same condemnation, nor several other books superadded by Patricius, they being unquestionably distinct from the Pœmander, and no signs of spuriousness or bastardy discovered in them. Much less ought those Trismegistic books cited by the fathers, and now lost, to have been condemned also unseen. Wherefore, notwithstanding all that Casaubon has written, there may very well be some Hermetic or Trismegistic books genuine, though all of them be not such; that is, according to our after-declaration, there may be such books, as were really Egyptian, and not counterfeited by any Christian, though perhaps not written by Hermes Trismegist himself, nor in the Egyptian language. And as it cannot well be conceived, how there should have been any counterfeit Egyptian books, had there been none at all real; so that there were some real and genuine, will perhaps be rendered probable by these following considerations.

That there was anciently amongst the Egyptians such a man as Thoth, Theuth, or Taut, who, together with letters, was the first inventor of arts and siences, as arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and of the hieroglyphic learning, (therefore called by the Greeks Hermes, and by the Latins Mercurius) cannot reasonably be denied; it being a thing confirmed by general fame in all ages, and by the testimonies not only of Sanchoniathon,[6] a Phenician historiographer, who lived about the times of the Trojan war, and wrote a book concerning the theology of the Egyptians, and Manetho Sabennyta,[7] an Egyptian priest, contemporary with Ptol. Philadelphus; but also of that grave philosopher Plato, who is said to have sojourned thirteen years in Egypt, that in his Philebus[8] speaks of him as the first inventor of letters, (who distinguished betwixt vowels and consonants, determining their several numbers) there calling him either a God or a divine man; but in his Phædrus[9] attributeth to him also the invention of arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy, together with some ludicrous recreations, making him either a god or demon: Ἤκουσα περὶ Ναύκρατιν τὴν Αἰγύπτου, γενέσθαι τῶν ἐκεῖ παλαιῶν τινα θεῶν, οὗ καὶ τὸ ὄρνεον τὸ ἱερὸν, ὃ καὶ καλοῦσιν Ἶβιν, αὐτῷ δὲ ὄνομα τῷ δαίμονι εἶναι Θεῦθ, "I have heard (saith he) that about Naucratis, in

[6] In Eusebius, Præpar. Evang. lib. 1. cap. 9. p. 31. 32. But the learned Doctor's memory here deceives him, when he states that this Sanchoniathon wrote a book on the theology of the Egyptians. He is said to have written on the precepts of the Phœnicians, not of the Egyptians.

[7] In Georg. Syncellus, Chronographia, p. 40. [8] P. 75.

[9] P. 356. On these and other testimonies of ancient authors, usually cited in proof that such a man as Hermes existed, I shall say nothing, as their value has already been inquired into by the learned J. Hen. Ursinus, De Zoroastre, Sanchoniathone et Hermete, p. 73. Jo. Marsham, Can. Chronic. p. 35. &c. and others.

Egypt, there was one of the ancient Egyptian gods, to whom the bird Ibis was sacred, as his symbol or hieroglyphic; the name of which demon was Theuth." In which place the philosopher subjoins also an ingenious dispute betwixt this Theuth, and Thamus, then king of Egypt, concerning the convenience and inconvenience of letters; the former boasting of that invention· ὡς μνήμης καὶ σοφίας φάρμακον, "as a remedy for memory, and great help to wisdom," but the latter contending, that it would rather beget oblivion, by the neglect of memory, and therefore was not so properly μνήμης as ὑπομνήσεως φάρμακον, "a remedy for memory, as reminiscence, or the recovery of things forgotten:" adding, that it would also weaken and enervate men's natural faculties by slugging them, and rather beget δόξαν σοφίας, than ἀλήθειαν, "a puffy conceit and opinion of knowledge," by a multifarious rabble of indigested notions, than the truth thereof. Moreover, since it is certain that the Egyptians were famous for literature before the Greeks, they must of necessity have some one or more founders of learning amongst them, as the Greeks had; and Thoth is the only or first person celebrated amongst them upon this account, in remembrance of whom the first month in the year was called by that name. Which Thoth is generally supposed to have lived in the times of the patriarchs, or considerably before Moses; Moses himself being said to have been instructed in that learning which owed its original to him.

Again, besides this Thoth or Theuth, who was called the first Hermes, the Egyptians had also afterwards another eminent advancer or restorer of learning, who was called δεύτερος Ἑρμῆς, "the second Hermes;" they perhaps supposing the soul of Thoth or the first Hermes, to have come into him by transmigration, but his proper Egyptian name was Siphoas, as Syncellus[10] out of Manetho, informs us: Σιφωὰς, ὁ καὶ Ἑρμῆς, υἱὸς Ἡφαίστου, "Siphoas, (who is also Hermes) the son of Vulcan." This is he who is said to be the father of Tat, and to have been surnamed Τρισμέγιστος, "Ter Maximus" (he being so styled by Manetho, Jamblichus, and others). And he is placed by Eusebius[1] in the fiftieth year after the Israelitish Exitus, though probably somewhat too early. The former of these two Hermes was the inventor of arts and sciences; the latter, the restorer and advancer of them: the first wrote in Hieroglyphics upon pillars, ἐν τῇ Συριγγικῇ γῇ, (as the learned Valesius[2] conjectures it should be

[10] Chronograph. p. 124. a. The words which follow shortly after concerning the second Hermes are taken from a fragment of Manetho, in the same Syncellus, p. 40. &c. Compare what has been collected by Jo. Marsham, Can. Chronic. p. 240.

[1] In Chronico, p. 556.

[2] In his notes on Ammian. Marcellinus, lib. 22. p. 339. But J. Alb. Fabricius, Biblioth. Græc. lib. 1. cap. 11. p. 73. is justly dissatisfied with this conjecture of

read, instead of Σηριαδικῇ·) which Syringes what they were, Am. Marcellinus[3] will instruct us. The second interpreted and translated those Hieroglyphics, composing many books in several arts and sciences; the number whereof set down by Jamblichus[4] must needs be fabulous, unless it be understood of paragraphs or verses. Which Trismegistic or Hermetic books were said to be carefully preserved by the priests in the interior recesses of their temples.[5]

Valesius. Compare Henr. Dodwell on this *terra Syriadica*, in the Append. ad Diss. Cyprianic. sect. 13. p. 8.

[3] Histor. lib. 22. cap. 15. p. 339.

[4] De Mysteriis Ægyptior. sect. 8. cap. 1. p. 157. See Fabricius' Biblioth. Græc. lib. 1. cap. 11. sect. 6. 7. p. 76. 77.

[5] The opinions, or rather conjectures, of learned men on these Egyptian Hermes, many and various as they are, I have neither inclination nor opportunity to enumerate and examine in this place. I shall content myself with a few observations, which on attentively considering all that is here brought forward respecting Hermes have occurred to me as possessing some semblance of probability. I. In my opinion, the Mercury or Hermes of the Greeks, and the Theuth or Thoth of the Egyptians are not one and the same God, but exhibit to us an example of that confusion of deities which was common to the Greeks, Romans, Egyptians, and most other nations. Thoth was an Egyptian philosopher, legislator, king, or other eminent character, whom the Egyptians held forth as the inventor of certain sciences necessary to human life. And the Greeks, having heard of this Thoth in their intercourse with the Egyptians and perceiving a great resemblance between him and their own Mercury, hesitated not to call him Mercury or Hermes, as though he had been the same as their own ancestral God of that name: whence the custom sprung up in both nations of naming this Egyptian deity indiscriminately Theuth and Mercury. So great, however, is the difference of circumstances and actions recorded of the Egyptian Hermes and the Greek Mercury, that it is plain we have an instance in these deities of the evil custom prevailing among the ancients of confounding totally different gods. II. The remaining accounts respecting the two Hermes are, in my opinion, to be connected and reconciled as follows, if indeed an opinion can be formed on matters involved in such darkness and so obscured by the brevity and discordance of authors. There was some one among the earliest Egyptians, who besides teaching the rude inhabitants many other useful things invented also the art of expressing the thoughts not by letters like ourselves, but by images and figures, like the Chinese of the present day. [Compare Leibnitz, Epistol. p. 414. whose conjecture respecting the Chinese language confirms this of mine. Parennin, however, Lettr. Edifiant. tom. 24. p. 37. proves that the Egyptian hieroglyphics are very different from the Chinese characters.] At all events, all ancient authors agree in this, that the hieroglyphical system of writing was a most ancient invention of Hermes. And as I consider the method of expressing the thoughts by figures and images to be much more concise and simple than that of letters and characters, I am easily led to believe, that it belonged to the earliest ages and that those who first taught nations to write employed this and no other system. [The barbarians in America still write in this manner. See Lettres Edifiant. tom. 23. p. 304. La Fiteau. This is proved by numerous testimonies, Biblioth. Francoise, tom. 32. p. 33.] In the age in which Thoth lived, the use of paper and parchment was unknown to the Egyptians. Therefore, according to the custom of antiquity, he inscribed on walls and columns, the laws, precepts, and dogmas which he wished to be preserved, representing them by various figures and images; so that those who were acquainted with the signification and power attached to each figure could have no difficulty in understanding them; in the same way as the modern Chinese easily decipher the meaning of their own characters. These institutions flourished for a long period in Egypt. But subsequently, inundations such as those expressly recorded by Manetho, in Syncellus, Chronograph. p. 40. and others, and perhaps other vicissitudes, wrought a mighty change in that country, and either dispersed, or in a great measure destroyed and extinguished, the ancient inhabitants. Hence, the sciences themselves, and the art of writing by figures, which had been handed down from Thoth, were at the same time

But besides the hieroglyphics written by the first Hermes, and the books composed by the second, (who was called also Trismegist) it cannot be doubted but that there were many books written by

obliterated and buried in oblivion. At this period, probably, many of the Egyptians migrated to India and China, and founded new cities in those countries. For, in my opinion, great attention is due to the conjecture of learned men, who suppose the Chinese and ancient Indians to be colonies of Egyptians and prove it from the similarity of their institutions. After the lapse of some time, new colonists flocked into Egypt, differing from those ancients above mentioned in manners, laws, and doctrines. [See Warburton, at great length, on Hieroglyph. in his Divine Legation of Moses, lib. 2.] Of this indeed, the accounts of ancient authors furnish such a mass of evidence, as scarcely to leave room for doubt. Among these, in like manner, there existed some one superior to the rest in wisdom, who restored the use of the sciences, geometry, arithmetic, and the like, which are indispensable to the inhabitants of Egypt and which had for a time been neglected and abandoned. Those who remained of the primitive race of Egyptians, observing the great resemblance between this man and the Thoth of early times, called him the new or second Thoth; and the Greeks, after their example, Hermes. The new people and this new restorer of the sciences introduced among the Egyptians a totally different mode of writing, and taught them to express their ideas by characters and letters, and not by figures and images, as had been the custom heretofore. [That the Egyptians made use both of the common letters and hieroglyphics, the latter being confined to the priests, is proved at large in Biblioth. Françoise, tom. 32. p. 23. although the sacred letters of the priests probably differed from the hieroglyphics, ibid. 40.] The violence, however, of deluges and other momentous changes, respecting which antiquity is silent, had not been so destructive throughout the various Egyptian provinces, as not everywhere to have left monuments of a bygone age; including columns, in which, according to the injunction of the ancient Hermes, the laws and history of the nation had been inscribed in hieroglyphical images. Numerous documents of the kind were dug out of the earth, in which they had been buried by the force of earthquakes and waters. But the ancient art of writing being lost, there was no one at that time among the Egyptians who could explain them and decipher their hidden meaning. Hence, various conjectures were started respecting the sense of these figures, each interpreting that which he was ignorant of, according to his own conception, till, as was natural, as many fables sprung up as there were monuments discovered. Most of them, knowing these columns to have been dug out of the earth and not doubting but that transcendant wisdom lay hid under these outward symbols, supposed the ancient Thoth to have purposely concealed the treasure for the sake of posterity, that they might serve instead of books and be a guide to the intelligent in the path to learning and science. Indeed, as often as I think upon the rumour prevalent in former times among so many nations, of certain columns having been filled with divine wisdom, and concealed under the earth by Seth, Mercury, and others, I am confirmed in my opinion, that it suddenly sprung up among the Egyptians and other nations, at the time when some of these ancient columns, adorned with various images, were accidentally discovered in caves and subterraneous places. For who had informed those, who were living at the time when these columns were brought to light, of this intention of Thoth or Seth? The second Hermes, whom I have spoken of, being a shrewd man, and regardful of his own interests, insisted that the mysteries set forth in these columns were known to himself alone and therefore gave that interpretation to the images, which he judged would be most beneficial to himself and to the condition and circumstances of the country. He, moreover, committed to writing such precepts as he wished the people to believe had been derived by him from these books of stone. See Manetho in Syncellus, Chronograph. p. 40. For which reason his books were called Hermetic, as being supposed to contain the substance of the monuments left behind by the ancient Hermes. In the meantime, the columns themselves, agreeably to the sacred character attached to them, were deposited in the temples and carefully guarded as treasures of surpassing wisdom, which few were deemed worthy to behold. Those, therefore, who were admitted to a sight of them, and who afterwards became renowned for wisdom, were forthwith proclaimed by the Egyptians, arrogant and superstitious as they were, as having obtained all their inventions from their own columns. Whence arose that fable, which tells us that Pythagoras and Plato borrowed all their philosophy from

the Egyptian priests successively in several ages. And Jamblichus informs us, in the beginning of his mysteries, "That Hermes the God of eloquence, and president or patron of all true knowledge concerning the gods, was formerly accounted common to all the priests, insomuch that τὰ αὐτῶν τῆς σοφίας εὑρήματα αὐτῷ ἀνετίθεσαν, Ἑρμοῦ πάντα τὰ οἰκεῖα συγγράμματα ἐπονομάζοντες, they dedicated the inventions of their wisdom to him, entitling their own books to Hermes Trismegist." Now, though one reason hereof might probably have been thought to have been this, because those books were supposed to have been written according to the tenor of the old Hermetic or Trismegistic doctrine; yet Jamblichus here acquaints us with the chief ground of it, namely this, that though Hermes was once a mortal man, yet he

these Hermetic columns. See Jamblichus, De Mysteriis Ægyptior. sect. 1. cap. 2. p. 3. For the Egyptians suspected these men to have been skilled in the art of interpreting those abstruse images and, while inspecting the columns, to have been enabled by the favour of Hermes to make themselves acquainted with the hidden truths contained in them. Nor were the priests themselves idle in deciphering these ancient figures, whose virtue they conceived to be still unexhausted. In every college at least there was a scribe, or ἱερογραμματεὺς, whose peculiar office it was to interpret them. But as that primitive method of writing was altogether lost to human recollection, the same happened to them as to antiquarians of the present day, who, on the discovery of coins or stone marked with ancient and obscure characters, are divided into a variety of discordant opinions. Clemens. Alexandr. Strom. lib. 6. cap. 4. p. 757. Each explained the supposed Hermetic figures as seemed most advantageous to himself and most consistent with his own opinions. One fancied he discovered in them the symbols of physical, another of moral, a third of metaphysical, and a fourth of astronomical truths. [For proof of this, consult Biblioth. Françoise, tom. 33. par. 1. p. 40.] One supposed a hawk to represent God, another the sun, a third blood, a fourth victory, a fifth humility of mind. See Horapollo's Hieroglyph. cap. 6. p. 9. As many as were the men of any ingenuity, so many were the opinions; and again, so many the interpretations and different systems of writing. The priests followed the example of Hermes, and conceived it to be to their interest to clothe their own precepts in figures and images. But to these they did not all attach the same power and meaning, and therefore, in writing employed them differently. He who held a beetle to denote the world in the Hermetic columns, in like manner, drew a beetle, when consigning to figures some precept concerning the world. Another, who supposed the beetle to be the symbol of father, when he happened to address fathers, placed a beetle at the head of his discourse. Even this will be sufficient to show, how vain and unprofitable for the most part is the labour of learned men, who strive to interpret Egyptian hieroglyphics, and who fancy it to be possible at this day to define their import; whose diligence I should applaud, if some constant and unvarying meaning has been attached to these images among the Egyptians themselves, and if the priests of Memphis, for instance, had accepted them in the same sense as those of Heliopolis. But we may learn from Horapollo alone that this figurative mode of writing was circumscribed by no common laws, but varied according to the diversity of talent in the men themselves. Those ingenious scholars, therefore, who endeavour to expound the *Isiac table* published by Pignorius and others, will for ever torture themselves in vain, unless they first ascertain in what province of Egypt it was composed, and what meaning its authors assigned to the figures contained in it. Such is my opinion of these Hermes themselves, and of the Hermetic columns and figures. That the whole rests on conjecture I do not deny, nor am I so vain as to suppose every thing I have advanced to be free from error. Still, I am confident that those who carefully examine ancient authorities on these subjects and compare with them the habits of mankind generally, as well as the relations of primitive ages, will confess that these hypotheses seem to possess great semblance of truth. But let each enjoy his own opinion. On the authors who have treated of these columns, consult among others Pet. Dan. Huet, Demonstr. Evangel. p. 94. &c.

was afterward deified by the Egyptians, (which is testified also by Plato) and made to be the tutelar God, and fautor of all arts and sciences, but especially theology; by whose inspiration, therefore, all such books were conceived to have been written.[6] Nay further, we may observe, that in some of the Hermaic or Trismegistic books now extant, Hermes is sometimes put for the divine wisdom or understanding itself. And now we see the true reason why there have been many books called Hermetical and Trismegistical; some of which, notwithstanding, cannot possibly be conceived to have been of such great antiquity, nor written by Hermes Trismegist himself, viz., because it was customary with the Egyptian priests to entitle their own philosophic and theologic books to Hermes. Moreover, it is very probable, that several of the books of the Egyptian priests of latter times were not originally written in the Egyptian language, but in the Greek; because, at least from the Ptolemaic kings downward, Greek was become very familiar to all the learned Egyptians, and in a manner vulgarly spoken, as may appear from those very words, Hermes, Trismegist, and the like, so commonly used by them, together with the proper names of places; and because the Coptic language to this very day hath more of Greek than Egyptian words in it; nay, Plutarch ventures to etymologize those old Egyptian names, Isis, Osiris, Horus, and Typhon, from the Greek, as if the Egyptians had been anciently well acquainted with that language.

Now, that some of those ancient Hermaic books, written by Hermes Trismegist himself, or believed to be such by the Egyptians, and kept in the custody of their priests, were still in being and extant amongst them after the times of Christianity, seems to be unquestionable from the testimony of that pious and learned father Clemens Alexandrinus,* he giving this particular account of them, after the mentioning of their opinion concerning the transmigration of souls: "The Egyptians follow a certain peculiar philosophy of their own, which may be declared by setting down the order of their religious procession. First, therefore, goes the Precentor, carrying two of Hermes' books along with him; the one of which contains the hymns of

[6] But perhaps Jamblichus was either ignorant of or purposely silent respecting the true cause of this custom. I suspect, indeed, that those who formerly put forth books under the name of Hermes, did so for the sake of deceiving the people and of adding authority to their own inventions, just as many of the ancient Christians prefixed the names of Christ himself and his disciples to unimportant writings, in order to give greater influence to the opinions contained in them. In which conviction I am not a little strengthened by the fact, that prior to the Christian era this shameful custom of passing off books under the names of others flourished only in Egypt, and was subsequently borrowed by the rest of the Christians from those of that country. I have touched on this subject more copiously in my Dissertation on the Disturbance of the Church by the later Platonists.

* Stromat. 6. p. 633. [Cap. 4. p. 757. Edit. Potteri.]

the gods, the other directions for the kingly office. After him follows the Horoscopus, who is particularly instructed in Hermes' astrological books, which are four. Then succeeds the Hierogrammateus, or sacred scribe, with feathers upon his head, and a book and rule in his hands, to whom it belongeth to be thoroughly acquainted with the hieroglyphics, as also with cosmography, geography, the order of the sun and moon and five planets, the chorography of Egypt, and description of Nile. In the next place cometh the Stolistes, who is to be thoroughly instructed in those ten books, which treat concerning the honour of the gods, the Egyptian worship, sacrifices, first-fruits, prayers, pomps, and festivals. And last of all marcheth the prophet, who is president of the temple and sacred things, and ought to be thoroughly versed in those other ten books called sacerdotal, concerning laws, the gods, and the whole discipline of the priests. Wherefore, amongst the books of Hermes there are forty-two accounted most necessary; of which thirty-six, containing all the Egyptian philosophy, were to be learned by those particular orders before mentioned; but the other six, treating of medicinal things, by the Pastophori. From which place we understand, that at least forty-two books of the ancient Hermes Trismegist, or such reputed by the Egyptians, were still extant in the time of Clemens Alexandrinus, about two hundred years after the Christian epocha.[7]

Furthermore, that there were certain books really Egyptian, and called Hermaical or Trismegistical (whether written by the ancient Hermes Trismegist himself, or by other Egyptian priests of latter times, according to the tenor of his doctrine, and only entitled to him), which, after the times of Christianity, began to be taken notice of by other nations, the Greeks and Latins, seems probable from hence, because such books are not only mentioned and acknowledged by Christian writers and fathers, but also by Pagans and philosophers. In Plutarch's discourse, De Iside et Osiride,* we read thus of them: Ἐν δὲ ταῖς Ἑρμοῦ λεγομέναις βίβλοις, ἱστοροῦσι γεγράφθαι, περὶ τῶν ἱερῶν ὀνομάτων, ὅτι τὴν μὲν ἐπὶ τῆς τοῦ ἡλίου περιφορᾶς τεταγμένην δύναμιν, Ὧρον, Ἕλληνες δὲ Ἀπόλλωνα καλοῦσι, τὴν δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ πνεύματος, οἱ μὲν Ὄσιριν, οἱ δὲ Σάραπιν, οἱ δὲ Σωθὶ Αἰγυπτιστὶ, "In the books called Hermes', or Hermaical, it is reported to have been written concerning sacred names, that the power appointed to preside over the motion of the sun is called by the Egyptians,

[7] This passage of Clement is not quoted entire, many things bearing less closely upon the matter in hand being omitted. It has been illustrated by Jo. Marsham, Canon. Chronic. p. 241. and Pet. Lambecius, Prodromus Histor. Litterar. p. 135. &c. as also more recently by the learned J. Alb. Fabricius, Biblioth. Græc. lib. 1. cap. 11. sect. 5. p. 75.

* Page 374. [p. 375.]

Horus (as by the Greeks, Apollo), and that which presides over the air and wind is called by some Osiris, by others Sarapis, and by others Sothi, in the Egyptian language." Now these sacred names in Plutarch seem to be several names of God; and therefore, whether these Hermaic books of his were the same with those in Clemens Alexandrinus, such as were supposed by the Egyptians to have been written by Hermes Trismegist himself, or other books written by Egyptian priests, according to the tenor of this doctrine; we may by the way observe, that, according to the Hermaical or Trismegistic doctrine, one and the same Deity was worshipped under several names and notions, according to its several powers and virtues manifested in the world;[8] which is a thing afterwards more to be insisted on. Moreover, it hath been generally believed, that L. Apuleius Madaurensis, an eminent Platonic philosopher, and zealous assertor of paganism, was the translator of the Asclepian dialogue of Hermes Trismegist out of Greek into Latin; which therefore hath been accordingly published with Apuleius' works. And Barthius affirms, that St. Austin does somewhere expressly impute this version to Apuleius; but we confess we have not yet met with the place. However, there seems to be no sufficient reason why Colvius should call this into question from the style and Latin.[9] Again, it is certain, that Jamblichus doth not only mention these Hermaic books, under the name of Τὰ φερόμενα ὡς Ἑρμοῦ, "The books that are carried up and down as Hermes', or vulgarly imputed to him;" but also vindicate them from the imputation of imposture. Not as if there were any suspicion at all of that which Casaubon is so confident of, that these Hermaic books were all forged by Christians; but because some might then possibly imagine them to have been counterfeited by philosophers; wherefore it will be convenient here to set down the whole passage of Jamblichus[10] concerning it, as it is in the Greek MS.: Διευκρινηθέντων οὖν τούτων οὕτως καὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς συγγράμμασιν, οἷς λέγει ἐπιτετυχηκέναι, σαφὴς ἐστιν ἡ διάλυσις· τὰ μὲν γὰρ φερόμενα, ὡς Ἑρμοῦ, Ἑρμαϊκὰς περιέχει δόξας, εἰ καὶ τῇ τῶν φιλοσόφων γλώττῃ πολλάκις χρῆται· μεταγέγραπται γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς Αἰγυπτίας γλώττης ὑπ' ἀνδρῶν φιλοσοφίας οὐκ ἀπείρως

[8] If the doctrine of Hermes and the subject of the disputation concerning sacred names may be gathered from the passage of Plutarch here adduced, I should consider rather that the dogma to be imputed to him is this: That over the different parts of nature, winds, stars, sun, moon, &c. certain genii or invisible powers are appointed to preside, which different nations, as the Greeks and Egyptians, designate by different names.

[9] Regarding Apuleius, and his version of Asclepius, see the copious illustrations of Pet. Lambecius, Prodrom. Histor. Litterar. lib. 2. cap. 1. p. 141. and of J. Alb. Fabricius, Biblioth. Latin. lib. 3. cap. 2. p. 522. also Biblioth. Græc. lib. 1. cap. 8. p. 55. where he concurs with Dr. Cudworth in rejecting Colvius' reason for questioning its authenticity.

[10] This passage is extant in Dr. Gale's edition, sect. 8. cap. 4. p. 160.

ἐχόντων. Χαιρήμων δὲ, &c., "These things being thus discussed and determined, the solution of that difficulty, from those books which Porphyrius saith he met withal (namely, the Hermaics, and those writings of Chæremon), will be clear and easy. For the books vulgarly imputed to Hermes do really contain the Hermaic opinions and doctrines in them, although they often speak the language of philosophers; the reason whereof is, because they were translated out of the Egyptian tongue by men not unacquainted with philosophy. But Chæremon and those others," &c. Where it is first observable, that Jamblichus doth not affirm these Hermaic books to have been written by Hermes Trismegist himself, he calling them only τὰ φερόμενα ὡς Ἑρμοῦ, "the books that were carried about as Hermes'." But that which he affirmeth of them is this, that they did really contain the Hermaical opinions, and derive their original from Egypt. Again, whereas some might then possibly suspect that these Hermaic books had been counterfeited by Greek philosophers, and contained nothing but the Greek learning in them, because they speak so much the philosophic language; Jamblichus gives an account of this also, that the reason hereof was, because they were translated out of the Egyptian language by men skilled in the Greek philosophy, who therefore added something of their own phrase and notion to them. It is true, indeed, that most of these Hermaic books which now we have seem to have been written originally in Greek; notwithstanding which, others of them, and particularly those that are now lost, as τὰ Γενικὰ, and the like, might, as Jamblichus here affirmeth, have been translated out of the Egyptian tongue, but by their translators disguised with philosophic language and other Grecanic things intermixed with them. Moreover, from the forecited passage of Jamblichus we may clearly collect, that Porphyrius in his epistle to Anebo the Egyptian priest (of which epistle there are only some small fragments left)[1] did also make mention of these Hermaic writings; and whereas he found the writings of Chæremon to be contradictious to them, therefore desired to be resolved by that Egyptian priest, whether the doctrine of those Hermaic books were genuine and truly Egyptian, or no. Now, Jamblichus in his answer here affirmeth, that the doctrine of the ancient Hermes, or the Egyptian theology, was as to the substance truly represented in those books (vulgarly imputed to Hermes), but not so by Chæremon. Lastly, St. Cyril of Alexandria informs us,[2] that there was an edition of these Hermaic

[1] The whole of the fragments of this epistle to be met with in ancient authors are carefully collected and aptly and skilfully connected and arranged, by Dr. Gale, in the preface to his edition of Jamblichus, at the conclusion of which he tells us, that in his opinion there are not many wanting.

[2] Contra Julianum, p. 31. ed. Spanhemii. These fifteen books, as Cyril's passage

or Trismegistic books (compiled together) formerly made at Athens, under this title, Ἑρμαϊκὰ πεντεκαίδεκα βιβλία, "Fifteen Hermaic books." Which Hermaics, Casaubon,[3] conceiving them to have been published before Jamblichus' time, took them for those Salaminiaca, which he found in the Latin translations of Jamblichus, made by Ficinus and Scutellius; whereas, indeed, he was here abused by those translators, there being no such thing to be found in the Greek copy. But the word ἀλμενικιακὰ, (not understood by them) being turned into Salaminiaca, Casaubon therefore conjectured them to have been those Hermaic books published at Athens, because Salamis was not far distant from thence.[4] Now, it cannot be doubted, but that this edition of Hermaic books at Athens was made by some philosopher or Pagans, and not by Christians; this appearing also from the words of St. Cyril himself, where, having spoken of Moses and the agreement of Hermes with him, he adds: Πεποίηται δὲ καὶ τούτου μνήμην, ἐν ἰδίαις συγγραφαῖς, ὁ συντεθεικὼς Ἀθήνῃσι τὰ ἐπίκλην Ἑρμαϊκὰ πεντεκαίδεκα βιβλία, "Of which Moses also, who compiled and published the fifteen Hermaic books at Athens, makes mention in his own discourse" (annexed thereunto). For thus we conceive that place is to be understood, that the Pagan publisher of the Hermaic books himself took notice of some agreement, that was betwixt Moses and Hermes.[5] But here it is to be noted, that because Hermes and the Hermaic books were in such great credit, not only among the Christians, but also the Greek and Latin Pagans, therefore were there some

and the words he quotes from that work clearly show, are not the supposed Hermetic books themselves but merely compilations from those books. They were called Hermetic, no doubt, because their author professed to have expounded in them the sum and substance of the whole Hermetic doctrine.

[3] Exerc. 1. in Baronii Annales, p. 55. Casaubon's opinion is followed by Herm. Conringius, De Hermetica Ægyptior. Medicina, cap. 7. p. 59.

[4] But Dr. Gale, in his notes on Jamblichus, p. 304. although he, sect. 8. cap. 4. p. 160. himself edits ἐν τοῖς Ἀλμενιχιακοῖς, confesses, however, that all the MS. copies read Σαλμενισχιακοῖς, which clearly justifies Ficinus and Scutellius, and shows that the learned Doctor's memory here deceived him. Claud. Salmasius, in his book De Annis Climactericis, p. 605. observes that the same reading, Σαλμενισχιακὰ, occurs in Hephæstion and has himself no doubt of its correctness. If what the same Salmasius remarks be true, that the word Σαλμεσχίνια is Persian, from which the Arabians, by a slight corruption formed their own *Almanack*, I see no reason for disputing as to which reading is to be preferred. In the reading *Salmenischiaca*, the true Persian pronunciation is retained, in *Almenichiaca*, the corrupt one of the Arabians. The thing itself remains the same in both, and each word denotes a book containing astronomical observations.

[5] The learned doctor here follows the generally received opinion, that those fifteen books mentioned by Cyril were those of Hermes himself, to which the editor subjoined some dissertation of his own. For my own part, as I have just intimated, I entertain a different view, and consider this man to have published fifteen books compiled by himself from the Hermetic doctrines. I am led to think so chiefly by the passage quoted by Cyril from the first of these books, in which the author does not introduce Hermes as the speaker, but himself discourses of Hermes and his scientific inventions, and seems to be defending this philosopher against some opponents.

counterfeit writings obtruded also under that specious title; such as that ancient botanic book mentioned by Galen, and those Christian forgeries of later times, the Pœmander and Sermon on the Mount; which, being not cited by any ancient father or writer, were both of them doubtless later than Jamblichus, who discovers no suspicion of any Christian forgeries in this kind.[6]

But Casaubon, who contends that all the theologic books imputed to Hermes Trismegist were counterfeited by Christians, affirms all the philosophy, doctrine, and learning of them (excepting what only is Christian in them) to be merely Platonical and Grecanical, but not at all Egyptian; thence concluding, that these books were forged by such Christians as were skilled in the Platonic or Grecanic learning. But first, it is here considerable, that since Pythagorism, Platonism, and the Greek learning in general, was in great part derived from the Egyptians, it cannot be concluded, that whatsoever is Platonical or Grecanical therefore was not Egyptian. The only instance that Casaubon insists upon is this dogma in the Trismegistic books, "That nothing in the world perisheth, and that death is not the destruction, but change and translation of things only:" which, because he finds amongst some of the Greek philosophers, he resolves to be peculiar to them only, and not common with the Egyptians. But since the chief design and tendency of that dogma was plainly to maintain the immortality, pre-existence, and transmigration of souls, which doctrine was unquestionably derived from the Egyptians: there is little reason to doubt but that this dogma was itself Egyptian also. And Pythagoras, who was the chief propagator of this doctrine amongst the Greeks, οὐδὲν οὐδὲ γίγνεσθαι οὐδὲ φθείρεσθαι τῶν ὄντων, "that no real entity (in generations and corruptions) was made or destroyed," according to those Ovidian verses before cited,

> Nec perit in toto quicquam, mihi credite, mundo,
> Sed variat faciemque novat. Nascique vocatur
> Incipere esse aliud, &c.

did in all probability derive it, together with its superstructure (the pre-existence and transmigration of souls), at once from the Egyptians. But it is observable, that the Egyptians had also a peculiar ground of their own for this dogma (which we do not find insisted upon by the Greek philosophers), and it is thus expressed in the eighth of Ficinus' Hermetic books or chapters: Εἰ δεύτερος θεὸς ὁ κόσμος, καὶ ζῶον ἀθάνατον, ἀδύνατόν ἐστι τοῦ ἀθανάτου ζώου μέρος τι ἀποθανεῖν· πάντα δὲ τὰ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ μέρη ἐστὶ τοῦ κόσμου, μάλιστα δὲ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, τὸ λογικὸν ζῶον,

[6] On these books Fabricius has professedly treated, Biblioth. Græc. lib. 1.

"If the world be a second god and an immortal animal, then is it impossible that any part of this immortal animal should perish or come to nothing; but all things in the world are parts of this great mundane animal, and chiefly man, who is a rational animal." Which same notion we find also insisted on in the Asclepian dialogue: Secundum deum hunc crede, ô Asclepi, omnia gubernantem, omniaque mundana illustrantem animalia. Si enim animal mundus vivens semper et fuit et est et erit, nihil in mundo mortale est: viventis enim uniuscujusque partis, quæ in ipso mundo, sicut in uno eodemque animale semper vivente, nullus est mortalitatis locus. Where though the Latin be a little imperfect, yet the sense is this: "You are to believe the world, O Asclepius, to be a second god governing all things, and illustrating all mundane animals. Now if the world be a living animal and immortal, then there is nothing mortal in it, there being no place for mortality as to any living part or member of that mundane animal that always liveth." Notwithstanding which, we deny not, but that though Pythagoras first derived this notion from the Egyptians, yet he and his followers might probably improve the same farther, (as Plato tells us, that the Greeks generally did what they received from the barbarians) namely, to the taking away the qualities and forms of bodies, and resolving all corporeal things into magnitude, figure, and motion. But that there is indeed some of the old Egyptian learning contained in these Trismegistic books now extant, shall be clearly proved afterwards, when we come to speak of that grand mystery of the Egyptian theology (derived by Orpheus from them) "that God is all." To conclude, Jamblichus' judgment in this case ought, without controversy, to be far preferred before Casaubon's,[7] both by reason of his great antiquity and his

[7] I readily assent to the opinion of the learned Doctor, that Casaubon's argument here treated of is not sufficient to prove the whole of the Hermetic books to have been written by some Greek imbued with Platonic principles. For, that nothing returns to nothing and that the origin and dissolution of things are merely the changes and conversions of one and the same matter, was believed, not only by the Greek philosophers, but also by those of many barbarous nations. But I do not see how it follows from this, I. That those who assented to this dogma did so for the sake of being better able to defend the immortality of souls and their wanderings through various bodies. For I cannot make out how this doctrine of the eternity and transmigration of human souls derives any support from the supposition, that the particles of which bodies are composed do not perish, but on the destruction of the bodies return to their fountain head. Neither does it appear that the Greek philosophers, Hippocrates, Aristotle, Democritus, Epicurus, and so many others, who are known to have favoured the dogma, that all things flow and change, and that nothing is in reality generated or destroyed, were led by it to believe in the eternity of human souls. II. Pythagoras' dogma, that no real entity is made or destroyed, differs I apprehend from the one I have just named. For, according to the Pythagorean doctrine, τὰ ὄντα, or real entities, are things devoid of matter, and free from all concretion. See Jo. Scheffer, De Philosoph. Italica, cap. 8. p. 56. Consequently, the meaning of that Pythagorean precept is this, "Whatever things are separate from matter are not subject to any change." I am unwilling to go into a lengthened discussion of the other matters here touched upon.

being much better skilled, not only in the Greek, but also the Egyptian learning; that the books imputed to Hermes Trismegist did Ἑρμαϊκὰς περιέχειν δόξας, "really contain the Hermaic opinions," though they spake sometimes the language of the Greek philosophers.

Wherefore, upon all these considerations, we conceive it reasonable to conclude, that though there have been some Hermaic books counterfeited by Christians, since Jamblichus' time, as namely the Pœmander and the Sermon in the mount concerning regeneration, neither of which are found cited by any ancient father; yet there were other Hermaic books, which though not written by Hermes Trismegist himself, nor all of them in the Egyptian language, but some of them in Greek, were truly Egyptian, and did, for the substance of them, contain the Hermaic doctrine. Such probably were those mentioned by the ancient fathers, but since lost, as the τὰ Γενικὰ, which seems to have been a discourse concerning the cosmogonia, and τὰ διεξοδικὰ, and the like. And such also may some of these Hermaic books be, that are still extant; as to instance particularly, the Asclepian dialogue, entitled in the Greek ὁ τέλειος λόγος, "the perfect oration," and in all probability translated into Latin by Apuleius. For it can hardly be imagined, that he who was so devout a Pagan, so learned a philosopher, and so witty a man, should be so far imposed upon by a counterfeit Trismegistic book, and mere Christian cheat, as to bestow translating upon it, and recommend it to the world, as that which was genuinely Pagan. But however, whether Apuleius were the translator of this Asclepian dialogue or no, it is evident, that the spirit of it is not at all Christian, but rankly pagan; one instance whereof we have, in its glorying of a power that men have of making gods, upon which account St. Austin[8] thought fit to concern himself in the confutation of it. Moreover, it being extant and vulgarly known before Jamblichus' time, it must needs be included in his τὰ φερόμενα ὡς Ἑρμοῦ, and consequently receive this attestation from him, that it did contain not merely the Greekish, but the Hermaical and Egyptian doctrine.

There are indeed some objections made against this, as first from what we read in this dialogue,* concerning the purgation of the world partly by water, and partly by fire: Tunc ille Dominus et pater Deus, primipotens, et unus gubernator mundi, intuens in mores factaque hominum, voluntate sua (quæ est dei

[8] De Civitate Dei, lib. 8. cap. 23. p. 162. t. 7. opp. What Asclepius means by the phrase "making gods," will be best understood from St. Augustine's own words: Spiritus invisibiles per artem quandam visibilibus rebus corporalis materiæ copulare, ut sint quasi animata corpora, illis spiritibus dicata et subdita simulacra, hoc esse dicit Deos facere, "To unite by a certain art invisible spirits with the visible things of corporeal matter, so as to form as it were animate bodies, or images consecrated and subject to those spirits, is what he calls making gods."

* Page 607. col.

benignitas) vitiis resistens, et corruptelæ errorem revocans, malignitatem omnem vel alluvione diluens, vel igne consumens, ad antiquam faciem mundum revocabit, "When the world becomes thus degenerate, then that Lord and Father, the supreme God, and the only governor of the world, beholding the manners and deeds of men, by his will (which is his benignity) always resisting vice, and restoring things from their degeneracy, will either wash away the malignity of the world by water, or else consume it by fire, and restore it to its ancient form again." But since we find in Julius Firmicus,[9] that there was a tradition amongst the Egyptians, concerning the Apocatastasis of the world, partim per κατακλυσμὸν, partim per ἐκπύρωσιν, "partly by inundation and partly by conflagration," this objection can signify nothing. Wherefore there is another objection, that hath some more plausibility, from that prophecy, which we find in this Asclepius, concerning the overthrow of the Egyptian paganism (ushered in with much lamentation) in these words: Tunc terra ista, sanctissima sedes delubrorum, sepulchrorum erit mortuorumque plenissima, "Then this land of Egypt, formerly the most holy seat of the religious temples of the gods, shall be every where full of the sepulchres of dead men." The sense whereof is thus expressed by St. Austin:* Hoc videtur dolere, quod memoriæ martyrum nostrorum templis eorum delubrisque succederent; ut viz. qui hæc legunt, animo à nobis averso atque perverso, putent à Paganis deos cultos fuisse in templis, à nobis autem coli mortuos in sepulchris, "He seems to lament this, that the memorials of our martyrs should succeed in the place of their temples, that so they, who read this with a perverse mind, might think, that by the Pagans the gods were worshipped in temples, but by us (Christians) dead men in sepulchres." Notwithstanding which, this very thing seems to have had its accomplishment too soon after, as may be gathered from these passages of Theodoret:† Καὶ γὰρ αὐτῶν τῶν καλουμένων θεῶν τὴν μνήμην ἐκ τῆς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐξήλειψαν (οἱ μάρτυρες) διανοίας, "Now the martyrs have utterly abolished and blotted out of the minds of men the memory of those, who were formerly called gods." And again: Τοὺς γὰρ οἰκείους νεκροὺς ὁ δεσπότης ἀντεισῆξε τοῖς ὑμετέροις θεοῖς, καὶ τοὺς μὲν φρούδους ἀπέφηνε, τούτοις δὲ τὸ ἐκείνων ἀπένειμε γέρας, &c. "Our Lord hath now brought his dead (that is, his martyrs) into the room and place (that is, the temples) of the gods; whom he hath sent away empty, and bestowed their honour upon these his martyrs. For now instead of the festivals of Jupiter and Bacchus, are celebrated those of Peter and Paul, Thomas and Sergius, and other holy martyrs." Wherefore this

[9] Matheseos, lib. 3. cap. 1. p. 34.
* Civ. D. lib. 8. cap. 26. [p. 166. t. 7. opp.]
† De Cur. G. A. lib. 8. [p. 544. t. 2. opp.]

being so shrewd and plain a description in the Asclepian dialogue of what really happened in the Christian world, it may seem suspicious, that it was rather a history, written after the event, than a prophecy before it, as it pretends to be: it very much resembling that complaint of Eunapius Sardianus in the life of Ædesius,[10] when the Christians had demolished the temple of Serapis in Egypt, seizing upon its riches and treasure, that instead of the gods, the monks then gave divine honour to certain vile and flagitious persons deceased, called by the name of martyrs. Now if this be granted, this book must needs be counterfeit and supposititious. Nevertheless, St. Austin entertained no such suspicion concerning this Asclepian passage, as if it had been a history written after the fact, that is, after the sepulchres and memorials of the martyrs came to be so frequented; he supposing this book to be unquestionably of greater antiquity. Wherefore he concludes it to be a prophecy or prediction made instinctu fallacis spiritûs, "by the instinct or suggestion of some evil spirit;" they sadly then presaging the ruin of their own empire. Neither was this Asclepian dialogue only ancienter than St. Austin, but it is cited by Lactantius Firmianus[1] also under the name of ὁ τέλειος λόγος, "the perfect oration," as was said before, and that as a thing then reputed of great antiquity. Wherefore, in all probability, this Asclepian passage was written before that described event had its accomplishment. And indeed if Antoninus the philosopher (as the forementioned Eunapius[2] writes) did predict the very same thing, that after his decease, that magnificent temple of Serapis in Egypt, together with the rest, should be demolished, καὶ τὰ ἱερὰ τάφους γενήσεσθαι, "and the temples of the gods turned into sepulchres;" why might not this Egyptian or Trismegistic writer receive the like inspiration or tradition? or at least make the same conjecture.[3]

But there is yet another objection made against the sincerity of this Asclepian dialogue, from Lactantius' citing a passage out of it for the second person in the Trinity, the Son of God; Hermes in eo libro (saith Lactantius[4]) qui ὁ τέλειος λόγος inscribitur, his usus est verbis, ὁ κύριος καὶ ὁ πάντων ποιητὴς, ὃν θεὸν

[10] In Vitis Sophistar. Vit. Ædesii, p. 84. 85.

[1] Divinar, Instit. lib. 4. cap. 6. p. 418.

[2] In Vitis Sophistar. p. 76. edit. Plantini.

[3] The writer here modestly refuted by the learned Doctor, without mention of the name, is the illustrious theologian Jo. Henr. Ursinus, who in his book De Zoroastre, Hermete, et Sanchoniathone, exerc. 2. sect. 7. p. 151. &c. asserts that Asclepius wrote at the time when the laws were enacted by Christian emperors against the worship of false gods: and p. 153. in particular: Quis, says he, tam bardus est, qui non intelligat, verba illa Hermeti afficta non esse de futuro prophetantis, sed præsentem statum paganismi, pessum cuntis jam, deplorantis? "Who is so stupid as not to perceive, that these words imputed to Hermes are not those of one who is prophesying of the future, but who is deploring the present ruined condition of paganism?"

[4] Divinar. Instit. lib. 4. cap. 6. p. 419.

καλεῖν νενομίκαμεν, ἐπεὶ τὸν δεύτερον ἐποίησε θεὸν, ὁρατὸν καὶ αἰσθητὸν (αἰσθητὸν δέ φημι οὐ διὰ τὸ αἴσθεσθαι αὐτὸν, περὶ γὰρ τούτου οὐκ ἔστι πότερον αὐτὸς αἴσθοιτο, ἀλλ' ὅτι εἰς αἴσθησιν ὑποπέμπει καὶ εἰς νοῦν) ἐπεὶ τοῦτον ἐποίησε, πρῶτον, καὶ μόνον, καὶ ἕνα, καλὸς δὲ ἐφάνη αὐτῷ, καὶ πληρήστατος πάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ἠγίασέ τε καὶ πάνυ ἐφίλησεν ὡς ἴδιον τόκον· Which we find in Apuleius' Latin translation thus rendered,* Dominus et omnium conformator, quem rectè Deum dicimus, à se secundum deum fecit, qui videri et sentiri possit; quem secundum [deum] sensibilem ita dixerim, non ideo quod ipse sentiat (de hoc enim an ipse sentiat annon alio dicemus tempore) sed eo quod videntium sensus incurrit: quoniam ergo hunc fecit ex se primum, et à se secundum, visusque est ei pulcher, utpote qui est omnium bonitate plenissimus, amavit eum ut divinitatis suæ prolem (for so it ought to be read, and not patrem, it being, τόκον in the Greek), "The Lord and Maker of all, whom we rightly call God, when he made a second god, visible and sensible, (I say, sensible, not actively, because himself hath sense, for concerning this, whether he have sense or no, we shall speak elsewhere, but passively, because he incurs into our senses) this being his first and only production, seemed both beautiful to him, and most full of all good, and therefore he loved him dearly as his own offspring." Which Lactantius, and after him St. Austin,[5] understanding of the perfect Word of God or eternal Λόγος, made use of it as a testimony against the Pagans for the confirmation of Christianity; they taking it for granted, that this Hermaic book was genuinely Egyptian, and did represent the doctrine of the ancient Hermes Trismegist. But Dionysius Petavius[6] and other later writers, understanding this place in the same sense with Lactantius and St. Austin, have made a quite different use of it; namely, to infer from thence, that this book was spurious and counterfeited by some Christian. To which we reply, first, that if this Hermaic writer had acknowledged an eternal Λόγος, or "Word of God," and called it a second God and the Son of God, he had done no more in this, than Philo[7] the Jew did, who speaking of this same

* Colv. p. 588.

[5] I do not recollect Augustine's having done so except in the Contra quinque Hæreses, or Contra quinque Hostium Genera, cap. 3. p. 3. tom. 8. Append. But notwithstanding the antiquity of this book, learned men have good reason for doubting, whether Augustine be its author. At any rate, the Benedictine editors have not thought proper to give it a place among his genuine writings, but only in the Appendix of the eighth volume.

[6] Petavius mentions the book and passage here treated of in his Dogmat. Theologic. t. 2. lib. 2. De Trinit. cap. 2. sect. 5. p. 20. But he does not prove from this passage, that the author of the Asclepian dialogue was a Christian, but merely gives it to be understood generally that his doctrine "savours of the pure fictions of the Platonists." Which on the whole is right; although Petavius, who imprudently follows in the footsteps of Lactantius and Augustine, wrongly applies Asclepius' passage to the Son of God.

[7] The meaning of this passage of Philo respecting the divine nature, and the source

Λόγος, expressly calls it δεύτερον θεὸν and πρωτόγονον υἱὸν θεοῦ, "the second God" and "the first-begotten Son of God." Notwithstanding which, those writings of Philo's are not at all suspected. And Origen affirms, that some of the ancient philosophers did the like:* Multi philosophorum veterum, unum esse deum, qui cuncta crearit, dixerunt; atque in hoc consentiunt legi. Aliquanti autem hoc adjiciunt, quod Deus cuncta per verbum suum fecerit et regat, et verbum Dei sit, quo cuncta moderentur; in hoc non solùm legi, sed et evangelio quoque consona scribunt, "Many of the old philosophers (that is, all besides a few atheistic ones) have said, that there is one God who created all things, and these agree with the law: but some add further, that God made all things by his Word, and that it is the Word of God, by which all things are governed; and these write consonantly not only to the law, but also to the gospel." But whether Philo derived this doctrine from the Greek philosophers, or from Egyptians and Hermes Trismegist, he being an Alexandrian, may well be a question. For St. Cyril† doth indeed cite several passages out of Hermaic writings then extant, to this very purpose. We shall only set down one of them here: Ὁ κόσμος ἔχει ἄρχοντα ἐπικείμενον δημιουργὸν λόγον τοῦ πάντων δεσπότου, ὃς μετ' ἐκεῖνον πρώτη δύναμις, ἀγέννητος, ἀπέραντος, ἐξ ἐκείνου προκύψασα, καὶ ἐπίκειται, καὶ ἄρχει τῶν δι' αὐτοῦ δημιουργηθέντων· ἔστι δὲ τοῦ παντελείου πρόγονος καὶ τέλειος καὶ γόνιμος υἱός, "The world hath a governor set over it, that Word of the Lord of all, which was the maker of it; this is the first power after himself, uncreated, infinite, looking out from him, and ruling over all things that were made by him; this is the perfect and genuine son of the first omniperfect Being." Nevertheless the author of the τέλειος λόγος, or Asclepian Dialogue, in that forecited passage of his, by his second God, the son of the first, meant no such thing at all as the Christian Logos, or second person of the Trinity, but only the visible world. Which is so plain from the words themselves, that it is a wonder how Lactantius and St. Austin could interpret them otherwise, he making therein a question, whether this second God were [actively] sensible or no. But the same is farther manifested from other places of that dialogue, as this for example: Æternitatis Dominus Deus primus est, secundus est mundus, "The Lord of eternity is the first God, but the second God is the world." And again: Summus qui dicitur Deus rector gubernatorque sensibilis Dei, ejus qui in se complectitur omnem locum,

from whence he obtained it, has in our time been inquired into by no one more learnedly than by the acute J. Le Clerc: see his Comm. in 18. priora Commata Evangelii Johannis in Hammond's N. T. t. 1. p. 396. and Epistolar. Criticar. 8. p. 223. For the present we have no opportuuity of canvassing the subject.

* In Gen. Hom. 14. † Con. Jul. lib. 1. p. 33.

omnemque rerum substantiam, "The supreme God is the governor of that sensible God, which contains in it all place and all the substance of things." And that this was indeed a part of the Hermaic or Egyptian theology, that the visible world animated was a second God, and the son of the first God, appears also from those Hermaic books published by Ficinus, and vulgarly called Pœmander, though that be only the first of them. There hath been one passage already cited out of the eighth book: Δεύτερος θεὸς ὁ κόσμος, "The world is a second God." After which followeth more to the same purpose: Πρῶτος γὰρ πάντων ὄντως, ἀΐδιος καὶ ἀγέννητος, καὶ δημιουργὸς τῶν ὅλων θεός. δεύτερος δὲ ὁ κατ' εἰκόνα αὐτοῦ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ γενόμενος καὶ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ συνεχόμενος καὶ τρεφόμενος καὶ ἀθανατιζόμενος ὡς ὑπ' ἰδίου πατρὸς, "The first God is that eternal unmade maker of all things; the second is he that is made according to the image of the first, which is contained, cherished or nourished and immortalized by him, as by his own parent, by whom it is made an immortal animal." So again in the ninth book: Πατὴρ ὁ θεὸς τοῦ κόσμου, καὶ ὁ μὲν κόσμος υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ, "God is the father of the world, and the world is the son of God." And in the twelfth: Ὁ δε σύμπας κόσμος οὗτος ὁ μέγας θεὸς καὶ τοῦ μείζονος εἰκὼν, "This whole world is a great God and the image of a greater."[8]

[8] Dr. Cudworth correctly explains Hermes' meaning, which Lactantius and Augustine, in their too great zeal to find mention of our Saviour in ancient records, altogether corrupt and pervert. This had already been observed by the eminent scholar Herm. Conringius, De Hermetica Ægyptior. Medicina, cap. 5. p. 40. 41. but whether or not this book was known to the learned Doctor at the time of writing this, I cannot tell. As to the Asclepian dialogue in question, Dr. Cudworth is right in maintaining that it was written by some one imbued with pagan principles. The whole book proclaims this, being full of the foulest superstitions, and exhibiting an incredible reverence for statues and the fictitious gods of the ancients. Nor do the learned Marsil. Ficinus, Herm. Conringius, J. Henr. Ursinus, J. Alb. Fabricius, and others, entertain a different opinion. It will also be taken for granted, I suppose, that its author was an Egyptian; indeed, among other things, the very name of Hermes, under which he wished to shelter himself, would seem to indicate as much. But I confess myself at a loss to understand how we are to infer from thence what the learned Doctor seems to suppose, that this Asclepian dialogue was written previously to the introduction of the Christian religion. I certainly can hardly persuade myself, that before the birth of our Saviour there was any one among the Pagans in Egypt, who by the inspiration of God, or some evil spirit foretold the destruction and overthrow of the pagan religions. On which account I prefer the opinion of Ursinus and Fabricius, Biblioth. Græc. lib. 1. cap. 8. p. 56. who consider this book to have been composed by some friend of the ancient worship after the passing of the acts against the pagans. There are numerous phrases occurring in it which savour of the Christian religion, so as clearly to demonstrate that its author was by no means a stranger to the sacred books of the new covenant. Moreover, in more instances than one, mention is made of the laws enacted for the suppression of the pagan worship: Alienigenis enim, he says, among other things, regionem istam terramque complentibus, non solum neglectus religionum, sed, quod est durius, quasi de legibus a religione, pietate, cultuque divino statuetur, *præscripta pœna*, prohibitio, "For this country being filled by foreigners, not only is there neglect of religions, but what is more painful, religion, piety, and divine worship are interdicted as it were by penal laws." And in another place: Capitale periculum constituetur in eum, qui se mentis religioni dederit, "A capital charge will be brought against him who devotes

As for the other Hermetic or Trismegistic books, published partly by Ficinus and partly by Patricius, we cannot confidently condemn any of them for Christian cheats or impostures; save only the Pœmander, and the Sermon in the mount concerning regeneration, the first and thirteenth of Ficinus' chapters or books. Neither of which books are cited by any of the ancient fathers, and therefore may be presumed not to have been extant in Jamblichus' time, but more lately forged; and that probably by one and the self-same hand, since the writer of the latter (the Sermon in the mount) makes mention of the former (that is, the Pœmander) in the close of it. For that, which Casaubon objects against the fourth of Ficinus' books or chapters (entitled the Crater), seems not very considerable, it being questionable whether by the Crater any such thing were there meant, as the Christian Baptisterion.[9] Wherefore, as for all the rest of those Hermaic books, especially such of them as being cited by ancient fathers may be presumed to have been extant before Jamblichus' time; we know no reason why we should not concur with that learned philosopher in his judgment concerning them, that though they often speak the language of philosophers, and were not written by Hermes Trismegist himself, yet they do really contain δόξας Ἑρμαϊκὰς, "Hermaical opinions," or the "Egyptian doctrine." The ninth of Ficinus' books mentions the Asclepian dialogue, under the Greek title of ὁ τέλειος λόγος, pretending to have been written by the same hand: Χθὲς ὦ Ἀσκλήπιε, τὸν τέλειον ἀποδέδωκα Λόγον, νῦν δὲ ἀναγκαῖον ἡγοῦμαι ἀκόλουθον ἐκείνῳ καὶ τὸν περὶ αἰσθήσεως λόγον διεξελθεῖν. The meaning

himself to the rational religion." I know of no period to which this can be more conveniently referred than to that in which the Greek emperors not only filled Egypt with foreign soldiers and Greek colonists, but decreed punishments against those that should refuse to abandon the superstitions of their ancestors. Nor will any one not unacquainted with sacred history find it difficult to conjecture the reason that could induce a pagan to forge such a book. The Christians, that they might render the Egyptians more favourable to their own worship, wrote certain books under the name of Hermes, a name held in the highest reverence in Egypt, in order to persuade that people, that those who joined the Christians adopted not so much a new doctrine as the ancient religion of Hermes. To counteract this fraud, a zealous supporter of the old religion had recourse to a similar fallacy; and, adopting the same name, wrote another book with the design to keep men in their former faith. The like is my opinion respecting some other Hermetic books, which exhibit evident traces of pagan superstitions. However, the author of this book does not appear to have been too well versed in the philosophy which then flourished in Egypt. Certainly he discourses somewhat crudely, when he calls this visible world *the second God*, and *the Son of God*; an opinion which the Egyptian philosophers of that period were far from entertaining. They indeed called the world *the second God* and *the Son of God*, but not the visible world; meaning that which is cognizable to the mind only, namely, the *intelligible world*, which Philo calls *divine reason*. See Philo Περὶ Κοσμοποιΐας, p. 6. opp. and of the later Platonists, Plotinus, Ennead. 5. lib. 5. cap. 3. p. 322. &c. It would seem, therefore, that he either did not rightly comprehend the opinion of the principal Egyptian philosophers of that day, or had espoused the doctrines of one of the minor and less important sects.

[9] See Fabricius' Biblioth. Græc. lib. 1. cap. 7. sect. 5. p. 51.

of which place (not understood by the translator) is this: "I lately published (O Asclepius) the book entitled Ὁ Τέλειος Λόγος, (or the perfect oration) and now I judge it necessary, in pursuit of the same, to discourse concerning sense." Which book, as well as the perfect oration, is cited by Lactantius.[10] As is also the tenth of Ficinus, called the Clavis, which does not only pretend to be of kin to the ninth, and consequently to the Asclepius likewise, but also to contain in it an epitome of that Hermaic book called Τὰ Γενικὰ, mentioned in Eusebius' Chronicon:[1] Τὸν πρὸ τούτου λόγον, ὦ Ἀσκλήπιε, σοὶ ἀνέθηκα, τὸν δὲ σήμερον δίκαιόν ἐστι τῷ Τατ. ἀναθεῖναι, ἐπεὶ καὶ τῶν Γενικῶν Λόγων, τῶν πρὸς αὐτὸν λελαλημένων, ἔστιν ἐπιτομή, "My former discourse was dedicated to thee, O Asclepius, but this to Tatius, it being an epitome of those Genica that were delivered to him." Which Γενικὰ are thus again afterwards mentioned in the same book: Οὐκ ἤκουσας ἐν τοῖς Γενικοῖς, ὅτι ἀπὸ μιᾶς ψυχῆς τῆς τοῦ παντὸς πᾶσαι αἱ ψυχαί εἰσιν, "Have you not heard in the Genica, that all souls are derived from one soul of the universe?" Neither of which two places were understood by Ficinus. But doubtless this latter Hermaic book had something foisted into it, because there is a manifest contradiction found therein; forasmuch as that transmigration of human souls into brutes, which in the former part thereof is asserted after the Egyptian way, ὡς καταδίκη ψυχῆς κακῆς, "as the just punishment of the wicked," is afterwards cried down and condemned in it, as the greatest error. And the eleventh and twelfth following books seem to us to be as Egyptian as any of the rest; as also does that long book entitled κόρη κόσμου, the thirteenth in Patricius. Nay, it is observable that even those very books themselves that are so justly suspected and condemned for Christian forgeries, have something of the Hermaical or Egyptian philosophy here and there interspersed in them. As for example, when in the Pœmander, God is twice called, ἀρρενόθηλυς, "male and female together," this seems to have been Egyptian (and derived from thence by Orpheus), according to that elegant passage in the Asclepian dialogue concerning God: Hic ergo, qui solus est omnia, utriusque sexûs fœcunditate plenissimus, semper voluntatis suæ prægnans, parit semper, quicquid voluerit procreare, "He therefore, who alone is all things, and most full of the fecundity of both sexes, being always pregnant of his own will, always produceth whatsoever he pleaseth." Again, when death is thus described in it, παραδιδόναι τὸ σῶμα εἰς ἀλλοίωσιν καὶ τὸ εἶδος, ὃ εἶχες, εἰς ἀφανὲς γίνεσθαι, "to be nothing else but the change of the body, and the form or life's passing into the invisible:" this

[10] See Divin. Instit. lib. 2. cap. 15. p. 254. where the passage occurs, quoted from the Hermetic book entitled Περὶ Αἰσθήσεως.

[1] See Scaliger, Ad Græca Eusebii, p. 409. On the Hermetic *Genica* consult Fabricius' Biblioth. Græc. lib. 1. cap. 11. p. 78.

agreeth with that in the eleventh book or chapter: Τὴν μεταβολὴν θάνατον εἶναι, διὰ τὸ μὲν σῶμα διαλύεσθαι, τὴν δὲ ζωὴν εἰς τὸ ἀφανὲς χωρεῖν, "That death is nothing but a change, it being only the dissolution of the body, and the life or soul's passing into the invisible or inconspicuous." In which book it is also affirmed of the world: Γίνεσθαι μέρος αὐτοῦ καθ' ἑκάστην, ἡμέραν ἐν τῷ ἀφανεῖ, "That every day, some part or other of it goes into the invisible, or into Hades;" that is, does not utterly perish, but only disappears to our sight, it being either translated into some other place, or changed into another form. And accordingly, it is said of animals, in the twelfth book, διαλύεται οὐχ ἵνα ἀπόληται, ἀλλ' ἵνα νέα γένηται, "that they are dissolved by death, not that they might be destroyed, but made again anew." As it is also there affirmed of the world, that it doth πάντα ποιεῖν καὶ εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἀποποιεῖν, "make all things out of itself, and again unmake them into itself; καὶ διαλύων πάντα ἀνανεοῖ, "and that dissolving all things, it doth perpetually renew them." For that nothing in the whole world utterly perisheth, as it is often declared elsewhere in these Trismegistic writings, so particularly in this twelfth book of Ficinus: Σύμπας ὁ κόσμος ἀμετάβλητος, τὰ δὲ μέρη αὐτοῦ πάντα μεταβλητὰ, οὐδὲν δὲ φθαρτὸν ἢ ἀπολλύμενον, "The whole world is unchangeable, only the parts of it being alterable; and this so, as that none of these neither utterly perisheth, or is absolutely destroyed: Πῶς μέρος τι δύναται φθαρῆναι τοῦ ἀφθάρτου, ἢ ἀπολέσαι τι τοῦ θεοῦ, "For how can any part of that be corrupted, which is incorruptible, or any thing of God perish or go to nothing?" all which, by Casaubon's leave, we take to have been originally Egyptian doctrine, and thence in part afterwards transplanted into Greece. Moreover, when in the Pœmander, God is styled more than once, φῶς καὶ ζωὴ, "light and life," this seems to have been Egyptian also, because it was Orphical. In like manner, the appendix to the Sermon in the mount, called ὑμνωδία κρυπτὴ, or the "occult cantion," hath some strains of the Egyptian theology in it, which will be afterwards mentioned.[2]

[2] No one in his senses can doubt, that all these doctrines were known and publicly professed among the Egyptians at the time when the Hermetic books were written. But what should induce us to believe, that they not only flourished in Egypt in the very earliest times, but even first sprung up in that country and were propagated from thence into Greece, I am at a loss to find out. They were as well held by other philosophers, who had never visited Egypt; nor are they such doctrines, indeed, as could not enter the mind of any one without the aid of an Egyptian or other master. I will frankly state the opinion I have myself arrived at respecting the motives of those who wrote the Hermetic books. The principal reason then for prefixing the name of Hermes to these books, was to make others believe that their doctrines were of the greatest antiquity and belonged to Hermes himself. The Platonists, to whom I consider some of these books to belong, adopted the name, in order to show that this most ancient philosopher was a stranger to the principles inculcated by the Christians and favoured the worship of many gods. While the Christians, on the other hand, in putting forth books under the name of Hermes, were actuated solely by the wish to make him appear

The result of our present discourse is this, that though some of the Trismegistic books were either wholly counterfeited, or else had certain suppositititious passages inserted into them by some Christian hand, yet there being others of them originally Egyptian, or which, as to the substance of them, do contain Hermaical or Egyptian doctrines (in all which one supreme Deity is every where asserted), we may well conclude from hence, that the Egyptians had an acknowledgment amongst them of one supreme Deity. And herein several of the ancient fathers have gone before us; as first of all Justin Martyr:[3] Ἄμμων πάγκρυφον τὸν θεὸν ὀνομάζει, Ἑρμῆς δὲ σαφῶς καὶ φανερῶς λέγει, θεὸν νοῆσαι μέν ἐστι χαλεπὸν, φράσαι δὲ ἀδύνατον, "Ammon in his books calleth God most hidden, and Hermes plainly declareth, that it is hard to conceive God, but impossible to express him." Neither doth it follow that this latter passage is counterfeit, as Casaubon concludes, because there is something like it in Plato's Timæus, there being doubtless a very great agreement betwixt Platonism and the ancient Egyptian doctrine. Thus again, St. Cyprian:* "Hermes quoque Trismegistus unum Deum loquitur, eumque ineffabilem et inæstimabilem confitetur, "Hermes Trismegist also acknowledgeth one God, confessing him to be ineffable and inestimable;" which passage is also cited by St. Austin.[4] Lactantius, likewise:† Thoth antiquissimus et instructissimus omni genere Doctrinæ, adeò ut ei multarum rerum et artium scientia Trismegisti cognomen imponeret; hic scripsit libros et quidem multos, ad cognitionem divinarum rerum pertinentes, in quibus majestatem summi et singularis Dei asserit, iisdemque nominibus appellat, quibus nos, Deum et patrem. Ac nè quis nomen ejus requireret; ἀνώνυμον esse dixit. "Thoth (that is, Hermes) the most ancient and

to have been of their own creed. This, in my opinion, is evident from the fact, that few of the Egyptians approved of all the opinions contained in these books. Besides, had they been public doctrines, what necessity would there have been for ascribing them to Hermes and seeking, as it were, the protection of his name? Wherefore, we ought, I conceive, to be very cautious before deciding thus: "This occurs in the Hermetic books; therefore it is an Egyptian dogma." Some, perhaps, will consider the contrary to be more true and will come rather to this conclusion: "This is found in the Hermetic books; therefore it was not a dogma of the Egyptians, but a later invention, and foisted into the commentitious volumes, in order to make it more readily pass as Hermetic." I would not say, that some old maxims of the Egyptians are not everywhere to be met with in these books; for, as I have stated above, the object itself of these impostors required that they should temper their own opinions with some admixture of ancient doctrines. But it requires, I contend, at the same time, that we should not immediately admit as Egyptian everything held forth as such by the Hermetic books, nor is any one, I consider, in the present day, so skilled in matters of Egyptian antiquity, as to be able to distinguish what are really Egyptian from those which falsely bear that name.

[3] Cohort. ad Græcos, p. 37. opp. This saying of Hermes respecting God occurs in the beginning of his Epistle to That. See Casaubon's Exerc. in Baronium, p. 62.

* De Idol. van. [p. 226. opp.]

[4] De Baptismo contra Donatistas, lib. 6. sect. 87. p. 126. tom. 9. opp.

† Lib. 1. p. 30. [Divin. Instit. cap. 6. p. 42.]

most instructed in all kind of learning (for which he was called Trismegist) wrote books, and those many, belonging to the knowledge of divine things, wherein he asserts the majesty of one supreme Deity, calling him by the same names that we do, God and Father; but (lest any one should require a proper name of him) affirming him to be anonymous." Lastly, St. Cyril[5] hath much more to the same purpose also: and we must confess that we have the rather here insisted so much upon these Hermaic or Trismegistic writings, that in this particular we might vindicate these ancient fathers from the imputation either of fraud and imposture, or of simplicity and folly.

But that the Egyptians acknowledged, besides their many gods, one supreme and all-comprehending Deity, needs not to be proved from these Trismegistic writings (concerning which we leave others to judge as they find cause), it otherwise appearing, not only because Orpheus (who was an undoubted assertor of monarchy, or one first principle of all things) is generally affirmed to have derived his doctrine from the Egyptians; but also from plain and express testimonies. For besides Apollonius Tyanæus' affirmation concerning both Indians and Egyptians,* before cited, Plutarch throughout his whole book, De Iside et Osiride, supposes the Egyptians thus to have asserted one supreme Deity, they commonly calling him, *τὸν πρῶτον Θεὸν*, "the first God." Thus in the beginning of that book he tells us, that the end of all the religious rites and mysteries of that Egyptian goddess, Isis, was, *ἡ τοῦ πρωτου, καὶ κυρίου, καὶ νοητοῦ γνῶσις, ὃν ἡ Θεὸς παρακαλεῖ ζητεῖν παρ' αὐτῆ καὶ μετ' αὐτῆς ὄντα καὶ συνόντα*, "the knowledge of that first God, who is the Lord of all things, and only intelligible by the mind, whom this goddess exhorteth men to seek, in her communion." After which he declareth, that this first God of the Egyptians was accounted by them an obscure and hidden Deity, and accordingly he gives the reason why they made the crocodile to be a symbol of him:† *Μόνου δέ φασιν ἐν ὑγρῷ διαιτουμένου, τὰς ὄψεις ὑμένα λεῖον καὶ διαφανῆ παρακαλύπτειν, ἐκ τοῦ μετώπου κατερχόμενον, ὥστε βλέπειν μὴ βλεπόμενον· ὃ τῷ πρώτῳ Θεῷ συμβέβηκεν*, "Because they say the crocodile is the only animal which, living in the water, hath his eyes covered by a thin transparent membrane, falling down over them, by reason whereof it sees and is not seen; which is a thing that belongs to the first God, to see all things, himself being not seen." Though Plutarch in that place gives also another reason why the Egyptians made the crocodile a symbol of the Deity: *Οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ ὁ κροκόδειλος αἰτίας πιθάνης ἀμοιροῦσαν ἔσχηκε τιμὴν, ἀλλὰ μίμημα Θεοῦ λέγεται γεγονέναι μόνος μὲν ἄγλωσσος ὤν· φωνῆς γὰρ ὁ Θεῖος λόγος ἀπροσδεής ἐστι, καὶ*

[5] Lib. i. contra Julianum, p. 31. * Page 269. † Page 381.

δι' ἀψόφου βαίνων κελεύθου καὶ δίκης, τὰ θνητὰ ἄγει κατὰ δίκην, "Neither were the Egyptians without a plausible reason for worshipping God symbolically in the crocodile, that being said to be an imitation of God, in that it is the only animal without a tongue. For the divine λόγος, or reason, standing not in need of speech, and going on through a silent path of justice in the world, does without noise righteously govern and dispense all human affairs." In like manner, Horus Apollo in his Hieroglyphics[6] tells us, that the Egyptians, acknowledging a παντοκράτωρ and κοσμοκράτωρ, "an omnipotent being that was the governor of the whole world," did symbolically represent him by a serpent: Ἐν μέσῳ αὐτοῦ οἶκον μέγαν δεικνύοντες, ὁ γὰρ βασίλειος οἶκος αὐτοῦ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ, "They picturing also a great house or palace within its circumference, because the world is the royal palace of the Deity." Which writer also gives us another reason, why the serpent was made to be the hieroglyphic of the Deity:[7] Τὸ ὡς τροφῇ χρῆσθαι τῷ ἑαυτοῦ σώματι, σημαίνει, τὸ

[6] The passage here cited occurs lib. 1. cap. 61. p. 75. But I consider it to be erroneously referred to God. For in this and some other chapters Horus, whoever he may be, is treating of the images, not of God, but of good or bad kings. The title of the chapter is this: Πῶς μηνύουσι κοσμοκράτορα; and the magnificence of the word κοσμοκράτωρ led the learned doctor to suppose that the supreme Being was meant. But κοσμοκράτωρ in Horus has no such august sense, denoting merely a far-ruling king. This is sufficiently evident from the beginning of the chapter, where the word βασιλεὺς is combined with it, the better to define the subject of discourse: Πάλιν δὲ τὸν βασιλέα κοσμοκράτορα νομίζοντες καὶ μηνύοντες, αὐτὸν μὲν ὄφιν ζωγραφοῦσιν, which are manifestly to be rendered thus: "Again, when they wish to denote a most powerful and far-ruling king, they in like manner picture a serpent." Therefore the remark of Jo. Corn. de Pau, in his notes on the passage, p. 346. is a just one, that κόσμος in this name is the same as οἰκουμένη. Moreover, the learned Doctor translates the Greek words, which are evidently corrupt and mutilated, agreeably to his own opinion, but not according to their true meaning. The words of Horus are: Ὁ γὰρ βασιλεῖος οἶκος, παρ' αὐτοῦ—ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ, which cannot, as far as I know, be properly translated: "Because the world is the royal palace of the Deity." Jo. Mercerus, in his notes thereon, p. 188. thought that the word κυβερνᾶται or ὑπάρχει has been dropped, and therefore rendered the passage: Regia enim domus, quæ ab eo regitur, in mundo est, "For the royal house which he rules is in the world;" which, however, gives manifestly but a meagre and almost puerile sense. Wherefore, a recent editor of Horus, dissatisfied with this explanation, has entered upon a new path, considering that the passage should be restored as follows: Ὁ γὰρ βασιλεῖος οἶκος παρ' αὐτοῦ κράτος ἐστὶν ὁ κόσμος, "For the royal house, according to the extent of his power, is the habitable world." But this conjecture also seems to be somewhat harsh. Indeed I see no reason for disputing, as to how this corrupt passage should be restored, when the sense is obvious without any emendation. According to this author, the serpent is with the Egyptians the symbol of a king. Within the circumference of this serpent they place a house, when they wish to denote a king ruling over almost the whole world. This house therefore is the image of the world. Which gives us this sense: "For the royal palace of such a king is the world itself." Here every thing is smooth and easy. Whether the word παντοκράτωρ implied God, we shall see presently.

[7] The passage is in lib. 1. cap. 2. p. 5. But in my opinion the learned Doctor is again wrong in referring it to the matter in hand. Horus in this chapter is not showing how the Egyptians pictured the Deity, but explaining what hieroglyphic they made use of to represent the world. "The Egyptians," he says, "to represent the world, paint a serpent feeding on its own tail." In the words here quoted, therefore,

πάντα ὅσα ἐκ τῆς θείας προνοίας ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ γεννᾶται, ταῦτα πάλιν καὶ τὴν μείωσιν εἰς αὐτὸν λαμβάνειν, "Because the serpent feeding as it were upon its own body, doth aptly signify, that all things generated in the world by divine providence are again resolved into him." And Philo Byblius,[8] from Sanchoniathon, gives the same reason why the serpent was deified by Taut, or the Egyptian Hermes: Ὅτι ἀθάνατον καὶ εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἀναλύεται, "Because it is immortal, and resolved into itself." Though sometimes the Egyptians added to the serpent also a hawk, thus complicating the hieroglyphic of the Deity; according to that of a famous Egyptian priest in Eusebius:[9] Τὸ πρῶτον ὂν θειότατον ὄφις ἐστὶν, ἱέρακος ἔχων μορφὴν, "That the first and divinest being of all is symbolically represented by a serpent having the head of a hawk." And that a hawk was also sometimes used alone for a hieroglyphic of the Deity, appeareth from that of Plutarch,[10] that in the porch of an Egyptian temple at Sais, were engraven these three hieroglyphics, a young man, an old man, and a hawk; to make up this sentence, "that both the beginning and end of human life dependeth upon God, or providence." But we have two more remarkable passages in the forementioned Horus Apollo,[1] concerning the Egyptian theology,

he is assigning the reason, why the Egyptians so represent the world, namely, to show that all things are generated out of the matter of the world and return to it again.

[8] In Eusebius, Præpar. Evangel. lib. 1. cap. 10. p. 41.

[9] Præpar. Evangel. lib. 1. cap. 10. p. 41.

[10] De Iside et Osiride, p. 363. t. 2. opp. The interpretation of these figures, which is given here as though it occurred in Plutarch, is due to the Doctor's own ingenuity rather than to that author. For Plutarch merely says, that *a child* and *an old man* denote beginning and end, *a hawk* God.

[1] The former occurs lib. 1. cap. 64. p. 77. which chapter is inscribed: Πῶς παντοκράτορα, id est, σημαίνουσιν. But Horus says, that the παντοκράτωρ, as he calls him, is represented among the Egyptians by the image of an entire serpent: and then subjoins the words here quoted. Of which J. Corn. de Pau, in his notes on the passage, p. 346. supposes this to be the sense: Ita apud eos anguis symbolum est spiritus per totum universum sese diffundentis, "Thus, according to them, a serpent is the symbol of a spirit diffused through the whole universe." Although I have no objection to this interpretation, I cannot refrain from adding, however, that this author is altogether very trifling and insignificant, and not only ignorant of philosophical and just order, but at the same time so intricate and uncouth generally in his phraseology as to make his meaning in many places exceedingly doubtful and uncertain. The interpretations, too, which he gives of the Egyptian figures, are so forced, so pointless, in short, so foreign to the things themselves, that it is very clear, if the Egyptians really had a symbolical system of philosophy, he is not the man from whom we are to learn it. What the παντοκράτωρ may be, which he speaks of in this chapter, as denoted by the figure of an entire serpent, is likewise altogether uncertain. Dr. Cudworth, with whom the recent editor concurs, does not doubt but that the word is meant to denote God. While J. Mercerus translates it: late rerum potens, "far-ruling." If Horus were an author who expressed himself with propriety and accuracy, I should incline to the former opinion. For I am aware, that this epithet belongs and is applied pre-eminently to God. See J. Casp. Suicer, Thesaur. Ecclesiastic. t. 2. p. 562. But as the diction of this writer is so remote from all propriety and words are so strangely misapplied by him, I do not know whether we ought not to prefer that of Mercerus. What certainly makes very much for his opinion is, that the antecedent chapters treat exclusively of human kings, and in those which follow there is no mention of divine

which must not be prætermitted; the first this: Παρ' *αὐτοῖς τοῦ παντὸς κόσμου τὸ διῆκόν ἐστι πνεῦμα*, "That according to them, there is a spirit passing through the whole world, to wit, God." And again: *Δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς δίχα θεοῦ μηδὲν ὅλως συνεστᾶναι*, "It seemeth to the Egyptians, that nothing at all consists without God." In the next place, Jamblichus was a person who had made it his business to inform himself thoroughly concerning the theology of the Egyptians, and who undertakes to give an account thereof, in his answer to Porphyrius' epistle to Anebo, an Egyptian priest; whose testimony therefore may well seem to deserve credit. And he first gives us a summary account of their theology after this manner:[2] *Χωριστὸς, ἐξῃρημένος μετέωρος, καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὸν ὑπερηπλωμένος τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ δυνάμεών τε καὶ στοιχείων, ὁ τῆς γενέσεως καὶ φύσεως ὅλης καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς στοιχείοις δυνάμεων πασῶν, αἴτιος θεός· ἅτε δὴ ὑπερέχων τούτου, ἄϋλος καὶ ἀσώματος, καὶ ὑπερφυὴς, ἀγέννητός τε καὶ ἀμέριστος, ὅλος ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἀναφανεὶς, προηγεῖται πάντων τούτων, καὶ ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὰ ὅλα περιέχει, καὶ διότι μὲν συνείληφε πάντα, καὶ μεταδίδωσιν*, "That God, who is the cause of generation and the whole nature, and of all the powers in the elements themselves, is separate, exempt, elevated above, and expanded over, all the powers and elements in the world. For being above the world, and transcending the same, immaterial, and incorporeal, supernatural, unmade, indivisible, manifested wholly from himself, and in himself, he ruleth over all things, and in himself containeth all things. And because he virtually comprehends all things, therefore does he impart and display the same from himself." According to which excellent description of the Deity, it is plain, that the Egyptians asserting one God that comprehends all things, could not possibly suppose a multitude of self-existent deities. In which place also the same Jamblichus[3] tells us, that as the Egyptian hieroglyphic for material and corporeal things was mud or floating water, so they pictured God, in loto arbore sedentem super lutum; "sitting upon the lote-tree above the watery mud." Quod innuit Dei eminentiam altissimam, qua fit, ut nullo modo attingat lutum ipsum. Demonstratque Dei imperium intellectuale, quia loti arboris omnia

matters: from which it would appear, that this *παντοκράτωρ* also signifies a man possessing great power and subject to no law. Nor are examples of this signification wanting in the more modern Greek authors. But I decide nothing: nor perhaps will the obscurity and extreme carelessness of this writer's style admit of our deciding any thing. The other passage here quoted occurs lib. 1. cap. 13. p. 27.

[2] Jamblichus, De Myster. Ægyptior. sect. 7. cap. 2. p. 151. where the words occur in the inverse order to that in which they are here quoted. For those which are here placed at the beginning stand at the end of the passage in Jamblichus.

[3] Jamblichus ibid. p. 151. *Συμμαρτυρεῖ δὲ τοῦτο ὑπεροχήν τε καὶ τὴν ἰσχὺν μὴ ψαύουσαν μηδαμῶς τῆς ὕλης, καὶ ἡγεμονίαν νοερὰν καὶ ἐμπύριον ἐπιδείκνυται· κυκλότερα γὰρ πάντα ὁρᾶται τὰ τοῦ λωτοῦ, καὶ τὰ ἐν τοῖς φύλλοις εἴδη, καὶ τὰ ἐν τοῖς καρποῖς φαινόμενα.*

sunt rotunda, tam frondes quàm fructus, &c. "Which signifies the transcendent eminency of the Deity above the matter, and its intellectual empire over the world; because both the leaves and fruit of that tree are round, representing the motion of intellect." Again, he there adds also, that the Egyptians sometimes pictured God sitting at the helm of a ship.* But afterward in the same book, he sums up the queries which Porphyrius had propounded to the Egyptian priest, to be resolved concerning them, in this manner: Βούλει σοι δηλωθῆναι, τί τὸ πρῶτον αἴτιον ἡγοῦνται εἶναι Αἰγύπτιοι; πότερον νοῦν, ἢ ὑπὲρ νοῦν; καὶ μόνον, ἢ μετ' ἄλλου, ἢ ἄλλων; καὶ πότερον ἀσώματον, ἢ σωματικὸν; καὶ εἰ τῷ δημιουργῷ τὰ αὐτὰ, ἢ πρὸ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ; καὶ εἰ ἐξ ἑνὸς τὰ πάντα, ἢ ἐκ πολλῶν; καὶ εἰ ὕλην ἴσασιν, ἢ σώματα ποῖα πρῶτον; καὶ εἰ ἀγένητον ὕλην, ἢ γενητήν; "You desire to be resolved, what the Egyptians think to be the first cause of all; whether intellect or something above intellect? and that whether alone or with some other? whether incorporeal or corporeal? whether the first principle be the same with the demiurgus and architect of the world, or before him? whether all things proceed from one or many? whether they suppose matter, or qualified bodies, to be the first? and if they admit a first matter, whether they assert it to be unmade or made?" In answer to which Porphyrian queries, Jamblichus thus begins: Καὶ πρῶτον μὲν, ὃ πρῶτον ἠρώτησας, περὶ τούτου ἄκουε· πρὸ τῶν ὄντως ὄντων καὶ τῶν ὅλων ἀρχῶν ἐστι θεὸς εἷς· πρῶτος, καὶ τοῦ πρώτου θεοῦ καὶ βασιλέως, ἀκίνητος· ἐν μονότητι τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ἑνότητος μένων· οὔτε γὰρ νοητὸν αὐτῷ ἐπιπλέκεται, οὔτε ἄλλο τι, "I shall first reply to that you first demand, that, according to the Egyptians, before all entities and principles there is one God, who is in order of nature before (him that is commonly called) the first god and king; immoveable; and always remaining in the solitariety of his own unity, there being nothing intelligible, nor any thing else complicated with him," &c. In which words Jamblichus, and those others that follow after, though there be some obscurity (and we may perhaps have occasion further to consider the meaning of them elsewhere), yet he plainly declares, that according to the Egyptians, the first original of all things was a perfect unity above intellect; but intimating withal, that besides this first unity, they did admit of certain other divine hypostases (as a perfect intellect and mundane soul) subordinate thereunto, and dependent on it, concerning which he thus writeth afterwards:† Τὴν πρὸ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καὶ τὴν ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ ζωτικὴν δύναμιν γινώσκουσι, καθαρόν τε νοῦν ὑπὲρ τὸν κόσμον προτιθέασι, "The Egyptians acknowledge, before the heaven, and in the heaven, a living power (or soul), and again they place a pure

* Seg. 8. cap. 1.

† Cap. 4. p. 160.

mind or intellect above the world. But that they did not acknowledge a plurality of co-ordinate and independent principles is further declared by him after this manner:[5] Καὶ οὕτως ἄνωθεν ἄχρι τῶν τελευταίων ἡ περὶ ἀχρῶν Αἰγυπτίοις πραγματεία ἀφ' ἑνὸς ἄρχεται, καὶ πρόεισιν εἰς πλῆθος, τῶν πολλῶν αὖθις ἀφ' ἑνὸς διακυβερνωμένων, καὶ πανταχοῦ τῆς ἀορίστου φύσεως ἐπικρατουμένης ὑπό τινος ὡρισμένου μέτρου, καὶ τῆς ἀνωτάτω ἑνιαίας πάντων αἰτίας, "And thus the Egyptian philosophy, from first to last, begins from unity; and thence descends to multitude; the many being always governed by the one; and the infinite or undeterminate nature every where mastered and conquered by some finite and determined measure; and all ultimately by that highest unity, that is the first cause of all things." Moreover, in answer to the last Porphyrian question concerning matter, whether the Egyptians thought it to be unmade and self-existent or made, Jamblichus thus replies: Ὕλην δὲ παρήγαγεν ὁ θεὸς ἀπὸ οὐσιότητος ὑποσχισθείσης ὑλότητος, "That according to Hermes and the Egyptians, matter was also made or produced by God;" ab essentialitate succisâ ac subscissâ materialitate, as Scutellius turns it. Which passage of Jamblichus, Proclus upon the Timæus* (where he asserts that God was ἄῤῥητος αἰτία τῆς ὕλης, "the ineffable cause of matter") takes notice of in this manner: Καὶ ἡ τῶν Αἰγυπτίων παράδοσις τὰ αὐτὰ περὶ αὐτῆς φησιν· ὅ γέ τοι θεῖος Ἰαμβλίχος ἱστόρησεν, ὅτι καὶ Ἑρμῆς ἐκ τῆς οὐσιότητος τὴν ὑλότητα παράγεσθαι βούλεται, καὶ δὴ καὶ εἰκὸς κἀκ τούτου, τὸν Πλάτωνα τὴν τοιαύτην περὶ τῆς ὕλης δόξαν ἔχειν, "And the tradition of the Egyptians agreeth herewith, that matter was not unmade or self-existent, but produced by the Deity: for the divine Jamblichus has recorded, that Hermes would have materiality to have been produced from essentiality (that is, the passive principle of matter from that active principle of the Deity): and it is very probable from hence, that Plato was also of the same opinion concerning matter:" viz. because he is supposed to have followed Hermes and the Egyptians. Which indeed is the more likely, if that be

[5] These words occur sect. 8. cap. 3. p. 159. where are to be found also those immediately following on the origin of matter. Dr. Gale has translated the latter passage better than Scutellius: Deus materiam produxit dividendo materialitatem ab essentialitate, "God produced matter by dividing materiality from essentiality." These high sounding and obscure words, however, mean nothing more than what we at this day express more intelligibly thus: "The matter of all things emanated from the Deity or divine nature itself:" which the Platonists to whom Jamblichus belonged maintained to have been done from all eternity. But I would not form my estimate of the ancient doctrine of the Egyptians from this Jamblichus, initiated although he pretends to be in their hidden mysteries. For it was the custom of these Platonists to accommodate entirely to their own precepts whatever they could find anywhere recorded respecting the philosophy of antiquity, that the wisdom of all nations might appear to have fallen exclusively to their lot.

* Page 117.

true, which the same Proclus affirmeth concerning Orpheus: *ὥς τε καὶ Ὀρφεὺς κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἀπὸ τῆς πρωτίστης τῶν νοητῶν ὑποστάσεως παράγει τὴν ὕλην*, "that Orpheus also did, after the same manner, deduce or derive matter from the first hypostasis of intelligibles," that is, from the supreme Deity. We shall conclude here in the last place with the testimony of Damascius, in his book of Principles,[6] writing after this manner concerning the Egyptians: *Αἰγυπτίους δὲ ὁ μὲν Εὔδημος οὐδὲν ἀκριβὲς ἱστορεῖ· οἱ δὲ Αἰγύπτιοι καθ' ἡμᾶς φιλόσοφοι γεγονότες, ἐξήνεγκαν αὐτῶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν κεκρυμμένην, εὑρόντες ἐν Αἰγυπτίοις δή τισι λόγοις· ὡς εἴη κατ' αὐτοὺς ἡ μὲν μία τῶν ὅλων ἀρχὴ σκότος ἄγνωστον ὑμνουμένη, καὶ τοῦτο τρὶς ἀναφωνούμενον οὕτως*, "Eudemus hath given us no exact account of the Egyptians; but the Egyptian philosophers, that have been in our times, have declared the hidden truth of their theology, having found in certain Egyptian writings, that there was, according to them, one principle of all things, praised under the name of the unknown darkness, and that thrice repeated:" which unknown darkness is a description of that supreme Deity that is incomprehensible.

But that the Egyptians amongst their many gods did acknowledge one supreme, may sufficiently appear also, even from their vulgar religion and theology; in which they had first a peculiar and proper name for him as such. For as the Greeks called the supreme God Ζεὺς, the Latins Jupiter or Jovis, so did the Egyptians call him Hammon or Ammon, according to Herodotus,[7] whose testimony to this purpose hath been already cited, and confirmed by Origen,[8] who was an Egyptian born. Thus also Plutarch in his book De Iside:[9] *Τῶν πολλῶν νομιζόντων, ἴδιον παρ' Αἰγυπτίοις ὄνομα τοῦ Διὸς εἶναι, τὸν Ἀμοῦν, ὃ παράγοντες ἡμεῖς Ἄμμονα λέγομεν*, "It is supposed by most, that the proper name of Zeus or Jupiter (that is, the supreme Deity) amongst the Egyptians is Amous, which we Greeks pronounce Hammon." To the same purpose Hesychius: *Ἀμμοῦς ὁ Ζεὺς, Ἀριστοτελὴς*, "Ammous, according to Aristotle, is the same with Zeus." Whence it came to pass, that by the Latin writers Hammon was vulgarly called Jupiter Ammon. Which Hammon was not only used as a proper name for the supreme Deity by the Egyptians, but also by the Arabians and all the Africans, according to that of Lucan:[10]

[6] These words of Damascius are to be found among those extracted from this philosopher's unpublished work by J. Christ. Wolf, Anecdot. Græc. tom. 3. p. 260. But to this Damascius, I would apply the same that I have just remarked respecting Jamblichus.

[7] Histor. lib. 2. cap. 42. p. 105.

[8] Or rather Celsus in Origenes, Contra Celsum, lib. 5. p. 261.

[9] De Iside et Osiride, tom. 2. opp. p. 354.

[10] Pharsal. lib. 9. v. 517. 518.

Quamvis Æthiopum populis Arabumque beatis
Gentibus, atque Indis, unus sit Jupiter Ammon.

Wherefore not only Marmarica (which is a part of Africa, wherein was that most famous temple of this Ammon) was from thence denominated Ammonia, but even all Africa, as Stephanus informs us, was sometimes called Ammonis from this god Ammon, who hath been therefore styled Ζεὺς Λίβυκος, the Lybian Jupiter.[1]

Indeed it is very probable, that this word Hammon or Ammon was first derived from Ham or Cham, the son of Noah, whose posterity was chiefly seated in these African parts, and from whom Egypt was called, not only in the scripture, "the land of Ham," but also by the Egyptians themselves, as Plutarch testifieth, Χημεία, or Chemia, and as St. Jerome, Ham; and the Coptites also to this very day call it Chemi. Nevertheless this will not hinder, but that the word Hammon, for all that, might be used afterwards by the Egyptians, as a name for the supreme God, because, amongst the Greeks, Ζεὺς, in like manner, was supposed to have been at first the name of a man or hero, but yet afterwards applied to signify the supreme God. And there might be such a mixture of herology or history, together with theology, as well amongst the Egyptians as there was amongst the Greeks. Nay, some learned men conjecture,[3] and not without probability, that the Zeus of the Greeks also was really the very same with that Ham or Cham, the son of Noah, whom the Egyptians first worshipped as a hero or deified man; there being several considerable agreements and correspondencies between the poetic fables of Saturn and Jupiter, and the true scripture-story of Noah and Cham; as there is likewise a great affinity between the words themselves, for as Cham signifies heat or fervour, so is Ζεὺς derived by the Greek grammarians from ζέω. And thus will that forementioned testimony of Herodotus in some sense be verified, that the Greeks received the names of most of their gods, even of Ζεὺς himself, from the Egyptians.

Perhaps it may be granted also, that the sun was sometime worshipped by the Egyptians, under the name of Hammon;[4]

[1] These testimonies of the ancients are pursued to greater length by G. J. Vossius, De Origine ac Progressu Idololatriæ, lib. 2. cap. 11. p. 134. 135. and Sam. Bochart, Phaleg. lib. 1. cap. 1. p. 6. 7.

[2] This opinion was first broached by Sam. Bochart in his Phaleg, lib. 4. cap. 1. p. 204. 205. &c. and lib. 1. cap. 1. p. 6. 7. who has also given the authorities here quoted. Nor does the acute J. Marsham, Canon. Chronic. Ægypt. dissent from it.

[3] He alludes chiefly to Sam. Bochart, from whose Phaleg. lib. 1. cap. 1. p. 7. 8. the arguments here brought forward to prove the identity of Ham and Zeus are borrowed. In my opinion, Jac. Perizonius, Origin. Ægyptiac. cap. 5. p. 76. 77. justly repudiates this opinion.

[4] On this subject consult Vossius, De Origine ac Progressu Idololatriæ, lib. 2. cap. 2. p. 134. 135.

it having been in like manner sometimes worshipped by the Greeks under the name of Zeus. And the word very well agreeth herewith, חמה in the Hebrew language signifying not only heat, but the sun; from whence חמנים Chamanim also was derived. Nevertheless, it will not follow from hence, that therefore the visible sun was generally accounted by the Egyptians the supreme Deity, no more than he was amongst the Greeks: but, as we have often occasion to observe, there was in the Pagan religion a confused jumble of herology, physiology, and theology altogether. And that the notion of this Egyptian god Ammon was neither confined by them to the sun, nor yet the whole corporeal world or nature of the universe (as some have conceived), is evident from hence, because the Egyptians themselves interpreted it according to their own language, to signify that which was hidden and obscure, as both Manetho, an ancient Egyptian priest, and Hecatæus (who wrote concerning the philosophy of the Egyptians) in Plutarch agree:[5] Μανεθὼς μὲν ὁ Σεβεννίτης τὸ κεκρυμμένον οἴεται καὶ τὴν κρύψιν ὑπὸ ταύτης δηλοῦσθαι τῆς φωνῆς· Ἑκαταῖος δὲ Ἀβδηρίτης φησὶ τούτῳ καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους τῷ ῥήματι χρῆσθαι τοὺς Αἰγυπτίους, ὅταν τινὰ προσκαλοῦνται, προσκλητικὴν γὰρ εἶναι τὴν φωνήν· διὸ τὸν πρῶτον θεὸν, ὡς ἀφανῆ καὶ κεκρυμμένον ὄντα, προσκαλούμενοι καὶ παρακαλοῦντες ἐμφανῆ γενέσθαι καὶ δῆλον αὐτοῖς, Ἀμοῦν λέγουσι, "Manetho Sebennites conceives the word Amoun to signify that which is hidden; and Hecatæus affirmeth that the Egyptians use this word when they call any one to them that was distant or absent from them: wherefore, the first God, because he was invisible and hidden, they, as it were, inviting him to approach near, and to make himself manifest and conspicuous to them, call Amoun." And agreeably hereunto, Jamblichus[6] gives us this account of the true notion of this Egyptian god Ammon: Ὁ δημιουργικὸς νοῦς, καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας προστάτης, καὶ σοφίᾳ ἐρχόμενος μὲν ἐπὶ γένεσιν, καὶ τὴν ἀφανῆ τῶν κεκρυμμένων λόγων δύναμιν εἰς φῶς ἄγων, Ἀμῶν κατὰ τὴν τῶν Αἰγυπτίων γλῶσσαν λέγεται, "The demiurgical intellect, and president of truth, as with wisdom it proceedeth to generation, and produceth into light the secret and invisible powers of the hidden reasons, is, according to the Egyptian language, called Hammon." Wherefore, we may conclude, that Hammon, amongst the Egyptians, was not only

[5] De Isîde et Osiride, p. 354. tom. 2. opp. I am afraid, however, that in quoting this passage, our learned author has to a certain extent subserved his own cause. For he has omitted some words, which are confirmatory of the opinion rejected by him a little before, that the Egyptians held the whole nature of things to be the supreme and first God. Plutarch writes thus: Διὸ τὸν πρῶτον θεὸν τῷ παντὶ τὸν αὐτὸν νομίζουσιν, ὡς ἀφανῆ καὶ κεκρυμμένον ὄντα, "As the Egyptians consider the first God to be the same with the whole universe, they therefore invoke him as invisible and hidden." But compare what he remarks a little afterwards on these words.

[6] De Mysteriis Ægyptior. sect. 8. cap. 3. p. 159.

the name of the supreme Deity, but also of such a one as was hidden, invisible and incorporeal.

And here it may be worth our observing, that this Egyptian Hammon was in all probability taken notice of in scripture, though vulgar interpreters have not been aware thereof.[7] For thus we understand that of Jer. xlvi. 25. "The Lord of hosts, the God of Israel saith, behold I will אמון מנא (that is, not the multitude of Noe, but) Ammon (the God) of Noe, and Pharaoh and Egypt with her (other) gods and kings, and all that trust in him; I will deliver him into the hands of those that seek their lives, and into the hands of Nebuchadnezzar, king of Babylon." For the understanding of which place, we must observe, that according to the language of those ancient Pagans, when every country or city had their peculiar and proper names, for the gods presiding over them or worshipped by them, the several nations and places were themselves commonly denoted and signified by the names of those their respective gods. With which kind of language the scripture itself also complieth; as when the Moabites are called in it, "the people of Chemosh," Num. xxi. and when "the gods of Damascus are said to have smitten Ahaz," because the Assyrians smote him, 2 Chron. xxviii. Accordingly whereunto also, whatsoever was done or attempted against the several nations or countries, is said to have been done or attempted against their gods. Thus Moab's captivity is described, Jer. xlviii. "Thou shalt be taken, and Chemosh shall go into captivity." And the overthrow of Babylon is predicted after the same manner, in the prophecy of Isaiah, chap. xlvi. "Bell boweth down, Nebo stoopeth, themselves are gone into captivity." And also the same is threatened in that of Jeremiah, chap. li. "I will visit Bel in Babylon, and will bring out of his mouth that which he hath swallowed up, and the nations shall not flow unto him any more, for the wall of Babylon shall be broken down." Now Bel, according to Herodotus,[8] was a name for the supreme God amongst the Babylonians, as well as Ammon was amongst the Egyptians; who, notwithstanding by both of them was wor-

[7] This passage of Jeremiah had already been thus expounded by Sam. Bochart, Phaleg, lib. 1. cap. 1. p. 5. 6. Amon de No, id est, Deum Ammon, in cujus honorem consecratum fuit fanum in urbe No, "Amon of Noe, that is, the god Ammon, to whose honour a temple was dedicated in the city of No." But, to confess the truth, however ingenious this interpretation may be, I am more favourable to the one adopted by Hugo Grotius, Comm. in h. l. p. 258. and most other interpreters, who translate: "the multitude or people of the city of Noe." For it is only afterwards that mention is made of the gods, whom the Lord is about to deliver into the hands of their enemies; nor is it likely, that the holy prophet would separate at some interval the principal god from the others, that is, the father from his family.

[8] I do not recollect, where Herodotus has stated this. The learned Doctor probably meant Diodorus Siculus, who, Biblioth. Histor. lib. 2. p. 69. has these words: Διὰς, ὃν καλοῦσιν οἱ Βαβυλώνιοι Βῆλον, "Of the supreme God or Jupiter, whom the Babylonians call Belus."

shipped after an idolatrous manner. And therefore, as in these latter places, by the visiting and punishing of the Babylonians, so in that former place of Jeremiah, by the visiting of Ammon, and the gods of Egypt, is understood the visiting of the Egyptians themselves; accordingly as it is there also expressed. No was, it seems, the metropolis of all Egypt; and therefore Ammon the chief god of those ancient Egyptians, and of that city, was called Ammon of No. As likewise the city No is denominated from this god Ammon, in scripture, and called both No-Ammon and Ammon-No. The former in the prophecy of Nahum, chap. iii. "Art thou better than No-Ammon?" or that No in which the god Ammon is worshipped? Which is not to be understood of the oracle of Ammon in Marmarica, as some have imagined[9] (they taking No for an appellative, and so to signify habitation;) it being unquestionably the proper name of a city in Egypt. The latter in that of Ezekiel, chap. xxx. "I will pour out my fury upon Sin, the strength of Egypt, and will cut off Hammon-No." In which place, as by Sin is meant Pelusium, so Hammon-No, by the Seventy, is interpreted Diospolis, the city of Jupiter; that is, the Egyptian Jupiter, Hammon. Which Diospolis was otherwise called the Egyptian Thebes, (anciently the metropolis of all Egypt) but whose proper name, in the Egyptian language, seems to have been No; which from the chief god there worshipped was called both No-Ammon and Hammon-No; as that god himself was also denominated from the city, Ammon of No. And this is the rather probable, because Plato[10] tells us expressly, that Ammon was anciently the proper or chief god of the Egyptian Thebes or Diospolis, where he speaks of Theuth or Thoth, the Egyptian Hermes, in these words: Βασιλέως δ' αὖ τότε ὄντος Αἰγύπτου ὅλης Θαμοῦ, περὶ τὴν μεγάλην πόλιν τοῦ ἄνω τόπου, ὃν οἱ Ἕλληνες Αἰγυπτίας Θήβας καλοῦσι, καὶ τῶν θεὸν Ἄμμωνα, "Thamus was then king over all Egypt, reigning in that great city (the metropolis thereof), which the Greeks call the Egyptian Thebes, and whose God was Ammon." But whereas the prophet Nahum (who seems to have written after the completion of that judgment upon No, predicted both by Jeremiah and Ezekiel) describes the place as situate among the rivers, and having the sea for its wall and rampart; whence many learned men[1] have concluded that this was rather to be understood of Alexandria than Diospolis, (notwitstanding that Alexandria was not then in being, nor built till a long while

[9] This is aimed at Gerh. J. Vossius, who has entered into an able defence of this opinion, De Origine ac Progressu Idololatr. lib. 1. cap. 32. p. 89. Dr. Cudworth has Bochart again on his side, Phaleg lib. 1. cap. 1. p. 6.

[10] In Phædro, p. 356. opp.

[1] The Chaldean interpreter, Drusius, St. Jerome, and many others: see Vossius, ibid. p. 89. who are opposed also by Bochart, ibid. p. 6. but on a different ground from that taken by the learned Doctor.

after, in Alexander the Great's time:) This may very well, as we conceive, be understood of Egypt in general, whose metropolis this No was; that was situate among the rivers, and had the seas for its wall and rampart, the Red and Mediterranean. And thus much for the Egyptian Jupiter, or their supreme Deity, called by them Hammon.

There is an excellent monument of Egyptian antiquity preserved by Plutarch[2] and others, from whence it may be made yet further evident, that the Egyptians did not suppose a multitude of unmade, self-existent deities, but acknowledged one supreme, universal, and all-comprehending Numen. And it is that inscription upon the temple at Sais: Ἐγώ εἰμι πᾶν τὸ γεγονὸς, καὶ ὂν, καὶ ἐσόμενον, καὶ τὸν ἐμὸν πέπλον οὐδεὶς πω θνητὸς ἀπεκάλυψεν, "I am all that hath been, is, and shall be, and my *peplum* or veil no mortal hath ever yet uncovered." Which though perhaps some would understand thus, as if that Deity therein described were nothing but the senseless matter of the whole corporeal universe, according to that opinion of Chæremon before mentioned and confuted; yet it is plain, that this could not be the meaning of this inscription: first, because the God here described is not a mere congeries of disunited matter, or aggregation of divided atoms, but it is some one thing, which was all: according to that other inscription upon an altar dedicated to the goddess Isis, which we shall also afterward make use of, Tibi, una, quæ es omnia; "To thee, who being one, art all things." Again, in the Deity here described, there is both a veil or outside, and also something hidden and recondite;* the sense seeming to be this, I am all that was, is, and shall be; and the whole world is nothing but myself veiled; but my naked and unveiled brightness no mortal could ever yet behold or comprehend. Which is just as if the sun should say, I am all the colours of the rainbow (whose mild and gentle light may easily be beheld), and they are nothing but my simple and uniform lustre, variously refracted and abated; but my immediate splendour and the brightness of my face no mortal can contemplate, without being either blinded or dazzled by it. Wherefore, this description of the Deity may seem not a little to resemble that description which God makes of himself to Moses, "Thou shalt see my back-parts, but my face shall not be seen." Where there is also something exterior and visible in the Deity, and something hidden and recondite, invisible and incomprehensible to mortals. And Philo[3] thus glosseth upon those words: Αὔταρκές ἐστι σοφῷ, τὰ ἀκόλουθα καὶ ὅσα μετὰ τὸν Θεὸν γνῶναι,

[2] De Iside et Osiride, p. 354. tom. 2. opp.

* Ἀφανὴς ἅμα καὶ ἐμφανὴς· Proclus of this Egyptian God, that it was both *invisible and manifest.* In Timæum, p. 30.

[3] De Profugis, p. 474. opp.

τήν δὲ ἡγεμονικὴν οὐσίαν ὁ βουλόμενος καταθεάσασθαι, τῷ περιαυγεῖ τῶν ἀκτίνων πρὶν ἰδεῖν πηρὸς ἔσται, "It is sufficient for a wise man to know God *à posteriori*, or from its effects; but whosoever will needs behold the naked essence of the Deity, will be blinded with the transcendent radiancy and splendour of his beams." Whereas, according to Philo, the works of God, as manifesting the attributes of his power, goodness, and wisdom, are called the back-parts of the Deity; so are they here in this inscription called the *peplum*, the veil and exterior garment of it, or else God himself veiled. Wherefore, it is plain that the Deity here described cannot be the mere visible and corporeal world as senseless and inanimate, that being all outside and exposed to the view of sense, and having nothing hidden or veiled in it. But thirdly, this will yet be more evident if we do but take notice of the name of this God which was here described, and to whom the temple was dedicated; and that was in the Egyptian language, Neith,* the same with Ἀθηνᾶ amongst the Greeks, and Minerva amongst the Latins; by which is meant wisdom or understanding: from whence it is plain that the inscription is to be understood not of such a God as was merely senseless matter (which is the god of the Atheists), but a mind. Athenagoras[4] tells us, that the pagan theologers interpreted τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν, or Minerva, to be τὴν φρόνησιν διὰ πάντων διήκουσαν, "wisdom or mind passing and diffusing itself through all things;" than which there cannot be a better commentary on this inscription. Wherefore, it may be here observed, that those Pagans who acknowledged God to be a mind, and incorporeal being secrete from matter, did notwithstanding frequently consider him not abstractedly by himself alone, but concretely together with the result of his whole fecundity, or as displaying the world for himself, and diffusing himself through all things, and being in a manner all things. Accordingly, we learned before from Horus Apollo that the Egyptians by God meant a spirit diffusing itself through the world, and intimately pervading all things; and that they supposed that nothing at all could consist without God. And after this manner, Jamblichus in his Mysteries[5] interprets the meaning of this Egyptian inscription: for when he had declared that the Egyptians did, both in their doctrine and their priestly hierurgies, exhort men to ascend above matter, to an incorporeal Deity, the maker of all, he adds: Ὑφηγήσατο δὲ καὶ

* Νηΐθας, in Procl. upon Plato's Tim. p. 30.

[4] Legat. pro Christianis, cap. 19. p. 86.

[5] De Mysteriis Ægyptior. sect. 8. cap. 5. p. 161. But I cannot see, how these words of Jamblichus explain the meaning of the inscription given in Plutarch. For, although Bithys be said to have interpreted to king Ammon the name of that god who pervades all things, this does not prove the supreme and principal deity of the Egyptians to be meant in that inscription. Neither is it shown by the mention of Sais in Jamblichus.

ταύτην τὴν ὁδὸν ὁ Ἑρμῆς, ἡρμήνευσε δὲ Βίθυς προφήτης Ἄμμωνι βασιλεῖ, ἐν ἀδύτοις εὑρὼν ἀναγεγραμμένην, ἐν ἱερογλυφικοῖς γράμμασι κατὰ Σάϊν τὴν ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ, τό τε τοῦ Θεοῦ ὄνομα παρέδωκε τὸ διῆκον δι' ὅλου τοῦ κόσμου, "Hermes also propounded this method, and Bithys, the prophet, interpreted the same to king Ammon, having found it written in hieroglyphic letters in the temple of Sais in Egypt; as he also there declared the name of that God, who extends or diffuses himself through the whole world." And this was Neith, or Athena, that god thus described, "I am all that was, is, and shall be, and my *peplum* or veil no mortal could ever uncover." Where we cannot but take notice also that whereas the Athena of the Greeks was derived from the Egyptian Neith,* that she also was famous for her *peplum* too, as well as the Egyptian goddess. *Peplum* (saith Servius) est propriè palla picta fœminea, Minervæ consecrata, "*Peplum* is properly a womanish pall or veil, embroidered all over, and consecrated to Minerva." Which rite was performed at Athens, in the great Panathenaics, with much solemnity, when the statue of this goddess was also by those noble virgins of the city, who embroidered this veil, clothed all over therewith. From whence we may probably conclude that the statue of the Egyptian Neith also, in the temple of Sais, had likewise, agreeably to its inscription, such a peplum or veil cast over it, as Minerva, or Artemis, at Athens had; this hieroglyphically to signify, that the Deity was invisible and incomprehensible to mortals, but had veiled itself in this visible corporeal world, which is, as it were, the peplum, the exterior variegated or embroidered vestment of the Deity. To all which considerations may be added, in the last place, what Proclus[6] hath recorded, that there was something more belonging to this Egyptian inscription, than what is mentioned by Plutarch; namely, these words: Καὶ ὃν ἔτεκον καρπὸν, ἥλιος ἐγένετο, "And the sun was the fruit or offspring, which I produced;" from whence it is manifest, that according to the Egyptians, the sun was not the supreme Deity, and that the god here described was, as Proclus also observeth, δημιουργικὴ θεὸς, "a demiurgical deity," the creator of the whole world, and of the sun. Which supreme incorporeal deity was notwithstanding, in their theology, said to be all things, because it diffused itself through all.[7]

* Μία τῶν δύο πόλεων ἔφορος τῆς τε Σάεως καὶ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν, "Sais and Athens had one and the same Tutelar God," Procl. in Tim. p. 30. Where also Theopompus affirms the Athenians to have been a colony of the Saites.

[6] It will be proper to quote Proclus' own words, as they differ somewhat from those of Plutarch, Comm. in Timæum Platonis, lib. 1. p. 30.: Αἰγύπτιοι δὲ ἱστοροῦντες, ἐν τῷ ἀδύτῳ τοῦ Θεοῦ προγεγραμμένον εἶναι τὸ ἐπίγραμμα τοῦτο· τὰ ὄντα, καὶ τὰ ἐσόμενα, καὶ τὰ γεγονότα ἐγώ εἰμι· τὸν ἐμὸν χιτῶνα οὐδεὶς ἀπεκάλυψεν, ὃν ἐγὼ καρπὸν ἔτεκον, ἥλιος ἐγένετο.

[7] [But on the other hand see Jablonsky, Diss. de Neitha in Miscellan. Lipsiens. t. 6. p. 448. who, however, explains it differently, quoting my authority, Panth. Ægyptiac. lib. 1. cap. 3.] The most learned Pet. Zorn, Biblioth. Antiquario-exeget. t. 1. p. 655.

Wherefore, whereas Plutarch[8] cites this passage out of Hecatæus, concerning the Egyptians, τὸν πρῶτον θεὸν τῷ Παντὶ τὸν αὐτὸν νομίζουσιν, "that they take the first God, and the universe,

has intimated his future intention of explaining this Saitan inscription given by Plutarch. In the mean while I shall state what, after a careful examination, has occurred to my own mind respecting it; and I shall do so the more willingly, because learned men, I perceive, attach the highest importance to it and not only entertain no doubt of its being a description of the most high God, but even scruple not to compare it with the accounts given of the Deity in the sacred writings. See, among many, God. Olearius, Diss. de Rebus Gestis Pauli in Urbe Athoniensium, sect. 17. p. 20. &c. who contends, that this Saitan Minerva was the unknown God of the Athenians, and at the same time that one God who made all things. I. In the first place, then, I cannot but own my strong conviction, that this inscription is spurious and of no authority. Plutarch tells us it was publicly exhibited in the temple of Sais; while Proclus, on the contrary, relates that, according to the account of the Egyptians, it was discovered in the ἄδυτον, or inmost recesses of the temple, to which none but the priests had access. No person, therefore, had seen this inscription, but the whole depended upon the veracity of the Saitan priests, who asserted that they found it in the inmost recesses of temple. But who is not aware, that this class of men was almost unparalleled in deception and imposture? Again, the inscription itself, if I am not altogether mistaken, betrays its own late origin. For not only are the Egyptian goddess Neith and the Grecian Minerva manifestly identified in it, as Dr. Cudworth himself has observed, which mode of confounding the deities of different nations belongs to later times, and is not characteristic of antiquity; but it is evident also, that the worship of Neith, whatever she may have been, is made to harmonize with reason and philosophy and the goddess herself pronounced to be that deity who is all things. But that custom of explaining the absurd religion of many gods, so as to make it appear not too inconsistent with reason, was one of the resources of the later Egyptian priests; which those cannot be ignorant of, who have paid even a moderate degree of attention to ancient matters. Wherefore, my opinion regarding this inscription is as follows: Certain Greeks who visited Egypt for the purpose of carrying home with them some philosophic information, having witnessed the celebration of the Saïtic rites, were surprised at the absurdity of those ceremonies by which the goddess Neith was appeased. The Egyptian priests, wishing to appear more learned than all others, to put an end to this surprise, intimated to their guests, that this worship was the veil or outward guise of a higher doctrine, and that the goddess Neith was the image of the supreme Deity of all things; and to obtain credence to this opinion, they pretended to have found long ago, in the hidden recesses of the temple, an ancient stone, inscribed with hieroglyphical letters, purporting that the goddess Neith is the whole universe of things and not a mere woman admitted among the goddesses. Hence the report spread among the Greeks; and as rumours of the kind are accustomed to be magnified, some even persuaded themselves that the inscription was to be seen on the walls of the Saitic temple. However this may be, I consider it evident that it was a philosophical interpretation of the worship of the goddess Neith, and therefore cannot be taken as a monument of the doctrine professed by the ancient Egyptians. II. But, supposing such an inscription to have really existed and not to have been forged, as was most probably the fact, by the Saitic priests, as a cloak to the absurdities of their religion; still there are many things to prevent us from believing that its author rightly expounded the Saitic religion. The stone was dedicated to Neith: which goddess was not the deity of the whole country, but only of a single city and district. But who is not aware that such deities, peculiar to certain people and cities, were either the founders of those cities, or kings and queens, whom popular superstition had raised to the rank of gods? Whereas if Neith had been a deity such as the stone represents her, her worship and religion would doubtless have been adopted throughout the whole of Egypt; which, however, was by no means the case. I say nothing of the rites and ceremonies themselves, by which she was honoured; which clearly show, that this goddess, as most other divinities of the ancients, is to be sought for among mankind; nor shall I dwell upon the fact, that the

[8] De Iside et Osiride, p. 354. t. 2. opp.

for one and the same thing;" the meaning of it cannot be, as if the first or supreme God of the Egyptians were the senseless corporeal world,[9] Plutarch himself, in the very next words,

Egyptians compared her with Minerva, which again evinces her human origin, as Minerva was beyond all question the daughter of a certain Grecian king. III. Least of all should I feel disposed to adopt the opinion of those who suppose this Neith to be the supreme God which we worship, the maker and founder of all things; the fallacy of which opinion is sufficiently shown by this alone, that this deity was of the female sex. If any of the ancients were so mad as to express the most high and omnipotent God by a human figure, still none of them, I am certain, ever fell into the gross absurdity of supposing that this great Deity could be represented by the image of a woman. All who speak of the supreme God ascribe to him the masculine gender; or if they proceed farther, as some philosophers are known to have done, represent him as combining in himself both the male and female nature. But no one of the ancients, as far as I know, has explained the symbol of Venus, Minerva, Juno, Diana, in reference to the eternal parent of the universe. Nor does the inscription in question by any means show this, as will more clearly appear by and by. As to the distinction of the obscure and the manifest, observed by learned men, in the Deity we are speaking of, this does not prove that the supreme God is indicated by it; nor has what is brought forward respecting the veil of Minerva any weight towards establishing such an inference. For the universe in like manner is visible and manifest in one respect, but in another hidden and recondite. Facts themselves and natural events are obvious to all men, but the causes of those events lie concealed and are not easily investigated. For my part I by no means consider so much wisdom to lurk beneath the veil of Minerva, nor do I greatly admire those ancient philosophers who supposed it to have been the symbol of some important mystery. Among the ancients, and especially the Greeks, virgins, on going abroad, were covered with veils, a fact that is most notorious. See Jo. Phil. Pfeiffer, De Cura Virginum apud Veteres, and the commentators on 1 Cor. xi. Hence as the statue of Minerva represented a virgin, regard to decorum required, that she also should be veiled. The same propriety, therefore, was observed by the Athenian matrons and virgins in respect to Minerva, as is shown at this day by the ministers of the Roman pontiff towards the images of the blessed Virgin, which are arrayed by them in fitting costume, such as the custom of each nation requires. Those who in former times fancied they could perceive any greater mysteries in this veil seem to me to act just as wisely as those who should endeavour to refer the garments worn at the present day to certain precepts of philosophers. IV. Lastly, to state my own opinion of the sense of this inscription, I consider its author, or the Saitic priests, meant it to represent the universe and wished their goddess Neith to be regarded as the image of the whole nature of things. That many of the Egyptians confounded nature with the author and founder of nature, and held nature herself and no other to be the maker of all things, is evident from the testimonies of Chæremon in Porphyry's Epistle to Anebo, of Hecatæus in Plutarch, De Iside et Osiride, p. 346. and others, which are every where to be met with. It is not surprising, therefore, that the priests of Sais should have been imbued with this opinion. Ἓν τὸ πᾶν, says Macrobius, Saturnal. lib. 1. cap. 17. p. 272. sapientum principes prodiderunt, "has been asserted by the principal philosophers." The inscription itself is dedicated to a goddess, or female Deity; but that Nature was saluted by the ancients as female and sometimes represented by the statue of a woman, is too well known to require proof. Again, it celebrates the Deity which is and constitutes all things that are, have been, and will be, but not the nature which administers, controls, and governs all things. And who does not readily perceive that, while this description can scarcely be applied to a nature separate from this world, it agrees admirably with the wicked opinion of those who suppose no other deity to exist besides this universe? Finally, this stone was dedicated to Neith. But the later Egyptians, as Plutarch expressly tells us, De Iside et Osiride, p. 364. considered this Neith not to differ from Minerva; moreover, they sup-

[9] They are certainly wrong who interpret Hecatæus' words of the corporeal world; whereas those who understand them as referring to the whole of animated nature give, in my opinion, the best explication.

declaring him to be ἀφανῆ καὶ κεκρυμμένον, "invisible and hidden;" whom therefore the Egyptians, as inviting him to manifest himself to them, called Hammon; as he elsewhere affirmeth, "That the Egyptians' first God, or supreme Deity, did see all things, himself being not seen." But the forementioned passage must needs be understood thus, that according to the Egyptians, the first God, and τὸ Πᾶν or "the universe," were synonymous expressions, often used to signify the very same thing; because the first supreme Deity is that which contains all things, and diffuseth itself through all things. And this doctrine was from the Egyptians derived to the Greeks, Orpheus declaring, ἕν τι τὰ πάντα, "that all things were one;" and after him Parmenides and other philosophers, ἓν εἶναι τὸ πᾶν, "that one was the universe or all," and that τὸ πᾶν was ἀκίνητον, "that the universe was immoveable;" they meaning nothing else hereby, but that the first supreme Deity was both one and all things,

posed Minerva to be the same as Isis, consequently, according to their opinion, Neith, Minerva, and Isis are one and the same deity. And this is confirmed also by that other Capuan inscription of which we shall speak presently, and which in like manner affirms Isis to be all things, so as easily to show that it is a copy of the former. Hence we may ascertain what opinion we ought to form in regard to Neith from the accounts handed down by them respecting Isis. But there are many testimonies of ancient authors to prove, that the later Egyptians interpreted Isis to be the nature of things. I pass over a remarkable passage of Apuleius, subsequently quoted by Dr. Cudworth himself, and shall merely bring forward a saying of Athenagoras on this subject, which is particularly to the point, Legat. pro Christian. cap. 19. p. 86.: Ἡ περὶ τῆς Ἴσιδος, ἣν φύσιν αἰῶνος, ἐξ ἧς πάντες ἔφυσαν, καὶ δι' ἧς πάντες εἰσὶ, λέγουσιν, "What shall I say of Isis, who they assert is the nature of things, from which all are produced and by which all exist?" I add Macrobius, who Saturnal. lib. 1. cap. 20. p. 300. says: Isis vel terra est, vel natura rerum subjacens soli, "Isis is either the earth or the nature of things underneath the sun." Compare cap. 21. p. 302. What can be plainer? V. Nor is this explication at variance with the words which Proclus tells us were added to this inscription: Καὶ ὃν ἔτεκον καρπὸν, ἥλιος ἐγένετο. For what should hinder our supposing these Saitan priests to have inculcated, that a most subtle and ethereal matter first issued from the confused chaos of things, and that thus before every thing else the sun was made, which afterwards by its warmth produced the human race and all other things. Assuredly many of the ancients held this opinion. Necesse est, says Macrobius, ut solem, qui moderatur nostra, moderantem omnium, quæ circa nos geruntur, fateamur auctorem, "We must necessarily acknowledge the sun, by which we ourselves are controlled, to be the controling cause of all that takes place around us." And that the Egyptians thought thus, is clear from the accounts Diodorus Siculus gives in his first book concerning their religion. However, as this supplement was unknown to Plutarch, I am almost inclined to suspect Proclus to be its author. The Platonic sect, of which Proclus was a distinguished member, entertained a profound regard and reverence for the sun, to which they assigned the place next to the supreme father of all things, and paid the most select honours. See Julian's Oratio in Solem, and Zacharias Mitylenæus' Dialog. de Opificio Mundi, p. 173. 176. 184. Wherefore, as these philosophers spared no imposture which could assist them in proving the extreme antiquity of their own doctrine, so it is not unlikely, that Proclus added these words to the inscription from his own imagination, in order to sanction by its authority the religious reverence of his sect towards the sun. VI. Lastly, if this were altogether as far from the truth as in my opinion it is closely bordering upon it, still it would be impossible to gather from this inscription the doctrine of Egypt generally, in which, as I have remarked above, there were various religions, and a diversity of opinions on divine matters, but merely the creed of the Saitan priests themselves, from whom probably the other ministers of sacred rites dissented.

and immoveable. And thus much is plainly intimated by Aristotle[10] in these words: Εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἱ περὶ τοῦ παντὸς, ὡς ἄν μιᾶς οὔσης φύσεως, ἀπεφήναντο, "There are some, who pronounced concerning the whole universe, as being but one nature;" that is, who called the supreme Deity τὸ πᾶν, or "the universe," because that virtually contained all things in it.

Nevertheless, τὸ πᾶν, or "the universe," was frequently taken by the pagan theologers also, as we have already intimated, in a more comprehensive sense, for the Deity, together with all the extent of its fecundity, God as displaying himself in the world; or, for God and the world both together; the latter being looked upon as nothing but an emanation or efflux from the former. And thus was the word taken by Empedocles in Plutarch,[1] when he affirmed, οὐ τὸ πᾶν εἶναι τὸν κόσμον, ἀλλ' ὀλίγον τι τοῦ παντὸς μέρος, "that the world was not the universe, but only a small part thereof." And according to this sense was the god Pan understood both by the Arcadians and other Greeks, not for the mere corporeal world as senseless and inanimate, nor as endued with a plastic nature only (though this was partly included in the notion of Pan also), but as proceeding from a rational and intellectual principle, diffusing itself through all; or for the whole system of things, God and the world together, as one deity. For that the Arcadic Pan was not the corporeal world alone, but chiefly the intellectual ruler and governor of the same, appears from this testimony of Macrobius:[2] Hunc Deum Arcades colunt, appellantes τὸν τῆς ὕλης κύριον, non sylvarum dominum, sed universæ substantiæ materialis dominatorem, "The Arcadians worship this god Pan (as their most ancient and honourable god), calling him the lord of Hyle, that is, not the lord of the woods, but the lord or dominator over all material substance." And thus does Phornutus[3] likewise describe the Pan of the other

[10] Metaphys. lib. 1. cap. 5. p. 270. t. 4. opp. But that the learned Doctor does not give the correct meaning of this passage, is clear from what Aristotle immediately subjoins, that those who consider nature as one are not all of the same opinion, but greatly at issue among themselves. Of those who held the dogma that "all things are one, and all things are God," some doubtless entertained more rational views than others. Consequently it follows that we must gather from the peculiar doctrine of each individual philosopher the sense in which this dogma was taken by him, and cannot come to any general conclusion as to the meaning assigned to it by the ancients.

[1] De Placitis Philosoph. lib. 1. cap. 5. p. 879. I see no reason, however, why we should suppose πᾶν to signify in this passage both God and the universe.

[2] Saturnal. lib. 1. cap. 22. p. 307. But Dr. Cudworth has omitted to add, that Macrobius' opinion respecting Pan differs from his own. For Macrobius makes Pan to be the sun: Pan ipse, quem vocant Inuum, sub hoc habitu, quo cernitur, solem se esse prudentioribus permittit intelligi, "Pan himself, whom they call Inuus, under the garb in which he is seen, gives the more intelligent to understand that he is the sun."

[3] De Natura Deor. cap. 27. p. 203. in Gale's Scriptores Mytholog. Veterum. But little credit can be attached to him when writing of these matters. He was a Platonist, as Dr. Gale has justly observed. But this sect wonderfully perverted the whole history of the gods; and, in defiance of all truth, sought for their own doctrines alone

Greeks, not as the mere corporeal world, senseless and inanimate; but as having a rational and intellectual principle for the head of it, and presiding over it; that is, for God and the world both together, as one system; the world being but the efflux and emanation of their Deity. "The lower parts of Pan (saith he) were rough and goatish, because of the asperity of the earth; but his upper parts of a human form, because the ether being rational and intellectual, is the Hegemonic of the world;" adding hereunto, "that Pan was feigned to be lustful or lascivious, because of the multitude of spermatic reasons contained in the world, and the continual mixtures and generations of things; to be clothed with the skin of a libbard, because of the bespangled heavens, and the beautiful variety of things in the world; to live in a desert, because of the singularity of the world; and lastly, to be a good demon, by reason of the προεστὼς αὐτοῦ λόγος, that supreme mind, reason, and understanding, that governs all in it." Pan therefore was not the mere corporeal world senseless and inanimate, but the Deity as displaying itself therein, and pervading all things. Agreeable to which, Diodorus Siculus[4] determines, that Πὰν and Ζεὺς were but two several names for one and the same deity (as it is well known, that the whole universe was frequently called by the Pagans Jupiter, as well as Pan). And Socrates himself in Plato[5] directs his prayer,

in the fables, and that for the most part in so absurd and preposterous a manner, as to give good reason for supposing them to have been mad; which is even shown by this exposition of the image of Pan.

[4] Biblioth. Histor. lib. 1. p. 7.

[5] This prayer occurs at the end of the Phædrus. I cannot by any means approve, however, of the learned Doctor's interpretation, nor do I believe that Pan denotes the supreme Deity in them. The prayer itself shows, that Socrates is addressing those gods who were supposed to preside over the place in which the disputation comprised in the Phædrus took place. But it is evident from the beginning of the dialogue, that the conversation concerning beauty had hitherto been held in a grove under the shade of a plane tree. From which it is at once clear, why Socrates, on departing thence invoked Pan in preference to the other gods. He was the god of woods and groves; and it was the custom of the ancients to pray to the gods of those places in which any thing good or memorable had happened to them. Besides, Socrates in the same Plato, Cratylus, p. 267. when speaking professedly of Pan, so far from affirming the supreme Deity to be implied by this name, inculcates, on the contrary, that it signifies λόγος, "language," or the brother of language: Καὶ ἔστιν ἤτοι λόγος, ἢ λόγου ἀδελφὸς Πᾶν. For my part I think the same of Pan as of the other gods of the Greeks and ancient nations. All that is recorded concerning Pan, his actions, dress, manners, proclaim him to have been a man, whom the Arcadians, a rude and rustic race, ranked among the gods, and fancied to preside over woods, flocks, and shepherds. Nor can there be any doubt, that Pan is one of the very earliest names, as it is every where met with in ancient monuments. But after a greater knowledge of things was gradually introduced into Greece, the Arcadians themselves became ashamed of the religion of their ancestors, and along with the rest of the Greeks, as in the case of other fables, endeavoured to find in this history I know not what moral or physical sense; with which, however, the image of Pan, his favour with the shepherds, the very sacrifices offered to him, in short, the traditions of the Arcadians were openly at variance. That those, however, from whom these interpretations emanated, followed nothing but their own imagination and therefore are altogether undeserving of attention, is sufficiently clear from the great discordance prevailing among those who interpret Pan otherwise than

in a most devout and serious manner, to this Pan; that is, not the corporeal world or senseless matter, but an intellectual principle ruling over all, or the supreme Deity diffusing itself through all; he therefore distinguishing him from the inferior gods: Ὦ φίλε Πᾶν, καὶ ἄλλοι ὅσοι τῇδε θεοὶ, δοίητέ μοι καλῷ γενέσθαι τἄνδοθεν, τὰ ἔξωθεν δὲ ὅσα ἔχω τοῖς ἐντὸς εἶναί μοι φίλια, "O good (or gracious) Pan, and ye other gods, who preside over this place, grant that I may be beautiful or fair within, and that those external things, which I have, may be such as may best agree with a right internal disposition of mind, and that I may account him to be rich, that is wise and just." The matter of which prayer, though it be excellent, yet it is paganically directed to Pan (that is, the supreme god) and the inferior gods both together. Thus we see that as well, according to the Greeks, as the Egyptians, the first or supreme God, and τὸ πᾶν or universe, were really the same thing.

And here, we cannot but by the way take notice of that famous and remarkable story of Plutarch's, in his Defect of Oracles, concerning demons lamenting the death of the great Pan. In the time of Tiberius (saith he) certain persons embarking from Asia to Italy, towards the evening sailed by the Echinades, where being becalmed, they heard from thence a loud voice calling one Thamous, an Egyptian mariner amongst them, and after the third time commanding him, when he came to the Palodes, to declare that the great Pan was dead. He, with the advice of his company, resolved that if they had a quick gale, when they came to the Palodes he would pass by silently; but if they should find themselves there becalmed, he would then perform what the voice had commanded: but when the ship arrived thither, there neither was any gale of wind nor agitation of water. Whereupon Thamous looking out of the hinder deck towards the Palodes, pronounced these words with a loud voice, ὁ μέγας Πᾶν τέθνηκε, "the great Pan is dead;" which he had no sooner done, but he was answered with a choir of many voices, making a great howling and lamentation, not without a certain

historically. While many, misled by the meaning of the word, hold Pan to be the symbol of universal nature, Socrates in Plato's Cratylus, p. 267. as I have just remarked, supposes this god to be the image of language; and Macrobius, Saturnal. lib. 1. cap. 22. p. 307. stoutly maintains him to be the sun. Now which of them are we to believe? In my opinion not one; nor do I doubt, that many will concur with me who carefully investigate the customs of the ancients. Indeed, if the ancients, in order to express either the nature of things, or language, or the sun, had painted a goat-footed god, with a horned head, and hairy limbs, and playing on a pipe, as he is exhibited on coins (see Ezek. Spanheim's Not. in Juliani Cæsares, French edit. p. 45), I should consider them to have been mad, and entirely destitute of common sense. At this day certainly, if any one were to clothe his philosophy in such symbols, and represent things so notorious as the sun, the world, or language, by goats' feet, a pipe, or the image of a lascivious man, he would be held by all rational men to stand in need of his physician and keeper.

mixture of admiration. Plutarch, who gives much credit to this relation, adds, how solicitous Tiberius, the emperor, was, first concerning the truth thereof, and afterwards, when he had satisfied himself therein, concerning the interpretation; he making great inquiry amongst his learned men, who this Pan should be. But the only use which that philosopher makes of this story, is this, to prove that demons having bodies as well as men, (though of a different kind from them, and much more longeve) yet were notwithstanding mortal; he endeavouring from thence to solve that phenomenon of the defect of oracles, because the demons who had formerly haunted those places, were now dead. But this being an idle fancy of Plutarch's, it is much more probably concluded by Christian writers, that this thing coming to pass in the reign of Tiberius, when our Saviour Christ was crucified, was no other than a lamentation of evil demons (not without a mixture of admiration) upon account of our Saviour's death, happening at that very time; they not mourning out of love for him that was dead, but as sagely presaging evil to themselves from thence, as that which would threaten danger to their kingdom of darkness, and a period to that tyranny and domination which they had so long exercised over mankind; according to such passages of scripture as these, "Now is the prince of this world judged;" and "having spoiled principalities and powers (by his death upon the cross) he triumphed over them in it." Now, our Saviour Christ could not be called Pan, according to that notion of the word, as taken for nothing but the corporeal word devoid of all manner of life, or else as endued only with a plastic nature; but this appellation might very well agree to him, as Pan was taken for the λόγος προεστὼς τοῦ κόσμου, "that reason and understanding by which all things were made, and by which they are all governed," or for φρόνησις διὰ πάντων διήκουσα, "that divine wisdom which diffuseth itself through all things." Moreover, Pan being used not so much for the naked and abstract Deity, as the Deity as it were embodied in this visible corporeal world, might therefore the better signify God manifest in the flesh, and clothed with a particular human body (in which respect alone he was capable of dying.) Neither indeed was there any other name, in all the theology of the Pagans, that could so well befit our Saviour Christ as this.[6]

[6] Many learned men, besides Dr. Cudworth, have not hesitated to refer this fable or history of the death of the great Pan to the crucifixion of our Saviour. Out of a long catalogue, I mention Jan. Jac. Boissard, De Divinat. et Magicis Præstigiis, p. 22. Pet. Molynæus, Vates, lib. 3. cap. 11. and of eminent modern writers, Pet. Dan. Huet, who, Demonstr. Evangel. prop. 9. cap. 136. p. 1014. affirms that "the death of Christ was signified to the heathens by a stupendous miracle." Eusebius, however, Præpar. Evangel. lib. 5. cap. 17. p. 207. supposed this great Pan to be the prince of evil spirits and held this history to be an argument, that his empire was overthrown and his power, as it were, destroyed in the reign of Tiberius, when our Saviour Christ was crucified: and Phil. Mornæus, among others, follows in his footsteps, De Veritate

We have now made it manifest, that according to the ancient Egyptian theology, (from whence the Greekish and European was derived) there was one intellectual Deity, one mind or wisdom, which, as it did produce all things from itself, so doth

Christian. Religionis, p. 201. But to others, who carefully examined the whole matter, this narrative appeared absurd and ridiculous. Probably our countrymen, the Centuriatores Magdeb. cent. 1. lib. 2. cap. 15. p. 523. ed. Ludov. Lucii, were the first who publicly repudiated this story, to which not even Cæsar Baronius, as is remarked by Ant. Van Dale, De Oraculis, diss. 2. p. 438. attached any great importance. Of the more modern scholars, very many have rejected it: among whom Van Dale, ibid. p. 432. stands pre-eminent. To myself, indeed, it has always appeared strange, I confess, that men, in other respects acute and ingenious, could so easily be led to refer this fable to our Saviour, and that too upon the strength of no other argument of any moment, except the name of the great Pan, which they fancied to be applicable to Christ. But I am altogether at a loss to conceive, how the death of our Saviour could be made known to the Gentiles by this means, inasmuch as they were ignorant who the great Pan was, and on inquiry being instituted into the subject by command of Tiberius, not one of the learned men ever imagined that this mournful cry was to be understood of any other Pan than the son of Mercury and Penelope. It may be worth while, I fancy, to examine more diligently into this matter, than I recollect to have hitherto done, and to divest this history of the death of Pan of the dignity and importance which a great many have ascribed to it. I. It rests upon the authority of one man, the grammarian Epithersis, whose credibility, doctrine, capacity, and so on, are altogether unknown. Hence, as the truth of facts is to be estimated by the weight and amount of the evidence, it is already clear, how much value a wise man can attach to this story. II. Although Plutarch tells us that this happened in the time of Tiberius, still, he does not say at what particular time or in what year of that emperor's reign; which shows, what a slender argument they rely upon, who conclude our Saviour Christ to be the great Pan, whose death the voice announced, merely because it took place in the reign of Tiberius. III. Those who have no doubt of the truth of this history, must necessarily admit and believe many things in regard to the nature and dispensation of demons, which are repugnant to reason and sacred writ. Demons, if all this be true, are obliged to employ men as their messengers, when they wish to communicate any thing to their fellows in another district, and are unable to pass to and fro themselves, or in any other manner declare their thoughts to the absent. But this is trifling in comparison with what I shall now advert to. The demons who inhabit the isle of Paxos possess such great knowledge, that they can tell the name of the pilot of a foreign ship and are acquainted with what is about to take place in that ship. They are so powerful as to be able to calm the sea and so to still the waves, as to cause the vessel to stop at the place they wish. They foresee that the mariners will disobey their commands, unless they restrain the motion of the winds. And yet, these same demons, endowed with such knowledge, such foresight, and such power, cannot of themselves communicate the intelligence of Pan's death to their fellows, but require the agency of men to convey it. Now, any one who considers these things will, I am certain, conclude that nothing can be more absurd than this story. IV. But if we refer it more intimately to Christ, we shall have other difficulties to contend with, by no means less important than those we have mentioned. In the first place, we shall have to assume that in the community of evil spirits, a law, as it were, had been passed, according to which Jesus, our blessed Saviour, was to be saluted by the name of a heathen deity and to be denominated the great Pan. For the demons inhabiting the Palodes, on hearing the name of the great Pan, immediately understood who was meant by it, nor did those who dwelt in Paxos entertain any doubt of their knowing this. Wherefore, if the great Pan be Christ, we must necessarily conclude, that this name was applied to him by the common consent of the wicked demons and was the received appellation in the kingdom of darkness. Let him believe this who can; to me it seems incredible, that those adversaries of the human race, who could not be ignorant of the other names of our Saviour, should have been either willing or even able to designate him by the name of an idle image. V. But why is the death of our Saviour announced to these demons and not also his return to life, which soon after followed? His death, properly speaking, is not so formidable to the empire of Satan as that most glorious victory which he achieved over death,

περιέχειν τὸ ὅλον, "contain and comprehend the whole," and is itself in a manner all things. We think fit in the next place to observe, how this point of the old Egyptian theology, viz., God's being all things, is every where insisted upon throughout the Hermaic or Trismegistic writings. We shall begin with the Asclepian dialogue or the τέλειος λόγος, translated into Latin by Apuleius; in the entrance of which the writer having declared, Omnia unius esse, et unum esse omnia, "that all things were of one, and that one was all things," he afterwards adds this explication thereof: Nonne hoc dixi, *Omnia unum esse, et unum omnia,*

Therefore, if the demons had wished to inform their fellows of the disasters impending over their community, they would no doubt have announced, not only that the great Pan had died, but also that he had vanquished and prevailed over death. Which certainly would have been a just and sufficient cause for the howling and wailing of this unhappy race. But as is clear and evident from the whole story, those who so bitterly bewailed the death of the great Pan had no hope of his ever being restored to life. VI. Again, to pass over many other things, which show the absurdity of applying this fable to our Saviour, I appeal to the judgment of all sensible men, whether it would not have been the greatest folly in these demons to make the sailors witnesses of their calamity and distress. They do not hesitate to declare publicly, how disastrous Pan's death will be to themselves. But if these sailors had happened to learn that the great Pan was Christ, they would necessarily have conceived the highest reverence towards him and embraced the worship of a deity that had brought destruction upon the power of demons; and their example no doubt would have been followed by many others. Therefore, these demons would have injured themselves, and by their imprudent clamours have enlarged the dominion of him whose power and authority they dreaded. But I am dwelling perhaps too long upon these trifles; and shall proceed rather to state the impressions I have formed on comparing this history with what took place in the reign of Tiberius. It was the forgery, I suspect, of cunning men, who instigated some foreign sailors to disseminate it among the Romans, in order to increase the popular hatred of that emperor. No event during his reign had been more deplored throughout the whole Roman empire than the death of Germanicus, whom Piso was suspected to have taken off by poison with the emperor's connivance. Tacitus describes at great length the profound grief with which all the kings and provinces were overwhelmed at the news of this great man's death, Annal. lib. 2. cap. 72. &c. p. 81. and lib. 3. cap. 1. p. 91. Agreeably to the superstition of that period, most persons believed that a great demon had inhabited his body, and consequently did not scruple to award to him statues, solemnities, and sacrifices. Statuarum, says Tacitus, Annal. lib. 2. cap. 83. p. 86. locorumve in quibus coleretur, haud facile quis numerum iniret, "The statues and the places in which he was worshipped were almost innumerable." It seemed to be the interest of Agrippina, whom he had left a widow, and of her children, for whom an extraordinary regard was felt by the majority of the Romans, to make the people suppose that even demi-gods and demons had deplored the premature death of this illustrious hero, and therefore, that it was the less to be wondered at, if mortals should lament it. They well knew, that if this belief could be instilled into their minds, it would greatly increase the general hatred towards Tiberius, who had not been sufficiently careful in concealing the delight he felt at the death of Germanicus, and who viewed with indignation the almost countless honours that were paid to his manes. Hence, while the general sorrow was yet fresh, they instigated certain sailors to assert, that they had heard while at sea the voice of demons bewailing the death of the great Pan, being convinced that the people would naturally conclude this great Pan to be the lately deceased Germanicus. Nor does the fraud seem to have escaped the penetration of Tiberius, who, alarmed at the rumour, and convinced that the people would most assuredly believe the prodigy to have taken place, immediately consulted learned men, to know who this Pan might be. And they, to allay the popular excitement, answered in compliance with the wish of the emperor, that this Pan appeared to them to be no other than the son of Mercury and Penelope. Thus fraud begat fraud, and the emperor's artifice baffled the designs of his enemies.

utpote quia in creatore fuerint omnia, antiquam creâsset omnia? Nec immeritò unus est dictus omnia, cujus membra sunt omnia. Hujus itaque, qui est *unus omnia*, vel ipse est Creator omnium, in tota hac disputatione curato meminisse. "Have we not already declared that all things are one, and one all things? forasmuch as all things existed in the Creator, before they were made; neither is he improperly said to be all things, whose members all things are. Be thou therefore mindful in this whole disputation of him, who is one and all things, or was the creator of all." And thus afterwards does he declare, that all created things were in the Deity before they were made: Idcirco non erant, quando nata non erant, sed in eo jam tunc erant, unde nasci habuerunt, "They did not properly then exist before they were made, and yet at that very time were they in him, from whom they were afterwards produced." Again, he writes thus concerning God: Non spero totius majestatis effectorem, omnium rerum patrem vel dominum, uno posse quamvis è multis composito nomine nuncupari. Hunc voca potius omni nomine, siquidem sit *unus* et *omnia*; ut necesse sit aut omnia ipsius nomine, aut ipsum omnium nomine nuncupari. Hic ergo solus omnia, &c., "I cannot hope sufficiently to express the author of majesty, and the father and lord of all things, by any one name, though compounded of never so many names. Call him therefore by every name, forasmuch as he is one and all things; so that of necessity, either all things must be called by his name, or he by the names of all things." And when he had spoken of the mutability of created things, he adds,* Solus deus ipse in se, et à se, et circum se, totus est plenus atque perfectus, isque sua firma stabilitas est; nec alicujus impulsu, nec loco moveri potest, cum in eo sint omnia, et in omnibus ipse est solus, "God alone in himself, and from himself, and about himself, is altogether perfect; and himself is his own stability. Neither can he be moved or changed by the impulse of any thing, since all things are in him, and he alone is in all things." Lastly, to omit other places,† Hic sensibilis mundus receptaculum est omnium sensibilium specierum, qualitatum, vel corporum; quæ omnia sine Deo vegetari non possunt: *Omnia* enim *Deus*, et à Deo omnia et sine hoc, nec fuit aliquid, nec est, nec erit; omnia enim ab eo, et in ipso, et per ipsum——Si totum animadvertes, vera ratione perdisces, mundum ipsum sensibilem, et quæ in eo sunt omnia, à superiore illo mundo, quasi vestimento, esse contecta, "The sensible world is the receptacle of all forms, qualities, and bodies, all which cannot be vegetated and quickened without God; for God is all things, and all things are from God, and all things the effect of his will; and without God there neither was any thing, nor

* P. 612. Colv. † P. 617.

is, nor shall be; but all things are from him, and in him, and by him———And if you will consider things after a right manner, you shall learn that this sensible word, and all the things therein, are covered all over with th t superior world (or Deity) as it were with a garment." As for the other Trismegistic books of Ficinus' edition, the third of them called, Ἱερὸς λόγος, is thus concluded: Τὸ γὰρ θεῖον ἡ πᾶσα κοσμικὴ σύγκρασις, φύσει ἀναθεωρουμένη· ἐν γὰρ τῷ θείῳ καὶ ἡ φύσις συγκαθέστηκεν, "The divinity is the whole mundane compages, or constitution; for nature is also placed in the Deity." In the fifth book written upon this argument, ὅτι ἀφανὴς θεὸς φανερώτατός ἐστι, "that the invisible God is most manifest," we read thus: Οὐδὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἐν παντὶ ἐκείνῳ, ὃ οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτὸς, ἔστιν αὐτὸς καὶ τὰ ὄντα καὶ μὴ ὄντα· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὄντα αὐτὸς ἐφανέρωσε· τὰ δὲ μὴ ὄντα ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτῷ, "For there is nothing in the whole world which he is not; he is both the things that are, and the things that are not; for the things that are he hath manifested; but the things that are not, he contains within himself." And again, Οὗτος ὁ ἀσώματος καὶ ὁ πολυσώματος· μᾶλλον δὲ παντὸς σώματος οὐδέν ἐστιν, ὃ οὗτος οὐκ ἔστι· πάντα γὰρ, ἃ ἐστι, καὶ οὗτός ἐστι· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο αὐτὸς ὀνόματα ἔχει πάντα, ὅτι ἑνός ἐστι πατρός· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ὄνομα οὐκ ἔχει, ὅτι πάντων ἐστὶ πατήρ, "He is both incorporeal, and omnicorporeal, for there is nothing of any body which he is not; he is all things that are, and therefore he hath all names, because all things are from one father; and therefore he hath no name, because he is the father of all things." And in the close of the same book: Ὑπὲρ τίνος σε ὑμνήσω; ὑπὲρ ὧν ἐποίησας, ἢ ὑπὲρ ὧν οὐκ ἐποίησας; ὑπὲρ ὧν ἐφανέρωσας, ἢ ὑπὲρ ὧν ἔκρυψας; διὰ τί δὲ καὶ ὑμνήσω σε; ὡς ἐμαυτοῦ ὤν; ὡς ἔχων τι ἴδιον; ὡς ἄλλος ὤν; σὺ εἶ γὰρ, ὃ ἐὰν ὦ· σὺ εἶ, ὃ ἂν ποιῶ· σὺ εἶ ὃ ἂν λέγω· σὺ γὰρ πάντα εἶ. τὸ ἄλλο οὐδέν ἐστιν, ὃ μὴ εἶ· σὺ πᾶν τὸ γενόμενον, σὺ τὸ μὴ γενόμενον, "For what shall I praise thee? for those things which thou hast made, or for those things which thou hast not made? for those things which thou hast manifested, or for those things which thou hast hidden and concealed within thyself? And for what cause shall I praise thee? because I am my own, as having something proper and distinct from thee? thou art whatsoever I am; thou art whatsoever I do, or say, for thou art all things, and there is nothing which thou art not; thou art that which is made, and thou art that which is unmade." Where it is observable,[7] that before things were made, God is said κρύπτειν, "to hide them

[7] It is worthy of remark also that the author of this book did not believe all things to have emanated from God, but many to have remained concealed within him. Hence he must necessarily have supposed, that the time would perhaps come when new worlds would proceed from God and many other successions of things be added to that which we now see. Some other opportunity will I hope be afforded me of more minutely explaining the clumsy philosophy of the fictitious Hermes.

within himself;" but when they are made, *φανερουῦν*, "to manifest and reveal them from himself." Book the eighth, *Νόησον, ὅτι ὁ μὲν κόσμος ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ ἐν τῷ Θεῷ· ἀρχὴ δὲ καὶ περιοχὴ καὶ σύστασις πάντων ὁ Θεός*, "Understand that the whole world is from God, and in God; for God is the beginning, comprehension and constitution of all things." Book the ninth: *Μᾶλλον δὲ λέγω, ὅτι οὐκ αὐτὸς αὐτὰ ἔχει· ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἀποφαίνομαι· αὐτὸς ἅπαντά ἐστιν· οὐκ ἔξωθεν αὐτὰ προσλαμβάνων, ἔξω δὲ ἐπιδιδούς*, "I would not say that God hath all things, but rather declare the truth, and say that he is all things; not as receiving them from without, but as sending them forth from himself." Again, afterwards in the same book: *Καὶ οὐκ ἔσται ποτὲ χρόνος, ὅτε ἀπολειφθήσεταί τι τῶν ὄντων· ὅταν δὲ λέγω τῶν ὄντων, λέγω τοῦ Θεοῦ· τὰ γὰρ ὄντα ὁ Θεὸς ἔχει, καὶ οὔτε αὐτοῦ οὐδὲν ἐκτὸς, οὔτε αὐτὸς οὐδενός*, "There shall never be a time, when any thing that is shall cease to be; for when I say any thing that is, I say any thing of God; for God hath all things in him, and there is neither any thing without God, nor God without any thing." Book the tenth: *Τί γάρ ἐστι θεὸς, καὶ πατὴρ, καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν, ἢ τὸ τῶν πάντων εἶναι οὐκ ἔτι ὄντων· ἀλλὰ ὕπαρξις αὐτὴ τῶν ὄντων*; "What is God, but the very being of all things that yet are not, and the subsistence of things that are?" And again: *Ὁ Θεὸς, καὶ πατὴρ καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν, τῷ εἶναι τὰ πάντα*, "God is both the father and good, because he is all things." Book the eleventh: *Αὐτουργὸς γὰρ ὢν ἀεί ἐστιν ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ, αὐτὸς ὢν, ὅ ποιεῖ· εἰ γὰρ χωρισθείη αὐτοῦ, πάντα μὲν συμπεσεῖσθαι, πάντα δὲ τεθνήξεσθαι ἀνάγκη*, "God acting immediately from himself is always in his own work, himself being that which he makes; for if that were never so little separated from him, all would of necessity fall to nothing and die." Again: *Πάντα ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ θεῷ, οὐχ ὡς ἐν τόπῳ κείμενα*, "All things are in God, but not as lying in a place." And further, since our own soul can by cogitation and fancy become what it will, and where it will, any thing, or in any place, *τοῦτον οὖν τὸν τρόπον νόησον τὸν Θεὸν, ὥσπερ νοήματα πάντα ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἔχειν, τὸν κόσμον αὐτὸν ὅλον*, "you may consider God in the same manner, as containing the whole world within himself, as his own conceptions and cogitations." And in the close of that chapter, that, which is also thence cited by St. Cyril,[8] is to the same purpose: *Ἀόρατος ὁ Θεὸς; εὐφήμησον, καὶ τίς αὐτοῦ φανερώτερος· δι' αὐτὸ τοῦτο πάντα ἐποίησεν, ἵνα διὰ πάντων αὐτὸν βλέπῃς· τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ ἀγαθὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ· τοῦτο δὲ αὐτοῦ ἀρέτη, τὸ αὐτὸν φαίνεσθαι διὰ πάντων*, "Is God invisible? speak worthily of him, for who is more manifest than he? for this very reason did he make all things, that thou mightest see him through all things: this is the virtue and goodness of the Deity, to be seen

[8] Adv. Julianum, lib. 2. p. 52. ed Spanhemii.

through all things. The mind is seen in thinking, but God in working or making." Book the twelfth: Ἤκουσα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ δαίμονος λέγοντος (ἐκεῖνος γὰρ μόνος, ὦ τέκνον, ἀληθῶς ὡς πρωτόγονος θεὸς, τὰ πάντα κατιδὼν, θείους λόγους ἐφθέγξατο) ἤκουσα γοῦν αὐτοῦ ποτὲ λέγοντος, ὅτι ἕν ἐστι τὰ πάντα, "I have heard the good demon (for he alone, as the first begotten god, beholding all things, spake divine words), I have heard him sometimes saying, that one is all things." Again in the same chapter: Ὁ δὲ σύμπας κόσμος οὗτος ἡνωμένος ἐκείνῳ, καὶ συσσώζων τὴν τάξιν καὶ βούλησιν τοῦ πατρὸς, πλήρωμά ἐστι τῆς ζωῆς· καὶ οὐδέν ἐστιν ἐν τούτῳ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ αἰῶνος, οὔτε τοῦ παντὸς, οὔτε τῶν κατὰ μέρος, ὃ οὐχὶ ζῇ, νεκρὸν γὰρ οὐδὲ ἓν οὔτε γέγονεν, οὔτε ἐστὶν, οὔτε ἔσται ἐν κόσμῳ, "This whole world is intimately united to him, and observing the order and will of its father, hath the fullness of life in it; and there is nothing in it through eternity (neither whole nor part) which does not live; for there neither is, nor hath been, nor shall be, any thing dead in the world." The meaning is, that all things vitally depend upon the Deity, who is said in scripture[9] to quicken and enliven all things. Τοῦτό ἐστιν ὁ θεὸς, τὸ πᾶν· ἐν δὲ τῷ παντὶ, οὐδέν ἔστιν, ὃ μή ἐστιν· ὅθεν οὔτε μέγεθος, οὔτε τόπος, οὔτε ποιότης, οὔτε σχῆμα, οὔτε χρόνος περὶ τὸν θεόν ἐστι· πᾶν γάρ ἐστι, τὸ δὲ πᾶν διὰ πάντων καὶ περὶ πάντα, "This is God, the universe or all. And in this universe there is nothing which he is not: wherefore there is neither magnitude, nor place, nor quality, nor figure, nor time about God, for he is all or the whole (but those things belong to parts)". And the Arcane Cantion, though that thirteenth book, to which it is subjoined, be supposititious, yet harps much upon this point of the Egyptian theology, that God is all: Ὑμνεῖν μέλλω τὸν τῆς κτίσεως κύριον, καὶ τὸ πᾶν, καὶ τὸ ἕν, "I am about to praise the Lord of the creation, the all and the one." And again, "All the powers, that are in me, praise the one and the all." Book the fifteenth: Ἐάν τις ἐπιχειρήσῃ τὸ πᾶν καὶ ἓν χωρίσαι, τὸ πᾶν τοῦ ἑνὸς λύσας ἀπολέσει τὸ πᾶν, πάντα γὰρ ἓν εἶναι δεῖ, "If any one go about to separate the all from the one, he will destroy the all, or the universe, for all ought to be one." Book the sixteenth: Ἄρξομαι τοῦ λόγου ἔνθεν, τὸν θεὸν ἐπικαλεσάμενος, τὸν τῶν ὅλων δεσπότην, καὶ ποιητὴν, καὶ πατέρα, καὶ περίβολον, καὶ πάντα ὄντα τὸν ἕνα, καὶ ἕνα ὄντα τὰ πάντα· τὸ πάντων γὰρ τὸ πλήρωμα ἓν ἐστι, καὶ ἐν ἑνί, "I will

[9] I should wish this to be received with caution. For the doctrine of sacred writ, that God imparts life to all things, is different from that of Hermes concerning the animated world. The scriptures make a broad distinction between the life of God and the life which animates this world, and gives us no reason for supposing God himself to be that which produces motion and life in matter. But Hermes, who asserts that all things emanated from God, and manifestly confounds God and the world, makes the divine nature or supreme being itself to be the life which animates matter. For he considers the world as an animal; supposing matter which proceeded from God to be its body, and God himself, who is diffused through that matter, its soul.

begin with a prayer to him, who is the Lord, and maker, and father, and bound of all things; and who being all things, is one; and being one, is all things; for the fulness of all things is one and in one." And again; Μόρια τοῦ Θεοῦ πάντα ἐστίν· εἰ δὲ πάντα μόρια, πάντα ἄρα ὁ Θεός· πάντα οὖν ποιῶν ἑαυτὸν ποιεῖ, "All things are parts of God, but if all things be parts of God, then God is all things; wherefore he making all things, doth, as it were, make himself."

Now, by all this we see how well these Trismegistic books agree with that ancient Egyptian inscription in the temple of Sais, that "God is all, that was, is, and shall be." Wherefore the Egyptian theology thus undoubtedly asserting "one God that was all things;" it is altogether impossible, that it should acknowledge a multitude of self-existent and independent deities.

Hitherto we have taken notice of two several Egyptian names for one and the same supreme Deity; Hammon and Neith: but we shall find, that, besides these, the supreme God was sometimes worshipped by the Egyptians under other names and notions also; as of Isis, Osiris, and Serapis. For first, though Isis have been taken by some for the moon, by others for the whole earth, by others for Ceres or corn, by others for the land of Egypt (which things, in what sense they were deified by the Egyptians, will be elsewhere declared), yet was she undoubtedly taken also sometimes for a universal and all-comprehending Numen. For Plutarch affirms, that Isis and Neith were really one and the same god among the Egyptians, and therefore the temple of Neith or Minerva at Sais, where the forementioned inscription was found, is called by him the temple of Isis; so that Isis, as well as Neith or Minerva among the Egyptians, was there described, as that God, who is "all that was, is, and shall be," and whose veil no mortal hath ever uncovered; that is, not a particular God, but a universal and all-comprehending Numen. And this may be yet further confirmed from that ancient inscription and dedication to the goddess Isis, still extant at Capua:

TIBI.
VNA. QVÆ.
ES. OMNIA.
DEA. ISIS.

Where the goddess Isis is plainly declared to be ἓν καὶ πάντα, "one and all things," that is, a universal and all-comprehending Deity. And with this agreeth also that oration of this goddess Isis in Apuleius:* En adsum tuis commota, Luci, precibus,

[10] De Iside et Osiride, p. 354. tom. 2. opp. But what the learned Doctor subjoins, that the temple dedicated to Minerva at Sais was called by Plutarch the temple of Isis, is incorrect and a slip of the memory.

* Metam. l. 12. [Lib. XI. p. 243.]

rerum naturæ parens, elementorum omnium domina, seculorum progenies initialis: summa numinum, regina marium, prima cœlitum, deorum dearumque facies uniformis; quæ cœli luminosa culmina, maris salubria flamina, inferorum deplorata silentia, nutibus meis dispenso. Cujus numen unicum multiformi specie, ritu vario, nomine multijugo totus veneratur orbis, "Behold here am I, moved by thy prayers, Lucius, that nature, which was the parent of things; the mistress of all the elements; the beginning and original of ages; the sum of all the divine powers; the queen of the seas; the first of the celestial inhabitants; the uniform face of gods and goddesses; which with my becks dispense the luminous heights of the heavens, the wholesome blasts of the sea, and the deplorable silences of hell; whose only divine power the whole world worships and adores, in a multiform manner, and under different rites and names." From which words it is plain, that this goddess Isis was not the mere animated moon (which was rather a symbol of her), but that she was a universal Deity, comprehensive of the whole nature of things; the one supreme God, worshipped by the Pagans under several names, and with different rites. And this is the plain meaning of those last words: Numen unicum, &c., "That the whole world worshippeth one and the same supreme God, in a multiform manner, with various rites and under many different names." For, besides the several names of the other Pagans there mentioned, the Egyptians worshipped it under the names of Hammon, Neith, and others that shall be afterwards declared. And thus was Isis again worshipped and invoked, as the unicum numen, or only divine power, by Apuleius himself, in these following words: Tu sancta humani generis sospitatrix perpetua, dulcem matris affectionem miseris tribuis, fatorum inextricabiliter contorta retractas litia, fortunæ tempestates mitigas, et stellarum noxios meatus cohibes: te superi colunt, observant inferi. Tu rotas orbem, luminas solem, regis mundum, calcas Tartarum. Tibi respondent sidera, gaudent numina, serviunt elementa: tuo nutu spirant flamina, &c., "Thou holy and perpetual saviour of mankind, that art always bountiful in cherishing mortals, and dost manifest the dear affections of a mother to them in their calamities, thou extricatest the involved threads of fate, mitigatest the tempests of fortune, and restrainest the noxious influences of the stars; the celestial gods worship thee, the infernal powers obey thee; thou rollest round the heavens, enlightenest the sun, governest the world, treadest upon Tartarus, or hell; the stars obey thee, the elements serve thee, at thy beck the winds blow," &c. Where Isis is plainly supposed to be a universal Numen and supreme monarch of the world. Neither may this hinder, that she was called a goddess, as Neith also was; these Pagans making their deities to be indifferently of either

sex, male or female.[1] But much more was Osiris taken for the supreme deity, whose name[2] was sometimes said to have signified in the Egyptian language, πολυόφθαλμος, "that which had

[1] What construction, ought in my opinion, to be put upon the things here stated respecting Isis, will, I think, be obvious from what I have already more than once remarked. I. Isis, beyond all question, was an ancient queen of the Egyptians, whom that superstitious nation deified after her death. But when in the course of ages all memory of this queen was obliterated and the more intelligent began to be ashamed of paying divine honours to a woman long ago dead, they sought for either moral or physical interpretations of Isis, as of most of the other deities. Hence some supposed the moon, some the earth, some corn, some Egypt itself, to be implied by this name. See Laur. Pignorius, Mensa Isiaca, p. 2. 3. 4. Which interpretations even the variety itself, setting aside many other things, sufficiently proves to be entirely destitute of certainty and truth. II. Amongst those who attached a recondite and hidden meaning to Isis, some believed the name to signify the whole of animated nature: upon which subject I have already spoken in treating of the Saitic inscription. To this class Apuleius belongs, as his words here quoted testify. This man supposed Isis to be the whole universe, consisting of matter and of spirit exciting and animating that matter. So far therefore from our being able to prove upon the authority of this writer, that the Egyptians held Isis to be the name of the supreme Deity separate from nature, he on the contrary strengthens the argument of those who identify the whole religion of the Egyptians with the infamous doctrine professed in our time by Spinoza. III. For my part, however, I do not concur with these; having long entertained the opinion, that the religion of the entire Egyptian people, which was most certainly diversified, cannot safely and fairly be judged of from the testimonies of a few authors. Consequently, although it were even certain, which however is by no means the case, that there were some Egyptians who imagined Isis to be the supreme parent and ruler of the universe, still it does not at all follow that the whole people, or at least the entire body of Egyptian philosophers, held the same view. IV. The Capuan inscription, which many others since Gruter have brought forward, is given by most of them incorrectly, nor is it exhibited entire by Dr. Cudworth himself. The best reading of this inscription is that of Marq. Gudius, in Notis ad Phædri Fabulas, lib. 3. fab. 19. who himself carefully inspected it:

TE TIBI
UNA QUAE
ES OMNIA
DEA ISIS
AERRIUS BALBINUS V. C.

It is found according to the same Gudius in the temple belonging formerly to St. Benedict, and at the present day to the Jesuits. The stone is that of some private person, who has expounded his own notion respecting Isis, and therefore cannot be taken as authority as to the general opinion of the Egyptians. But this inscription is copied from the one at Sais, of which we have treated copiously above; as a comparison of the two will of itself show. The man therefore who dedicated this stone, inconsiderately put faith in the Saitan priests, who, as Plutarch informs us, affirmed Neith to be the same with Isis. And Neith, as we have clearly shown above and as the Saitan inscription sufficiently testifies, being supposed by these priests to be the symbol of the whole universe, it was obviously necessary, that the same construction should be put upon this inscription consecrated to Isis. This has to a certain extent been already seen by G. J. Vossius, De Origine et Progressu Idololatriæ, cap. 2. p. 720, where he observes that this stone treats of the occult power of nature; although he presently begins to doubt, whether we should not rather adopt the opinion of those who hold Isis to be the moon. Neither does Phil. a Turre, Monument. Veteris Antii, p. 179. appea to be very farfr om entertaining this opinion. We will prove, however, from the stone itself, that in it Isis is the nature of things. *Te Tibi*, says its founder, *Una Quæ Es Omnia*. Therefore the man dedicates the goddess to herself, or *Isis to Isis*. Now this is totally destitute of meaning, unless we suppose Isis to be the nature of things: by doing which we shall get at an apt sense. The stone dedicated by Balbinus was a

many eyes;" sometimes κράτος ἐνεργοῦν καὶ ἀγαθοποιὸν, "an active and beneficent force" (and whose hieroglyphic was an eye and a sceptre); the former signifying providence and wisdom, and the latter power and majesty (as Plutarch tells us),[3] who also is thus described in Apuleius: Deus deorum magnorum potior, et majorum summus, et summorum maximus, et maximorum regnator, Osiris, "That God who is the chiefest of the greater gods, and the greatest of the chiefest, and which reigneth over the greatest." Wherefore the same Apuleius[4] also tells us, that Isis and Osiris were really one and the same supreme Numen, though considered under different notions, and worshipped with different rites, in these words:[5] Quanquam connexa, imo vero unica, ratio Numinis religionisque esset, tamen teletæ discrimen esse maximum, "Though Isis and Osiris be really one and the same divine power, yet are their rites and ceremonies very different." The proper notion of Osiris being thus declared by Plutarch,[6] Τὸ πρῶτον καὶ κυριώτατον πάντων, ὃ τ' ἀγαθῷ ταὐτόν ἐστι, "that first and highest of all beings, which is the same with good." Agreeably whereunto, Jamblichus[7] affirmeth, ἀγαθῶν ποιητικὸς ὢν Ὄσιρις κέκληται, "that God, as the cause of all good, is called Osiris by the Egyptians." Lastly, as for Serapis,

part of the nature of things. Therefore in dedicating this stone to nature, he consecrated to nature a part of nature itself, or nature to nature. Consequently, I understand the words thus: "Thou Isis art the whole universe, thou art all things and in all things: nothing can I present to thee except a part of thyself, nothing except a member of thine own body. Therefore in dedicating to thee this stone, I dedicate thyself to thee, who art one and all things." With this combine what we have remarked above on the Saitan inscription. I cannot therefore but reject the opinion of those who consider the supreme Being who governs all things to be implied in this stone, as well as the one in which Gudius also concurs, that Isis is here said to be all things, because some call her Juno, others Ceres, others the moon, others Thesmophoria, and others by other names. For, to omit other things, neither of these opinions at all expresses the force and meaning of the words of this inscription.

[3] On the various derivations of the name Osiris consult what has been collected by Jo. Braun, Selecta Sacra, lib. 4. cap. 3. p. 384. &c. G. J. Vossius, De Idololatr. lib. 1. cap. 27. p. 74. Joach. Christ. Jehring, De Etymo Osiridis, in the Biblioth. Brem. class. 5. fascic. 2. p. 387. J. Selden, De Diis Syris, p. 147. J. Le Clerc, Biblioth. Choisie, tom. 7. p. 131. Where those who are willing to exercise their common sense will find ample proof of its being a light and easy task to make ropes of sand and unravel the etymologies of ancient names. One of the significations here met with is given by Diodorus Siculus, the other by Plutarch, De Iside et Osiride, p. 368.

[3] De Iside et Osiride, p. 354. and p. 371. tom. 2. opp.

[4] Metamorphos. lib. 11. p. 358.

[5] Ibid. p. 256.

[6] He alludes to the following words of Plutarch concerning Isis, which occur in the book above quoted, p. 372: Ἐκεῖ δὲ σύμφυτον ἔρωτα τοῦ πρώτου καὶ κυριωτάτου πάντων, ὃ τἀγαθῷ ταυτόν ἐστι· κἀκεῖνα ποθεῖ καὶ διώκει, "The love implanted in her by nature of that first and most excellent of all beings, which is the same with good: this she desires and pursues." Plutarch however does not affirm this to be the true interpretation, but merely informs us, that some Egyptians so interpreted the history of Isis and Osiris. Throughout the whole of this book Plutarch is not so much declaring his own opinions as showing how various were the expositions given by the Egyptians of these fables.

[7] De Mysteriis Ægyptior. sect. 8. cap. 3. p. 159.

though Origen[8] tells us, that this was a new upstart Deity, set up by Ptolemy in Alexandria, yet this God in his oracle[9] to Nicocrion the king of Cyprus, declares himself also to be a universal Numen, comprehending the whole world, in these words: Οὐράνιος κόσμος κεφαλὴ, &c., to this sense: "The starry heaven is my head, the sea my belly, my ears are in the ether, and the bright light of the sun is my clear piercing eye." And doubtless he was worshipped by many under this notion. For as Philarchus[10] wrote thus concerning him: Σάραπις ὄνομα τοῦ τὸ πᾶν κοσμοῦντος, "That Serapis was the name of that God, which orders and governs the whole world;" so doth Plutarch[1] himself conclude, that Osiris and Serapis were ἄμφω ἑνὸς θεοῦ καὶ μιᾶς δυνάμεως, "both of them names of one God, and the same divine power." Accordingly whereunto Diodorus Siculus[2] determines, that these three, Hammon, Osiris, and Serapis, were but different names for one and the same Deity, or supreme God. Notwithstanding which, Porphyrius,[3] it seems, had a very ill conceit of that power which manifested itself in the temple of this god Serapis, above all the other pagan gods, he suspecting it to be no other than the very prince of evil demons

[8] Adv. Celsum, lib. 5. p. 257. ed. Cantabr.

[9] Extant in Macrobius, Saturnal. lib. 1. cap. 20. p. 299. But if this oracle were of any weight or authority, it would show, that Serapis is the nature of things rather than God the parent and lord of nature.

[10] In Plutarch, De Iside et Osiride, p. 362. But the learned Doctor has omitted to add, that Plutarch ranks this opinion among the absurd conceits of Phylarchus.

[1] The matter itself is found in Plutarch as above, p. 361. 362. but I cannot meet with the words that are here quoted.

[2] Diodorus nowhere says this, but merely states, Bibl. Hist. lib. 1. cap. 25. p. 21. that there was a great diversity of opinion among the Egyptians concerning their gods: in particular, that Osiris was variously supposed to be Serapis, Dionysus, Pluto, Jupiter, Hammon, and even Pan. And who, I ask, would understand by this, that the Egyptians took Osiris, Serapis, and Hammon, to be different names of the one supreme Deity? The learned Doctor, I suspect, was led into this error by Vossius, who, De Idololatr., lib. 7. cap. 2. p. 721. has not hesitated to write as follows: Similiter Diodorus in primo ait, idem Numen intelligi per Osirim, Serapim, et Hammonem: neque hos tantum, sed etiam Græcorum Dionysum, Jovem, Pana et Plutonem, "In like manner Diodorus especially says, that the same Deity was understood by Osiris, Serapis, and Hammon: and not these alone, but also the Dionysus, Jupiter, Pan, and Pluto of the Greeks." Manifestly wrong. Diodorus' opinion is, that some of the Egyptians supposed Osiris to be Serapis, while others identified him with Bacchus, others with Pan, and others with other deities.

[3] De Philosophia et Oraculis, in Eusebius' Præpar. Evangel. lib. 4. cap. 23. p. 175. Do not suppose however, that the words here given were so written by Porphyry, and and stand in this order in Eusebius. I. The learned Doctor connects two passages of Porphyry, which in Eusebius are at a considerable distance from each other. II. He erroneously states, that Porphyry suspected the three-headed dog to be the symbol of Serapis; whereas Porphyry merely conjectures, that Cerberus was perhaps the symbol of the ancient demons, of whom he had before stated Serapis to be the prince and head. Here are his own words: Μήποτε οὗτοί εἰσι, ὧν ἄρχει ὁ Σάραπις; καὶ διὰ τούτων σύμβολον ὁ τρικάρηνος κύων, τοῦτ' ἔστιν, ὁ ἐν τοῖς τρισὶ στοιχείοις, ὕδατι, γῇ, ἀέρι, πονηρὸς δαίμων, οὓς καταπαύει ὁ θεός, "Are these the demons, of whom Serapis is the head and ruler? whose symbol is, therefore the three-headed dog, that is, the wicked demon dwelling in the three elements, water, earth, and air; whom God restrains."

or devils: Τοὺς δὴ πονηροὺς δαίμονας οὐκ εἰκῇ ὑπὸ τὸν Σάραπιν ὑποπτεύομεν· οὐδ' ἐκ τῶν συμβόλων μόνον ἀναπεισθέντες, &c., "We do not vainly or without ground suspect and conjecture, that the evil demons are under Serapis as their prince and head: this appearing (saith he) not only from those rites of appeasement used in the worship of this God, but also from the symbol of him, which was a three-headed dog, signifying that evil demon which ruleth in those three elements, water, earth, and air." Neither indeed can it be doubted, but that it was an evil demon or devil, that delivered oracles in this temple of Serapis, as well as elsewhere among the Pagans, however he affected to be worshipped as the supreme God.[4]

[4] I. Whether Serapis and Osiris be one and the same God, or two different deities, I shall not venture to determine: nor if I did, could I avail myself of such arguments of ancient writers as would place the truth of my opinion beyond doubt, inasmuch as no slight testimonies are to be found on each side of the question. I can affirm, however, without hesitation, that this Osiris was a man and a king, renowned for noble and gallant achievements, to whom after death the superstition of the Egyptians decreed divine honours. This is proclaimed by all that is recorded of him in Diodorus Siculus and Plutarch; nor in my opinion does what has been remarked concerning Osiris by J. Le Clerc, among others, Biblioth. Histor. et Universelle, tom. III. p. 12. 27. leave room for further doubt; although I do not on all points concur with him. The memory, however, of ancient matters being lost, each interpreted the history of Osiris according to his own conception; some in a physical, others in a mathematical, others in an astronomical sense; as is abundantly evident from Plutarch, De Iside et Osiride. And as the highest place amongst the Egyptian deities was assigned to this Osiris, some philosophers were also found who confounded him with the sovereign lord of all things, pointed out by nature and reason, and persuaded themselves that Osiris was the name of the supreme God. II. That Serapis belonged to the class of later Egyptian deities, is not only testified by Origen, but appears to be confirmed also by many other ancient authors, Plutarch, Clemens, Tacitus, and others, who relate at great length, how this god was imported into Egypt in the time of Ptolemy Soter. And their authority is followed by not a few most learned men, of whose reasoning and arguments no one has given a more elegant and lucid account than Humphr. Prideaux, History of the Jews, par. 2. lib. 1. tom. 3. p. 17—22. Nevertheless, in opposition to these, others assert that Serapis was not an adopted god of the Egyptians, but a most ancient deity of this country. See G. J. Vossius, De Origine Idololatr. lib. 1. cap. 29. p. 82. 83. and what J. Le Clerc has not long ago remarked in answer to Prideaux, Biblioth. Ancien. et Moderne, tom. 19. p. 401. Moreover, a great many of the ancients as well as moderns maintain, that Joseph was worshipped by the Egyptians under this name. See J. Spencer, De Legibus Hebræor. Ritual. lib. 3. cap. 8. p. 879. &c. tom. 2. last edition. The latter opinion unquestionably is the better founded of the two; as is manifest both from many other things and from what Plutarch expressly records, De Iside et Osiride, p. 361. 362. that, according to the account of the Egyptian priests, the statue which Ptolemy in consequence of a dream had caused to be conveyed from Sinope to Alexandria, was Serapis. For it clearly shows, that the priests gave to this foreign god introduced by Ptolemy the name of a certain ancestral and ancient deity, whom the Egyptians had worshipped heretofore. That crafty and astute race had just cause to fear, that the old religion of the Egyptians, and with it the priests, would be brought into contempt, if a strange god should be preferred before the ancestral deities. Therefore they wisely adopted this new intruder and falsely pretended that he had been theirs long ago. Should any one choose to reconcile the two opinions and determine that the god himself was ancient, but that his statue was new and not older than the time of Ptolemy, I for my part shall not object. Such, indeed, is the view taken by J. Braun, Select. Sacra, lib. 4. sect. 46. p. 396. But I can hardly be led to suppose, that Serapis is to be taken for Joseph, especially when I see that the supporters of

Besides all this, Eusebius himself from Porphyrius[5] informs us, that the Egyptians acknowledged one intellectual Demiurgus, or maker of the world, under the name of Cneph, whom they worshipped in a statue of human form, and a blackish sky-coloured complexion; holding in his hand a girdle and a sceptre, and wearing upon his head a princely plume, and thrusting forth an egg out of his mouth.* The reason of which hieroglyphic is thus given: Ὅτι λόγος δυσεύρετος καὶ κεκρυμμένος, καὶ οὐ φανὸς, καὶ ὅτι ζωοποιὸς, καὶ ὅτι βασιλεὺς, καὶ ὅτι νοερῶς κινεῖται· διὸ ἡ τοῦ πτεροῦ φύσις ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ κεῖται, "Because that wisdom and reason, by which the world was made, is not easy to be found out, but hidden and obscure. And because this is the fountain of life and king of all things; and because it is intellectually moved, signified by the feathers upon his head." Moreover, by the egg thrust out of the mouth of this God was meant the world, created by the eternal λόγος, and from this Cneph was said to be generated or produced another God, whom the Egyptians call Phtha, and the Greeks Vulcan; of which Phtha more afterwards. That the Egyptians were the most eminent asserters of the cosmogonia, or temporary beginning of the world, hath been already declared; for which cause the scholiast upon Ptolemy thus perstringeth them: Περιττῶς εἰώθασι λέγειν γένεσιν Αἰγύπτιοι κόσμου, "The Egyptians were wont to talk perpetually of the genesis or creation of the world." And Ascle-

this opinion assume many things which no one would easily admit. See what has been brought forward in opposition to this opinion by Pet. Jurieu, Histoire Critique des Dogmes et des Cultes, par. 3. cap. 6. p. 521. Add J. Fran. Buddeus, Histor. Eccles. V. T. tom. 1. p. 357.

[5] I have an observation or two to make upon this passage of Porphyry, as quoted by the learned Doctor. I. He assumes, that the saying is to be understood of the supreme Deity of all. But I doubt this. Porphyry is speaking of the δημιουργὸς or maker of the world. Now Cudworth could not but know, that most of the Egyptian philosophers, not to speak at present of the Platonists, to whom Porphyry belonged, did not suppose this maker of the world to be the supreme Being, but placed him far below the parent and founder of all things. See Jamblichus, De Mysteriis Ægyptior. sect. 8. cap. 2. p. 158. and Gale's notes thereon. II. He speaks, as though the whole of Egypt paid divine honours to this Cneph. [On Cneph, see Jablonsky, Pantheon Ægyptior. lib. 1. cap. 5. p. 81. &c. who both commits, as usual, many other mistakes and makes a local deity to be the universal god of the Egyptians. This error runs through the whole of his book.] Whereas, according to the passage of Plutarch, which soon after follows, the inhabitants of Thebais only, and not the entire Egyptian people, worshipped this deity. III. The words do not occur in Eusebius as they are here quoted by Dr. Cudworth: who has aimed merely to express their sense. IV. But in doing so, unless I am grossly mistaken, he attributes some things to Porphyry which are nowhere to be met with in that author. Porphyry does not say that "the wisdom and reason, by which the world was made, is not easy to be found out;" but simply intimates, as the Greek words here show, ὅτι λόγος δυσεύρετος, namely, "that it is not easy to develope the cause of all created things." What is here stated respecting the world created by the eternal λόγος is altogether unknown to Porphyry. Lastly, he does not say that another deity was generated from Cneph, but that another deity was afterwards produced from the egg thrust out of the mouth of this god.

* Præp. lib. 3. cap. 11. p. 115.

pius,* an ancient Egyptian writer, in his Myriogenesis,[6] affirms, that according to the Egyptian tradition, the sun was made in Libra. But that the Egyptians did not suppose the world to have been made by chance, as Epicurus and other atheistical philosophers did, but by an intellectual Demiurgus called by them Cneph, is evident from this testimony of Porphyrius. Which Cneph was looked upon by them as an unmade and eternal Deity, and for this very cause the inhabitants of Thebais refused to worship any other God besides him, as Plutarch informs us in these words: Εἰς δὲ τὰς γραφὰς τῶν τιμωμένων ζώων, τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους συντεταγμένα τελεῖν, μόνους δὲ μὴ διδόναι τοὺς Θηβαΐδα κατοικοῦντας, ὡς θνητὸν θεὸν οὐδένα νομίζοντες, ἀλλὰ ὃν καλοῦσιν αὐτοὶ Κνὴφ, ἀγέννητον ὄντα καὶ ἀθάνατον, "Whilst the other Egyptians paid their proportion of tax imposed upon them, for the nourishment of those sacred animals, worshipped by them, the inhabitants of Thebais only refused, because they would acknowledge no mortal God, and worshipped him only whom they call Cneph, an unmade and eternal Deity."

Having now made it undeniably manifest, that the Egyptians had an acknowledgment amongst them of one supreme, universal, and unmade Deity, we shall conclude this whole discourse with the two following observations; first, that a great part of the Egyptian polytheism was really nothing else but the worshipping of one and the same supreme God, under many different names and notions, as of Hammon, Neith, Isis, Osiris, Serapis, Cneph, to which may be added Phtha, and those other names in Jamblichus, of Eicton and Emeph. And that the Pagans universally over the whole world did the like, was affirmed also by Apuleius, in that forecited passage of his, Numen unicum, multiformi specie, ritu vario, nomine multijugo, totus veneratur orbis, "The whole world worshippeth one only supreme Numen in a multiform manner, under different names, and with different rites." Which different names for one and the same supreme God might therefore be mistaken by some of the sottish vulgar amongst the Pagans, as well as they have been by learned men of these later times, for so many distinct, unmade, and self-existent deities.[7]

* Scal. Emend. Temp. lib. 5. de Condit. Mundi.

[6] The astrological hypothesis of the creation of the world, according to the Egyptian tradition, has been expounded by Julius Firmicus, Astronomicor, lib. 3. in Præf. and cap. 1. on the authority of Asclepius and others. Add Macrobius, In Somn. Scipionis, lib. 1. cap. 21. p. 110. who however differs in many points from Firmicus. Consequently, in this matter again there is nothing fixed and certain.

† De Iside et Osiride. [P. 357.]

[7] But the very worship itself, which was paid to them by the Egyptians, places it beyond controversy, that different and distinct deities were designated by these names. Thus Isis was appeased by one description of rites, Serapis by another, Neith by another: the history also of these gods was different. We can by no means infer the religion of the whole people from the fact, that some persons, a little above the vulgar, perhaps supposed all these to be the names of the one supreme God.

Nevertheless, here may well be a question started, whether amongst those several Egyptian names of God, some might not signify distinct divine hypostases subordinate; and particularly, whether there were not some footsteps of a trinity to be found in the old Egyptian theology? For since Orpheus, Pythagoras and Plato, who all of them asserted a trinity of divine hypostases, unquestionably derived much of their doctrine from the Egyptians, it may be reasonably suspected, that these Egyptians did the like before them. And indeed Athanasius Kircherus makes no doubt at all hereof, but tells us that, in the Pamphylian obelisk, that first hieroglyphic of a winged globe, with a serpent coming out of it, was the Egyptian hieroglyphic of a tri-form Deity, or trinity of divine hypostases; he confirming the same, from the testimony of Abenephius an Arabian writer, and a Chaldaic fragment imputed to Sanchoniathon; the globe being said to signify the first incomprehensible Deity, without beginning or end, self-existent; the serpent the divine wisdom and creative virtue; and lastly, the wings that active spirit, that cherisheth, quickeneth and enliveneth all things. How far credit is to be given to this, we leave others to judge;[8] but the clearest footsteps that we can find any where of an Egyptian trinity is in Jamblichus' book, written concerning their mysteries; which whole place therefore is worth the setting down: Κατ' ἄλλην δὲ τάξιν προστάττει [Ἑρμῆς] θεὸν τὸν Ἥμηφ, τῶν ἐπουρανίων θεῶν ἡγούμενον, ὅν φησιν νοῦν εἶναι αὐτὸν ἑαυτὸν νοοῦντα, καὶ τὰς νοήσεις εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἐπιστρέφοντα. Τούτου δὲ ἓν ἀμερὲς, καὶ ὃ φησι τὸ πρῶτον μάγευμα προτάττει, ὅν καὶ Εἰκτὼν ἐπονομάζει, ἐν ᾧ τὸ πρῶτόν ἐστι νοῦν καὶ τὸ πρῶτον νοητὸν, ὃ δὴ καὶ διὰ σιγῆς μόνης θεραπεύεται. Ἐπὶ δὲ τούτοις . . . . ὁ δημιουργικὸς νοῦς καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας προστάτης, καὶ σοφίᾳ ἐρχόμενος μὲν ἐπὶ γένεσιν, καὶ τὴν ἀφανῆ τῶν κεκρυμμένων λόγων δύναμιν εἰς φῶς ἄγων, Ἀμῶν κατὰ τὴν τῶν Αἰγυπτίων γλῶσσαν λέγεται, συντελῶν δὲ ἀψευδῶς ἕκαστα καὶ τεχνικῶς μετ' ἀληθείας Φθᾶ, Ἕλληνες δὲ εἰς Ἥφαιστον μεταλαμβάνουσι τὸν Φθᾶ, τῷ τεχνικῷ μόνον προσβάλλοντες, ἀγαθῶν δὲ ποιητικὸς ὢν Ὄσιρις κέκληται, καὶ ἄλλας δι' ἄλλας δυνάμεις τε καὶ ἐνεργείας ἐπωνυμίας ἔχει, "According to another order or method, Hermes places the god Emeph,* as the prince and ruler over all the celestial gods, whom he affirmeth to be a mind understanding himself, and converting his cogitations or intellections into himself. Before which Emeph, he placeth one indivisible, whom he calleth Eicton, in which is the first intelligible, and which is worshipped only by silence. After which two, Eicton and Emeph, the demiurgic mind and president of truth as with wisdom it proceedeth to generations, and

[8] The folly of this interpretation of Kircher's has already been exposed by Herm. Witsius, in his Ægyptiac. lib. 2. cap. 5. sect. 8. p. 95. Add lib. 1. cap. 3. p. 8, 9.

* Or Cneph.

bringeth forth the hidden powers of the occult reasons into light, is called in the Egyptian language Ammon; as it artificially affects all things with truth, Phtha (which Phtha, the Greeks attending only to the artificialness thereof, call Hephestus or Vulcan) as it is productive of good, Osiris, besides other names that he hath, according to its other powers and energies." In which passage of Jamblichus[9] we have plainly three divine hypostases, or universal principles subordinate, according to the Hermaic theology; first, an indivisible unity called Eicton; secondly, a perfect mind, converting its intellections into itself, called Emeph or Hemphta; and thirdly, the immediate principle of generation, called by several names, according to its several powers, as Phtha, Ammon, Osiris, and the like: so that these three names with others, according to Jamblichus, did in the Egyptian theology signify one and the same third divine hypostasis. How well these three divine hypostases of the Egyptians agree with the Pythagoric or Platonic trinity, of first, τὸ ἓν or τἀγαθὸν, "unity and goodness" itself, secondly, νοῦς, "mind," and thirdly ψυχὴ, "soul," I need not here declare. Only we shall call to mind what hath been already intimated, that that reason or wisdom, which was the Demiurgus of the world, and is properly the second of the forementioned hypostases, was called also among the Egyptians, by another name, Cneph; from whom was said to have been produced or begotten the god Phtha, the third hypostasis of the Egyptian trinity; so that Cneph and Emeph are all one. Wherefore we have here plainly an Egyptian trinity of divine hypostasis subordinate, Eicton, Emeph (or Cneph) and Phtha. We know not what to add more to this of Jamblichus, concerning an Egyptian trinity, unless we should insist upon those passages, which have been cited by some of the fathers to this purpose out of Hermaic or Trismegistic books, whereof there was one before set down out of St. Cyril; or unless we should again call to mind that citation out of Damascius,[10] μία τῶν ὅλων ἀρχὴ σκότος ἄγνωστον ὑμνουμένη καὶ τοῦτο τρὶς ἀναφωνούμενον οὕτως, "that according to the Egyptians, there is one principle of all things praised under the name of the unknown darkness, and this thrice repeated." Agreeably to which, Augustinus Steuchus produces another passage out of the same philosophic writer; that the Egyptians made, πρώτην ἀρχὴν σκότος ὑπὲρ πᾶσαν νόησιν, σκότος ἄγνωστον, τρὶς τοῦτο ἐπιφημίζοντες, "the first principle of all, to be darkness above all knowledge and understanding (or unknown darkness), they thrice repeating the same." Which the forementioned Steuchus

[9] De Mysteriis Ægyptior. sect. 8. cap. 3. p. 158. 156.

[10] In Wolf's Anecdota Græca, p. 260. The passage from Steuchus, which follows, though expressed somewhat differently, is evidently to the same purport.

takes to be a clear acknowledgment of a trinity of divine hypostases in the Egyptian theology.[1]

Our second observation is this, that the Egyptian theology as

[1] If the Egyptian trinity rested upon these authorities alone, scarcely any thing, I should think, might more easily be overthrown. In the first place I would remark generally, that no reliance is to be placed upon the junior Platonists, to whom Jamblichus and Damascius belonged, when treating of Egyptian doctrines. For such was the recklessness of the whole of this sect, that in defiance of truth they dragged almost all nations into their ranks and strangely perverted the dogmas of all philosophers, so as to make them appear to be in accordance with their own. Of which practice instances almost innumerable are to be met with. And that they tenaciously adhered to the same practice in explaining the dogmas of the Egyptians, is proved by the diversity of their interpretations, which varied according to the various opinions they themselves severally entertained. Therefore as these men, in order that they might not appear to be too much at variance with the Christians, were continually dwelling upon three principles, they easily persuaded themselves to introduce them into the Egyptian theology. However, as regards the passage of Jamblichus, upon which the present question chiefly turns, it is so far from being of any avail in the matter, that it rather makes against the opinion of those who suppose the Egyptians to have believed in a trinity. To make this appear I would observe, I. That Jamblichus is not treating of the first and supreme gods and of first principles, but of another class of deities called by him *ἐπουράνιοι*, "celestial." This is shown by the very commencement of the passage: and it will be still more clear to any one who attentively peruses the preceding second chapter. For in this chapter Jamblichus tells us, that the Egyptians had two principal gods, passing all human understanding; one *αὐτογενὴς* and *μονοκράτωρ*, "self-born" and "self-produced," the other *αὐτάρκης*, or "self-sufficient," who was developed out of the first, and is the *god of gods*. After explaining the nature of these two gods, he subjoins these words: *Αὗται μὲν οὖν εἰσιν ἀρχαὶ πρεσβύταται πάντων, ἃς Ἑρμῆς πρὸ τῶν αἰθερίων καὶ ἐμπυρίων θεῶν προτάττει καὶ τῶν ΕΠΟΥΡΑΝΙΩΝ*, "These, therefore, are the most ancient principles of all, which Hermes places above the ethereal, empyreal and celestial gods." From these words it is evident that, according to Jamblichus, or the Egyptians, the celestial gods were inferior to the first principles or gods. To these celestial gods, then, he proceeds in the third chapter, beginning with the words here quoted, and tells us that the god Emeph was placed over them. The trinity of the Egyptians, therefore, already falls to the ground. For according to them, those two are simply the first principles of all things: nor is that passage treating of these, but of gods far inferior to them. II. Besides, Jamblichus does not reckon only three, but many such gods; which entirely settles the question. Thus, after having spoken of the god Emeph, and of the god he calls Eicton, he proceeds as follows: *Ἐπὶ δὲ τούτοις τῶν ἐμφανῶν δημιουργίας ἄλλοι προεστήκασιν ἡγέμονες*, "Besides these, other rulers preside over the making of visible things." Which words are omitted by the learned Doctor, who after *ἐπὶ δὲ τούτοις* immediately goes on to *δημιουργικὸς νοῦς*: which entirely deranges and alters the author's meaning. Among these rulers, Jamblichus assigns the first place to the Demiurgic mind, which he tells us is called Ammon, Phtha and Osiris. The next he gives to the governor of the elements: *Ἔστι δὲ οὖν καὶ ἄλλη τις ἡμεμονία τῶν περὶ γένεσιν ὅλων στοιχείων*, "There is also another government of all the elements in generation." The third he ascribes to the moon. He then goes on to say, that the heavens are distributed by the Egyptians into various parts, and that these parts have each their own princes and rulers. Lastly, he informs us that one superior to the rest is placed over them all. Now let any one attempt to find in these rulers and gods those three principles or three persons of one godhead. We have first five major gods: Eicton, Emeph, demiurgic nature, the ruler of the elements, and the moon. We have then several minor princes, to whom the various parts of the heavens were supposed to be entrusted. Lastly, we have one higher and more excellent than these princes of the heavens, who governs and controls all things. On the passages of Damascius I see no reason for making any particular remark, as he is a writer of no repute or authority, and the words themselves throw little light upon the subject. Nevertheless, it ought to be noticed, that Plutarch makes mention of three principles as having probably been recognized, if not by all, at least by some of the Egyptians. But these

well as the Orphic (which was derived from it) asserting one incorporeal Deity, that is all things; as it is evident, that it could not admit a multitude of self-existent and independent deities, so did the seeming polytheism of these Egyptians proceed also in great measure from this principle of theirs not rightly understood; they being led thereby, in a certain sense, θεοποιεῖν, "to personate and deify" the several parts of the world, and things of nature, bestowing the names of gods and goddesses upon them. Not that they therefore worshipped the inanimate parts of the world as such, much less things not substantial, but mere accidents, for so many real, distinct, personal deities; but because conceiving that God, who was all things, ought to be worshipped in all things (such especially as were most beneficial to mankind) they did, according to that Asclepian and Trismegistic doctrine before-mentioned, call God by the name of every thing, or every thing by the name of God. And that the wiser of them very well understood, that it was really one and the same simple Deity, that was thus worshipped amongst them by piecemeal, in the several parts of the world, and things of nature, and under different names and notions, with different ceremonies, is thus declared by Plutarch:* Ἑλληνικὸν ἡ Ἶσις ἐστὶ, καὶ ὁ Τυφὼν πολέμιος τῇ θεῷ, καὶ δι' ἄγνοιαν καὶ ἀπάτην τετυφωμένος, καὶ διασπῶν καὶ ἀφανίζων τὸν ἱερὸν λόγον, ὃν ἡ θεὸς συνάγει καὶ συντίθησι καὶ παραδίδωσι τοῖς τελουμένοις θειώσεως, "Isis is a Greek word, which signifies knowledge; and Typhon is the enemy to this goddess; who being puffed up by ignorance and error, doth distract and discerp the holy doctrine (of the simple Deity) which Isis collects together again, and makes up into one, and thus delivers it to those who are initiated into her sacred mysteries, in order to deification." In which words, Plutarch intimates, that the Egyptian fable, of Osiris being mangled and cut in pieces by Typhon, did allegorically signify

three principles differ widely from the three persons or essences of the divinity, and can in no way be reconciled with the Platonic or Christian trinity. For they are God, eternal matter, and the world created by God out of this eternal matter. Behold Plutarch's own words, De Iside et Osiride, p. 373: Ἡ δὲ κρείττων καὶ θειοτέρα φύσις ἐκ τριῶν ἐστι, τοῦ νοητοῦ, καὶ τῆς ὕλης, καὶ τοῦ ἐκ τούτων, ὃν κόσμον Ἕλληνες ὀνομάζουσι, "The more excellent and divine nature consists of three,—of the intelligible, of matter, and of that which is compounded from these, which the Greeks call the world." He next shows, how these three were designated by Plato, and then returns to the Egyptians: Αἰγυπτίους δὲ ἄν τις εἰκάσειε τῶν τριγώνων τὸ κάλλιστον μάλιστα τούτῳ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς φύσιν ὁμοιοῦντας, ... καὶ τὸν μὲν Ὄσιριν ὡς ἀρχὴν, τὴν δὲ Ἶσιν ὡς ὑποδοχὴν, τὸν δὲ Ὧρον ὡς ἀποτέλεσμα, "The Egyptians, it is probable, likened the nature of the universe to the most beautiful of triangles, ... and supposed Osiris to be the principle, Isis the recipient, and Orus the effect." This is Plutarch's conjecture, which appears to have little to support it; still I would not deny, but that some of the Egyptian priests, divided as they were in their opinions, may have so expounded the fables respecting the gods, and consequently comprised the whole nature of things in three principles.

* De Is. et Os. 351.

the discerption and distraction of the simple Deity, by reason of the weakness and ignorance of vulgar minds (not able to comprehend it altogether at once) into several names and partial notions, which yet true knowledge and understanding, that is, Isis, makes up whole again, and unites into one.[2]

[2] Not a few learned men, and those too of the highest eminence, concur in the opinion here professed by Dr. Cudworth, concerning the numerous gods to which the ancients paid religious homage. They tell us, that the ancients supposed God to be a spirit diffused through the whole nature of things; that hence they were led to believe the several parts of the universe to be members of God: that the gods of antiquity are nothing more than parts of this universe; for example, Juno the ether, Vulcan fire, Neptune the sea; whom the ignorant vulgar rashly converted into persons and worshipped as gods. For my part, however, I am convinced, that there are many things to show this opinion to be altogether untenable. In the first place, all that is recorded of the gods of antiquity and their actions clearly makes against it and proves the truth of what was long ago remarked by Cicero, De Nat. Deor. lib. 3. cap. 19. p. 3078. In plerisque civitatibus intelligi potest, augendi virtutis gratia———virorum fortium memoriam honore Deorum immortalium consecratam, "It is observable, that in most states, for the sake of enhancing their virtue, the memory of brave men was consecrated with the honours of immortal gods." Again, there are innumerable gods, who can by no means be identified with any of the parts of the universe. For which part would Diana be, which Honour, which Bellona, which Mars, which Fever? to pass over an infinity of others. Besides, if the nations worshipped God in the several members of universal nature, I see no reason why they should not above all have worshipped themselves and man paid homage to man, who, according to the doctrine of so many philosophers, contains a spark of divine light and a portion of the Deity. If they worshipped the parts of nature on account of the divine presence in them, I cannot indeed understand, why the worship of beasts, to which the Egyptians were devoted, should have appeared so absurd and ridiculous to other nations. Nor, supposing this to have been their reason for such worship, can I comprehend, why the Egyptians paid divine honours only to some and not to all animals and all parts of nature; for example, to all trees, all pools, and all insects. But, unless my judgment deceives me, learned men have been much too hasty in following the Stoics, by whom this explication of the gods was invented for the purpose of conveniently adapting the popular religion to their own philosophy, which inculcated God to be mind pervading the whole universe and present in its several members. On which subject see the discourse of Balbus, the Stoic, in Cicero, De Natura Deor. lib. 2. cap. 28. p. 2996. where amongst other things he says: Fabulis spretis ac repudiatis, Deus pertinens per naturam cujusque rei, per terras Ceres, per maria Neptunus, alii per alia poterunt intelligi, "Disregarding and repudiating fables, we can understand thereby God as passing through the nature of every thing, Ceres through the earth, Neptune through the seas, and others through other parts." But wise men long ago exposed the fallacy of this Stoical interpretation; of whom I instance only Cicero, De Natura Deor. lib. 3. cap. 16. &c. p. 3071. Even Plutarch himself has passed a brief but powerful censure upon it, whose words, De Iside et Osiride, p. 377. are as follows: "Οπως σφόδρα προσέξουσι καὶ φοβήσονται, μὴ λάθωσιν εἰς πνεύματα, καὶ ῥεύματα, καὶ σπόρους, καὶ ἀρότους, καὶ πάθη γῆς καὶ μεταβολὰς ὡρῶν διαγνάφοντες τὰ θεῖα καὶ διαλύοντες, ὥσπερ οἱ Διόνυσον τὸν οἶνον, "Ηφαιστον δὲ τὴν φλόγα· Περσεφόνην δέ φησί που Κλεάνθης τὸ διὰ τῶν καρπῶν φερόμενον καὶ φονεύομενον πνεῦμα.———οὐδὲν γὰρ τούτου διαφέρουσι τῶν ἱστία καὶ κάλους καὶ ἄγκυραν ἡγουμένων κυβερνήτην, καὶ νήματα καὶ κρόκας ὑφάντην, καὶ σπονδεῖον ἢ μελίκρατον ἢ πτισάνην ἰατρόν, "Unless they take the most diligent heed, they will unwittingly dissipate and divide the deities into spirits, streams, seeds, tillage, and affections of the earth and changes of the seasons, as those who take Bacchus for wine, and Vulcan for fire. Thus Cleanthes (the Stoic) somewhere asserts Proserpine to be a spirit, passing through fruits and perishing——These do not differ from such as take the sails, cables, and anchor for the pilot, the threads and warp for the weaver, or the cup, mulse, and broth for the physician." The learned Doctor, therefore, is manifestly mistaken, in supposing Plutarch to be favourable to his opinion. For in the passage here quoted he does not say, that the mangled limbs of Osiris are the various parts of nature, which the ignorant and untaught multitude con-

XIX. It is well known that the poets, though they were the prophets of the Pagans, and pretending to a kind of divine in-

verted into so many gods, but which the wise will again collect together and unite; for in doing so he would have been grossly inconsistent with himself. He intimates simply, that reason, of which Isis is said to be the image, restores to its pristine splendour and integrity the true and wise philosophy, which men inflated by pride have stifled and suppressed.

But, passing over these matters, I shall come to the religion of the Egyptians, upon which I have intimated my intention of offering some comments in this place. I. Scarcely any subject or religion of antiquity has given rise to so many books, writings, and discourses, as the theology of Egypt: the investigation or rather mystification of which has occupied the labours of many ancient as well as modern authors. [The ancient religion of the Egyptians is very fairly discussed by Maillet, Description de l' Egypte, t. 2. p. 43. who, however, among other errors, in p. 54. adopts the untenable position of Dr. Cudworth, that the Egyptians worshipped one God in animals.] For as the Egyptians had always held a high reputation for philosophy and literature, learned men fancied they could in no way better bestow their diligence than in exploring the opinions and doctrines of this nation: which being once known, while some supposed that they would then have arrived at truth itself, others did not hesitate to believe, that they would thereby obtain a clue to the religious creed of the whole world, which, according to the uniform tradition of antiquity, had copied the institutions of the Egyptians. In our own times, to pass over an innumerable host of others, both ancient and modern, two most learned men have endeavoured to throw new light upon matters of Egyptian history and doctrine in specific works. One is Andr. Acoluthus, a theologian, eminent for his knowledge of oriental literature, whose premature death, however, prevented him from finishing a work, by which he flattered himself he was about to restore the ancient philosophy of that nation. See his epistle in Christ. Aug. Heumann's Pœcile, lib. 4. tom. 2. p. 546. 548. The other is Sicard, a French jesuit, who sojourned several years in Egypt for the purpose of disseminating the Roman Catholic religion, and wrote an elaborate and copious work, De Veteri et Novo Ægypto, of which he has himself given a lucid sketch, in the Nouveaux Memoires des Missions de la Compagnie de Jesus dans le Levant, tom. 6. p. 204. In consequence of the lamented death of its author, which took place in 1726, it is uncertain whether this book will ever be given to the public. See Memoires des Missions, tom. 7. p. 256. II. Hitherto, however, the labours of men of undoubted worth and excellence have scarcely had any other result than merely to furnish us with their several opinions and to convince us from the number and variety of these, that unless the greatest caution be exercised and a long examination entered into, it is altogether impossible to arrive at any satisfactory conclusion respecting the nature and character of the ancient religion of Egyptians. Nor is this dissension of recent date only. The ancients no less than ourselves were at issue upon the subject, and Plutarch's well known book, De Iside et Osiride, is nothing more than an enumeration of various opinions respecting it: from which it will be seen, that there were as many interpretations given of this religion, as there were men possessed of intelligence and imbued with fixed opinions of their own. Wherefore, I am the more surprised at the boldness of not a few at the present day, who would fain make us believe, that they alone have penetrated into the Egyptian mysteries and unveiled the secret recesses of their temples. III. In inquiring into the causes of this great discordance of opinion, it has occurred to me that all those who attempt to speculate upon the institutions and religions of ancient nations fall into certain errors; which, as applying especially to the writers on Egyptian matters, I shall advert to before speaking of the religion itself of this people. In the first place, it is, I observe, a common mistake with all of them, to suppose that the religion of Egypt, of Greece, of Syria, of Persia, and other countries, was one and the same throughout the whole of the respective nations, and that in Egypt, for example, the doctrine which flourished at Alexandria was the same as that which prevailed in the other towns and provinces. Which, however, is far from the fact. Among ourselves, who have certain points of doctrine, which are alike binding upon all ministers of religion, it is possible generally speaking, to form an idea of the religion of the whole people from the worship of a particular city. But the case was different with the religions of antiquity, nor were all the priests bound to conform to the same creed. Hence, it necessarily followed, that there were a variety of opinions on sacred matters and the priests of

spiration, did otherwise embue the minds of the vulgar with a certain sense of religion, and the notions of morality, yet these

Thebes for instance, of Sais, and of Memphis, inculcated different doctrines. The whole of the religion of ancient nations may be conveniently distributed into the popular and the philosophical, or the religion of the vulgar and of the wise.* That the popular religion was in most of them of a varied character, admits of no controversy. There were in all certain principal gods worshipped by the whole nation; in Greece, for example, Jupiter, Apollo, Minerva; in Egypt, Isis, Osiris, Orus, Typhon. But besides these, each district sometimes, or town, revered peculiar deities of its own, to which the other cities paid very little or no homage. Thus, Neith was the goddess of the Saitans, whom the rest of the Egyptians considered it to be no part of their duty to appease and worship. The same thing is observable at this day among the Roman Catholics, who have certain principal saints, to whom all pay homage, and besides these, many others of inferior note, whose worship is supposed to pertain only to particular provinces. Thus, the French hold St. Genevieve in the most devout reverence; but very few follow their example. Nor indeed were the supreme gods worshipped throughout the whole of a nation. A temple of Isis was not found in all the cities of Egypt, nor of Diana in all those of Greece, but sometimes the peculiar gods of each were alone worshipped. The religion of the wise, as I have termed it, is a philosophical interpretation of the popular religion, or an explication of the fables concerning the gods, adapted to reason and philosophy. There were in all nations, it is well known, learned men, who maintained the vulgar rites to be symbols and images of more sublime things; but these differed so widely in their opinions and sentiments, that no one, I imagine, will assert that all the philosophers and wise men taught the same theological doctrines. The religions and interpretations of the public rites in each nation were as numerous as its men of talent and its sects of philosophers. And that this observation is especially applicable to Egypt, is abundantly testified by Plutarch, Diodorus Siculus, Juvenal, in a word, by all that have touched upon the Egyptian religion, who show that this people held no common sentiment on the subject of religion, but that each of the districts and cities had different deities, victims, and sacred rites, and the philosophers and priests, who harmonized the religion with reason, conformed to no certain and fixed rule, but were guided solely by their own fancies. Such being the case, those who do not scruple to give a general definition of the religion of the Egyptians and to attribute to them a common code or body of doctrine, appear to me not to act more wisely than those, who undertake to measure the religions and institutions of the American tribes, diversified as they notoriously are, by one and the same rule and standard. Compare our remarks on the same subject above. Another error of those, who examine into the religions of antiquity, seems to me to consist in this, that they do not take into consideration the vicissitudes of human affairs and the revolutions of states, but suppose the religion of a people to have always remained one and the same and, therefore, endeavour to discover in it some permanent and constant form. Inundations, wars, commerce with foreign nations, colonies, and such like, are wont, as we all know, to bring manifold evils and changes upon a state, as well as upon its religion and sacred rites. And, what nation of former times has been exempt from these visitations? To confine ourselves to Egypt alone, every one moderately acquainted with ancient history must be aware, how many important revolutions, physical as well as civil, this nation has undergone. And in the midst of such calamities and perpetual changes, who I ask, can suppose the ancient religion to have remained unaffected and unaltered? Who would assert, that the Persians, the Chaldeans, and other nations introduced none of their superstitions into this vanquished country, and that the strangers and colonists caused none of their ancestral rites to be adopted in Egypt? That the fact was so, will by and by be made to appear. And yet the inquiries of learned men into the religion of the ancients, and especially of the Egyptians, are as general as though its form and character had remained the same in all ages. The Greek writers, from whom, as the only authorities now extant, all our own knowledge of the ancient oriental religions is to be derived, have led the way to a third description of error to learned men, who delight in exploring the doctrines of antiquity. For it was the practice of these writers, as is evident from Herodotus alone, to identify the deities worshipped in Greece with the gods of the Egyptians, Syrians, and other nations, and on observing any even the slightest resemblance, to pronounce Osiris, for example, to be Jupiter, Isis, Minerva, and Typhon Pluto. And the explorers of antiquities

notwithstanding were the grand depravers and adulterators of the pagan theology. For this they were guilty of upon several

have rashly given credence to them. Hence innumerable disputations have arisen on these subjects and so great confusion has been introduced into the history of ancient religions, that intelligent men scarcely know where they can safely place a foot. Lastly, many suffer themselves to be led away by the later philosophers and priests and do not hesitate to assent to the truth of all that these men have recorded respecting the hidden meanings of the sacred rites of antiquity. The religion of Egypt especially has met with various interpretations and elucidations: which very variety ought to be regarded by learned men as a proof, that they are destitute of truth and were invented in later times for the purpose of disguising the deformity and turpitude of the ancient worship. But the generality of them are swayed more by the authority of the Platonic philosophers and the Egyptian priests, than by right reason. Hence, each forms an opinion of the Egyptian religion according to the guide he has chosen for himself; one having recourse to mathematical circles, another to astrology, a third to natural philosophy, while a fourth again betakes himself to ethics, a fifth to chemistry, a sixth to the medical art, for the solution of these sublime and abstruse rites, as they suppose them. One imagines Isis to be nature, another the moon, a third the earth, a fourth liquid gold, and what not. I shall not now speak of the hieroglyphics, having already professedly treated of them above; although in these, I must confess, lies one of the main causes of the numerous errors in which Ath. Kircher and others have involved themselves in the exposition of Egyptian affairs.

He who reflects upon all these things will, I doubt not, be sensible, how hazardous and unsafe it is to decide universally on the religion of the Egyptians, and will perceive that it is no light task to disentangle the truth of the doubts and difficulties which encompass it. Nor am I one to suppose myself capable of throwing a new light upon matters shrouded in eternal night: nevertheless, there are some points which I shall touch upon, not with the confidence of a Pythian Apollo, as though all that I say were infallible, but as one individual out of the many and following probable conjecture. Let those speak positively, who profess to have a clear insight into all ancient matters and who wish to appear to compass in one mind the whole subject of antiquity. On the whole I lay down these three things, than which in my opinion nothing is more certain. In the first place: that, like all human precepts and doctrines, the religion of the Egyptians also underwent its changes and vicissitudes and was not always of the same form and character. Secondly, that the religion of the whole of Egypt was not one and the same, as regarded most of its precepts, but differed according to the diversity of provinces and dispositions. Thirdly, that the religion of the ancient Egyptians must be distinguished from the latter expositions and interpretations invented by the priests and that they are not to be believed, who endeavoured to pass off the greatest folly, in many instances, as a certain occult and secret wisdom. The second of these positions I should wish to be particularly attended to, inasmuch as there are many who suppose every thing recorded concerning the Egyptians to apply at once to the whole of that country. From which error even those writers are not free, who in other respects held a high reputation among the ancients. So Juvenal, Sat. 15. v. 9. mentions, that the Egyptians regarded the leek and onion with religious reverence:

Porrum et cepe nefas violare et frangere morsu.

But, according to the authority of Herodotus, the common people ate leeks, onions, and garlic, without the least scruple, Hist. lib. 2. cap. 124. p. 127. and Plutarch informs us, that the priests alone abstained from these plants, not so much from religious motives as on the score of health, De Iside et Osiride, p. 353. t. 2. opp. Macrobius, besides many others, Saturnal. lib. 1. cap. 7. p. 215. states: Nunquam fas fuisse Ægyptiis, pecudibus aut sanguine, sed precibus et thure solo, placare Deos, "That the Ægyptians were not allowed to propitiate the deities by victims and blood, but only by prayers and incense." I can believe this to have been the custom with some of the Egyptians: but that it is wrong to refer it to the whole of them, we have ample testimony from Herodotus, who, lib. 2. cap. 41. p. 104. tells us, that the Egyptians sacrificed oxen and calves. Nor did Herodotus himself sufficiently guard against this error, as I could show, if my limits would permit; although otherwise he

accounts. As first, their attributing to the gods, in their fables concerning them, all manner of human imperfections, passions and vices. Which abuse of theirs the wiser of the Pagans were

strikingly corroborates our present remark, lib. 2. cap. 42. p. 104. *Θεοὺς γὰρ δὴ οὐ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἅπαντες ὁμοίως Αἰγύπτιοι σέβονται*, "The Egyptians do not all worship the same gods alike." Add also what seems to me to be very important towards a thorough understanding of this question, that there are many accounts respecting the Egyptians, which are by no means true, and not a few things recorded of them in derision, to which they were utter strangers. For as the Jews formerly were upbraided by Plutarch, Petronius, and others, with worshipping pork, because they did not eat it, so the Egyptians, I doubt not, were charged with the worship of many things, which they eschewed not so much from a religious motive as for other reasons. Because some of them abstained from eating fish, they were suspected of paying divine honours to fishes; and because some fancied onions and garlic to be prejudicial to health, this led Juvenal to rank these among the Egyptian deities and to sneer at the pious men, *whose gods grew in their gardens.*

To come at once to the question. The entire religion of Egypt cannot, in my opinion, be more conveniently contemplated than by placing it before our view, first, as it was in its earliest infancy, naked and free from all explication of philosophers and wise men; secondly, in that form which it seems to have assumed, after the absurd notions of the Persians and Chaldeans respecting the two principles of good and evil were incorporated with the ancient religion, and lastly, as it existed after Egypt fell under the power of the Greeks.

The opinions of the primitive inhabitants of Egypt on things divine have been treated of by no one more accurately than by Diodorus Siculus, throughout the first book of his Bibliotheca Historica; in which work, indeed, we are not to look for accurate arrangement, choice of subjects, and complete demonstration; virtues hardly to be expected in a writer who treats of matters belonging to so remote a period. Nevertheless, he points out sufficiently clearly and expressly the course we ought to follow. The earliest Egyptians, then, regarded the sun, moon and stars, as gods; taught that souls do not perish, but continually migrate into new bodies; acknowledged the existence of demons or natures more excellent and noble than man; supposed that these demons frequently reside among men, inclosed in human bodies, and on leaving these proceed to the stars; and lastly believed a certain worship and religious reverence to be due to them from men: nor would I much dissent from those who are of opinion, that they also held a supreme Deity to preside over the whole nature of things. To enumerate other dogmas of this people we have not leisure, nor is it expedient, or perhaps possible. Conceiving the demons to be frequently concerned in human affairs, they were easily led to believe, that suchlike beneficent and excellent natures had resided in their own first kings and founders, especially Osiris and Isis, as Orus and others, from whom they had received the most important benefits and had been raised from the savage state to the comforts of civilized life, and on that account to pay to them divine honours after death. This is confirmed by Plutarch, who, De Iside et Osiride, p. 362. has these words: *Ὁ μὲν γὰρ Ὄσιρις καὶ ἡ Ἶσις ἐκ δαιμόνων ἀγαθῶν εἰς θεοὺς μετήλλαξαν*, "For Osiris and Isis were changed from good demons into gods." Should any one lay down a different system and contend, that the ancient Egyptians supposed the souls of heroes and distinguished men on quitting the bodies to be changed into demons on account of noble deeds, and that from this cause arose the worship of the first Egyptian kings, I shall not feel much disposed to dispute with him. So, I am aware, taught most of the Platonists, whose masters it is well known, were instructed in Egyptian schools. Plerique tamen, says Chalcidius, in Timæum Platonis, cap. 135. p. 330. ex Platonis magisterio dæmonas putant animas corporeo munere liberatas: laudabilium quoque virorum ætherios dæmonas, "The major part, however, of the Platonists, suppose demons to be souls freed from the bodily office: also the ethereal demons to be those of praiseworthy men." That the gods held in especial reverence by the Egyptians, Osiris, Isis, Orus, were men illustrious for the magnitude of their achievements and good actions has long ago been demonstrated by others, and is evident not only from the whole of their history, but also from the inscriptions mentioned by Diodorus Siculus, Biblioth. Histor. lib. 1. cap. 27. p. 22. to say nothing at present of their mysteries and sepulchres,

in all ages highly sensible of and offended with, as partly appears from these free passages[3] vented upon the stage:

and other matters, on which consult Plutarch, De Iside et Osiride, p. 258. 259. To preserve the memory of these deities and of the great benefits conferred by them upon the Egyptians, in that rude age in which the use of letters and books was either unknown or extremely rare, certain anniversary rites were instituted, representing by signs, figures and images, the former fortunes of these gods, or the things for which Egypt was indebted to them. These ceremonies, ordained in the earliest times for the purpose of commemoration, are those celebrated Egyptian mysteries, which in later times few were permitted to behold. For the priests, fearing lest most persons should learn from these rites, that the objects of Egyptian worship were mere men, long ago deceased, and apprehensive of the danger that would thereby ensue to the cause of the religion and the interests of its ministers, gradually withdrew these sacred rites from the eyes of the multitude and admitted none to witness them except those of whose fidelity and prudence they had satisfied themselves by a long probation. I have many authorities to prove what I have stated on the nature of mysteries; but I am unwilling to be prolix, more especially as I have already touched upon this argument. Suffice it therefore to say, that scarcely any one can hold a different opinion, who examines into whatever mystic rites have come down to our times and compares them with recorded accounts of the Egyptian deities. Add also, that not a few of the more intelligent of the ancients, Plutarch, Lucan, Xenophanes of Colophon, in Plutarch's De Iside et Osiride, p. 379. and many others, observed long ago, that the secret religion of the Egyptians proves the objects of their worship to have been men. And, while writing this, a very striking passage of Cicero occurs to my recollection, Tusculan. Quæst. lib. 1. cap. 13. p. 2579. in which he clearly states, that the initiated could not but know, that the superior gods were men, translated from earth to heaven: Ipsi illi, says he, majorum gentium Dii qui habentur, hinc a nobis profecti in cœlum reperientur.—Reminiscere, quoniam *es initiatus*, quæ traduntur, *mysteriis*, "Those very gods, who are accounted superior, will be found to be men who have passed from us into heaven.—Remember, for thou art initiated, what is taught in the mysteries." Nothing can be plainer than this statement. The same high opinion, which the people of Egypt generally entertained of their first kings and lawgivers, was cherished throughout the several provinces and cities of this most wealthy empire towards those, by whose industry and labour they had respectively either been governed and protected by laws, or freed from terrors and dangers, or, lastly, supplied with arts and works beneficial to human life. Hence, besides the common gods of the entire nation, each city or district reverenced its own proper and peculiar deities; nor were the same gods worshipped by all. For this appears to have been thoroughly implanted in the minds of the most ancient nations, that no man had become great and illustrious without divine influence and that the souls of those, whose virtue and fortitude had exalted them above others during life, when freed from the body, were received into the council of the gods. Hence, as has long ago been noticed by learned men, the founders of almost all the cities were deified and worshipped by the inhabitants. See Ez. Spanheim, Sur les Cesars de Julien, p. 13.

I shall now speak of the worship of beasts, in respect to which the religion of the Egyptians differs from all other religions. For that this consecration of brute animals was not a later innovation, but originated with the religion itself, is testified by all the written accounts of it now extant. Nothing in former times excited a greater contempt for the Egyptians among wise men than this religious reverence towards beasts; for proof whereof see, among many other authorities, Juvenal's Sat. 15. and Lucian's Concilium Deorum, lib. 2. p. 713. Hence both ancient and modern writers have laboured with incredible zeal to develope the origin of so monstrous and absurd a

[3] These two passages of Euripides, extracted from Stobæus' Florilegium, appear in the Excerpta Veterum Comicorum et Tragicorum, p. 334. edited by Hugo Grotius, who is also the author of the Latin version added by Dr. Cudworth. Many more passages of the same kind, showing the indignation of wiser men, that the vices of mortals should be attributed to the gods, are extant in ancient authors. See Terence, Eunuch. act 3. scen. 5. v. 35. &c. and Isocrates, Encom. Busiridis, p. 452. not to speak at present of philosophers, especially Plato.

Καὶ γὰρ ὅστις ὢν βροτῶν
Κακὸς πεφύκει, ζημιοῦσιν οἱ θεοί·
Πῶς οὖν δίκαιον, τοὺς νόμους ὑμᾶς βροτοῖς
Γράψαντας, αὐτοὺς ἀνομίαν ὀφλισκάνειν.

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religion in a people, who in former ages had the highest reputation for wisdom. But to declare frankly my own opinion, few appear to me to have taken the right course towards explaining the matter, too ready an ear having been lent to the Egyptian priests, whose practice it was to assign occult reasons for these silly and idle ceremonies. Not to speak of others, the erudite Abbé Banier has lately devoted a specific Dissertation to the investigation of this subject and has attempted to exhibit to us, in an elegant French dress, the various accounts now extant among ancient authors respecting it. See Histoire de l' Academie des Inscriptions et Belles Lettres, lib. 6. p. 116—135. However, in exploring the truth of some of the hypotheses put forth, he has paid little or no regard to sound argument. Most of the opinions of the ancients on the causes of the worship of beasts among the Egyptians have been collected together by Plutarch, De Iside et Osiride, p. 379. Diodorus Siculus mentions three; two of which he disregards, but seems not to disapprove of the third, which is founded upon the usefulness of the animals. Biblioth. Hist. lib. 1. cap. 86. &c. p. 74. Others are repeatedly to be met with in other authors. This very discordance of opinions ought to have convinced learned men, that the Egyptians had nothing known and certain to go upon in this matter, and consequently, that we should not rashly put faith in them, but estimate the whole according to the standard of reason. To the same conviction they might easily have been led by the comments not only of Christian but also of profane authors, who ridicule the attempt of the Egyptians to veil the folly of their religion by false and groundless interpretations. But I know not how it happens, that many men, otherwise acute and intelligent, had rather adopt implicitly what they find handed down from the ancients than seek a path of their own to truth by study and reflection. I shall now consider in detail the chief of the hypotheses put forth respecting the Egyptian worship of beasts; and having shown their folly, shall then proceed to state my own opinion on the subject.

I pass over the childish fable of the Egyptians, that the gods from fear of Typhon passed into the bodies of brutes and that thence arose the custom of consecrating them. Banier, among others, makes no doubt of this absurd story having had influence enough on the minds of the Egyptians to lead them to this worship. But he forgets, that, had this been the true cause, they would all have paid homage to the same beasts; which, however, is contrary to the fact; nor does he bear in mind, that Plutarch, De Iside et Osiride, p. 379. and Lucian, De Sacrificiis, t. 1. opp. p. 369. have long ago exposed the fallacy of this supposition. Other opinions possess greater semblance of truth. The later Platonists, and they are followed by many men of distinguished learning, assign as the reason for this worship of animals, that the Egyptians supposed the Deity to be diffused through the whole nature of things and consequently some portion of him to be concealed in brutes. See Porphyry, De Abstinentia ab Usu Carnium, lib. 4. sect. 9. and Eusebius, Præpar. Evangel. lib. 3. cap. 4. p. 93. But in opposition to this opinion I have already advanced sufficient to show its fallacy. It will be at once rejected, I should imagine, by any one who considers, that the animals held sacred by the Egyptians were not the self-same, but different and various. Let the abettors of this opinion explain to me, why wolves, which the inhabitants of Lycopolis worshipped, were put to death by the rest of the Egyptians, and why the hippopotamos, an object of religious veneration to the Papriemetans, was, according to the testimony of Herodotus, despised and slaughtered in the other parts of the country. Besides, one man would have built a temple to another, neighbour to neighbour, peasant to peasant, and the country thus have been filled with sacred edifices, if the opinion had prevailed among them, that the Deity presides in every portion of nature and ought to be worshipped as present therein. Let us cease, then, to attach credence in all instances to the junior Platonists, the authors of this opinion, and to look upon their inventions as so many oracles of Apollo. This sect corrupted and contaminated the ancient systems to an extent that is scarcely credible, and yet most men assent to what they say as though they were the only interpreters of truth.

An ingenious opinion is started by Sir J. Marsham, Canon. Chronic. Egypt. sæc. 1. p. 38. and adopted by Bossuet and many others, according to which the hieroglyphical

Si quis est mortalium,
Qui scelera patrat, exigunt pœnam dei:
At nonne iniquum est, vos, suas leges quibus
Gens debet hominum, jure nullo vivere?

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system of writing, as they termed it, was the cause of the insane veneration of the Egyptians towards beasts. [This opinion is very ably defended by Warburton in his Divine Legation of Moses, t. 2. p. 166. who, however, explains it differently from myself.] If I rightly understand the opinion of these learned men, it is as follows: The Egyptians were led to consecrate animals from having observed, that these were the signs and symbols of other things, and of philosophical precepts. But there seem to me to be so many things, which make against this opinion, that I am at a loss to conceive, how it ever could have been espoused by men by no means deficient in mental ability or acuteness. In the first place, it is to me, I confess, difficult to understand, how any one, by contemplating these mysterious figures, could be led to the worship of brute animals. A hawk, if we are to believe Horus Apollo, was the Egyptian symbol of the wind, a mouse of death, a fly of impudence, a baboon of the moon. Now I want to know, by what process those who beheld these symbols arrived at this foolish inference: We ought to pay divine honours to the hawk, to mice, to baboons, and flies. Although I should a hundred times be called stupid and senseless by the advocates of this opinion, still I am free to confess my utter ignorance, how a superstitious reverence for beasts could arise from the circumstance of the figures of beasts being employed to express sacred and philosophical things. Again, as the same animals were not held sacred by all the Egyptians, it would follow, agreeably to this opinion, that there were as many hieroglyphical systems in Egypt, as towns and provinces. Lastly, to pass over many other things, showing the worthlessness of this hypothesis, there were among these secret figures many animals, which the Egyptians did not regard as sacred; for example, flies, gnats, lions, panthers, and others. Not much different from this is the opinion mentioned by the author of the Recognitions of Clement. I shall give it in his own words, lib. 5. sect. 21. p. 351. tom. 1. Patr. Apostol. Addunt (Ægyptii) figuras esse (animalia) et allegorias virtutum quarumdam, quibus adjutricibus regatur humanum genus, "They add that the animals are allegorical signs of certain virtues, by the aid of which mankind are governed." But the same author correctly adds: Sed pudoris perfugio, hæc et nonnulla his similia connectentes, errorem suum velare nituntur, "But in devising these and similar things, they endeavour to hide their errors under a veil of modesty." Beautiful reasoning, truly! The Egyptians worship animals, because they are the images of the virtues which govern human life. An ox, for example, is the image of labour, a dog of vigilance, a goat of fecundity; therefore, these animals are to be regarded with religious homage and worshipped as gods. The Egyptians would have been stocks or stones and not men, if they had thus reasoned. Besides, I should like to know, what virtues were represented by the crocodile, the cat, the wolf, the ape, or whether these beasts were ever ranked by any one among the teachers of moral rectitude. And yet these were also worshipped. Perhaps those who paid religious respect to the river-horse awarded to it this honour because of its being an emblem of voracity, and those who deified fishes beheld in them the images of taciturnity. I pass over what I have already frequently mentioned respecting the variety of this animal worship, as well as other things, this opinion being too absurd to be likely to have many followers.

I do not think much more favourably of those, who suppose this worship to have emanated from the doctrine of the transmigration of souls into beasts, to which, as Herodotus and many other authors inform us, the Egyptians were devoted; although this opinion, I am aware, has been entertained by men of the greatest eminence and merits, and is, I confess, not entirely destitute of plausibility. According to Diodorus Siculus, Biblioth. Histor. lib. 1. p. 52. and Plutarch, De Iside et Osiride, p. 380. some of the ancient Egyptians asserted the souls even of the gods to have migrated into the bodies of certain animals; the soul of Osiris, for instance, into the body of the ox called Apis, and that of Typhon into crocodiles and other noxious beasts. This notion, however, which was confined to but few persons, we shall not dwell upon, as it is scouted and repudiated even by Plutarch, and sufficiently betrays its own fallacy. Those, indeed, if any such there really were who entertained it, seem to me to have been more like madmen than reasonable beings; nor can I understand, what sort of

To this sense, "Since mortal men are punished by the gods for transgressing their laws, is it not unjust, that ye gods, who write these laws, should yourselves live without law?" And again:

god they could have fancied to themselves, who supposed his soul to lie hid in the body of a beast. But perhaps the account given of this dogma by the ancients is not sufficiently accurate. We shall merely say a few words as a general answer to those, who seek the origin of animal worship in the Egyptian doctrine of the transmigration of souls. In the first place, if the Egyptians worshipped beasts because of the souls which were concealed in them, they doubtless had this among their religious tenets: Every soul is to be honoured with divine worship. But holding such a principle it was their duty to worship not only beasts, but also all human beings, as possessing a rational soul; but the Egyptians by no means did so. I am aware that Porphyry, and from him Eusebius, Præpar. Evang. lib. 3. cap. 4. p. 94. and cap. 12. p. 117. speak of a man being worshipped in a certain Egyptian town called Anamis. But, besides that neither of them has told us what sort of man this was, it is clear, that the religion and opinions of one small district cannot be taken as a criterion of the general doctrine of the country. The religion of the Egyptians was various, as regards the several provinces and towns; but we are here inquiring into that which was common to the whole people. Again, if the transmigration of souls into beasts was the reason, why the Egyptians regarded them with such devout reverence, they ought not only to have worshipped every animal, which we know they did not do, but to have been free from all discordance in this worship. For example, if a wolf had become sacred from the belief, that the soul of a tyrant had migrated into its body, it would not have been lawful for this beast to be put to death in one district, while in another it received religious homage.

The opinion, which Plutarch seems to favour in preference to the rest, De Iside et Osiride, p. 380. 381. that beasts were held in such honour by the Egyptians, because of their being the images of the divine virtues and perfections, I consider to be little less than ridiculous. Not to mention, that to compare God with beasts and to seek for images of the Supreme Being in brute animals is highly injurious to his majesty and can scarcely be the act of sane men, I would observe, that there are beyond question more images of the divine virtues in men than in beasts and, therefore, that this reason ought to have led the Egyptians to the worship of men rather than beasts. Besides, if we look more closely into this reason, it is so idle and absurd, that if it really did influence the Egyptians in this worship, I should think the other nations would have been justified in importing yearly a supply of hellebore into that country. Only suppose men reasoning after this manner: The watchfulness of the dog is proverbial; but the Deity ever watches men's actions, nor at any time ceases to superintend human affairs; therefore the dog is an image of the Deity; therefore it behoves us to regard the dog as a god, and to appease it with victims. Most beautiful! Why not rather the wakeful Diospolitan or the soldiers keeping watch by night, which certainly would have been more honourable and more worthy of the Deity? Again, The crocodile is without a tongue; the Deity does not make use of a tongue; therefore the crocodile bears a resemblance to the Deity; therefore we ought to hold crocodiles in the rank of gods. Subtle reasoning beyond doubt! But why not malefactors also, whose tongues had been torn from their jaws by the executioner?

Others have recourse to astronomy, to dispel the darkness which envelopes the sacred animals of the Egyptians. These follow in the footsteps of Lucian, who, De Astrologia, p. 849. tom. 1. opp. remarks, that the Egyptians distributed the heavens into twelve parts and represented each under the figure of a beast; that hence arose among them not only the worship of animals, but also the diversity of this worship: that those worshipped the ram, who were situated towards the ram; that those who lived under the fishes, abstained from eating fish; and the bull was worshipped in honour of the celestial bull. Atha. Kircher, Œdipus Ægyptiacus, tom. 2. par. 2. p. 160. and Banier, Histoire des Inscript. tom. 6. p. 127. have been at great pains to illustrate this opinion. To myself it appears to have even less to recommend it than the others I have already spoken of. That some Egyptian priest related these fables I have no doubt, nor am I at all surprised at it; but that learned and intelligent men should without hesitation have adopted these fictions, is what I can hardly account for. If the Egyptians had worshipped twelve animals only, and no others but those

Οὐκέτ' ἀνθρώπους κακῶς
Λέγειν δίκαιον, εἰ τὰ τῶν θεῶν κακὰ
Μιμούμεθ', ἀλλὰ τοὺς διδάσκοντας τάδε.

whose names astronomers make use of to denote the celestial houses, there might have been some show of reason in this opinion. But far different is the fact. In the first place, many more than twelve beasts were held sacred by the Egyptians. Secondly, they paid divine honours to many that never had a place assigned to them among the stars. For I do not remember the crocodile, wolf, ape, or cat, to have been classed by any one among the heavenly signs; although the Egyptians regarded these beasts as especially worthy of veneration. Neither had the ichneumon or ibis, the most sacred of Egyptian animals, ever been translated to heaven, according to the doctrine of this people. Again, there are in the heavenly signs animals, to which the Egyptians never paid religious homage, for example, the lion and the crab. In short, when I view this opinion more attentively, I am altogether perplexed and can hardly persuade myself, that any man of sane mind ever reasoned in this manner: Astronomers fancied they could discover the figures of certain animals in the signs of the heavens and the position of the stars and therefore employed the names of beasts to designate these: therefore it behoves me to worship those animals, whose forms they have been pleased to place in the heavens.—I should have been more inclined to concur with learned men in this matter, if they had shown that the archer, the balance, the virgin, and the twins, were enrolled among the gods either by the Egyptians or any other nation, inasmuch as these figures also are numbered among the heavenly signs.

In former times, according to the testimony of Plutarch, De Iside et Osiride, p. 379. 380. there were those, who supposed this question could be best expounded on the basis of ancient history. Hence, some asserted Osiris to have divided his army into certain cohorts and to have delivered to each a standard distinguished by the figure of some animal; whence it came to pass, that they each deemed the animal that had fallen to their share to be worthy of religious homage and worship. This cause is mentioned also by Diodorus Siculus, Biblioth. Histor. lib. 1. cap. 86. p. 75. Others were of opinion, that the ancient kings, to strike greater terror into their enemies, went forth to battle adorned with head pieces of gold and silver, representing the heads of beasts. Both these reasons are justly repudiated by Plutarch. For, besides its being very doubtful whether these are facts or mere fictions, no one will easily believe, that the helmets of kings and leaders, or the images of standards could have produced such an effect upon the minds of the Egyptians, as to become the groundwork of their religion. Hercules is said to have been arrayed in a lion's hide; and the Germans in battle were clad in the skins of beasts. Nevertheless, we are not told that any one was led on that account to worship lions or other animals. Eagles were the military standards of the Romans; and yet to these temples were never dedicated nor religious solemnities decreed.

We now come to the last reason, drawn from the utility of the animals, and, according to Diodorus, Plutarch, and others, the one chiefly assigned by the Egyptians. I shall give it in the words of Cicero: Ipsi, qui irridentur, Ægyptii nullam belluam, nisi ob aliquam utilitatem, consecrarunt: velut ibes maximum vim serpentum conficiunt, "The Egyptians themselves, who are ridiculed, consecrated no animal, except on account of some usefulness: for instance, the ibis destroys the great multitude of serpents." De Natura Deor. lib. 1. cap. 36. p. 2935. [What Cicero says, however, is not altogether true: See Theodor. Therap. 3. p. 113.] But this opinion, although in other respects more probable, I confess, than the rest, does not remove all the difficulties. For the Egyptians reverenced many beasts, from which no benefit was derived, for example, eels; and many even, which no doubt caused them much loss and mischief, such as wolves and the like. Having thus examined the opinions and conjectures of others, it now remains for us to state our own.

Before doing so, however, I shall premise one or two general observations, which, I flatter myself, will open the way to a more satisfactory discussion of this question. I. We ought to bear in mind, then, that some animals were sacred throughout the whole of Egypt and to the entire population, and others only in certain towns and districts. Herodotus, Juvenal, Plutarch, and the rest of the few ancient authors who have touched upon Egyptian superstitions, afford ample evidence of this fact. II. Those animals which were regarded as deities by the whole of the Egyptians were inviolable, and to

Nulla nos posthac notet
Censura, siquando ista, quæ superos decent,
Imitamur homines. Culpa ad auctores redit.

"Let men no longer be blamed for imitating the evil actions of

offer injury to them was a capital offence. See Herodotus, lib. 2. cap. 65. p. 113. whereas, those which were peculiar to certain cities and districts only, could in the rest of the country be put to death with impunity, which frequently caused the gravest wars and conflicts among the Egyptians, as we learn from Juvenal, Plutarch, and other authors. Add Josephus, Antiq. Judaic. lib. 1. cap. 8. sect. 2. p. 30. III. The beasts worshipped throughout the entire country were, I find, of a class highly useful and beneficial to the inhabitants, nor do I think an example is to be found of any noxious or mischievous animal being an object of general homage. See what is stated by Diodorus Siculus on the usefulness of cats, ibises, dogs, and sheep in Egypt, Biblioth. Histor. lib. 1. cap. 87. p. 75. and compare Plutarch, De Iside et Osiride, p. 380. tom. 2. opp. The usefulness of cows and oxen is self-evident. IV. Of those animals, which were sacred only in certain parts, some are not only of no signal benefit, but productive even of harm and danger to mankind, as bears, wolves, crocodiles, hawks, and other animals, to which there is no doubt of the Egyptians having paid religious homage. V. Some Egyptians worshipped animals, from which neither good nor evil was to be expected; for example, birds; others venerated those, which physicians tell us cannot be eaten without injury to the body, such as eels and some other kinds of fishes. These different gradations, as it were, let us distinguish in investigating the true causes of the animal worship of the Egyptians.

Egypt is not very fruitful of those animals which are useful to man, and which agriculture, of primary importance in Egypt, cannot dispense with. Herodotus, Histor. lib. 2. cap. 65. p. 113. says: Ἔουσα δὲ Αἴγυπτος ὅμουρος τῇ Λιβύῃ, οὐ μάλα θηριώδης ἐστίν, "Egypt, being contiguous to Libya, does not much abound in beasts." On the contrary, the number of savage and of venomous animals in Egypt, such as crocodiles, wolves, bears, serpents, river-horses, and the like, is very great and was formerly much more so. It was the duty, therefore, of those who founded a city or commonwealth in that country, to see that the numbers of the useful animals should increase in proportion to that of the inhabitants, lest pestilence or famine should again dissolve the newly constituted state, and that the multitude of mischievous and noxious ones should be lessened. For this reason, it was necessary in the first place, to prohibit by public laws the injuring of useful beasts, such as sheep, cows, oxen, goats. In the next place, as some animals are the natural enemies of others that are noxious, as the ichneumon of crocodiles, the stork of serpents, it was proper also to provide for the safety of these and to prevent men under the fear of punishment from putting them to death. But such is usually the perversity or depravity of mankind, that provided they can benefit themselves, they care but little for the public interests and resist the best of laws, when they observe them to run counter to their own wishes. And as this happened also in Egypt, it was deemed expedient to fortify the laws by religion, and through the instrumentality of the priests to imbue the citizens' mind with a certain doctrine, which by its influence might restrain them from killing these animals. [The ancients prohibited oxen from being sacrificed or put to death, Varro, De Re Rustica, lib. 2. cap. 5. p. 523. Jac. Gothofredus, Ad. Cod. Theod. tom. 1. p. 261. See Irhovius, De Palingenesia Veter. lib. 1. p. 145. &c.] Hence, it was proclaimed among the people, that certain animals were under the protection of the gods themselves and that a divine influence resided in them; for which reason no one could offer injury to them without committing the greatest sin, and incurring the grave indignation of the gods. That such was the case, is evident not only from what has been remarked just above, that no animals were held sacred by the whole Egyptian people, except those which confer manifest benefit upon that country, but also from the fact, that the females were held in much greater reverence than the males. See Herodotus, Histor. lib. 2. cap. 41. p. 104. and cap. 67. p. 114. For it seemed to be to the advantage of the community, that these sorts of animals should be multiplied; which would much sooner take place by carefully preserving the females. We here see the first origin of this worship of animals. The Egyptians, when they had learnt from the priests, that they would provoke the indignation of the gods, if they dared to offer violence to such beasts, forthwith became prone to offer them every respect and homage. And the priests, in

the gods; for they can only be justly blamed, who teach men to do such things by their examples."

Secondly, the poets were further guilty of depraving the

order more easily to delude the people, having assigned to each its own rites and ceremonies, it came to pass in process of time, that temples, victims, and in short, divine honours, were decreed to them and no limit put to the superstitions.

But it has not yet been made to appear, whence arose that diversity of opinion among the Egyptians in the worship of animals, and what led the several towns and districts to choose for their own peculiar homage other beasts besides those which were the objects of national veneration, for example, wolves, crocodiles, hawks, bears. We shall now, therefore, explain in detail the causes of this custom. There were those to be met with formerly, as Plutarch, De Iside et Osiride, p. 380. informs us, who referred the whole of this matter to the craft and policy of the kings. For these, said they, having foreseen, that the concord and unanimity of the citizens would be dangerous to themselves and the public peace, contrived to estrange them from each other by a difference of religions and sacred solemnities and to sow the seeds of perpetual dissension among the various tribes inhabiting Egypt. Hence to one they appointed this to another that animal for popular worship, in order that each people might always find in the other something to excite their hatred and detestation. On the score of ingenuity this reason has much, I own, to recommend it: hence it has been approved of by not a few of the explorers of ancient matters. For my own part, however, as I can neither see, how the people could be persuaded to adopt opinions so contrary to each other, nor consider such a reason reconcilable with the interests and emoluments of the priests, without whose consent nothing of importance, we are told, was decreed or undertaken by the ancient kings, nor, lastly, am in want of other and more satisfactory causes, I should not hesitate at once to repudiate it. It is a fact well ascertained and established even by Herodotus alone, that the Egyptians had not all the same deities, but that each province worshipped its own god or gods, in addition to those which received the homage of the entire nation. This variety of gods, I suspect, independently of the stratagems and menaces of kings, produced the variety of sacred animals. After the minds of the people were impressed with the belief, that the common gods of their country delighted in certain animals and imparted an extraordinary influence to those, which were the objects of their especial favour, it followed as a natural consequence, that each city and district should entertain a like notion respecting their own peculiar gods. For in times past, men most commonly so far flattered themselves as to suppose, that the virtues and properties ascribed to the superior gods belonged also to those deities, to whose worship they were in particular devoted. Wherefore in Egypt each city and tribe selected some one of the national animals which appeared to correspond more than the others to the nature of the Deity they worshipped, and not doubting but that this would be highly acceptable to their god, paid a kind of homage and reverence to it, as the image of the Deity. We are informed by Diodorus Siculus and Plutarch, that the inhabitants of Lycopolis prayed to wolves, and those of Thebes to eagles. The deity of the former, therefore, in my opinion, bore some resemblance to Mars, on which account his worshippers consecrated to him a warlike, strong, and rapacious animal; while the latter ascribed to their god the attributes of surpassing swiftness and keen-sightedness, and therefore supposed him to delight in the eagle above all other birds. If the nature of all the deities worshipped by the Egyptians of old were more thoroughly understood by us at this day, or, to speak more properly, if we were acquainted with the opinions and fables of the Egyptians concerning their gods, we might be able to arrive at some more satisfactory conclusion on this subject. But as these are lost and buried in oblivion, we must content ourselves with probable conjecture. In order to throw some light upon it, let us take the example of the Roman Catholics as an illustration. In that community, it is well known, there are certain superior saints, to which all confess homage to be due, for example, the holy Virgin, St. Peter, and St. Paul; there are others also which are objects of veneration only in particular cities and nations. Suppose this people to have the opinion instilled into their minds, that any one of the saints worshipped by the whole of their community delights in some particular animal, what, I ask, would be the result? If I know any thing of human nature, the several nations and states would immediately conclude the same predilection to be entertained by their own

religion and theology of the Pagans, by their so frequently personating and deifying all the things of nature and parts of the world, and calling them by the names of those gods that were supposed to preside over them; that is, of the several divine

peculiar and patron saints, and would assign to each some favourite animal. It may be added, however, that in all probability some of the legislators and priests looked to the health of their citizens in publicly decreeing sacred rites to certain beasts and fishes. For, observing it to be of much importance to the state to guard against diseases and bodily infirmities and having learnt from experience that the flesh of some animals is highly injurious to health, they therefore had recourse to the aid of religion, in order to infuse habits of temperance into their citizens, and caused the unwholesome animals to be consecrated to the gods.

I now come to the change which I conceive to have taken place in the ancient Egyptian religion under the domination of the Persians and Chaldæans. That the Persians held possession of Egypt for a long period, is a fact well known from ancient authors. See Herodotus, Histor. lib. 3. cap. 1. &c. p. 159. Moreover, that this nation, according to the custom of conquerors, introduced many corruptions into the ancient rites of Egypt, and that the Egyptians themselves, fond as mankind generally are of novelty, adopted without reluctance many foreign institutions and doctrines, will I think be readily admitted by all, who possess even a moderate acquaintance with human history. Many if not all of the later Egyptians, as appears from some passages of Herodotus and still more clearly from Plutarch's book De Iside et Osiride, believed in the existence of two principles, one good and the other evil; the former of which they identified with Osiris, and the latter with his adversary Typhon. Of this dogma not the slightest vestige is to be found in all the accounts, which we meet with in Diodorus Siculus and other authors, of the primitive religion of the Egyptians. Nay more, the whole form and theory of that religion is altogether repugnant to this dogma: as will be evident to all, who carefully examine into it. It appears, therefore, to be beyond question, that this doctrine was imported into Egypt from some other country. But it is well known to have been a doctrine, to which the Persians of all people adhered most tenaciously and which had been borrowed from them by the neighbouring nations. Hence I have no doubt, that they were the cause, after their descent into Egypt, of its being adopted and recognized by many of the Egyptians. But when this had taken place, it became absolutely necessary to remodel the ancient religion, so as to make it appear to correspond to this foolish error and to inculcate what the Persians had taught them. The ancient gods of the Egyptians were all beneficent, as is manifest from Diodorus and others: nor had any one been so silly as to imagine divine honours to be due to a malignant deity. Very conveniently for the purpose of those, who sought to accommodate the Egyptian rites to the absurd phantasies of the Persians, the ancient history of the gods made mention of Typhon, the foe of Osiris, whom he cruelly mangled and put to death. See Diodorus Siculus, Biblioth. Histor. lib. 1. cap. 21. p. 17. Therefore, by forged interpretations they so warped and perverted the account of his achievements, as to make him appear to be the evil god they were in search of, while Osiris, on the other hand, was represented as the good and beneficent deity of the Persian theology. Hence new customs and ceremonies: and hence also the eternal controversies and contentions of the Egyptians on sacred matters. As far as can be gathered from the narratives of Plutarch and the statements of other authors, the Egyptian nation was divided from that period into three different sects. Some would not allow themselves to be torn from the tenets of their ancestors, nor could they be prevailed upon to recognize the newly received opinion concerning Typhon and Osiris. But when the others brought as an argument against them the inexplicable difficulties under which the ancient religion laboured, it gradually came to pass, that these also, each according to his own conception and capacity, gave either a physical or moral construction to the ceremonies and histories of the gods. From this origin arose the distinction into public and secret religion; the former of which was that of the people and consisted in fables, rites, and sacrifices; the latter was confined to the priests, being an interpretation of the ancient history and ceremonies, adapted in a certain way to philosophy and reason. Others, although assenting to the doctrine of two principles and believing Typhon to be the evil deity, refused nevertheless to offer him homage and to propitiate with victims the

powers manifested in them. This Plutarch[4] taxes the poets with, where giving directions for young men's reading of their writings, he thus seasonably cautions against the danger of it: Τοῦτο δὲ

invetorate foe of the human race. Lastly, others, that they might not incur the indignation and vengeance of this maleficent being, placed him in their temples and honoured him with statues, images, and sacrifices.

And these later inhabitants alone, in my opinion, imposed upon themselves that worship of noxious and mischievous animals, to which I hold it to be most certain, that the ancient Egyptians were utter strangers. One thing, indeed, is beyond all controversy, that those who paid homage to animals hostile to human kind, did not do this from a supposition, that they were created by God for good and beneficial purposes, neither did they observe and worship in them some benign and salutary virtue. We are left, therefore, to believe, that the fear of another being, powerful indeed and mighty, but propense to evil rather than good, impelled them to this insane superstition. For the Egyptians were persuaded, that the influence of the beneficent deities was diffused through certain useful animals, and that each of these deities had his favourite beast. Hence those who had adopted the worship of Typhon naturally supposed his influence or spirit to be similarly diffused, and considered that he, no less than Osiris, entertained a partiality for particular animals. And what made this appear to them the more probable was, that they observed many animals to be so savage, cruel, and so destructive to mortals, that they were to be ranked with far more propriety among the maleficent than among the beneficent, and completely represented the nature ascribed to the invidious and malignant Typhon; namely, crocodiles, serpents, river-horses, bears, and other such like beasts. Wherefore, to avoid provoking the anger of a god, by nature malevolent and irascible, those Egyptians, who had embraced his worship, conceived it to be incumbent upon them to honour animals of this class with incense, victims, fanes, and ceremonies, as well as those supposed to be pleasing to the beneficent deities. I am either very much mistaken, or no more probable reason can be assigned, why many of the Egyptians paid religious homage to savage and most destructive animals and were unwilling to kill crocodiles or bears, whose increase was fraught with so much danger to themselves.

Such, on the whole, was the state of religion in Egypt, prior to the conquest of that country by Alexander the Great and the establishment of the dynasty of the Ptolemies after his death. From that time the form of this religion again underwent many important changes. Indeed, long before this, the intercourse of the Greeks, who visited Egypt for the purpose of commerce, had already exercised such influence upon the Egyptians, as to cause them to confound their country's gods with those of Greece, and to amalgamate the histories of the respective deities: a fact of which ample testimony is afforded by Herodotus. But in the reign of the Ptolemies, when the Greeks had become masters of Egypt and Grecian opinions and rites, as well as philosophical sects, poured into that country, still more of their institutions and doctrines became incorporated with the Egyptian religion. The public and popular religion, indeed, remained for the most part inviolate; nor does any one of the more important ancient rites appear to have been abolished. Nevertheless, it was by no means forbidden them to blend foreign ceremonies with the institutions of their ancestors; and to admit, for example, some of the rites of Jupiter into the worship of Osiris, whom they erroneously supposed to differ from that god only in name. And were I not apprehensive, that many will consider this disputation to have already exceeded all due bounds, I could show, by some striking examples from Julian, from Celsus in Origen, from Porphyry, and others, that this desire of associating and combining the religion and deities of the two nations operated so powerfully with many, that they not unfrequently altered, perverted, and corrupted the history of the gods on purpose. Lest the history of the Greek Jupiter, for instance, should seem to differ too widely from that of the Egyptian Osiris, it was sometimes necessary to do violence to the traditions of the ancients on both sides. As regards the religion of the wise or the doctrine of the priests, which they termed *occult* and *secret*, its character from the period when the Ptolemies acquired the sovereignty of Egypt was most varied and discordant; nor do I suppose any two

[4] De Audiendis Poëtis, p. 22. t. 2. opp.

ἀναγκαῖον, καὶ χρήσιμον, εἰ μέλλοιμεν ἐκ τῶν ποιημάτων ὠφεληθήσεσθαι καὶ μὴ βλαβήσεσθαι, τὸ γινώσκειν, πῶς τοῖς τῶν θεῶν ὀνόμασιν οἱ ποιηταὶ χρῶνται . . . . χρῶνται δὲ τοῖς τῶν θεῶν ὀνόμασι οἱ ποιηταὶ, ποτὲ μὲν αὐτῶν ἐκείνων ἐφαπτόμενοι τῇ ἐννοίᾳ, ποτὲ δὲ δυνάμεις τινὰς, ὧν οἱ θεοὶ δωτῆρές εἰσι καὶ καθηγεμόνες, ὁμωνύμως προσαγορεύοντες, "It is very profitable and necessary, if we would receive good from the writings of the poets, and not hurt, that we should understand how they use the names of the gods in different senses. Wherefore the poets sometimes use the names of the gods properly, as intending to signify thereby the gods themselves, and sometimes again they use them improperly and equivocally, for those powers which the gods are the givers and dispensers of, or the things which they preside over." As for example, Vulcan is sometimes used by the poets for that God or divine power, which presides over fire and the arts that operate by fire, and sometimes again the word is taken by them for fire itself. So Mars, in like manner, is sometimes used for the God, which presides over military affairs, and sometimes again it signifies nothing else but war. An instance whereof is there given by Plutarch out of Sophocles:

Τυφλὸς γὰρ, ὦ γυναῖκες, οὐδ' ὁρῶν Ἄρης,
Συὸς προσώπῳ, πάντα τυρβάζει κακά,

Mars (O Mulieres) cæcus hirsuto suis
Velut ore frendens, cuncta commiscet mala.

And we might give this other instance of the same from Virgil:

Furit toto Mars impius orbe.

For the god of war, that is, the divine providence that presides over military affairs, could not be called impious or wicked, but it is war itself that is there so styled.

Indeed we shall afterwards make it appear, that the first ori-

colleges of priests to have maintained the same doctrines on divine and physiological subjects. For the license of philosophizing having been introduced along with Grecian sects and opinions, as each priest was morally disposed or mentally gifted, so he interpreted the public religions and expounded them in private to the curious. One sought for images of physical, another of moral, a third of civil, a fourth of metaphysical, a fifth of astronomical truths, in his country's rites and institutions; nor were those who agreed generally as to the department of wisdom lying concealed in the public religion united by any bond of concord, when they descended to particulars. This is the reason, why we at this day meet with such a variety of expositions of the Egyptian philosophy and religion in ancient authors; which expositions the most talented men, have hitherto in vain laboured to connect and reconcile with each other. But I perceive I am trenching beyond my prescribed limits, and shall therefore conclude. Those whose minds are unbiassed will, I hope, be able to learn from these remarks, what opinion ought to be entertained generally of the ancient religion of the Egyptians. An opportunity will perhaps be afforded me in the sequel of discussing at greater length whatever may appear to have been here treated too cursorily and not sufficiently explained and illustrated.

ginal of this business, proceeded from a certain philosophic opinion amongst the Pagans, that God was diffused throughout the whole world, and was himself in a manner all things, and therefore ought to be worshipped in all things: but the poets were principally the men who carried it on thus far, by personating the several inanimate parts of the world and things of nature, to make such a multitude of distinct gods and goddesses of them. Which humour, though it were chiefly indulged by them, ψυχαγωγίας ἕνεκεν, "only for the delight and pleasure of the reader," besides gratifying their own poetic fancies; yet was it a matter of dangerous consequence, as the same Plutarch gravely and soberly advises, in his book de Iside, it begetting in some gross and irrational superstition (that is, in our Christian language, idolatry), and carrying others on to downright impiety and atheism. But this will be afterwards also again insisted on.

Wherefore, in the next place, we shall observe, that the poets did also otherwise deprave the theology of the Pagans, so as to make it look somewhat more aristocratically, and this principally two manner of ways; first, by their speaking so much of the gods in general and without distinction, and attributing the government of the whole world to them in common, so as if it were managed and carried on, communi consilio deorum, "by a common-council and republic of gods," wherein all things were determined by a majority of votes, and as if their Jupiter, or supreme god, were no more amongst them, than a speaker of a house of lords or commons, or the chairman of a committee. In which they did indeed attribute more to their inferior deities, than, according to their own principles, they ought.

And secondly (which is the last depravation of the pagan theology by these poets), by their making those, that were really nothing else but several names and notions of one and the same supreme Deity, according to its several powers manifested in the world, or the different effects produced by it, to be so many really distinct persons and gods; insomuch as sometimes to be at odds and variance with one another, and even with Jupiter himself. This St. Basil seems to take notice of, in his oration, how young men may be profited by the writings of the Greeks:"[5] Πάντων δὲ ἥκιστα περὶ Θεῶν τι διαλεγομένοις (ποιηταῖς) προσέξομεν, καὶ μάλισθ' ὅταν ὡς περὶ πολλῶν τε αὐτῶν διεξίωσι, καὶ τούτων οὐδὲ ὁμονοούντων, "But least of all will we give credit to the poets, where they discourse concerning the gods, and speak of them as many (distinct and independent) persons, and that not agreeing amongst themselves neither, but siding several ways, and perpetually quarrelling with one another."[6]

[5] In his oration, Quomodo Legere Græcos Deceat, p. 16. ed. Oxon. J. Potteri.

[6] It is a common saying, that the license of the poets caused greater injury to the ancient theology than all other things put together, and that nothing operated so

Notwithstanding all which extravagancies and miscarriages of the poets, we shall now make it plainly to appear, that they really asserted, not a multitude of self-existent and independent

powerfully in imbuing the minds of the people with such absurd and foolish notions of religion as those pleasing poems of Homer, Hesiod, and others, on the history and acts of the gods. [See Biblioth. Françoise, tom. 19. par. 1. p. 149.] For my part, however, although I would by no means deny, that the reading of the poets tended to impress more firmly on the minds of youth the idle nonsense vulgarly entertained respecting the gods; still I am almost inclined to take the part of this condemned class and to maintain, that the poets are unjustly charged with the crime. I. If the poets, Homer, Hesiod, and others, had themselves invented all that they state concerning the gods in their poems, there would have been just grounds for the accusation. But, it is evident, they were not the authors and inventors of the things they sing of, but merely exhibited in a poetic dress the traditions concerning the gods which were publicly current among the Greeks at the time. When Homer composed his poems, the gods, whose achievements he records, had already their respective temples, groves, priests, statues, ceremonies, and victims among the Greeks. See Ever. Feith, Antiquit. Homericæ, lib. 1. cap. 3. 4. 5. p. 14. &c. Which shows incontrovertibly, that neither these gods themselves, nor their histories, conflicts, wars, and pedigrees were the creations of Homer's own fancy, but simply, that he embodied in verse what was handed down concerning the gods in the ancient history of Greece. Dearly, indeed, unless I am altogether mistaken, would the divine Homer have paid for his temerity, if he had been the first to dare to promulgate these elegant and absurd fictions among a people imbued with better precepts. Wherefore, if the truth is to be stated, so far from the poets having led the people into these errors, I should affirm, that the people and priests corrupted the poets; and consequently, II. those are mistaken who suppose, that the poets expressed by the names of persons divine virtues or portions of the nature of things, and that it was this custom of theirs which gave rise to the multitude of deities worshipped by the ancient nations. [To this opinion P. Brumoy is not unfavourable, who makes a distinction between the *poetic* and the *true* theology of the Greeks. But this system is satisfactorily refuted, Biblioth. Françoise, t. 19. par. 1. p. 149.] For to those gods, long before the time of the poets, temples and fanes had been dedicated and priests publicly appointed. Let us suppose, for example, that Homer in his poem designated divine wisdom by the name of Minerva and by poetic license introduced it as a person. The fallacy of the supposition is at once evident from the fact mentioned by the same poet, Iliad 2. v. 549. that at Athens Minerva had a temple and priests. For this shows, that Minerva was regarded as a person before Homer's time and that no one heretofore had supposed a divine virtue to be implied by this name. The same is to be understood of the other Homeric gods, Neptune, Diana, Apollo. III. The poets, indeed, I am aware, sometimes expressed themselves in a loose and improper phraseology, using Bacchus for wine, Mars for war, Venus for love, and embellishing their language with other figures of the kind. But I can hardly believe that these figures led any one to conceive absurd notions of God and divine things, whose sentiments previously had been correct and rational. What do not the poets of our own times adventure? What those especially, who compare kings with the ancient deities and place a second Jupiter in the council of the gods? And yet no one of sane mind, I perceive, is tempted by their extravagant rhodomontade to imbibe superstitions he had hitherto been free from and to mix up ancient fables with the Christian religion. The fact is, people were aware in former times, as they are in our own, that the language of poetry is not to be criticized according to the precepts of reason and still less that a system of theology is to be elicited from their poems. Which being the case, I consider those miserable errors concerning the gods, in which the world was for so many ages involved, to be attributable, not so much to the poets, as to the vices and innate corruption of the human race and to the frauds and impostures of designing men; although at the same time I would readily admit, that the charms of their poetry caused the received fables to be more easily impressed upon the popular mind and to be much more acceptable than they would have been, if set forth without embellishment. Recte igitur, to use the words of Cicero, Tusculan. Disput. lib. 2. cap. 11. p. 2664. t. 8. opp. a Platone educuntur ex ea civitate, quam finxit ille, quum mores optimos et optimum reipublicæ statum exquireret, "They

deities, but one only unmade Deity, and all the other, generated or created gods. This hath been already proved concerning Orpheus, from such fragments of the Orphic poems, as have been owned and attested by pagan writers: but it would be further evident, might we give credit to any of those other Orphic verses, that are found cited by Christians and Jews only (and we cannot reasonably conclude all these to be counterfeit and supposititious), amongst which we have this for one.[7]

Εἷς ἐστ' αὐτογενὴς, ἐνὸς ἔκγονα πάντα τέτυκται,

"There is one only unmade God, and all other gods and things are the offspring of this one." Moreover, when God, in the same Orphic fragments, is styled Μητρο-πάτωρ, "both father and mother of all things" (accordingly as it was observed before), that both the Orphic and Egyptian theology made the supreme Deity especially, to be ἀῤῥηνόθηλυν, "hermaphroditical," or "male and female together;" this, as Clemens Alexandrinus[8] rightly interprets the meaning of it, was to signify, τὴν ἐκ μὴ ὄντων γένεσιν, "the production of things out of nothing," or from the Deity alone, without any pre-existent or self-existent matter.

But we shall pass from Orpheus to Homer. Now it is certain, that Homer's gods were not all eternal, unmade and self-existent, he plainly declaring the contrary concerning the gods in general; that they had a Genesis, that is, a temporary production, as in that forecited verse of his.[9]

Ὠκεανόν τε θεῶν γένεσιν, &c.

"The ocean from whence the gods were generated;" where, by gods are meant all the animated parts of the world superior to men, but principally (as Eustathius observes) the stars, θεῶν ἀντὶ ἀστέρων, "gods (saith he) are here put for stars." And as the same philologer further adds, the gods or stars do by a

(poets) are therefore very properly excluded by Plato from his imaginary republic, as he required the best morals and the best state of a commonwealth."

[7] This verse, together with others passing under the name of Orpheus, is extant in Clemens Alexandr. Cohort. ad Gentes, cap. 7. p. 64. It is exhibited somewhat differently, however, by Eusebius, Præpar. Evan. lib. 13. cap. 12. and Theodoret, De Curandis Græcor. Affect. serm. 1. p. 475. t. 2. opp.

[8] Stromat. lib. 5. p. 724. Μητρο-πάτωρ in the Orphic verses means, that God is the *parent* of the *earth*, which the ancients commonly called *mother*. But it cannot, I imagine, be inferred from thence, that this name signifies creation out of nothing. The good Clement sees many things in the ancient authors, which nobody besides himself can easily discover. On the Orphic poems and their authority we have already treated at sufficient length.

[9] Iliad. Ξ. v. 201. and 302. I cannot, however, understand, what led Eustathius to suppose Θεοὺς to be put for stars in these verses. It certainly would be difficult to gather as much from Homer. Indeed, I have no doubt, that *gods* here mean the whole of the deities worshipped by the Greeks.

synechdoche signify all things, or the whole world, *ἀντὶ τοῦ πάντων ὡς ἀπὸ μέρους*, "a part being put for the whole," accordingly as the same poet elsewhere[10] declares his sense, speaking likewise of the ocean,

——"Ος γένεσις πάντεσσι τέτυκται,

"Which was the original of all things," or from whence (not only the gods, but also) all other things were generated. Wherefore the full meaning of Homer was this, that the gods or stars, together with this whole visible world, had a temporary production, and were at first made out of the ocean, that is, out of the watery chaos. So that Homer's Theogonia, as well as Hesiod's, was one and the same thing with the Cosmogonia; his generation of gods the same with the generation or creation of the world, both of them having, in all probability, derived it from the Mosaic Cabala, or tradition. And Eustathius tells us, that, according to the ancients, Homer's *ἀσπιδοποιΐα*, described Il. *σ.* was *αἴνιγμα τῆς κοσμογενείας*, "an obscure signification of the Cosmogenia, or Cosmogonia."

Nevertheless, though *οἱ θεοὶ*, or the gods in general be by Homer thus generated from the ocean or watery chaos, yet this is to be understood only of the inferior gods, and he is supposed to be distinguished from them, who in the same poet is frequently called, *ὁ θεὸς κατ' ἐξοχὴν*, "God by way of eminency," (to whom he plainly ascribes omnipotence), and *Ζεὺς* or Jupiter, whom he styleth *κράτιστον ἁπάντων*,[1] "the most powerful of all," and *πρῶτα θεῶν*, "the first and chiefest of the gods," and *ὕπατον θεῶν* and *κρειόντων*, "the highest of gods and governors," and whom he affirmeth infinitely to transcend the gods, Il. *θ.*[2]

Τόσσον ἐγὼ περί τ' εἰμὶ θεῶν, περί τ' εἰμ' ἀνθρώπων.

And to reign as well over gods as men, Il. *α.*

——ὅς τε θεοῖσι καὶ ἀνθρώποισιν ἀνάσσει.

Lastly, whom he maketh to be *πατέρα θεῶν*, "the father of the gods as well as men;" that is, nothing less than the creator of them and the whole world. He therefore, who thus produced the gods and stars out of the ocean or watery chaos, must needs be excluded out of that number of gods, so as not to have been himself generated or made out of it. Thus have we before

[10] Iliad. Ξ. v. 246.

[1] I know of no passage in which Homer calls Jupiter *κράτιστος ἁπάντων*. But he styles him *πρῶτα θεῶν*, Odyss. Ξ. v. 158. and P. v. 155. and *ὕπατος θεῶν* and *ἄριστος*, Iliad. T. v. 258. and Odyss. T. v. 303.

[2] This verse occurs Iliad. Θ. v. 20. the following one Iliad. A. v. 281.

observed, that οἱ θεοὶ, or "the gods" in general, are frequently taken, both by Homer and other Greek writers, in way of distinction from ὁ θεὸς, or Jupiter, that is, for the inferior gods only.

It is true indeed, that others of the Pagan gods, besides Jupiter, were by the Latins in their solemn rites and prayers styled patres, "fathers;" and as Jupiter is nothing else but Jovis pater, contracted into one word, so was Mars called by them Marspiter, and Saturnus, Janus, Neptunus and Liber had the like addition also made to their names, Saturnuspater, Janus-pater, Neptunuspater, Liberpater: and not only so, but even their very heroes also (as for example, Quirinus) had this honourable title of father bestowed on them; all which appeareth from those verses of Lucilius,[3]

> Ut nemo sit nostrum, quin aut pater optimus divûm,
> Aut Neptunus pater, Liber, Saturnus pater, Mars,
> Janus, Quirinus pater nomen dicatur ad unum.

Notwithstanding which, here is a great difference to be observed, that though those other gods were called fathers, yet none of them was ever called either by the Greeks πατὴρ θεῶν, or by the Latins, pater optimus divûm, save only Ζεὺς or Jupiter, the supreme Deity.

And that Homer was thus generally understood by the Pagans themselves to have asserted a divine monarchy, or one supreme Deity ruling over all, may further appear from these following citations. Plutarch in his Platonic questions:[4] Καὶ Ξενοκράτης Δία Ὕπατον καλεῖ, πρότερον δὲ Ὅμηρος τὸν τῶν ἀρχόντων ἄρχοντα θεὸν, ὕπατον κρειόντων προσεῖπε, "Zenocrates called Jupiter, Hypaton, or the highest; but before him Homer styled that God, who is the prince of all princes, ὕπατον κρειόντων, the highest of rulers or governors." Again, the same Plutarch, De Iside et Osiride:* Τὸν δὲ Ὄσιριν αὖ πάλιν ὀφθαλμῷ καὶ σκήπτρῳ γράφουσι, ὧν τὸ μὲν τὴν πρόνοιαν ἐμφαίνει, τὸ δὲ τὴν δύναμιν· ὡς Ὅμηρος τὸν ἄρχοντα καὶ βασιλεύοντα πάντων Ζῆνα ὕπατον καὶ μήστωρα καλῶν, ἔοικε τῷ μὲν ὑπάτῳ τὸ κρατὸς αὐτοῦ τῷ δὲ μήστωρι τὴν εὐβουλίαν καὶ τὴν φρόνησιν σημαίνειν, "The Egyptians, when they described Osiris by those hieroglyphics of an eye and a sceptre, did by the former of them signify Providence, and by the latter Power; as Homer, when he calls that Ζεὺς or Jupiter, who ruleth and reigneth over all things, ὕπατον and μήστωρα, seems by the word ὕπατον to denote

[3] These verses have been preserved by Lactantius, Divinar. Instit. lib. 4. cap. 3. p. 408. where see the remarks of J. G. Walch on the custom of calling the gods fathers.

[4] Quæstion. Platon. 1007. tom. 2. opp. Plutarch's passage is not given here entire, but retrenched of that portion which does not bear upon the matter in hand.

* P. 371.

his power and sovereignty, but by *μήστωρα* his wisdom and knowledge."[5] To Plutarch may be added Proclus, who, upon Plato's Timæus, having proved that, according to that philosopher, there was *τοῦ κόσμου παντὸς εἷς καὶ ὅλος δημιουργός*, "one only maker of the whole world," affirms the same likewise of that divine poet Homer, (as he there styles him): *Ὃς καὶ διὰ πάσης ποιήσεως ὕπατον κρειόντων καὶ πατέρα ἀνδρῶν καὶ θεῶν αὐτὸν ἀνυμνεῖ, καὶ πᾶσιν εὐφημεῖ τοῖς δημιουργικοῖς νοήμασιν*, "That he also throughout all his poesy praises Jupiter as the highest of all rulers, and the father both of gods and men, and attributes all demiurgical notions to him." Whereupon he concludes in this manner: *Οὕτω τοίνυν σύμπασαν τὴν Ἑλληνικὴν θεολογίαν ἀπεφήναμεν, τῷ Διὶ τὴν ὅλην δημιουργίαν ἀπονέμουσαν*, "And thus we have made it manifest, that all the Greekish theology universally ascribes to *Ζεὺς*, or Jupiter, the making of all things." Lastly, Aristotle himself confirmeth the same with his testimony, where he writes of the paternal authority after this manner: *Ἡ τῶν τέκνων ἀρχὴ βασιλικὴ· διὸ καλῶς Ὅμηρος τὸν Δία προσηγόρευσεν εἰπών,**

——*Πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε,*

τὸν βασιλέα τούτων ἁπάντων· φύσει γὰρ τὸν βασιλέα διαφέρειν μὲν δεῖ, τῷ γένει δ' εἶναι τὸν αὐτόν· ὅ περ πέπονθε τὸ πρεσβύτερον πρὸς τὸ νεώτερον, καὶ ὁ γεννήσας πρὸς τὸ τέκνον, "The paternal power or authority over children is a kingly authority: wherefore Homer, when he intended to set forth Jupiter's kingly power over all, very well called him the father of men and gods. For he that is king by nature ought both to differ from those that he reigneth over, and also to be of the same kind with them; as the senior is to the junior, and he that begetteth to his offspring." Where Aristotle's sense seems to be this, that Jupiter had therefore a natural and not acquired kingly power over all the gods, because they were all his offspring and begotten by him, as well as men. In which passage therefore Aristotle plainly acquits and frees Homer from all suspicion of atheism.[6]

[5] In Timæum Platon. lib. 2. p. 96.

* De Rep. lib. 1. cap. 13. [p. 412. Tom. III. opp.]

[6] I shall not here enter upon a lengthened inquiry into Homer's notions of God and rligion, as others are known to have professedly treated of this subject. I shall merely remark what may be sufficient towards enabling us to form a correct estimate of the arguments here brought forward by the learned Doctor, to make good his position, that no traces of an untoward opinion respecting the Deity are to be met with in Homer. I am friendly to the poet, as far as truth and reason will permit: but in opposition to these neither Homer, nor any other man wiser than he, ought in my opinion to be defended. In the first place, I would grant without hesitation, that Homer placed Jupiter over all the other gods, and ascribed to him the supreme control of all things. Innumerable passages of his proclaim this. But I do not know whether it can also be admitted, that this poet entertained the same notion regarding his Jupiter, that wise men, and we Christians at the present day hold of the supreme creator and maker of all things. I

As for Hesiod, if we had not already sufficiently proved from his Theogonia, that all his gods (that is, his inferior deities)

own he frequently extols in magnificent terms the power, might, and wisdom of his Jupiter; which, doubtless, led learned men to suppose, that there is nothing to be found fault with in his opinion concerning God. But, setting aside that poetic diction is not to be judged by the same rules as philosophical discourses, he, on the other hand, says a multitude of things respecting this parent of the gods, which are by no means applicable to supreme majesty, and represents his sovereign Jupiter as the same in pedigree, nature, and disposition with the rest of the deities introduced by him. I shall adduce a few instances out of many. In several places he calls Ζεὺς or Jupiter, Κρόνιος, "son of Saturn," in others, Ὀλύμπιος, "inhabitant of Olympus." In Homer's opinion, therefore, this God was begotten after the manner of mortal men by Saturn, according to the vulgar tradition of the Greeks, and as was supposed by the same with regard to Jupiter the king of Thessaly, had formerly fixed his abode in Mount Olympus. Do these things, I ask, argue a God without beginning and exempt from all weakness and vice? And what, if we show that Homer ascribed to Jupiter a not much nobler origin than to the rest of the gods, and derived him in like manner from Oceanus? This may easily be done. He unquestionably ranked Saturn among the gods. Therefore, Saturn was the offspring of Oceanus, from whom, he tells us in divers places, all the gods were sprung. But Jupiter and Juno were the children of Saturn; as the poet declares frequently. See Iliad Ξ. v. 243. 247. Moreover, Juno states herself to have been brought up in the house of Oceanus and Tethys, as grand-children sometimes are in the houses of their grand-parents, Iliad. Ξ. 302. 303.

Ὠκεανόν τε θεῶν γένεσιν, καὶ μητέρα Τηθὺν,
Οἵ μ' ἐν σφοῖσι δόμοισιν ἐὐτρεφον ἠδ' ἀτίταλλον.

Oceanumque Deorum ortum, et matrem Tethyn,
Qui me in suis ædibus bene nutrierunt et educarunt.

[See Zimmermann, De Religione Homeri, in the Museum Helvet. tom. 7. p. 158. In washing Homer he washes an Ethiopian, and winks at the greatest scandals.] We have here, then, the origin of Jupiter, who, like the rest of the gods, was descended through Saturn from Oceanus. Such a god I will by no means allow myself to confound with the supreme Parent of all things. To avoid prolixity, I now pass over much more that is at hand to the same effect. The passages here brought forward from ancient authors, to make Homer appear to have held more sound and correct notions of divine things, are in my judgment of little force or weight. In the first place, the opinions of Homer and of the ancients generally ought to be obtained from their own books and not from the testimonies and authorities of others, who, for the most part, look solely to what makes for their own cause, and obscure and corrupt this prince of poets especially, with their endless and unmeaning interpretations, in order that he may seem to have been a perfect master of science and erudition. Again, neither Plutarch nor Aristotle confirms the position, that Homer's Jupiter is the supreme Deity who made all things; they are merely noticing the honourable epithets applied to Jupiter by that poet. But the testimony of Proclus, a Platonist, and a man of more imagination than sound judgment, is least of all to be attended to in this matter, it having been the well known custom of the sect to which he belonged to explain ancient authors not according to the truth of the thing, but agreeably to their own views. Indeed, if any reliance were to be placed upon authorities in this question, the ancient author, whoever he was, of the life of Homer, commonly prefixed to his poems, would be a much more clear and satisfactory witness. For he long ago propounded the same opinion as Dr. Cudworth, and founded it upon nearly the same passages of Homer: whose words, as forcibly expressing all that can be brought forward on the subject, I shall here quote from Gale's Scriptor. Veter. Mytholog. p. 337. Τούτων δὲ πάντων ἀρχηγὸν καὶ ἡγέμονα τὸν πρῶτον θεὸν νομιζόντων τῶν ἀρίστων φιλοσόφων ἀσώματον ὄντα καὶ νοήσει μᾶλλον καταληπτὸν, καὶ Ὅμηρος ταῦτα ὑπολαμβάνειν φαίνεται, παρ' ᾧ λέγεται ὁ Ζεὺς πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε, καὶ· ὃ πάτερ Κρονίδη, ὕπατε κρειόντων· καὶ αὐτὸς μὲν ὁ Ζεὺς φησιν· Ὅσσον ἐγὼ περί τ' εἰμὶ θεῶν, περί τ' εἰμ' ἀνθρώπων· ἡ δὲ Ἀθηνᾶ πρὸς αὐτόν· Εὖ νυ καὶ ἡμεῖς ἴδμεν, ὅ τοι σθένος οὐκ ἐπιεικτὸν, "As all the greatest philosophers suppose that first God, the sovereign and

were generated and made, as well as men, it might be made unquestionably evident from this verse of his in his Opera,[7]

Ὡς ὁμόθεν γεγάασι θεοὶ θνητοί τ' ἄνθρωποι.

"When the gods and mortal men, were both together, alike made or generated." Where the word ὁμόθεν is thus interpreted by the Greek scholiasts, ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς ῥίζης and ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ γένους, i. e. "the gods and men, were both alike made from the same root or stock." And though it followeth immediately after:

Χρύσεον μὲν πρώτιστα γένος μερόπων ἀνθρώπων
Ἀθάνατοι ποίησαν, ὀλύμπια δώματ' ἔχοντες,

"That first of all a golden age of men was made by the immortal gods;" yet Moschopulus there notes: Ἀθάνατοι ποίησαν, ὁ Ζεὺς μόνος ἐποίησεν, ὡς ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων φάνερον γίνεται· λέγει δὲ πάντας τοὺς θεοὺς, τὸ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἔργον ἐπὶ πάντας τοὺς ὁμοειδεῖς ἀναφέρων, "The immortal gods made; the true meaning (saith he) is, that Jupiter alone made this first golden age of men; as may be proved from other places in the same poet: and though he speak of the gods in general, yet doth he but transfer that, which was the work of one upon all of the like kind. And there are several other instances of this poet's using θεοὶ for θεὸς, gods for god." But it is possible, that Hesiod's meaning might be the same with Plato's,[8] that though the inferior mundane gods were all made at first by the supreme God, as well as men, yet they being made something sooner than men, did afterwards contribute also to the making of men.

But Hesiod's Theogonia, or generation of gods, is not to be understood universally neither, but only of the inferior gods, that Ζεὺς or Jupiter being to be excepted out of the number of them, whom the same Hesiod, as well as Homer, makes to be the father of gods, as also the king of them, in these words:[9]

ruler of all, to be incorporeal and cognizable only to the intellect, so Homer also appears to believe the same: with whom Jupiter is called the father of men and gods, and O father Jupiter, the high-supreme of rulers. And Jupiter himself says, By how much I am superior to gods and mortals; and Minerva to him: We know well how matchless is thy power." But I look upon it as almost an unworthy labour, to inquire minutely into the religious sentiments of Homer; who is shown throughout the whole of his poems to have been altogether inconsistent with himself and to have confounded the suggestions of reason respecting God and the precepts of the oldest philosophers on physical things with the fables and absurd traditions of the Greeks. Should any one consider this to be too severe a judgment and the sign of a corrupt taste, I shall not feel much disposed to dispute the point; but I shall ask him in turn to exhibit to us the substance of this poet's religion out of his own poems, not only perfect in all its parts, but in keeping with itself and harmonizing with the rest of his opinions: a task which I consider impossible to be performed.

[7] Vers. 108. 109. 110. ed. Clerici.

[8] In Timæo, p. 530. &c. opp.

[9] This verse is not extant in the poems of Hesiod that have come down to us, but is quoted as Hesiod's by Clemens Alexandr. in his Cohort. ad Gentes, cap. 7. p. 63. tom. 1. ed. Potteri.

Αὐτὸς γὰρ πάντων βασιλεὺς καὶ κοίρανός ἐστιν
Ἀθανάτων.

And attributes the creation of all things to him, as Proclus writeth upon this place:

[10] Ὃν τε διὰ βροτοὶ ἄνδρες ὁμῶς, &c.

"By whom all mortal men are, δι' ὃν πάντα, καὶ οὐκ αὐτομάτως· πάντα τῷ Διΐ προσαναπλάττει, by whom all things are, and not by chance; the poet, by a synecdoche, here ascribing the making of all to Jupiter." Wherefore Hesiod's Theogonia is to be understood of the inferior gods only, and not of Ζεὺς or Jupiter, who was the father and maker of them (though out of a watery chaos) and himself therefore αὐτοφυὴς, "self-existent," or unmade.[1]

[10] Hesiodi Opera et Dies, v. 3. p. 197. But Proclus, as well as the learned Doctor, is quite mistaken in supposing Hesiod to attribute in this verse the creation of all things to Jupiter. For the whole context shows the poet's meaning to be, that Jupiter dispenses the fates of mortals, and of his will gives to one a higher, to another a lower rank and station:

Ὃν τε διὰ βροτοὶ ἄνδρες ὁμῶς ἄφατοί τε φατοί τε,
Ῥητοί τ' ἀῤῥητοί τε Διὸς μεγάλοιο ἕκητι,

"By whom mortal men alike become obscure and illustrious,
Noble and ignoble, at the will of mighty Jove."

[1] I shall not repeat in this place what I have argued at great length above on the religion of Hesiod. It is necessary, however, to give a brief refutation of the learned Doctor's position, that this poet excepted Jupiter from the number of generated gods and regarded him as the supreme Parent of all things. The poet, I confess, every where speaks of his Jupiter in the most magnificent and sublime terms. In the Theogonia, v. 49. p. 12. thus:

Ὅσσον φέρτατός ἐστι θεῶν, κράτει τε μέγιστος,

"How much he is the most excellent of the gods and the greatest in power."

Prometheus in the same poem, v. 548. p. 92. addresses him in these words:

Ζεὺς κύδιστε, μέγιστε θεῶν ἀειγενετάων,

"O most glorious Jupiter, greatest of the eternal gods."

To adduce more passages of the kind is needless. But the exalted opinion we form of Jupiter from these and other passages of the poet, we are compelled again to abandon, by what he sings in so many other places of the same deity: from which it would appear, that he regarded Jupiter as nothing more than a man, generated after the manner of mortals from Saturn and Rhea, but superior to the rest of the gods, and to his own parent himself, in courage and other endowments. This I shall establish out of Hesiod's own mouth. Thus then in his Theogonia, v. 453. &c. p. 77.

Ῥείη δ' αὖ δμηθεῖσα Κρόνῳ τέκε φαίδιμα τέκνα,
Ἑστίην, Δήμητρα, καὶ Ἥρην χρυσοπέδιλον,
* * * * * *
Ζῆνά τε μητιόεντα, θεῶν πατέρ' ἠδὲ καὶ ἀνδρῶν,

"But Rhea compressed by Saturn brought forth illustrious children,
Vesta, Ceres, and the golden-sandalled Juno,
And the wise Jupiter, father of gods and men."

In like manner, that Pindar's gods were not eternal, but made or generated, is plainly declared by him in these words:*

Ἓν ἀνδρῶν, ἓν θεῶν γένος, ἐκ
Μιᾶς δὲ πνέομεν
Ματρὸς ἀμφότεροι.

Unum hominum, unum Deorum genus,
Et ex una spiramus
Matre utrique.

"There is one kind both of gods and men, and we both breathe from the same mother, or spring from the same original." Where by the common mother both of gods and men, the scholiast understands the earth and chaos, taking the gods here for the inferior deities only, and principally the stars.[2]

This of Pindar's therefore is to be understood of all the other gods, that they were made as well as men out of the earth or

For according to Hesiod many gods had sprung from *earth* and *heaven*, whom he enumerates, Theogon. v. 134. 135. p. 25. The youngest of these gods was Saturn, ibid. v. 136. And this Saturn afterwards begot of Rhea Jupiter and Juno, besides many other sons and daughters. But Jupiter, partly by cunning, partly by courage, and partly by benefits, acquired supremacy over the other deities. We here see an absurd jumble of ancient physiology and history. A noble Jupiter certainly, and worthy to be identified with the supreme Being; whose father Saturn was a man sprung from heaven and earth, whose grandfather was heaven, and grandmother the earth! As to Jupiter being styled by Homer and Hesiod, *father and king of the gods*, this amounts to no reason why we should ascribe a greater dignity to him, and suppose him to be the creator and maker of the other gods. He appears to be called so principally because he freed the superior gods from the maw and bonds of Saturn, and as it were restored to them the life they had lost. For Saturn devoured his children as soon as they were born: Hesiod. Theogon. v. 459. But overcome by the artifice and stratagem of his son Jupiter, he was again obliged to disgorge them all, ibid. v. 495. &c. These deities, drawn forth to light by means of Jupiter from the bowels of their parent, manifested to him their gratitude, and armed him with the power of thunder. Fortified by this power, he exercises sway over gods and men:

Τοῖς πίσυνος, θνητοῖσι καὶ ἀθανάτοισιν ἀνάσσει,

"Relying on these, he rules over gods and men."

Hesiod. ibid. v. 506. p. 86. Jupiter therefore holds the sovereignty in heaven and earth, not by the law of nature, but partly through the favour of the gods whom he had benefited and partly by virtue of his own superior might. [See Callimachus, Hymn. in Jovem. v. 66. 67.] Into the meaning of the fable I do not now inquire: suffice it, that we learn from these things, why Jupiter is called by the poets king and father of the gods. I would not deny, however, that he may have been so designated, because he is supposed to take charge of the affairs of gods and men, as a parent of his children, and, like a king, to administer and govern the whole world by his prudent counsels. That such was Aristotle's opinion respecting this epithet, is affirmed by Erasm. Schmid. Not. ad Pindari Olymp. p. 206. [Compare what Theodoret says of Homer and Hesiod, Therap. 2. p. 65. 69.]

* Nem. Od. 6. [P. 120. Ed. Schmidii.]

[2] I cannot refrain from quoting here the words of Clemens Alexandrinus, which refer to this passage of Pindar and at the same time illustrate what follows, Stromat, lib. 5. p. 710: Πίνδαρος τῇ ὕλῃ παραδίδωσι, "Pindar by the word mother means matter," καὶ ἕνα τὸν τούτων δημιουργὸν, ὃν ἀριστοτέχναν πατέρα λέγει, τὸν καὶ τὰς προκοπὰς κατ' ἀξίαν εἰς θειότητα παρεσχημένον, "and asserts one maker and framer of all these, whom he calls the most wisely contriving father, who promotes every one according to his worth even to divinity."

chaos, but not of that supreme Deity, whom the same Pindar elsewhere calls Θεῶν κράτιστον, "the most powerful of the gods," and τὸν πάντων κύριον, "the lord of all things," and παντὶ αἴτιον, "the cause of every thing," and ἀριστοτέχνην Θεὸν, "that God who is the best artificer," or was "the framer of the whole world," and as Clemens Alexandrinus tells us,[3] τὸ πᾶν, or "the universe." Which God also, according to Pindar, Chiron instructed Achilles to worship principally, above all the other gods:*

Μάλιστα μὲν Κρονίδαν
Βαρυόπαν, στεροπᾶν κεραυνῶν τε πρύτανιν,
Θεῶν σέβεσθαι·

The sense of which words is thus declared by the scholiast: Ἐξαιρέτως τὸν μεγαλόφωνον ἀστραπῶν καὶ κεραυνῶν δεσπότην τὸν Δία, παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους Θεοὺς τιμᾶν καὶ σέβεσθαι, "That he should honour and worship the loud-sounding Jupiter, the lord of thunder and lightning, transcendently above all the other gods." Which by the way confutes the opinion of those who contend, that the supreme God, as such, was not at all worshipped by the Pagans.[4]

However, this is certain concerning these three, Homer, Hesiod, and Pindar, that they must of necessity either have been all absolute Atheists, in acknowledging no eternal Deity at all, but making senseless chaos, night, and the ocean, the original of all their gods without exception, and therefore of Jupiter himself too, that king and father of them; or else assert one only eternal unmade self-existent deity, so as that all the other gods were generated or created by that one. Which latter doubtless was their genuine sense; and the only reason why Aristotle and Plato might possibly sometime have a suspicion of the contrary, seems to have been this, their not understanding that Mosaic cabala, which both Hesiod and Homer followed, of the world's,

[3] Who Stromat. lib. 5. p. 726. says: Πίνδαρός τε ὁ μελοποιὸς οἷον ἐκβακχεύεται, ἄντικρυς εἰπών,

Τί Θεός; ὅ τι τὸ πᾶν,

"Pindar, the lyric poet, seized as it were with Bacchic fury, speaks thus expressly:

'What is God? The universe.'"

But the poem from which Clemens extracted these words is lost.

* Pyth. Od. 6. p. 260.

[4] I can easily suppose Pindar not to have been so obtuse-minded, as to have no conception of a God the parent of all things. But the passages here adduced, if we except the one quoted by Clemens, relate not so much to such a Deity, as to the Jupiter of the Greeks; who, he states expressly elsewhere, was the son of Saturn, and brought up on Mount Ida, Olymp. Od. 5. p. 145. was the father of Æolus, Pyth. Od. 6. p. 159. was transformed into gold, strove with Saturn for the empire of Olympus, and had Ganymede for his cup-bearer, Olymp. Od. 1. p. 62. to omit other things of the kind. How foreign all this is to the nature of the one omnipotent Being, whom we are led by reason to venerate, will be obvious to every one.

that is, both heaven and earth's, being made at first out of a watery chaos; for thus is the tradition declared by St. Peter, epis. ii. ch. 3.[5]

There might be several remarkable passages to the same purpose, produced out of those two tragic poets, Æschylus and Sophocles; which yet, because they have been already cited by Justin Martyr, Clemens Alexandrinus, and others; to avoid unnecessary tediousness, we shall here pass by. Only we think fit to observe concerning that one famous passage of Sophocles,[6]

Εἷς ταῖς ἀληθείαισιν, εἷς ἐστιν Θεὸς,
Ὃς οὐρανόν τ' ἔτευξε καὶ γαῖαν μακρὰν,
Πόντου τε χαροπὸν οἶδμα, κἀνέμων βίαν, &c.

Unus profectò, unus est tantùm Deus,
Cœli solique machinam qui condidit,
Vadumque ponti cœrulum, et vim spiritus, &c.

"There is in truth one only God, who made heaven and earth, the sea, air, and winds," &c. After which followeth also something against image-worship; that though this be such as might well become a Christian, and be nowhere now to be found in those extant tragedies of this poet (many whereof have been lost) yet the sincerity thereof cannot reasonably be at all suspected by us, it having been cited by so many of the ancient fathers in their writings against the Pagans, as particularly Athenagoras, Clemens Alexandrinus, Justin Martyr, Eusebius, Cyril and Theodoret; of which number Clemens tells us,[7] that it was attested likewise by that ancient pagan historiographer Hecatæus. But there are so many places to our purpose in Euripides, that we cannot omit them all; in his Supplices we have this, wherein all men's absolute dependence upon Jupiter, or one supreme Deity, is fully acknowledged.[8]

Ὦ Ζεῦ, τί δῆτα τοὺς ταλαιπώρους βροτοὺς
Φρονεῖν λέγουσι; σοῦ γὰρ ἐξηρτήμεθα,
Δρῶμέν τε τοιαῦτ', ἂν σὺ τυγχάνῃς θέλων.

Miseros quid homines, O deûm rex et pater,
Sapere arbitramur? Pendet è nutu tuo
Res nostra, facimusque illa, quæ visum tibi.

[5] My own sentiments on this subject must be pretty evident from what I have already remarked in various places. The learned Doctor assumes, not proves, that Homer and Hesiod held the same doctrine on the origin of things, as the divine writer Moses.

[6] This fragment of Sophocles is extracted from Stobæus' Eclogues by Grotius in his Excerpt. Veterum Comicor. et Tragicor. p. 148. who is also the author of the Latin version added by Dr. Cudworth.

[7] Stromat. lib. 5. p. 717.

[8] V. 734. 735. 736. p. 41. These words, however, are addressed to the Jupiter worshipped by the Greeks, and do not clearly prove this poet to have professed one supreme Lord of all things, but simply show that he ascribed great wisdom and forethought to Jupiter.

We have also this excellent prayer to the supreme Governor of heaven and earth, cited out of the same tragedian:[9]

Σοὶ τῶν πάντων μεδέοντι χοὴν,
Πέλανόν τε φέρω, Ζεὺς εἴτ' Ἀΐδης
Ὀνομαζόμενος στέργεις·
Σὺ γὰρ ἐν τε θεοῖς τοῖς οὐρανίδαις,
Σκῆπτρον τὸ Διὸς μεταχειρίζων,
Χθονίων δ' Ἀιδῃ μετέχεις ἀρχῆς·
Ἥμψον μὲν φῶς ψυχαῖς ἀνέρων
Ταῖς βουλομέναις ἄθλους προμαθεῖν,
Πόθεν ἕβλαστον, τίς ῥίζα κακῶν,
Τίνι δεῖ μακάρων εὖ θυσαμένους
Εὑρεῖν μόχθων ἀνάπαυλαν.

Tibi (cunctorum domino) vinum,
Salsamque molam fero, seu Ditis
Tu sive Jovis nomine gaudes:
Tu namque deos superos inter
Sceptrum tractas sublime Jovis;
Idem regnum terrestre tenes.
Te lucem animis infunde virûm,
Qui scire volunt, quo sata mentis
Lucta sit ortu, quæ causa mali;
Cui cœlicolûm rite litando
Requiem sit habere laborum.

Where we may observe that Ζεὺς and Ἀιδης, "Jupiter and Pluto," are both of them supposed to be names equally belonging to one and the same supreme God. And the sum of the prayer is this, "That God would infuse light into the souls of men, whereby they might be enabled to know what is the root from whence all their evils spring, and by what means they may avoid them."

Lastly, there is another devotional passage, cited out of Euripides,[10] which contains also a clear acknowledgment of one self-existent Being, that comprehends and governs the whole world:

[9] These verses are extant in Clemens Alexand. Stromat. lib. 5. p. 688. but not in continued order, as in this place. They are digested and arranged, as here given, by Grotius in his Fragments of uncertain Tragedies of Euripides, Excerpt. Vet. Comicor. et Tragicor. p. 431. Nevertheless, two verses occurring between the third and fifth have been omitted by the learned Doctor.

[10] This passage from Euripides' Tragedy of Pirithous is likewise preserved by Clemens Alexandr. Stromat. lib. 5. p. 717. The arrangement of the verses is by the same Grotius, who has translated them as follows:

Te voco, te non aliunde satum,
Qui naturam turbine versas
Totam ætherio, quem lux circum
Noxque astricolor, semper et ingens
Circumsultat chorus astrorum,

"Thee, the self-sprung, I invoke, who enfoldest the whole nature of things, whirling in ethereal gyration, around whom day and variegated night, and the countless throng of stars perpetually dance." Which version, although rejected by Dr. Cudworth, seems to me to be more in accordance with the Greek, than the one he has given. Should any, however, prefer the latter, I have no objection to offer.

Σὲ τὸν Αὐτοφυῆ, τὸν ἐν αἰθερίῳ
Ῥόμβῳ, πάντων φύσιν ἐμπλέξανθ',
Ὃν περὶ μὲν φῶς, περὶ δ' ὀρφναία
Νὺξ αἰολόχρως· ἄκριτος τ' ἄστρων
Ὄχλος ἐνδελεχῶς· ἀμφιχορεύει.

"Thou self-sprung being, that dost all enfold,
And in thine arms heaven's whirling fabric hold!
Who art encircled with resplendent light,
And yet liest mantled o'er in shady night!
About whom, the exultant starry fires
Dance nimbly round in everlasting gyres.

For this sense of the third and fourth verses, which we think the words will bear, and which agrees with that Orphic passage,

Περὶ γὰρ νέφος ἐστήρικται,

"That God being in himself a most bright and dazzling light, is respectively to us," and, by reason of the weakness of our understanding, "covered over with a thick cloud;" as also with that in the Scripture, "clouds and darkness are round about him:" I say, this sense we choose rather to follow, as more rich and august than that other vulgar one, though grammatically and poetically good also: "That successive day and night, together with a numberless multitude of stars, perpetually dance round about the Deity."

Aristophanes, in the very beginning of his Plutus, distinguishethbetwixt Ζεὺς and Θεοὶ, "Jupiter and the gods:"

Ὡς ἀργαλέον πρᾶγμ' ἐστιν, ὦ Ζεῦ καὶ Θεοί, &c.

And we have this clear testimony of Terpander, cited by Clemens Alexandrinus,[1] Ζεῦ πάντων ἀρχὰ, Ζεῦ πάντων ἀγήτωρ, "Thou Jupiter, who art the original of all things, thou Jupiter, who art the governor of all." And these following verses are attributed to Menander:[2]

Τὸν ὄντα πάντων κύριον γενικώτατον
Καὶ πατέρα, τοῦτον διατέλει τιμᾶν μόνον,
Ἀγαθῶν τοιούτων εὑρέτην καὶ κτίστορα.

Rerum universarum imperatorem et patrem,
Solum perpetuo colere suppliciter decet,
Artificem tantæ et largitorem copiæ.

Where men are exhorted to worship the supreme God only, as the sole author of all good, or at least transcendently above all the other gods. There are also two remarkable testimonies, one

[1] Stromat. lib. 6. p. 784.

[2] Extant in Eusebius, Justin Martyr, and Clemens Alexandr.; the last of whom, however, attributes them to Diphilus the comedian. See Le Clerc's Relig. Menandri et Philemonis. The version is Grotius', Excerpt. Comicor. p. 716.

of Hermesianax an ancient Greek poet, and another of Aratus, to the same purpose; which shall both be reserved for other places.[3]

Wherefore we pass from the Greek to the Latin poets, where Ennius first appears, deriving the gods in general (who were all the inferior deities) from Erebus and Night, as supposing them all to have been made or generated out of Chaos, nevertheless acknowledging one, who was

. . . . Divûmque hominumque pater, rex,

" both father and king of gods and men," that is, the maker or creator of the whole world, who therefore made those gods together with the world out of chaos, himself being unmade.[4]

Plautus in like manner sometimes distinguisheth betwixt Jupiter and the gods, and plainly acknowledgeth one omniscient Deity,*

Est profecto Deus, qui, quæ nos gerimus, auditque et videt.

[3] These passages of Aristophanes, Terpander and Menander place it indeed beyond controversy, that these poets supposed one of the gods to preside and rule over the others; but whether they meant thereby such a god, as right reason suggests to us, or never ascended in their conceptions beyond the Jupiter of the Greeks, remains in obscurity. The same remark may be applied to some of the poetic passages which follow.

[4] I have already shown, in what sense Jupiter is styled the father and king of the gods. That Ennius derived all the gods from night and Erebus, is testified by this verse of his, which is quoted by Jan. Parrhasius, De Rebus per Epistol. Quæsitis:

Quos omnes Erebo perhibent et nocte creatos.

" Who are all said to be sprung from Erebus and night."

But Paul. Merula, in his notes on the Fragments of Ennius, p. 160. confesses his ignorance, as to the source from which this verse was obtained. Probably the learned Fr. Hessel, whose Fragments of Ennius are not at present by me, has pointed out the author by whose diligence it has been preserved. In the matter itself there is nothing incredible, as Ennius is well known to have expressed in verse the Greek fables respecting the origin and generation of the gods, and Cicero affirms, De Natur. Deor. cap. 17. p. 3075. t. 9. opp. that many gods were derived by the poets from Erebus and night. And yet, if Ennius followed in the footsteps of Hesiod and other Greek authors, he could not understand this of all the minor gods, but only of certain deities, of which we have now no opportunity to speak. The fragment here quoted:

Divûmque hominumque pater, rex,

occurs in Varro, De Lingua Latina, lib. 4. as is noted by Paul. Merula, Fragm. Ennii. p. 230. But I cannot be induced to form any exalted notion of Ennius' religion from this verse. The words unquestionably relate to Jupiter, to whom Ennius ascribed no better origin than to the other gods, supposing him to be sprung from Saturn. For thus:

Saturno sancte create,
Qui cœlum vorsas stellcis fulgentibus aptum.

Servius ad Æneid. Virgil. lib. 10. See Merula, p. 231.

* Cap. Act. 2. sc. 2.

Which passage very much resembles that of Manlius Torqutus in Livy, Est cœleste numen, es magne Jupiter; a strong asseveration of one supreme and universal Deity. And the same Plautus, in his Rudens, clearly asserts one supreme monarch and emperor over all, whom the inferior gods are subservient to:

Qui gentes omnes mariaque et terras movet,
Ejus sum civis civitate cœlitum;
Qui est imperator divûm atque hominum Jupiter,
Is nos per gentes alium aliâ disparat,
Hominum qui facta, mores, pietatem et fidem
Noscamus.——
Qui falsas lites falsis testimoniis
Petunt, quique in jure abjurant pecuniam,
Eorum referimus nomina exscripta ad Jovem.
Cotidie *Ille* scit, quis hic quærat malum.
Iterum *Ille* eam rem judicatam judicat.
Bonos in aliis tabulis exscriptos habet.
Atque hoc scelesti illi in animum inducunt suum
Jovem se placare posse donis, hostiis;
Sed operam et sumptum perdunt, quia
Nihil Ei acceptum est à perjuris supplicii.

Where Jupiter, the supreme monarch of gods and men, "is said to appoint other inferior gods under him, over all the parts of the earth, to observe the actions, manners, and behaviours of men every where; and to return the names both of bad and good to him. Which Jupiter judges over again all unjust judgments, rendering a righteous retribution to all. And though wicked men conceit that he may be bribed with sacrifices, yet no worship is acceptable to him from the perjurious." Notwithstanding which this poet afterwards jumbles the supreme and inferior gods all together, after the usual manner, under that one general name of gods, because they are all supposed to be co-governors of the world:

Facilius, siqui pius est, à Diis supplicans,
Quam qui scelestus est, inveniet veniam sibi.

Again the same poet elsewhere brings in Hanno, the Carthaginian, with this form of prayer addressing himself to Jupiter or the supreme God:*

Jupiter, qui genus colis alisque hominum, per quem vivimus
Vitale ævum; quem penes spes vitæque sunt hominum omnium,
Da diem hunc sospitem, quæso, rebus meis agundis.

In the next place, we have these verses of Valerius Soranus, an ancient and eminent poet, full to the purpose, recorded by Varro:[5]

* Pen. Act. 5. sec. 4.
[5] De Lingua Latina, p. 71. ed. 1581. 8.

Jupiter omnipotens, regum rex ipse deûmque,
Progenitor genitrixque deûm, Deus UNUS et OMNIS.

To this sense: "Omnipotent Jupiter, the king of kings and gods, and the progenitor and genitrix, the both father and mother of those gods; one God and all gods." Where the supreme and omnipotent Deity is styled "progenitor et genitrix deorum," after the same manner as he was called in the Orphic theology, μητροπάτωρ and ἀρρενόθηλυς, that expression denoting the gods and all other things to have been produced from him alone, and without any pre-existent matter. Moreover, according to the tenor of this Ethnic theology, that one God was all gods and every god, the Pagans supposed, that whenever any inferior deity was worshipped by them, the supreme was therein also at once worshipped and honoured.

Though the sense of Ovid hath been sufficiently declared before, yet we cannot well omit some other passages of his, as that grateful and sensible acknowledgement:

Quod loquor et spiro, cœlumque et lumina solis
Aspicio (possumne ingratus et immemor esse?)
Ipse dedit.[6]

And this in the third of his Metamorph.:

Ille pater rectorque deûm, cui dextra trisulcis
Ignibus armata est, qui nutu concutit orbem.

Virgil's theology also may sufficiently appear from his frequent acknowledgment of an omnipotent Deity, and from those verses of his before cited out of Æn. 6. wherein he plainly asserts one God to be the original of all things, at least as a soul of the world; Servius Honoratus there paraphrasing thus: Deus est quidam divinus spiritus, qui per quatuor fusus elementa gignit universa, "God is a certain spirit, which, infused through the four elements, begetteth all things." Nevertheless, we shall add from him this also of Venus' prayer to Jupiter, Æn. 1.

O qui res hominumque deûmque
Æternis regis imperiis, et fulmine terres!

Which Venus again, Æn. 10. bespeaks the same Jupiter after this manner:

[6] These verses occur Metamorph. lib. 14. v. 172. &c. but the learned Doctor is much deceived in supposing them to pertain to the supreme Being. They are in praise of Æneas, to whom Achæmenides professes himself to owe life and everything. This is proved by those which precede:

Iterum Polyphemon et illos
Adspiciam fluidos humano sanguine rictus,
* * * * *
Si minus Æneam veneror genitore, nec unquam
Esse satis potero, præstem licet omnia, gratus,
Quod loquor et spiro, &c.

O pater, O hominum divûmque æterna potestas!

Where we have this annotation of Servius, divûmque æterna potestas, propter aliorum numinum discretionem, "Jupiter is here called the eternal power of the gods, to distinguish him from all the other gods, that were not eternal, but made or generated from him.

Neither ought Horace to be left out, in whom we read to the same purpose, Lib. 1. Od. 12.

Quid prius dicam solitis parentis
Laudibus? qui res hominum et deorum,
Qui mare et terras, variisque mundum
Temperat horis.

Unde nil majus generatur ipso,
Nec viget quicquam simile aut secundum:
Proximos illi tamen occupavit
Pallas honores.

And again, Lib. 3. Od. 4.

Qui terram inertem, qui mare temperat
Ventosum, et urbes, regnaque tristia;
Divosque, mortalesque turmas,
Imperio regit UNUS æquo.

Where from those words of Horace, solitis parentis laubibus, it appears that the one supreme Deity, the parent and maker of all things, was then wont to be celebrated by the Pagans as such, above all the other gods. And whereas those Pagans vulgarly ascribed the government of the seas particularly to Neptune, of the earth and Hades or Inferi (which are here called tristia Regna) to Pluto, these being here attributed by Horace to one and the same supreme and universal Deity; it may well be concluded from thence, that Jupiter, Neptune, and Pluto, were but three several names or notions of one supreme Numen, whose sovereignty notwithstanding was chiefly signified by Jupiter.[7]

[7] This by no means follows. For the ancient poets, though ascribing the government of the seas to Neptune, and of Hades to Pluto, do not deny, nevertheless, that Jupiter holds supreme sway over these portions also of the world and gives laws to those gods who preside over them. [See what Ovid says most expressly, Fast. lib. 4. v. 599.] Nor does Horace, in saying that Jupiter governs the "dreary realms," deprive Pluto of his empire over them. Horace explains himself, when he subjoins: Divosque mortalesque regit, "and rules gods and mortals." Nor is there any more weight in what the learned Doctor immediately adds respecting Pallas. For my own part, I look for no such sublime wisdom in the Latin poets, especially Horace, who, embodied in their verse the vulgar notions of religion and the gods, and had no other object than that, populo placerent, quas fecissent, fabulæ, "the fables they had composed might please the people." That Horace was not ignorant of the chief doctrines of Plato and Pythagoras, I can readily believe. But, setting aside that there is little or no foundation for the supposition of a Pythagoric and Platonic trinity, whoever reads Horace will be convinced that this poet, when singing of Pallas, was neither thinking of eternal wisdom nor a divine trinity, but extolling with his praises the goddess whom the people worshipped under this name. Least of all can I suppose, that he derived what

Which same is to be said of Pallas or Minerva too, that signifying the eternal wisdom, that it was but another name of God also, though looked upon as inferior to that of Jupiter, and next in dignity to it; unless we should conclude it to be a second divine hypostasis, according to the doctrine of the Pythagoreans and Platonists (probably not unknown to Horace) as also to that Scripture cabala, "I was set up from everlasting, or ever the earth was; when there were no depths, I was brought forth," &c. But of this more afterward.

Lastly, we shall conclude with Manilius, who lived in the same Augustean age, and was a zealous opposer of that atheistical hypothesis of Epicurus and Lucretius, as appears from these verses of his:

> Quis credat, tantas operum sine numine moles
> Ex minimis cæcoque creatum fœdere mundum ?[8]

Wherefore he also plainly asserts one supreme Deity, the framer and governor of the whole world, in this manner, lib. 2:

> Namque canam tacitâ naturam mente potentem,
> Infusumque Deum cœlo, terrisque, fretoque,
> Ingentem æquali moderantem fœdere molem,
> Totumque alterno consensu vivere mundum,
> Et rationis agi motu; quum SPIRITUS UNUS
> Per cunctas habitet partes, atque irriget orbem,
> Omnia pervolitans, corpusque animale figuret, &c.

And again:

> Hoc opus immensi constructum corpore mundi
> Vis animæ divina regit, sacroque meatu
> Conspirat Deus, et tacita ratione gubernat.

And lib. 4:

> Faciem cœli non invidet orbi
> Ipse Deus, vultusque suos, corpusque recludit,
> Semper volvendo, seque ipsum inculcat et offert;
> Ut bene cognosci possit, monstretque videndo,
> Qualis eat, doceatque suas attendere leges.

he says of Minerva from sacred writ; to which I should imagine, the bard of Venusia, slothful and voluptuous as he was, paid but little attention. So much does the force of opinions, once rashly espoused, influence the minds even of the most learned men, that they seem to themselves to see everywhere what no one, unless infected with the same malady, can discover.

[8] Astronomic. lib. 1. v. 492. 493. p. 16. The second passage occurs lib. 2. v. 61. p. 31. the third lib. 4. v. 915. p. 108. More of the same kind might easily be produced from Manilius, if necessary. But this poet is not the one from whom we are to learn correct notions of the Deity. For he holds the whole world to be god, and all things in it to be parts of god. Hear what he says, lib. 1. v. 483. p. 15.

> Ac mihi tam præsens ratio non ulla videtur,
> Qua pateat, mundum divino Numine verti,
> *Atque ipsum esse Deum*, nec forte coisse magistra.

He was a Stoic, as Dr. Cudworth rightly observes, and belonged to those Stoics who are justly accused of Spinozism.

Ipse vocat nostros animos ad sidera mundus;
Nec patitur, quia non condit, sua jura latere.

Where notwithstanding, we confess, that the whole animated world, or rather the soul thereof, is, according to the Stoical doctrine, made by Manilius to be the supreme Numen.[9]

[9] The whole of these passages of Greek and Latin poets concerning one god, thus elaborately brought together by Dr. Cudworth, are rejected by the most learned J. Le Clere, Bibl. Choisie, tom. 3. p. 67. and pronounced to be of no force or efficacy. The following is the substance of what he says: "The gods introduced by the poets appear to me to be no other than the descendants of Saturn and some others like them; of whom Jupiter was the king, as he was the parent of many other gods. Therefore, if any traces be found in these poets of the ancient doctrine, which asserts one supreme God, more ancient than all the others sprung from chaos, we must suppose these words to have fallen from them unconsciously and inadvertently, as they are manifestly opposed to the rest of their opinions." This judgment of the erudite man I own to a certain extent to be correct and true; as is shown by what we have hitherto remarked upon these testimonies of the poets. But I can by no means assent to the whole of it. For in my opinion the whole of the Greek and Latin poets were not so stupid and destitute of reason, as to refer the administration and government of the world solely to the son and posterity of Saturn, and to have no conception of a supreme and eternal cause of all things. The passages which may be quoted even from Manilius and Virgil concerning a Deity pervading the whole nature of things, show that there were some belonging to this class, who attached little value or importance to the fables of the vulgar, although they interspersed them in their poems.

END OF VOLUME I.

J. Haddon, Printer, Castle Street, Finsbury.

00059915

Digitized with financial assistance from the
Government of Maharashtra
on 17 February, 2016